


Southern Africa REPORT

Vol. 4 No. 5

May 1989



Solidarity: What Now?

CHALLENGES FOR
SOLIDARITY

SA'S Struggle in a
New Phase

Anti-Apartheid Activism:
A Cross-Canada Survey

Quebec & Southern Africa:
Still Crazy After All These
Years


NKOMATI REVISITED?
by Joseph Hanlon

price: \$3.00

Southern Africa REPORT

Vol. 4 No. 5

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Southern Africa REPORT

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Contents

Editorial	
Hard Choices: Support Work & the State of Siege	1
South Africa's Struggle in a New Phase:	
Challenges for Solidarity	3
Anti-Apartheid Activism:	
A Cross-Canada Survey	8
Quebec & Southern Africa:	
Still Crazy After All These Years	11
Workers' Unity: NACTU Out of Step	14
Nkomati Revisited?	17
Sneaking Around Sanctions	22
Divestment Breakthrough in Ontario	24
Singing External's Song:	
Journalism Conference Controversy	26
Rural Ontario: Apartheid's Long Reach	28
Reviews:	
Mozambique: A Dream Undone?	29
Coming of Age in Zimbabwe	30
Different Worlds	32

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Hartman

Hard Choices: Support Work & the State of Siege

Hard times in southern Africa. This is a reality stressed repeatedly in recent issues of *Southern Africa REPORT*. The movement in South Africa has been stalemated, however temporarily, by the State of Emergency. The Frontline States seem increasingly drained of their progressive promise by destabilization and the crushing embrace of such arms of western capital as the IMF. And according to current press reports, the transition to independence in Namibia is proving more fraught than even the most pessimistic predicted. The ostensible victory there threatens to be qualified in ways that are depressingly familiar. How are these developments to be assessed by the anti-apartheid network? What implications do they have for our work?

These are big questions, ques-

tions that no single issue of *SAR* can be expected to address comprehensively or adequately. Nor are such questions free of potential for controversy and difference of opinion. In recent issues we have seen such controversy erupt over the anti-apartheid movement's assessment of Mozambique and Angola. Solidarity with these countries is clearly in order, not least because the chief architect of the difficulties and contradictions these states now experience has been South Africa and its grisly policy of regional destabilization. Yet there is ground for unease in the fact that a country like Mozambique is being penetrated by "IMF-logic" and by suspect agencies like those Joe Hanlon identifies in his article here.

Or take an example from a recent European solidarity confer-

ence. A well-known anti-apartheid activist was urging pressure on the United States to allow Angola into that same IMF - itself the architect, through its destructive structural adjustment programmes, of so much misery in other African countries. Here we can see just how far the promise of progress in southern Africa has moved from the heady days of the 1970s. Perhaps it is the case that Angola's sheer survival is dependent on such an ever-widening "opening to the West." But it is not an outcome that solidarity activists who have even an ounce of anti-imperialist consciousness can embrace in any way but grudgingly.

Such activists can take some comfort, of course, from the awareness that the overthrow of the

apartheid state in South Africa will, in all probability, open up a whole new range of more positive long-run possibilities in the southern African region. But this is of little immediate solace. For the success of South Africa's repressive policies under the Emergency regulations has certainly postponed the day of reckoning with Pretoria. This is the theme explored at some length in our lead article in this issue of *SAR*. The article raises questions about the new, more sobering realities that confront the democratic movement in South Africa and also begins to hint at some of the challenges these pose for our own anti-apartheid work.

Of course, there are ways forward, both for the South African democratic movement and for the anti-apartheid movement in the west. We need scarcely despair. Reflect just how far and how quickly, measured in historical time, southern Africa has come since the dark and quiescent days of the 1960s and the first South African Emergency. We need not lose perspective, least of all in this year of the two hundredth anniversary of the French Revolution. Recall the story (perhaps apocryphal, although one hopes not) about Mao Zedong and the events of 1789. How did he evaluate the outcome of the French Revolution, he was asked. "It's too soon to tell," he replied. True as well for southern Africa.

Identifying the ways forward and acting upon them will tax our ingenuity. This is especially true for the anti-apartheid movement in western countries. The demobilization of the movement in South Africa has helped undermine some of that groundswell of political enthusiasm that, in Canada and elsewhere, accompanied South Africa's own insurrectionary wave of 1984-86. And it has also taken some of the pressure for action off our own governments, not least the Mulroney government, whose enthusiasm for sanctions has all too quickly melted away with an apparent decline in the urgency of the situation.

How then, in this more sober and complex moment in southern Africa, in the light of government back-peddalling, might activists in Canada breathe fresh life into solidarity work? How to increase pressure on the Canadian government and build the level of anti-apartheid consciousness and action in all constituencies?

The survey conducted by *SAR* of anti-apartheid activists across the country indicated that we are all preoccupied by these questions. But our responses seem less decisive, more diffuse than a few years ago. Sure, there appears to be energy, there are creative ideas, there is ongoing work. But some of us felt that we have not really come to terms with the new realities in southern Africa, that we are not doing enough serious rethinking and evaluation of our strategies and priorities to respond to the more intricate issues now being posed.

Certainly there are broad ongoing campaigns and goals that warrant our continued support. The most obvious of these is the call for the lifting of the State of Emergency and the release of political prisoners. Only when these conditions are met will the democratic movement in South Africa be able fully to concentrate its energies on building its oppositional organization. Other, more strategic and immediate issues are less clear cut. Take, for example, a current debate being faced here in Canada - the question of the appropriateness of the Canadian government's continuing diplomatic link with South Africa. The move to break off all diplomatic relations with the apartheid state would, without doubt, be symbolically important and useful in delegitimizing and/or removing South Africa's own ambassadorial profile in Canada. But might it not also jeopardize some of the assistance that the Canadian government, via its embassy in Pretoria, is providing to important organizations within the

democratic movement inside South Africa? We need further information on just what that assistance entails, of course. But, in order to make a judgement of the pros and cons on this and other forms of Canadian linkage (whether official or non-official!), we also need a more nuanced sense of the make-up and trajectory of the South African movement in its own terms.

Informants in the survey stressed this need for more and better information about the more subtle developments and debates in southern Africa that our own mainstream media tend to blur or ignore. There is the challenge too of how best to communicate the greater complexities of the situation to a wider Canadian public. Only by being better informed can we organize our work to support, most effectively, the exigencies of the democratic movement in South Africa and the struggles of Frontline states. Only in this way will we equip ourselves to tackle the thornier questions of solidarity. Should we, for example, be persisting in a blanket call for total mandatory sanctions against South Africa, or deciding how to refine and prioritize sanctions to maximize their efficacy in undermining the apartheid state? This is a debate we have taken up in previous issues of *SAR*. The more flexible but intricate boycott position of the South African movement in relation to sports, academia and culture, challenges us to keep abreast of developments in all these fields and maintain effective channels of communication with the relevant democratic organizations.

Articles in this issue seek to capture something of the reality in South Africa and the capacities and conundrums of the solidarity movement. What cannot emerge in this forum are any definitive directions. We offer the pages of future issues of *SAR* for serious collective thinking and debate about the hard choices the anti-apartheid movement must now make.



Afrapix

South Africa's Struggle in a New Phase: Challenges for Solidarity

This article draws on material from an article by John S. Saul which will appear shortly in Socialist Register.

Things have changed in South Africa since the "insurrectionary moment" of 1984-86. This is scarcely profane knowledge in post-insurrectionary South Africa, in the South Africa of the perpetual Emergency. It is also well known in the anti-apartheid movement outside South Africa. But how serious are these changes? Do they mean anything for the anti-apartheid movement?

Set back in South Africa

South Africa's first Emergency, in the 1960s, did succeed in crushing the democratic movement there for a decade, both physically and psychologically. Slowly but surely the movement rebuilt itself. The emergent Black Consciousness movement found focus in the student rebellion that shook Soweto in 1976; the working class assertions that broke out dramatically in Durban in the early

seventies spread in subsequent years to the building of a new and vibrant independent trade union movement (a pattern of development which culminated, in turn, in the 1985 creation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)). Moreover, the activities of students and youth were merely the forerunner of a wide range of community-based initiatives and organizations that surfaced in the 1980s and that came together politically, at the national level, in the United Democratic Front. Simultaneously, the Black Consciousness movement *per se* retreated to the political margin in South Africa, yielding centre-stage within the democratic movement to a revived and resurgent African National Congress. It was this combination of revolutionary ingredients - COSATU, the UDF, the ANC - that underwrote the dramatic insurrection that occurred in South Africa between 1984 and 1986.

Those were heydays for the anti-apartheid movement in western countries. As resistance inside South Africa seemed to move from strength to strength, so too did anti-apartheid work, finding allies (such as Brian Mulroney) in the most unexpected quarters. The debate, at that time, was as much about what a post-apartheid society would look like as it was about how to reach that post-apartheid moment itself. A far cry from the days, well-remembered by the older generation of activists, when the most the anti-apartheid movement could aspire to was mere hand-wringing about an apparently frozen South African situation.

Yet heady as was the atmosphere of insurrection, equally sobering was its aftermath. The new nation-wide Emergency, imposed in South Africa from 1986 on, has worked, inflicting a severe setback upon the democratic movement. Anti-apartheid

activists work now in a trough of the South African struggle, bereft of some allies who have abandoned the issue for other, "more pressing" fronts while we too are faced with new and more difficult challenges. One of these challenges lies in our developing an informed understanding of the new range of activities – more modest than "insurrection" but absolutely crucial – in which the democratic movement is now called upon to engage as it seeks to rebuild and to regain the initiative in South Africa. A second challenge lies in our communicating such an informed understanding to a wider public and a wider potential constituency – this in the context of the media's relapse into a fog of relative indifference towards southern African concerns. In fairness, it is also a context that finds Pretoria, through its intensified censorship regulations, making it as difficult as possible for that media to wrest stories from South Africa – unless, like the Winnie Mandela story, they serve the regime's interest!

For much of the news from South Africa tends to be "small"; smaller, certainly, than the "Big Story" of 1984-86. Small, in terms of the day-to-day, now all too familiar, slog of repression. Yet, in the words of South Africa's *Weekly Mail*, as it recently reviewed the events of 1988, "dealing with opponents on the left (is) one of the few areas where the government showed no hesitation and a clear-cut imaginative policy. They produced a constant supply of new methods of repression, the best example of which was the Emergency restriction order ... individuals, organizations, even funerals, were subjected to the most extraordinary list of incomprehensible restrictions, dished out so fast that nobody could keep track ... The government started the process by restricting 17 organizations in February, including the United Democratic Front and Azapo, with a partial restriction on COSATU. This dealt with the major and best known

organizations. Gradually, as new bodies began to reveal themselves or old bodies took up the cudgels, they were dealt similar blows ... It was a new form of prison without bars."

Of course, there have been plenty of bars as well, and other equally merciless tactics. Thus "some of the major resistance leaders of the 1980s, the people who pioneered the UDF-style of non-violent opposition, were dubbed violent terrorists and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment in the 'Delmas' treason trial." Or take those churches that tried to step into the partial vacuum left by the February restrictions. "Government response: the clergy were water-cannoned by police in Cape Town, the headquarters of the South African Council of Churches and the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference were mysteriously bombed and the Reverend Frank Chikane's mother received a hand grenade in the post."

When 143 (white) conscripts announced that they would not honour their call-up for military service it looked, momentarily, as if the state might discuss seriously the possibility of alternative service with the End Conscription Campaign (ECC). Colder heads prevailed, however, and the ECC merely joined the list of restricted organizations. Assassination continued to be a favourite tactic of the powers that be, both at home (where the list of victims grew) and abroad, where a pattern of physical removal of ANC activists (about 50 since 1981) peaked with the murder of the ANC's Paris representative, Dulcie September, in March. When, as the year progressed, more and more student and youth organizations became a particular target for state attack, the implications were sobering. If the apartheid state was not even marginally interested in finding real intermediaries for dialogue about a different kind of future, what alternatives were open? As youth representatives put the point: "Underground is not a healthy ter-

rain for struggle for an organization that wants to reach the masses, make statements and operate above-board. But conditions of near-illegality have been forced on us."

Morbid symptoms

How depressing it is that the perpetration of such enormities should merely have won South Africa an easing of international (including Canadian) pressure – and an easing, too, of bad press! – rather than the reverse. And how crucial to the rekindling of western interest in and response to things South African that a revived popular movement begin once again to place revolution on the agenda there. Even as the movement struggles to do so, however, we must also face the fact that foiled revolution in South Africa does, for the moment, produce its own pathologies; balked of fulfilment, if only temporarily, some of the creative energy shown by the democratic movement can turn sour. In the words of Italian theorist Antonio Gramsci, "the crisis consists primarily in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appears." The pathology apparently attendant upon Winnie Mandela's recent role in Soweto is merely one example of such a morbid symptom. So, too, are those former militants amongst the township youth who have turned vigilante or informer, as the police rally to rebuild their own brand of township network. So, too, are those who permit themselves to be mobilized by ruthless warlords, along patron-client lines, against progressive trends in Natal or Crossroads.

