

Southern Africa **REPORT**

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


SOUTH AFRICA'S WAR ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

Southern Africa REPORT

Vol. 1 No. 5

April 1986



Southern Africa REPORT

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Apartheid: Hitting Out From the Laager

There has been a dramatic mobilization against apartheid South Africa in North America over the past year or so. But even within the anti-apartheid movement and in a political climate so unfavourable to South Africa the brutal wars of destabilization which that country is continuing to wage against its neighbours have remained far too invisible. How ironic, too, that in the United States the very same Congress which began to set in motion economic sanctions against South Africa could vote, almost simultaneously, to repeal the Clark amendment (an amendment which had, for ten years, set severe limits to American covert intervention in Angola). Yet this latter action further freed the hands of the Reagan administration to back South Africa's destabilization efforts - via its UNITA proxy - in Angola.

A particularly brutal exercise in destabilization continues in Mozambique as well - despite the well-publicized Nkomati Accord struck in 1984 between South Africa and Mozambique. The destructive activities of the counter-revolutionary movement there (the MNR or "Renamo") are still crucially dependent on South African backing. Or take Botswana, its once peaceful and stable polity increasingly rocked by the South African attacks which Peter Gillespie itemizes in this issue of SAR. And, most recently, there is Lesotho. As analyzed by Dan O'Meara below, South Africa has capped an extended period of both military and economic destabilization of Lesotho by facilitating a *coup d'état* in that country. Clearly, it is South Africa's neighbours who still must pay much of the price for the defensive death agonies of apartheid and racial capitalism.

Domination of its regional environment in defense of the *status quo* at home: this is South Africa's goal. More specifically, it seeks to



Resister

undermine support for the African National Congress in the neighbouring states, in particular concrete support in the form of bases, supply lines and freedom of passage. Clearly, South Africa is mainly engaged in a propaganda exercise here - the better to project its own internal conflicts onto the rest of the subcontinent and present them as coming from outside, from "communist-backed," hit-and-run "terrorists." Needless to say, this approach seeks to blur the fact that the ANC is, first and foremost, rooted not outside South Africa but in the ongoing struggle within; it manages, too, to overstate the degree of support (in logistical as distinct from rhetorical terms) which has come to the ANC from states in the region. Still, as the Nkomati Accord demonstrated, South African pressure can


do the ANC some damage, however temporary.

There are other, perhaps more important reasons for South Africa's assertiveness *vis-à-vis* its neighbours, however. One is economic. The southern African economy developed, historically, as a hinterland for South Africa and the latter is prepared to try various means to retain its economic hegemony there, to retain it as market, labour pool, transport outlet. In consequence, one key target of South African-sponsored incursions into neighbouring countries has been the infrastructure of transport and communications among these states which, under the auspices of such initiatives as the Southern African Coordination Conference (SADCC), might be seen to be contributing to the emergence

of a regional economic grid outside the orbit of South African control. Moreover, South Africa can hope to so weaken individual states and economies as to make them more vulnerable to economic penetration, both by its own and other international capitalist actors.

South Africa also relishes the possibility that failed economies and shattered societies beyond its immediate borders will serve its propaganda purposes, both externally and domestically. If, on the one hand, South Africa's own responsibility for these outcomes can be blurred somewhat, then it might be made to appear that it is "socialism" and "black majority rule" that are not working in Africa. If, on the other hand, significant economic and political concessions can be extorted from its neighbours some might be convinced to hail South Africa's "positive" role as peace-maker and help-mate in the region; so, at least momentarily, was South Africa able to present the Nkomati Accord, parlaying it into a 1984 Botha tour of Western European capitals during which he found a few more doors than usual open to him.

Nonetheless, it is primarily the invisibility, rather than the acceptability, of these wars that South Africa relies upon. That, and the extreme difficulty which the highly vulnerable target states of southern Africa have in resisting such bullying. For brute force - along with the manipulation (involving both economic blackmail and the occasional proffering of economic carrots) of South Africa's inherited predominance in the region - is the name of the game. As Lesotho's Foreign Minister admitted quite candidly on one earlier occasion - when, in 1983, Lesotho was forced to evacuate certain ANC personnel from its territory - his country "could no longer withstand South African military and economic pressure." Under such circumstances, the summary of the situation offered by Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda remains



much too close to the truth of the matter for any easy comfort:

"Yes, humble Swaziland agrees, humble Mozambique accepts, humble Zambia hosts meetings of unequal neighbours like South Africa and Angola. What else can we do? But we are not doing it with happy hearts. We do it out of fear, but that fear will end one day. It is bound to."

In fact, none of these countries can hope even to begin to realize their full potential for development so long as an untransformed South Africa hovers over them, stick and carrot in hand.

We may take some consolation from Kaunda's final line, of course. Any advantages that South Africa can gain from regional aggression are bound to be short-lived. For destabilization can do nothing whatsoever to resolve South

Africa's own internal contradictions. Indeed, these contradictions have sharpened - since Nkomati! - in 1984's dramatic resistance to the new South African constitution and amidst 1985's deepening crisis; the ANC's star has continued to rise and the apartheid regime's isolation continued to grow. Moreover, as Dan O'Meara puts the point elsewhere in this issue, South Africa's actions may also come back to haunt the apartheid regime in another way: for

"the blockade against Lesotho has sharply undermined Pretoria's own propaganda offensive against sanctions. If it is admissible for South Africa to force political change in Lesotho through sanctions, presumably it is admissible to use sanctions to try to do the same in South Africa. Moreover as the coup proved, sanctions work."

In the meantime, however, the costs of South Africa's aggressive policies to its neighbours are high. As Steve Godfrey's first-hand report from Angola in this issue demonstrates, the latter do resist as best they can, and even the new Lesotho government is attempting to retain some room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis Pretoria. At the same time, and ominously enough for such neighbours, the Pretoria regime does seem presently to be giving a renewed currency to its characteristic rationale for aggression: a rhetorical line, downplayed somewhat around the time of Nkomati, which emphasizes the threat of a "total onslaught," mounted, both globally and regionally, against South Africa by that old bogeyman, "the communist menace." For southern Africa, in short, worse may be yet to come. This is one more good reason why we must not allow the drama of South Africa's internal crisis - crucial though that crisis undoubtedly is - to displace a simultaneous concern for South Africa's wars of destabilization from the agenda of the world-wide anti-apartheid movement.

The Coup d'Etat in Lesotho

BY DAN O'MEARA
(CIDMAA)

On the 19th of January the head of Lesotho's Paramilitary Force, General Justice Lekhanya, deposed Prime Minister Chief Leabua Jonathan who had ruled the former British Protectorate (once called Basutoland) since its independence in 1966. The new ruler of this tiny mountain kingdom quickly initiated talks to end South Africa's three week blockade of Lesotho. Goods began to flow across the border, and within a week 60 South African refugees were expelled from Lesotho. Lesotho's six-man Military Council handed over formal executive power to King Moshoeshe II, officially reserving for itself a purely "advisory" role.

This is Lesotho's second coup since independence. Like the earlier coup in 1970, it was provoked by South Africa's apartheid government. Yet this latest coup is a far more complex affair than the earlier one, and though its political consequences are not easy to predict, they are likely to be contradictory. Any understanding of the coup and its consequences requires a grasp of the extraordinarily complicated developments in Lesotho's politics between the two coups.

From Client to Critic of Pretoria

Chief Leabua Jonathan's Basotho National Party (BNP) emerged in the late 1950s as a conservative alternative to the already existing Basotho Congress Party (BCP). With backing from the British colonial administration, conservative chiefs and Lesotho's powerful Catholic church, not to mention South Africa's secret Afrikaner Broederbond, the BNP squeaked out an electoral victory in 1965 and led Lesotho to independence in 1966. Sidelining King Moshoeshe

and establishing close links with both South African capital and the apartheid government, Jonathan actually lost the first post-independence election to the BCP in 1970. But Jonathan then merely seized state power with the support of the South African trained Lesotho Paramilitary Force and ruled for some time by decree - despite an abortive uprising by one wing of the BCP in 1974

Surprisingly, however, from such beginnings as a faithful client of Pretoria, Jonathan slowly but surely



Weekly Mail

King Moshoeshe II

turned sharp critic as the 1970s progressed. Personally, Jonathan felt betrayed by the meagreness of South Africa's economic assistance and cooperation; in addition, he increasingly sought to use "anti-Boer" nationalism as a means to improve his domestic image after the uprising. More generally, behind him a new generation of Basotho technocrats and aspirant capitalists was growing increasingly restive at the extent of South African control. Taking strength

from the collapse in the region of Portuguese colonialism, Jonathan hailed Mozambican independence, condemned the 1976 Soweto massacre and, his greatest crime in South Africa's eyes, undermined the latter's "grand apartheid" strategy by refusing, in that same year, to recognize the "independence" of the Transkei Bantustan.

Somewhat paradoxically, a faction of the BCP in exile now struck a markedly opportunist deal with South Africa's Bureau of State Security (to "ride on the back of the devil to cross the river" as that faction's leader put it at the time), becoming, under BOSS's aegis, the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA). The LLA was thus available to Pretoria as an instrument for the escalation of sabotage and terror against Lesotho when, after Mugabe's victory in Zimbabwe and the collapse of South Africa's scheme to create a "Constellation of Southern African States" under its hegemony, Pretoria lashed out at most of the states in the region. But the South Africans were also quite capable of acting more directly, as witnessed by the brutal commando raid on Maseru in December 1980, when some 30 ANC members and 12 Basotho citizens were murdered.

In response, Jonathan both strengthened his ties with various Eastern bloc governments and reinforced his backing of the ANC, this latter move, in particular, winning him some grudging support from radical students and others who might, under other circumstances, have opposed his corrupt and autocratic government. Nonetheless, conservatives within his own party were increasingly uneasy at some of these developments, as were army leaders at the increasing prominence, at Jonathan's side, of the BNP Youth League (many North

Korean-trained and some of them armed). Moreover, a wave of intensified destabilization from South Africa began in 1983. Sabotage and infiltration increased sharply (e.g. a bomb attack on the Maseru Hilton Hotel and, by extension, against Lesotho's luxury tourist industry); in addition, sporadic border closings were imposed by Pretoria by way of further harassment. In consequence, Lesotho was that same year forced to ask the ANC to withdraw large numbers of refugees. Yet it refused, despite pressure to do so from both Pretoria and the United States, to enter into a humiliating security pact with South Africa on the model of the latter's Nkomati Accord with Mozambique.

The result? An intensification, in 1984, of South Africa's squeeze-play via a second wave of destabilization. Thus, on the one hand, South Africa orchestrated the formation of a new formal political opposition group in exile (the Bosotho Democratic Alliance); on the other, it threatened the reduction of Lesotho's quota of migrant workers to South Africa (workers whose remitted wages make up 42% of Lesotho's GNP!), refused the transit of several key shipments of arms to the land-locked country, and purposely stalled a crucial joint development project (the Highlands Water Project). There was then a temporary lull in this kind of harassment (in part because of criticisms of South Africa's role by the British government, among others), but in late 1985 South Africa launched its third, and decisive, wave of destabilization. Another brutal attack on Maseru claimed nine lives in December. This was followed on New Year's Day by the imposition of the total economic blockade against Lesotho which finally precipitated the January 19 coup.

Events Leading Up To the Coup

Pretoria's initial use of the LLA to destabilize Lesotho backfired. It



General Justice Lekhanya (at left) takes part in ceremonies following Lesotho's coup.

Dan Edkins/AFP

had enabled Jonathan to rally fierce anti-South African sentiment and paper over divisions in his own party. However, once South Africa switched to economic and political pressure after the Nkomati Accord, this fed into growing political tensions within the BNP ruling group itself and opened the way for Pretoria to provoke a coup.

