

Southern Africa

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# REPORT

December 1986

## A Luta Continua


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# Southern Africa REPORT

Vol. 2 No. 3

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## Southern Africa REPORT

is produced 5 times a year by a volunteer collective of the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (TCLSAC),

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## Contents

Editorial	
A Luta Continua . . . . .	1
Remembering —	
Samora Machel . . . . .	3
People Who Lost Their Lives in the Crash . . . . .	5
Aquino de Bragança . . . . .	6
Fernando Honwana . . . . .	7
A Photo Essay . . . . .	8
The Funeral:	
“A People Cannot Bid Farewell to its Own History” . . . . .	10
Mozambique:	
What is South Africa’s Strategy? . . . . .	13
Mozambique’s Agricultural Crisis:	
A Second Look . . . . .	18
Constructive Disinvestment or Deceptive Engagement? . . . . .	21
Red Baiting in America . . . . .	24
S.A. Notebook:	
Malawi and the MNR . . . . .	26
Reviews:	
South Africa as a Neighbour . . . . .	27
States of Grace . . . . .	28

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President Joaquim Chissano

## A Luta Continua

This is not the issue of *Southern Africa REPORT* we had originally intended, but grim circumstances – the air crash that killed Mozambican President Samora Machel – were to shape its content for us. Some readers will remember that the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (TCLSAC) began life in 1972 as the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Portugal's African Colonies (TCLPAC) and, as John Saul reminds us elsewhere in these pages, TCLPAC's links with Frelimo and the Mozambican revolution were close from the start. Our first major fund-raising effort, in 1973, was to purchase a truck for Frelimo to help facilitate the movement's activities in southern Tanzania, just behind the front lines of the operational zone in northern Mozambique. Twice in the years before victory over Portuguese colonialism, senior Frelimo officials addressed large gatherings at our "Cinema of Solidarity" series in Toronto

(one of them being present, in fact, on the occasion when local fascists attempted to break up our meeting at the University of Toronto's Medical Sciences Auditorium by physical force). As John Saul also notes, a TCLPAC delegation was invited, in 1975, to "represent the Canadian people" at the independence celebrations in Mozambique. Also, many TCLPAC/TCLSAC members were soon to be found working as co-operantes in Mozambique itself for shorter or longer periods of time. Small wonder that the death of Samora Machel – and of those of his colleagues who were with him on that fatal flight and whose deaths these pages also mark – came as such a shock to us, demanding some attempt at adequate response even as we reeled in shock and horror. We are grateful to those who have helped us to put together this issue at such short and tragic notice.

The several eulogies we have included, the first-hand account of

the funeral in Maputo, the photographs, Samora's own words, all speak for themselves. However, Robert Davies' article reminds us of the grisly context which frames the President's death. He begins to suggest the host of suspicious circumstance which surrounds the crash itself and, indeed, more might have been written in these pages about the various suspect activities of the South African authorities at the time and about the aggressive "disinformation" campaign they have mounted since in order, apparently, to muddy the waters which swirl around that event. Perhaps in some future issue we can try to pull together some balance sheet of the evidence. For if, as many suspect, South Africa has Samora Machel's blood on its hands, it would be well to expose that fact as clearly as possible.

At another level, however, such a discussion – much of it necessarily speculative, even sensation-

alist - is less important than allowing the momentary global focus on Mozambique to highlight just how much Mozambican blood South Africa (and its surrogate wrecking-group Renamo, operating on the ground inside Mozambique) already has on its hands. Thus, the main thrust of Davies' article is to draw out the brutal and cynical premises which have underpinned South Africa's strategy towards Mozambique to date and which continue to form the relevant policy debate in Pretoria at present: whether merely to destroy the viability of Mozambique's economy and polity, the better to narrow Frelimo's own policy options, or actually to attempt to overthrow the Frelimo government itself! Consider too Otto Roesch's first-hand, grassroots account in this issue of Mozambique's struggle to find an effective agricultural policy. As Roesch documents, there has been much trial and error in this sector, much compromise and conflict. Yet how important it is that Mozambique's agrarian debate has been carried out within the context of the destabilization South Africa has inflicted on the country. How difficult to move forward with any kind of development effort when personnel, resources, attention must be di-

verted to the war effort. But of course it is precisely such a diversion of Frelimo's energies from the development effort that is South Africa's principal war aim.

*A luta continua*, the struggle continues - Frelimo's watchword, a phrase worn somewhat thin through repetition but still true, perhaps now more than ever. Even while our own *Maclean's*, in a singularly misinformed news article, speculated about a "succession struggle" in Mozambique, the Frelimo leadership team held firm, elevating from their number Joaquim Chissano as Samora Machel's successor. For those with any knowledge of Mozambique he was virtually the inevitable choice. A student activist in Mozambique in the 1950's, central to the undertakings of Frelimo operating from Tanzania in the 1960's, the key political actor on the ground inside Mozambique during the tense period of the transitional government which Frelimo mounted jointly with Portugal's Armed Forces Movement from September, 1974, to Independence Day, June, 1975, Foreign Minister and key Political Bureau member ever since, Chissano brings great competence and a wealth of experience to the job. There seems, in

short, no break in Frelimo's stride in Mozambique, for all that the loss of a man of such boundless energy and intellectual creativity as Samora Machel must, self-evidently, be a costly one.

The new president has embraced unequivocally the unwelcome necessity, in his words, to "continue with war in order to finish with war," to struggle for "the complete elimination of banditry," fully aware that Renamo's "banditry is an integral part of the regional destabilization carried out by the South African apartheid regime." He describes this banditry as "one of the instruments through which the Pretoria regime and its most backward and bellicose elements are trying to maintain their grip over the countries of southern Africa." Moreover, even as Frelimo works "to restore peace and tranquility to all citizens," it will "proceed with the recovery of our economy," linking the needs of the country's defense and the economy "so that the economy may support the war against the bandit gangs, and so that the defense effort may create the necessary security for economic activity." By this route too, he emphasized, "we will reach socialism!"

*A luta continua?* Indeed. How crucially important then, that like President Chissano those of us committed to a brighter future for Mozambique turn our grief into positive energy, that we turn our anger into renewed support for the efforts of Mozambicans and others in southern Africa to survive, to stave off and eventually to overthrow the callous apartheid regime which qualifies so much of the region's promise, to realize, slowly but surely, their own development goals. Fourteen years ago Samora Machel quite specifically asked Canadians to join the Mozambican struggle. Shouldn't his death concentrate our minds, refocus our attention? Can we not rededicate ourselves to that task? *A luta continua*, yes.



*President Machel with Canadian cooperantes in Mozambique*

# Remembering . . . .



AIM

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## Samora Machel

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BY JOHN S. SAUL

Several hundred people gathered in Trinity/St. Paul's Church in Toronto on Friday, October 24, for a commemorative ceremony to mark the passing of Samora Machel, President of Mozambique. The Tanzanian High Commissioner to Canada, Mr. Fernand Ruhinda, was a featured speaker and messages of condolence were presented by a wide range of Toronto-based groups. Samora Machel had touched the lives of many Torontonians,

and John Saul, York University Professor and member of the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (TCLSAC) was asked to speak on their behalf. This abbreviated version of his remarks also appeared in the Toronto weekly *NOW*.

We may never know the true circumstances surrounding the air crash which killed Mozambique's president, Samora Machel. Accidents do happen, after all. Yet the fact that so many observers could

immediately suspect the South Africans of having helped to engineer it is itself no accident. For such an act would be perfectly consistent with South Africa's brutal record of aggression, assassination and destabilization. Indeed, Samora Machel's own country has been one of the principle targets of such South African activities.

A man of astonishing energy and intelligence, Machel played the key role in spearheading Mozambique's

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## remembering

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10 year war against the armed might of Portuguese colonialism. Then, with independence in 1975, Machel and his Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) turned to the even more daunting task of launching a popularly-based development effort along socialist lines.

Under the best of circumstances this would have proven a difficult enough task, given the grim inheritance left to Mozambique by Portugal. But even more significant have been the attacks from outside, most importantly South African sponsorship of a counter-revolutionary movement which it has continued to supply and orchestrate right up to the present - and in spite of the peace treaty between the two countries signed at Nkomati in 1984.

Machel and his colleagues did make errors of their own. But they also demonstrated a marked capacity, over the years, for reflection and self-criticism, an ability to rethink many of their premises. Unfortunately, South Africa's unrelenting economic and military assault has allowed Mozambicans little room to learn from errors made and to launch fresh policies.

Of course, such has been Frelimo's continuing legitimacy and Samora Machel's own popularity that the South Africans have never tried very hard to present a real political alternative. Rather, theirs has been a scorched earth policy, one of destroying economic infrastructure and terrorizing villagers, one of creating chaos and check-mating progress. Not the least of Samora Machel's recent achievements was his capacity to fight on - with vigour, enthusiasm, even good humour - against the lengthening odds South Africa imposed upon his country.

I mourn Samora Machel as a friend of 20 years standing, and as a source of personal inspiration and political stimulus for myself and many others, in Mozambique and

abroad. Equally I mourn for his country, bereft now of his leadership and bereft, as well, of so much of the rich promise of its hard-earned liberation. I contrast the high hopes of Independence Day in 1975 with the grim reality I witnessed when I returned to Mozambique last year for the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of that independence.

And I echo the thought that Samora himself shared with me on that last occasion when we spoke together: as long as South Africa's apartheid state straddles the region, club in hand, the promise opened up by the ending of colonialism in Mozambique will never be fully realized. This is one more good reason why Canadians must support whatever needs to be done to bring down South Africa's cancerous system.

\* \* \*

Surely one of the most galling things about the general run of media coverage of Samora Machel's death this past week has been the sudden discovery by the media that he was not in fact the stereotypical tin-pot dictator of some "Soviet backed" "Marxist regime" in Darkest Africa they had often presented him as being. Rather, they now revealed, he was a man of intelligence, humour, energy, "charisma." Yet many of us knew this all along, had they but cared to ask.

I could recount many incidents which reflected Machel's deft sense of humour and his keen intelligence. ... But I can also speak at first hand of the remarkable energy of the man, of his charisma, of the power of his personality. In particular, I remember vividly a conversation in my garden in Dar es Salaam in 1972. A few weeks earlier he had arranged for me to accompany Frelimo guerillas on a visit to the liberated areas of Tete province and now had come to bid me and my family goodbye as we packed to leave Tanzania.

"You have now seen something of our struggle," he said. "But for

most Canadians their knowledge of it is at point zero. You must try to do something about that when you return home."

It was not an order exactly, yet I could literally feel his will galvanizing me into action, communicating to me personally the kind of drive and purpose I have seen him communicate to Mozambicans, singly and in large gatherings, both before and since that day. It was no accident that on my return to Canada I would soon find myself working with others to launch the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Portugal's African Colonies, TCLPAC (later to become the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa, TCLSAC).

I think it fair to say that TCLPAC was successful in realizing some of the goals Machel wished for us. Certainly, too, the power of his personality - though he never did visit Canada himself - has continued right up to the present to have an impact on Canadians who came in contact with him, either directly or indirectly. For his part, he never forgot the "Toronto front" of Frelimo's struggle, even inviting a TCLPAC delegation instead of the Canadian government (then tied to colonial Portugal through NATO) to represent "the Canadian people" at the independence celebrations in 1975. Small wonder that no one in TCLSAC finds it easy today to think of Samora Machel as being gone.

\* \* \*

I find this difficult myself. But then I find it doubly difficult to conceive of yet another death dogging the heels of the Mozambican revolution. Over the years so many have died unnecessarily, victims of the madness which is white minority rule and racial capitalism in southern Africa. I think of such Mozambicans, but I also think of specific individuals whom I knew well.

