

Southern Africa **REPORT**

Vol. 3 No. 4

February 1988



The Frontline

ANGOLA

Angola, The Front
of the Frontline:
Economic Reform

■
Interview with
Iona Campagnola

ZIMBABWE

Unity
in
Zimbabwe

MOZAMBIQUE

Mozambique Diary:
Life on the Frontline

BOTSWANA


Caught in the
Middle:

Botswana's Position
in
South Africa

price: \$3.00

REPORT

February 1988



Southern Africa REPORT

is produced 5 times a year by a volunteer collective of the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (TCLSAC),

427 Bloor St. W.
Toronto, M5S 1X7
Tel. (416) 967-5562

Submissions, suggestions and help with production are welcome and invited.

Subscriptions

Annual TCLSAC membership and Southern Africa Report subscription rates are as follows:

SUBSCRIPTION:

Individual (1 year) \$15.00
Individual (2 years) \$30.00
Institution \$30.00

MEMBERSHIP: (includes subscription)

Regular (Canada) \$30.00
Unemployed
Student \$15.00
Senior
Sustainer \$50.00
to \$300.00

Overseas add \$5.00

Contents

Editorial	
Supporting the Frontline	1
Unity in Zimbabwe	3
Mozambique Diary:	
Life on the Frontline	7
Angola, Front Line of the Frontline:	
Economic Reform	11
Campagnola: More Canadian Help	13
Caught in the Middle:	
Botswana's Position in Southern Africa	15
Making the New South African Culture:	
The Amsterdam Conference	18
"Virtually a Government in Exile":	
The ANC at Arusha	22
Extending the Frontlines	24
Sports	
Tackling Tennis	26
Reviews	
Filming the Frontlines:	
Destabilization/Development	27
Letters	29

Bruce Paton photos in this issue taken from a circulating photo exhibit titled "Another Battle Begun" available through CUSO.

We would like to thank OXFAM Ontario for the grant which made possible this issue of Southern Africa REPORT

S. A. R. Collective

Jonathan Barker, Nancy Barker, Claudette Chase,
David Cooke, Mark Fawcett, Esmeralda Fernandes,
David Galbraith, Anne Gillies, Christie Gombay, Linda Guebert,
Carole Houlihan, Jo Lee, Blaine Little, Mary MacNutt,
Judith Marshall, Hélène Moussa, Colleen Omanique, Otto Roesch,
John S. Saul, Heather Speers, Joe Vise, Mary Vise

Cover design by Art Work

Cover photo by Bruce Paton



Bruce Paton

Supporting the Frontline

In regional terms, the central reality in Southern Africa is the war of aggressive destabilization being waged by South Africa against its neighbours. It is a war which South Africa wages on many fronts, economic, psychological and military (in the latter case by means both of direct intervention and of proxy forces which it recruits, directs and arms). There can be no doubt that the first instinct of anti-apartheid activists in responding to the consequent plight of such Frontline States is the correct one – that of solidarity with them both in their struggles to protect the integrity of their development efforts from the deprivations of South Africa and their attempts to contribute to the long-term liberation of South Africa itself.

There is an understandable temptation to stop the discussion right there, refusing to venture into the kind of critical discussion of these countries' own internal dynamics which might, as it unearths problems and contradictions, be thought to give aid and comfort to the apartheid enemy. As articles in this (and earlier) issues of *Southern Africa REPORT* will attest, the *Southern Africa REPORT* editorial working group have not thought this to be the wisest course to follow. There are, of course, the citizens of these states themselves to be considered. Their fates are profoundly affected not only by South Africa but also by any corruptions and shortfalls in performance of their own leaderships. They certainly deserve our sympathetic understanding as

they carry out their own domestic political actions to realize a better life.

But we also feel strongly that intellectual honesty and analytical rigour in the discussion of the Frontline States (as also in the discussion of all other aspects of the transformations underway in Southern Africa) are of direct and profound importance to the anti-apartheid movement itself. For an anti-apartheid movement built on mere enthusiasm and apolitical moralizing cannot easily survive the cruel vicissitudes inevitable in so difficult a struggle as the one for Southern Africa. Those who stay the course, experience attests, are those who are least naive.

For us at SAR, the problem of finding the most effective tone to

adopt in balancing a concern for the broader context of South African destabilization on the one hand and a careful scrutinizing of the weaknesses as well as the strengths of the various post-colonial projects in the region on the other has been posed most starkly with respect to Zimbabwe. Indeed, it may be this problem which has induced us to write rather less about Zimbabwe over the years (both in *Southern Africa REPORT* and its predecessor *TCLSAC Reports*) than about almost any other Frontline State. If so, this was not a legitimate course to follow, given the importance of Zimbabwe in terms of its economic centrality to the region (not least within SADCC), of its ongoing attempt to exemplify a non-racial resolution to the problem of white-minority rule and of its military role (as witnessed in its crucial current support for Mozambique).

Yet even in the days of armed struggle, the infighting between ZANU and ZAPU (as well as within each of these movements) which helped stall the liberation struggle seemed to represent rather more the wasting factionalism of an opportunist brand of petty-bourgeois politics than any more principled differences. The same could be said, as this issue's lead article (by our Zimbabwean Correspondent) suggests, of much of the pattern of post-independence politics in Zimbabwe. Moreover, many of the lofty goals of socialist transformation, announced in ZANU's high-flown rhetoric over the years seems to have been lost in the Zimbabwean elite's "accommodations" with international capitalism, the state's self-interested muzzling of working-class organizations and its stalling of any very meaningful programme of rural transformation. Can we avoid telling these

latter aspects of the story "like they are" (while also ourselves reflecting soberly on their implications)?

No, we cannot — provided we speak equally clearly about the many positive accomplishments of the Zimbabwean regime and provided also that (as stated above) we constantly contextualize our evaluation of that regime by making firm reference to the harsh facts of South African aggression. Not for our Correspondent the kind of an analysis of an Oakland Ross (*The Globe and Mail*, January 30, 1988) who can write an extended article on the arrival of one party rule in Zimbabwe

economic "reforms" described may well be, in part, positive policy adjustments designed to work towards a more "feasible" brand of socialism. Yet they also carry the danger, inherent in any enforced accommodation to World Bank/IMF-style market-oriented responses to economic problems, of slowly but surely undermining the promise of socialist advance. We must assess carefully such realities, even to the point of debating critically some of our own most cherished assumptions about liberation, socialism and development.

We must also pose sharply the question of just what it is that has produced the economic crises in these countries which make such recovery programmes necessary in the first place. Errors of policy certainly have their place in the list of explanations. But what of a recent piece in the *Toronto Star* (Saturday, January 16, 1988, by Gordon Barthos) that explains the economic problems of Southern Africa's "Marxist nations" in terms of "a



Bruce Paton

Emergency taxi cooperative, Masvingo, Zimbabwe

that makes no reference whatsoever to South Africa's important role in exacerbating internal conflicts there. For it remains SAR's central premise that none of the countries of Southern Africa can realize their full developmental and human potential so long as an untransformed South Africa bestrides the region, club in hand.

This issue of *Southern Africa REPORT* also looks at some of the other countries in the region from this perspective, Botswana, for example, where a shifting programme of advance and retreat vis-à-vis South Africa is shown, by Jaqueline Solway, to be in process. Or take the examples of Angola and Mozambique (discussed below by Daniel Dos Santos and Judith Marshall). In these countries, the

deadly mix of chronic poverty, ignorance, inefficient forced collectivization, drought, civil war, pest infestation, refugee problems and exhaustion of fertile land". No mention of the central fact of South Africa's destabilization efforts which, in Mozambique and in Angola far more than in Zimbabwe, explains both economic crisis and such retreats from progressive policies as these countries have found to be necessary. Pace Barthos, they have been literally bludgeoned into disarray by South Africa and its various international backers. Honesty and rigour in analysis and evaluation then, but also commitment to the on-going struggle for the liberation of Southern Africa. There is no contradiction between these two activities.

Unity in Zimbabwe

The following article is based on a paper prepared by David Moore.

The declaration of unity in Zimbabwe between Zanu and Zapu is without doubt the most important political event in Zimbabwe since the advent of majority rule and the first election in 1980. Announced on December 22, 1987, the merger capped a tumultuous year, which included crucial constitutional alterations (the removal of the twenty parliamentary seats reserved for whites and the creation of an executive presidency for Robert Mugabe) but also heightened inter- and intra-party maneuvering, a resurgence of dissident activity in Matabeleland and even incursions from Mozambique by the South African-backed anti-Frelimo forces of the MNR. Now the creation of a new Zanu expansive enough to accommodate the old members of

Zapu means that a one-party state is a *de facto* reality. The present article seeks to evaluate the significance of this development.

Given the history of relations between the two main parties of Zimbabwean nationalism, the creation of unity by consent rather than fiat is no mean feat. It is also a deeply ambiguous accomplishment, of course. History has shown that there is no strong reason automatically to hail the advent of a one-party state in other parts of Africa. Socialist states are not ushered in by mere executive order. Opposition and dissent may be not so much swept away from the political scene as swept temporarily under the carpet, with elections to be replaced by factional jockeyings for power and privilege, by authoritarianism and by coups d'état. Moreover, many aspects of the past and present

practices of Zimbabwean politicians must give rise to fears of some such denouement in that country – and also raise concerns as to the potential fragility of the actual accord which has been reached.

We shall return to some of these realities internal to Zimbabwe momentarily. First, however, we must note that unity is being achieved in the context of a regional war of aggression waged by South Africa against the Frontline States, including Zimbabwe. It is this, more than any other single factor perhaps, which illuminates the positive side of the recent declaration of unity. For, in addition to using many other tactics in order to destabilize Zimbabwe, South Africa has realized its greatest successes precisely by exploiting internal divisions within that country. This has meant, most centrally, exploiting the inter-party divisions between Zanu and Zapu, and also the divisions between the Shona-speaking people and the Ndebele because historically, these inter-



Bruce Paton

Kuririre sawmill cooperative, Chimanimani, Zimbabwe

party divisions have come to have ethnic significance. If unity now removes most of the ground for dissidence in Matabeleland, South Africa will find it more difficult to manipulate, for its own ends, Zimbabwe's political differences. Concomitantly, if party unity serves to strengthen a common Zimbabwean nationalism, there may be a much more unified resistance to South African intervention across a wide range of fronts.