One dimension of this was fierce factional conflict within the BNP, mainly over the eventual succession to the aging Jonathan and centering around the question of the appropriate response to South African destabilization. Planning Minister Evaristus Sekhonyana led one influential faction which argued that Lesotho should sign a pact with the South African government. (Sekhonyana actually lost his second portfolio, that of Foreign Minister, in 1984 for presuming to begin negotiating the details of such a se-

curity pact!) Vincent Makhele, BNP Secretary-General, very close to the Youth League and Sekhonyana's successor as Foreign Minister, led a second, opposed faction.

Two other issues surfaced, one relating to the election of September 1985. By the end of 1984 Jonathan faced strong pressure to hold such an election. His stubborn assertion of independence had enhanced Lesotho's reputation and Jonathan was awarded the Dag Hammarskjold Peace Prize in December 1984. Yet international donors, and particularly the Scandinavian countries, were eager to see a "restoration of democracy". Despite domestic support for Jonathan's anti-South Africa stance, the BNP had never really shed the stigma of usurping power in 1970. An electoral victory would establish its legitimacy.

The timing was propitious too. The opposition parties were in disarray, the "common front against Jonathan" announced by the BCP (itself badly split) never having materialized, for example. Yet Jonathan remained a despot to the last and chose to manipulate the electoral rules unscrupulously - and, in all probability unnecessarily - with the result that all 60 BNP candidates were duly declared elected without a contest. In consequence, Jonathan's authoritarian image was merely reinforced, both internationally and domestically.

Second, as previously mentioned, the growing influence of the Youth League and its often questionable methods brought it into conflict with General Lekhanya's Paramilitary Force. Lekhanya, himself a highly conservative Catholic and fierce anti-communist was deeply disturbed, in any case, by what he saw as the Youth League's "radicalism". Then, emboldened by the outcome of the elections and with its domination of the BNP seemingly secure, the Youth League faction appeared to seek control of the Paramilitary Force itself. While, for starters, the Youth League looked to the replacement of General Lekhanya as LPF Commander, Lekhanya's own efforts to persuade Jonathan to rein in the Youth League failed.

It was this growing tension between the Youth League and the Paramilitary Force which finally gave South Africa a context for successful intervention. Pretoria again demanded a formal security pact obliging Lesotho to expel refugees whom South Africa claimed were ANC personnel, and giving South Africa the right to vet all future refugees in Lesotho. When Jonathan again refused, a total blockade was imposed at the beginning of 1986. Supplies of food, petroleum products and medicine rapidly dried up in Lesotho and

the population became increasingly restive. A week before the coup the LPF occupied the Prime Minister's residence in a still unexplained "military exercise". General Lekhanya probably used this display of force to urge Jonathan both to settle with South Africa and disband the Youth League.

Three days before the coup General Lekhanya led a Lesotho delegation to negotiate with South Africa. Prime Minister Jonathan still refused to accept the South African demands, and announced the day before the coup that he would now seek direct assistance from Cuba - whose Foreign Minister was visiting Maseru at the time. This declaration provided the anti-communist Lekhanya with the pretext to seize power. It seems obvious that he had already privately agreed to Pretoria's demands and informed the South African government of his planned coup.

On January 19th the LPF overthrew Jonathan. Five people were killed in a shootout which seems to have disposed of the more direct challenge to the LPF chain of command from the BNP Youth League (as *Africa Confidential* delicately put the point). Lekhanya immediately dispatched former Foreign Minister Sekhonyana to Cape Town to negotiate. Since, as seen, Sekhonyana was dismissed in 1984 for advocating an agreement with South Africa this was a clear signal of an intention to comply with Pretoria's demands. The blockade ceased and 60 refugees were rapidly expelled.

Implications of the Coup

Despite support for Jonathan's anti-South African stance, his corrupt and despotic government had never been really popular, and few Basotho mourned its demise. The hand over of formal executive power to King Moshoeshoe II by the Military Council was a popular move. Though identified with none

of the squabbling politicians, King Moshoeshoe has long sought to transform the constitutional monarchy into an executive one. His new Council of Ministers is based mainly on the military and "third force" intellectuals he had gathered around him. It covers the political spectrum from conservatives through to the radical, Moscow-trained, Minister of Planning, Michael Sefali. Sekhonyana is the only former BNP Minister who remains in the government, now as Finance Minister, and only one of the former opposition parties is represented (the Marema Tlou Freedom Party).

A week following the coup, Planning Minister Sefali informed the Harare SADCC meeting that Lesotho's commitment to SADCC remained firm, that it would not sign a security agreement with Pretoria, and would not allow itself to be used against the international campaign for sanctions against South Africa. However Lesotho's sovereignty has clearly been deeply compromised, and it will be very difficult for the new government to maintain an anti-South African position, even if it wants to. While the government is clearly popular domestically, its room to manoeuvre is severely restricted. Lesotho is totally dependent on South Africa economically, and even a radical government would be able to do little to change this. Thus the inclusion of a Marxist Planning Minister in the Cabinet is little more than a gesture to national unity. The very broad base of the government must in fact lead to divisions within it, and a consolidation of the position of the King. Lesotho does not have the same kind of royalist tradition as Swaziland, and its class structure does not really lend itself to the same sort of consolidation of royalist power. Yet, as noted, the King has long wanted effective executive power for the monarchy, and can be expected to try to consolidate and extend it.

(continued on page 13)



Espresso

The second congress of the MPLA

Angola: Tough Road Ahead

BY STEVE GODFREY

The governing MPLA-PT party faces formidable new challenges in the coming year due to renewed US support to the rebel movement UNITA and a catastrophic fall in oil revenues – the mainstay of the economy. At the same time there have been important political changes in Angola. Steve Godfrey of Inter Pares, recently returned from Angola, reports.

The Second Congress of the MPLA held in Luanda in December saw major changes in the structure and leadership of party and government. The most dramatic changes were the departure from the politburo of party secretary Lucio Lara and other seemingly permanent elements in the leadership of the Angolan revolution such as Ludy Kissassunga, Evaristo Kimba and Joao Neto Xieto. In the ensuing three months President dos San-

tos has carried out a reorganization of the party and government, and made substantial changes in ministerial and party leadership.

More importantly, the day-to-day management of the economy has moved more firmly into ministerial hands with the establishment of three new Ministers of State – for Production, Economic and Social Affairs, and State Inspection. Two new members of the politburo, Maria Mambo Cafe and Loy Van Dunem head the first two of these. The streamlining of the state structures in the economic sphere by the appointment of three “superministers” closely associated with the President will improve coordination between the economy and Defence and Security, External Relations and Justice (which already report directly to the President). It creates a small group of ministers –

an inner cabinet – around the President able to take a more effective control in executive management of the affairs of state.

In announcing the change dos Santos stated that the “new working style” of ministers of state would overcome “a lack of mechanisms to ensure coordination of the execution and control of decisions.”

Whilst debate at the Congress was muted on a number of substantive issues such as economic liberalization and the black market, a number of important criticisms prevailed. Among these was the need to make party organization more dynamic and geared to popular needs. In his closing address to the Congress, President dos Santos stated that “more effort must be made to improve the Party’s working style and methods, combatting the tendency to bureaucratize –

central and intermediate structures, which has negative effects on the base organisations." Significantly, dos Santos himself has taken over the party responsibility for organisation, replacing Lucio Lara. In addition two new departments – for agrarian policy and for youth and mass organisations – have been created to build greater involvement at the grassroots. Other changes in the party secretariat are substantial: six departments dissolved or merged and some nine department heads removed from their posts. As a result the majority of the thirteen department heads are new. Ministerial changes are lighter: four new ministers were appointed up to the end of February with another post, that of State Security, vacant. Most notable among the ministerial changes was the removal of planning minister, Lopo de Nascimento, who becomes Commissioner of Huila.

There is no agreement by outside observers of the exact significance of these changes. Even among Angolans not fully in agreement with

the changes there is recognition that an infusion of new blood was needed to provide a fresh impetus in coming to grips with the enormous problems of poor economic performance, and the coordination of national efforts. As a result, the role of the party will be more strategic with the government able – because its key leaders more effectively dominate the party hierarchy – to get on with the job of governing. Politically, the removal from the centre of power of convinced Marxists such as Lucio Lara, and former foreign minister Paulo Jorge, is interpreted by some as a shift towards more pragmatic policies. Other commentators sensitive to issues of racial balance emphasize that their departure represents primarily the further "africanization" of the leadership.

In any case the real effects may be less dramatic than ideological interpretations suggest. External pressures mean that Angola has little room for manoeuvre in the policy arena, and within the party individual positions on key policy issues are

overlapping and varied rather than in clear "blocks." The new leadership will miss the experience of some of its former members. It remains to be seen how far greater likemindedness and a fresh approach will succeed in compensating for this.


Economic Policy

Discussion on key problems in the economy was muted at the Congress: ideological skirmishes were avoided. Nevertheless, the dominant trend in party thinking is towards greater decentralization and democratization of economic control. The desperate need to improve food production and reconstruct the rural economies is evident to all. But efforts to develop peasant production in the north and the "experiment" with more decentralized economic planning in the south-west have suffered from poor implementation capacity and reticence from some sectors of the party – quite apart from the security and logistical problems.

In the international field Angola is likely to continue to expand its



Eduardo dos Santos





economic relations with western nations. The accession to the Lomé Convention - which brings some \$90 million in aid over five years from the EEC - will boost links with Europe. However, the political impact of this opening of economic relations with the West can be overestimated - Angola, due to the structure of its main exports (oil, diamonds and coffee) has always required close economic ties with capitalist countries, and the current drive is an effort to diversify economic links with such countries as Spain, Brazil, Canada and the Nordic States. In particular, these moves do not, in themselves, represent a political shift away from the socialist block. The Soviet Union itself clearly recognizes the need of many socialist countries, eg., Nicaragua and Mozambique, for western technology and investment.

However, the drive for more pluralistic economic relations is part of an attempt to improve the quality of foreign, particularly technical, assistance. As a result, the foreign labour force will be reduced, together with its cost - some \$180 million in 1983. The poor quality of technical assistance from the socialist countries is a frequent complaint heard in the country.

Overshadowing the economic plan affirmed by the People's Assembly in January is a fall in oil prices - which will devastate the Angolan economy. Oil revenues make up some 85% of Angola's Gross Domestic Product, and the price per

barrel has halved in the last three months from \$25. As a result Angola's national product has roughly halved and in March the Politburo announced a crash austerity program - cutting foreign travel, overseas diplomatic missions and external telex and telephone costs; redefining investment priorities towards industrial rehabilitation; and promoting foreign exchange control for foreign companies.

Since defence is the number one priority of the economy and cannot be cut, cuts in living standards in the urban economies are likely to be sharp - food and other consumer imports will probably be hard hit. These consequences will be unpopular and it could be argued will pose a more formidable political challenge to the party than even the UNITA problem.

Foreign and Defence Policy

Whilst economic policy is in flux, foreign and defence policies are likely to remain stable. Cuban and socialist block military assistance will remain crucial; but the dos Santos government will continue to seek negotiated solutions with the U.S. and South Africa, and continue to deal with economic relations on a pragmatic case-by-case basis. The limits of Angolan flexibility stop at U.S. requests to negotiate with Savimbi, or place the security of the country in jeopardy. Such a policy of dialogue has its critics, who argue that the results so far have been unimpressive. But the policy does represent a

widespread feeling in the nation that Angola should as far as possible follow a *non-aligned policy* in foreign affairs. [The Party Congress, with only a low-key resolution recognizing socialist country support, emphasized that Angola does not wish to increase the heavy dependence on these countries which the circumstance of South African destabilization has clearly required.]

