



U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa

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U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa

| | |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Author/Creator | Committee on Foreign Relations |
| Publisher | U.S. Government Printing Office |
| Date | 1975-06-11 - 1975-07-29 |
| Resource type | Hearings |
| Language | English |
| Subject | |
| Coverage (spatial) | Southern Africa (region), United States, South Africa, Angola, Mozambique |
| Description | A wide-ranging set of hearings including testimony by scholars and representatives of non-governmental organizations. |
| Format extent (length/size) | 529 page(s) |

<http://www.aluka.org/action/showMetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.uscg029>

U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA

HEARINGS

HELD AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

1975-1976


OR

HEARINGS OF THE RELEASE FROM SOUTHERN AFRICA

HELD AT WASHINGTON, D.C. IN 1975 AND 1976



Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations



U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
OVERVIEW OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH SOUTHERN AFRICA

JUNE 11, 13, 16; JULY 9, 10, 14, 23, 24, 28, AND 29, 1975



Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

60-619

WASHINGTON : 1976

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20462 - Price \$4.80
Stock Number 062-070-03195-6

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U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA

Mozambique

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 11, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Dick Clark (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Clark, Pearson, and Griffin.

Senator CLARK. The hearing will come to order.

COMMENDATION OF SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS

Before reading my opening remarks I want to express appreciation for the great contribution that the more senior members of this subcommittee have made to African-American relations. I know that Senator Pearson, who is here this morning, as well as Senators Humphrey and McGee, have on numerous occasions called the attention of the Congress to the critical African issues that might otherwise have been ignored. They have devoted considerable time and effort to Africa-related legislation, such things as the restoration of U.S. compliance with sanctions against Rhodesia, relief for the drought-stricken nations of the Sahel, the U.S. contributions to the African Development Fund, support for the independence of Portuguese African territories, and increasing Africa's share of economic development assistance.

All of these Senators have been very much involved in those efforts. They have also worked on behalf of better United States-African relations in their strong support of the U.N. in their initiative in focusing U.S. foreign assistance on the world's poorest people and nations, and their pioneering efforts for world food reserves and increasing the world food production.

One could go on and on with the list of accomplishments that members of this subcommittee over the last several years have made.

Quite frankly, such efforts are not on the top of the priority list of most of their constituencies. They have nevertheless taken the leadership on a number of these issues. I think they reflect the commitments of true statesmanship to further understanding among nations.

At least in this committee such efforts should be recognized and appreciated.

We all owe a tremendous debt to these Senators who will continue to serve on this subcommittee.

OPENING STATEMENT

The fundamental changes occurring in southern Africa today present unique challenges and opportunities for U.S. foreign policy.

In Angola and Mozambique, the struggle for independence was in many ways a struggle between the East and the West, and between the former colonies of Africa and the former colonial powers. Portugal was a member of NATO, and the United States provided it with economic and military assistance all during the colonial wars. At the same time, China and the Soviet Union—as well as the independent nations of Africa—assisted those people who will soon govern Angola and Mozambique in their fight for independence.

During all this time, the United States remained committed to self-determination for the people of Angola and Mozambique and to non-violent change. Today the people of Angola and Mozambique have won political self-determination. From now on change hopefully will be peaceful. The challenge to the United States is to make good on the verbal commitments it has been making for more than a decade.

IMPACT OF INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE

The independence of Angola and Mozambique will not occur in a vacuum. As independent nations, they will have a profound impact on one of the most troubled and potentially explosive areas of the world—the minority-ruled nations of Rhodesia and South Africa. In Rhodesia, the 4 percent of the population that is white has established a regime of racial domination that is not recognized as a “government” by any state in the world. This regime will now be practically surrounded by independent African states, and it will come under increasing military and economic pressure from them. Under an independent government Mozambique no longer will help its neighbor violate international economic sanctions. It probably will no longer allow the use of its ports for 80 percent of Rhodesia’s trade or provide false documents to cover Rhodesia’s exports. Mozambique also can be expected to provide the same assistance to freedom fighters in Rhodesia that was provided to FRELIMO [Front For the Liberation of Mozambique], the Mozambique independence movement, by other independent African states.

DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO RHODESIA PROBLEM

Fortunately, even at this time of increasing economic and military pressure, there is also a greater chance than ever before for diplomatic solution to the Rhodesia problem. Rhodesia may well become the independent, black-ruled nation of Zimbabwe through peaceful negotiations rather than conflict. The challenge to the United States is to find ways to help bring about a speedy and peaceful transfer of power.

This Government must also begin to assist Zimbabwe’s future leaders build a strong foundation for self-determination. Recently, two of Zimbabwe’s future leaders were in this country: Bishop Muzorewa and Reverend Sithole. They asked for educational and training assistance

to help prepare Zimbabweans effectively to govern and develop their country. They also asked the United States to help bring about a peaceful solution to the Rhodesia problem, again complying with international economic sanctions against Rhodesia.

SOUTH AFRICAN OCCUPATION OF NAMIBIA

The changes in southern Africa will have an immediate impact on South Africa as well—in the form of pressure against its illegal occupation of Namibia. Namibia shares a long border with Angola, a border which could not be guarded effectively even by the well-trained and well-equipped South African Army. The liberation movement within South Africa is bound to increase with Angolan independence. At the same time, the pressure within the United Nations on South Africa to withdraw from Namibia is increasing. This was the reason for South Africa's suspension from the General Assembly. In response, South Africa has recently agreed for the first time to discuss the issue of Namibian independence with the head of the U.N. Council for Namibia and with representatives of the Organization for African Unity [OAU]. It remains to be seen how effective these talks will be.

Here, too, the United States can play an important and positive role in bringing about an early, peaceful transition to independence with majority rule. Up to this point, the United States has been reluctant to increase international diplomatic pressure on South Africa beyond a voluntary arms embargo. If this country's statements of support for the independence of Namibia are to have any credibility, the United States must now work together with other U.N. members to further the independence of Namibia. If this cannot be accomplished without additional diplomatic pressure, the United States must provide it.

SIGNIFICANCE OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD INDEPENDENT BLACK AFRICAN NATIONS

In determining future U.S. policy toward all of southern Africa, it is important to take into account the significance of that policy to the independent black African States. Although they have tremendous economic development needs of their own, many of these countries have committed substantial resources to the struggle for independence and self-determination in southern Africa. They have given top priority in their diplomatic relations to increasing world pressure against racial domination and colonialism in southern Africa. The African nations' internal economic and political policies, as well as their foreign policies, differ considerably. Yet they are united in their strategy to further human rights and racial equality in southern Africa. One of the main reasons for founding the Organization for African Unity, and a major reason for its survival in spite of serious differences among the African states, is the promotion of independence in southern Africa. Beginning with the signing of the Lusaka Manifesto in 1969, these countries have come together frequently not only to reaffirm their long-term goal of the liberation of all of Africa, but to set short-term strategies for reaching that goal. The most recent meeting concluded with the signing of the Dar Declaration, focusing on Zimbabwe and Namibia, and endorsing the efforts of Tanzania, Zambia, and other

states in the region to reach a negotiated settlement of the Rhodesia problem.

The United States must not underestimate the importance of these "southern African" issues to the independent nations of Africa. As former colonies themselves, the African states have been particularly sensitive to the continued existence of colonialism in the Portuguese territories and Rhodesia, and to minority rule in South Africa. Nor can we underestimate the importance of U.S. policy to them.

The African nations have looked to the United States for support and assistance in the struggle for racial equality and self-determination in southern Africa. They have looked to the United States because it is committed to individual freedom. They have looked to the United States because it stands for majority rule with minority rights. They have looked to the United States because it is a former colony—a colony which won its independence in a revolution.

They have looked to the United States because it has the second largest black population in the world. This country has lived with the struggle for human dignity and racial equality throughout its entire history. Dignity and equality are not empty commitments for the United States. They are at the core of our identity and experience.