I think of my friend, Eduardo Mondlane, Frelimo's first president,

killed by a book bomb during my years in Tanzania. I think of my friend and colleague at the University of Eduardo Mondlane, Ruth First, killed by a letter bomb in her room just down the hall from my own office in Maputo. I think of my dear, dear friend Aquino de Bragança, director of the Centre of African Studies in Maputo, deafened by the bomb that killed Ruth First, now dead himself in the recent crash. And, of course, I think of Samora himself.

Too many have died – though even one would have been too many. We cannot let this madness continue. It is true, of course, that we do not know for certain whether this time South Africa pulled the trigger. But then Machel would not have been in Zambia in the first place were it not to help rally the front-line states of southern Africa against South Africa's latest threats. In any case, so much Mozambican blood is visible on South Africa's hands that the point is almost academic.

\* \* \*

How, finally, to cope with this loss? As I asked myself that question this week I thought of Frelimo's own 1969 eulogy to an earlier fallen president, Eduardo Mondlane. Once again I found it moving and, as an example of how Mozambicans have sought themselves to deal with such setbacks, personally helpful. Since it seems almost eerily to speak of Samora Machel as well, I will repeat it here:

*"Thus we commemorate his life and we mourn his death. We knew, as he knew, that this could happen, even if it seemed impossible that all that energy, all that strength and vitality could be crushed. How full of life was his body, how free and at ease his way of moving and doing things, how sure his voice.*

*"We mourn the death of these physical things which cannot survive as other aspects of him can. We mourn him as a man. And as a man, we know that he was not free of fault or error, or of shortcomings. The Revolution will build better men, but he worked to build the*

*Revolution. And he fought – as we continue to do – in this hope: that our descendants can be better men than we were ever given the chance to be. But they will carry with them the memory of our leader.*

*"By his death they will understand that for us the principle 'Independence or Death' was not devoid of meaning. But to it we add that it has been a physical death; it will be another step toward independence. We will make it so. We will be more determined, more stubborn and implacable than we ever were. ... Our enemies must not forget that the guerilla fighter returns to battle with increased rage when he sees a comrade fall."*

Surely this is the spirit in which we must come to terms with the loss of Samora Machel. But is it the case that the Mozambican revolution – if it is allowed to survive – really will build a better person than Samora Machel? Perhaps, but it would not be easy to do, even in the best of times. Such was the strength of character of the man we mourn.

## PEOPLE WHO LOST THEIR LIVES IN THE CRASH

Samora Moisés Machel – *President of The Republic & President of Frelimo*

Luis Maria de Alcântara Santos – *Minister of Transport & Communications*

José Carlos Lobo – *Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs*

Aquino de Bragança – *Director of the Centre of African Studies*

Fernando Honwana – *Special Assistant to the President*

Alberto Cangela de Mendonça – *Chief of Protocol*

Muradali Mamadahusen – *Private Secretary to the President*

João Tomás Navesse – *Deputy Director in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

Ivete Amós – *Secretary to the President*

Oswaldo de Sousa – *English Interpreter to the President*

Bernardino Chiche – *French Interpreter to the President*

Gulamo Khan – *Press Attaché in the President's Office*

Daniel Maquinasse – *Official Photographer*

Parente Manjate – *Staff, President's Office*

Nacir Charamadane – *Staff, President's Office*

Adão Gore Nhoca – *Staff, President's Office*

Eduardo Viegas – *Staff, President's Office*

Albino Falteira – *Staff, President's Office*

Alberto Chauque – *Staff, President's Office*

José Quivanhane – *Staff, President's Office*

Azarias Inguana – *Photographer for the newspaper Noticias*

Fernando Nhaquila – *Flight Engineer*

Orlanda Garrine – *Flight Attendant*

Esmeralda Luisa – *Flight Attendant*

Sofia Arone – *Flight Attendant*

Ilda Carão – *Flight Attendant*

Henriques Bettencourt – *President's physician*

Ulisses La Rosa Mesa – *President's physician*

Iuri Novdran – *Captain of the aircraft*

Igor Kartamychev – *Copilot*

Oleg Kaudrainov – *Flight Engineer*

Anatoli Choulipov – *Flight Engineer*

Cox C. Sikumba – *Ambassador of Zambia in Mozambique*

Tokwalu Batale Okulakamo – *Ambassador of Zaire in Mozambique*

# Aquino

BY IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN

*Immanuel Wallerstein is director of the Fernand Braudel Center at SUNY, Binghamton, N.Y., author of numerous books and coeditor with Aquino de Bragança of The African Liberation Reader.*


Aquino de Bragança was my friend, my brother. I first met him, I believe, in 1959 in Morocco where he was then living. He was there as the leader of the Goa liberation movement and a member of the team who were laying the base for the creation of the CONCP, the structure that linked together the national liberation movements of the Portuguese colonies. Like so many others who knew him, I found him a warm, generous, passionate, intellectually alive human being, and we became close, almost immediately.

Aquino was a totally political person. He played, however, three different political roles. He was a militant, he was a diplomat, he was a revolutionary. They are not the same. But he played all these roles with an incredible integrity.

A militant engages the enemy. Aquino became a militant as a student in Goa, then continued in Lisbon and Paris. He was part of that absolutely remarkable group who came together in Lisbon in the 1950's to launch the struggle against Portuguese colonialism - Mario de Andrade, Amilcar Cabral, Viriato Cruz, Eduardo Mondlane, Agostinho Neto, Marcelino dos Santos, among the most well known.

When Algeria became independent in 1962, he moved to Algiers and there pursued his tasks as a militant. He wrote for *Révolution Africaine* (Algiers) and *Afrique-Asie* (Paris). He edited all the material relating to Portuguese-speaking and southern Africa for these two journals, which became major outlets of

expression for their national liberation movements. Aquino became in effect the prime spokesperson of the CONCP to the outside world.



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He was based in Algiers from 1962 to 1974 and came to be the communications link for the CONCP. All the major figures of the PAIGC, MPLA, Frelimo, and the CLSTP came through Algiers regularly. Aquino provided them their logistical base. But more importantly he was their discreet confidant, their honest counselor, and major channel of internal communication.

When the MFA overthrew the Portuguese Fascist regime in 1974, the situation suddenly changed. By 1975, all the Portuguese colonies would become independent, but not however without a great deal of political struggle. In this key period of transition, Aquino became the special diplomat, used by the movements (and especially Frelimo) to help them navigate the rapids of delicate political negotiations, particularly in Lisbon. A militant faces the enemy, but a diplomat faces the interlocutors. It is a different skill.

After independence, Aquino moved to Maputo where Samora Machel offered him many positions. But he requested only one, that of creating and directing the Centro de Estudos Africanos of the Universidade Eduardo Mondlane. It is, when you think of it, a remarkable choice.

I know of no other leader in a nationalist struggle in Africa (or elsewhere) who made a similar request to a president.

If Aquino wanted to create a university center of research, it was not because he was in love with scholarship or archives. He certainly sought no ivory tower. If he made this choice, it was because he wanted to be more than a militant facing the enemy or a diplomat facing the interlocutor. He wanted to be a revolutionary, and he knew that revolutionaries face their comrades, struggling with them in the search for how really to transform the world.

He railed in private and in public, ever since 1975, against "triumphalism" which he considered to be the betrayal of the revolution. He had no tolerance for slogans, for dogmas, for forced optimism, for sacred cows. He saw the temptation everywhere - in all the states and movements aspiring to be revolutionary - to fall into what the French call the "langue de bois," the heavy ritual language which deceives no one except those who use it and which he found all too widespread. For him, the Centro could offer an analysis that would be honest and sober, and therefore revolutionary.

He came to be known by everyone as an irreverent maverick. Some feared him for it, some ignored him, but most of us loved him for it. Samora loved him for it. Aquino came with no arrogance to his questioning, only with an "optimism of the will."

The day that Cabral was assassinated, we spoke. He cried to me: "They have killed our Amilcar." It was, typically, Aquino who would write soon thereafter the most comprehensive, honest reportage of the assassination of Amilcar Cabral, and of the role that elements within the movement, collaborating with the enemy, played in it. He grieved the death of Amilcar, but he sought to have us all learn from it.

They have killed our Aquino.




# Fernando Honwana

BY ALLEN ISAACMAN

*Allen Isaacman is a professor of history at the University of Minnesota who has taught and researched in Mozambique and has authored numerous books on that country.*

At thirty-six Fernando Honwana had already given so much to his country and had so much more to give. He brought youthful energy, mature judgment and unfailing loyalty to his position of senior advisor and confidante to Mozambique's late President Samora Machel. A man of enormous intellect with a probing mind, Fernando was always ready to challenge received wisdom when it did not correspond to the Mozambican reality and Frelimo's socialist agenda. Perhaps President Chissano said it best: "He a was brilliant and lucid intellectual ... [and] a respected leader loved for his competence and humanism."

Frelimo's leaders quickly came to appreciate Fernando's rare combination of critical inquiry and dedication. While still in his twenties, he was sent to represent Mozambique in the Lancaster House negotiations which resulted in Zimbabwean independence. The close ties he developed with his Zimbabwean counterparts gave him an important entry to that country's leadership after independence and proved to be critical in strengthening relations between the two nations. In addition to his frequent trips to Harare, Fernando went on strategic missions to countries ranging from North Korea to the United States. And while formally serving as special assistant to the President, he also held important positions in the military and security branches of the government. Nevertheless, for all his involvement in delicate matters of state, he loved nothing more than to relax with a spy novel.



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Fernando Honwana was born on November 24, 1951, in Moamba district. He came from a southern Mozambican family that was both fiercely proud of its African identity and deeply committed to breaking the chains of colonial oppression. His relatives had fought against the Portuguese colonialists at the turn of the century and both his father Raul and brother Luis were arrested by PIDE – the hated secret police. And yet when describing the indignities that he and his family members had experienced, he was never consumed with bitterness nor hatred. To the contrary, he had a rare inner strength and vision of the future which enabled him to transcend his own personal suffering and to mock the most absurd features of colonialism.

From his father Fernando developed a keen sense of history and appreciation of how the past could be

a powerful weapon to forge a new future. An outstanding student he was one of a handful of Africans to receive a higher education. He completed secondary school at Waterford in Swaziland, and won a scholarship to York University in England from which he graduated in 1973. Unlike a number of other Mozambicans studying in the west who chose to remain abroad after completing their education, Fernando underwent military and political training at Nachingwea in Tanzania. There, according to President Chissano, he "demonstrated his dedication to the cause of the people and his commitment to the revolution." He returned to Mozambique shortly before independence and began his varied and distinguished governmental career.

In death Fernando left behind a proud family who not only mourn his loss but, as Frelimo members, continue to struggle for a just society. This commitment is embodied in his wife Flavia Honwana, herself a leading militant and member of the Organization of Mozambican Women (OMM). In the infrequent moments they had together, Flavia and Fernando were always dreaming about the vacation they were never to have. I recall on several occasions walking along the beach with their young son Ozzie on my shoulders when he would point to the plane overhead and explain with glee, "Papa está ali – my father is up there." For Fernando was rarely at home.

Those of us who knew and loved Fernando will miss his radiant smile, witty sense of humor and penetrating intellect. People such as Fernando are rare, indeed. Our lives were enriched immeasurably by his presence. And in this moment of grief we re-dedicate ourselves to support Mozambique and the other front-line states against the violence perpetrated by Pretoria and its armed clients such as the MNR who seek to destroy everything for which Fernando stood.