In the past twelve months Angola has sought to increase its contacts with Canada. Following the first ministerial visit to Canada since Independence by Loy Van Dunem and Trade Minister Ismael Martins, political relations have warmed considerably. In January, the Conservative leader of the Senate, Duff Roblin went so far as to publicly disagree with U.S. proposal to back Savimbi. "We're ... having a problem," he said, "because our policy does not coincide with that of the U.S."

Angola, with its high credit rating, offers good commercial potential for Canada in such sectors as oil, gas, transport and communications. In January, the Government affirmed \$30 million cover for Angola by the Export Credit Development Corporation, and commercial exchanges are planned during 1986. In addition, the Canadian Coordinator for the African Emergency, David McDonald, visited Angola in February and added his voice to the need for Canadian emergency and development assistance to Angola.

But whilst CIDA will support some emergency aid and assistance through NGOs, the lack of any bilateral aid program is likely to be a block in developing relations. Although, like Mozambique, Angola is eligible to receive funds for regional SADCC projects, it is only a Category III country in its own right and is not eligible for bilateral aid. Despite a strong argument on humanitarian, development and commercial grounds, it is unlikely that Ottawa will upgrade Angola without further public pressure.

Botswana: Beleaguered Oasis

BY PETER GILLESPIE

Peter Gillespie was a CUSO cooperant in Botswana and now works for Inter Pares in Ottawa.

In mid January of this year, Botswana braced itself in anticipation of an attack from South Africa. Troops and heavy military equipment were stationed around the Botswana capital of Gaborone. One border village in the south was reportedly deserted, as terrified residents fled the area.

Much to everyone's relief, the attack didn't materialize. Botswana officials later said that it was only the vigorous diplomatic intervention of the British and Americans that prevented the attack. South African Foreign Minister 'Pik' Botha once again accused Botswana of harbouring ANC guerrillas and allowing them to mount attacks across the border. Botswana Foreign Minister Chiepe responded by saying that the South Africans were "bullies" and "sabre-rattling" and reiterated her government's policy of not allowing Botswana territory to be used as a springboard for armed incursions.

This incident is the latest in a series marking a new phase in South Africa's destabilization campaign against Botswana. In the last 12 months South Africa has embarked on a strategy of murder and military attack designed to terrorize and punish Botswana for its policy of sanctuary for South African refugees and its defiance in refusing to sign an Nkomati-type accord.

This latest phase was announced in February last year with a massive bomb blast which destroyed the Gaborone home of South African exile Nat Serache. Serache, a correspondent for the BBC and Reuters, miraculously survived the blast and has since fled to Zambia. The normally peaceful Gaborone was again


shocked in May by the car bomb assassination of refugee Rogers Nkadimeng, a part-time CUSO worker and son of SACTU Secretary General John Nkadimeng. In June, the South African military staged a midnight raid into Gaborone, killing 12.

South Africa denied any responsibility for the attacks on Serache and Nkadimeng. The raid on Gaborone, South Africa said, was an exercise carried out with military precision against members of the armed wing of the ANC. The truth is that the raid was conducted with all the precision and subtlety of a sledgehammer. None of those killed in the raid were military targets nor remotely associated with armed activity. Victims included a university student, community workers, an artist, a civil servant responsible for day care, and a six-year old boy. All were unarmed and most were shot in their beds.

This military strategy is a major escalation of the destabilization war against Botswana. South Africa, of course, has conducted military operations against other front-line states and undertaken covert actions in Botswana in the past. But the June raid on Gaborone was the first military attack against Botswana. As a precedent, it makes future military action all the more real.

Why the change in strategy?

In part, military action against Botswana is a reflection of the general escalation of war in the region, a war that South Africa is waging with increasing desperation. Such attacks detract attention away from rapidly expanding dissent within South Africa and contribute to the propagandized fiction that guerilla activity is conducted from outside South Africa's borders. Military action has public relations value for the right wing constituency and is



Resister

likely a morale booster for an increasingly frustrated and impotent South African army, faced with an elusive enemy.

But perhaps most importantly, the shift to military tactics is evidence that previous destabilization efforts have not achieved the desired effect. Botswana has remained firm on its policy related to South African refugees and intransigent on the question of an Nkomati-type accord. Clearly, past tactics have not been successful in bludgeoning Botswana into following a more acceptable line.

Botswana's policy on refugees has long been a sore point for South Africa. Because of its proximity to South Africa, Botswana has become an important centre for exiles and host to a number of politically active liberation support groups. Groups like the MEDU Arts Ensemble, for example, became rallying points for exiled writers, poets, artists and musicians to promote cultural forms of resistance. Similarly, the Solidarity News Service (SNS) was established by exiles for the express purpose of gathering and disseminating information on the struggle from sources within South Africa. South Africa was enraged that such groups were openly operating so close to its borders and made repeated requests to the Government of Botswana to close them down. Subsequently, both MEDU and SNS were key targets in the Gaborone attack. The SNS office and equipment were destroyed and several MEDU members were targeted for assassination.

In attacking Botswana, South Africa is also attempting to sow internal dissent around the question of refugees. There exists disagreement within Botswana related to official refugee policy and South Africa is clearly attempting to exploit these divisions. In the aftermath of the Gaborone attack there were calls within Botswana to force refugees into camps in the north. Fortunately, the government position has prevailed.

In the past, South Africa's destabilization strategy has primarily consisted of selective economic actions. The opening of the military option has immediate and traumatizing effects; economic actions, however, are as punitive and damaging.

Between a Rock and a Hard Place

Much like Lesotho and Swaziland, Botswana is an economic hostage of South Africa. Deliberately created as a resource and labour preserve for South Africa, Botswana has been unable to disentangle itself from the tentacles of economic power, control and influence emanating from the south - figuratively and literally, all roads lead to Pretoria.

South Africa has a formidable array of economic tactics at its disposal. Botswana is dependent on South Africa for most of its imports, including fuel. South Africa prevents Botswana from building up strategic fuel supplies and could quickly bring the country to a halt with a full blockade. Similarly, Botswana products are exported through South African transport networks, providing South Africa with control over access to external markets.

South African interests play a major role in the two largest sources of government revenue in Botswana. The South African corporation Anglo-American controls the copper mines at Selebi-Phikwe as well as the vitally important diamond industry through its De Beers subsidiary. Botswana's resource industry is thus firmly under South African control. Botswana gains substantial revenue from its membership in the Southern African Customs Union, a relic of the colonial past which integrates Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland into the South African economy. The Customs Union ensures that the BLS countries are captive markets for South Africa manufactured goods and deters self-sufficient eco-

nomie development. South Africa controls the purse-strings of the union, thus controlling the turnover time in revenue payments. The agreement is more or less binding, since if Botswana withdrew from the Union it would forfeit revenues from the previous year.

South Africa continues to use its powerful influence in the Botswana economy as a bludgeoning tactic. The recent withdrawal of South Africa from a soda ash project in the Sua Pans ensured the speedy collapse of the project. Selective subsidization of South African exports to Botswana ensures no local competition develops and dependency is thus maintained. South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia prevents the building of a trans-Kalahari railway which is prerequisite to the development of Botswana's massive coal reserves. These are powerful levers to engage in exploiting Botswana's economic vulnerability.

Dependency and vulnerability, then, provide the context for Botswana's development struggle. It is a context which can only change when a non-racist, democratic government is installed in Pretoria. Until then, the use of terrorism and economic sabotage will inevitably increase as the South African regime brings the region to the brink of all out war.

One of the tragic consequences of this escalation is increased militarization, both in the region generally and in Botswana. Botswana is now diverting scarce resources to arming itself. The Botswana Defence Force is being trained by the elite British SAS and there have been American promises of military aid in the form of helicopters.


Another outcome of this escalation is a new awareness within Botswana of its role and place in the struggle for a free and non-racist South Africa. Historically, Botswana has been rather like a peaceful oasis surrounded by conflict in the region. South African military attacks have punctured this illusion.

Defending Apartheid

If some of the dealings of South Africa with its neighbouring governments show that sanctions can work, the case of South Africa's arms industry shows that the United Nations ban on sales of arms and related materials to South Africa has had more ambiguous results. The ways the ban has been evaded and the way the South African arms industry has developed are revealed in two recent articles in two very different magazines. How the ban continues to be implemented will have a real influence on the maintenance of South Africa's military capacity, a capacity that is directed both to repression inside South Africa and to aggression against surrounding countries.

The *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist* for March 1986 carries an article by Thomas Conrad of the American Friends Service Committee in Philadelphia. With the title and theme "South Africa Circumvents Embargo" he writes:

"The official record shows that there have been no such [arms] shipments [from the United States] to South Africa for several years; the same seems to be true for government-to-



A new three dimensional milling and measuring machine at ARMSCOR is large enough to handle entire vehicle hulls.


government arms sales by other nations.

"The real record, however, is mixed, in large part due to the failure of the United States and other Western nations which are deeply and directly involved in the South African economy to strictly and resolutely implement the em-

bargo. South Africa, a nation shunned worldwide and thought to have lost its access to outside military technology, has itself grown to the world's tenth-largest arms manufacturer.

"Pretoria has added several new locally manufactured products to its arsenal. A relatively well-known one is the G-5 155-millimeter howitzer and its variant, the G-6, two spinoffs of a system developed in the late 1970s by the U.S.-Canadian-South African firm, Space Research Corporation. Other less well-known systems include the Kukri V3 missile, an innovative frequency-hopping tactical communications system, a laser rangefinder, a new family of grenade launchers, a new series of mine-resistant counterinsurgency vehicles, and new sonar electronics systems.

"The fact that South Africa has been able to design, develop, and field these new systems points up one of the major failures of the arms embargo: Pretoria continues



ARMSCOR Kukri missile, as displayed in a glossy arms industry journal.


to have commercial access to a vast array of advanced foreign products, including systems with direct military applications, dual-use commodities, and 'precursor technologies' vital to whole generations of arms. These commodities - foreign-supplied computers, software, laser technology, electronics, communications technology, and components - are the building blocks of modern weaponry."

The article goes on to say that the purchases are usually straight commercial transactions duly authorized by the U.S. Departments of Commerce and State, often with the South African government arms manufacturing conglomerate ARMSCOR. Among the important suppliers are Mohawk Data Systems (equipment for the ARMSCOR subsidiary, Kentron, which makes guided missile systems and for other military units and suppliers in South Africa); Sperry (a computer for ARMSCOR's Atlas Aircraft); and Hewlett-Packard (computer for ARMSCOR affiliate Naschem). Other suppliers to civilian-owned firms and to government research bodies who do work for the South African Defense Force include: Burroughs Corporation, Digital Equipment Corporation, IBM Corporation, Control Data, Amdahl Corporation. The activities which these sales may have enhanced include: missile design, fingerprint storage, signal processing, and counterinsurgency vehicle design.

U.S. computer corporations also supply the agencies which control and manage the black population of South Africa. One such application has expanded "surveillance of black workers at the workplace:"

"A microprocessor made by the U.S. electronics manufacturer Ontel Corporation functions as the electronic brain of a locally assembled worker-monitoring network which has been installed in over 25 mines. The 'Labour Information System', which reads workers' electronically coded

identification cards, 'provides full information on every worker, from his ethnic group to his merit rating, and also keeps tabs on where every worker is at any given time'." (Reported in the *Financial Mail* of 11 July 1980.)



ARMSCOR frequency hopping tactical radio

Typical of the comments on the computer companies confronted with the above facts was that of John Emmerich of Ontel: "A general-purpose computer could have many applications. We don't have any knowledge of what they use it for."