The South African factor

It is true that Zimbabwe has been somewhat less of a target for South African aggression than either Mozambique or Angola. Perhaps this is because the latter regimes have been more actively socialist in their policies, and they have also given more prominent support to the apartheid state's most serious foe, the African National Congress. Moreover, Zimbabwe is honey-combed with the economic interests of South African-based firms who would probably not take kindly to the brand of devastation inflicted by Pretoria on those two ex-Portuguese colonies. On the other hand, Zimbabwe is sufficiently economically developed to be an important potential economic rival of South Africa, one likely to expand its role if the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) can succeed in developing a regional economic grid outside South African control. Zimbabwe, insofar as it is successful in its experiment in non-racial politics and pragmatic economic development can serve as a positive pole of attraction for those pushing for progressive change in South Africa itself. And Zimbabwe has the military muscle to play an important part in helping checkmate some of South Africa's own military designs in the region, as witness the important role of Zimbabwean forces in assisting Mozambique to counter the MNR.

One need not merely speculate about this, in fact. For the pattern of aggressive intervention by South

Africa in Zimbabwe has been well documented (by Joseph Hanlon, for example, in three extended chapters of his book, *Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa*, CIIR, 1986). This intervention has economic dimensions: manipulating Zimbabwe's inherited dependence on South Africa by deliberately disrupting the flow of trade, labour and transport between the two countries and simultaneously reinforcing this dependent relationship



Robert Mugabe

by destroying (through MNR action) possible alternative linkages to the sea for land-locked Zimbabwe via Mozambique. Even more dramatic has been the continuing pattern of South African-sponsored disinformation, sabotage and assassination inside Zimbabwe (not least an attempt on Robert Mugabe's life in December, 1981). Most important, as noted above, is the fact that (in Hanlon's words) "South Africa has organized anti-government forces in Zimbabwe, just as it did in Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho and Zambia ... focussing its attention on a dissident movement in the southern part of the country, particularly Matabeleland."

Not that the situation of dissidence in Matabeleland is entirely of South Africa's own making. The latter has been able to make trouble by exacerbating already existing tensions, which, whatever their more ancient roots, arise primarily from the historic failure of the Zimbabwean nationalist movement to transcend the wasting pattern of factional and ethnic politics into which it has fallen. The original split within Zapu in 1963 which led to the creation of the present ruling party demonstrated how fragile political unity has been from the beginning. The initiative which gave rise to ZIPA (the Zimbabwe People's Army) in 1975-76, though ideologically promising, was unable to hold the armies (ZANLA and ZIPRA) of the two rival liberation movements together. And the joint Patriotic Front, formed to confront the Smith regime in the final transitional period from white minority-rule did not last much longer than that regime. With the election of 1980 the two liberation-movements-cum-political-parties separated again, and the subsequent government of national unity, which included Joshua Nkomo and a handful of other Zapu members in the cabinet, lasted less than two years.

Extreme partisanship

The ostensible cause of this latter breakdown of unity was the discovery on a Zapu cooperative farm of a cache of arms, evidence, Zanu immediately claimed, of Zapu's traitorous intent. But the political situation was already grossly overheated by the extreme partisanship of spokespersons on both sides of the party divide, who were also quick to correlate party division with ethnic identification (Zanu with "the Shona," Zapu with "the Ndebele"). The pattern is not an unfamiliar one in Africa, of course. Not that an ethnically-based politics is inevitable there. But in the absence of a more class-based politics which seeks to mobilize the mass of Africans as "peasants and work-

ers," the newly privileged African elites come to jockey for power and privilege between themselves and, in doing so, as often as not seek to advance their positions by politicizing ethnicity, by seeking to rally constituencies behind themselves on "tribal" and regional grounds. This seems to be the trap into which Zimbabwe has fallen.

Indeed, the venomous nature of this kind of politics in Zimbabwe is notorious and is not confined to the interplay between Zanu and Zapu, Shona and Ndebele. It occurs, increasingly frequently, *within* the ruling party itself where competing political barons have heightened intra-Shona rivalries, most notably between "the Zezeru" and "the Karanga." Nonetheless, it is the former division which has been the most highly-charged one and the most damaging; here the kind of rhetorical overkill which expresses such politicking has to be heard to be believed. It is unfortunate, too, that more than mere rhetoric has been involved. When, for example, the Zimbabwean army's Fifth Brigade has in recent years, marched into Matabeleland to deal with "the dissident problem" its presence there has been marked by the most brutal kind of violent repression directed towards the local population. Of course, this is not a style of interaction which will be easily abandoned; indeed, 1987 actually saw some significant escalation of the political name-calling - before cooler heads prevailed towards the end of the year and the present unity agreement was firmed up.

As earlier suggested, not much of this kind of politicking has been preempted by a class-based politics - in spite of the fact that the ruling party has tended to present itself as a socialist, even "Marxist-Leninist," organization. For the consensus of opinion on post-colonial Zimbabwe seems to be (as Zimbabwean social analyst Ibbo Mandaza has put the point) that

as the African petty bourgeoisie began gradually to find access to the

same economic and social status as their white counterparts so, too, did it become increasingly unable to respond to the aspirations of the workers and peasants ... It became imperative, as an act of survival for the new state to put a rein on its mass base ... Political principles and ideological commitment appeared mortgaged on the altar of private property! (Mandaza, ed., Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition, 1980-1986, Dakar, 1986, p. 51)



Joshua Nkomo

Not that an across the board policy of immediate radical socialist transformation would necessarily have been wise. Zimbabwe, learning negative lessons from Mozambique, chose to tackle its inherited (and extremely skewed) socio-economic structure very gingerly indeed; in doing so it at least achieved "substantial levels of food production, the growth of a layer of medium to small peasant producers, a maintenance of infrastructure, improved educational and agricultural services for much of the population and an absence of racial polarization." (J. Hyslop, writing in the August-September, 1987, edition of the *South African Labour Bulletin*) Yet

even Hyslop is uneasy with Mugabe's "commandist style of leadership" and his "demobilizing (of) democratic forms of organization after independence." And other observers emphasize Zimbabwe's extensive, often quite supine, accommodations with international capitalism, the state's self-interested muzzling of the working class and its stalling of any very meaningful programme of rural transformation (cooperativization, the beginnings of land reform and the like).

Troubled waters

These, then, are the troubled waters in which South Africa has been able to fish. There has been popular disaffection from the central government in Matabeleland, in part occasioned by Zanu's crushing electoral victory, more by Zanu's (and the Fifth Brigade's) subsequent stance vis-à-vis the region. There have also been partisan ex-ZIPRA dissidents who build on such discontent as exists: such dissidents may well have operated outside the orbit of official Zapu control, although by the very nature of the case it is difficult to know. And there are those "bands of men" who have kept their weapons and simply "turned to armed banditry." Thirdly, however, there is the so-called "super-Zapu", comprised of "men infiltrated from South Africa" (in Hanlon's words), armed, trained and orchestrated by the Pretoria regime who, "despite the fact they have been rejected by the 'true dissidents' ... have been able to take some advantage of discontent ... to agitate and cause disruption." Hanlon traces many of the most extreme actions linked to "the dissidents" to this source, while also noting the role of the South African-based "Radio Truth" in beaming into southern Zimbabwe (in Ndebele) a barrage of anti-government messages. There is even evidence, Hanlon suggests, that the celebrated (and extremely tension-creating) discovery of the Zapu arms-cache may well have been stage-managed by the



Tanhi fruit growing cooperative, Rusape, Zimbabwe

Bruce Paton

South-Africans – the more deeply to divide Zanu and Zapu.

Of course, it is not certain that the dissidents in Matabeleland will now end their campaigns of destabilization. Zapu itself has, in any case, consistently dissociated itself from the dissidents, even though the latter's demands have often been pro-Zapu (e.g. "Release Zapu detainees"). Dissidents who continue to operate will be doing so in a territory still suspicious of central government pretensions to represent the forces of "law and order"; they may also attempt to lay claim to representing the "true Zapu" tradition, labelling the compromisers as sell-outs. Moreover, the "rebels" reliant on South African support will no doubt continue to receive Pretoria's patronage. Nonetheless, the declaration of unity remains something to celebrate even if doubts persist. At least the groups of leaders in the altered ruling party will now be able to work more closely together on problems such as those in the south-west. The dissidents' identity will become clearer. If unity holds, the rebels themselves will find it more difficult to draw on Zapu's legitimacy while, on the other hand, Zanu personalities like Enos Nkala, Minister of Home Affairs, will no longer be able to stoke the flames by demagogic claims that such dissidents "swim in the political struc-

tures of Zapu." Perhaps even more importantly, South African destabilizers will find it far more difficult to hide behind the enmity between Zanu and Zapu; their hypocrisy and their aggression thus becoming even more exposed than usual.

Looking ahead

As argued at the outset of this article, unity could thus enable Zimbabwe to become all the more forceful in its role as a crucial actor within the anti-apartheid camp in southern Africa. The possible domestic implications of the developments we have been discussing are a little less easy to predict. Perhaps removing some of the most vocal partisan-cum-ethnic hub-bub from the political arena – if this indeed transpires – will help further to unmask the rapidly crystallizing – and extremely parasitic – class structure of Zimbabwe. And this, in turn, might encourage the left to come together more overtly across the party divide and to take greater advantage of the fact that Zanu's official ideology, a residue of the period of armed struggle, is socialist; this may be even more possible after the restraints on change, embedded in the Lancaster House agreement, are discarded after 1990.

Yet the left is weak, so there is also a strong chance that the reverse will be the case, that the right will

itself now consolidate its hold even more effectively, while further reinforcing some of the state's already authoritarian tendencies. Even this development could have some benefits for Matabeleland. For those interested in a "pragmatic" capitalist route for Zimbabwe may at least produce a better balance of state-assisted regional development. Perhaps Joshua Nkomo's new cabinet post overseeing several rural development ministries will facilitate this process, as could the appointment of Zapu's former vice-president Joseph Msika as Minister of Public Construction and National Housing. It may not be useful to speculate further about the future, although we can conclude with a check-list of relevant questions about that future. Will unity hold? What will South Africa do next (economically? in southern Zimbabwe? in the east via the MNR)? What will be the substantive policy content of such unity as is consolidated? We will look for some of the answers to these pressing questions in the coming months.

Readers who are interested in keeping up with the Zimbabwean press should consider subscribing to the Britain-Zimbabwe Society's Review of the Zimbabwean Press, compiled by Terence Ranger, available through Percy Murombe-Chivero, Secretary of the Society, 5 Croham Park Avenue, Croydon, CR2 7HN, UK.

Life on the Frontline

Mozambique Diary:

BY JUDITH MARSHALL

Judith Marshall, a long-time member of the Southern Africa REPORT collective, worked for six years in the Ministry of Education in Mozambique. She spent two months in Mozambique at the end of 1987 evaluating a literacy staff training project.

Maputo

It's hard to get your bearings, coming back to Mozambique now. Even when you're not directly in a war zone, the war affects everything. Today I had lunch with an Australian doctor friend. We were joined by a former student of hers, Felisberta, who arrived smartly dressed, even to her eye make-up. I mentally pegged her as one of the upwardly mobile and arrogant city types among the medical students.