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# remembering

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How can we mourn a comrade but by holding the fallen gun and continuing the combat.

The flowers which fall from the tree are to prepare the land for new and more beautiful flowers to bloom next season.

Your life continues in those who continue the Revolution.

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Photo: T. P. P. P.

Photo: Leftist from London. The Air Line Club by Barbara P. P.

# The Funeral: "A People Cannot Bid Farewell to Its Own History"

BY JENNIFER DAVIS

*Jennifer Davis is Director of the American Committee on Africa in New York.*

Maputo was sad, and sombre, and yet, in a strange way also strengthening and reinforcing. It was a relief to be surrounded by people who were also grieving, even as they went about all the work that had to be done. It was moving and strangely comforting to share the ceremonies of burial and mourning with thousands of Mozambicans, to hold, even for a moment, old friends like Janet Mondlane and Joaquim Chissano, people who have lost so much more than me. And then, after the days devoted to the dead, it was helpful to have a little time to spend trying to collect information, discuss urgent needs, seek out photographs and films, so that, in the end, I was turned toward the future again.

I spent six days in Maputo, and, a month later I have still not been able to assimilate the experience into the ordinary web of my life. The days were filled with a multitude of different activities and impressions, but I am always busy in New York too. Perhaps what was different was my intense feeling of awareness ... I wanted to notice everything, big things and little things ... the way people looked, and moved and talked to each other, at the funerals, visiting families, in the streets. I wanted to hear what they said, absorb the way the city "felt", see what food people ate, count the cars in the streets, and the people in the buses. In New York one lives by blocking out surroundings. In Maputo, everything seemed to have significance, both in itself and as a "sign" of something else. Perhaps ultimately I was looking for the signs that could

speaking about the existence of a future, for I had come bearing terrible questions about Mozambique's ability to survive the onslaughts of a murderous South Africa added to drought, flood and the mistakes made in the process of learning how to build a new socialist society.

I arrived in Maputo early on Monday morning, on a LAM flight from Paris carrying many foreign dignitaries as well as returning Mozambicans. Visitors were being handled by "protocol" officials, in a situation where chaos might well have prevailed ... some 130 official delegations and 17 Heads of State arrived for the funerals, often without notification, and always with far larger delegations than expected ... 29 instead of 3, I heard, in one case. This in a country with a handful of hotels, only one of international status.

But in a little while we were all sorted out. Along with two old friends from the European solidarity movement, I was found not only a house, but also an interpreter/"guide", Antonio, who gave

us endlessly of himself, in many ways. He lent us his parent's house, as they were away. He spent hours of his time, often from dawn to late at night, sharing with us his insights, carrying us everywhere in his motor car, making the many phone calls that filled out the details of our days, all in time that he had taken off from his commercial job, so that he could help in a time of crisis, and all with a quiet seriousness that asked nothing in return, and lives now in my memory as one of those "signs" of the future I was seeking.

Monday morning was hot, sunny and humid, and had to be spent on the technicalities of getting organized, so that I was too late for the funerals of my two closest personal friends, Carlos Lobo and Aquino de Bragança. But in the afternoon we went to the cemetery, which stands on the edge of town, to the funerals of other Mozambicans killed in the crash. Many were buried together, and we stood behind thousands of people, straining, in the hush, to hear the service and see what was happening. After a while



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the restrained quiet was broken by the wailing of women, then the quavering notes of a bugle, then the dull thud of earth on wood as family and friends filled in the graves. Suddenly heavy clouds gathered, and soon it began to rain in gusts. No one moved . . . we too waited for a while, and then went in search of the grave of another of South Africa's victims, Ruth First, long time activist, killed by a parcel bomb. I had once seen Ruth every day, intensely alive, as she ran in and out of the same building in which I worked, in South Africa. Now she lies in a quiet part of Maputo's cemetery, away from the ornate gravestones, under some flame trees. I carried a seed pod home with me, but in New York a customs official took it away.

From the funerals, we drove back into the centre of town, to wait, in Independence Square, for our turn to pay our last respects to President Machel, lying in state in City Hall. The Square was filled with thousands of Mozambicans, waiting their turn to file past the coffin. Many stood on through the night - there was no curfew; indeed the lack of obvious security throughout the ceremonies was notable - as though a decision had been made that soldiers bristling with guns would separate the leadership from the people rather than protect it.

Maputo's City Hall has a classic, columned facade, with tiers of steps leading down into Independence Square. As we waited, the daylight turned to dusk; floodlights washed across the portrait of Machel at the center of the facade; people stood so quietly, that I could hear the two flags flying at half mast on either side of the portrait snap in the breeze; classical music played in the background, and hundreds of swallows circled, swooping in and out of the light. We waited our turn for a long time, standing at the bottom of the main stairs, up which we watched the passage of President Mugabe and other Heads of State. The scene was both disorganized and organized - a common contradiction in Mozambique. All the time we were waiting a tiny stream of Mozambicans was making its way into the building, sometimes slowed by the passage of a VIP. From time to time some of the thousands of people in the Square surged impatiently up the stairs below us. As far as I could see, major crowd control responsibility lay in the hands and voice of one energetic, non-uniformed Mozambican woman, who intervened when things got out of hand, restoring order by exhorting people to behave in a proper Mozambican way. And they did. I had time to watch the faces of the people coming out of City

Hall, their faces sober, young formally clad men, old women, draped in many layers of clothes, an old man with tears streaming down his face.

After maybe two hours it is our turn. We walk up the red carpeted stairs, through a brightly lit hall, into a chamber banked from floor to ceiling with the flowers of many nations; in front of us is a group of young soldiers, they move slowly past the coffin, in a formal slow march, stopping to salute; then two diplomats from Japan bow, and then I stand for a moment in front of the closed shining wooden surface, and move on. We were all very quiet going home.

It was still raining early next morning as we gathered to catch the buses which carried all except the most senior of foreign visitors to the funeral of President Machel. Antonio told us that according to local belief great leaders come and go with rain; certainly the weather, cold and grey, seemed fitting symbolically.

The funeral ceremonies began at Independence Square, still crowded with thousands of people. The President's family, foreign Heads of State and Mozambican officials gathered inside City Hall, while we waited outside. After a while the coffin was carried to the head of the stairs, the army honour guard band playing sombre music; there were two brief speeches, honouring the President, one from a young man representing all the mass organizations and one from Alberto Chipande, on behalf of the armed forces. And then Marcelino dos Santos delivered a funeral eulogy that still reverberates for me. This was not a religious ceremony, but a profoundly political one; yet it rang with the beauty of poetry, and the feeling of a lifetime spent together in the struggle to build a better future for all the people of Mozambique. The program indicated dos Santos would speak for 15 minutes; he spoke for an hour, and the only movement in the crowd came as sometimes a hand

moved quietly to wipe away tears. At one point, describing Machel's links to the many different people in Mozambique, dos Santos began to weep, but he spoke on, through his weeping, dedicating himself and all Mozambicans to the future.

*"Your dreams are our dreams. Your struggle is our struggle. Now the most difficult moment for all of us has come, the moment of farewell. But we are only delivering your body to the earth. You remain with us. But we will never say farewell to you. A people cannot bid farewell to its own history. Samora lives."*

After this a small contingent of military units accompanied the President's body through the streets of the city, out to Heroes' Square, at the centre of which is a crypt

When the formal funeral was ended people began to file through the crypt, moving on to convey their greetings and condolences to the members of the political bureau, all standing quietly in a line, with hundreds of people thronging about them. Later that day someone gave me a photograph taken last year, inside the crypt, of Machel standing in front of the slab marking Mondlane's resting place. As I walked out of the crypt I met Janet Mondlane, and she stopped for a moment, to embrace, and to ask how friends in North America were, in the face of this terrible blow. It was common for this to happen, and also for people to say how important it was for them that friends had come, physically, as well as in spirit, to share this time.


each other and to the Mozambican people.

I, a relative stranger, was exhausted by the day. As I embraced Marcelino dos Santos he seemed illumined by grief, a portrait from an El Greco painting. Yet the next day the Frelimo leadership was alternating meetings with Heads of State, a Front Line State meeting and the many internal meetings to ensure a coherent transition to the next Presidency. And in the midst of all that, there was still time to think about the needs of people like us, who came representing no governments, able to offer no immediate massive food or military aid. Soon after our arrival we had indicated a desire to meet some members of the government, including Joaquim Chissano, if that was possible. In the next few days, we set about meeting as many other people as possible, both to express our condolences to the families involved, and to equip ourselves for new solidarity work, which is clearly an urgent necessity.

When I was in Mozambique in 1983 I was often struck by a kind of discontent with the slow pace of progress, a malaise which seemed to colour many people's view, so that they found it hard to be enthusiastic. Now the mood was different ... sober, but somehow less disgruntled, more committed to the future. Perhaps because there is now a very clear enemy. Nevertheless, no one was starry-eyed about the months to come. Yet in many different ways people were working on new projects, even despite the tremendous destruction being wrought by the bandits.

Aquino de Bragança's wife is an artist ... movingly she spoke of the brief time she had with him "I am only a short passage in his life ... there are so many who knew him longer, who always came to talk." But she also talked about ideas she had to engage the children of different countries in working for peace.

*(continued on page 25)*



in which lie buried Frelimo's first President, Eduardo Mondlane, and other Mozambican heroes. The ceremonies here were brief; there was no loudspeaker system, so, like the thousands of Mozambicans around us we stood quietly and waited. People had flowed out of the neighbourhood to pack the area, most children barefoot. There were a few hand-lettered signs, denouncing South Africa as the assassin - but mostly the mood was subdued, rather than militant ... a striking contrast to the pictures of recent South African funerals.

Waiting my turn in line I listened to the conversations around me. Much of the comment from foreigners was speculation about the succession ... who would be the next President. Interestingly, when I was with Mozambicans, I heard much less of this. There seemed little of the gossip and speculation about "infighting" and "power struggles" that might have marked such an event. Whatever the problems of the times ahead, it seems true that the Frelimo leadership picks up the renewed struggle with a high degree of commitment and loyalty both to



# Mozambique: What is South Africa's Strategy?

BY ROBERT DAVIES

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The death in the air crash on the night of the 19<sup>th</sup> October of President Samora Machel and other senior Frelimo party and Mozambican government leaders will clearly have a major impact on both the political situation in Mozambique and regional relations.

The full details of the incident itself are not yet available and it is still being officially investigated. However, although it may in the end be difficult to prove conclusively, there is a growing body of circumstantial evidence suggesting that the crash might have been caused by some sophisticated form of electronic sabotage. Informed sources in Maputo are discounting the possibilities that it might have been the result of poor weather, "human error" resulting from an allegedly inexperienced crew, or the plane drifting off course. It appears that the flight had proceeded normally until the presidential plane was about 70 km from Maputo in the region of Manhica. There were no faulty systems on the plane, the weather was fine and the crew was experienced. Contact was lost shortly after the control tower in Maputo gave orders for the plane to prepare for a routine instrument landing.

The plane crashed 200 metres inside South African territory near the Mbuzini mission in KaNgwane at about 9:30 on the night of Sunday 19<sup>th</sup> October. However, it was not until 6:40 the next morn-

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"Apartheid is responsible for the death of our President" reads sign

ing that the Mozambican authorities were informed that the plane had crashed on South African territory, despite the fact that the plane's entry had, as Foreign Minister R.F. Botha acknowledged, been monitored on South African radar. Moreover, one of the survivors, Captain Fernando Manuel, had walked to a local clinic after the crash, arriving, according to *Business Day*, at about 10 pm. Shortly thereafter the clinic had phoned the local police.