Such is the nature of the "crisis" in South Africa that more such "morbid symptoms" may appear, and we will have to learn to explain them better – not, of course, in such a way as to excuse them but in order to preempt their being used as part of any campaign by South Africa and its friends to further "blame the victim." Yet, the

more serious challenge to us lies elsewhere. The democratic movement is rebuilding and this is, in fact, the "big story," but one presently being played out in modest ways. It is these "modest ways," the "small stories," that we must keep in focus, must learn better to communicate, must build our support activities around. For there does remain some space for above-ground resistance and manoeuvre and the democratic movement continues its attempt to occupy and expand that space.

The movement regroupes

Amidst the recent bannings of student and youth movements, for example, suddenly a story about actions by the Western Cape Students' Congress surfaces. "The burning barricades, the demonstrations violently broken up by the police recalled the turmoil of 1985. But a new discipline and maturity underlay student action. Instead of ad hoc reactions, protests formed part of a coordinated programme marked by a thorough canvassing of student opinion for properly mandated change." Moreover, the action's "major significance . . . lay beyond the numbers involved: it resulted in police reversing a decision to enter schools and ensure teaching took place" (*Weekly Mail*). Other examples could be cited. The rent boycott has continued in Soweto, sufficiently successfully that state and local council authorities now show signs of coming, cap in hand, to the organizers of the boycott to sue for some kind of peace. In recent weeks, the hunger strikes by detainees have drawn sufficient attention to their plight that the state seems ready to make concessions to these detainees. And the trade union movement rallied in March (see the article on this subject elsewhere in this issue) to plan more united and more effective resistance to the draconian new Labour Relations Act that has come to qualify many of the gains made by unions in recent years.

For the democratic movement,



Students staged open protests prior to Emergency, Cape Town 1985

these struggles increasingly represent a way of profiting from the lessons of failed insurrection and of moving forward. For it was only in the final days of that insurrection that the urgency of further consolidating the movement's capacities at the base – in stronger community organizations, in street committees, in people's courts – began fully to be understood. The various fronts upon which the movement now seeks to ground its activities represent a further evolution of this approach. As stated, it is important that we draw the attention of a wider audience to the strategic rethinking and organizational development taking place. And important too, that we ourselves learn how to make sense of and support the current initiatives.

How, in broader terms, might we interpret the democratic movement's attempts to consolidate local organization at the base and take on the state more strategically? There are those who see the moves as representing a relapse into "reformism"; others see a wise and judicious adjustment in that direction. Thus Steven Friedman of the South African Institute of Race Re-

lations, who has written widely on these matters (not least in his regular column in the *Weekly Mail*), maintains that, given the strength of the state, a policy of bargaining and negotiation with the state is the only viable politics possible for the movement. His principal point of reference for this is the trade unions' entry into the industrial relations system – the better to find space for further manoeuvre and demand. Could not township organization also group around concrete local demands, analogous to the wage demand, in order to make gains, build strength and gradually transform the South African situation?

It can be argued that, in Friedman's hands, such an approach does collapse into a too jejune and unrealistic "reformism" (unrealistic in terms of the state's bottom-line of unswerving opposition to any genuine democratic change). Yet the possible cumulative impact of local and organized resistances can be conceived in more positive and realistic – in effect, *more revolutionary* – terms. Perhaps a revival of André Gorz's concept of "structural reform" (which he dis-

tinguishes, precisely, from mere "reformism") would be useful here, in large part because it does lead to a far more revolutionary understanding of the kind of activities being identified here than does Friedman's studied "pragmatism."

For Gorz suggests that in periods when revolution is not immediately on the agenda organization for reform can be a revolutionary act - provided (1) that the gains demanded and won are self-consciously understood by the political movement in question as implicating, systemically, a series of further demands and provided (2) that the mobilization of people around such demands leads to the crystallization of organizational forms that mark a process of cumulative empowerment and developing revolutionary potential. In a situation like that of South Africa this approach could mean visible advance on specific fronts (thereby giving people a necessarily concrete sense of the on-going struggle in the short-run) while also building the popularly based organizational infrastructure crucial to another, more successful round of insurrection sometime in the future.

Was it some such thinking, for example, that surfaced last year when some UDF activists even briefly floated, for discussion, the idea of participating in the local, blacks-only elections, and thereby seizing hold of state-structured township councils as one possible way of giving fresh focus to resistance to the state? The idea was quickly rejected, since the councils are, in fact, so tightly controlled by the apartheid administrative apparatus that they grant the democratic forces little room for manoeuvre. In fact, only the most obvious of collaborators concluded otherwise, while Bishop Tutu and others, at some risk to themselves, called for a renewed boycott of such structures in the October elections. Continued boycott of the councils made sense, but some further discussion of the merits of



Funerals, an integral part of political expression before the emergency, are now restricted. Cape Town 1986

the boycott made sense too. Moreover, the latter discussion provided a good example of the readiness of South African democrats to scrutinize past practice in their effort to devise new and more relevant tactics.

We must be prepared, in short, to publicize and to contextualize, in revolutionary terms, the more subtle activities now demanded of the South African movement on the new terrain that confronts it. This is difficult work, given the short attention span (and rather low level of understanding of the dynamics of revolutionary activity!) of most Canadians and the relentless search for the maximally dramatic on the part of our media. It also challenges us to relate ever more creatively to an ever more complex proto-revolutionary movement inside South Africa.

Recent issues of *SAR* have demonstrated some of these complexities. A democratic movement on the ground in South Africa demands that its own voice be heard in defining the precise modalities of implementing such international tactics as the academic boycott, the cultural boycott, the sports boycott and even the details of the programme of economic sanctions. In

this way, fresh challenges are posed for us regarding what voices to heed and what kind of links to make to the broad and protean movement there.

Armed struggle?

Of course, forging such links via the mediation of the ANC must remain an important part of our project, principally because of the renewed centrality (noted earlier) of the ANC to the broad democratic alliance inside South Africa. But this cannot be taken as a short-cut for resolving all questions in this regard, if only because the ANC is not itself in one-way or entirely predictable interplay with the diversity of forces that are at work, politically and progressively, in South Africa. However, on one aspect of its relationship to the ANC the anti-apartheid movement can permit itself no ambiguity. If it is significant for us that fresh attempts continue to be made to regroup the democratic struggle aboveground in South Africa, the difficulties of so doing underscore the importance of also having an *underground*. And any such underground must also be conceived as being, in part, a *military* underground.

There can be little doubt that

the ANC must be the agent of such effective armed action as the broad political struggle for freedom is likely to manifest in South Africa. True, the ANC did prove incapable of delivering on its promise to defend militarily the popular movement from state repression during the insurrectionary period. And there are some signs that debates about how to deliver on its military promise continue within the movement, for example around the question of "hard" versus "soft" targets. The ANC had begun several years ago to make it clear that, in pursuing military targets on the terrain now offered by the apartheid regime, there could be fewer guarantees than previously that civilian casualties would be avoided. Then, in mid-1988, statements by certain ANC personnel were taken in the South African press to imply that direct attacks on (white) civilians could not be ruled out, a controversy that coincided with a spate of such attacks inside South Africa.

As it turned out, some of these attacks were of uncertain provenance (quite possibly right-wing provocations) and others the ANC disowned as mistakes, eschewing publicly – and not for the first time – the use of such tactics (just as it had on an earlier occasion been moved to condemn the wave of "necklacing" that momentarily swept the townships). Not that the issue is undebatable. Would a collapse into "mere terrorism" actually harden white attitudes as is often claimed or might it, in the longer run, wear down white intransigence while further mobilizing black support? The case of Northern Ireland (to go no further afield) tends to suggest the latter scenario to be an unlikely one, something that the ANC, at the end of the day, is itself well aware of. At the same time, it is not difficult to imagine a certain desperation entering, from time to time, into the calculations of some armed liberators when faced with so gross and unyielding an enemy as the South African state.

Fortunately, the ANC is chiefly active on the military front in other, more promising, ways. Indeed, it "carried out an unprecedented number of guerilla attacks (in 1988), despite security force claims that the movement's momentum had been broken. According to South African police statistics, a total of 238 guerilla attacks took place in the first ten months of 1988, compared with 234 during the whole of last year, 230 in 1986, 136 in 1985 and 44 in 1984" (*Weekly Mail*). In addition to the familiar brand of exemplary sabotage, many of these actions seem to have directly targeted army and police personnel (something promised, in June of 1988, by ANC military leader, Chris Hani). Moreover, it seems likely that, more than previously, much of the backup for these actions – the training and logistics – is grounded within structures internal to the country. It requires stating that, from the point of view of the anti-apartheid movement and given the intransigence of the apartheid regime, these are welcome developments. For it is now more important than ever before that the popular movement in South Africa be able to complement its already broad and impressive range of political tactics with a growing military capacity. The fact that this is unlikely to be, immediately, a welcome message to many whom the anti-apartheid movement in western countries must win to its cause does not make it any less crucial that we deliver it as clearly and responsibly as possible.

* * *

The raw facts of the South African situation are actually better known to those in positions of power in western countries than they generally admit. Instead of telling it like it is, however, they spend most of their time falsely packaging that explosive situation, with a view to defusing it politically. Witness, then, the eleventh hour conversion to truth-telling of Chester Crocker, Ronald Reagan's right-hand Africa man. Over his eight years in of-

fice he talked of little but the importance of South African reform intentions and of the inadvisability of using "irresponsible" means to do something about apartheid. Yet recently, in a valedictory interview, he admitted that Pretoria had "failed to address the most important issues" and had therefore been responsible for the mass uprising, in the townships in the mid-eighties. "The way it has been handled led to the big movement of black unrest in the mid-eighties which, in turn, has led to great new waves of repression against blacks, further human rights abuse, detentions and so on"!

Whatever lessons Crocker and his ilk may draw from this record, we must hope that any future "mass uprising" will be more successful. Inevitably there will be crucial flash-points of national significance in South Africa. The regime itself has nightmares about the likely mass reaction if, for example, Nelson Mandela were to die on its hands in prison (although it is equally fearful to release him). But flash-points are not a revolution, even if they can prove to be privileged moments for focussing revolutionary energies. How will that energy, undoubtedly still present in South Africa despite the Emergency, sustain itself and find more effective focus? We have seen something of the on-going struggle to find such sustenance and focus in this article. As argued, this defines the crucial process to which we must, ever more effectively, link ourselves in South Africa. And link ourselves – however much on complex terrain – to the organizations that are the main protagonists of this struggle, to organizations like COSATU, like the UDF, like the ANC, like a hundred others, bent but not broken by repression, bearing the commitment of tens of thousands of ordinary South Africans even as they search for more effective ways forward. We cannot allow the backsliding of the Canadian government, taken off the hook by the success of repression, to blunt our purpose in this respect.

Anti-Apartheid Activism: A Cross-Canada Survey

To provide some grass roots input to the discussion of the challenges facing the anti-apartheid network in Canada, *SAR* called on a selection of activists across the country to give us their perspective on the work we've all been doing. We spoke to people from the Maritimes, central Canada, and the Prairies to describe what they think is happening to anti-apartheid work in Canada. (Because some people travel in southern Africa, not all agreed to be named.)

Many responses were similar; there's a need for more planning, more information about the struggle inside South Africa, more sharing of successful tactics, a tighter communication network among the Canadian groups. But there was also a lot of optimism about the level of activity communities are able to generate.

Virtually everybody detects a significant difference in intensity compared to the early and mid-1980s. Don Kossick, of Regina, says "some of the steam" has gone out of the movement. But he cites, as does almost everyone else, a busy schedule of visitors, meetings and campaigns that shows people are, nevertheless, very active. Bill Hind of St. John's says that work doesn't seem as "cohesive or focussed" as it was a couple of years ago and there aren't the spontaneous offers of help from the public that there once were. But despite the yearning to be more effective that almost everyone expressed, the accounts of what's been happening are heartening.

Last fall, Hind and his colleagues petitioned the St. John's City Council to declare the city apartheid-free. Not only was it much easier than they expected, but the news of the Council's decision appeared in the daily newspaper on the same day that the South African Consul arrived from Ottawa for 'private'



Art Work

meetings with influential people. Now the network there is starting to work on making the university's investment portfolio apartheid-free.

Other regions have their own lists of activities - involvement in the Shell boycott, campaigning to reverse the Bank of Nova Scotia's loan to South African interests, public meetings with visitors from South Africa and the region.

The dissatisfaction that's expressed doesn't spring from apathy. "The biggest problem," says Bill Hind, "is what to do with all the energy that exists." Zeeba Loxley, vice-chairperson of the Manitoba Coalition of Organizations Against Apartheid, had a similar concern. "How do we keep people joining and staying active all the time?" she says. But for her, the problem is

part of the nature of Canadian activism which, she says, is a network rather than a movement. "There are people you can call on, but the numbers are still quite small. I see the beginnings of things, but they need nurturing and directing."

Another problem Loxley identifies is Canadian racism which, she says, prevents mass mobilization. "Many Canadians believe that whatever the whites are doing, they're doing better than what the blacks are doing." These attitudes feed into Joe Clark's do-nothing approach, she says. "People are looking for excuses not to care and Clark provides them with plenty of opportunity to do that."

Most people expressed the frustration of seeing their best work unshared. People see some successes on their own turf, and they have lots of ideas - what they want is a larger impact, beyond their own doorstep.