I could hardly have been further off the track. Felisberta turned out to be the director of health for a district in Niassa, one of the least developed provinces in the north, bordering Malawi. She was in Maputo recovering from the trauma of having been captured during a "bandido" attack on her district capital.

After her practicum in Niassa at the end of her training, she and six other students had opted to stay and build up Niassa's health services. Last June she got caught in a bandit attack which destroyed a number of buildings, including the health centre. Her own house and all her belongings were burned. She had the wits to make up a story and succeeded in hiding her identity as a district director from her captors, state and party officials being prime targets for "special" treatment from the MNR. The villagers captured with her didn't give her away.

All those captured were marched at gunpoint towards the "bandido" base, carrying loot from the raid. Felisberta tried once to escape and was caught. On the third day at a river crossing she found herself some distance from everybody else with dense foliage two metres from the path. She dashed into the brush, ran a bit, found a hole and dove in, covering herself with branches as best she could. Terrified, she stayed until the next day, and then made her way on swollen and bloody feet in the direction of the next district's capital.



Rural people in Sofala province flee terrorist actions of the MNR

Sérgio Santimano/AIM

During the first nights after her ordeal, back in the provincial capital, Lichinga, she couldn't sleep. She finally came south to Maputo and is now feeling calmer – but still easily upset and uncertain about what comes next. It set me wondering just how many women and men and children are in this state throughout Mozambique, traumatized, homeless, lives on hold. (I later learned that the Ministry of Education was planning to train more than a thousand teachers in how to recognize and respond to war trauma syndrome.)

Day three brought the shopping trip I tried to put off as long as possible. The economy of Mozambique, as it follows the IMF recipe for economic recovery, is truly a world of wonders. When I was here last February, just after the January devaluation of 240%, everyone still had mounds of meticaís and there was nothing to be bought with them. There was a further 100% devaluation in June. Now there are mounds of things to be bought, with markets full of produce and shop windows beckoning, but few people with buying power. For me, as a consultant earning in foreign currency at the new exchange rate, everything is cheap. A three course meal is less than ten dollars. But for Mozambicans, even with the two general 50% wage increases carried out, there is not enough money to buy the suddenly available consumer goods, ranging from shoes and capulanas (African cloth) to beer and household items.

The trip to the dollar shop at noon was just as horrendous as ever – African consumer goods amidst the sea of hunger all around. It's policed even more strongly than before – symbolic of the "situation"

IMPACT OF THE WAR ON THREE PROVINCES

In Zambezia, Sofala and Tete, the three provinces worst affected by MNR attacks, schooling has been a primary target.

- Of the 2,107 primary schools operating in 1982/83, 1,372 (65%) have been closed.
- Almost 200,000 pupils are out of school (43% of 1983 enrollment figures).

•More than 2,000 teachers can no longer teach (31% of total teaching staff in 1983).

•Almost 7,000 primary school classrooms are in need of major repairs because of bandit raids and attacks.

•Of the 63 secondary schools that exist, 16 (25%) have been closed down because of attacks. Twenty percent of the secondary school students are without classes.

(Source: Ministry of Education, July 4, 1987)

which turns honest Mozambicans into thieves and *cooperantes* into...! As I entered, I was haunted by a conversation during our orientation session for prospective *cooperantes* in Toronto last May. We'd agonized during the planning about how to help people feel their way into life as privileged consumers amidst Mozambique's worsening hunger. In the end, an anecdote told by Norman, a video worker from Quebec who had already spent time in Mozambique, told it all. He recounted how he and his partner had made a Saturday afternoon foray to the dollar shop after a busy week with their cameras. They filled their backpacks with food and started the walk home, cases of beer in hand. They felt good about the week's work and started singing along the way. A Mozambican woman appeared on the street, child on her back. Two little ones clinging to her skirts. They were aghast to hear her say as she passed by, "For foreigners, there's no crisis, eh?"

Beira

For the last three weeks I have felt constantly the travail of a country under siege, of the MNR in every province, penetrating by land, by air, by sea. We arrived yesterday in Beira, anticipating an easy time of it since there had been no power cuts since February 1987. We'd been told that mines had been laid around the electricity pylons by the Mozambicans, to make it harder for the "bandidos" to select remote points on the line and cripple the power supply at will. The first day there had us revelling in the Dom Carlos Hotel; not



Displaced mother and child arrive at Gorgongosa accommodation centre

Sérgio Santimano/AIM

only was it on the beach, there was light, and even the rare luxury of hot water.

I went for a morning run on the beach – azure seas, picturesque scenes of fishermen hauling in their nets, a ship heading into the Beira port. It was breathtakingly lovely – and made it hard to think of this vast Indian Ocean coastline as a vulnerable point of enemy access. We had confirmation from all sides, however, that units of the South African Defence Force are poised for action all along it, with regular entry points for troops and for provision of arms and supplies to the MNR.

It was easier to believe the next day. Evening brought an ominous flicker of the lights – and then darkness – for the next eight days. The Beira Corridor is clearly a key target. Attacks like these have an enormous economic impact, crippling all the efforts to up-grade the efficiency of the ports, railway and industry of Beira. We were also told that travel along the road between Beira and the Zimbabwe border had become less secure, despite the Zimbabwean troops so in evidence during our trips out to Dondo district.

Beira, like Maputo, showed lots of signs of the impact of the IMF recipe. Just as in Maputo, shop windows were full of goods and the market full of prawns, crabs and all manner of fruit and vegetables. Colleagues in the Ministry of Education felt that the situation was better than it had been. They recounted a working visit to Sofala province by President Chissano during his first months in office when he had got people talking about the situation in Sofala. A lot of complaints were made about abuses of power by the police and the military and about the lack of consumer goods, including basic commodities like rice and sugar. Beira residents complained that they themselves produced goods which were later sold at the dollar shop to which they had no access. Shortly thereafter, Beira inaugurated a ration system similar to the one in Maputo. Each sector of workers has its own shop and the right to certain quantities of basic goods per month. In addition to basic food items, the shops

have been selling blankets, kerosene lamps, batteries and the like.

As in Maputo, what is not readily available is buying power. The worker most enthusiastic about the new system is single with no dependents. For normal families of six and eight and ten, the new availability of consumer goods is not matched by income that allows access to them. Yet people seem to feel better to have the shops full. Tembe, a literacy worker en route home with us last week, mused that it was better now even for those on a small salary. "Before, there was nothing. Now there's everything but my salary can't buy much. But at least I know that if I need a pair of pants or shoes for my child, I can save for six months and buy them."

The green zones

I spent a good deal of time at the end of the trip catching up on events in the Green Zones around Maputo,

where the energy of survival takes most interesting forms. Since 1980, a strong cooperative movement has emerged in these peri-urban areas. Today there are 210 cooperatives with 11,500 members, 95% of whom are women. For a woman to be a member of one of these cooperatives means a profound transformation in her and her family's life. Not only has she a life in the "public" sphere, working daily in her cooperative, with access to all of the vegetables, grains and fruit that her cooperative produces. She also has access to what the increasingly diversified units in the cooperative produce, including ducklings for raising at home, fresh pork and sausages, and a variety of scarce goods like batteries, cloth and shoes, more or less bartered from Maputo factories in return for produce to feed their workers.

She has a chance to train in construction and to work in the build-

ing brigades or to learn mechanics and to service the cars, trucks, tractors, windmills, pumps and sprinkler systems now dispersed throughout the cooperatives. She has a chance for good day care for her toddlers, complete with hot meals prepared on a bio-gas cooker. She has a chance to do basic adult education, and continue on in lower primary school with her teen-age children who are being given places in the co-op schools when the overcrowded city schools have no room. She has a chance to buy small quantities of cement and roofing sheets for home improvements. She has a chance to go to leadership training courses, or even travel, as did 15 cooperative members who recently spent two weeks in Zimbabwe visiting peasant cooperatives.

The 210 cooperatives are of varying ages and strengths. They are linked into five zonal unions, which in turn are linked into a general



CUSO cooperant Angelica Aguilera (left) and Judith Marshall (right) chat with Celina Cossa, the dynamic president of the Green Zones cooperatives.

union with overall responsibility for servicing the individual cooperative units. There is a strong stress on leadership accountability and grass-roots involvement in planning and organizing each cooperative's activities. There is also a very strong pride in the movement's accomplishments and a healthy sense of distance from control by any outside force.

The co-op members say the post-independence "cooperatives" formed by the local administrator, the Mozambican Women's Organization (OMM) or the Dynamizing Group were not "real" cooperatives. Many times the members in them had no say in the organizing and planning of their cooperative's activities. The actual producers had no control over what they produced. The Green Zones Cooperatives were formed in a period when the old top-down cooperatives were under criticism and they continue zealously to guard their autonomy, whether from state, Frelimo Party or OMM.

The Green Zones Cooperatives in Maputo now find both their land and their markets under attack. Privatization, part of the IMF recipe, has brought many private produc-

ers into the Green Zones. Recent discussions within the Frelimo Party looking to expand the scale of private economic activity permissible for party members led coop members to anticipate increased pressure on their land, even though the party in the early 1980s had defended cooperative land rights against encroachment by private producers. New pressures are already being felt on the family plots which cooperative members maintain in addition to cooperative fields. Urban businessmen or bureaucrats, sheaves of documents in hand, are claiming title to their family land. For this reason, the General Union has begun to play a role in organizing associations of private producers. The private plot of a newly literate peasant is better defended when she can turn to her association for support.

Markets are similarly under attack. A few years ago, the Maputo Green Zones cooperatives were the only ones producing vegetables for a war-swollen city population of Maputo. Now private producers, supported by US AID inputs such as trucks and pumps designated specifically for the private sector, are strong competitors and the prices

are going down. But the cooperatives are seeking other markets and funding through NGOs for trucks that could keep them competitive.

Mozambicans - survivors, not victims

In short, the images from outside - famine statistics, comparisons with Ethiopia, passivity, Mozambicans as the helpless and hopeless victims of apartheid's destructiveness - don't in any way match with how it feels to be here. People's indestructible energy to survive is very evident, expressed not so much in political slogans denouncing South Africa as in "schemes" of personal and collective survival. The fact that so many top-down plans have not worked creates more space for initiatives in the middle and at the base. Indeed, the example of the cooperators in the Green Zones suggests that Mozambicans are hardy survivors. In the immediate future, the struggles in Mozambique are firmly embedded in the larger fight against apartheid. Meanwhile there are popular efforts to survive and organize, ones with which we in Canada have built up links over the years and which need our strong support right now.

WHY SHOOT THE TEACHER?

(Impact of the war on Mecuburi District, Nampula province)

- District population — 81,208 inhabitants
Primary school pupils affected — 1,795
Schools closed — 7 (13.2%)
All seven schools were destroyed. Three of them are being recuperated. Seven teachers were assassinated. One female teacher was kidnapped and 50 teachers have lost all their personal belongings.
- Namina Secondary School was attacked on November 26, 1974. Since that time, it has operated in the district capital in very precarious conditions.
- The residential center has been attacked twice, the last attack taking place on June 24, 1987. All the kitchen and dining room equipment has been lost. The dormitory with sixty beds was burned.