One hypothesis being put forward is that the plane's instruments and controls might have been interfered with by an electronic signal. An expert on electronic warfare in the United States said that there are so-called false beam devices quite capable of this kind of interference.

However that may be, the fact remains that this tragic development occurred at a time when Pretoria was stepping up pressure against Mozambique. On October 8th, ostensibly in response to a land mine incident in KaNgwane in which six SADF members were injured, the South African government announced that it was prohibiting the recruitment of Mozambican migrant workers. On October 11th, a Mozambican government communique said that information had been obtained from a South African citizen "linked to economic interests" that "the militarists" in Pretoria were planning to launch air raids and had infiltrated a commando to carry out attacks in and around Maputo city. Indeed, just a few days before the air crash, President Machel told a group of journalists that there had been several previous attempts by the South African military to assassinate him - the most recent being in November, 1985, when plans to attack his motorcade using bazookas had been uncovered.

All these developments took place in the context of a stepped up assault in the central provinces of

the country by MNR armed bandits operating out of Malawi (supplied, trained and directed by the extensive network maintained in that country by South African Military Intelligence with the active connivance of the Malawian authorities). One of the major objectives here was clearly to cut the Beira corridor and prevent it from serving as an alternative to continued dependence on South African ports and railways for SADCC countries - particularly in the event of the application of counter-sanctions, measures by Pretoria against neighboring states.

This article will examine recent South African actions against Mozambique, both as a background to the death of President Machel and as an indication of the possible direction of future South African policy toward the country.

#### **The Context: Intensified Destabilization**

The Pretoria regime said that the October 8<sup>th</sup> ban on migrant labour recruitment (and by implication the other, subsequent measures which it did not acknowledge) were a response to the land mine explosion in KaNgwane on October 6<sup>th</sup>. Defense Minister Magnus Malan alleged in a statement on the 7<sup>th</sup> that the mine was planted by ANC members operating from Maputo. It is true that Pretoria has complained on a number of occasions in the past few months about alleged ANC activity out of Maputo. It clearly wants the ANC presence in Maputo further reduced, if not eliminated altogether. In August, Deputy Foreign Minister Ron Miller, said that Pretoria wanted to raise the question with Maputo, and about the same time South African press reports quoted officials claiming that "the ANC has begun using Mozambican territory for infiltration again" (*Cape Times* 27/8/86).

Nevertheless, there is good reason to believe that the KaNgwane land mine was no more than a con-

venient pretext to implement a series of already planned measures against Mozambique. No proof was presented that the land mine attack had been planned or carried out by ANC members in Maputo, while the repatriation of foreign migrant workers had been threatened on several previous occasions as retaliation against sanctions. In fact the implementation of this measure (and other pressures being applied) was probably provoked by two other recent developments - the pressure by the front line states on Malawi (aimed at cajoling Malawi to cease allowing its territory to be used as a rear base by the armed bandits) and the vote in the US Congress to override President Reagan's veto of the Senate sanctions bill.

There is no doubt that concerted pressure by the front line states against Malawi posed a direct challenge to Pretoria's current regional strategy. Malawi has been used as a base for MNR operations for years and, indeed, after the capture of former MNR headquarters at Gorongosa in August 1985, it became the main rear base for bandit activity in the central provinces of Mozambique. At the same time, bandit action in the central provinces has become more strategically important to the Pretoria regime. One of the principal levers which South Africa has been able to wield against the SADCC countries as a whole has been their dependence on South African ports and railways - a dependence artificially created by the repeated sabotage of Mozambican facilities. As pressure for economic sanctions against South Africa increased, Pretoria made it plain that it intended to use the leverage it had over regional states arising from their dependence on South African transport services in its counter-sanctions campaign. This was demonstrated by the hold-ups of Zimbabwean and Zambian traffic in August, and again in early October when Foreign Minister R.F. Botha threatened to respond to a





Anti-Apartheid News

US Congress vote for sanctions by blocking the trans-shipment of US grain to regional states. In such circumstances, Pretoria clearly regards it as essential to act to prevent Mozambican ports from serving as an effective alternative.

The decision by SADCC in January to give top priority to rehabilitating the Beira Corridor to enable it to rapidly take an increased tonnage of SADCC cargo was thus seen as a threat. As the *Financial Mail* of August 15 put it: "There is ... a real possibility that if Beira threatens to become a viable alternative, Pretoria will shift from economic warfare to the real thing, using its military power (or MNR surrogates) to disrupt the rail link and oil pipeline from Beira, on which Zimbabwe is so dependent." In any event, the *Financial Mail's* prediction proved to be accurate. As rehabilitation work on the Beira Corridor advanced - faster than expected by many cynics in South Africa - bandit activity from Malawi was stepped up. Initially it was concentrated in Zambezia and Tete provinces, but there is no doubt that the plan envisaged embracing the entire central region and cutting the Beira corridor. On October 17, the MNR, in fact, claimed to have

attacked Villa Machado in the corridor itself.

The pressure put on Malawi by the front line states, in response to increasing bandit activity from Malawi, thus represented a serious challenge to Pretoria's current regional strategy. Malawi appears to have been seen by Pretoria to have drifted from the fold before (notably in joining SADCC and hosting the 1981 SADCC summit) and therefore to be vulnerable to such pressure. The conclusion drawn thus seems to have been that more pressure should be applied against Mozambique in order to weaken the impact of this action by the front line states. A few days after the news conference in which President Machel spoke about the possibility of closing the frontier with Malawi and stationing missiles along it (September 11<sup>th</sup>), the *SABC News Commentary* launched a strong attack on both Mozambique and Angola. The commentary said that the President's remarks showed that the "real cause" of destabilization in the region was "civil wars" in states ruled by "marxist dictatorships" unrepresentative of their people. These were spilling over into other states. This was one of the first occasions on which such language had been used in SABC com-

mentaries about Mozambique since Nkomati. It was also one of the first occasions in which the MNR bandits were so blatantly accorded legitimacy in the official media.

The other probable immediate cause of current pressure was the decision by the US congress to override the presidential veto on the Senate sanctions bill. Pretoria had for some time threatened to repatriate foreign migrant workers in retaliation for the imposition of sanctions. There is no doubt that the Pretoria regime was angered by the US vote. Not only did the bill itself represent a severe setback, but Foreign Minister R. F. Botha's lobbying (which, as noted above, included a threat to US grain sales) backfired. His threats to various undecided senators actually had the effect of turning them against him. This may, in part, explain why the decision was made to cut legal migrants straight away, rather than only so-called illegals, as initially expected. However, this does not explain why only Mozambique was so affected, nor does it explain the threatened military action against the capital. If we reject the explanation given - that this was a response to the KaNgwane land mine - then the only conclusion that remains is that current pressures are more than a mere reaction to recent developments, and more than a mere demonstration to the outside world of South Africa's capacity to damage the economies of its neighbours. They represent an attempt to force some changes in Mozambique - either in political behaviour or political structures.

#### Possible Objectives and Content of Continuing South African Pressure

The loss of President Machel at this moment will be a major blow to the embattled Frelimo government, and will add a further element of insecurity in an already fragile situation. The mood of the populace in general appears to be one of shock and sadness at the loss of a leader

who was held in considerable esteem by the Mozambican people. There is also a feeling of outrage at Pretoria's widely assumed responsibility for the death of Samora Machel. However, the immediate effect has been a consolidation of popular support behind the Frelimo leadership. At the same time, Pretoria has to some extent been placed on the defensive. It is being obliged to do all it can to cover its tracks and deny any involvement in the incident. These two factors together suggest that in the immediate short term, Pretoria may well lay off visible direct pressures against Mozambique. Above all it will probably not wish to confirm the general perception that it was responsible for the death of the President by further economic action or direct assaults on the capital just at this moment. This does not, however, apply to the MNR. The MNR has already announced that it will attempt to take advantage of the situation by stepping up its activity.

However, in the medium term – which may begin at any time after the funeral – the Pretoria regime can be expected to resume its pressure on all fronts. While it seems clear that Pretoria saw its recent pressures as a means of pushing for change in Mozambique, it is not wholly clear whether the changes sought were at the level of government positions and policies, or whether they were seen as part of a process of bringing about a change in the government itself. Indeed there were some indications that, while a consensus existed that Mozambique should be further pressured, there were possibly differences within the regime over the precise objectives such destabilization measures were intended to achieve. Some differences of tone and emphasis in the comments of members of the regime were discernible. For example, Defence Minister Magnus Malan, in a speech the day after the KaNgwane mine incident and the day before the announcement of the ban on Mozambican migrants, said

that President Machel was unwilling or unable to prevent his country from serving as a base for the "Moscow-inspired revolutionary war against South Africa" He claimed that President Machel appeared to have lost control of the situation in Mozambique, and said Pretoria was extremely concerned at the course of events there. Such a statement has all the hallmarks of a classic disinformation tactic designed to provide a justification for the overthrow of a government. On the other hand, in a speech on the 16<sup>th</sup>, State President P.W. Botha said that he hoped that the Nkomati Accord would survive. The fact that information on plans for stepped-up military pressure around the capital was apparently leaked to the Mozambicans also points to the possibility of divisions within the regime.

Hypothesizing from the above, it seems possible that two competing positions exist within the State Security Council (SSC), with the overall policy of the regime vacillating between them. For convenience these could be describe as *minimalist* and *maximalist* positions.

The *minimalists*, who may well be found in the ranks of the military, as well as among civilian politicians and diplomats, would appear to differ from the *maximalists* only over precisely how far to push the escalating cycle of destabilization measures against Mozambique. As members and defenders of a besieged racist minority regime, isolated to an unprecedented degree at both the regional and wider international levels, they would accept as objective necessities of the present conjuncture further pressure on regional states aimed at least at reducing further the ANC presence in the region as well as at maintaining the widest room for manoeuvre in a sanctions war. They would thus probably strongly support an intensification of bandit activity in the central provinces of Mozambique as a necessary measure to prevent the Beira corridor serving as a viable al-

ternative for SADCC states. They would not want to see the front line states succeed in pressuring Malawi to abandon its support for the armed bandits. They would probably, to some degree at least, share the view that any ANC presence of any type in any regional state was a potential threat. They would thus want to see the ANC presence in Maputo drastically reduced if not altogether eliminated. However, they would differ from the *maximalists* in not necessarily favouring an attempt to overthrow the government in Maputo. They would probably emphasize the risks for Pretoria of any such move – the prospect of getting tied down supporting a puppet regime in power, with Frelimo back in the bush. For the *minimalists*, escalating destabilization would be a means of changing political behaviour, not political structures.

Extrapolating from the above, it is possible to imagine the *minimalists* hoping that current pressures would force the Mozambican government to return to the Joint Security Commission (JSC) set up by the Nkomati Accord. Some sources have suggested that this is, in fact, one of Pretoria's immediate goals. Until recently it is very likely that Mozambique's non-participation in the JSC (following the discovery of the Gorongosa documents) did not bother Pretoria much. The agenda of meetings would probably have consisted of a series of well-substantiated Mozambican complaints about South African violations. However, as indicated earlier, since about the middle of this year it has become clear that Pretoria wants to press for a reduction of the ANC presence in Maputo, and to have a forum to raise complaints on a regular basis.