U.S. SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE

Yet the African nations have time and again been disappointed. This is the only country in the world that has passed a law requiring violation of sanctions against Rhodesia. This country's record in the U.N. on southern African issues has increasingly been one of abstentions, "no" votes, and vetoes. The most recent, and perhaps the most disappointing, example came only last week, when the United States vetoed the imposition of a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa designed to help bring about the independence of Namibia. Since the United States has complied with the voluntary arms embargo, and since this would have applied additional pressure on South Africa to give up its illegal occupation of Namibia, it is difficult to understand why the administration felt it could not support this positive, non-violent initiative.

While these positions have often made it appear that the United States was supporting racial domination and colonialism in southern Africa, I do not believe this was the intention of U.S. policymakers.

SOUTHERN AFRICA IMPORTANT TO UNITED STATES STRATEGICALLY, ECONOMICALLY, AND POLITICALLY

But southern Africa is important—strategically, economically, and as an indication of what our post-Vietnam policies are going to be. In the United Nations, in the Organization for African Unity, and in bilateral efforts, countries are trying peacefully to further the goals of human rights, racial equality, national self-determination, and majority rule in southern Africa. The United States cannot continue to merely give verbal support to these principles while undercutting the efforts of other countries to further them. We must come up with some positive proposals of our own.

The situation in southern Africa makes it more important than ever that change comes in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa as speedily, quickly, and as peacefully as possible. Independence with majority rule is now a probability for Rhodesia, a very real possibility for Namibia. But it could come only after long years of bitter struggle unless the settlements are negotiated. It is in this country's interest to assure that change comes peacefully if only because any prolonged, major armed struggle in the world affects the United States in one way or another. A destructive and costly battle in southern Africa would be expensive—not only for Africa but for the entire world. Finally, it is essential for simple humanitarian reasons that further change in southern Africa be brought about peacefully. A race war there would result in tremendous human tragedy on both sides—and would leave wounds that would be difficult to heal.

SUBCOMMITTEE EXAMINATION OF U.S. POLICY ISSUES

During the course of these hearings, the subcommittee will examine various proposals that have been made to strengthen U.S. support for nonviolent change in southern Africa—such measures as increased educational and training assistance to the people of Zimbabwe and Namibia, United States assistance to Mozambique in its effort to comply with sanctions against Rhodesia, denial of foreign tax credits to corporations operating in Namibia and paying taxes to the South African Government, and not supplying nuclear material or technology to South Africa.

Undoubtedly, the many witnesses who have studied southern Africa and U.S. policy there for some time will have many additional proposals, and there no doubt will be significant differences of opinion. But it is important at this critical time that this subcommittee and the Congress seriously consider what kind of substantive, positive action the United States can take on southern African issues.

Today, the subcommittee will be examining the situation in Mozambique on the eve of independence. The witnesses have all spent a great deal of time studying Mozambique. They know its future leaders, the policies they are likely to follow, and their attitudes toward the United States. Undoubtedly, they will be able to give us some useful suggestions on how this country can establish good relations with the Government of Mozambique.

MOZAMBIQUE ON THE EVE OF INDEPENDENCE

Two weeks from today, on the anniversary of the founding of Frelimo, Mozambique will become independent. It is important at the opening of this hearing to recognize the tremendous significance of this event. A government representing all the people of Mozambique will be taking power. There is every indication now that this Government will be dedicated to improving the quality of life for its people—especially for the majority living in rural areas who have been left out of economic development. It is also apparent that the new Government will make every effort to bridge racial and cultural differences, to make all the people of the country Mozambicans. Finally, the new Government will remain committed to human rights and self-deter-

mination and will play a significant role in furthering these principles throughout southern Africa.

Senator Pearson, do you have any opening comments?

WITNESSES

Senator PEARSON. No, I think courtesy requires me to say that I have another commitment—an executive committee markup of a bill. I am going to have to be rushing out and back but I want to tell the witnesses, who seem most appropriate to start these hearings, that I will read and study their statements and I appreciate their coming today. The chairman has been most generous in his comments. I have been on this African Subcommittee several years. I think this is the first time we have ever had hearings that I can remember. For those of us who have a sense of guilt about always being too concerned about another part of the world, I want to give to the chairman a very sincere thanks for breathing a little more life into this part of the Foreign Relations Committee activities. I congratulate him for it.