- The district education office has been attacked twice and the armed bandits have robbed all equipment and materials in it, breaking all of the windows. The residence of the district director of education has also been assaulted and robbed.
- The district director has twice been travelling in a convoy that has come under attack, first in November 1984 and later in December 1985. In the second attack, he lost 700,000 meticaís for payments of salaries and subsidies to teachers and school directors.
- The secondary school has not had a Portuguese teacher since 1985.

(Source: Ministry of Education, July 1987)

Angola, Front Line of the Frontline: Economic Reform

BY MY AND DANIEL DOS SANTOS

The authors recently returned from Angola. The longer original French language version of this article appears in the Montreal magazine Afrique.

In November 1987 South Africa amassed soldiers, artillery, bombers, fighter planes, and tanks on the border between Angola and Namibia. Then it invaded Angola once again. The western press recorded with triumph (particularly the right-wing French press) the defeat of the Angolan army. However, the same press did not adequately relate the objective of the South African invasion: to save their agent, Jonas Savimbi and his group, UNITA, a fact which was for the first time acknowledged by the racist Botha regime.

At the beginning of 1987, the Angolan army had launched a vast military operation on the land and in the air against UNITA, winning important victories and endangering the very existence of UNITA as a force inside Angola. UNITA retreated again toward the south and seemed routed. Moreover, Angolan society was not alone in suffering from this war. Not only is opposition to apartheid still alive in South Africa, but worry and even dissatisfaction and fear simmer and increase among the supporters of the racist regime. Now the military and political situation in Angola threatened to change in a way unfavourable to the interests of South Africa. The government of South Africa had to show its own population that it was in control of the war (hence the illegal visit by Botha and his generals and ministers to Angolan territory - "arrogance raciste oblige"). South Africa could not allow Angola to win, even for an instant, any apparent economic stability.



John Wieler

Angola, however, has been taking economic actions of its own. Faced with an unprecedented financial crisis resulting from the drop in 1986 in oil prices (which account for at least 80 percent of government revenue), Angola announced in the summer of 1987 its intention to join the IMF. It based its negotiating position on the war situation of the country and on the austerity policy (drastic spending cuts) which the government had already implemented for several years.

This action was part of a larger change which permitted Angola to take a very serious and critical look at its errors and to search for a new road to national economic development. The party and the state held

a series of seminars and workshops among officials from all sectors (public and private) to analyze the economic situation of the country and to propose solutions. These meetings were to culminate early in 1988 in a policy of economic and financial rehabilitation (S.E.F). Because the policy has yet to be presented in a definitive form, we present here only the major features of the analysis and the possible direction of the S.E.F.

Faced with the situation described above: "decrease in the purchasing power of the population, decline in productivity, financial inadequacy in state enterprises, budgetary deficit, growing external debt" as Angolan government doc-

uments put it in 1987, the S.E.F. seminars set their sights on a complete restructuring of the economic system and of national defense, the growth of production, and the improvement of the consumer goods distribution network. To do this, policy actions in addition to the economic ones were clearly underlined. Economic questions must become a constant preoccupation of the governing bodies of the party and the state; the program must be directed by a competent scientifically and professionally qualified team. The S.E.F. has no hope of bearing fruit and having concrete application without a general mobilization of the living energies of the Angolan economy.

Taking account of the proliferation of the informal economy and of the disordered growth of the economy, the government intends to follow a policy of alliances, defining the role of various components of the

economy: state companies, cooperatives, mixed public and private companies, private enterprises, and family production units. The alliance policy aims to encourage joint ventures between the Angolan state and foreign capital in sectors considered non-strategic but of national interest, and to promote the development of private enterprises in sectors such as road transport, retail trade, construction, animal husbandry, agriculture, and crafts. We can cite as an example the decision to retain only those state agricultural enterprises which are productive and profitable. It is no longer a question of the state continually covering their deficits: thus state ownership in agriculture has shrunk to some 20 large farms, while a few years ago there were a hundred of them. The rest were handed over to peasant associations or to small private owners. A few were changed over to training and technical support centres for peasant farmers.

The system for directing and managing the economy needs to be redefined in order to reduce sectoral and regional inequalities, to re-establish city-country exchange, and to re-adjust salaries in relation to national productivity. The first requirement is to clean up the state apparatus by attracting competent people with offers of favourable working conditions. To give greater financial autonomy to enterprises and to diminish the budget deficit the state is transferring investment decisions from ministers to the enterprises, assigning them full responsibility for their actions. The program of economic and financial rehabilitation aims also to mobilize private funds and popular savings in order both to establish conditions favouring accumulation of national capital and to finance the costs of national defense. "Obligatory loans," creating a new revenue source, will be repaid after the war.

In the present context in Angola, promotion of popular savings must go together with the legalization of the free market and a new pricing policy. Several steps will make prices reflect supply rather than speculation: allowing free movement of goods among regions, integrating intermediaries into the legal economy, and redefining fiscal policy. This legislation will give the state greater control over the elements of the market - supply and demand, production and consumption, prices and salaries, and the money in circulation - in order to assure productive reinvestment.

This program appears both ambitious, but also extremely necessary, given the present state of the Angolan economy and the large and painful effort already undertaken by the Angolan people. Successful implementation of the program would not only enable Angola to pull out of its present economic debacle, but also help it to resist the destabilization inflicted by South Africa and to fight better for the liberation of southern Africa.



John Wiertel

Angola, Front Line of the Frontline Campagnola: More Canadian Help

BY MARY MacNUTT

During the month of November, a Canadian delegation led by the Canadian Council for International Cooperation spent two weeks touring Angola. The trip was designed to help the Canadian government and Canadians find ways to strengthen ties with Angola and respond to emergency and development needs of the country.

One of the participants was Iona Campagnola, formerly Liberal MP for the federal riding of Skeena and from 1976-1979, Minister of State for Fitness and Amateur Sport. From 1982 to 1986 Campagnola was president of the federal Liberal party. She now works as coordinator of McMaster University's International Health Centre which is just beginning a project in Angola to help train medical personnel in the special difficulties of treating war-time casualties.

Campagnola represented CUSO in the CCIC delegation. This was her first trip to Angola.

Before you went on this trip how familiar were you with the nature of the war in Angola and South African involvement?

For many people in Canada I think Angola has been the forgotten country in the battle against apartheid and the battle against the South African government. My main reason for visiting Angola was that I think we have made some progress in upgrading Canadian support for Mozambique. The problems there are roughly parallel to what is going on in Angola but with very little direct Canadian response. So yes, I knew about Angola but not much because no Canadian knows very much about Angola.

In your delegation report you called Angola **THE** frontline of southern Africa? Why did you describe it that way?



Robert Kramer/Peoples Press Angola Book Project

Because it is intimately associated with the Namibian question and because South Africa is occupying a large amount of territory particularly in the south of the country. South Africa has made Angola **THE** Frontline State.

During your visit in November there was another South African offensive against southern Angola.

That's true. And the very day we arrived in Luanda, Pieter

Botha and his ministers invaded the sovereign territory of Angola to buoy up their troops in the southern sector. Later on in the visit I was in the town of Lubango and we were very close to the action. It's a disturbing thing to hear about the dreadful consequences of the ongoing struggle and see the results of it on the streets and in the orphanages and you see the horrible cost in human life. And then there are all the *deslocados* ... the dispossessed people. In Lubango there's about 90,000 ... refugees in their own country.

Is South Africa's strategy of destabilization working?

I would have to say that it is working. And that is partly because when the Portuguese left they left the countryside in disarray. They removed the entire managerial professional layer of people. On top of that they sabotaged what they left behind ... took all the plans of major cities and waterways, blew up the powerhouses, poured concrete into all the elevator shafts. And so when the new government took power it was taking command of a very dislocated unit. Then the continuing conflict between UNITA and the MPLA has further undermined the situation. And it is complicated by the fact that there are a lot of people in Southern Angola, the Ovimbundu people, who believe the forces of UNITA are their forces. It's a gravely complicated problem.

Given these problems do you think South Africa is winning in Angola?

The costs are enormous but I believe Angola is holding its own. Not until apartheid is removed as a policy in South Africa will there be a resolution to the problem in Angola. One of Angola's main tragedies is that it is on the road to the final war in South Africa and the final war of racism that will eventually take place.

In the delegation report you talk about the enormous human cost of the war ... 100,000 deaths between 1980 and 1985; 50,000 deaths of children under the age of five directly attributable to the war; the highest number of war disabled in the world. How are the people bearing up? What struck you most about the mood of the people?

Even unsophisticated people know and feel the struggle has to continue. Their watchword is "The struggle will continue and victory will be won." I recall one woman saying to me, "We know very well

that if the Cuban troops were not with us that all of Angola would now be a Bantustan."

You mention the presence of Cuban troops in Angola which, at least in the eyes of the Reagan administration, has complicated a solution for Angola. The Reagan administration still insists on linking the removal of Cuban troops and the independence of Namibia. Your delegation discussed this with Angola's foreign minister. What was your conclusion about this issue?

I don't think we felt unhappy about the presence of Cuban troops because of the presence of South African troops. They balance each other off. And there are so many ironies about the presence of Cuban troops. When you see Chevron ... 49% of the oil in Angola is owned by Chevron, 51% by the state oil company ... when you see the American company Chevron being guarded against attack from American armed, South African led troops you begin to see some of the dimensions of the problem. As I understand it, all the oil in Angola is cared for and looked after by American personnel and other European personnel under the direction of Chevron people. And then you have this spectacle of Angola attempting to gain entrance to the IMF and potentially being blackballed by the United States. Does that make sense to a person? It puts the United States in the ironic ideological position of promoting free market economics around the world, then blocking Angola's move to enter the IMF and giving aid to UNITA. It doesn't make sense to me.

What was the thrust of your delegation's recommendations?

Right now, the only direct Canadian bilateral support to Angola is a \$100,000 fund administered by the Canadian High Commission in Zimbabwe. The thrust of our report was that the Canadian government

put together the same kind of bilateral assistance as it has for Mozambique. (Editors note: This year the Canadian International Development Agency has \$15 million earmarked for food aid to Mozambique. And on January 28 at a regional economic development meeting in Arusha Tanzania, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark announced the government's promised development assistance worth over \$5 million a year.)

One of the problems is that Angola has not been forthcoming as it might be in providing Canada with a channel for help. One of the things we might do is encourage Angola to accredit an Ambassador to Ottawa. Until Canada has official representation from Angola it will be very difficult to undertake the kind of work that we want to do.

What has the delegation planned next?