One thing that is absolutely clear is that no one in the regime would want the JSC to become a forum dominated by Mozambican complaints of continued South African support for the armed bandits. No member of the regime would thus

want it to become even a forum in which the ANC presence in Maputo was traded off against South African support for the MNR. The regime needs more bandit activity, particularly around the Beira corridor and cannot afford to give this up even if concessions were offered by Maputo on the ANC. This would suggest the possibility of the *minimalists* supporting an attempt to revive the JSC but on different terms. This might involve the apartheid regime's trying to extract a tacit understanding that the JSC confine itself to discussing alleged violations only from the territory of the signatories, ie. an effective agreement that bandit activity from Malawi would be kept off the agenda. Then they might be prepared to bargain reduction, or elimination, of the ANC presence in Maputo against some resumption of migrant labour recruitment. This, at any rate, may be what the Chamber of Mines is proposing. Its statement on the October 8<sup>th</sup> ban "regretted" that it "had been found necessary" to take this step, but said it was not able to "evaluate the security considerations on which the decision was based. . . . The Chamber earnestly hopes that negotiations between the South African and Mozambican governments will lead to an early return to normality." Perhaps in addition to this, the *minimalists* might favour a renewed attempt to use the JSC to suggest and/or push for a negotiated settlement between the Mozambican government and the MNR - a long-standing objective of Pretoria's strategy towards Mozambique.

For the *maximalists*, on the other hand, not even such an outcome would be enough. They appear to believe that the overthrow of the Frelimo government is an essential precondition for the attainment of any of the major objectives of Pretoria's current regional strategy. They would probably also argue that such a development would enable them to reduce their existing, increasingly costly, commitment to

the MNR armed bandits and thus redeploy scarce resources on the domestic front. The question which arises is precisely how such forces would intend to go about overthrowing the Mozambican government. In my view, the experience of the Lesotho coup of January 20<sup>th</sup> merits close study as one possible *modus operandi*.

In the case of Lesotho, despite occasional reports of contacts between the South African Defence Force (SADF) and members of the Lesotho Defence Force, the principal South African intervention did not involve direct plotting of the coup. Nor did Pretoria attempt to install its own direct allies - the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA). Instead, it applied economic and other pressure with the objective of exacerbating the already acute internal contradictions to the point of rupture. The result was that the new government which took over was not seen as (and indeed was not) the mere puppet of Pretoria. Pretoria was not obliged to step in immediately and sustain it. On the other hand, the new government in Maseru immediately conceded a number Pretoria's demands, and has shown itself more susceptible to subsequent South African pressure than its predecessor.

It is possible that the recent pressure directed against the Mozambican capital may, in the *maximalist* scheme of things, be seen as having a similar role as pressures against Lesotho's President Jonathan in January. Attempts by both Pretoria and certain western intelligence services to promote a negotiated settlement between the Frelimo government and the MNR are generally seen to have failed. The intensification of pressure, in the *maximalist* scheme, would thus be aimed at exacerbating particular contradictions to the point of rupture. It has been clear for some time that Pretoria has attempted to intervene in contradictions which it

perceives to exist within its neighbours. In the case of Lesotho, there were sharp, obvious contradictions between a minority in the armed forces supporting the Basotho National Party Youth League, and the majority. In the case of Mozambique such obvious splits do not exist. However, a reading, particularly of the literature of the MNR bandits (which to some extent at least probably reflects the views of the SADF) suggests that they see a potential contradiction between certain unspecified senior figures in the Mozambican Armed Forces, who are seen to be "nationalists" more disposed to negotiate with the MNR, and the Frelimo political leadership, seen as intractable "communists." More recent statements from the MNR have indicated that they consider that without President Machel the two factions will not be able to hold together.

### Conclusions

It is possible that the death of President Machel (assuming that Pretoria had a hand in it) represented a compromise between *maximalists* and *minimalists*. Removing the President could be seen as a change of political structures which might result in policy shifts, but which would not involve the risks for Pretoria associated with a wholesale change of government. However that may be, what is certain is that in the medium term at least some resumption of the intensified destabilization campaign can be expected. Whether this will take the form of an attempt to force the Mozambican government, under President Chissano, to enter into negotiations on new, less favourable terms, or an attempt to provoke domestic contradictions to the point of rupture, remains to be seen. The Frelimo leadership - now minus President Machel - will be in for a testing time, and will have to mobilize all the domestic and international support available if it is to successfully withstand the storm ahead.

# Mozambique's Agricultural Crisis: A Second Look

BY OTTO ROESCH

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After an absence of 3 years, it was with considerable anticipation and excitement that I returned to the lower Limpopo River valley, in southern Mozambique's Gaza Province. I had lived and worked in this area, located some 200 km north of Maputo, for almost a year during a study tour between 1981 and 1983. I was eager to see what changes had taken place, especially what effect the new policies of economic liberalization and increased support for peasant and private sector agriculture, announced at Frelimo's Fourth Party Congress in 1983, were having on levels of agricultural production and rural life in general.

I travelled from Maputo to the city of Xai-Xai, the capital of Gaza province, in a small 6-seater aircraft operated by Mission Aviation, an American organization which has set up business in Mozambique only in the past year, as part of the increased U.S. presence in Mozambique since the signing of the Nkomati Accord in 1984. Because MNR terrorist attacks against civilian vehicles have made road travel in many

areas very dangerous, if not impossible, Mission Aviation is doing a brisk business (in foreign exchange) ferrying cooperantes and international aid workers about the country. My own decision to fly between Maputo and Xai-Xai - a distance I regularly drove during my previous visit to Mozambique - was the result of the sporadic attacks which the MNR continues to mount along the road linking the two cities.

MNR attacks on the Maputo - Xai-Xai road, however, are no longer the serious affairs they were in late 1984 and early 1985, in which dozens of Mozambican civilians lost their lives. What attacks do now take place usually take the form of ineffective long distance sniper fire, and are confined almost exclusively to a single short stretch of road passing through heavily wooded terrain in Maputo province, which Mozambican truck drivers (for obvious reasons) have come to refer to as "Beirut". The present ineffectiveness of MNR attacks appears due to the fact that all traffic now travels in well-armed convoys along this dangerous stretch, and more generally that the Mozambican armed forces are now able to keep enough pressure on MNR bands to prevent them from grouping into units large enough to mount serious attacks. In the lower Limpopo valley itself, the military situation continues to remain as secure as it was when I was there last, and it is possible to travel freely throughout the area.

As we flew in low over the Limpopo valley in preparation to land at Xai-Xai's airport, the well defined boundaries of cultivated fields and the parallel rows of planted crops that I could see on all sides immediately suggested that a

much larger area of this fertile valley was now under cultivation than had previously been the case. At the time of my last visit, large expanses of this once highly productive valley lay abandoned and uncultivated. The low productivity which then characterized agricultural production in the valley was a reflection of the depth of the agricultural crisis which has gripped this area, like the rest of the country, since independence.

The agricultural crisis of the lower Limpopo valley, like that of all of Mozambique, is rooted in the collapse of the country's colonial economy after independence. The flight of settler farmers, the collapse of national commercial networks, the decline in levels of migrant labour to South Africa (which historically has served as an important source of agricultural capital in southern Mozambique), all contributed to a sharp drop in levels of agricultural output in the immediate post-independence period. Frelimo's subsequent decision to make state farms the cornerstone of national agricultural policy served only to compound the country's agricultural problems. The state farms proved expensive and unworkable failures, and the concentration of investments in the state farm sector deprived peasants, cooperatives and capitalist farmers of much needed support, thereby limiting their productive capacity and output. A succession of natural disasters, especially the severe drought which has afflicted much of the country since 1980, and the crippling effects of South Africa's war of destabilization, have further exacerbated Mozambique's precarious agricultural situation. The agricultural

reforms introduced by the Fourth Congress are an attempt to find a way out of this crisis.

The view of the Limpopo valley which greeted me from the air upon arrival seemed to suggest that the Fourth Congress reforms were having some measure of success. On the ground too, the relative abundance of agricultural produce in Xai-Xai's central market, and the greater quantities of consumer goods in the stores - two developments which had also been evident in Maputo - stood in marked contrast to the empty stalls and bare shelves of my earlier visit to Mozambique.



Anders Nilsson/AIM

One of the main reasons for this increase in marketed agricultural production was readily apparent at the weigh scales of every stall in Xai-Xai's central market: the price of food is higher, much higher, than it was when I was last in Mozambique. The policy of commercial liberalization which the government began implementing in 1985 has freed the price of many agricultural products, giving rise to increased supplies of marketed produce, but also to dramatic price increases. At the beginning of the tomato season, for example, tomatoes in Xai-Xai's central market were selling for 300 meticals (MT) per kg. As the season advanced and supply increased, competition drove the price down to about 80-90 MT per kg, a figure which is still very high when one

considers that the average Mozambican urban wage is only about 6000 MT a month. Though the government has denounced the price gouging of many retail merchants, the root problem remains one of supply, and as long as supplies remain low, prices will remain high.

My excursions to the countryside soon revealed some of the other reasons for the recent growth in agricultural output in the lower Limpopo valley. In many communities throughout the region, large areas of what was once state farm or cooperative sector land are now being turned over to peasants and cap-

italist farmers. The state farms and cooperatives, which formerly controlled much of the best agricultural land in the valley, but lacked the capacity to use it productively, have been left with only as much land as they can actually cultivate. This decision, which is in keeping with the current policy of allocating resources to those producers who have the capacity to use them most efficiently (whether these be state farms, cooperatives, capitalist farmers or peasants), has had the effect of bringing much fallow land back into production.

Another important factor in stimulating the recent growth in agricultural output in the lower Limpopo valley has been the dramatic increase in levels of state material support now being extended

to private and peasant producers. Hand tools, trucks, tractors, fuel and other inputs are now available in much greater quantities than was formerly the case. A sizeable part of this increased support is currently being financed by foreign donor agencies. USAID, for example, has been supplying a considerable amount of support to private farmers. Trucks and tractors emblazoned with the USAID logo are now a common sight throughout the area. Dutch NGOs, on the other hand, have been playing a very important role in support of peasant producers. Their support has gone to rebuilding the largely abandoned drainage-irrigation system upon which peasant cash cropping was based in the colonial period. In the severe drought conditions which have afflicted the area since 1980, this programme, which counts on large-scale popular participation to build the canals, has met with widespread popular support. Dutch support has also gone to helping establish a small-scale metal working industry in the area, capable of supplying the region with basic agricultural and household implements, such as plows, hoes, and buckets. This latter project struck me as being particularly important as an attempt to link agricultural and industrial development at the local level.

Though I was very encouraged by these initiatives, and by the increase in marketed output they have generated, it was quite evident that the obstacles to any major and sustained increase in agricultural production continue to be considerable. The most obvious and immediate of these is the continuing shortage of basic consumer goods in the countryside. For the peasantry in particular, the unavailability of consumer goods constitutes a major disincentive to increased production. If there is nothing to be bought with the money peasants earn through the sale of their crops, there is little reason for them to produce crops for market in the first place. The

capacity of the Mozambican government to increase the supply of consumer goods at this time, however, would appear to be very limited, in view of the massive economic losses and military expenditures imposed on the country by South Africa's war of destabilization.

The shadow which South Africa casts on the agricultural reforms of the Fourth Congress also looms large in another respect. Because of the traditional dependency of the rural economy of southern Mozambique on migrant labour to South Africa, the recent decision by the South African government to expel, over the next year, all Mozambican migrant workers is likely to deal a severe blow to Frelimo's efforts to stimulate private and peasant sector agriculture, and to the economy of southern Mozambique as a whole.