I do not have an opening statement, Mr. Chairman. I am very anxious to hear the witnesses. As I say, I apologize for running back and forth during your testimony today.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much.

The panel before us is Thomas H. Henriksen of the Department of History, at State University College in Plattsburgh, N.Y.; Professor Norman Bailey, Columbia University, New York; and Professor Allen Isaacman, Department of History, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.

I think what we will do is hear your statements, one after another, and have the remaining part of the morning for questions.

So let's start with Professor Henriksen.

[Professor Henriksen's biography follows:]

Curriculum Vitae of Thomas H. Henriksen, January 1975, Department of History, State University of New York, Plattsburgh, N.Y.; Cadyville, N.Y.

Marital status: Married—one daughter.

Age: 34.

Degrees: B.A., 1962 Virginia Military Institute; M.A., 1966 Michigan State University; Ph. D., 1969 Michigan State University.

Experience: Graduate Assistant—Michigan State University—1968-69; Assistant Professor—SUNY—1969-1973; Associate Professor—SUNY—1973-Present.

PUBLICATIONS

Articles

"African Intellectual Influences on Black Americans: The Role of Edward W. Blyden," *Phylon* (forthcoming).

"End of Empire: Portugal's Collapse in Africa," *Current History*, Vol. 68, No. 405 (May 1975), pp. 211-215, 229.

"Portugal in Africa: A Noneconomic Interpretation," *African Studies Review*, Vol. XVI, No. 3 (December, 1973), pp. 905-16.

"The Revolutionary Thought of Eduardo Mondlane," *Genere Africain*, Vol. XII, No. 1 (July, 1973), pp. 37-52.

"Portugal's Changing Fortunes in Africa," *Current History*, Vol. 64, No. 379 (April, 1973), pp. 106-110, 130-131.

"History for the 70's: An Approach to Contemporary History," *The History Teacher*, Vol. VI, No. 1 (November, 1971), pp. 9-16.

"Black is Beautiful: An Old Idea," *Negro History Bulletin*, Vol. 34, No. 7 (November, 1971), pp. 150-52.

"Edward W. Blyden: His Influence on Contemporary Afro-Americans," *Pan-African Journal*, Vol. IV, No. 3 (Summer, 1971), pp. 255-65.

"Black is Beautiful: A West African Origin," *Papers on the Social Sciences*, Vol. I, No. 5 (August, 1971), pp. 69-78.

Professional Papers

"Contemporary History as an Enrollment Magnet," American Historical Association, San Francisco, December 28, 1973.

"The Impact of African Intellectuals on Afro-American Thought, 1880-1912." Missouri Valley History Conference, University of Nebraska at Omaha, March 8-10, 1973.

"Africa, Portugal and the United States: Changing Configurations." SUNY African Studies Faculty, Annual Meeting, Binghamton, Dec. 9, 1972.

"Portugal in Africa: End of a Stalemate," Scholar-Diplomat Seminar in Washington, D.C., Nov. 13-17, 1972.

"Portugal's Retention of African Territory: An Analysis of Non-Economic Factors." SUNY African Studies Faculty Association, Annual Meeting, Brockport, N.Y., Feb. 25, 1972.

"Eduardo Bondlane, His Political Thought," African Studies Association, 14th Annual Meeting, Denver, Colo., Nov. 4, 1971.

"The Transference of Cultural Nationalist Ideas from Africa to Afro-Americans in the United States." SUNY African Studies Faculty, Annual Meeting, International Center, Oswego, May 14, 1971.

Book Reviews

Fourteen book reviews in various journals. Please see attached page for specifics.

HONORS AND AWARDS

SUNY Faculty Research Fellowship—1975; SUNY Faculty Research Fellowship—1973; NDFL Fellowship in Portuguese—Summer 1972 at Luso-Brazilian Center, University of Wisconsin.