Conrad concludes:

"Though flawed and inadequately enforced, the arms embargo is beginning to have a negative effect on South Africa's military potential. ... [T]he capacity of the growing indigenous arms industry spawned by

the embargo is severely limited... [M]uch of South Africa's equipment is obsolete and overworked. ... The embargo has forced South Africa to accept a decline in its net military capacity that no other industrial nation of comparable size would countenance. ... The pivotal question is whether policy-makers in the United States and other countries will stop winking at the strategic commercial trade with Pretoria.

The lavishly illustrated defense industry trade journal from Paris, *Defense & Armament* in its January 1986 issue has a lead article on the "South African Armament Industry". This article confirms some of the above points, if indirectly. "With many factories operating at one-third capacity and international pressure on South Africa at its peak, ... South Africa must export. And to export, it must work on its international image."

The Chairman of ARMSCOR, Piet Marais, stresses the importance of fast and mobile weapons "to move ... from the Angolan Border across the country to Mozambique." Predictably, he links the development of ARMSCOR and its future to "the arms embargo" and "the amount of Soviet equipment coming into South Africa." "Now these two things were orchestrated to happen together." It is interesting that, in response to a question about riot control equipment, he does see the importance of developing weapons calculated to control the black population:

The definition of these weapons is very difficult. First of all, you don't want to maim or kill people; you just want to neutralize them. Some times they are as close as 25 metres. Then the stonethrowing will take place up to 150 metres. So you have the problem that the rubber bullet that can be effective at 150 metres will kill or maim someone at 25 metres. We have asked them to sit down and work out their specifications. Then you find that conditions can vary. In the urban ar-


Defence & Armament

eas, the people are in concentrated crowds. When you are out in the townships, they are spread out wide. So the equipment must be different. We are setting about this in a very scientific way, just to get their thinking right. Once we know what they want, then we can develop something. Another concept we are working on is throwing up blockades with rolls of barbed wire. But we have not been tasked to work on this yet.

In his interview with *Defense & Armaments*, General J. J. Geldenhuys, the newly appointed Commander of the South African Defense Force made much of the Soviet presence in the region, particularly their aid to SWAPO forces and FAPLA (Angolan army) and their growing capacity to intervene militarily in the region. More revealing, however, was his response to the question "What do you think is the greatest threat South Africa faces today, the external arms build-up or the internal unrest?"

There is a linkage between the two. Because if you have the ANC infiltrating to place mines and commit acts of sabotage, they come from the same places, and have the same advisors and the same organizations,

as advise the elements and organizations of those other countries. ... I will not deny that SWAPO and the ANC started out in the 1950's as champions of internal ideals, fighting for more rights, etc. But this



Resister

was a long time ago. Today, if the Soviet Union does not have complete control of these organizations, they do have a very strong hand on them, and ... they do use them to achieve their own goals.

One other question was: "Do you feel your soldiers are well prepared to cope with the current unrest situation?"

"Yes, even if this is not the primary role of the Army. After all we have been mentalized for use of the Army in this role. It happened in 1922, 1948, 1949, in the late 1950s, 1960, 1976, 1984. Recent military history is full of cases where we did just this sort of thing."

On the question of being effective "in a time of shrinking budgets", the Commander brags:

"We have a record of cost-effective utilization of the SADF. For instance, we have the smallest ratio of soldiers per terrorist in any war of insurgency, except for Rhodesia - roughly 1.9 troops per SWAPO terrorist. I don't want to evaluate our operations by a hit count. But we inflict more casualties on the enemy per contact than any other case I know."

Thus do the developers and the commanders of South Africa's machinery for war and repression "work on their government's image".

Lesotho Coup

(continued from page 5)

By provoking the coup the South African government seems to have had both regional and domestic objectives. It has succeeded in forcing Lesotho to crack down on the ANC. The new government may well not sign a formal security agreement. Yet despite the brave claims at the SADCC meeting, Lesotho is now clearly going to have to allow Pretoria to decide which refugees can remain in Lesotho. The coup further demonstrates to regional governments that as the Pretoria regime gets ever more desperate, it will escalate efforts to bend southern African states to its will. At this

level the bully boy tactics have worked again.


The use of the big stick against Jonathan was probably also designed to show to the far right opposition that P.W. Botha's government is doing *something* to stem the mass revolt inside South Africa. Since the right has always ascribed all black resistance to "external agitators", the evident use of South African power will have pleased them. But it has done nothing to solve the acute crisis confronting the apartheid state. Botha's problems are internal not external, and as the sharp *escalation* of ANC armed actions in the 18 months following the Nkomati Accord showed, security Pacts are also no solution

to the armed struggle. So at this level Pretoria has achieved little. It may also have really damaged itself. The blockade against Lesotho has sharply undermined Pretoria's own propaganda offensive against sanctions. If it is admissible for South Africa to force political change in Lesotho through sanctions, presumably it is admissible to use sanctions to try to do the same in South Africa. Moreover as the coup proved, sanctions work.

Finally, however, the Pretoria-provoked coup simply re-emphasizes that so long as apartheid survives, peace and political stability in Southern Africa will remain a chimera.

Looking at SADCC

Atlas of African Affairs



The article that follows is based on a seminar on SADCC which TCLSAC hosted in Toronto, March 22, 1986. Resource people Dan O'Meara from CID-MAA and Steve Godfrey of INTER PARES provided us with a stimulating day of solid information and useful ideas about the Southern African Development Coordination Conference.

What Is SADCC?

The Southern African Development Coordination Conference, SADCC, was formed in 1980 and comprises the states of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. It explicitly aims to reduce economic dependence on South Africa and develop economic cooperation and integration among the nine countries in the region.

The model SADCC chose to achieve its goals is unique: each member state has assumed responsibility for a particular aspect of the regional economies and coordinates joint projects within their individual sector. There are 17 sectors, and projects are undertaken by two or more member states; any project vetoed by even one of the nine countries is rejected. Another notable characteristic of SADCC is its remarkable lack of bureaucracy – there are only three SADCC officials.


Presently, SADCC's primary goal is the integration and development of regional transportation and communication links. Mozambique coordinates these areas – a sound choice given that its ports are the only real alternative to South Africa's, on which most SADCC states are currently dependent. As six SADCC countries are landlocked, the development of these ports is fundamental to lessening South Africa's control in the region. Certain rail lines already in place and linking the member states are being rehabilitated and new lines are being built.

SECTORAL RESPONSIBILITIES

Angola	Energy Conservation and Development
Botswana	Agricultural Research and Animal Disease Control
Lesotho	Soil and Water Conservation and Land Utilisation; Tourism
Malawi	Fisheries, Wildlife and Forestry
Mozambique	Transport and Communications
Swaziland	Manpower Development
Tanzania	Industrial Development
Zambia	Southern Africa Development Fund and Mining
Zimbabwe	Food Security

A quick look at the rail, road, communication and power grids indicates the enormity of the task that the integration of these infrastructures involves, as well as pointing to the history of underdevelopment in the region and within the nine countries.

The combined human and natural resources of the area hold great promise and it is these resources SADCC is determined to channel. Sixty-five million people are represented in SADCC with a com-



Atlas of African Affairs

combined GDP of US\$27 billion. Minerals and energy are the basis of the region's exports and the potential for its wealth. Oil, coal, electricity, gold, copper, chrome, cobalt and other minerals are all exported. In spite of these riches, however, SADCC countries are among the poorest in the world and have been severely hit, as export-dependent economies, by the world recession. No SADCC country's annual per capita income exceeds US\$900 and in three it is less than US\$300. Dependence on a single export commodity makes countries vulnerable and for three member states one product accounts for more than two-thirds of its total exports (oil in Angola; diamonds in Botswana; copper in Zambia) for another three between one- and two-thirds (coffee in Tanzania; sugar in Swaziland; tobacco in Malawi). As with most export economies, industry is woefully underdeveloped. Zimbabwe is the only semi-industrialized country among the nine although Mozambique, Angola and Tanzania have some industrial development.

With the exception of Angola and Tanzania, SADCC countries are locked into South Africa in three major ways – transport, labour and as markets for South Africa's manufactured goods. The position of



Carlos Cardoso/AIM

Mozambican militias arrive at Machipanda on the border of Zimbabwe on a train carrying goods for Zimbabwe.

Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland geographically and politically ties them even more closely to South Africa. Along with Namibia, they are formally connected to one another and South Africa through South Africa's "Southern Africa Customs Union", a common tariff union in which customs and fiscal decisions affecting member countries directly are made in South Africa without their participation.

To add to these grim facts, SADCC countries were among the worst hit by the recent drought. While it appears that the worst is over and some states are predicting self-sufficiency and even surpluses in food, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho and Mozambique continue to have food crises. This fact makes it even more difficult at the present moment for them to break their links with South Africa.

SADCC and South Africa

Given that 14% of South Africa's external trade is with Africa - mostly with southern Africa - any lessening of this dependence poses a threat to South Africa. As well, the wealth of natural and human resources in the region plays no small part in South Africa's determination to maintain its control.

The 1970s saw not only the establishment of radical, black majority governments in southern Africa with their powerful message to blacks inside South Africa, but also the re-emergence of black opposition inside, particularly in the formation of militant black trade unions and the student movement.

Against this background the South African government, in 1978, developed its "total strategy" combining economic actions (incentives

and pressures) and direct and indirect military aggression focussed on the frontline states. South Africa hoped to consolidate its powerful economic position through the formation of its Constellation of South African States in 1979. South Africa's hopes hinged on getting a pliant black government in power in Zimbabwe to balance against the socialist governments of Angola and Mozambique. Historical and economic ties would bring Zambia and Zaire into the economic and social Constellation. There could be no doubt that Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland would soon follow. When ZANU-PF defeated the compromised Muzorewa in Zimbabwe's elections, South Africa's hopes for CONSAS were dashed. Then began the shift of the "total strategy" to military aggression. If there could not be a forced economic union then

states would be beaten into submission. Regional aggression was aided by Reagan's "constructive engagement" policy, which handed South Africa virtual carte blanche to escalate terror throughout southern Africa.

Through a combination of economic incentives and military terror, South Africa forced a number of its neighbors to sign agreements. In exchange for signing a non-aggression pact in 1982, Swaziland gained an extra \$50 million under SACU and received assistance in building a railway line to the South African port facilities of Richard's Bay. The pattern was repeated throughout the region - in 1980-81, for example, 40% of Lesotho and Swaziland's national budgets came from SACU.

The perceived radical threat posed by Angola and Mozambique called for less subtle tactics, made possible by the climate provided by "constructive engagement". Through its support to the MNR in Mozambique and UNITA in Angola, South Africa assumed a relentless bombardment of the political and economic structures in these two countries. In the four year period from 1980 to 1984 these attacks cost the Angolan economy US\$10 billion and Mozambique's economy US\$3.8 billion. It seems obvious that the key positions occupied by Angola and Mozambique in SADCC, as well as the inclination of their governments, fuelled the viciousness of South Africa's attacks. The losses suffered in human terms are incalculable. Reeling from these attacks and the war-induced famine, Mozambique signed a non-aggression pact, the Nkomati Accord, and Angola the Lusaka Agreement, both in 1984. These agreements generated tremendous debates, interpreted by some as victories for Mozambique and Angola, by others as capitulation especially significant as their governments cut off support for the ANC.

Significant now, however, is the failure of Nkomati. Given Mozam-

bique's coordination of transportation and communication within SADCC, there was some fear that Nkomati spelled the end of the experiment. But South Africa could not or would not deliver its part of the bargain - the MNR aggression has continued and the promise of food stabilization and economic investment never materialized. The war in Angola rages on and assumes even graver implications with Reagan's recent pledges of increased aid to UNITA. The reappearance of Holden Roberto on the scene illustrates all too well that "constructive engagement" is continuing its albeit somewhat rocky marriage to "total strategy".