We've set up a working group which will work towards putting in place an Angolan task force of NGOs and church groups on the same style as the Mozambique task force. It would work under the auspices of CCIC and Partnership Africa-Canada. The idea is that we all go in there together as a co-operative group. That is because of the conflict ... because of the logistical difficulties in Angola it's not possible for NGOs to go in as individual groups. We're going to have to set up our own infrastructure and it's going to be very costly.

Canadian officials talk a lot about support for the Frontline States but don't really seem to single out Angola for much attention. Nor does Angola receive the same kind of coverage in the media that Mozambique has recently received. What is the stumbling block? Has American support of UNITA clouded the picture for Canadians?

I think there is some of that but we also have to remember that

the Commonwealth does not include Portuguese ex-colonies. It was quite unique that the government of Canada invited Mozambique to be an observer at the Commonwealth Conference. We've had to make a special effort in Mozambique and we have to make an equal effort in the case of Angola.

The problem with sending development aid to Frontline States is that South Africa so often destroys the results of that aid. And so one of the suggestions on the table for discussion among many Canadians concerned about Frontline States is that Canada should also send some kind of military support.

I don't think a delegation such as ours make those kind of decisions. We're a very preliminary group. It's on the issue of Namibia that I, and the rest of the delegation, really feel Canada should take a much more active role within the international community. It's one of the linch pins of the problem.

One of the recommendations in the delegation's report is that Canadians concerned about Angola put special emphasis on advocacy. As a former politician you know better than most people what makes politicians do things. What would make Canadian politicians move on Angola?

Advantage to themselves and advantage to Canada. In this case there isn't a distinct public advantage other than being seen as a leader of Commonwealth plans so I think that while there are some members of the government who are oriented toward the international scene there are a great many others who are oriented toward more parochial issues. For them it's a matter of pure humanitarian concern. And that never sells very well. So I think what we have to do is arouse the public at large and if the public can be seen to understand the dimensions of the human tragedy then they will put pressure on their politicians to move in appropriate ways.

Caught in the Middle: Botswana's Position in Southern Africa

BY JACQUELINE SOLWAY

Jacqueline S. Solway is a post-doctoral fellow in International Development Studies at the University of Toronto (Scarborough Campus).

Botswana's unequivocal policy of non-racialism may pose a threat to South Africa but its basic commitment to a capitalist economy does not. Botswana is a member of the Frontline States and of SADCC, and it consistently maintains that South Africa's major trading partners should not use SADCC countries as an excuse for not imposing sanctions against South Africa. Yet Botswana maintains a customs union with South Africa and is overwhelmingly dependent on it. Although Botswana has no official diplomatic relations with South Africa, clearly, links are strong. Botswana supports the ANC and provides refuge for ANC members, but also strictly circumscribes ANC activity in the country. Indeed, the list of contradictions is legion, and

reflects both the class divisions in Botswana and the harsh reality of South Africa's economic and military power over Botswana.

* * *


At independence in 1966 Botswana was ranked among the poorest nations in the world. Surrounded by white-ruled Rhodesia, South Africa, and South African-occupied Namibia, and sharing only a point in the Zambezi river with the majority-ruled Zambia, Botswana's future domestically and as a force in the Southern African struggle appeared grim. Two decades later Botswana boasts the fourth highest per capital income in Africa and the fastest growing economy on the continent, while the country has become a member of the Frontline States and finds its capital, Gaborone, the headquarters of SADCC. These rather impressive facts reveal true steps forward, but, as indicated above, the fuller picture remains more complex.

In the early colonial period, annexation to South Africa was generally considered the most sensible solution to administering Botswana (then Bechuanaland), and creating the customs union agreement which, in 1910, integrated Bechuanaland's economy into South Africa's was part of that strategy. As world opinion turned against South Africa in the first half of this century, annexation by South Africa was rejected by the British colonial overlords but the customs union remained. It is now a source of revenue for Botswana but also generates enormous dependence on South Africa; it makes import substitution industries (and consequent employment opportunities) very difficult to develop. Indeed, South Africa remains far and away Botswana's largest trading partner. As a land-locked country, most of Botswana's imports and exports go through South Africa and key commodities such as petrol are supplied exclusively by South Africa. Thousands of men migrate annually to the South African mines.

South Africa has been quick to exercise its military might in Botswana as well, violating the country's borders on several occasions. The most extreme act of aggression was on June 14, 1985, when South African troops, disguised in Botswana government vehicles, carried a pre-dawn raid on alleged ANC targets, murdering twelve people, many of whom were civilians, in the process. Although world opinion condemned South Africa for this act, negative opinion was accompanied by few concrete moves and less than a year later South Africa struck again, this time murdering one civilian.

Politically, Botswana has a history of defending its integrity. The country is, and always has been, a thorn in South Africa's side, standing for and demonstrating the viability of policies white South Africa maintains cannot work. Non-racialism is a paramount creed (Botswana's first President Seretse Khama was married to a white British woman), and party politics tend to divide along rural/urban, not ethnic lines. Elections have been democratic and peaceful. In 1976 Botswana left the Rand Monetary Area, creating its own currency which - although initially valued on par with the rand - soon surpassed it. Botswana is a member of the non-aligned movement, and the list of countries which have diplomatic representation in Gaborone (ranging from the USA through the People's Republic of China and the USSR to Libya) reflects Botswana's attempt to distance itself from South Africa and diversify its own diplomatic network. Moreover, as noted above, Botswana is strongly committed to SADCC, an initiative designed specifically to increase links between majority-ruled Southern African states and to lessen links with South Africa.

Botswana has consistently refused to sign a security pact with South Africa, arguing that it is not at war with South Africa and, more



Vivienne Wait

Pay-day at agricultural offices: "Botswana who can no longer survive on subsistence farming are employed on government projects."

cogently, that South Africa's record in terms with its keeping with either the letter or the spirit of the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique demonstrates its untrustworthiness. This refusal to sign a border pact has inhibited Botswana from obtaining favourable selling rates for certain products in South Africa, thus demonstrating that the country will, in certain instances, put politics and principles above profits and expediency. Botswana has also continued to develop its Defense Force, which was first created in the 1970s when Botswana's borders were violated by Rhodesia. Because of South African threats, the force has recently received training from the British Special Air Services. Botswana has also received international recognition for its harboring of political refugees from other parts of Southern Africa, and it has flatly refused to recognize the independence of South African homelands.

Botswana has some resilience. Economically speaking, minerals, mostly diamonds (of which Botswana has become one of the world's leading producers), account for the dramatic turn-around in Botswana's economy in terms of its positive balance of payments and sizeable foreign exchange kitty. Diamonds are mined in Botswana by Debswana, a company owned half by De Beers and half by the government. Beef production for export has also become an important pillar of the Botswana economy.

Resilient, Yet Vulnerable

But in spite of the wealth, the country's diamond mines have generated limited employment. Deteriorating conditions in the rural areas, partly as a result of seven years of drought, have undermined rural productive efforts creating a tide of urbanization which has given Botswana's capital, Gaborone, the

fastest rate of growth in the world and highlighting growing class divisions. In order to ameliorate such problems, Botswana has used diamond revenues to launch a massive relief campaign and agricultural development programme. No one has starved. However, with agropastoralism (beef production is the core of Botswana's rural economy) becoming increasingly capital intensive, and the manufacturing sector growing at a snail's pace, a sizable displaced sector of the population is developing which will be increasingly hard to placate.

Before Zimbabwe's independence Botswana's minute border with Zambia was its lifeline to majority-ruled Africa; at great expense a tarred road was constructed to the border, and Botswana and Zambia developed strong ties. These ties remain, but with a free Zimbabwe

and the development of SADCC, Botswana found it could diversify. Indeed, it is second only to Zimbabwe in inter-SADCC trade, albeit a distant second. But what kinds of temptations will be placed in the path of Botswana's economic decision-makers? Because of its membership in the South African Customs Union, its openness to foreign capital and its political stability, Botswana could become an important locale for sanctions busting. Companies can establish offices or plants in Botswana and reach the large South African market with little difficulty, and flights can carry passengers to and from Gaborone, with easy connecting transport to Johannesburg.

Whether Botswana yields to these temptations will depend to a certain extent on political developments. Here the signs are

not entirely promising. In response to South Africa's raids, Botswana has become much tougher on ANC members in the country, and in 1986 it passed a National Security Act which gives the state far greater powers over individuals. Indeed, with the increasing class polarization noted above and with sharpening political divisions between the ruling party and the growing left-leaning opposition party, internal dissent has begun to be repressed more forcefully (the tear-gassing of university students at a recent rally being a case in point).

* *




Nobu Atakawa

President Quett Masire: "Botswana stood its ground, rejecting any agreement of the kind that Mozambique has signed."

Over a decade ago when Julius Nyrere sympathetically admitted that Botswana would be committing economic suicide if it imposed sanctions on South Africa, Botswana was a poor nation by African standards. Today it is not. The contradictions inherent in Botswana's pro-business/anti-apartheid stance are, if anything, even more pronounced and will, in all likelihood, become far more so in the near future. Botswana has managed to be vocal in its opposition to apartheid, to increase its foreign reserves and to remain aloof from the armed struggle, all of which have contributed to making it the darling of western donors. However, this position is likely to become increasingly untenable as both the struggle in South Africa sharpens and as unemployment, class conflict and political divisions at home heighten. Botswana will then have to choose more definitely on which side it will stand.

SADCC



Making the New South African Culture: The Amsterdam Conference



Members of the COSATU choir at the opening of the visual arts exhibitions, (top insert) Nana Kutumela (UDF), (bottom insert) Pallo Jordan (ANC)

BY MARGIE BRUUN-MEYER

The author is a Toronto cultural activist who was sponsored by CUSO to attend the conference.

Amsterdam

The Anti-Apartheid Movement of the Netherlands (AABN) hosted a conference in December 1987, *Culture in Another South Africa*. It was one of several such conferences that have been held in various parts of the world to discuss post-apartheid society. This was culture however, and it promised to be a conference with a difference. The delegates were three hundred South African cultural workers, one hundred from 'inside' and the rest in exile, all there

because of a shared knowledge that art is partisan and is a vital weapon in the arsenal of a liberation struggle. The six days of meetings and debate were held within a parallel festival of South African culture, dynamically linked together as speakers by day became performers by night.

The first weekend

Registration. Gearing up. The conference starts on Monday but already the delegates are gathering. Is there something unique about the way South Africans greet each other? Does the brutality of exile inject a poignancy that charges the embrace with added significance? Eyes searching across faces, a shout

of recognition, the tears and laughter, arms reaching around bodies muffled by coats and scarves against the unfamiliar northern cold. How will it be when the reunion happens on South African soil?