Scholar-Diplomat Seminar at the Department of State, Washington, D.C., Nov. 13-17, 1972.

American Philosophical Society Grant—1972.

African and Afro-American Summer Seminar at University of Buffalo—Summer, 1970.

College Merit Award for Community Service—P.S.U.C.—1970.

Faculty Research Associate, Program of East African Studies, Syracuse University.

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Editorial Board, *African Studies Review*, 1974-1977.

Chairman of the Panel: "Conflict in Portuguese Africa," African Studies Association, Denver, Colorado, November 4, 1971.

Chairman of the Panel: "Blacks—Politics and Ethnic Conflict," Duquesne History Forum, Pittsburgh, Pa., November 2, 1972.

Discussant: "African Liberation Movements in Comparative Perspective," African Studies Association, Syracuse, New York, November 1, 1973.

Secretary, New York African Studies Association, 1973-Present.

Book review Editor—*Pan-African Journal*, 1971-Present.

Secretary, Executive Committee of SUNY African Studies Faculty Association, 1971-1973.

Member, African Studies Association.

Member, American Association for Portuguese and Brazilian Cultures.

Contributor to planning of SUNY Overseas Program at University of Ibadan, Nigeria.

COMMUNITY SERVICE

Lectures to inmates of Dannemora Prison, Diagnostic and Treatment Center—Dannemora, N.Y.—Spring 1971.

Inaugurated and coordinated an Afro-American Speakers and Films Program—P.S.U.C.—1970.

Talks to civic groups.

References and credentials: On request.

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DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE,
PLATTSBURGH, N.Y.**

Mr. HENRIKSEN. Before I begin my statement I would like to say I took the liberty—this was supposed to be a background. Perhaps I

concentrated too much on the historical aspect in two or three pages. Let me say something about the organization.

Senator CLARK. I think that is a good way to start.

Mr. HENRIKSEN. Anything I have said early in my statement will play a part in what I have to say later. I hope it will have some meaning and would not be working in a vacuum. I did mention background so maybe it is better I go first.

MOZAMBIQUE'S RISE TO INDEPENDENCE

Mozambique's rise to independence this June 25 constitutes another example in the world community of successful nationalist revolution against colonialism. Although it comes in the late nationalist period which witnessed its beginnings in central Europe during the 19th century, the Mozambican revolution's international and Marxist image is comprehensible in the general historical context of nationalism.

Mozambican nationalism first projected its most concrete expression in the formation of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique—Frelimo—Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique, on June 25, 1962. Before this opposition to Portuguese rule had been regional, ethnic, divided, and sporadic. Indeed, earlier African reaction to the centuries-long presence of Portuguese soldiers, administrators, traders, missionaries, and settlers was characterized by disunity and even accommodation due to the multiplicity of small states, ethnic groups, and disintegrating African empires. Relations between white and black were marked by warfare at times, by peaceful exchange at other times and by even domination of the Europeans in certain regions.

PORTUGUESE INFLUENCE ON ISLAND OF MOZAMBIQUE

Until the mid-19th century, Portuguese influence was most thoroughly felt on the small Island of Mozambique, off the northern coast and a handful of riverine and coastal garrisons or trading posts. Up the Zambezi, the country's principal river, Portuguese backwoodsmen—sertanejos—established an estate system—prazos—from early in the 16th century, which, in time, became heavily Africanized in blood, culture, and institution.¹ This adaptation attenuated the Portuguese presence and Lisbon's rule in later centuries. A decline in Portugal's imperial fortunes and internal troubles turned Lisbon's attention from its weak toehold in Mozambique until the late 19th century when the stimulus of other European states scrambling for African colonies helped push Portugal into the competition so as to preserve and expand its holdings.

Military campaigns were used to "pacify" African resistance to Portugal's occupation of its east African claims. Regular white troops were employed along with large numbers of African auxiliaries. By recruiting African soldiers and playing one ethnic group against another, Lisbon succeeded in establishing a precarious hold over Mozambique by 1902. Revolts continued after that date. Fifteen years later in 1917 its fragile grip was nearly snapped by one of the most serious pan-ethnic risings in southern Africa during the early 20th century. When the rising collapsed, Portuguese rule was firmly entrenched for the next half century.