Historically, migrant labour to South Africa has been an important source of agricultural capital and consumer goods for this part of the country. Though levels of labour recruitment to South Africa dropped sharply after independence, they have again increased in recent years, reaching over 61,000 this year in the mining industry alone - a figure approximating colonial levels of recruitment. The increased supply of capital and consumer goods which this increase in labour recruitment has entailed, has been very important in enabling peasants, and especially capitalist farmers, to respond to the agricultural reforms introduced by the government. For though the government has sought to increase supplies of tools and other capital inputs to rural areas, a large part of these continue to be brought in by returning migrant workers from South Africa. Nearly all the private farmers I spoke to, for example, depended on migrant workers to supply them with the spare parts and lubricants they needed to keep their tractors and trucks in working order. The same was true for the vehicles operated by rural merchants.

At the level of general popular consumption as well, the importance of consumer goods brought back by returning migrant workers is now also very great. The chronic shortage of consumer goods inside Mozambique has led to a dramatic increase in the amount of merchandise being imported by migrant workers, and to the development of a flourishing import business (and a corresponding entrepreneurial stratum) - all based on the foreign currency purchasing power of migrant labourers. Convoys leaving Maputo for Xai-Xai, and for Inhambane further north, are often in excess of 2 km in length, consisting mostly of trucks laden with consumer goods bought by miners for shipment back to their home communities inside Mozambique.

These goods are usually redistributed through informal systems of exchange and the parallel economy. For many Mozambican rural families, returning miners, not local shops, have now become the main source of soap, cloth and other consumer goods. Much of the current economic upswing which was so noticeable to me on this trip, has been, I think, closely linked to this increase in labour recruitment to South Africa.

This dependency of the Mozambican economy on migrant labour to South Africa is quite starkly evident in global financial terms as well. Wenela, the labour recruiting organization for the South African mining industry, which has an office in Maputo, estimates that migrant labour to the mines alone is worth approximately 230 million Rand to the Mozambican economy this year (1986), with a large part of this sum taking the form of the imports described above. It is clear that if the expulsion of the Mozambican migrant workers goes ahead, the impact on the economy of southern Mozambique is going to be severe.

In the face of this escalation in South Africa's war of destabiliza-

tion against Mozambique, it is clear that the short term prospects for Mozambique's agricultural reforms are at best uncertain. To meet the threat of South African sanctions, and growing military aggression, Mozambique will need substantial international economic support, in order to give the kinds of local level development initiatives now being implemented in the lower Limpopo valley a chance of working.

Taken as a whole, the agricultural reforms of the Fourth Congress clearly represent a significant retreat from the ambitious strategy of rural collectivization launched immediately after independence, and adhered to right up until 1982 when preparations for the IV Congress began. In the current context of drought, acute food shortages; and especially war, the primary concern of the Mozambican government has increasingly become one of augmenting food production and keeping critical sectors of the economy functioning, regardless of the relations of production through which this is achieved.

The dangers which this opening to market forces poses for Mozambique's long term socialist objectives are evident. Already, in fact, one could see that capitalist farmers, and entrepreneurs generally, were exhibiting much greater public assertiveness and an increasing tendency to play a more active role in local political affairs. On the other hand, these reforms may well be viewed in Mozambique as a necessary tactical retreat, aimed at grounding future efforts to build a socialist rural economy on a firmer productive basis. But whatever the case, it is clear that the Fourth Congress reforms represent a genuine attempt to correct past policy mistakes and to pursue a more balanced rural development strategy. Ultimately, however, any progress in this direction, as we have seen, will be closely linked to the outcome of the overall struggle for an apartheid-free South Africa.

# Constructive Disinvestment or Deceptive Engagement?


BY JIM CASON & MIKE FLESHMAN

Faced with escalating unrest inside South Africa and growing pressures from divestment activists, a number of major U.S. corporate investors have announced they are heading for the exit. Coca-Cola, General Motors, and IBM have all announced they are "withdrawing" from South Africa, and the British banking giant Barclays followed suit in late November.

But are they? In most cases the answer is turning out to be no.

Take for example IBM. The day that IBM announced they were withdrawing, IBM South Africa ran full page ads in all the major South African newspapers assuring customers that their products would still be available. The current manager of IBM South Africa, Jack Clark, will become the new manager of an as yet unnamed company that will buy out IBM's interests in South Africa. IBM is providing a low interest, five year loan to the new company and has signed a renewable three year agreement to supply IBM products and a similar five year agreement for servicing.

General Motors, which is also selling its assets to its local South African management, was even more careful, writing into the sales agreement a clause enabling GM in Detroit to buy back its South African interests at a future date. General Motors has also signed long term licensing and franchising agreements with the "new" company and provided a low interest loan to set up that company. Interestingly, both GM and IBM had to rush to complete these loans before the Congressional ban on new investment came into effect on November 12.



Southern Africa

IBM, GM and Coca-Cola among others are attempting to ease anti-apartheid pressures at home by selling off their local subsidiaries to nominally independent local companies while continuing business through licensing and franchise agreements. As one IBM dealer in South Africa cheerfully admitted to the *Washington Post*, "Nothing has really changed except that IBM no longer has to account for its presence in South Africa." Even IBM South Africa director Jack Clark described the arrangement as virtually "business as usual."

But business as usual even camouflaged with licensing agreements and locally owned front companies isn't getting IBM and GM off the hook. Los Angeles, which is one of 32 cities in the U.S. with legislation restricting city business with corporations involved in South Africa, still has IBM and GM on their list. "They would still clearly be disqualified - no doubt about it," said Mark Fabiani, legal advisor to Los Angeles Mayor Thomas Bradley. "They will have more than enough business ties with South Africa to fall within the scope of the Los Angeles law."

The state of New Jersey, San Francisco and Washington D.C., have all followed the Los Angeles' example in insisting that U.S. companies sever all ties to South Africa.

"As the nature of U.S. economic relations with South Africa changes, the divestment movement needs to pressure for an end to all involvement - sales, investments, trade and licensing agreements - with the South African economy," wrote American Committee on Africa Projects Director Rob Jones in a letter to anti-apartheid activists in late October. "In the coming months, we need to ensure that state and local divestment and selective purchasing measures continue to target companies like IBM and GM."

## Closing Corporate Loophole

But to give the corporations their due, companies like IBM and GM have, technically, satisfied the principal demand of the anti-apartheid movement - ending all direct investment in South Africa. Historically, anti-apartheid activists built their anti-corporate campaigns around the 350-odd U.S. companies with direct investment in South Africa.

The "hit list" of US companies in South Africa published by ACOA, the prime mover behind the divestment campaign in the United States, lists only companies with direct investments in or loans to South Africa rather than the estimated 6,000 companies doing business with South Africa.

The use of the direct investment criteria was first and foremost a function of campaign logistics, but it did create a loophole that the companies have tried to exploit. In response, the anti-apartheid movement has moved quickly to close it - developing stringent new criteria for disinvestment that include licensing, technology transfers and sales. A draft of the proposed new criteria is circulating among anti-apartheid activists in the United States, and is scheduled for release in December.

But Big Business isn't giving up. When Coca Cola announced its intention to "disinvest" earlier this year, Coke vice president Carl Ware went a step further than his corporate peers in adopting an anti-apartheid pose. "We do not believe that disinvestment alone is an adequate statement of opposition to apartheid," Ware wrote in a letter to US church leaders. "For this reason we are currently involved in negotiations to sell a large portion of our equity holdings in the bottling and canning business to our retail dealers, most of whom are black."

What Ware didn't tell the churches is that Coke's bottling interests accounted for less than 10 percent of the \$55 million Coke earned in South Africa in 1985. Syrup sales, which earned Coke a tidy \$50 million last year, will continue from a new plant in neigh-

boring Swaziland, and the ubiquitous Coke logo will still dot the apartheid landscape. Coke's "withdrawal" from South Africa won't disturb its 75 percent share of the South African soft drink market.

Anti-apartheid activists are not persuaded. "It's a sham," says Atlanta activist Tandi Gcabashe. "They're still selling their products there, they're still making money and they're still doing business. Nothing has changed." Gcabashe and other activists are coordinating a nationwide consumer boycott of the Atlanta-based multinational.

But Coke's careful cultivation of an anti-apartheid image, which includes the creation of a \$10 million philanthropic fund in South Africa (see *Southern Africa REPORT*, April 1986) in addition to its to date fruitless search for black investors, has won it some friends in South Africa and the United States, including a leading anti-apartheid campaigner, the Rev. Allan Boesak.

According to U.S. press accounts, Boesak endorsed Coke's disinvestment scheme during a Coke-sponsored visit to the United States in November. "In that way," Boesak told the Post, "divestment would become a process of empowering blacks economically and politically, thereby bringing more pressure on the South African government and more confidence for our people." Boesak also sits on the board of directors of Coke's South Africa Foundation, and his links to the company have hampered efforts to launch the Coke boycott.

Other South African activists *Southern Africa REPORT* spoke to, however, expressed surprise at Boesak's reported endorsement of Coke's actions, pointing out that Boesak has been a leading advocate of sanctions and corporate withdrawal from South Africa. Coke's South Africa policy has also been endorsed by some leading civil rights activists, including Coretta Scott King and Atlanta Mayor Andrew Young.





But Coke's emphasis on "development of a black leadership infrastructure" – corporate newspeak for the creation of a black middle class – is just the latest in an increasingly desperate search for black "moderates" to manage a post-apartheid South Africa for the capitalist West. Far from promoting the end to apartheid, Coke's policy is designed to demobilize black resistance and obstruct far reaching economic, political and social change. Coca-Cola operations in South Africa may now be once removed, but they continue to operate in and benefit from the apartheid economy and that's why activists in South Africa and in the U.S. will continue to demand full withdrawal of all corporations from South Africa.

## Disinvestment and the Unions

But ironically the disinvestment movement's greatest challenge may come not from management but from labour. In October, workers at two General Motors plants in Port Elizabeth went on strike to protest the terms of the company's recently announced decision to pull out of South Africa. Contrary to press reports, the strike was not against GM's decision to disinvest but over the company's failure to consult with workers over the terms of the disinvestment. The workers had two demands – severance pay and control over pension funds – but the underlying issue was the company's refusal to negotiate the terms of its disinvestment with the National Automobile and Allied Workers Union (NAAWU).

According to NAAWU regional secretary Les Kettleidas, "NAAWU has absolutely no opposition to the Americans leaving. Our position is that GM has been in the country for sixty years and for at least 55 of those years has been making profits, and exploited the apartheid situation to its benefit. At the point when the corporation pulls out it should pay some compensation to the workers."

But GM refused to negotiate the terms of its withdrawal with its workers. On October 6 General Motors decided to sell its South African operations to local management but it was not until workers went on strike that GM agreed to meet with the union leadership to discuss the sale. And even then GM took a very tough attitude toward the strike, firing 500 workers who were sitting in at the plant and later calling in police with attack dogs to break up a picket line at the plant gate – the first direct police intervention in a motor industry labour dispute in recent memory. The combination of police violence and threat of mass firings succeeded in breaking the strike on November 18.

NAAWU's action is a forceful reminder that South Africa's emerging black trade unions have a lot at stake in the withdrawal of corporations from South Africa. It's a reality that the anti-apartheid movement in the U.S. will have to come to terms with as the pace of disinvestment accelerates. On this issue the unions are trying to balance contradictory interests. On the one hand the unions are playing a political role in the struggle against apartheid and that accounts for their strong support for corporate disinvestment. On the other hand the union's political strength comes from their ability to deliver material benefits to their members on the shop floor – an ability that is potentially threatened by corporate withdrawal and economic sanctions.