Sunday night

The opening night of the festival at the new opera house. A taste of most of the offerings of the festival as well as speeches of welcome, even the mayor of Amsterdam is a poet. There is too much and the programme is too long, but the energy is irrepressible and at 1.00 am the Dutch citizens, along with their South African guests, are dancing in the aisles to the Jazz Pioneers.


Monday

The opening of the conference. Conny Braam of the AABN welcomes us. It is especially fitting that Amsterdam, the home of the Dutch colonists, led by Jan van Riebeck, who landed on the Cape of Good Hope 335 years ago, should now, as an Anti-Apartheid city, be host for this event. Barbara Masekela, head of the ANC Cultural Department, outlines our task. Are the newly formed organizations of progressive artists reaching the people? Do they "represent the majority of patriotic artists and serve to accommodate the needs of groups at various levels of consciousness?" She sets a tone of openness and warns against such dangers as "prescribing for the people", "raising our own consciousness to a fetish" and "relegating to irrelevance the contribution of our white democratic compatriots."

Tuesday

Pallo Jordan (ANC Research Department) prefaces his talk with an assurance that he is not going to give the 'ANC line'; his is a contribution to the wealth of ideas and debate. He begins to define People's Culture. He weaves in legends from ancient Greece and Africa, he layers on images of a culture infused with internationalism and humanism stamped indelibly with an African influence. He describes a new South Africa in embryo, with a spirit of patriotism not embedded in race or language but in the richness of variety, drawing from its indigenous roots as well as from "Mozart, Charlie Parker and Ravi Shankar." While he asserts the primacy of African culture, he warns against romanticizing a return to traditional culture, "it's hard to sing with a combine harvester." He stresses that in order for a people's culture to flourish, it must first wrest control from the present owners of the means of production and dis-

tribution of culture. The clause of the Freedom Charter "The doors of learning and culture shall be open" is meaningless unless it is linked to an economic clause which gives all language and cultural groups the means of practicing and promoting



Barbara Masekela, Director of ANC cultural department

their culture.

He ends by exhorting the delegates to pursue excellence and thereby best serve liberation. "The ANC does not need political pamphleteers and sloganeers - we have enough of those already" (laughter, applause).

The afternoon

Nana Kntumela, from the UDF Cultural Desk, describes the framework for the organization of cultural workers, and their structural relationship to the mass democratic organizations. The discussion picks up energy, some of the delegates are demanding clear criteria which will be used to endorse artists wishing to travel overseas. The UDF refuses to be prescriptive, the boycott is only a tactic and must be kept flexible, the development of criteria will be done in consultation with cultural workers. Some delegates are frustrated by this lack of clarity, they

want to contribute, but they say the reality is that the leadership is often inaccessible (in detention, in hiding or plain overworked). Hessie Sibayoni (COSATU) urges delegates to take responsibility for creating a "dynamic working relationship." I hear later that some felt the discussion was destructive and divisive, others felt their concerns went unresolved. I thought I had seen democracy in action.

Wednesday

Over the next days we will hear papers on media, poetry, literature, visual and performing arts and music. They are the collective product of small meetings of delegates working within these disciplines. From them, and the discussion arising, resolutions will emerge to be adopted on the final day. There are themes apparent throughout; the building of structures to ensure that cultural work is integrated into the mass democratic organiza-

tions and accountable to them; the democratization of culture through more collective creative effort, commitment to affirmative action for women in structures, training and anti-sexist content; the redress of unequal training and resources suffered by black artists. The issue of language is returned to often, as is the problem of ownership and control.

Over the past year or so the cultural boycott has been the focus of extensive debate. President Tambo had articulated the ANC thinking on the issue in the Canon Collins lecture in 1987. The UDF also tackled the question and came up with its own position at its Congress in the same year. Amsterdam provided the moment for a clear policy to click into place. Isolation of all apartheid culture, academia and sport is to continue and escalate. At the same time the vibrant 'peoples culture' is to be promoted as an im-

1



2



3




4



1. Performance by the COSATU choir erupts into the 'toyi toyi'. 2. Nadine Gordimer. 3. Jazz Pioneers. 4. Thami Mnye Quartet.

Photos by Margie Braun-Meyer



Abdullah Ibrahim.

portant expression of political activity and add a creative dimension to international solidarity work. Full consultation with the ANC and the mass democratic organizations must happen before cultural workers can travel or work outside. The formation of cultural groups both inside and in exile will facilitate this and make the policy more consistent and effective.

Dinner

We all gather in the Studio on Korte Leidsedwaarsstraat which had been dubbed the CASA Restaurant

and where AABN volunteers cook, serve and clean up dinner for us every night. There are announcements about where to pick up warm clothing, to confirm flight arrangements, where the photographers are to meet after dinner; the levels of logistical detail needed to co-ordinate us are awesome.

Later

So many choices of theatre to see; we can't possibly do it all. *Bopha*, about the dilemma of a black policeman; *You Have Struck A Woman*, *You Have Struck A Rock*, a play which emerged from grass

roots women's experiences; Athol Fugard's *Blood Knot*; COSATU's *Living Wage*; ... I decide to see *Sophiatown* with an old friend. It's a wonderful play, full of politics, love, humour and music. Everyone always talks about Sophiatown with such nostalgia, it has become a symbol, it was a special flowering moment in cultural history, a community of artists and intellectuals smashed into fragments by apartheid's Group Areas Act.

De Melk Weg

(A night club, one of the many venues of the festival). I see a Dutch woman who was on the same tram as me, she's dancing alone on the small clearing for dancers, eyes closed, swaying, arms arcing, describing the swell of the sound. Maybe she's one of the volunteers, maybe she cut bread rolls for lunch, or set up media interviews, maybe she just read about it in the paper. Tonight it's Sabenza, what a treat, Basil 'Mannenbergh' Coetzee and his sweet, searching sax, and a group of talented, multi-racial musicians. This is what we have been talking about, the new sound of South Africa, a complex infusion of many different roots, but unique and undeniably South African.

3 am: De Kring

(An artist's club which has been opened to delegates). A group of us are sitting around a few tables pulled together. Thabo Mbeki is with us and were talking about the poetry reading we all heard. Thabo is critical of some South African protest culture for allowing apartheid to set the framework within which artists work. He deplores what he calls the South African "obsession with race" which limits the scope of our creativity. Activists hunch forward to hear better, they interject, the dialogue flows, this in essence is what CASA is about: the rare opportunity for South Africans to come together, to talk (and laugh, drink and dance), to break through the barriers of exile, unfamiliarity and disinformation, and plan together for another South Africa.

"Virtually a Government in Exile": The ANC at Arusha

BY VICTORIA BRITTAIN

Victoria Brittain is the editor of the Third World page in the Guardian [UK].

The 75th anniversary of the African National Congress ended with the liberation movement's first ever international conference held in Arusha, Tanzania, in December 1987. The conference, attended by government representatives from a range of countries from the USSR to the US, and including such different political allies as China, India and Sweden, was a culmination of the ANC's year-long political offensive for international recognition as virtually a government in exile. (The whites-only election in South Africa earlier in the year had in fact seen the liberation movement portrayed for the first time by the Pretoria regime itself as its principle opposition.)

This diplomatic offensive included much more exposure of the ANC leadership to a wide variety of people than the liberation movement sought previously. From the much-publicized meeting in Dakar with a group of white liberal South African politicians, through numerous encounters with businessmen with substantial South African interests in Lusaka and London, a major speech in London in May by ANC President Oliver Tambo on the modification of the terms of the cultural and academic boycott, to the ambitious Harare children's conference in September which brought more than 200 activists out of the country, it appeared the ANC was ready to show the outside world a very different image from its previously calculated formality.

The liberation movement even opened itself to the Western press,

including that based in Johannesburg, with the predictable result that the new openness was widely interpreted as a new "pragmatism," and stories of secret negotiations with Pretoria had repeatedly to be denied by the ANC. The price of so many interested outsiders, many at least previously hostile to the ANC, having access to its leadership, was a torrent of ill-informed interpretation and speculation about the political character of the "real" ANC, and the organisation's intentions.

In fact, despite the numerous articles, and briefings by Western officials and others in 1987 which forecast new ANC preparedness to compromise with Pretoria, the important National Executive Committee statement of October restated unchanged basic demands. The October 9 statement, published after a long NEC meeting, spelt out the need for the release of all political prisoners, the removal of troops from the townships, ending the State of Emergency, and called for the "transformation of the country into a united and non-racial democracy." It warned, too, against the attempt by Pretoria "to defuse the struggle inside our country by holding out false hopes of a just political settlement which the Pretoria regime has every intention to block."

But the principal development of the last year was not so much the interest of Western capitalism in courting the ANC's external leadership as it was the evolution of the organization of internal resistance and its complex but increasingly open relationship with the ANC headquarters in Lusaka.

The state's myriad attempts to use the accusation of "furthering the aims of the ANC" as a catch-

all against dozens and dozens of detained activists no longer appears to have much deterrent power. At Harare in September, for instance, more than 200 people came from inside the country to expose the systematic torture of children and youth, to find the majority of the ANC's NEC participating with them in the conference. There was a wide variety of political experience at Harare. Many delegates from UDF township organizations were already well-known to people at ANC headquarters. Other participants — lawyers, doctors, churchmen — were often not mandated by organizations and were utterly stunned by the unforeseen experience of meeting Oliver Tambo, Joe Slovo, Secretary-General of the South African Communist Party, and other legendary ANC exiles. For the external leadership too, meeting some of the township youth from the front line of the civil war and hearing them speak as their heirs, was clearly deeply moving. Five days and nights of formal and informal meetings provided a unique opportunity for deepening contacts and for extended discussion of some ANC policies articulated from Lusaka which had been misunderstood or misinterpreted by those inside the country, by the western press, or by the many official and unofficial go-betweens of recent months.

Harare, with its focus on children as prime targets of state repression, and the dominance of South African participants, was informal, emotional and intimate in atmosphere, almost like an extended family discussing a common problem.

In contrast Arusha, 2½ months after, was more of a formal affirmation of the ANC's status in the world. Arusha's main focus was not however on the external mission of the ANC although all the

most senior civilian leaders of the National Executive Committee, including Oliver Tambo, attended all sessions of the 4-day conference and a massive solidarity rally organised by the Tanzanian party Chama Cha Mapinduzi. Party Chairman, Julius Nyerere gave the keynote address on the first day, setting a new tone in Frontline States' speeches by emphasizing not the present struggle but the complexity of the coming post-apartheid period in South Africa: *"changing the structure of political power in South Africa is the first task ... building justice and human respect and democracy in a society which has for more than 75 years been based on oppression, domination and racial discrimination, is the second task. And it will not be an easy task."*

But it was the young, anonymous delegates from the democratic structures within the country who fired the Arusha conference with their portrayal of civil war conditions in the townships and the rural areas. "Many people have tried to speak for us, but we do not need them, we prefer to speak for ourselves," said the COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions) speaker, while the SAYCO (South African Youth Organisation) delegate finished his speech with the uncompromising words, "the youth feels that under these circumstances of oppression it is not yet time for the democratic movement to sit around the table with the regime - that table is still covered in blood." Their descriptions of the emerging alternative society, whose mandated representatives they were, graphically contradicted the conventional picture of broken resistance transmitted by the Western press based in South Africa and subject to the censorship of the State of Emergency.