¹ Allen F. Isaacman, "Mozambique: The Africanization of a European Institution: The Zambezi Prazos, 1750-1902" (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1972), pp. 17-23.

Portuguese colonial policy in Mozambique had features similar and dissimilar to those of other European powers in Africa. As Europeans elsewhere on the continent, the Portuguese set about establishing a colonial infrastructure of administration, transportation networks, and recruitment of African labor for private and public projects. But Portugal's economic impotence retarded its colonial enterprises and prohibited it from economically exploiting the entire southeast African province. Three large companies—two of which were almost exclusively foreign financed, chartered by the Lisbon government and given administrative obligations—held quasi-political powers over wide swaths of Mozambique until the new state—*estado novo*—of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar terminated their concessions.² The end of the companies' administrative function did not signal a cessation in the forced recruitment of African labor, for it continued in various guises up to the initial stages of the nationalist war in 1964.

Portugal bristled, more than other colonizing powers, with a colonial credo predicated on the assumption that Africans should be Europeanized as Portuguese citizens. Lisbon lacked, however, the economic wherewithal and a genuine commitment to Mozambican education and welfare implied by such a goal. Yet these deficiencies failed to check government spokesmen or apologists from touting Portugal's "civilizing mission." Taught a modicum of the Portuguese language and the Catholic faith, a handful of Africans were expected to think of themselves as black Portuguese and as members along with Angolans and Brazilians of a tricontinental Lusitanian nation. In 1950, only 4,353 black and mulatto Mozambicans out of a population of 5,733,000 reached the *assimilado* status which granted the right to vote, travel without permission, and freedom from contract labor.³

POST-WORLD WAR II MOZAMBIQUE LITERARY, ARTISTIC PROTEST

The contradictions between theory and practice and the disparities in life styles between whites and blacks were to evoke a literary and artistic protest among educated Mozambicans in the post-World War II days. Contract labor was considered by Mozambicans and foreign critics as merely a thinly veiled form of slavery. The mutually beneficial exchange of Mozambican labor to work in South African mines for repayment in gold and guaranteed shipping through the Lourenco Marques docks was viewed not only as the grossest form of hypocrisy of the "civilizing mission" but also the rankest exploitation since the slave trade.⁴ Strikes and demonstrations against the harsh realities came to grief at the hands of the colonial regime that held protest over economic and social grievances to be signs of political discontent.⁵

² James Duffy, "Portuguese Africa" (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 268-288; Alan K. Smith, "Antonio Salazar and the Reversal of Portuguese Colonial Policy," *Journal of African History*, vol. XV, No. 4 (1974), pp. 653-667.

³ Duffy, "Portuguese Africa," 295; the *assimilado* status was abolished in 1953.

⁴ Marvin Harris, "Labour Emigration Among the Mozambique Thonga: Cultural and Political Factors," *Africa*, vol. 29 (1959), pp. 50-66; and "Race, Conflict, and Reform in Mozambique," *The Transformation of East Africa*, ed. Stanley Diamond and Fred G. Burke (New York: Basic Books, 1966), pp. 157-183; for the poetic and artistic protest of conditions in Mozambique, see "The Role of Poetry in the Mozambique Revolution," *Mozambique Revolution*, No. 37 (January-February 1969), pp. 23-31, and No. 38 (March-April 1969), pp. 17-32.

⁵ Details of strikes and protest are sketchy. For a partisan's account, see Mondlane, "The Struggle for Mozambique" (Baltimore: Penguin, 1969), pp. 101-121; for a journalist's brief account of one strike, see A. T. Steele, "On the Edge of Africa's Racial Troubles," *New York Herald-Tribune*, Nov. 26, 1952.