The unions themselves have demonstrated that it is possible to both support disinvestment and organize strong trade unions, but the U.S. anti-apartheid movement has yet to demonstrate that it understands and supports workers' complex attitudes toward disinvestment. The GM strike is a case in point. Despite GM's strong arm tactics and the legitimacy of NAAWU's demands for compensation and consultation, the U.S. anti-apartheid movement did nothing to support

the strikers. With disinvestment actions certain to increase in the months to follow, the movement's failure to support black workers' demands and defend workers' interest can only weaken workers' support for disinvestment in South Africa and ultimately erode the political and moral legitimacy of the anti-apartheid movement itself.

On November 1, the three major unions in the auto industry issued a six point statement on disinvestment demanding full consultation, job security, severance pay, and control over pension funds from the departing companies. These demands should be taken up by the disinvestment movement in the United States and incorporated into the disinvestment criteria now under discussion.

The struggle in South Africa has changed dramatically over the last two years and the anti-apartheid movement has sometimes had to struggle to keep pace with the growing strength of the black resistance. Strong public support for the unions disinvestment demands is both an obligation and an opportunity for anti-apartheid activists to forge new links of communication and solidarity with the people of South Africa. Such links or the lack of such links are certain to be tested in the weeks and months to come.



Frank Horley

# Red Baiting in America

BY DAVID LEWIS

*David Lewis is a South African trade unionist temporarily living in New York.*

The US Administration's South Africa policy may be down, but it's not out. In Reagan's widely repudiated 22 July speech on South Africa, the key to his administration's current foreign policy lies in his references to the "Soviet armed guerillas of the ANC". Supporting apartheid may have proved too hot to handle, but fighting communism is what they're really good at.

The "Soviet menace" has always been part of the Reagan administration's South Africa policy. In the name of fighting communism in Angola, the administration has armed UNITA. The US-conceived linking of Cuban withdrawal from Angola with South African withdrawal from Namibia has successfully stymied a settlement in that country.

But the "Soviet menace" strategy has never been applied with much success to South Africa itself. The strength of the apartheid issue aside, it has been difficult to associate the international opposition to apartheid with the Soviet Union. It is principally an African-led campaign, and, the best efforts of the South African government notwithstanding, it has proved fairly impervious to notions of super power rivalry.

But clearly the red-baiting effort is now being made in the hope that, even if it does not bear fruit in the short run, it will pay off in the long run when the fate of *post-apartheid* South Africa is decided. A contributor to the influential and liberal *Washington Post* warned, in an article on South Africa, that "it is the Soviet way to try to capture popular revolutions on a broad

platform of justice and nationalism, leaving issues of post-revolutionary organization to the fine print." It is at this "post-revolutionary organization" that the red-baiting is directed, with the ANC as the major target.

Some of the far right campaigners are crude. In an article in the *Los Angeles Times*, Raymond Price, a former Nixon speechwriter, writes that "the real struggle in South Africa is not about race ... it is about whether South Africa will fall into the hands of the Soviet stooges of the African National Congress and become another Bulgaria, Nicaragua or Afghanistan". He refers to the "communist-run ANC and its terrorist allies who burn people alive". A recent *New York Times* *op ed* article entitled "In South Africa, Black Leninism" cites ANC support for Soviet foreign policy positions and, replete with graphic stories of 'necklaces' and 'petrol bombs', concludes that "Mrs. (Winnie) Mandela wishes to impose on fellow South Africans a dictatorship as brutal as that imposed by Moscow on the Ethiopians and the Afghans ... The blacks of South Africa will not find a better life under an ANC dictatorship." The writer of this article is John R. Silber, president of Boston University, and it is no coincidence that his university is conferring an honorary doctorate upon Gatsha Buthelezi.

In fact, this right wing venom derives support from Buthelezi's own characterization of the ANC. In an article in the *LA Times*, Buthelezi refers to "ANC comrades and other purveyors of death and destruction". He asks "Is this what the American people really want to support? The ANC kills people as a matter of policy. Surely the lessons of Korea and Vietnam are still fresh in your minds."

The policy tack will not necessarily take the shape of an attempt to discredit the ANC as a whole. Chester Crocker recently acknowledged at a Senate hearing that the ANC qualified "in a generic sense" as a group of "freedom fighters". He was harshly criticized by the right wing for this concession. But Reagan himself has called on the South African government to release Mandela and un-ban the ANC President Oliver Tambo or Secretary General Alfred Nzo. When referring to the ANC, Reagan's speech is littered with adjectives like 'communist', 'terrorist', and 'Soviet armed', the buzz words for official US hostility. And yet the administration has acknowledged that it is considering official contact with the ANC.

The Administration's hope is that there will be elements - 'nationalists' is the term - within the ANC with whom it can deal. It's worth quoting Reagan at length: "... the ANC started out some years ago and there was no question about it being a solid organization. But in 1921 in South Africa the Communist Party formed, and just moved into the African National Congress ... We've had enough experience in our own country with so-called Communist fronts to know that you can have an organization with some well meaning and fine people, but you have an element in there that has its own agenda, and this is what has happened with the ANC ... the ANC in exile, the ones that we are hearing from and that are making the statements, are the members of that African Communist Party. So now if you could do business with and separate out and get the solid citizens in the ANC to come forward on their own that's just fine." All of which sounds remarkably similar to Buthelezi's persistent distinction between what he refers to as

"the External Mission of the ANC" (which he asserts is Moscow dominated) and an unidentified authentic core that will recognize his leadership claims.

Underlying the Administration's attempts to distinguish, and, if necessary, create camps within the ANC is the reluctant admission that somewhere down the line it will have to treat seriously with the ANC. The trick is to separate the reds from the blacks. And in the euphoria surrounding the recent passage - over Reagan's veto - of the Anti-Apartheid Act it is often forgotten that the new law itself enshrines and legitimizes Reagan's red-baiting. Section 509 of the Act instructs the CIA and other intelligence gathering agencies to submit to the Senate within the 90 days two reports - one classified, the other unclassified - which "shall set forth the activities of the Communist Party in South Africa, the extent to which Communists have infiltrated the many black and non-white (sic) South African organizations engaged in the fight against the apartheid system and the extent to which any such Communist infiltration or influence sets the policies and goals of the organizations with which they are involved."

Whilst a Democratic Party Administration would probably lower the red-baiting temperature somewhat, they're at one with their Republican colleagues on the Soviet threat. In the recently released Democratic Party programme, *New Choices in a Changing America*, the first of the Foreign Policy Principles states "the expansion of Soviet influence continues to pose the major threat to American interests and world peace. We must not and cannot relax our vigilance against Soviet imperialism." The document commits itself to "tough and effective sanctions against South Africa" so as not to be ultimately faced with a "no win choice among racism, Marxism, or other extremist elements." The Chairman of the Foreign Policy panel is the New York Congressman Steven Solarz, one of Congress' leading anti-apartheid campaigners.

Red-baiting is not going to disappear. Its going to intensify. And an anti-apartheid movement that wishes to maintain its broad base of support in order to capitalize on its recent success will have to deal with this. The ANC, to its credit, continues to proclaim the broad anti-capitalist tenor of its struggle and its close alliance with

the SACP. Anti-apartheid supporters in North America will have to be equally forthright. There are a number of ways of doing this. There is the powerful, though essentially defensive, response that asserts the fight against apartheid, like the fight against the Nazis, legitimates an alliance with the Communists. In a song called "Invade South Africa" Trinidadian calypso star Mighty Sparrow sings "... it's not an easy decision with this racial problem, but I'd rather have an 'ism than the apartheid system."

But maybe the only way of effectively dealing with the red-baiting is to insist, even at the immediate cost of some support, that the US simply does not have the right to determine the nature of post-apartheid society, and to make it clear that even the current CIA investigation is a serious violation of the rights of the South African majority. This will probably lose some anti-apartheid support. But it may start to inject a new notion into the American polity. To rupture, even slightly, the Republican/Democratic mould that takes for granted the right of the US to intervene in other countries when a threat to the US national interest is perceived is worth the loss of a few limp allies in the anti-apartheid struggle.

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## The Funeral

(continued from page 12)

I spent time with health workers and journalists, with people planning new films and people struggling to fill the food gap which will place 4 million Mozambicans at risk this year.

And then, on Saturday, our last day, Antonio arrived with the message that somehow, before we left, our request for time to meet with some government officials would be met. Late in the day, coming out of meetings, Joaquin Chissano and Armando Guebuza outlined the serious situation now facing Mozam-

bique, touched on the need for new international solidarity.

But perhaps the most memorable minutes of my stay in Mozambique were fifteen minutes spent with Graça Machel and hour before leaving. She had borne herself with great dignity throughout the public ceremonies. Now, face to face, she embraced me, listened to my messages of sympathy and solidarity and said, "We have always known that we had many friends, but it is good that you are here, so we can touch." Then she went on to talk about the tasks ahead.

She talked about aid for Mozambique in terms of strengthening mo-

bilization for sanctions - "Apartheid must be killed," she said. "We can go on for ten or twenty years, but we will not succeed to overcome our difficulties, with South Africa as an aggressive neighbour."

And finally she talked a little about herself, with extraordinary strength and dignity. "When they first told me he was dead, I wanted to die too, but then I thought, he did not die, he was killed. He wanted to live. So now I must live, and carry out the work."

The stars were shining one hour later when the plane left Maputo. Perhaps when I return again the sun will be shining.

# Malawi and the MNR

Malawi has a lengthy history of playing both sides of the street in the regional politics of southern Africa. It has taken up membership in SADCC while at the same time it is giving support to the South African backed MNR in its aggressive actions against Mozambique. Mozambique's (overly?) patient efforts to woo Malawi into line through SADCC were dramatically challenged by leaders of the Front Line states bordering Malawi in early September.

In an important show of growing political coordination, the leaders of Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, through whose countries the bulk of Malawi's international trade passes, informed Malawian life president Hastings Kamuzu Banda of their intention to close the borders with Malawi unless it ceased its support for the MNR. At the meeting in Blantyre on September 11, President Samora Machel, just five weeks before his death, informed Malawi of Mozambique's intentions to set up missile installations along their common border in a bid to halt the aggression.

The aging President Banda has long dreamed of a "Greater Malawi" that would encompass all of Mozambique north of the Zambezi river, and give land-locked Malawi a link to the sea. This would include the international port at Nacala that Banda reportedly is fond of referring to as "my port." Banda's dream dates back at least to 1962 when he visited Dar es Salaam bearing an old Portuguese map and tried to persuade Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere that Mozambique did not exist as a separate country. Nyerere refused to accompany Banda on a tour to put his case to other African leaders and to Portuguese colonial leaders in Lisbon. Salazar and other leaders of the

Portuguese dictatorship soon found it convenient to encourage Banda's fantasy, however, holding out the hope of "Greater Malawi" as the bait for Banda's not allowing Frelimo fighters access to Mozambique through Malawi. Throughout the independence war and even after Mozambique independence in 1975, Malawi has supported a series of anti-Frelimo movements. The last of these, the Mozambique Revolutionary Party (MRP) merged with the South African-backed MNR in 1982. The Malawian policy of cooperation with South Africa's strategy of destabilization in the region reached new heights following the signing of the Nkomati Accord in 1984. The levels of MNR activity in northern Mozambique increased dramatically as a result of Malawian willingness to serve as an alternate conduit for MNR infiltration into Mozambique.

At a meeting between President Banda and Presidents Mugabe, Kaunda and Machel in September, the Mozambican officials produced a dossier documenting Malawian support for the "armed bandits." The Mozambique Revolutionary Party's signatory to the merger with the MNR was one Jimo Phiri, who served as the MNR chief representative in Malawi. The dossier included photocopies of two passports for him under different names, and documents referring to Phiri, including one from MNR leader, Afonso Dhlakama, giving details of weapons, ammunition and other support required from Malawi. Not surprisingly, Mozambique has several times appealed for his extradition.