Grimly highlighting the increase in repression against the democratic movement's leaders which was stepped up after Harare, delegates from COSATU, SAYCO,

and other UDF (United Democratic Front) organizations such as those of women, lawyers, churches, and those from inside the Bantustans, addressed the conference anonymously; tape recorders and film equipment banned during their sessions by the Conference's Chairman, Tanzania's defence Minister Salim Salim. Most of the journalists accredited to Arusha were in fact the Johannesburg press corps and they chose not even to report these speeches - a remarkable illustration of the power of self-censorship. The COSATU del-



Kioka carving. Angola

egate's speech contained a strong endorsement of the ANC as "our only liberation movement," and of the Freedom Charter as the "minimum programme towards socialism." The speaker claimed the current "national democratic struggle as the foundation for socialist transformation" and affirmed "our people have rejected capitalism." He spelt out the practical goals of COSATU's "Living Wage Campaign" which, he said, grew out of earlier SACTU struggles. Standing ovations followed these interventions, all of

which started with a homage to the leadership of "our liberation movement externally" and a moving embrace with Oliver Tambo as each speaker left the rostrum. The conference's tough final document reflected the uncompromising political tone of these delegates within the 4 working commissions. It called for "people's sanctions" where Western governments would not apply them, for defence aid for the Frontline States in their undeclared war with South Africa, for Prisoner of War status under the Geneva Convention for captured ANC guerrillas and called on all states to provide residential and transit facilities for South African war resisters, refugees and ANC fighters.

Umkonto we Sizwe, the fighting wing of the ANC, was singled out for particular salutation in an important speech by the representative of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Ambassador Yilma Tadesse, assistant Secretary General in charge of political affairs. Ambassador Tadesse's speech appeared to reflect a growing preoccupation among some leading African officials with the need to boost support for the ANC. They believe that otherwise a devastating Western-sponsored "Unita-type" contender for power could be a prospect for South Africa. US backing for the remnants of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) - still nominally recognised by the OAU - as well as for other marginal anti-ANC South Africans is already clear. *"The ANC is the torch of African freedom, the instrument of liberation and emancipation. It is, in short, the movement of hope to freedom, justice and racial equality in a future democratic South Africa,"* said Ambassador Tadesse. That speech, like the top-level Tanzanian protocol and security given to conference delegates as guests of the ANC, were just some of the growing signs of some African leaders' response to the clear demands of the democratic movement with South Africa.

Extending the Frontlines



Priscilla Settee

Zimbabwean comrades at a community meeting in Saskatchewan

When Canadians hear about struggling people in the world and feel that something should be done to help, their usual response is to find some aid agency to give money to, or if they feel more strongly about a particular situation, to demand that the Canadian government increase its assistance to the country in question. But for many people the impersonal nature of such actions leaves them feeling that they have not really participated in the process, and being limited only to giving donations perpetuates the idea that aid is preferable to solidarity and that the poor countries of the world are simply waiting for handouts from the richer ones.

In response to the need felt by many Canadians for more direct participation in support activities in the southern Africa region and the successful experiences in linkage of groups such as the Grain Services Union in Saskatchewan and the British Columbia Teachers' Federation (see *Southern Africa REPORT*,

Vol. 3 No. 1), a new project, called **Backing the Frontline: Campaign Against Apartheid**, has been initiated. It is a national project working to promote direct links between popular organizations in Canada and in those countries known as the Frontline States. Proposed initially as a three-year program, it is supported by Canadian development organizations and solidarity groups, and by Partnership Africa Canada (PAC).

The aims of **Backing the Frontline** are to link community groups and other organizations in Canada with their counterparts in the Frontline States, through tours, visits and other means; provide education in Canada on southern Africa and on how Canadians and their organizations can support the Frontline States; encourage linked organizations in Canada to provide appropriate material and technical support to partner organizations in southern Africa; and coordinate activities and sup-

port among solidarity groups across Canada. At present project activities are going on in three provinces: Saskatchewan, Quebec and Ontario. They involve labour unions, co-operatives, native people's groups, schools and other sectors.

In Saskatchewan three member organizations of the Saskatchewan Linkage Committee - *Briarpatch* magazine, the Saskatchewan Federation of Producer Cooperatives and Aboriginal Women's Council/Saskatchewan Association of Local Northern Governments - are planning to send representatives to Zimbabwe and Mozambique from mid-March to mid-April. The purpose of the trip is to consolidate linkage work with partner organizations and expand contacts. The Co-op Federation has already signed an accord to send farm machinery and equipment to the Organization of Collective Cooperatives in Zimbabwe (OCCZIM), after visits from OCCZIM members last year, and *Briarpatch* has established a link with Memorial Printers in Harare. Saskatchewan is also planning to host a national "organizing school" to help give people the tools needed to initiate and develop anti-apartheid and linkage activities.

In Quebec a network of solidarity centres has been formed made up of unions, black community groups, solidarity groups and churches. An initial linkage has been made between health workers in the Confederation des Syndicats Nationaux (CSN) and the Mozambique Workers' Organization (OTM). Mozambican journalist and author Lina Magaia, in Quebec as part of a North American tour, will be meeting with students in journalism schools and with members of the media in February. Her tour also includes points in western Canada and Ontario. Other activities in Quebec include the production of a video about the project made in French and English in col-

working links

laboration with Video Tiers Monde, and a briefing paper on Mozambique produced in both languages. Quebec participants are also involved in the Mozambican education tour mentioned below.

Ontario activities have been going on in two regions. In the past six months the Ottawa Valley BFL Committee has supported direct talks between OCCZIM and two locals of the National Farmers' Union (NFU) in Renfrew County, worker cooperative members of the Sudbury Citizen's Movement, day care workers of the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) and community organizers of Pinecrest Queensway Centre in Ottawa, as well as between health workers of CUPE and members of the Mozambique Workers' Organization (OTM). Planning is underway to do further work with community associations and the International Affairs Committee of the Ottawa Carleton District Council of CUPE which will focus on membership education. An auction in support of the efforts of the OTM health workers is being organized in Ottawa by a community health centre and CUPE.


Toronto-based activities have focussed on the education sector. Two Toronto secondary schools have been twinned with a school in Nampula province in Mozambique, and students have exchanged letters and other material. Contacts have also been made with teachers' federations, school boards and individual teachers. In March Mario Souto, Secretary of the Mozambique Teachers' Organization (ONP), and two students from Nampula will be in Canada, visiting schools, school boards and teachers' federation meetings and taking part in the Toronto Board student anti-apartheid conference. Their tour will also include Quebec and British Columbia, where already existing links between teachers' federations in these provinces (CEQ and BCTF) and the ONP will be reinforced, and where more school and other visits are to take place. Also planned this

year in Ontario is a workshop for teachers on southern Africa and the production of resource materials for classroom use.

Activities such as these help Canadians to begin to understand that their struggles for workplace justice and accessible social services and their campaigns against racial and sexual domination are part of a global struggle. Through direct links with groups in the Frontline States, they can exchange organizing skills, develop mutual strategies for community improvement and share processes of decision-making and community control. As one community worker in Ottawa put

it, "Our visitor from Zimbabwe encouraged us in our community work. They really know how to encourage community participation, and they have a lot of pride in what they do. It's given us a completely different view of Africa, and of ourselves."

For more information on the Backing the Frontline Project contact the Saskatchewan Linkage Committee, c/o 2138 McIntyre St., Regina S4P 2R7; CIDMAA, 3738, rue St. Dominique, Montreal H2X 2X9; Steve Seaborn at CUSO, 135 Rideau St., Ottawa K1N 9K7; or TCLSAC (address in inside front cover).



Partners on the frontlines: Zimbabweans and Canadians working together

Priscilla Settee

Tackling Tennis

BY BRUCE KIDD

Bruce Kidd teaches physical education at the University of Toronto.

Apart from a few notable exceptions like Arthur Ashe and John McEnroe, the stars and officials of tennis have belligerently defied the international campaign to isolate apartheid sport.

The International Tennis Federation continues to recognize South Africa as a full member, and includes the South African Open on its grand prix. Most stars have accepted large amounts of money to play there. Last November, reigning Wimbledon men's champion Pat Cash of Australia, Israeli champion Amos Mansdorf, and French stars Guy Forget and Henri Leconte, played in the South African Open in Johannesburg, despite an international appeal not to do so.

West German stars Boris Becker, who played in South Africa in 1984, and Steffi Graf, repeatedly refuse requests by the anti-apartheid movement to endorse the boycott and not play there again. "The noise is ridiculous," Becker said recently. "I am a professional and it is my job to play where tournaments are held. The fact that I played in South Africa does not mean that I support apartheid."

At home, *Tennis Canada* invites South Africans to its highly publicized men's and women's tournaments every August. Some of its directors claim that the Men's International Professional Tennis Council forces it to do so, but that hasn't happened in the case of other grand prix tournaments which bar South Africans - in Tokyo, Buenos Aires, Amsterdam, Copenhagen, and Stockholm.

Despite this obvious violation of the Commonwealth Gleneagles Agreement, *Tennis Canada* still receives federal support. A succes-

sion of tennis-loving sports ministers has simply ignored their own policy, which disqualifies any federation involved with South Africa from assistance. Last year, Sport Canada gave *Tennis Canada* \$476,000.

Anti-apartheid groups are now making a renewed effort to bring the complicit tennis organizations and athletes under public censure. In September, a broad coalition of anti-apartheid, labour, women's and community groups staged an effective protest against the US Open in New York.

In December, at the initiative of a Swedish group, the United Nations Children's Fund, UNICEF, publicly dropped Boris Becker as one of its goodwill ambassadors. In January, Pat Cash, and the others who have played in South Africa met with protests and boos at the Australian Open in Melbourne.

Further efforts were planned at the international conference on the sports boycott in Harare, Zimbabwe, in November. It is likely that there will be large protests in 1988 at Wimbledon and the French and US Opens.

A major focus for the campaign will be the International Olympic Committee, which has placed tennis on the program of the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul. Cash, Becker, and several other stars on the United Nations blacklist have already been named to their respective national teams.

At the Harare conference, the IOC went further than ever before in declaring its support for the boycott. Speaking for the Executive Board, vice-president Keba M'Baye of Senegal stated that South Africa would not be readmitted to the Olympic Movement until apartheid had been completely eradicated. Previously, IOC leaders had limited themselves to the promise that no further ac-

tion would be taken on the South African question "without the approval of the African members of the IOC and African sports leaders."