The aim of "total strategy" was to tighten South Africa's economic and social dominance in southern Africa, disrupt the socialist governments completely and cut off all external support for the ANC. Has it succeeded? Perhaps to some degree. SADCC member states have been forced to withdraw support for the ANC; war and drought have forced economic reliance not only to continue but in some instances to increase; projects developed to cut dependence - rail, road and communication links in particular - have been sabotaged and destroyed. However, the ANC continues its attacks against strategic installations inside South Africa; black militancy increases and strengthens daily; the superfederation of labour unions, COSATU, has emerged as a tremendous step toward black trade union unity and the international community has been forced to increasingly question, if not yet to cut, its support for the apartheid state. The destruction of vital projects notwithstanding, SADCC continues to attract more support from a growing number of countries.

Canada and SADCC

Initial support for SADCC came from the nordic states and the EEC (with the exception of the U.K. and West Germany, who contribute a pittance). Canada announced sup-

port of \$125 million in 1984, to be spread over the following five years. The support of several U.N. agencies, Commonwealth funds, some Arab countries, China, Brazil, and India have all helped SADCC realize its objective of a diversified base of support.

Canadian support centres on the development of rail links, research and training in the food sector, assistance in the integration of electrical power grids, and soil, water and forestry management and conservation.

The importance of SADCC is fundamental during the present phase of the South African liberation struggle and in the future. The point has been made by SADCC officials - SADCC is essential irrespective of who is in power in South Africa.

Canadian governmental and NGO involvement in the region must focus more clearly and vigorously on the important components for change - support for the ANC and the Freedom Charter, the application of economic sanctions against the present regime, support for the activities of South Africa's internal progressive forces, and increasing economic support for the SADCC countries and projects. For example, Mozambique is at present a category 3 country - aid must be approved at the Cabinet level. This is an important target for change, in order to permit agencies such as CIDA a more unfettered involvement in a country so crucial to SADCC's prospects.

Support for sanctions must be linked to support for SADCC, if we are truly concerned about the regional economic damage and dislocations that the application of sanctions will have. In the immediacy of the present struggle there is a tendency to lose sight of the future vision - the economic richness and potential of the region being fully developed with South Africa a partner in the process, no longer a focus of aggression and destabilization.

The Hidden Violence of Apartheid

BY CLAUDETTE CHASE


We are all by now familiar with the overtly violent tactics the South African government uses to control the lives of blacks and maintain the economic privileges enjoyed by whites. The news media (before they were banned from areas of confrontation) supplied numerous photos and film clips of riot police attacking blacks with guns, tanks and tear gas. These armed attacks have led to the death of over 1250 Africans in the last year.

The world has reacted in horror to these deaths and much international support for black South Africans has been mobilized to oppose the police state tactics employed by P.W. Botha and his backers. However, there is a covert violence going on that takes the lives of tens of thousands of blacks each year, yet receives little or no news coverage. In the wealthiest African country, African people are dying from diseases directly attributable to poverty and lack of health care.

Disease: A Political Weapon

Health care issues in South Africa are inextricably bound to the socioeconomic system that apartheid is structured to maintain. A desire to preserve the status quo privileges of whites permeates all health policies and explains the wide discrepancy in disease patterns and levels of health between blacks and whites. Two of the most important socioeconomic factors which impact on the health of black South Africans are bantustan policies and the migrant labor system.

The bantustans, only 14% of South Africa's total land area, have been designated as "homelands" for blacks by the minority government. Unemployed and ill people, women



Gill de Villeg/South African Women on the Move

and children are the ones who have been forced to relocate to these reserves. Although advertised by the South African government as areas where blacks can support themselves by farming, the reality is that the tiny land area set aside for reserves cannot begin to feed the large population of people forced to live there. Ciskei, one of the so-called independent homelands, is a good example of life in the bantustans. Only 15% of the land can be farmed there and 90% of the people have either plots too small to farm or no land at all. Clean water, recognized as an essential step in stopping the spread of communicable disease, is available to less than half of Ciskei's population. Unemployment (no accurate official figures are available) is estimated at 35%. Life in the bantustans involves hunger, lack of

clean water, overcrowded housing and the stress of no work—all of which sap people's strength, leaving them vulnerable to disease.

Integrally related to bantustan policies and pass laws is the migrant labor system. Under this system, people are only given passes to be in *white areas* if they have a job. This means the families are left behind to hope the worker is able to send part of his wages home. The worker is only able to return if his contract expires or he has become too ill or old to work. Because of a new system of contract labour passed in 1968, this means some workers spend as little as two weeks a year with their families. The return of ill workers to the *homelands* guarantees that a steady stream of diseases is carried back to those already weakened by malnutrition and overcrowded conditions.

Statistics: The Government Silence

Research in South Africa is difficult to conduct. There are no accurate state figures in many areas that are readily available in all other developed nations. The government either doesn't keep or refuses to release vital statistics on infant mortality rates and common communicable diseases (e.g. measles). We know, thanks to the independent efforts of committed researchers, that they don't keep these statistics because the information would ex-

pose an atrocious health record. UNICEF figures show the infant mortality rate for whites at 14/1000 live births as compared to 80/1000 live births for Africans. By looking at combined sources such as independent studies, hospital surveys and informed individuals we are able to examine some of the generalized health issues faced by the black population as well as problems more specific to age, gender, occupation and geographic location.

Of the myriad of health issues blacks contend with, three will be examined in closer de-

tail here: tuberculosis, malnutrition and women's gynecological illnesses. The common denominator to these three problems for black South Africans is that they are all intensified by the living conditions associated with apartheid; all are at epidemic levels among black South Africans.

Tuberculosis: Barometer of Social Conditions

Tuberculosis is part of South Africa's colonial legacy and demonstrates the link between socioeconomic factors and poor health. Brought originally by white colonists, it only reached epidemic proportion with the development of mining and the influx of infected white workers from England and Europe. Tuberculosis is a disease that thrives on poverty, overcrowding and poor working conditions. Healthy, well-fed individuals may become carriers if exposed to the bacillus, but the disease usually becomes active only in those whose resistance is weakened by malnutrition or the heavy exposure one gets living or working in crowded, poorly ventilated quarters. Black miners, forced to live in crowded barracks, to work ten hour shifts and to exist on only enough food to keep going, certainly meet these criteria.

Living and working conditions at the mines are responsible for the men contracting the disease and the migrant labor system is responsible for them spreading it to their families. According to the South African National Tuberculosis Association, between 50,000 and 60,000 new cases are reported each year and at least ten people die *every day* from this treatable disease. Neither the advent of drugs to treat tuberculosis or BCG immunization which increases resistance to the disease has halted the epidemic among blacks. In contrast, whites, with their adequate diets and comfortable living quarters, seldom contract tuberculosis. Whites comprise a



Inside Crossroads

Women collecting water at a tap in Crossroads

mere 0.5% of the population with the active disease, leaving black Africans to make up most of the remaining 99.5%. Without proper nutrition, adequate land space and well-ventilated working conditions, thousands will continue to die of this preventable, treatable disease.

Women's Health

Banishing people to the bantustans and creating the economic need for thousands to participate in the migrant labour system has turned the lives of most black women in South Africa into one continuous struggle for survival. The interests of the South African government are served by keeping blacks from developing stable communities and relationships. The courage and strength of black South African women has thwarted state desires to prevent a sense of community from developing, as these women have shown the ability to organize and support each other under even the desperate conditions of the townships and bantustans. The government has had little success in defeating the women's spirits but their policies have certainly worked to weaken women's bodies.

South Africa's medical care system is set up with a heavy emphasis on treatment and research. Only 4% of the total health budget goes to preventative care and community health. The lack of these services, combined with the breakdown of social structures inherent under apartheid has led to a situation where sexually transmissible diseases (STD's) are readily spread and no effort is made to treat them.

Women are left the most vulnerable and suffer the most pain and longterm ill effects from STD's. One study estimated that 25% of rural black women have syphilis. Syphilis and gonorrhoea can cause severe abdominal pain and result in permanent infertility.

Research shows that STD's are commonly associated with an in-

creased rate of cervical cancer and in South Africa poor nutrition and the unavailability of proper gynecological care strengthen the relationship. South Africa has one of the highest rates of cervical cancer in the world with 35.6 per 1000 screened women having been diagnosed with the disease. In 1980 the government stopped paying for pap smears, a simple diagnostic test for early detection of cervical cancer.

Cervical cancer and STD's can be controlled by comprehensive community health programs. The government has chosen to not take basic preventive actions. This inertia is one effective way to undermine the health and strength of black women, yet the government doesn't always just sit back and let things take their course. The widespread use of Depo-provera for birth control shows that the state is also quite capable of taking the offensive against women. This drug, linked to breast cancer, prolonged infertility and lethal blood clots, has been banned in the U.S. since 1978. It is given as an injection that works to prevent conception for three to six months. Women who have no access to safer methods of birth control or who want certain jobs must accept these injections.

Malnutrition

Very few black South Africans have proper nutrition. People don't make the wages in urban areas to eat a well-balanced diet and there is no longer enough land in rural areas to support even subsistence agriculture. The extent of malnutrition is well documented by numerous non-governmental studies. These studies attempt to fill in the gap left when the government took kwashiorkor and marasmus (nutritional diseases) off the list of notifiable diseases in 1966. Rather than deal with the problem, they just stopped keeping statistics on nutritional diseases. Children pay the most for inadequate diets. Professor A. Moosa,

a pediatrician in Durban, has estimated that 30,000 South African children die of malnutrition every year. Forty children die of kwashiorkor and marasmus each day in the area of only one hospital in Pietermaritzburg. At a United Nations conference in 1980 it was reported that "75 children (African and Coloured) are dying every day from lack of proper and adequate food".

Perhaps after the staggering numbers of starving people we've heard about in Ethiopia, it would be difficult to not have a certain immunity to these statistics. What makes it real is to read the comments made by parents: "We are being forced to live in places where we find no work or food, and have witnessed the painful death of our children through starvation." The obscene contrast between well-fed white children and black children literally starving to death is perhaps the strongest indictment of the South African government. South African Minister of Health, Dr. Van der Merwe, demonstrates government insensitivity to the question of black children starving to death by attributing the problem to "uncontrolled breeding". Malignant neglect characterizes the health care situation for blacks in South Africa. This hidden violence kills tens of thousands of people yearly. When the government veers from this policy of inaction it is only to further weaken the health of people already debilitated by malnutrition, tuberculosis and other communicable diseases. As long as the socioeconomic conditions perpetuated by apartheid exist, so will these illnesses.

Resources used for this article include:

- *For Their Triumphs and For Their Tears* by Hilda Bernstein
- *The South African Disease: Apartheid Health and Health Services* by Cedric de Beer
- *South African Women on the Move* by the Vukani Makhosikazi Collective
- *The Apartheid Handbook* by Roger Omond.

Coke Adds Artificial Sweetener: Buying Into the Black Opposition

BY JAMES CASON AND
MICHAEL FLESHMAN

In a surprise announcement in late March, the Coca-Cola Company announced that it was forming a series of "Equal Opportunity Funds" to support black economic development in South Africa. The funds, which will be administered by a board of prominent South Africans, including anti-apartheid campaigners Bishop Desmond Tutu and Rev. Allan Boesak, are to be started with a \$10 million grant from Coke. According to a Coca-Cola spokesperson in Atlanta, the funds are to support "education, housing, health care and business opportunities, particularly business opportunities".

Just a few days before the Coke announcement, another major American investor in apartheid, Citibank, announced it was beginning to provide loans at preferential rates to black businessmen.