Except for the short-lived associations formed during the Portuguese Republic—1910–26—black Mozambicans had no organizations to seek redress. The regime-sponsored associations under the Salazar-Caetano dictatorship merely reflected the authoritarian government's needs. Unlike the British and French in their territories, the Portuguese either crushed or infiltrated African political groups. Movements formed in exile offered the only opportunity of success.

EMERGENCE OF FRELIMO

Mozambicans working and living in the neighboring states of Rhodesia, Malawi, Tanzania, and Kenya coalesced into small political groups with the general rise of African nationalism in the 1950's and early 1960's. From three of these groups—União Democrática Nacional de Mocambique [UDENAMO], Mocambique African National Union [MANU] and União Africana de Mocambique Independente [UNAMI]—emerged Frelimo in June 1962. Headed by Eduardo Mondlane, an American university educated Mozambican, Frelimo at its first party congress 3 months after formation, enunciated the aim of "the rapid access of Mozambique to independence." Other goals included the promotion of "the social and cultural development of the Mozambican woman" and "the literacy of the Mozambican people."⁶

Attempts were made by Frelimo, or third parties to discuss Mozambican independence but these were spurned by Lisbon. Frelimo leaders became convinced by such failures and by the wars raging in Angola and Guinea-Bissau that only an armed struggle would bring independence. Fighting began on September 25, 1964, when small guerrilla bands struck in the northern region.

The initial aims and programs of the Frelimo leadership were not particularly radical as judged by the revolutionary lexicon of movements around the world, or even within the United States. But the struggle against the Portuguese army, recruitment of younger, more militant members and the identification of the Mozambican war with past and contemporary conflicts elsewhere tended to radicalize Frelimo's goals. Three years after the commencement of guerrilla warfare Mondlane talked of restructuring Mozambican society away from colonial and traditional economic and social patterns.⁷ By the second party congress, held in Niassa province in northern Mozambique in July 1968, Frelimo announced a series of revolutionary resolutions on national reconstruction calling for "organization of agricultural, commercial and industrial cooperatives," "development of schools of political training" and "resettlement of the population."⁸ These and other resolutions indicated that the goal went beyond just political independence from Portugal.

Mondlane's personal political philosophy contained a measure of pragmatism and involved an eclectic approach to ideologies and solutions to national problems. The war effort helped to radicalize his political thought as well as that of many Frelimo leaders.⁹

⁶ For a reprinting of Frelimo resolutions, see Mondlane, "The Struggle for Mozambique," pp. 123–23.

⁷ Helen Kitchen, "Conversations with Eduardo Mondlane," *Africa Report* (November 1967), p. 51.

⁸ Mondlane, "The Struggle for Mozambique," 193.

⁹ Thomas H. Henriksen, "The Revolutionary Thought of Eduardo Mondlane," *Geneve-Afrique*, vol. XX, No. 1 (1973), pp. 37–52.

This radicalization of Frelimo was not undergone without friction within the movement. The evidence suggests that Mondlane's death on February 3, 1969, by a bomb placed in a book, was the result of dissension between radical and traditional elements. Lazaro Kavandame, an elderly leader from the Makonde people, has been most frequently cited as the chief perpetrator of the assassination and as an accomplice of the Portuguese secret police.¹⁰ At the second party congress, which Kavandame and other political leaders from Cabo Delgado boycotted, the split was apparent. At a subsequent conference the next month—August 1968—in Mtwara, Tanzania, Kavandame is reported to have held views of less sweeping changes for an independent Mozambique. It is also reported that he advocated a separate independence for the Makonde, and was profiteering from his political position in the party.¹¹ Six months later Mondlane was dead, and Kavandame had defected. Other murders and defections preceded and followed Mondlane's assassination.

With the death of Mondlane, who stood close to center of the Frelimo political spectrum in lifestyle and political approach, the nationalist movement was temporarily commanded by a triumvirate comprised of Vice President Uria Simango; Secretary of Political Affairs Marcelino dos Santos; and the commander in chief of the armed forces, Samora Machel. This collective leadership reflected the internal divisions within the movement.