Not surprisingly, African leaders (who have few votes on the tennis federation) have asked the IOC to bring the ITF into line. They want the ITF to withdraw grand prix status from the South African Open and ban South Africans from all international tournaments, i.e. to undertake the minimum of sanctions which exist in other Olympic sports. Failing that, they and their supporters will turn their attention to the Seoul Olympics. The Supreme Council for Sport in Africa has said that a boycott cannot be ruled out.

Canadians can contribute to this effort by stepping up the pressure upon the Mulroney Conservatives to honour Canada's Gleneagles commitment to prevent all sports exchanges with South Africa. *Tennis Canada* and York University, where one of the annual August tournaments is held, should also face public pressure to support the boycott.

* * *

The Commonwealth Games Federation, the governing body for the Commonwealth Games, moved against "passports of convenience" at its annual meeting in London in January.

You will recall that in 1984, the South African runner Zola Budd was able to compete in the Los Angeles Olympics thanks to a British passport which she received in a record three weeks. In 1986, the inclusion of Budd and South African swimmer Annette Cowley, who also had a British passport, on the English team fueled the anger which eventually led to the third world boycott of the Edinburgh Games. Neither Budd nor Cowley had made any effort to settle in Britain.

The CGF has now tightened eligibility to require that any athlete who emigrates to another country must establish genuine residence in that country and live there for 36

months in a five-year period before becoming eligible for the Games.

In a parallel action, the Swaziland Olympic and Commonwealth Games Committee has announced

that five years residence and full citizenship will be necessary before Swaziland will enter former South Africans in international competition. Last October, three prominent

South African athletes moved there in an attempt to compete for Swaziland in the 1988 Olympics. Apparently, after the announcement, they moved back to South Africa.

Filming the Frontlines: Destabilization/Development

BY DAVID COOKE & LINDA GUEBERT

Destructive Engagement, produced and directed by Toni Strasburg, Scope Films, Ltd. 52 min., colour, video formats. Rental: \$50/\$75; Sale: \$525 (Available from Development Education Centre, 229 College, Toronto M5T 1R4.)

Corridors of Freedom, produced by Ingrid Sinclair, directed by Simon Bright, Trade Films, Ltd. 52 min., colour, 16mm. (Available from IDERA Films, 2524 Cypress St., Vancouver V6J 3N2.)

"South Africa is always exporting apartheid," points out Mozambican journalist Carlos Cardoso. The result in Mozambique is 400,000 war casualties, of whom half are under five. Neighbouring countries like Angola suffer constant invasions, and can easily identify the invader, South Africa. Indeed, Pretoria has now publicly acknowledged its overt role. As in Nicaragua, these so-called "low-intensity wars" effectively terrorize the population, through killing, maiming and destroying livelihoods. They also displace large segments of the rural population. As Cardoso says, "People do not run away from Frelimo or the MPLA [governing party in Angola] but they do run away from the MNR [Mozambique National Resistance], because it is not a liberation movement." Famine in Mozambique has therefore become an effective weapon of war, since both



production and distribution are affected.

These disturbing facts are little known outside Africa. The media concentrate on South Africa and events inside the country, with little coverage of the rest of the region. As well as world attention given to apartheid, and to the faltering drive for sanctions, what is

needed are continuing reminders of the horrible effects of South Africa's wars of destabilization on its neighbours.

At the same time, it is important to recognize the courageous and far-sighted response of these neighbouring states, in various areas. For one reason, it is vital to counter the images of Africans as victims, which is the trap of much media coverage of famine in Ethiopia, and is a strong temptation for news reports on Mozambique. For another, it is critical to promote support for positive African initiatives such as the growing regional cooperation in southern Africa. As the late Mozambican President Samora Machel stated, "We should not wait for aid, but rather work for cooperation." The Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), the forward-looking project of regional cooperation between independent states in southern Africa, can point to a number of significant achievements in promoting self-reliance and in loosening ties to South Africa. Contrary to the images on western TV screens, African states are not passively waiting for the rich countries to come to save them.

Taken together, two recently released documentaries about the Frontline States help to address the related issues of aggression and development. *Destructive Engagement* concentrates on South Africa's



Destructive Engagement

destabilization in the region and vividly shows its effects. The film includes many examples of the brutal tactics used by the MNR on ordinary citizens in Mozambique, of the way war creates famine and displaces large numbers of people throughout the region, and of South African attacks on civilian targets in Angola and other countries. The facts are well marshalled (the contribution of consultants Phyllis Johnson and David Martin can be seen) and include some perhaps lesser known information, such as evidence of South African involvement in attacks on white farmers in Zimbabwe. Very effective testimonials by some of those immediately affected convey a real sense of the horror of this war: a Mozambican teacher describes being kidnapped by the bandits, an Angolan woman relates how she lost both legs in a land mine, and many others tell equally compelling stories.

The devastation and grief caused by the war is impressed upon the viewers again and again, but there is little emphasis on the initiatives being taken by members of the Frontline States or their people to resist South African aggression or create alternatives. In *Destructive Engagement* SADCC is mentioned only briefly, and statements by people like Tambo and Cardoso are restricted to those which call for international pressure on South Africa. There is a danger that viewers will be overwhelmed by the extremity of

the situation and not know quite what to do about it.

In *Corridors of Freedom* a different orientation is immediately evident. There are African narrators, with upbeat Zimbabwean music, and the opening images are very positive. This is a film about SADCC, about what the countries of southern Africa are doing to counter the economic dominance of South Africa in the region. Beginning with the formation of SADCC and using old footage to illustrate its historical background, the film goes on to demonstrate the efforts and successes of SADCC in various sectors, including the reconstruction of roads, railways and ports, the revitalization of copper and oil refineries and the development of seeds and fertilizer. Again, testimonials are used effectively; truck drivers, farmers, SADCC workers and government officials all contribute to give a sense of the vital importance of regional cooperation.

However, this film suffers from the opposite tendency of the first – it tries too hard to be optimistic. In several cases what appears to be rehearsed dialogue is used, leaving the impression that people may not really feel as positive as some would like. Although the financial costs of destabilization are mentioned and some of its effects are shown, there is a limited sense of how projects are affected by South Africa's attempts to sabotage SADCC efforts and retain control of the region.

These two films may be said to complement each other, and, indeed, they were both commissioned by and shown on Britain's Channel 4 in a series called "Frontline Southern Africa." Still, one cannot help but want an effective visual which combines the two aspects shown in these films – the effects of South Africa's aggression in the region and the positive steps being taken by the people faced by it. *Corridors of Freedom* does in fact include an example of how effective the juxtaposition of these two elements can be, in a short sequence showing images of the aftermath of an MNR attack on the Tete road, interspersed with those of trucks continuing to travel along it. One is left with an impression of the resiliency and courage of the people in the face of tremendous adversity.

It should be noted, though, that at almost an hour each, these films are probably too long to be used together in most presentation settings (public educationals, classrooms, etc.). In fact, because of their television program length, it might be difficult to use even one of them for development education, where time for introduction and discussion are desirable (although *Destructive Engagement* is in two parts which could conceivably be used separately). Of professional quality and well researched, these films will be welcomed as much-needed resource material on the Frontline States, but a shorter audiovisual on this topic would certainly be appreciated.

Readers' Forum

SPORTS BOYCOTT APPEAL

26 Nov. 1987

To: Mr. Bruce Kidd
Southern Africa REPORT

I am writing you to share some background on our efforts to increase the boycott of South African athletes. The following is a copy of a letter we have forwarded to members of the Manitoba Sports Federation:

We would like to enlist the support of the members of the Manitoba Sports Federation (MSF) in our lobby of the Federal Government. Our major goal is to encourage the Government to withdraw entry visas to all South African professional athletes. At present these athletes are unrestricted in their quest for hundreds of thousands of dollars in prize money.

Our current Government restrictions affect only amateur athletes from South Africa. In 1977 at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting the members agreed upon the Gleneagles Declaration. This pledged all members to discourage by all practical means any sporting contact between their citizens and South Africans. In 1982 the Commonwealth Games Federation adopted a Code of Conduct for its members to give specific meaning and force to the general commitment reached at Gleneagles. However these policies do not apply to professionals, only amateurs and teams sponsored by the Pretoria Government. Consequently such athletes as Nicky Price, David Frost, Nigel Mansell and countless others compete and win large sums of cash prizes at events held in Canada. This is accomplished without as much as a raised eyebrow from our sporting community or worse our Government.

Therefore we would invite the MSF to join in our efforts to extend the Gleneagles Declaration to include all South African citizens.

Through dialogue we have found a positive attitude toward such action and have the support of the Manitoba Coalition of Organizations against Apartheid. To assist your Association in understanding our goals we are available to address your members at any general meeting.

It is our belief that such a movement is best supported at the ground level. As well we feel that the associate members best represent the local community spirit and offer the strongest message possible to our Federal Government.

Please contact us at any time to schedule a discussion with your association.

I would like to know if there are any such efforts being made in Ontario or other provinces. If so we wish also to know and share with them what we are doing and gain some ideas of what we can do in the future.

I hope you will have some items to encourage us in our efforts and we wish all the best in your efforts with the Southern Africa REPORT.

Sincerely,
Michael L. Thompson
68 Ferndale Ave.
Winnipeg, Manitoba.
R2H 1T8

WORDS OF PRAISE

Your work is excellent and invaluable for my teaching on southern Africa and research.

Bonnie Campbell



MOZAMBIQUE RESPONSE

31 Oct. 1987

Thank you for your letter . . . and the magazine . . . These will help our students to understand better the landscape of your country in their geography lessons.

The document [the special issue of Southern Africa REPORT on the death of Samora Machel] was received at the right time, when we were preparing for the ceremony on death occasion of our president Samora Machel. Therefore your magazine contributed a lot during the ceremony as didactic material for the teachers and the students when performing their dramas. . .

Yours sincerely,
Amissi Kampango
Nampula, Mozambique.

Southern Africa REPORT

has now produced 14 issues....
A number of back copies are still available.



\$3.00 each

Vol. 1 No. 2 – “The Question of Sanctions”

Vol. 2 No. 2 – “Sanctions: What’s Left?”

Vol. 1 No. 3 – “The Question of Power”

Vol. 2 No. 4 – “Taking Sides”

Vol. 1 No. 4 – “Focus on Women”

Vol. 2 No. 5 – “The Question of Violence”

Vol. 1 No. 5 – “South Africa’s War on Southern Africa”

Vol. 3 No. 1 – “Education and Transformation”

Vol. 2 No. 1 – “Focus on Labour”

Vol. 3 No. 3 – “Stalling on Sanctions”

from TCLSAC, 427 Bloor St. W., Toronto, M5S 1X7, telephone (416) 967-5562.