There is little question here in the U.S., however, about what motivates these companies' rush to help black South Africa - both have been targetted for specific consumer boycotts in the U.S. and these steps are clearly attempts to deflect the growing divestment movement. It is particularly noteworthy that Coca-Cola chose Tutu and Boesak - two oft-quoted advocates of divestment - as members of the foundation's board, although at *Southern Africa REPORT* press time there was some controversy over the terms of their participation.

Less well-known, however, is that these corporate initiatives are part of a broader - and growing - effort by corporations, universities, foundations and private groups to promote the development of a black, pro-capitalist middle class in South Africa.



Things going better with Coke?

It did not go unnoticed among U.S. business and government leaders that workers at the formation of COSATU late last year denounced not only apartheid but also capitalism. The angry denunciations of apartheid, the U.S. and capitalism in general that have become regular features at mass demonstrations and funerals in recent years have conjured up fears that a future, black majority-ruled South Africa might adopt a harshly anti-capitalist, pro-socialist perspective. In reacting to the trend, the U.S. has developed a number of programs that are designed ultimately to direct any future transition in South Africa in a more capitalist direction.

Thus Harvard University late last year set up a \$1 million fund to "aid black South Africans" and announced that its first project would be to send Harvard students to South Africa as interns with programs beneficial to blacks. The program, as Harvard anti-apartheid activists quickly pointed out, had

nothing to do with aiding black South Africans; in fact the Harvard administration made no serious efforts to contact representatives of black South Africans. Instead, the Harvard activists charged, the program was designed to support the status quo and to divert attention away from efforts to force Harvard to divest its more than \$400 million in South African related stocks.

Another conference in January, sponsored by the Johnson Foundation (of the Johnson Wax Corporation with investments in South Africa), encouraged U.S. students to "support their non-white counterparts who seek a higher education in South Africa where, in time, they will have responsibility for sharing in the leadership of their nation".

And the president of Tufts University, Jean Mayer, has set up a fund that provides money for blacks to attend university in South Africa (whites, of course, get government funding). Mayer, an energetic critic

of divestment, argues that his fund makes "a strong contribution...to the dismantling of apartheid and the preparation of a non-white professional and politically sophisticated class in South Africa".

These programs are certainly directed at defusing pressures for divestment, but they may also be part of a growing acceptance of a U.S. policy toward South Africa that has been advocated by a few liberal foundations for a number of years. In this "liberal option", articulated most succinctly in the 1981 Rockefeller Foundation study *Time Running Out* a transition to black majority rule is inevitable in South Africa in the relatively near future and the task for the U.S. is to manage that transition. Thus *Time Running Out* argued for closer U.S. links to black organizations, for U.S. efforts to promote black leadership and business training and for a distancing of American policy from apartheid through open condemnations of the whole government.

Such a policy clearly seems to be the intent behind many of the programs described above, but perhaps even more interesting is that this policy appears to be gaining some currency among sectors of the conservative and neo-conservative establishment. The conservative churchman Richard Neuhaus, director of the Centre for Religion and Society, thus recently signed on to an Anglo-American funded study project, "South Africa Beyond Apartheid", that seeks to "outline and evaluate a range of strategic options for post-Apartheid South Africa". Black neo-conservative Bayard Rustin, who in February hosted UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi at his New York office, has just set up a "Project South Africa" to encourage Americans to establish direct links with individuals and groups in South Africa that are "waging the struggle in a democratic, nonviolent manner", and oppose the armed opposition offered by the African National Congress,



and, increasingly, students and workers in the black urban townships.

At the State Department, Chester Crocker's "constructive engagement" policy even seems to have adopted some of these programs. In 1981 Crocker was declaring that "In South Africa it is not our task to choose between black and white" and in the entire period January 1982 to December 1984 the Assistant Secretary managed only to meet with 16 black South Africans. But in stark contrast, Crocker now regularly condemns apartheid and drops in to visit with black leaders in Soweto on most of his trips to South Africa. The U.S. has also substantially beefed up its aid programs inside the country, with over \$20 million in projects this year promoting programs for, among others, entrepreneurial training and education. Even Ambassador Herman Nickel, who in 1984 declared that white minority rule would last until at least the next century, and that U.S. policy should focus on the whites, is now overseeing the \$2.5 million human rights fund that gives grants to black organizations for legal training, education and promotion of private enterprise.

This is not to suggest, however, that a consensus on policy even within the Reagan administration has emerged. That point

was driven home in early March when the White House strongly censured Crocker for suggesting that the ANC in South Africa might have within it some legitimate freedom fighters.

The failure of constructive engagement made most obvious by the sustained black rebellion in South Africa has forced the U.S. establishment, both in an out of government, to scramble for new policies that protect their interests. This sudden new interest in "black opportunity" suggests that a major new focus of future U.S. policy will be efforts to create a pro-capitalist, pro-western black middle class. Or to put it more crudely, to buy off as broad or "authentic" a portion of the black opposition as possible - hence the significance of Tutu's and Boesak's decision to sit on the board of Coke.

As U.S. policy comes to include corporate carrots as well as government sticks it will become increasingly difficult for anti-apartheid activists to maintain the momentum on divestment. Difficult but not impossible.

The Harvard students' 48-page critique of their school's program, for example, lays bare the political intentions of the liberal option and may have increased pressure on Harvard to divest by focussing attention back on black South Africans' demands for divestment and true liberation.

Stamp News

BY TOM WHELAN

The ad reads (in part): "Postage stamps may change the course of history for Angola ... Dramatically drawn freedom stamps signify the fight of UNITA against an oppressive marxist government." Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA forces are seeking to raise funds and establish legitimacy by issuing propaganda stamps for sale to stamp collectors.

A Florida stamp dealer, Marc Rousso, has been appointed by UNITA as their philatelic agent. For this purpose, Rousso has created the Resistance Stamp Agency (RSA) Inc., based in Palm Beach. (It is ironic that RSA is also the acronym for the Republic of South Africa, UNITA's main supporter) The stamps will be designed and printed by George McDermott, a printer from Pompano Beach, Florida.

Rousso is no stranger to right-wing philatelic ventures. Last November, he brokered a deal for

a Midwestern industrialist to trade \$2.5 million of costume jewelry in exchange for a rare cover posted in a rebel-held area of Afghanistan, franked with two stamps issued by one of the guerilla groups in 1982. The jewelry went to the Federation for American Afghan Action, which will use the proceeds to support the mujaheddin.

The first four Unita stamps, issued in March, show propagandistic images of UNITA's so-called "freedom struggle".

Each stamp's surtax (the larger number given - see boxes) is unusually large; most countries which issue semi-postal stamps, such as Belgium, rarely make the surtax more than 50 per cent of the postal value. One set of four stamps will be issued per month over the course of the next year and each set will cost \$15.


Many collectors are wondering whether or not there is a local postal need for these stamps in eastern Angola. U.S. Congressman Dan Burton (Republican - Indiana), a leading supporter of aid to UNITA, assures us that there is. In a press release, Burton says that "Many sets will be used as postage for letters that proclaim UNITA's struggle. These letters will be mailed from UNITA headquarters in Jamba to Namibia and then to UNITA correspondants all over the world." The sets will probably be used exclusively for propaganda purposes on mail showing that there is a postal system in UNITA-held areas. Such mail would never see Angola; the letters can be cancelled in Namibia or South Africa, and then placed in the international mails. The US Postal Service accepts the validity of stamps from nations which have



Wrecked Benguela Railway petrol tanker: continuing UNITA sabotage

no Universal Postal Union membership (Taiwan, Turkish Cyprus), but whose mail is distributed by a member, so the UNITA stamps will probably have no problem in being accepted.

If successful, there is a danger that similar arrangements in the near future could be made for the Afghan rebels, Nicaragua's contras, and maybe even Renamo of Mozambique. Philately in the service of "anti-communism" should not surprise us. As a propaganda ploy, the UNITA labels are a distorted reflection of a longstanding example of philatelic solidarity - the over 40 nations who have issued close to 160 stamps honoring the liberation struggles of southern Africa over the years.



The 10 kwanza + 200 k shows Savimbi in uniform, with the quote: "There are no weapons in the world with the capacity to forever stop the will of the people."

The 20 kwanza + 300 k shows a black hand shaking a white hand in friendship with the UNITA flag in the background.



The 30 kwanza + 400 k shows a tiger, symbolizing UNITA's determination.

The 40 kwanza + 500 k shows a portrait of Savimbi with the UNITA flag in the background.

Divestment at Queens: The Pressure Mounts

BY LAURIE E. ADKIN

The divestment campaign at Queen's has gathered momentum since September 1985, with the convergence of efforts by undergraduates, graduate students, and faculty members to exert pressure on the Board of Trustees. Unlike the situation at York University — where campus-based unions became involved in the issue — at Queen's members of the undergraduate students' society [AMS] have, since 1981, taken the lead in pursuing the divestment issue. Queen's conservatism and the administrative system of "collegiality", underpinned by its affluence relative to other Canadian universities, have withstood efforts in recent years to unionize staff, teaching assistants, and faculty. The campaign to influence Queen's investment policies has therefore been sustained by the educational work of the student organizations (AMS Outer Council, 1983-84; AMS Committee on South Africa, 1985-86; the Graduate Students' Society, 1981-83), and by off-campus groups like the Kingston Solidarity Committee and the Kingston Anti-Apartheid Coalition [KA-AC]. These groups have attempted to mobilize student and faculty opinion in order to bring pressure to bear on the structures of "collegiality".

Faced in the late 1970s with protest against Queen's holdings in Noranda, then operating in Chile, the Board of Trustees (responsible for administering the University's investments) created a Committee on Social Responsibility in Investment Policy [CSR]. The CSR's official functions are to "receive representative views of the Queen's community" and to make regular writ-

ten reports to the Board of Trustees on investment policy. Its membership is composed of 6 members of the Board of Trustees, one alumnus, one support staff member, one faculty member, and one representative of each of the graduate students and undergraduate students.

Selective Divestment

Since the South Africa divestment issue was raised on campus in 1981, the CSR has adopted a position in favour of what it calls "selective divestment", or constructive engagement. In response to a strong student-initiated divestment drive in 1983, the Chairperson of the CSR, Alan Broadbent, reasserted the committee's view that foreign investment in South Africa "can be a positive force" toward ending apartheid. In 1983 Queen's had a \$40 million investment portfolio. Nearly \$18 million, or 44 per cent of this total, was invested in 24 companies and banks that either operated in, or lent money to South Africa (according to the *Kingston Whig Standard* of 22 March 1983).

As a result of this experience, student activists concluded that the real function of the CSR was not to hear and report to the Board of Trustees the majority view of the Queen's community on divestment, but to deflect pressure by appearing "to examine such issues openly ... and with confidence that our long established governing structures are appropriate for wrestling with such difficult ... problems" (in the words of Principal Smith as quoted in the *Queen's Journal*, 7 Feb. 1986). As David Duff, one of the 1983 student organizers observed: "[The CSR] are open to students expressing their views, they just won't act on them".

Losing Momentum

The divestment drive lost momentum in 1984; the CSR's May 1983 report had reasserted the policy of support for the Sullivan Principles and a turn-over in student leadership resulted in less progressive AMS and GSS executives. The AMS became enmeshed in the issue of its own corporate responsibility. The 1983-84 AMS Outer Council had recommended that the AMS withdraw its account with the Bank of Montreal, which lent to the Government of South Africa. The AMS, it was argued, could not lobby the University Administration with credibility as long as its own house was not in order. The Bank of Montreal is a major donor to Queen's, and its President, Mr. W. D. Mulholland, is a member of the Queen's Board of Trustees. AMS activists were made to feel that future donations might be "adversely affected" by a successful divestment campaign.