That raises the question of a national network - the same question that has been raised in every such discussion. Don Kossick of Regina thinks the work being done at the grass roots is less effective than it could be and suggests a national caucus of activists who would meet on a regular basis to co-ordinate actions.

Some people have taken the initiative in linking with other Canadian regions. The Halifax network has begun a petition campaign to urge the Bank of Nova Scotia to rescind their loan to Minorco, and they've sent copies to the network across the country hoping to broaden its effect. Others are concentrating on the Shell boycott.

More and more, however, people seem to be talking about building the information network. Don Ray of Calgary says they need more information on Canadian policy, with documentation. "Our office is continually bombarded with questions about Canadian policy. We don't have any easy answers and no ready source to turn to," he says.

Don Kossick of Regina wants a "critical research component" in the network to monitor Canada's relationship with South Africa. "We really feel the loss of SACTU research," he says.



Hartman

There's also a strong surge in the demand for information and analysis of what's happening inside South Africa and in the region. One of the problems, says a Quebec activist, is that "we lack current data." We need to know more about how the "South African version of the intifada," as he called it, has evolved to put more emphasis on

the work of mass organizations. We also need to do more analysis over the quality and quantity of development aid, because Canada and other western nations are making an "imperialist comeback" to southern Africa through their development assistance, he says.

The same Quebec activist believes another national meeting will have to be held, but not until there has been an accumulation of information and subsequent analysis that will build a consensus and strengthen the anti-apartheid network in Canada.

Money to carry out anti-apartheid work is a pre-occupation with people in the network. Bev Burke, part of a team of educators who travelled across Canada last year to hold workshops with the "On the Move" kit on South Africa, talked about the limited funds for many of the smaller groups doing anti-apartheid work, even though larger projects get money. "People tend to think that because there has been more money available lately - through Partnership Africa Canada, for example - that there's enough," says Burke. "But we saw that there's still a real shortage of money for the kind of work we want to do," Burke says.

Others expressed mixed feelings about the money that has been made available through the Canadian government. Janet Halpin, who as coordinator of the Manitoba Coalition of Organizations Against Apartheid is one of the few people in a salaried position in anti-apartheid work, says that most groups that receive government money have to tailor their projects accordingly. The Coalition is not so restrained. They are co-ordinating a series of fasts protesting the lack of Canadian action against South Africa. It begins March 21 and people will donate 'loonies' to indicate their opinion of Canadian policy.

Keith Philander of Regina says that having government money available increases what he calls "en-



Manitoba Coalition

trepreneurial activism," in which people jump on the anti-apartheid bandwagon not because of a long-term commitment, but because the money is there. He cited the recent conference on the media and South Africa, held by the University of Regina's Journalism School with \$40,000 provided by the federal government.

But the Journalism School is not the only group that is on the bandwagon, he says. "Groups that are part of the network - especially some of the NGOs - have to take stock of their relationship with the federal government and assess whether or not what they are doing really helps Canadians to understand the liberation process."

Although government money helps some activities, many believe it also limits the intensity of the pressure that we can put on government. Most people *SAR* spoke to believe that increasing pressure on Ottawa should be a major thrust of the network.

Charlotte Maxwell of the Anglican Church in Toronto thinks the Canadian anti-apartheid network still has not come to grips with its disappointment over government

policy. "We have yet to develop a consistent, national response to Ottawa and its actions that we can articulate to the public, especially with regard to sanctions," she says.

Keith Philander says that we have not taken advantage of the splits within the Canadian government. "There's no real consensus on South Africa among government officials," he says, "and that's in our favour." An activist from Halifax also believes we should "seize the political moment," increasing the pressure on External Affairs and thereby capitalizing on the up-coming Commonwealth meeting this summer.

People also had some things to say about events inside South Africa and the impact they have on our work. Overall those events tend to generate questions, not all of which can be answered. However, even the kind of media coverage recently about Winnie Mandela does not appear to have much negative effect. "Many people had already been prepared by her statements last year about 'necklacing'," says Charlotte Maxwell. "It's clear we've developed an informed network."

Bev Burke says that what happens in South Africa has "real res-

onance" in Canada and that activists have to be ready to respond. In her workshops last year, people practised through role-playing so they could perfect their responses to questions by the media and the public. She added: "We shouldn't presume that some of these events don't influence all of us. We all need to be doing some self-education and preparing to respond when questions are raised."

There were other concerns people brought up. Keith Philander thinks we should be doing a better job of monitoring the right-wing forces in Canada. Bev Burke also noted that people are often busy either working on a pressure campaign or hosting visitors from southern Africa, but we don't seem to find the resources or the planning time to maximize their effects by doing both together.

The feeling you get talking to people in different parts of the country is that the components are there - people, commitment, energy. Anti-apartheid work continues but without the clear sense of direction we've felt in the past. As a colleague from Quebec put it, "we're still searching for the way forward."

Quebec & Southern Africa: Still Crazy After All These Years

BY NANCY THEDE

Nancy Thede works with CIDMAA, the Centre d'information et de documentation sur le Mozambique et l'Afrique australe in Montreal

Quebec has a long and militant history of international solidarity, dating back at least to the MacKenzie-Papineau Battalion in the Spanish Civil War. Solidarity movements have been formed to support struggles from Vietnam to Latin America, and more recently, South Africa.

But the anti-apartheid movement faces new challenges in the 1990s. We must repoliticize our solidarity work. This task has two major components. In the first place, we need to unearth our own political origins and foundations. But this can't be enough; we also have to look closely at the recent changes that have taken place on our social terrain and in the more narrow institutional conditions under which the solidarity movement operates.

The Latin American connection

The rise of the nationalist movement in Quebec in the early 1960s consolidated and rooted a long-standing commitment to international solidarity, as the revolutionary experiences in Cuba, Algeria and Vietnam were closely followed and strongly supported in Quebec. The young and rapidly radicalizing union movement was a major force in developing that supportive attitude towards third world struggles, and it remains to this day the major institutional seat of international solidarity initiatives in Quebec. Another important force, unique to Quebec with respect to the rest of Canada, has been the Catholic Church. Active in the union movement, especially the Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux (CSN) at its origins,

Catholic missionaries were for many years the sole source of links with the Third World in popular consciousness.

The Chilean experience of 1970-73 captured the collective imagination of Quebec, and direct contact between popular organizations and unions here and in Chile developed into an ethos of "common cause." It was commonplace in progressive organizations to link the problems of class and national identity felt in Quebec with those experienced in Latin America. The aftermath of the Chilean coup in 1973 was a sort of apotheosis of international solidarity in Quebec: tens of thousands of unionists, students, nationalists and community organizers took to the streets in protest, expressing their solidarity with the Chilean resistance.

Enter Africa

Africa and other parts of the Third World were not seen by the popular movement in Quebec as potential partners in the dynamic exchange that existed with Latin American movements. Things began to change only in the mid-1970s, with the intensification of the armed liberation struggles in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. The unions, in particular the CSN and the Centrale de l'Enseignement du Québec (CEQ - the teachers' union), and two development education organizations: Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace (CCODP) and Service Universitaire Canadienne Outre-mer (SUCO) initiated solidarity and information campaigns in support of the liberation movements. If the openness of Quebec's unions was unique in North America, so was that of the Parti Québécois: whatever its political shortcomings may

have been on its home turf, it was the only mainstream political party to establish direct contact with and support for liberation movements and revolutionary regimes around the world. The PQ's readiness to do so was a reflection of the degree of popular mobilization in its bases and cadres around issues of international solidarity.

The going was rougher for the solidarity movement in trying to work with African movements than working with those in Latin America. Direct contact was almost nonexistent and the language barrier was an important obstacle. The successful "Angola-Quebec: zones à libérer" campaign was a graphic and imaginative attempt to overcome those barriers and concretize solidarity bonds.

A major turning point was the decision by SUCO to send cooperants to Guinea-Bissau in 1976 and to Mozambique in 1978: direct feedback from the region started to trickle into Quebec and more down-to-earth perceptions gradually developed. Regional solidarity groups around Quebec started to organize educational activities on southern Africa. Regular contacts were established with organizations in English Canada specializing in work on southern Africa (TCLSAC) or with direct contact in the region (Oxfam-Canada). The success of these informal links contrasts with the failure of every attempt coming from outside Quebec to set up a "provincial front" of a national organization: it is a clear fact of political life that any such initiatives must spring first and foremost from within Quebec itself.

Work on Africa continued to be quite sporadic, either because the organizations involved did not specialize in southern Africa or

had no institutional permanence. The creation of CIDMAA (Centre d'information et de documentation sur le Mozambique et l'Afrique australe) in Montreal in 1982 helped coalesce the work.

Since then, enormous strides have been made in structuring and consolidating a southern Africa network in Quebec. In particular, two developments should be underlined. Six regional solidarity committees have come together to consolidate regional resources for education work on southern Africa, by creating a network called Afriquébec, with funding for staff time and an infrastructure. In addition, a Montreal-based "table de concertation" coordinated by CIDMAA brings together some twenty organizations concerned with southern Africa to link individual initiatives and to define joint efforts. The "table" includes the unions, NGOs, solidarity organizations, the churches, human rights organizations and organizations of the black communities in Quebec. The whole network was galvanized by the visit of Bishop Tutu and two national conferences in 1987 ("Taking Sides" held in Montreal and the Parallel Commonwealth Conference in Vancouver). These events not only deepened understanding of the issues at stake in southern Africa and of Canadian policy, but also gave rise to a sense of participation in a nation-wide movement, something previously quite rare in Quebec.

So what happened?

The euphoria surrounding those high-profile events, and the flurry of preparatory and follow-up workshops accompanying them, served however to mask the evolution of the issues at stake. The movement had difficulty in grasping both the evolution of government policy, and the course of events in the region itself.

Mulroney's devious intervention at the United Nations in October 1988 finally sounded the alarm in the solidarity movement. People started to realise that we had

been lulled into inaction by our somewhat inexplicable faith in Mulroney's 1985 declaration that he was willing to impose total sanctions on South Africa if the regime did not make significant changes. Other warning signals passed nearly unnoticed, so strong was our confidence that things were on the right track. Our guard relaxed, we expectantly awaited each new pronouncement from the Secretary of State or the Prime Minister himself, grumbled when nothing happened, and patiently waited for the event which would finally spur the government into action. In a nutshell, we lost the initiative.

Fundamentally, the problem cannot be laid at the doorstep of Mulroney or Clark. The problem is principally due to our own lack of political analysis, clarity and strategy.

In many ways the situation in the solidarity movement here mirrors that of the movement for social transformation in southern Africa itself - without, of course, being a direct consequence of it. Since 1984, the region has seen a major setback for socialism in Mozambique and in Zimbabwe and the stagnation of movements for social change in Angola. The West prepares for an economic and diplomatic return to southern Africa: Namibia and Angola are particularly attractive investment targets. The issue of South African aggression as a major problem in the region has apparently disappeared from the minds of many observers.

In South Africa itself, the resistance is in a phase of reorganization, since the State's ferocious repression succeeded in checking the incipient insurrection in 1986. Restructuring the resistance will be a long and arduous task. Meanwhile, the impasse remains. The resistance is no longer in a position to articulate clear priorities for external support that could guide us in our solidarity efforts here. There are only questions, no answers. Sanctions? Disinvestment? Negotiated political


settlement? Role of the ANC? the UDF? ...

This downturn didn't register very clearly in the minds of many activists: individuals and organizations involved in support to southern Africa were still, well into 1988, living on the image of a mounting and victorious resistance. The brutal realization of the reversal of that situation has had a demobilizing effect.

The changing landscape

But the situation in Quebec, as in the rest of Canada, has also changed since the mid-1980s. The environment in which solidarity organizations operate has itself been transformed. The status of NGOs and "development education" organizations is quite different now. So too, even more significantly, is the social context of solidarity work. Neither set of changes has been sufficiently noted.

The past few years have seen an enormous increase in availability of Canadian government funding for development work in Africa, accompanied by a smaller but still significant increase in monies for "development education." This has created a "supply-led" dynamic in education and solidarity activities, including those directed towards southern Africa. Organizations that had neither significant expertise on the region, nor the institutional "absorptive capacity" in political terms to handle creatively the manna of extra funding, have flocked to the PAC (Partnership Africa Canada) trough. The result has been the appearance of an artificially-inflated southern Africa solidarity and education network. Most importantly, this situation has contributed to the increasing depoliticization of the work on southern Africa: the parameters are defined in the final analysis by CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency), although mediated by the NGOs present in PAC. This situation favours the dominance of bureaucratic and adminis-



trative criteria over the elaboration of long-term political strategies.

In addition, social and political struggles in Quebec have become less militant during the 1980s. The traditional leaders of those struggles, particularly the unions, have lost credibility in the eyes of a public in tune with the new conservative ethic of the 1980s. They are pedalling hard to develop a public image as "serious professionals." Increasingly, the unions are more concerned with their own survival as organizations and are less open to supporting controversial issues in the Third World. Moreover, the nexus of social struggles is changing: well-established institutions like the unions and the churches, our traditional supports for solidarity work, are not now necessarily at the forefront of social change in Quebec.