What Malawi's response will be to these long overdue pressures by its neighbours remains unclear. While publicly denying any involvement with the MNR, Malawi has


agreed to establish a high-level joint security commission with Mozambique to deal with the issue. At the same time, reports published in the Mozambican daily newspaper *Noticias* (7/10/86) suggest that the accusations of complicity with South Africa and the coordinated action by the front line states are giving rise to "serious contradictions among the Malawian leadership."

October and November have seen a sharp increase in the level of fighting along the Malawi-Mozambique border area between MNR rebels and Mozambican troops. Thousands of rural Mozambicans have fled from the terror into Malawi. Interpretations of these events vary widely. Some suggest that the movement of MNR personnel across the border may represent an expulsion of the MNR from Malawi (and a distancing of Malawi from South Africa's strategy of destabilization.) Others offer much more pessimistic perspectives, anticipating the fabrication of incidents in this region which South Africa will try to seize to justify still more dramatic actions of intervention.



Frank Horley

# South Africa as a Neighbour



BY JONATHAN BARKER

Joseph Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front: South Africa's War against Its Neighbours*, Penguin, 130pp., \$7.95.

Joseph Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa*, Catholic Institute for International Relations with James Currey and Indiana University Press, 368 pp. £8.95 in U.K.


Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, eds. *Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War*, Zimbabwe Publishing House for the Southern Africa Research and Documentation Centre, 378 pp., \$12.50 plus tax in U.S.A.

Many of us spent more time than usual listening to BBC and CBC radio reports in a search for more information, better background, and clearer analysis of the death of Samora Machel and his colleagues and of the plane crash which killed them. The voices which to me made the most sense and gave the most information were those of David

Martin, then in Maputo but usually based in Zimbabwe, and Joseph Hanlon, speaking from London after long residence and extensive travel throughout southern Africa. Hanlon and Martin, along with Phyllis Johnson, are the principal authors of the three books here under review. All the books were published before the death of Machel, but they bring to life the partially hidden, complex economic, political, and military war in the region. The shape and nature of this war must be grasped in order to understand the full dimensions of the struggle against apartheid, the painful side of sanctions, and the wide regional and international import of Machel's death. They also show why David Martin and Joseph Hanlon were so well-informed in their radio commentary and why their reports were suffused with scarcely concealed anger toward the apartheid state.

How can one fail to experience anger in the face of the catalogue of the sheer destructiveness of South Africa's forays against its neighbours? Hanlon's briefer study, *Apartheid's Second Front* (which is an abbreviated version of his longer book), chronicles the willful damage, starting with the attack of 9 December 1982 on a dozen flats and houses in Maseru, Lesotho's capital. South African commandos killed 30 South African refugees and 12 Lesotho nationals. That very day in the port of Beira in Mozambique another group destroyed a depot of fuel intended for Zimbabwe and Malawi. In all, Hanlon counts (as of early 1986) raids (killing hundreds) by South Africa's specially trained commandos on 7 neighbouring capitals and attempts to assassinate 2 prime ministers, in addition to the large-scale invasions of Angola (killing thousands) in 1975 and 1980 and the support for rebels in Mozambique since 1975 (killing more than 100,000).

## DESTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT



Southern Africa at War

Foreword by Julius K. Nyerere

More destructive and ultimately more deadly has been Pretoria's economic aggression. Extrapolating from figures calculated by the Southern Africa Coordination Commission in 1985, Hanlon estimates the cost of war damage, higher transport costs, lost production and exports, care for refugees, higher military budgets, and diverted investments at about £10,000 million in early 1986 and mounting at an accelerating rate. Particularly telling are the figures given by Martin and Johnson of more than 2700 schools closed, displacing 500,000 pupils and 5000 teachers. No wonder recent World Bank figures show that the proportion of children in primary school has declined in the last four years. The books do not calculate the lost production of food by farmers made refugees, the lost time of leaders diverted from development matters to defense, the lost talent diverted from productive administration to military service; but that these losses are all too real is made clear enough.

An excellent companion to the useful *Apartheid Handbook*, also published by Penguin, *Apartheid's Second Front* gives a concise account of the economic ties which South Africa uses to enforce its regional domination and to limit the psychological and political impact within South Africa of majority rule in the countries next door. The possibility of a successful socialist development pattern is doubly threatening to Pretoria. Hence the relentless and unbridled interventions of the apartheid state. The only defence of the front line states is to strengthen their internal economic coherence through SADCC and to lessen their dependency on South Africa. Western powers can help greatly by supporting SADCC and by imposing sanctions. Measures should be chosen for the psychological and economic effect. If strictly enforced, refusal to supply South Africa with new advanced technologies and with petroleum products could rapidly weaken the regime of apartheid.

What the short book cannot do is to examine in detail the inner weaknesses and conflicts of the front line states on which South Africa is able to play. The regime in fact cultivates such conflicts, as Hanlon shows in *Beggar Your Neighbours* and as Martin and Johnson and the other authors show in *Destructive Engagement*. Both books recount in fascinating detail the way in which South Africa uses the different vul-



Destructive Engagement

nerabilities of each country. Where it has little economic leverage, as is the case with Angola, it resorts to invasion and direct support for the UNITA rebels. Hanlon is more sensitive to the question of the basis of support for dissidents and factions, but Johnson and Martin give a fuller account of the ties between South Africa and the Reagan administration, arguing that Chester Crocker is well to the left of the real sources of United States policy in southern Africa. They also examine more directly the South African war machine and its nuclear capability. Besides its greater detail on the front-line states, Hanlon's book has the great advantage of a good index and useful statistical tables. *Destructive Engagement* reprints the full text of the Nkomati Accord and the "security understanding" between Swaziland and South Africa as well as several UN documents relevant to South African violence in the region, but it has no index.

The three books are an enormous aid to anyone who wants to understand the shape of political conflict

in the region from the perspective of struggle over apartheid. They are the work of committed reporters who have dug out and assembled the information which casts South Africa's little-known regional war in sharp relief. The emphases and selection of detail differ somewhat and there is room to argue over particular interpretations. About one central and crucial point there can be no dispute, however: the struggle against apartheid, while it is centered in South Africa, is also a regional struggle and the countries of the region will know no peace until apartheid is defeated.

Some readers may want to ask further questions about the direction development and policy are assuming in the pressured front-line states, about the content and pertinence of socialist, democratic, and egalitarian initiatives. Some may wonder how the attacks and threats in southern Africa compare with imperialist machinations in Central America or, indeed, with the now routine enforcement on debtor nations of subordination to market forces and business institutions. How does the regional struggle shape the longer-term trajectory in the area? There is raw material for reflection on such matters in these books, but little analysis beyond the crucial first step: a vivid depiction of the grim reality of the South African government's attempt to use all its powers to preserve its domination.

## States of Grace

BY DAVID GALBRAITH

Paul Simon. *Graceland*. Prod. Paul Simon. Warner Bros. 1986.

Even in an industry where hyperbole is the norm, the reception of *Graceland* has been surprising. Paul Simon is, after all, hardly the cutting edge of American music. Nonetheless, cries of "album of the decade"

have already been heard. In a long article in the *New York Times* (8.26.86), Stephen Holden effused that it "effervesces with an extraordinary sense of artistic freedom and adventure." While under other circumstances this endorsement alone might trigger suspicion in the minds of the more politically sophisticated, the response of large sections of the left has been almost equally unrestrained.

But because it was recorded in South Africa, using local musicians, it's also an album which seems almost calculatingly designed to generate a whole set of uneasy responses among anti-apartheid activists. The more simple-minded complaints either zero in on its alleged evasion of South African politics, or aim for higher ground by attacking more generally its "exploitation" of African music and musicians.

Neither of these objections is, by itself, very forceful. Although it's true that Simon eschews direct commentary on South Africa, these issues are very close to the surface in "The Boy in the Bubble" and "Homeless." But he's much more concerned with enacting the encounter between Africa and the metropolis to which he alludes explicitly in "You Can Call Me Al." On most tracks this is realized by counterpoising southern African music to Simon's very metropolitan literary sensibility.

This strategy has its own rewards. *Graceland* is much less susceptible than most of his work to accusations of preciousness. The tension between his voice and lyrics and the instrumental work gives it an edge which is absent from much of the rest of his music. This is most evident on the tracks which feature Baghiti Khumalo and Ray Phiri. I find the two songs with Ladysmith Black Mambazo less interesting because they attempt to reconstruct on a purely vocal level the edge which emerges, on other tracks, in the interplay between voice and instruments.

When the perspectives embodied in African instrumentation and Western lyrical concerns are held in suspension, as indeed they are on many tracks, *Graceland* is most successful. But Simon blows it completely when he attempts to return to America. The zydeco track is merely embarrassing; the song recorded with Los Lobos is disastrous. It's difficult to relate them in any significant way to the concerns of the rest of the album, apart from the presence on both of an accordion. A polka would make as much sense.

*Graceland* isn't the first Simon album to incorporate non-metropolitan music. Nor is it the only recent album which seeks to construct a dialogue between African and Western musical concerns. Talking Heads' *Remain in*

*Light* comes readily to mind. This is a project which is obviously difficult. One runs the risk either of falling into a naive and often racist identification with "the primitive" or of simply raiding another culture for fast thrills. Talking Heads negotiated this successfully; so, for the most part, does Simon.

PAUL SIMON  
GRACELAND



But this relative success doesn't get him off the hook so easily. Other issues remain, precisely because it's South Africa which is being addressed. The most important of these is the cultural boycott. Simon has stated that he received approval for the trip from such prominent American anti-apartheid cultural activists as Harry Belafonte and Quincy Jones. Irrespective of the truth of this claim (and one would want more information about the context of these discussions than Simon has provided), it does raise the issue of the status of the boycott. It is, after all, sponsored and administered by the United Nations. The authority of individual Americans, however prominent, to "clear" individuals to work in South Africa is at best questionable.

In this context, Simon's claim that the boycott hurts black South Africans becomes particularly objectionable. And it's hard not to read

his decision to include Linda Ronstadt, a prominent Sun City performer, on one track as a deliberate repudiation of the UN blacklist. The fact that "Under African Skies" happens to be the worst on the album is a purely serendipitous demonstration of the symbiotic relationship between art and politics. La Ronstadt has, after all, botched other musicians' sessions. But here it's almost as if Linda's voice drives the song into the Third Worldist bathos which the record elsewhere manages to evade. If this were a Lou Reed album, I'd be tempted to interpret the utter sentimentalism of the track as a calculated irony. But the man who wrote "Bridge Over Troubled Water" seems incapable of such finely calibrated effects.

Nonetheless, some very complex questions remain to be answered. The boycott was adopted at a time when the resistance movement within South Africa was at its lowest ebb. Its organizations were driven deeply underground, its leaders either jailed or in exile, and its mass base beaten temporarily into quiescence. Artists who identified with popular aspirations went into exile; there was good reason to be suspicious of most work being produced openly within the country.

This situation has been transformed in recent years. The current upsurge in popular resistance has been widely echoed in the arts. Increasingly, most interesting cultural production takes shape in often explicit dialogue with the liberation movement. Is there any way through which this material could be made available to people outside South Africa without abandoning the boycott? Or, in other words, is it possible to construct a policy which permits us both to attack the Rod Stewarts and Linda Ronstadts of the world and to diffuse the tremendously exciting work which is now being produced? One hopes so. *Graceland* is hardly a crucial test case. But it does, once again, focus these issues for us.

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