The 1984-85 AMS Committee on Divestment rejected much of the previous year's report, and decided not to withdraw AMS funds from the Bank of Montreal. In September 1985, the Bank of Montreal issued a statement that it would make no further loans to South Africa, but this was a managerial decision, rather than a policy formally adopted by the Bank's shareholders. In any case, the AMS decision had the effect of damaging the credibility of its commitment to divestment, and of defusing the student campaign.

Reviving the Issue

In 1985 the divestment issue has been revived as a result of the work of the new AMS Committee on

South Africa [AMSCOSA], more active involvement by graduate students, the formation of an Ad Hoc Committee of Students Concerned with Apartheid (which has undertaken its own actions to educate and mobilize students and to lobby the AMS and other bodies), and of an Ad-Hoc Faculty Group on Divestment. In addition, the Kingston Anti-Apartheid Coalition has linked up non-campus based groups and individuals with student and faculty organizers, adding considerable momentum and scope to anti-apartheid activities.

A series of events was organized in the fall term by the Queen's International Centre, the Kingston Solidarity Committee, the Programme for Studies in National and International Development, the Graduate Students' Society, and the Friends of Oxfam Society. They included Mr. Jabu Dube, on "The ANC's Agenda for Dismantling Apartheid and the Role of International Solidarity"; a lecturer at the University of Witwatersrand on "South Africa: the War Inside and Out"; a film about Allan Boesak and a public forum on "South Africa: State Violence, the Resistance Movement and the Case for Sanctions". It was noted that no members of the Board of Trustees, with the exception of Alderperson Helen Cooper, attended these educational events.

In October 1985, AMSCOSA organized a series of open forums on Queen's and South Africa, and carried out a survey of student views on social responsibility and divestment. Sixty per cent of the 400 students interviewed agreed that the AMS should pressure the Board of Trustees to divest. Then in December, AMSCOSA released a report documenting student opinion and recommending a course of action for the AMS on divestment. At subsequent meetings of the AMS Assembly, the following recommendations were debated and adopted:

•that the AMS make a commitment to working for the divestment

of shares in the Queen's portfolio, in companies and financial institutions which: i) have direct investments in South Africa; ii) have a controlling interest in South African operations; iii) are controlled directly or indirectly by South African interests; iv) make loans to the South African Government or its agencies.

•that the AMS maintain its current banking practices with the Bank of Montreal unless the Bank resumes lending to the government of South Africa or its agencies. Immediate withdrawal of all AMS funds will occur if the Bank reverses its managerial decision.

•that major capital purchases by the AMS be made from companies that are not South African in origin, or which do not have direct investments in South Africa, and are not transnational corporations with South African subsidiaries, unless the purchase is approved by the AMS Assembly.

However, the Assembly split over a tactic which would exert economic pressure on Queen's to divest. An ad hoc committee of students collected 500 signatures on a petition for an AMS referendum on the withholding of student contributions to the Queen's Appeal, a major university fundraising campaign. (These contributions would amount to approximately \$370,000 over the three remaining years of the Appeal.) While the petition's success required the AMS to hold a referendum on the question, at a March 6 meeting the Assembly voted to take a "no" stand on the Question. The "nos" argued that such an action would be detrimental to the quality of education students receive at Queen's, and is effectively a tactic of "blackmail", rather than of reason.

In view of the AMS Assembly's decision, the ad hoc student committee decided to withdraw the petition. They fear dividing the student body over this tactic, thereby weakening the overall momentum of the campaign.

The Graduate Students Society [GSS] voted in January on a motion to hold a referendum on the same question. However, the GSS referendum of February 5-6 resulted in a 53 per cent vote in favour of the withholding of the \$15 student contribution to the Queen's Appeal until such time as the Board of Trustees adopts a policy of divestment in South Africa-tied firms. Moreover, the funds thus accumulated will be redirected to "the promotion of racial equality in South Africa if the Board fails to adopt [this] policy before January 31, 1989". In 1986-87, this graduate student contribution will amount to approximately \$24,000. Graduate and undergraduate student contributions combined would amount to approximately \$150,000 per year, or \$450,000 over the duration of the Queen's Appeal (which ends in 1989).

The Debate Polarizes

On February 7, a number of events converged to polarize the university around the apartheid issue. Wesley Johanneson, Second Secretary at the South African Embassy, addressed the opening session of the Model U.N. Assembly, held on campus, despite concerted efforts by the KA-AC to persuade the AMS to withdraw its invitation. Johanneson's talk was met by about 300 demonstrators and a public meeting across the street with representatives of the ANC. The same day, the CSR met to hear representatives from the AMS, GSS, and the Ad-Hoc Student Committee, and to vote on the divestment question. About 300 students rallied outside the building in support of a pro-divestment position. A petition was presented to the AMS and the CSR by the Ad-hoc Committee with 2,500 signatures gathered in a period of two weeks. A letter, circulated by the Ad-hoc Faculty Group on Divestment, bearing 272 signatures from 27 departments, (collected in four days) was also presented.

After receiving this impressive declaration of the university community's views, the CSR voted 6-3 against divestment. (The three members in favour were the GSS and AMS representatives, and City Alderperson Helen Cooper.) However, because of the obvious "unrepresentativeness" of this decision, the CSR recommended to the Board of Trustees, at a meeting later the same evening, that it hold an open meeting on the question. (This had been proposed by a faculty delegation which met CSR Chairperson, Broadbent, earlier in the day. Other CSR members were not invited to this meeting, and no report of it was made to the full meeting of the CSR later, despite a request from the GSS representative that the arguments of the faculty members be made known. Nor were faculty members invited to address the CSR meeting. In view of the CSR's failure to act on the wishes of its constituencies, the GSS is currently considering boycotting the committee.)

Consequently, the Board decided to hold an open forum on divestment, April 2. Formal discussion of the question will begin at the May 9-10 Board meeting, after most students have left for the summer.

Recently published interviews with the Board's Director of Investment, Darryl MacDermiad, the CSR Chairperson Alan Broadbent, and Principal David Smith, have indicated their continuing commitment to the policy of "selective divestment", perhaps with some face-saving modifications. (The current market value of the securities that Queen's owns of companies that have activities in South Africa, according to Broadbent, is about \$22 million.) In a February 7 *Queen's Journal* interview, Smith identified three options for the investment policy:

- to continue basing South African related investment decisions on the degree of corporate adherence to the Sullivan principles;

- to follow the examples of McGill and Dalhousie, i.e., "total divestment";

- to "modify the present approach with some new directions that better meet the diverse concerns of the Queen's community".

In an interview in the *Queen's Journal* published February 11, Broadbent said: "What I would like to see is further amplification of the [Sullivan] principles to make them speak more to the areas that are central to the apartheid structure." It appears that the higher echelons of collegiality at Queen's are taking a few lessons from the manoeuvres of the Botha regime - on reforms without change.

Forum: April 2

At the April 2 Forum, the Board of Trustees heard two and a half hours of presentations from the Queen's students, faculty, the KA-AC, and the union of library workers (CUPE local 1302), all in favour of divestment. The oral presentations complemented an impressive set of written submissions prepared by AM-SCOSA and the Ad hoc Faculty Group on Divestment.

One speaker described the CSR as the "Star Wars" of the Board of Trustees - having the function

of sensing incoming questions about investment policy and deflecting them. The Board was repeatedly told that refraining from any action on divestment amounts to taking a position on complicity with apartheid no less than a decision to divest does. The Board was urged to take a clear decision on divestment at its May 9-10 meeting, and warned against any further attempts to defend its position of "selective investment" as one compatible with its professed "abhorrence" of apartheid.

Another speaker compared the Board's past commitment to constructive engagement to an attachment to the ideology of "white man's burden". He challenged any persons in the university administration or the CSR who still defend the Sullivan principles to speak up at the Forum, to expose their views to debate. Let us not hear later, he concluded, that on the basis of arguments which no one had the courage to voice publicly, the Board has decided against divestment. Of the approximately 25 speakers, not one advanced an argument against divestment.

The Forum was preceded by a divestment rally which drew 300-400 people, and the Forum itself was attended by about 300 - the limit of the room in which it was held.

Queen's has rarely, if ever, seen the university community so united around a political issue. In the light of the overwhelming message directed at the Board on April 2, it is difficult to conceive of the Board failing to take a decision to divest. At least, to do so would mean a severe loss of credibility and an even more determined convergence of pressure. Student leaders have not ruled out a September referendum on the withholding of student contributions to Queen's Appeal, and the momentum for divestment will only be fuelled by a Board decision which flagrantly disregards the views of the majority of the university community.

Laval Divestment?

From Nouvelles Universitaires.

The Syndicat des professeurs de l'Université Laval (SPUL) has asked the university retirement committee to withdraw any investments it has in companies investing directly in South Africa.

This resolution follows a request made by SPUL to the Vice-Rector about investments by the university in South Africa. It appears that 11% of the Canadian companies and 52% of the American companies in which the retirement committee had interest, had direct investments in South Africa.

The decision by SPUL to withdraw investments in companies dealing with South Africa follows a worldwide campaign against apartheid which has gained momentum ever since major unrest began in that country last year.

We Symbolize Toughness: MATCH Supports Zimbabwean Women

*As women in Zimbabwe
We symbolize toughness.*

*It's so tough
It can only be handled by women.*

*It does not matter how hard or how tough it becomes;
We as women ourselves symbolize toughness.*

Women sang this song everywhere during Zimbabwe's liberation war. It is still very popular and today the words refer to women's struggle for liberation from social and economic subordination.

MATCH International Centre is a small non-governmental development agency that was set up in 1976 to support the struggles of women in developing countries like Zimbabwe. Every year the Centre approves about 25 new projects each having an average value of \$10,000.

MATCH's premise is that although women are deeply involved in the work of development, their crucial role is unrecognized and undervalued. Women continue to make up the majority of the world's poor, powerless and exploited populations. But women in every part of the world are joining together to challenge these conditions. In their quest for empowerment, women are demanding an equal role with men in making the decisions that affect their lives.

MATCH takes its cue from the women in poor countries because we believe that the process of change cannot be imposed from outside. Projects should be directed by those who are most affected. MATCH responds to requests for assistance from groups and orga-

nizations that have defined their needs and formulated the most appropriate solutions for their situation. Funds are raised through a Canadian support network composed primarily but not exclusively of women. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) contributes three dollars for every one MATCH raises. MATCH's educational programs are designed to provide information about women in the Third World and to promote cross-cultural solidarity and understanding among women.

MATCH's support to women in southern Africa is currently concentrated in Zimbabwe. Three examples of projects currently receiving MATCH support include the Zimbabwe Women's Bureau, the Voluntary Associations in Community Enterprise (VOICE), and the Collective Kitchens component of the Zimbabwe project.

The struggle for political liberation involved women in many ways - on the front lines and in the villages - and had a profound impact on their consciousness. According to Olivia Muchena,

"It would not be an exaggeration to say that rural women - perhaps more than any other category of people - bore the brunt of the war. Through their involvement in the

BY SHERRY GALEY

Sherry Galey is the Canadian Program Officer for MATCH.

struggle and through the politicization process by the cadres, rural women gained a political consciousness that pervaded other aspects of their lives. In fact, women gained such a confidence that it has manifested itself in the increased awareness of their situation by expression of a desire to change - not just improve - their basic position."

And the changes Zimbabwean women need include increased economic power - most women have little or no economic power base in the home or community. Women must have more access to both formal and non-formal education to close the gap between men and women. The burden of domestic and agricultural work borne by women must be reduced so that women will have the time to take part in self-development and community development efforts. And finally, women must be afforded increased opportunity to make their voices heard in decision-making bodies at all levels.