On the other hand, new "marginal" sectors have emerged in the interstices of the social and economic modernization of Quebec. The women's movement, young unemployed, ecology and peace groups

are in the forefront of the contradictions of the Quebec of the 1990s. In much the same sense as in southern Africa itself, the terrain of social struggles in Quebec is changing, but the *solidarity movement has not established sufficient contact with these emergent, dynamic sectors.* Our traditional partners remain important and continue to have considerable social and political weight. But any forward-looking strategy for solidarity must also look to the transformations taking place in the social movements here and now.

What do we look like?

What does the southern Africa solidarity movement in Quebec look like in 1989? Where do we go from here? These two questions were at the centre of a workshop on the question of sanctions strategy within the solidarity movement organized by CID-MAA in early February.

A survey of fifteen groups in Montreal and various regions of Quebec revealed the following facts about the movement:

- Most groups have been active for over ten years, principally providing entry-level information on apartheid and organizing specific actions to support and reinforce sanctions against South Africa.
- They see their objectives in terms of social justice, and less often in terms of support for the popular movement in southern Africa.
- The most common target groups are the "broad public," students and youth, and church groups.

Their relatively long span of existence would lead us to expect a certain accumulation of expertise over the years. To a certain extent this is true. But there is less accumulated expertise in the area of content (knowledge and analysis of what is really happening on the ground in southern Africa) than in the realm of process (animation techniques, level of coordination of activities, etc.). Moreover, many groups have a high turn-over rate, which reduces or eliminates any accumulation. Although the general themes have remained quite consistent, the campaigns have lacked continuity.

In spite of these constraints, important gains were made in the period 1983-1987. Principal among these has been the building of a broad consensus on the principle of total sanctions. After much debate in some quarters, this demand is now accepted by all solidarity organizations, unions, churches and most NGOs. The sectors most clearly mobilized behind the demand for stronger sanctions are students, the churches and the union structures.

But now, in 1989, these groups lack a clear short- or medium-term objective regarding sanctions. We are uncertain about exactly what has been gained. What do we need to do now? How to do it? What do resistance organizations in South Africa need and want us to do?

In this context, groups in Quebec see their major needs as being:

- better analysis and information;
- clear leadership and an au-

continued on page 33

Workers' Unity

NACTU Out of Step

BY Our South African Labour Correspondent

Seven hundred workers met in Johannesburg on March 4th and 5th for what was described in a statement released after the summit as "one of the most significant demonstrations of worker unity in our history." Significant unity was certainly evident – the decisions of the meeting will bear that out – but for the moment most of the interest in the summit centres on the remarkable display of division demonstrated by the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU).

This division is likely, in time, to recast the shape of the union movement.

The summit was jointly chaired by representatives from each of the three groupings present: all the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) affiliates, several unaffiliated unions and eleven of the NACTU affiliates. All full-time officials – with the exception of a small secretariat whose sole task was to record and translate the minutes – were excluded from what has appropriately been dubbed the "workers' summit."

The meeting arose out of a series of meetings between COSATU and NACTU in the second half of 1988 which co-ordinated union responses to the new Labour Relations Act. The idea of a summit was, in fact, first mooted by NACTU. The impetus for such a meeting was strongly underwritten by NACTU's support of COSATU's call for the highly successful three-day stay-away in June last year.

Preparatory meetings between COSATU, NACTU and the unaffiliated unions proceeded smoothly until a few weeks before the sum-

mit was due to take place. Then the problems began. NACTU's enthusiasm for the summit had clearly waned. Its delegates began to suggest postponements. In particular, they objected to a proposed item on the agenda entitled "unity." They suggested that the item be renamed "differences" or "divisions." Clearly, discussing "differences" suggests a number of alternative possible formulations for solving problems, such as demarcation agreements between NACTU and COSATU unions organizing in the same industry. "Unity," on the other hand, is strongly suggestive of the direction that the unions should take in overcoming their "differences."

NACTU bolts

A few days before the March summit, NACTU announced that it was pulling out of the meeting. It restated a commitment to the principle of worker unity and of a workers' summit, but believed that the current summit was "premature." There is a strong sense of *déjà vu* here. In previous incarnations, whether as the Consultative Committee of Black Trade Unions (CCBTU) or as the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA), the tendency now represented by NACTU has displayed the same equivocation around the question of unity. Each time this has cost it dearly.

In 1979, the CCBTU displayed uncertainty around the formation of the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU). Some of its unions split off and went to FOSATU. The Consultative Committee went on to form CUSA which was, for the next five years, the "other" trade union federation relative to FOSATU.

In 1985, with the formation of COSATU, CUSA withdrew at the eleventh hour after having participated in protracted unity talks for four years. This time their hesitancy cost them their largest affiliate, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). CUSA then teamed up with a small grouping, the Azanian Congress of Trade Unions, to form NACTU and has ever since fulfilled its historic role as the "other" trade union federation.

There can be no doubt that this summit will lead to yet another rupture of the NACTU grouping. The eleven "rebel" unions – who constitute the majority of NACTU's affiliates – have been at pains to restate their continued loyalty to NACTU. However, the spokesperson for the eleven did say that they were attending the summit because they believed that NACTU's decision was not "in the broader interests of the working class but serving exclusivist organizational interests." In what could be an accurate portent for the future of NACTU, he went on to say that "our failure to rise to the expectations of our struggle will inevitably render us irrelevant to the historical struggle of our people."

NACTU, for its part, responded with marked aggression. Its Assistant General Secretary characterized the decision of the eleven to attend the summit as a "publicity stunt."

"The general secretaries of the unions – not the workers – signed the statement announcing their attendance of the summit," he said. "As far as the national council is concerned, no NACTU unions will be attending."

The reasons for the division in NACTU are matters for speculation. The arcane division that has re-



Afrapix

Migrant labour camp, Gordon's Bay

cently surfaced in NACTU between the "africanists" on the one hand, and a "black consciousness" grouping on the other, is said to play some role. What is clear is that it is the smaller of the NACTU unions that opted to attend the summit. They are in essence unions that cannot foresee a viable future without coming to terms with their overwhelmingly larger, and much better organized, COSATU counterparts - NACTU's 4,000 strong mining affiliate juxtaposed with the NUM's 200,000 members is one example. Even the largest of the NACTU unions that attended the summit, the 17,000 member Food union - a relatively well-established union in NACTU - pales alongside COSATU's 75,000 member Food and Allied Workers Union. Organizational survival rather than ideological purity may underlie the divisions within NACTU.

COSATU on track

What is more important in the long run is COSATU's re-emergence as a pole of unity within the union movement. After a period of intense internal division over relations with NACTU, COSATU has recently adopted a particularly conciliatory attitude towards NACTU. A recent COSATU leadership seminar called for joint campaigns with NACTU, invited NACTU to send representatives to meetings of COSATU locals, and called on COSATU unions to give "practical assistance" to NACTU affiliates.

There are a number of reasons for COSATU's new approach. Firstly, some of its own internal differences appear to be on the mend. In what was viewed as a very significant development, the Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers' Union of South Africa (CCAWUSA), the large COSATU affiliate that for the

last two years has been rent by the most searing divisions, sent a single delegation to the summit. CCAWUSA reunifying talks that had broken down, apparently irreparably, are now firmly on track again.

Secondly, COSATU is proving an irresistible attraction to unaffiliated unions (i.e., unions outside the COSATU or NACTU fold). For example, the 20,000 strong Postal Workers' Union (POTWA) has recently affiliated to COSATU. And a merger between COSATU's textile union, and the ex-Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA) clothing union is set down for June. This merger will form a union of 200,000 members rivalled in size only by the NUM and the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA). In addition, COSATU is brokering talks aimed at forming a single teachers' union.



Communal stove and concrete beds, migrant labour compound, Johannesburg

These developments are undoubtedly a boost to COSATU's confidence and self-esteem.

Thirdly, there is a palpable easing of some of the sectarian po-

litical positions that have been clearly present in COSATU. The COSATU executive has been popularizing a "code of conduct" that emphasizes organizational discipline

and freedom of speech and debate. COSATU NEWS prominently quoted a worker at the leadership seminar referred to above saying:

We should avoid political differences - the only important thing is unity. When we are one we will discuss political policy. We have differences even in COSATU on political policy Differences should not be a stumbling block to one federation.

It is not insignificant that the CCAWUSA rift, now apparently on the mend, centres on political policy, in particular whether to adopt the Freedom Charter or a "Workers Charter." Renewed unity in CCAWUSA may also be indicative of greater political tolerance within COSATU.

And finally there is the accursed Labour Relations Act. There is a strong imperative to unite against the act; the substance of the summit was concerned with planning such opposition. The summit resolved to demand a meeting with the national employers' body in order to re-discuss the unions' opposition to the Act. If this meeting fails to make "positive progress" within 30 days, participating unions resolved to "declare a national dispute with employers" and "intensify [their] rejection of the present Labour Relations Act through further protest action."

This campaign comes in the face of an assault by the bosses and the state on unions, of which the Labour Relations Act is the clearest example. The dramatic swing to the right of the Industrial Court - which the summit resolved to find ways of circumventing - is another. Examples from daily union organizing work are countless.

The summit resolved that "the basis for the ultimate unity of the working class can be achieved through unity in action." If "unity in action" is indeed the precondition, the unions may be on a quicker route to "ultimate unity" than anyone imagined.

Nkomati Revisited?

BY JOSEPH HANLON

Joseph Hanlon is a writer on southern Africa and author of the forthcoming book, Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots? (James Currey, hopefully 1989).

Direct talks involving South Africa and Angola seem to be leading to independence for Namibia and at least a reduction in destabilization in Angola.

Could new Mozambique-South Africa talks also lead to reduced destabilization on the other side of the continent? Mozambique is under growing internal and foreign pressure for talks that might lead to an "Nkomati II", or at least to the partial implementation of the Nkomati Accord. Therefore, it is timely to survey the terrain on which such talks might occur.

There are significant differences which limit any comparison between the positions in Angola and Mozambique. In Angola, South Africa suffered a stunning military defeat due to the combined impact of a very strong Angola army and air force, substantial Cuban help and an international arms embargo which weakened South African forces. Namibia was the focus of international attention and South Africa was under at least some pressure to settle. Angola's oil gives it some wealth and more ability to survive destabilization.

In Mozambique, South Africa also suffered a military reverse. It failed to cut the country in half, and the MNR was eventually pushed back from central Zambesia province. Zimbabwean troops have helped Mozambique keep the Beira corridor open and now Zimbabwean and UK-trained Mozambican troops are reopening the Limpopo corridor linking Zimbabwe to Maputo; together this ensures the success of SADCC attempts to reduce trans-

port dependence on South Africa.

But in other ways Mozambique is very different from Angola. Although Mozambique and its allies were able to block a major South African escalation as well as secure key corridors, they cannot expel the "contra" forces or pose a serious threat to white South African soldiers. In practice, the war is stalemated - South Africa cannot make major gains, but it can keep destabilization going indefinitely and cause massive damage.

Furthermore, there seems to be no international pressure on South Africa to stop its state terrorism in Mozambique. British military assistance says to Pretoria, in effect, that the present level of destabilization is acceptable, but that it should not be increased. The US is most concerned with Namibia, and with the presence of Cubans in Angola, and pays much less attention to Mozambique. The USSR is anxious not to make an East-West issue over South Africa.

The result is that South Africa is under no political or military pressure to withdraw from Mozambique.

Economic and military means

The problem for Mozambique is that destabilization works. The economic disruption has been catastrophic, and Mozambique is now dependent on foreign donors for US\$800 million plus 500,000 tonnes of grain each year. At least 400,000 people have died because of destabilization, and millions have been displaced. Many of the post-independence gains in health and education have been destroyed. Everyone in the country is affected by South Africa state terrorism, with the inevitable demoralization and war-weariness.

Mozambique seems locked in a downward spiral. The economic crisis means that development plans must be shelved, while the few re-

sources go to staying alive and limited rebuilding. And the economic weakness makes it impossible to build an Angola-style army and to effectively counter Pretoria's terrorism and stop the destruction.

Unfortunately, destabilization is also in the interests of many of the donors. Some impose conditions and use Mozambique's weakness to extract ever heavier economic and political concessions. Others hope to rebuild a flattened Mozambique according to their own model. The IMF and World Bank have imposed a structural adjustment programme that is singularly inappropriate for a country at war, and which makes economic recovery more difficult; the World Bank has even suggested Mozambique is spending too much reconstructing facilities destroyed by the war. The state role in health, education and the economy are all under attack by the World Bank and the United States.

The effect of these economic and political pressures is to make it ever harder to rebuild, to win the war, and to maintain a semblance of socialism. Some Mozambicans warn that the very survival of Frelimo and of a genuinely independent Mozambique are now at stake.

Inevitably, a question arises: If continued destabilization means continued concessions until there is nothing left to concede, then would it be better to make major concessions to South Africa now to end the war?

Such concessions would only be sensible if the war really did end, and Nkomati shows that South Africa is not to be trusted. But if a monitorable agreement could be reached, then it would stop the killing as well as strengthening Mozambique's position with donors. It is the kind of horrific choice faced by someone who must decide if they

should jump from a burning building – the future looks grim no matter what they do.

Will South Africa stop?