VOICE is an umbrella organization of voluntary groups in Zimbabwe. It promotes self-help projects by providing consultation, information and advisory services and by seeking support for the programs of member agencies. Josephine Mutandiro of VOICE came to Canada in October 1984 at the invitation of MATCH to participate in our Management for Change training program. She and another participant from Newfoundland, Dot Whelan, became interested in each other's work and resolved to find a way to continue their supportive relationship in a

practical way. The Newfoundland women learned about Zimbabwean women's need both to reduce the time they spend grinding grain and to generate income. The Newfoundland women committed themselves to raising money that would be channelled through MATCH to support a cooperative grinding mill enterprise run by a women's group.

Zimbabwe's cooperative movement has grown in the last five years from 375 to 1500 cooperatives. One third of these are run by ex-combattants from the liberation war and returned refugees. Cooperatives range from farms to supermarkets to machine shops. Women make up anywhere from 25 to 55 per cent of the large agricultural cooperatives. Women are beginning to challenge the traditional expectations that even though they work outside the home just as hard as the men, they should also continue to be exclusively responsible for domestic work. In the words of one female

member: "Women are beginning to play a role side by side their male coop members. Some of the old discrimination is wearing out but some of it keeps coming back. We come back tired from the fields. But they (the men) want us to demonstrate that we are wives by cooking them meals family by family."

With MATCH funds, the Zimbabwe Project, which is also funded by CUSO, has begun a program of setting up ten communal kitchen to

share more fairly the work of preparing food so that women will have more time to participate in the management of the cooperative. As the organizers of the project like to say, "The first revolution was waged in the bush. The next one will be in the kitchens."

MATCH is still seeking funds for these projects. If you can help to support Zimbabwean women, please contact MATCH at 171 Nepean Street, Suite 401, Ottawa, Ontario, K2P 0B4, (613) 238-1312.



Bruce Paton/Zimbabwe Project

ANC – COSATU Meetings

In our last "South African Notebook" (*Southern Africa REPORT* I, 4) we took note of a December meeting in Zimbabwe between Jay Naidoo, new general-secretary of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and representatives of the ANC. At that meeting, readers will recall, Naidoo emphasized to the ANC that, in his words, "COSATU was looking at alternatives which would ensure that any society that emerged would accurately reflect the interests of the working class".

We suggested, at the time, that there was no reason to think that Naidoo spoke to deaf ears when he made this kind of argument. And the joint communique from a more recent and more formal meeting between the ANC and COSATU (a meeting in which the South African

Congress of Trade Unions – SACTU – also participated) tends to reinforce the point.

Thus all parties "recognized that the emergence of COSATU as the giant democratic and progressive trade union federation in our country is an historic event in the process of uniting our working class and will immeasurably strengthen the democratic movement as a whole". Yet it was also "recognized that the fundamental problem facing our country, the question of political power, cannot be resolved without the full participation of the ANC, which is regarded by the majority of the people of South Africa as the overall leader and genuine representative".

And what of the future which these kinds of "recognitions" are likely to define?

"They (the three delegations) agreed that the solution to the problems facing our country lie in the establishment of a system of majority rule in a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa. Further, that in the specific conditions of our country it is inconceivable that such a system can be separated from economic emancipation. Our people have been robbed of their land, deprived of their due share in the country's wealth, their skills have been suppressed and poverty and starvation have been their life experience. The correction of these centuries of old economic injustices lies at the core of our national aspirations. Accordingly they are united not only in their opposition to the entire apartheid system, but also in their common understanding that victory must embrace more than formal political democracy."

The "Peasant Option" in Zimbabwe

BY DAVE MOORE

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Review of: David Lan, *Guns and Rain: Guerillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe* and Terence Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness and Guerilla War in Zimbabwe: a Comparative Study*, both published by James Curry, London, University of California Press, Los Angeles, and Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, 1985.

David Lan and Terence Ranger have written two quite exhilarating books. They should be read together not just because they deal with an essentially unified subject area – or because they represent the beginnings of true scholarship on Zimbabwe and the launching of an exciting new publisher of "Africana" (James Curry). More importantly for supporters of liberation in southern Africa, they offer key and specific insights into the interactions of peasants, guerillas and politicians – into the very political and ideological substance of wars of liberation. As such, the two books give us a much deeper understanding of Zimbabwean politics than the journalistic works of Martin and Johnson (*The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, Monthly Review Press, 1981) or the petty-bourgeoisie bashing of Andre Astrow (*Zimbabwe: A Revolution that Lost Its Way*, Zed Press, 1984). It's an added bonus that both books are finely crafted. Lan's expertise as a playwright enlivens his anthropology, linking the modern dialectic of peasant-guerilla politics with the "spectacle of the past" as he

shows the old ideologies of authority to have been bent to the new. And Ranger's committed espousal of what he conceives to be the radical "peasant option" – as well as his insistence that this was and remains the substance of the Zimbabwean revolution – is marked by a polemical spirit that engages even as it arouses.

Guns and Rain is the more straight-forward and less controversial of the two, because it is devoted to a specific time, place and subject – the interaction of the ideology and authority of the guerillas entering the northeastern Dande region, with that of the spirit mediums, those repositories of ancestral political legitimacy.

"Within a short period of their arrival in Dande, the ZANLA guerillas were incorporated into local social categories. The category into which they were placed was 'descendants of the *mhandro*', which is to say that they ... and by extension the nationalist politicians ... were regarded as the members of the royal lineages ... With the spirit mediums mounting a guard of honour, the guerillas marched in and took hold of the symbols of their new power." (Lan pp. 19,170)

Although Lan's aims are modest in comparison with Ranger's (and thus more attainable) he does come to some interesting conclusions – perhaps implicit, but there nonetheless – about the nature and roots of the contemporary relationship between peasant and government in post-independence Zimbabwe. Indeed, the book raises a question key to any socialist analysis of ru-

ral guerilla war: was it beneficial in the long term for the guerillas to incorporate pre-existing relations of legitimacy rather than more definitively beginning to transform them? For the democratic village committees set up during and after the war were soon replaced, in post-liberation Zimbabwe, by district and regional councils which are far more bureaucratic and more easily subordinated to central fiat. Might a more thorough-going transformation from the outset have prepared the ground for greater peasant resistance to such negative trends?

Ranger prefers not to question the nature of the relationships between peasant, guerilla and politician in this way. Instead he asserts, and sets out to prove, that the ideology which dominated the Zimbabwean revolution was that of the "peasant option" – by which he means an ideology which gives priority to the peasants' unfettered access to the market! For those who doubt the correctness of this interpretation, he somewhat mockingly asks the question posed indirectly by Lan:

"How then are we to evaluate all this (i.e. the subordination of the aims of the war to the 'peasant option', including all its traditional components)? Are we witnessing a treason of the modernizing intellectuals, a willful failure to carry out the task of enlightening the peasantry? Are we witnessing the failure to achieve a true 'people's war'?"

For Ranger the answer to such questions is a resounding "No". The Zimbabwean revolution embodied a radical peasant option because its key ingredient was opposition to the settler state's interference with the free market and African access to land. In contrast, says Ranger, "modernizing intellectuals" most often tend to betray this peasant small-holder vision of *laissez-faire*, either in the interests of "collectivism" on the one hand or pre-existing (much more advanced) capi-

talist patterns of land ownership on the other. But not in Zimbabwe (or at least not quite – Ranger does give evidence of the squatters' increasing impatience with a state that just might be waiting too long to challenge the power of the large agricultural interests!)

Comparisons with Mozambique and Kenya are used to reinforce Ranger's point that the Zimbabwean leadership did not "sell out" its peasant base. For Ranger, the Zimbabwean nationalists have not been "petty-bourgeois politicians" falling eagerly to the allure of neo-colonialism (in negative contrast to John Saul's and Basil Davidson's "noble but impossibly utopian" (Ranger, p. 11) vision of FRELIMO in Mozambique) Indeed, the liberatarian content of the radical peasant consciousness was so deep, says Ranger, that a Marxist-Leninist and statist solution could not have been imposed. Vanguard party or not, the peasants would not allow themselves to be "sold out" to the collectivist option. Nor, Ranger argues, has this radical peasant option been subverted by large rural capitalist interests as in the Kenyan case; sufficient rural differentiation has not taken place for such a form of class struggle to take shape. In short, the two comparisons serve to make the same point. Zimbabwe is not capitalist (bad) like Kenya, nor socialist (equally bad) like Mozambique. Rather, it is something unique: progressive, liberal and even "good".

The notion of "populism" has often been criticized as an imprecise ideological category, but loose as it is one could correctly attribute this perspective to Ranger. As Henry Bernstein has recently pointed out (at Cambridge, November, 1985), such populism fits both right and left. The new ideologies of the World Bank and the IMF, epitomized in the Berg Report, heap praise upon the "entrepreneurial peasant" and pour scorn on the interventionist and parasitical "monster state". Many left-populists

(à la Ranger) make similar points, although they tend to leave out the prefix "entrepreneurial" when describing their peasants. Moreover, both right and left populisms, in their concentration on the "monster state and the mythical masses" (in Bernstein's phrase), fail to make clear that their "peasant options" are unequivocally *capitalist* options. At their best, such options would lead to accumulation and differentiation in the countryside, and a process of urban industrialization and proletarianization that will take decades and generations to work itself through. At its worst – and in Africa this is the norm – the "free market" in agriculture leads to accumulation for international capital (and a few of its local allies) and urban marginalization instead of proletarianization. Such would seem to be the fate of the *laissez-faire* option in Zimbabwe.

There are many times when Ranger's own work seems to recognize certain of the problems here. There are definite signs of rural differentiation, he notes, but he hesitates to follow this through to any systematic questioning of the notion of the "peasant option" itself. Significantly, the main text closes with the thought that "the beginnings of a dominant rural bourgeoisie ... this ambiguous (sic) class" could well be underway. Lan ends with the same sort of preoccupation. If this is so, might not any "ambiguity" lie primarily in the eye of the beholder, and in the sort of ideology which uncritically underwrites the peasant option?

A second and even more immediate problem arises in Zimbabwe. The new state and the new state classes have, as Ranger and Lan make clear, come into power on their promise of "land for the people". Unfortunately, large local and foreign interests still hold most of the land, so the state is being forced to make a decision: either for the kind of (small-holder) capitalism that the peasant masses, in Ranger's view, have always been for or for the

kind they have always been against. (There is of course a third option, the "socialist option": perhaps it is "pie-in-the-sky" to add this in as conceivable one in the Zimbabwe context, but it bears noting that it, too, is still being talked about there).

In this regard, it is clear that Ranger would prefer the ZANU-PF to be more interventionist than it is, in order to redress the imbalances of the colonial state and economy. He would have the state (in a somewhat paradoxical and self-negating way) further clear the ground for the *laissez-faire* "peasant option", for the non-socialist people's revolution. But in the absence of a clear analysis of the formation of the new state and of the forces which, in addition to those allied to the peasant option, are acting upon it, we cannot really get much of an idea as to what are the prospects of realizing Ranger's preferred future. What are we to make, for example, of the state's vacillations around the squatter question (which Ranger does describe with a strong anti-bureaucratic tone)? To describe the Zimbabwe state as a people's state merely shuffles aside such questions.

[Ranger has been accused of shuffling aside other problems with his brand of ZANU-PF-oriented progressive populism, as when he deals with recent difficulties in Matabeleland by advising the Ndebele peasants to devote their critical attention to the "big men" and the politicians who manipulate tribalism to maintain the socio-economic privileges of chiefs and cattlemen. It is then indicated that the ZANU-PF "men of the people" are the real hope for Matabeleland. Some reviewers (see David Caute's scathing review in the *London Review of Books*, November 21, 1985) have seen this as a stark oversimplification of the issue of "tribe and class" in Zimbabwe and as reflecting a very *selective* brand of populism, one which has degenerated into a kind of partisan apologetics.]

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
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