South Africa has no urgent need to end its terrorism in Mozambique. Indeed, destabilization is an end in itself and has been a relatively successful and cheap strategy. It humbles Frelimo and destroys Mozambique as an alternative model to apartheid. It allows South Africa and its allies to claim that majority rule only brings "civil war" and starvation. And it underlines South Africa's continued military dominance of at least part of the region.

Nevertheless, Pretoria would probably rather have a relationship with Mozambique like the one it has with Malawi, Swaziland and Lesotho. Also, the present military stalemate suggests a need for an alternative policy, and that perhaps it is time to reap the profits of a decade of investment in destabilization. The rising cost of sanctions may also lead Pretoria to look to Mozambique as a route to break out of international isolation.

Two other factors might encourage talks. First, white elections must be held in South Africa next year, and the National Party often plays on international relations to build its image for elections. For example, the Songo talks in September 1988 between Presidents Botha and Chissano, as well as the high profile opening of the enlarged trade mission in Maputo, came just before local elections. Second, the South African business community would be pleased with an end to destabilization and access to Mozambique.

Thus South Africa has no necessity to agree to reduce destabilization, but there are reasons why it might be tempted by the momentum of the Angola/Namibia talks to try to cut a new deal with Mozambique.

What South Africa wants

South Africa is desperate to end its international isolation and become less of a pariah. It is also anxious to gain time – at least a decade – to create a new-style apartheid.

There are three ways that it sees the neighbouring states helping. First and most importantly, Pretoria is anxious to use the neighbours to fend off new sanctions and reduce the impact of old ones. Second, South Africa wants to gain international recognition of its claimed role as the dominant economic and military power in the region. Third, it

[Neil van Heerden, director general of the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs,] noted that the Mozambique peace effort was "well under way", both countries having already discussed economic cooperation projects as part of an attempt "to send practical signals" of South Africa's good intentions. "We are talking turkey and we are spending money," he said, recognizing that Mozambique was a particularly "tough nut to crack."

Independent, London, 17 March 1989

wants to negate any alternative non-racial models to apartheid.

To do these things, it has a series of clear political goals throughout the region. It wants the neighbouring states to:

- 1) take public stands against international sanctions, and
- 2) state publicly that "reform" is working inside South Africa. These are probably the two most important demands.

In addition, it wants the neighbours to:

- 3) give South Africa diplomatic recognition (with the opening of an embassy, through high level ministerial and presidential meetings, and by allowing South Africa to act as

mediator or peacemaker in regional disputes);

- 4) recognize the bantustans;
- 5) accept, and give wide publicity to, South African aid projects;
- 6) end press and radio criticisms of apartheid; and
- 7) accept the presence of at least token South African troops.

As well, South Africa would have one political demand which is specific to Mozambique: direct negotiations with the MNR, mediated by South Africa.

South Africa's priority economic goal in the region is to restrict the development of SADCC and especially to stop the SADCC states delinking and reducing their dependence on South Africa. The failure to close the Beira corridor and the prospect of a British-backed opening of the Limpopo line means that Pretoria has failed to gain this goal militarily, and thus will put greater stress on this in any talks.

South Africa is also looking to the neighbouring states for big development projects which will attract large amounts of foreign capital, most of which will find its way into South Africa, bypassing financial sanctions. The Lesotho Highland Water Scheme, the Sua Pan soda ash project in Botswana and the Cahora Bassa line rehabilitation are examples of this.

The neighbouring states are also seen as sources of water and energy, which are linked and critical because of the oil embargo. Again, the Highland Water Scheme and Cahora Bassa are examples. And the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa is negotiating for access to Mozambique's Pande gas field (in competition with Zimbabwe's parastatal Industrial Development Corporation).

Finally, South Africa would have three specific economic interests in



Joel Chiziane / AIM

Inauguration of the Pequenos Limbombos dam, 1986, an Italian aid project

Mozambique. First, it wants sanctions busting channels to allow it to ship falsely labelled fruit, clothing and other goods. This would involve substantially increased involvement in Maputo port, and perhaps Beira as well. It could also mean the use of a free trade zone (which is being promoted by the World Bank). Second, if the war were to stop and Mozambique were to receive massive rebuilding help, that money would be expected to pass through Johannesburg. This would create an important market and channel much-needed hard currency into South Africa. Third, South Africa would expect to gain the same kind of economic dominance over Mozambique

that it already has over Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. It may be impractical for Mozambique to join the customs union and Rand zone, but South Africa would expect some control over foreign investment and some preferential role for its own trans national corporations, such as Anglo and Barlow Rand.

These would make up a large part of South Africa's opening menu of demands. Clearly it would not expect all to be met. But if there was no international pressure on South Africa to negotiate, it would expect a large number of these in exchange for an end to destabilization.

Initial sparring

Many Mozambican leaders see a piv-

otal role for foreign business. They hope that foreign firms won't want their investments destroyed by bandits and will put pressure on their governments to try to curb destabilization. This line applies particularly to the US and South Africa, and there is a clear attempt to encourage South African investment in what are now insecure areas.

In an interview in the *New Internationalist* (Feb. 1989) Frelimo Foreign Secretary Jose Luis Cabaco said that "a South African policy in favour of private investment in Mozambique is the best guarantee we have that the apartheid regime will stop supporting the destabilization of this country."

Similarly, there seemed hopes that the strategy of creating defended corridors might be extended, with South Africa agreement to include Cahora Bassa powerline and the corridor from Maputo to South Africa.

Indeed, the Cahora Bassa agreement took the first step in this direction. South Africa gained four points: 1) an international agreement; 2) meetings involving government ministers; 3) a token military presence, in the form of drivers and equipment; and 4) the involvement of South African firms and foreign (Italian) money in the project. The agreement could not work unless Pretoria told the MNR not to attack the power line, so it meant a reduction in destabilization.


Mozambique went part way to meeting another demand when it made the opening of the enlarged South African trade mission in Maputo a high profile event attended by members of the Politburo. In effect, Frelimo accepted that the trade mission is a quasi-embassy.

The Songo talks were a meeting between presidents, and President Chissano's statement hinted at a willingness to say "reform" was working. But he had refused Botha's demand to meet in Maputo. And more importantly, he had refused Botha's demand that the meeting be a South African mediation between Malawi and Mozambique.

There have also been extensive talks about South African investment in Maputo port, in forestry in border areas, in Pande gas and elsewhere.

But no progress

So far, however, there has been little progress. There has been almost no economic investment. Violations of Nkomati have increased, not decreased. The Cahora Bassa talks were clearly conducted in bad faith; the MNR was knocking down hundreds more pylons while the talks were going on, and it is impossi-



Sawmill workers, Mozambique, 1987

Joel Chiziane/AIM

ble that the South Africans did not know.

At Songo P. W. Botha promised to make a public statement supporting South African investment in Mozambique (which would have carried the implication that such investment would be protected from attack). Not only was no such statement made, but the Songo talks were followed by a series of raids on the railways, power lines and economic installations between Maputo and South Africa which seemed calculated to stress to South African businesspeople the insecurity of Mozambique, rather than encourage investment.

This was capped by a hostile statement on 28 November 1988 in Beira by the South African Deputy Defence Minister, W. N. Breytenbach, at the handover of non-lethal military support for the Cahora Bassa protection force. Breytenbach said that South Africa demanded certain "prerequisites" from its neighbours. First, "South Africa is not interested in the type of government of its neighbours" and does not intervene in internal affairs. Similarly, it "expects its sovereignty and integrity to be recognized and respected." Second, South Africa "is the stabilizer of the region and wants to expand its role. Therefore, the

constant accusation that the South African armed forces are destabilizing southern Africa has no basis." Finally, the "export of revolution to South Africa, whether in the form of physical violence and terrorism, or in the form of propaganda and disinformation, cannot be accepted."

Breytenbach's message was clear: Frelimo had not been humbled enough and had to make major concessions on the information front.

What is the role of solidarity now?

Any negotiated settlement, either a public "Nkomati II" or quiet phased agreement (step-by-step or corridor-by-corridor), would be useful only if South Africa actually reduces or stops destabilization. Perhaps the biggest disappointment of Nkomati was the unwillingness of the west to act as guarantor of the accord. Clearly the CIA, US National Security Agency and other intelligence agencies monitor South

African support for the MNR in detail. But they say nothing. Thus the solidarity movement should demand that, as well as giving military help to Mozambique, our governments should use the information from the security agencies to publicly denounce the continued violence of Nkomati. Canada, Britain and the US could show the dishonesty of Breytenbach's statement and strengthen Frelimo's negotiating position simply by publishing what they already know. The first thing the solidarity movement could do is promote this.

Second, we must accept that Frelimo has been forced into duplicity by the World Bank and the United States, saying publicly that economic restructuring is good when it plainly is not, and that the free market is good when it is obviously unsuitable in a war economy. I believe that Frelimo expects the solidarity movement to realize that the US and World Bank demand obei-

sance from a country as vulnerable as Mozambique, and thus to use its good judgement and continue to criticize World Bank and US policy. Similarly, we know Pretoria wants cringing public statements on sanctions. If Frelimo feels that such duplicity will save the lives of tens of thousands of Mozambicans, we should accept that judgement. But I think that Frelimo will also expect us to remember Cabaço's view that "sanctions are the most effective way of putting pressure on the apartheid regime," and continue to fight for sanctions.

We must keep our faith with Frelimo, and not abandon it in a time of retreat when it most needs solidarity. We must allow for the false imposed rhetoric and major concessions that may have to be made. We must support the Mozambican government in this difficult time, and throw our efforts behind the remaining progressive aspects of Frelimo policy.

Researching Renamo

A new report on the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo) details its "recruitment" tactics and other operations, demonstrating the extent of linkages with the South African Defence Force.

The 17-page report, based on recent interviews conducted by William Minter with 32 ex-Renamo participants, provides compelling new evidence for two major conclusions:

- (1) A high proportion of the Renamo rank-and-file combatants, probably in excess of 90 percent, is recruited by force and kept in the Renamo ranks by threats of execution for attempted desertion;
- (2) The professionally competent Renamo military operations are sustained by regular supplies from South Africa, as well as by a centralized system of command, control and communications (C3) and a coordinated programme of basic and advanced military training.

Minter carried out the interviews during a seven-week research trip in November and December 1988. Half of those interviewed had accepted the amnesty offer of the Mozambican government; the other half were prisoners captured in battle. On average they had spent 37 months in the Renamo forces.

Without exception, all 27 who had been directly involved in combat inside Mozambique said they had originally been abducted at gunpoint. Moreover, they said that all or almost all of those who trained with them had also been forcibly abducted. Most said that the standard penalty for trying to escape was execution.

They described the supply operation for munitions as a strict need-to-know system in which only some soldiers had direct access to the deliveries. Almost all made reference to captured arms, but none said that these were their major source. Bases in southern Mozambique received some supplies overland from South Africa, but elsewhere the pattern was of periodic landings of DC-3s, parachute drops or sea landings.

The interviewees also described a highly centralized system of command, control and communications, with its apex the communications link between the Renamo headquarters in central Mozambique and South African special forces. The military training they described ranged from basic training inside Mozambique to long-term instruction in South Africa for selected soldiers.

Copies of the report may be obtained from TCLSAC for the cost of photocopying and postage, or contact William Minter, 1839 Newton St. N.W., Washington D.C. 20010, U.S.A., telephone (202) 234-0338.



Sanctions busting — ships in Durban harbor

Campbell/Sygma

Sneaking Around Sanctions

BY JOHN DANIEL

John Daniel is an editor at the London based Zed Press.

The serious and growing impact of the international sanctions campaign on the South African economy is reflected in the increasing number of ways the South African regime has found to dodge the force of sanctions already in place. In recent years these defence mechanisms have become increasingly complex and difficult to detect, involving not only the South African state and business but also, a wide range of other governments and interests. The international sanctions lobby must be continually alert to the impact of both the old and new forms of sanctions-busting which serve to immunize the apartheid regime against outside pressure.

To a large degree, Pretoria still depends on strategies that have served it well since the 1960s: import substitution and stockpiling. The most important examples of the former are two parastatal corporations: SASOL, which manufactures oil from coal, and ARMSCOR, which has developed a strong local arms industry. Today SASOL meets al-

most half of South Africa's domestic fuel needs; ARMSCOR has become a major exporter of arms, provides Pretoria with a major source of foreign exchange and effectively neutralizes the UN arms embargo.

One of the more recent additions to Pretoria's bag of sanctions-busting tricks is the "unconventional trade agreement," a strategy which targets poor and vulnerable countries who are then "induced" into becoming secret partners to expedite South African transactions. These countries, usually obscured from the world's media attention, include the Seychelles, Mauritius, the Maldives, the Isle of Man, Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea, the Ivory Coast and Somalia. Using these weak countries as go-betweens has proved a very effective method for circumventing the South African oil embargo and has also included oil-for-arms exchanges with Iran and Iraq.

The Indian Ocean Island of Comoros, located 300 kilometers off the coast of Mozambique and Tanzania, is a striking example of how these "unconventional trade agreements" operate. In 1984 South Africa took over the \$4 million per annum pay-

ment for the upkeep of the Comoros Presidential guard, then under the command of Bob Denard, a right-wing mercenary with close ties to South Africa. Since then, Comoros has become an offshore warehouse for relabelling and re-exporting of South African goods. Comoros also routes Saudi Arabian arms to Renamo in Mozambique, part of the "Contragate" operation negotiated between King Fahd and former CIA chief William Casey.

Pretoria does not confine itself to exploiting the poor in its sanctions-busting efforts. The rich and greedy are also ready partners, often willing to engage in elaborate cloak-and-dagger operations to get around UN embargoes or the limited sanctions of their home governments. The Shipping Research Bureau in Amsterdam has collected comprehensive material which documents continuing western involvement in oil shipments to South Africa. More recently Kairos, a Dutch anti-apartheid group, published evidence of a scheme used by Shell Oil to import South African coal to Europe: Shell carried coal to the Netherlands and Belgium where

it was blended with another kind of "Dutch Coal." The key point here is, of course, that the Netherlands stopped producing coal 20 years ago. The report goes on to show how the new blended coal was shipped on to Britain and France, thereby circumventing the oil embargoes of those countries.

Despite the success of these kinds of efforts Pretoria has had to face the fact that its traditional western markets are continuing to shrink as a result of sanctions. In response, Pretoria has turned eastward. Japan has now become South Africa's most important trade partner, with Taiwan and Hong Kong rapidly expanding. The South African state has also found a ready market for counter-insurgency weaponry in Sri Lanka and is reaching out to new markets in Chile and Paraguay.

Meanwhile South African business, working in collusion with the state, has developed its own arsenal to counter international pressure. Relabelling is a deliberate deception to disguise the South African origin of a product and has been used effectively by small-scale South African businesses which establish last-stage assembly plants in countries such as Botswana, Lesotho or Swaziland, or alternatively one of the bantustans. Thus, products like citrus, wood-pulp, coal and asbestos, made in South Africa, are reaching the outside world, labelled as the products of other countries.

South African corporate giants have developed an even more complex strategy for infiltrating external markets: building up independent economic bases outside South Africa (often in such tax havens as Luxembourg, Liechtenstein or the Bahamas, or free ports such as the Isle of Man). This "internationalization" strategy, allows South African

capital free sway around the world.


The Anglo American Corporation, now ranked the 25th in the world league of multi-nationals, is the largest South African corporation using "internationalization," and with great effect. Anglo began its move outside Africa in 1970 when it established MINORCO as a subsidiary of Anglo and De Beers in Bermuda. Initially MINORCO

At the February meeting of the special Commonwealth Committee on South Africa in Harare, External Affairs minister Joe Clark said the loan was "in bounds of Canadian sanctions."

Other South African companies have followed Anglo's lead in this kind of sanctions side-stepping. The Rembrandt/Volkskas group, headed by Anton Rupert, has established two investment vehicles, one in Switzerland and the other in Luxembourg. Gradually the Luxembourg CFR Corporation is acquiring control of all of Rembrandt's international operations including Cartier and Dunhill. And Liberty Life, another large South African insurance corporation, has recently set up Trans-Atlantic Holdings in Luxembourg which is involved in acquiring equity in Sun-Life, Britain's largest insurance company.


What are these companies really up to? The answer appears to be not so much sanctions-busting as sanctions evasion, an attempt to diversify out of South Africa with a view to controlling operations from secure bases, free from the stigma of a South African connection and safe from the "socialist reach" of a future South African government. These corporate manoeuvres are also a reflection that, as the London *Financial Times* puts it, "South Africa has become an economic cul-de-sac."

But for the moment, at least, the intricate web of sanctions busting and sanctions evasion continues to protect the apartheid regime from international pressure. What has been described above is no more than the proverbial "tip of the iceberg." The worldwide anti-apartheid movement must take on the role of "sanctions detectives" because much more work and research needs to be done.



served as a vehicle for the reinvestment of capital generated by the partial nationalization of Anglo's copper mines in Zambia. But in recent years MINORCO has broadened its operation and worked its way into North American and western European economies. In 1987 MINORCO moved to Luxembourg from where it launched its recent bid to take over Consolidated Gold Fields of Britain, another company with substantial South African holdings in gold mining. To finance this deal MINORCO has obtained agreement from Canada's Bank of Nova Scotia for a loan of \$600 million.

Divestment Breakthrough in Ontario



University of Toronto protest against SA ambassador Babb

BY MICHAEL STEVENSON

Michael Stevenson teaches Political Science at York University, Toronto.

Ontario's new South African Trust Investments Act, passed last December, is a cause for some celebration, reflection and action. Yet it has slipped into existence with hardly any publicity.

The new legislation says that managers or trustees of pension funds do not violate the law by divesting or refusing to invest in lucrative South African stocks. Until now, the legislation regulating funds has held trustees legally accountable for producing the best yields on investments. The new act makes a significant exception to the state's

usual practice of protecting capital markets from political interference. It is all the more notable since 60% of all Canadian pension funds are registered in Ontario.

Introduced to the legislature on November 5, debate lasted only a couple of hours on December 14, the day before final passage. The only opposition was voiced by the New Democrat member for Rainy River, who argued that with this bill "the government has taken the weakest way out" of its promises to act against South Africa, and that stronger measures would have made pension and trust divestment mandatory.

Even so, the legislation is worth celebrating, since it appears to remove roadblocks to divesting pension funds of unions and other organizations.

The law reads: "Despite the Trustee Act or any other law, a trustee who acts in accordance with this Act and in a reasonably prudent manner does not commit a breach of statutory or other legal duty by

(a) disposing of a South African investment even if the value of the property for which the trustee is responsible decreases or fails to increase sufficiently as a result; or

(b) refusing to acquire a South African investment."

"Reasonably prudent" will no doubt involve careful management of funds otherwise committed to South African investments, but beyond that trustees are merely required to ensure that a majority of the "identifiable beneficiaries" for whom they are responsible are not opposed to such action. In the case of funds with no more than 100 beneficiaries, written notice of divestment must be given, and action may be taken if after sixty days there is no notice of opposition from a majority of the identifiable beneficia-

Art Work

ries. In the case of funds with more beneficiaries, divestment can occur "only if the trustee has made inquiries and has reasonable grounds to believe that a majority of them would consent to the intended transaction." On the face of it, these seem far from serious obstacles to action.

Further, on the potentially tricky matter of what constitutes a South African investment, the Act covers a broad range of businesses:

- a corporation incorporated under the laws of South Africa or carrying on business in South Africa,
- a corporation having a substantial interest (more than 10% voting shares) in such a corporation,
- a corporation itself substantially owned (more than 10%) by such a corporation, or substantially owned by a business holding a substantial interest in a third business incorporated or doing business in South Africa,
- bonds, debentures, etc., issued or guaranteed by the government of South Africa or by any of the above types of business involved in South Africa, and
- any other investment that has a substantial connection with South Africa.

Again, this is hardly evasive legislative drafting. It invites rapid and total divestment of Ontario pension funds. And it is evidently possible for unions and other organizations through these means to put pressure on every sort of "substantial connection" between Canadian business and South Africa.

This new state of affairs is a by-product of efforts to divest university pension funds. Although no one such effort should be singled out, the experience of the York University divestment campaign casts interesting light on this matter. As reported in these pages a couple of years ago, the York campaign was brought to a halt by legal opinion that, despite majority consent of the beneficiaries, the University pension fund trustees should not divest. In



Protest outside SA embassy, Ottawa 1988

the aftermath, pressure on the University administration led to President Harry Arthurs writing immediately to Ontario's Attorney General. York also prompted the Ontario Council of University Faculty Associations (OCUFA) to support a change in legislation.

Room for action

There are some reasons for not cheering too loudly. The New Democratic member's criticism of the bill is partly supported by the lack of publicity given the legislation, and the fact that the Attorney General did not himself even introduce the bill or participate in the debate at second reading. There was no press coverage of the matter, OCUFA has yet to advertise the achievement, and, as far as we know, no pension fund has yet taken notice of the legislation. (The Pension Commission of Ontario's investment auditor knew nothing of the legislation or of any action contemplated under it at the time of writing.)

But it would be churlish to spurn what may be a Christmas gift to the anti-apartheid movement from an Attorney General who is a civil libertarian and opponent of apartheid, and from others with similar credentials, like York's President, Harry Arthurs, and OCUFA's past ex-

ecutive director, Howard Epstein. For no matter what else might and should be done by this provincial government, the legislation is something more concrete than has been produced recently by the rhetorically self-righteous government of Mulroney, and it opens up new scope for action by the anti-apartheid movement in Canada.

Even where pension fund links to South Africa have declined as a result of corporate divestment in the past few years, the Ontario legislation opens up room for significant action. (Less than one per cent of York's total pension fund, according to its Treasurer, is linked to corporations with substantial direct investments in South Africa.) The Bank of Nova Scotia, and all businesses responsible for the increased Canadian trade with South Africa in recent years, seem clearly permissible targets for divestment under this legislation.

Here is an opportunity for anti-apartheid organizations to coordinate a strategy for promoting the adoption of the Ontario legislation, or yet stronger action, by other provincial governments. And they should press for pension and trust fund divestment nation-wide to put pressure upon corporations still linked to apartheid.

Singing External's Song: Journalism Conference Controversy

BY MICHAEL VALPY

Michael Valpy is a journalist and former Africa and Middle East Bureau chief for the Toronto Globe and Mail.

As we go to press, the following 'open letter' written by Michael Valpy for the University of Regina student paper, the Carillon, was brought to SAR's attention. In it Valpy explains his reasons for refusing to participate in a recent conference on South Africa organized by the University of Regina's School of Journalism and Communications. As the letter makes clear, the conference raises a number of important questions about Canada's current policy towards South Africa - questions we hope to explore in greater depth with a more detailed report on the conference in the next issue.

I am boycotting the conference on South Africa organized by the University of Regina's School of Journalism and Communications. I frankly hope other people will do the same - and send a message to the Canadian government that it is betraying the opponents of apartheid around the world and betraying the honour of the people of Canada here at home.

This conference is largely paid for by the Canadian government and is structured so as to serve as a vehicle for Ottawa's intentions to renege on its once commendable South African policy.

I was scheduled to take part as chairman of a panel discussion. I cancelled on the day I found out that the conference's focus would be on South African censorship and propaganda and that the Department of External Affairs was looking after most of the bills with a donation of \$42,000.

Nothing would be wrong with a conference on South African propaganda and censorship - if it were not that these are the subjects Ot-

tawa wants Canadians to talk about ... and that what Ottawa does not want Canadians to talk about is the government's abandoned promise to take the strongest action against South Africa if it did not end apartheid and move toward a democratic multiracial state.

Stay with me while I take you through the history ...

In the summer of 1985, Commonwealth leaders - including Canada's Brian Mulroney - agreed at their Nassau summit to impose some voluntary economic sanctions against South Africa.

In the fall of 1985, Prime Minister Mulroney told the United Nations General Assembly that if the South African government did not dismantle apartheid and open a dialogue on full internal democracy, Canada would impose full and mandatory sanctions and possibly sever diplomatic relations.

In February 1987, at the end of his African visit, Mulroney said he was returning to Canada with the "sad conclusion ... that the way of dialogue [in South Africa] is not making progress but is regressing." Asked if this meant Canada would turn its voluntary sanctions into mandatory ones, Mulroney became puzzlingly vague - saying only that Canada would act in concert with its allies.

In October 1987, at the Commonwealth summit in Vancouver, Mulroney said in an interview he had seen nothing to indicate South Africa was dismantling apartheid or moving toward a democratic state. Asked if this meant Canada was moving toward severing diplomatic relations, he replied:

"We are coming closer to that, yes. We are moving. The silence and the absence of dialogue takes us closer to that. Canada cannot

be (merely) benignly interested in the greatest moral debate that is going on. Canada has to be on the high ground and provide leadership to its friends and allies around the world."

In June 1988, at the summit meeting in Toronto of the world's industrialized nations, the G-7, Mulroney tried to press the case of full and mandatory sanctions with Thatcher's Britain, Reagan's America, Kohl's West Germany ... and with that money-banking beneficiary of sanctions-busting, Japan. He got nowhere.

Two months later, in August 1988, Ottawa began its big lie.

The occasion was the meeting of the Commonwealth's committee of foreign ministers on southern Africa. External Affairs suddenly announced - with massive amounts of expensive publicity and hired impresarios - that South African censorship and propaganda were now the prime issues, no longer sanctions. To support this message, External Affairs spent hundreds of thousands of dollars to assemble speakers, musicians, artists. In the biggest single piece of hoopla, thousands of Torontonians were assembled to light candles for the cause of South African truth.

Commonwealth foreign ministers from Africa caught on quickly. On the day the conference began, the main headline on the *Globe and Mail's* front page read: "Ottawa deflection of sanctions issue angers delegates."

To quote Canada's leading academic expert on Canada-South Africa relations, Prof. Linda Freeman of Carleton University:

"[External Affairs Minister] Joe Clark's attempt to focus the delegates' attention on the minor Canadian project of combating South African censorship and propaganda and away from the main issue of wider and tougher sanctions angered and distressed the Commonwealth secretary-general and the African delegations.

"In exasperation, one African foreign minister asked Clark in a closed session what his problem was. Clark suggested that the Canadian public did not want a stronger policy - [although] as the African minister pointed out, polls show that half of all Canadians would support tougher measures."

Since the Prime Minister's honourable speech to the UN General Assembly in 1985, the South African government has travelled an undeviating path of greater repression. Since 1985, elements of petty apartheid - whites only toilets, whites only recreation facilities - have been reinstated. Since 1985, more and more voices of opposition have been silenced. Since 1985, not one step has been taken toward the dismantling of racism and the creation of a democratic state.

Since 1985, Canada's trade with South Africa has increased. Since 1985, the government of Brian Mulroney has taken no steps to make Canada's economic sanctions either full or mandatory. Canada's two-way trade with South Africa is still about \$200 million annually. The Canadian government has not kept

its pledge to discourage scientific co-operation. South Africans were permitted to attend three officially sponsored conferences in Canada. Canadian companies such as Canadian Pacific have been involved in sanctions busting.

What has happened is that Canada's honourable South Africa policy has never been more than Brian Mulroney's South Africa policy.

Mulroney has never had the support of Cabinet - some of whose members, such as John Crosbie, have visited South Africa at Pretoria's invitation. A majority of Cabinet is philosophically opposed to tampering with business, whatever the cause. Others still hold to the belief that Pretoria's racist government is the bulwark against communism in southern Africa.

Mulroney also has never had the support of External Affairs, perhaps the most spineless of Canadian ministries. External's basic creed is to dislike any policy that puts Canada at odds with the foreign policies of the United States and, to a lesser degree, Britain.

Thus, as Stephen Lewis, Canada's former ambassador to the UN, has put it, with regard to South Africa "Canada is on the verge of dereliction to our commitment."

In the meantime, External Affairs makes money available for conferences such as this one ... to talk about censorship and propaganda. Well, whose propaganda?

Sat Kumar, director of the School of Journalism, says that although External Affairs has paid for the conference and suggested speakers it has no control over "editorial content." My reply is that External Affairs does not need control; the conference is singing External's song.

The money for the conference comes from a \$1 million External Affairs fund created as part of Ottawa's "Canadian Action Plan - Strategy to Counter South African Propaganda and Censorship." Mr. Kumar should ask himself how much money he would have got from Ottawa if he had planned a conference to examine Canada's South African sanctions policy. He should then ask himself whether he has been bribed.



Hartman

An Evening with Albie Sachs

Albie Sachs recently participated in a TCLSAC cultural event directed by Robert Rooney. Celebrated Canadian actor R. H. Thomson read excerpts from the play, *The Jail Diaries of Albie Sachs*. (In 1985 he had performed the role of Albie.) Hundreds of people were moved by the magic of the two 'Albies' coming face to face. The audience had come to celebrate Albie's survival of a vicious car bomb attack in April 1988. Albie said the only revenge he yearned for was a free democratic South Africa.

Rural Ontario: Apartheid's Long Reach

BY LINDA SLAVIN

Linda Slavin works with a community radio station in Peterborough, Ontario. She is just one of many Canadians who are 'lobbied' by South African Embassy officials in this country. We've heard stories from all parts of Canada of visits by Embassy representatives, 'private' meetings, low-key 'information' sessions to give influential people the 'real' story. Contact with South African officials is often arranged by prominent local business people.

Wedge into a long sequence of incoming calls was one from the Cable T.V. programmer: "Please call the South African Embassy."

Continue on with a busy week.

Several days later, taping three shows at the studio: "Did you ever get in touch with the Embassy?"

No.

"Well, they phoned again. The Economic Attaché is coming to speak to the Rotary Club and wants to do an interview." I take five minutes to explain why he is coming, how he gets his message into town, and why I won't interview him.

Not the end. A direct phone call to me. I'm out and don't return the call. New twist. Local student radio director approaches me. We're both in a rush. He's been called several times and has agreed to interview the Attaché, as long as there's someone to balance; an articulate Kenyan who has worked with student refugees from South Africa has agreed. It's all arranged - if I will do the radio interview.

I consider: we all feel pressured. What is freedom of the press? Two more calls to me from the Embassy. The Attaché just wants

to talk about sanctions; his field doesn't include politics ... he laughs self-consciously when I counter that everything is political. Decision. If I can guarantee 'balance' ... okay. Phone Cable T.V. and arrange that we repeat the performance there after the radio interview.

Monday morning and the Kenyan is not in his office. Relief! Maybe he isn't back from Halifax. No, both arrive as scheduled at the radio studio ... polite introductions and we begin.

The Attaché is smooth. A 'liberal activist' during college days; a university professor who allowed - quite against the rules - a co-ed, co-colour dormitory; a genuine abhorrence of the mixed marriages law and the separation laws; but someone who has seen the legal changes and knows life is better. Do you endorse one person, one vote? "Yes, it is necessary to work towards one man, one vote. And the structures are in place ... the special advisory council will help with changing the constitution ..."

The Kenyan comes on strong. *Apartheid is morally wrong. Apartheid has to be dismantled totally. The changes are cosmetic. Real political and personal freedom is not present, nor ever can be under this abhorrent system of laws which institutionalizes racism. We can't talk about it in 'reform' terms. The government won't even negotiate with most of the black leaders. They are in jail, ignored in consultation.*

Passion upsets the Attaché. We must be rational about this. It's a slow process. Consider sanctions. There are a few who favour them, but Buthelezi, chief of six million Zulus, objects. Polls show blacks don't want to lose their jobs.

But the phrasing of the polls, the stark choices, get the desired answers. Polls have not been conclusive either way about the effectiveness of the sanctions, but most leaders and people, when faced with no political freedom, embrace the idea.

(Me, salving my conscience): You (the Attaché) are talking long, slow (ineffective) sanctions. Advocates want fast, hard ones which will not allow time to work out economic adjustments. Why is it against the law to talk about sanctions?

But the Attaché has black friends - and is quite hurt when interrupted by the Kenyan - *Yes, a black gardener, a black maid, black nanny, black cook.* The interview ends awkwardly.

The Attaché is concerned. "I forgot to ask. Are you a member of the ANC, because if you are, I'm not supposed to talk with you."

Exactly my point. When your government won't even talk with the opposition, how can you say changes are valid? No, I'm not a member, but I support it strongly. Perhaps I should join. (Me, too.)

The South African continues, conversation focussed carefully on the need for rationality, politeness, respect ... all important qualities, but - in this case - the need is to control. The subsequent T.V. interview has the same arguments, counterbalances, as the radio one, but lacks some of the Kenyan's earlier passion. Calculated success, although complaints that the Kenyan had the last word.

I bid goodbyes, feeling had. The Economic Attaché is a 'nice' man, with genuine and likable qualities, the best ambassador to send. He

continued on page 33

Mozambique: A Dream Undone?

BY OTTO ROESCH

Mozambique: A Dream Undone. The Political Economy of Democracy, 1975-1984, by Bertil Egero. Uppsala. Scandinavian Institute for Development Studies, 1987. 230 pp. ISBN 91-7106-262-9.

As one surveys the wreckage of Mozambique's war-ravaged economy, and ponders the uncertain outcome of the intensifying class struggle that the adoption of IMF-approved economic reforms is currently refueling [*SAR*, vol. 4, no. 2 (Oct. 1988)], one may well wonder at the prospects for continued socialist transition in Mozambique. Writing at a time before the worst effects of the war had made themselves felt, and before the adoption of the IMF panacea had pushed the Mozambican class struggle to its present level of intensity, Bertil Egero was already asking himself essentially the same question, as he surveyed the deepening crisis of Mozambique's post-independence socialist experiment. Why, he asked, "after ten years of development in the name of Popular Power," had the post-independence dream of "growing prosperity in a democratic society" failed to materialize, despite the best efforts of an honest and committed political leadership?

In *Mozambique: The Dream Undone*, Egero does not look for the answer in the adverse international and structural-historical conditions - the debilitating colonial legacy, South African destabilization, the international recession - that characterized the Mozambican experience. Rather he focuses on the experiment's own internal developmental contradictions. His concern is more with the content than with

the context of Mozambique's post-independence socialist project.


At the heart of Egero's analysis is what he sees as a basic disjuncture between the political dynamic of the period of armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism and the political dynamic that established itself in the country after independence. Egero's argument is that the popular democratic dynamic that developed between Frelimo leaders and the peasant masses during the course of the liberation struggle - a dynamic of *poder popu-*

quired a marked concentration of power in the hands of the state at the expense of popular participation.

In Egero's analysis, this concentration of power in the state's hands stemmed directly from "[t]he structure of the colonial economy and the conditions of liberation [which] made the creation of a strong state apparatus an inevitable part of national independence." Egero argues that the centralization of power was an historical necessity imposed on Frelimo by the class structure of colonial Mozambique. With no literate and politically-conscious working class to draw from, Frelimo had to rely on a small, illiterate and geographically-limited peasant social base for the state apparatus, and it had to ally itself with an urban 'middle level state strata' to be able to implement its bold political agenda. To prevent any elitist deviations of its popular agenda by this middle level strata, Frelimo opted for a high degree of centralization of political power. It was concentrated in the hands of the Party, under whose leadership all other social sectors had to subordinate themselves. This vanguardist solution to the problem of exercising revolutionary power after independence was further re-enforced by two other factors: the chaotic administrative and economic situation which followed the mass exodus of the colonial settler stratum after indepen-

dence, and the growing external military and economic siege to which the fledgling Mozambican revolution was subject from the outset.

Egero believes this developmental strategy was adopted mainly because of a convergence of inter-



lar or 'popular power' critical to the success of Frelimo's guerrilla war - could not be sustained after independence. It couldn't be sustained because the terrain of political action upon which Frelimo was forced to operate after independence re-

ests of Party cadres influenced by East European models of development – emphasizing modernization through state-directed processes of industrialization based on the economic dominance of the state sector – and of those in the state apparatus whose elitist and petty bourgeois aspirations were best served by keeping responsibility for development and modernization in the hands of the state bureaucracy. With the ascendancy of this developmental ideology, the rural-based popular participation politics of the liberation struggle found it difficult to assert itself. Mass mobilization as a component of Mozambique's development strategy began to steadily give way to "the restoration of managerial power, the centralization of decision-making and the demand for hierarchical respect."

Frelimo sought to counterbalance this centralization of power by actively fostering the growth of grass-roots mass organizations for workers, peasants, women, youth and professionals (teachers and journalists, for example). But the objective conditions for their growth were not favourable. The vast ma-

majority of Mozambicans were accustomed to rigidly hierarchical and authoritarian relations. They had not participated in the liberation struggle and had no historical experience of organized class political action. It was highly unlikely that such state-fostered organizations could develop the needed strength and autonomy to fulfill the counterbalancing function expected of them.

Furthermore, the role that Frelimo political directives defined for these organizations cast them, more often than not, as supporters of state policy rather than as popular correctives and constraints on such policies. In this context, sustaining active popular participation – participation which had been so central to the political process of the liberation struggle – became exceedingly difficult. Without the corrective of popular participation, the centralization of power led to elitism, bureaucratization and the isolation of the political leadership and the state from the people. The dismal economic performance of Frelimo's bureaucratic development strategy further accelerated the decline in popular political mobilization. It has

pushed Mozambique's socialist experiment into a deepening political and economic crisis to which no easy solutions exist.

Though it might be argued that Egero occasionally overstates his case – how legitimate, for example, is his downplaying of the corrective intent of the Fourth Frelimo Party Congress and of the importance of the war in shaping government economic policy after the Congress – it is hard not to agree with much of the thrust of his analysis. Egero's book is an important contribution to our understanding of the internal forces which have shaped the present crisis of Mozambique's socialist project and to the study of popular democratic development strategies in the Third World. Though the text suffers from a lack of careful copy editing – awkward syntax, typographical errors and stylistic inadequacies detract from clarity of expression and textual fluidity – this is a minor inconvenience. The book is well worth the read, not only by specialists in the field, but also by anyone interested in popular struggles for development and democracy in the Third World.

Coming of Age in Zimbabwe

BY MEG LUXTON

Meg Luxton teaches Women's Studies at York University and has travelled and researched in southern Africa.

Nervous Conditions by Tsitsi Dangaremba, published by The Women's Press, London, 1988. 204 pages

Once in a while I read a novel that so captures my imagination, its characters embed themselves in my consciousness, becoming old friends so that I catch myself wondering how they are and why they haven't written. Tsitsi Dangaremba's *Nervous Conditions* has done this for me. It's a wonderful, powerful work.

Set in colonial Rhodesia in the 1960s, it tells the story of five women and their men, articulating the personal pain and anguish, the social devastation wrought by the colonization of the Shona by the British. The storyteller is Tambu, who recounts her experiences of escaping from the poverty of her family's rural homestead, where physical survival is the major concern, to the relative luxury of life in a mission school where spiritual and intellectual development become possible for her. By contrasting her experiences with those of the other four women she loves, Tambu explores the various possibilities available to women in a colonial situation. Her


story is, she says, "about my escape and Lucia's; about my mother's and Maiguru's entrapment; and about Nyasha, . . . whose rebellion may not in the end have been successful."

Her mother, Mainini, remains poor and bound to the homestead, acknowledging, but never actively challenging the fact that "being a woman was a burden because you had to bear children and look after them and the husband." Her mother's sister, Lucia, is also poor but refuses to look after a husband, struggling always instead to elude the constraints of 'proper womanhood' in Shona society. Tambu's aunt Maiguru is "a different kind of

woman." With an MA from England and married to the principal of the mission school, Maiguru lives in relative luxury as a housewife on the mission station. She is, in effect, the ideal woman of the British middle class missionaries who paid for her and her husband's education and who pay him the salary with which he supports her. Maiguru's daughter, Nyasha, Tambu's closest friend and first love, was raised in England and cannot find a place as a Shona woman. She "had taken seriously the lessons about oppression and discrimination she had learned first-hand in England." Highly critical of both the colonial society and of patriarchal domination by Shona men, Nyasha rebels constantly. But she lacks a vision of what she is fighting for and so becomes ill with anorexia nervosa, that classic illness of oppressed women. Even this experience is denied, for the white psychiatrist insists that Africans do not suffer anorexia and claims she is just "making a scene."

The only woman who has any chance of escaping both the constraints of being a woman and the poverty of rural life is Tambu. Her journey to freedom "was a long and painful process" in which "quietly, unobtrusively and extremely fitfully, something in my mind began to assert itself, to question things and refuse to be brainwashed."

The central theme of the book is the development of consciousness. What makes the novel so powerful and effective is the way it demonstrates that gender, race and class are inseparable forces shaping people's daily lives and the social rela-



tions of colonial society. The story of a child growing up embodies the concept of consciousness raising.

Tambu is a child who lacks experience and knowledge and so approaches everything with careful attention, for she never knows what may be important. Her quick curiosity and intelligence is shown through her careful, detailed description of daily life. This recounting is never boring both because of the character's gentle, subtly snide cynicism and because of the author's skill with language. With life on the homestead being so familiar and so hard, Tambu initially sees life at the mission station as representing everything good in life. She is outraged by Nyasha's

criticisms of her own father, Tambu's uncle. "I thought she had no right to be so unhappy when she was Babamkuru's daughter." Gradually, Tambu comes to understand the price her people have paid for the wealth and education of the English and the devastation to women of male domination.

One of the themes which is subtly and brilliantly developed is the way in which people's choices are constrained by their circumstances. Over and over Dangaremba shows that, no matter how difficult, circumstances are never fully immutable; but agency is always limited and partial.

As a young girl, Tambu desperately wants an education. She sees learning as a way out of the poverty of her mother's life. She works incredibly hard to get into and stay in school despite the extraordinary difficulties imposed by grinding poverty (which requires her to work long hard hours before and after school); by the active opposition of her father (who spends the money sent to pay her school fees); and by her brother (who steals the mealies she has grown to earn replacement fees). She ends up going to the mission school but not directly because of her initiatives. Rather, at her brother's death, she is selected to replace him because her uncle firmly believes that one member of the family must get an education. There are no other boys.

The story is gripping and compelling, the language rich and the characters vibrant. It would be a wonderful book from which to teach. And while the characters may never actually write me a letter, I hope the author writes again for us.

Different Worlds

BY DAPHNE READ

Daphne Read is a literature scholar who will be teaching at the University of Alberta.

Cry Freedom, a film directed by Richard Attenborough, 1987. *A World Apart*, a film directed by Chris Menges, 1988.

There is a world of difference between *Cry Freedom* and *A World Apart*, a difference in politics and art embodied in their titles. "Cry Freedom" is a battle cry, a call to struggle, an anguished lament. The film dramatizes the relationship between Donald Woods, liberal newspaper editor, and Stephen Biko, powerful advocate of Black Consciousness, and charts Woods' own banning and flight into exile after Biko's death in 1977. In this dramatization, the focus is on the men who embody the values of liberalism, Black Consciousness and the state. It is a typically masculinist view of the relationship between politics and individuals.

Cry Freedom enacts the values and fictions of an oversimplified liberalism and invites the audience to collude in the ideological work it performs. Through vicarious identification with Donald Woods, viewers participate in their own education in the lessons of apartheid, or conversion, or adventure. One can view the film as the education of the protagonist, Woods, from the blindness of a white rationality to enlightenment. Biko, his guide and mentor on this journey, is presented as a Christ-like figure of wisdom, compassion and humanity. Or one can view the film as a simple conversion narrative, a variant of the biblical conversion of Saul to Paul. As such the film becomes a paean to the truth as revealed to Donald Woods, a paean to the Word written by Woods. Finally, the film can be seen as the triumph of rugged individualism, with

the hero successfully eluding the bad guys and escaping to freedom, the Book of Biko clutched to his breast.

Cry Freedom celebrates liberalism, its values, its vision of social justice, its heroes. Its dramatic power depends on the capacity of the audience to identify with its heroes and their goals — freedom, equality and brotherhood. In contrast, *A World Apart*, as the title signals, maintains its apartness in its relationship with the viewer; there is no easy emotional identification or catharsis, there is no escape from the world of apartheid. *A World Apart* dramatizes the relationship between Shawn Slovo, the filmmaker, and her mother, Ruth First, during the months surrounding First's detention under the 90-Day Law in 1963. Unlike *Cry Freedom*, this film is not an act of hero-worship. It explores the complex tensions in the relationship between political and personal commitments, and it does this through the eyes and heart of a thirteen-year-old white middle-class girl who stands at a shifting, sullen, petulant, self-conscious point between the innocence of her younger sisters and the political passion of her mother. Locating the film's point of view in a girl on the edge of adolescence creates unease and distance, precisely the critical distance that Brecht advocated in political art.

A second strategy that enhances critical response is the blurring of the autobiographical and historical. This has caused some anxiety for critics who favour a "faithful" mirroring of the past in political films. However, fictionalizing the historical figures as the "Roths" focuses attention on the issues the film raises and not on who the characters were or are in real life. While avoiding the danger of blind hero-worship, at the same time the film also — ironically — renders Ruth First anonymous. Few

Canadian film critics seem to know who Shawn Slovo's mother was.

A World Apart is in large part about the worlds of mothers and daughters in white South Africa. The departure of Gus Roth in the opening scene creates the space for a very particular, female exploration of the personal/political dynamic. In the absence of the father, the family consists of the grandmother, mother, three daughters and the servant, Elsie, who stands in as surrogate mother. The female world expands to include Molly's friend, Yvonne, and her parents, and the girls' school, where the personal and the political intersect in differing ways. However, the heart of the personal story is Molly's relationship with her mother. Through Molly's perspective, the film confronts the relationship between the personal and the political at an emotional level in the world of women. This confrontation has particular relevance for women with its exploration of the conflicts in 1963 between the daughter's desire for a mother of her very own, the mother's insistence on a room of her own (with all that it implies), and the daughter's tentative steps towards a political identity of her own. These conflicts are all, of course, mediated by the state's active intervention and interpretation.

To insist on the relevance of gender in this film is not to minimize the political struggle of the 1960s but to suggest a dimension of critical analysis that *Cry Freedom* lacks. *Cry Freedom* subordinates, even trivializes, personal concerns and uncritically reinforces both patriarchal authority in the family and heroic male individualism. Gender mediates Diana Roth's political experience, gender mediates Molly's personal experience. In prison, Ruth First/Diana Roth is told by an enraged interrogator that "You can count your lucky stars that we still have respect for women in our country. ... We still have some feeling for women." In a different vein, one film critic has worried that the film may be seen to reproduce the state's

condemnation of First as an unfit mother. Gender mitigates punishment at the same time that it constrains. For Molly the state is intrusive and bullying but her encounter with violence and terror comes from another quarter, when Yvonne's father, in a self-righteous blaze of territoriality, bans Molly from his house and viciously pursues her in order to ensure that she returns to her place. She is learning about patriarchal power and violence and about a woman's place.

A World Apart is about the education of Molly into the complexities and subtleties of personal and political engagement in South Africa. Together with and apart from her mother she attempts to know the world of apartheid for herself. She visits Elsie in her quarters, she goes with her mother to show solidarity with a black workers' strike, and then later, after her mother has been arrested, she goes with Elsie to visit

her family in the township. Attending a political meeting there, she witnesses the arrest of Solomon, Elsie's brother, who is her own private link to the ANC. It is this link that later cements the reconciliation between daughter and mother.

Molly embodies the inarticulate-ness of the child who cannot comprehend events around her, yet seeks ways of understanding. She doesn't understand the primacy of politics in her mother's life; her reaction to her mother's arrest is a mixture of loss, abandonment, anger. Yet she is fiercely loyal to her mother, even protecting her mother's terrible secret from the police, the secret that Diana Roth has not shared with Molly. The confrontation between Molly and Diana over Diana's attempted suicide in prison is, as Shawn Slovo has explained, a therapeutic fiction. In *117 Days* Ruth First recounted that she wrote her suicide note in the front of a cross-

word puzzle book but ripped it up and flushed it down the toilet before she left the prison. In the film Diana Roth writes a farewell note to her husband in the prison Bible. She hides it on her return home, but Molly discovers it. The daughter-mother confrontation wins Molly the recognition that "it's not fair . . . I'm not the mother you wanted," and enables Molly to move on in her reconciliation of the personal and political. She insists on going to Solomon's funeral - "he's my friend" - and mother and daughter stand in solidarity with each other and the mourners at the end of the film.

Solomon's funeral swells to a mass demonstration; as the mourning shifts in tenor to a celebration of the struggle, armored vehicles move in. The final image is of a man arrested in mid-motion, hurling a rock - a grim reminder of the implacability of apartheid. The grief is ours that so little has changed since 1963.

Quebec & Southern Africa

continued from page 13

tonomous agenda regarding sanctions;

•better coordination amongst ourselves and with English Canada.

CIDMAA sees these needs as a mandate for its future work, and is at present developing a working hypothesis for a sanctions programme to present to the network in April. That hypothesis will include mechanisms for analysis and circulation of information (both in relation to sanctions monitoring and the de-

mands of South African organizations themselves), a concrete programme of action to press for stricter sanctions, and improved coordination with our English-Canadian counterparts.

Towards repoliticization

The 1990s certainly offer major challenges. How can we begin to repoliticize our solidarity work? Certainly we need to rebuild upon our earlier foundations. But this must be done with flexibility, and with recognition of the changes that have

occurred. We must avoid a return to the ghetto (the good old days when our political direction was clear, but we had virtually no audience). But we must also refuse the temptation to conform to the new technocratic norms which infect sections of the movement and the society at large. Most importantly, we need to resurrect the principle that underlies our very existence - to be a bridge between movements here and in southern Africa that share a similar vision of a project for social transformation.

Apartheid's Long Reach

continued from page 28

comes with polite, academic steps into southern Ontario. The local press cover his speech at the Rotary Club, "Sanctions Won't Work," and the editorial asks, "Whoever do we believe?"

Do I leave freedom of speech to the uninformed media? Do I take

comfort in discomforting the messenger? Has the interview merely given credibility to apartheid? Yes . . . no. I won't repeat the experiment.

Editorial comment: SAR would like to keep track of these visits and their aftermath. Readers who know of such activities in their area are urged to get as many details as they can (com-

plete with names and titles of the South Africans and the people they meet with, plus the organizers) and forward them to Southern Africa REPORT. We also would like to receive any press coverage of protests of these visits, and copies of letters, editorial opinion, etc. that parrot the South African line. SAR will use the information to report to you periodically on the Embassy activities in Canada.

MOZAMBIQUE:

RIDING OUT THE STORM

ON THE BORDERS
OF APARTHEID




Mozambique is a country that has become the target of a war of "destabilization" organized by a powerful neighbor, South Africa. The war has been disastrous. Since 1980, several hundred thousands Mozambicans, mostly civilians, have died in the fighting, and the country has been brought to the brink of chaos.

Twenty-year-old Albertino Roda is lucky to be alive. He has survived five guerrilla attacks. He was shot in the leg; he walked away from a bazooka-hit car; he watched as his uncle was beheaded. Every school he has attended since 1983 was burned down. This film is Albertino's story.

Albertino lives in the northern part of the country, Nampula province. He decides to leave the relative security of the town, where he is studying to be an elementary school teacher. His aim is to find his parents who are cut off some-

where in the war zone. Travelling by train, truck and on foot, he meets old neighbors, friends and former teachers who guide him through a land being torn apart. Some of them are refugees; others stubbornly stay in their jobs, risking their lives every day. Yet, at the end of his journey, Albertino has faced the desperate situation of his country and is still able to talk about the future.

The war in Mozambique has made normal development aid ineffective. Large Canadian investments intended for rebuilding the railway sit frozen because of guerrilla attacks. Canadian volunteers and aid workers are restricted to towns while the work to be done is in the countryside. Canada, along with other Western nations, has to decide how to support Mozambique as it is gripped in the military struggle against apartheid.



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Cooperation Canada-Mozambique (COCAMO) is a coalition of 20 Canadian non-governmental organizations which have joined hands to assist Mozambique in responding to the crisis brought on by South African destabilization. The member agencies represent many Canadian groups, and function as a special working group of the Canadian Council for International Development. COCAMO is directing a seven-million-dollar program, financed by contributions from Canadians and matching funds from the Canadian International Development Agency and Partnership Africa-Canada, for emergency aid and rebuilding in Nampula province in northern Mozambique.

For more information contact COCAMO,
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