In November 1969, the three-way leadership dissolved and the heretofore little-known military leader, Machel, emerged as the second President; Dos Santos retained his post and later became the Vice President; Simango was expelled for breach of party secrecy and his political position.¹² From this point, Frelimo appeared to be in the hands of persons of revolutionary persuasion.

FRELIMO DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

The exact process of decisionmaking remains to this observer somewhat cloudy as yet. During the first phase of the struggle the Central Committee—expanded to about 40 members at the second party congress—and the Executive Committee—comprised of the president, vice president and secretaries of departments—appeared to exercise predominant power. After the death of Mondlane, the balance of power seems to have shifted to military figures, who were fighting in Mozambique.

Since Machel's rise to the presidency the army position appears to have been on the ascendant. In his speech, "Mozambique: People's Victory," Machel singled out the People's Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique [PFLM] for the important tasks of "mobilizing and organizing the broad masses" and "propagation of national culture among the broad masses."¹³ These duties represent a continuation of the army's importance in Frelimo.

¹⁰ David Martin, "Interpol Solves a Guerrilla Whodunit," *The Observer*, Feb. 6, 1972; Basil Davidson, "In the Eye of the Storm: Angola's People" (Garden City: Doubleday, 1973), pp. 228-231.

¹¹ Davidson, "In the Eye of the Storm."

¹² John Saul, "Frelimo and the Mozambique Revolution," *Monthly Review*, vol. 24, No. 10 (March 1973), pp. 22-52.

¹³ Machel's speech was broadcasted on Sept. 20, 1974. It was printed in its entirety in the *Daily News* (Tanzania), Sept. 23, 1974, and this reportage was reprinted in *Facts and Reports* (Amsterdam), vol. 4, No. 21 (Oct. 12, 1974), pp. 19-22.

A military man, Machel is felt to be thoroughly committed to revolutionary goals in reconstructing Mozambican society along collectivist lines and improving the living conditions of Mozambican peoples but less doctrinaire than other members of the Frelimo hierarchy.¹⁴ As most of the leadership, Machel was not educated in Europe. The non-African models of nation-building they are likely to be influenced by are the People's Republic of China and North Vietnam.¹⁵ But certainly the Tanzanian efforts to emphasize agricultural production, communal farming cooperatives, and rural society will exert a powerful affect on Mozambican development plans. But also in his September 20 speech to the Mozambican people, Machel spoke against "the attitude of uncritically imitating foreigners."¹⁶ Like his predecessor, Machel appears to hold a flexible approach to implementation of Frelimo goals. In the September 20th speech, he warned the people about false prophets who would mislead them by "extreme measures." He cautioned: "Ultra-leftism is thus a weapon of reaction."¹⁷

At this juncture it is likely that an independent Mozambique will not only pursue a peaceful policy toward South Africa but allow the continual flow of migratory labor to work in South African mines while demanding improvement in their living condition and terms of contract. Policy toward the white regime in Rhodesia is less firm and potentially more hostile. Currently, the Frelimo government is seeking \$65 million to offset losses involved in closing the ports of Beira and Lourenco Marques on which Rhodesia depends partly for transit to and from the Indian Ocean.

Senator CLARK. They are seeking \$65 million, actually?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. I heard \$60 as well, \$60 or \$65.

Senator CLARK. The Commonwealth, as I understand it, you are talking in terms of \$35 million, is that correct?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. It could be. I am not sure.

Senator CLARK. \$35 million?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. In any case, this would offset the losses in this.

Guerrillas of the Zimbabwe African National Union [ZANU] are using the frontier region of Mozambique for bases and sanctuaries in their strikes into northeastern Rhodesia. But Mozambique's precarious financial situation, dependence on neighboring transit trade and self-imposed goals of reconstruction make it highly unlikely that it will follow an adventuresome foreign policy.

Internally, an independent Mozambique under Frelimo guidance will no doubt pursue an assertive nationalism. The songs, dances, and celebrations of the independence struggle will form a central part of this national identity. Frelimo's aim is not only to eradicate Portuguese influence—except for the national language, but to foster a national consciousness as distinct from ethnic or regional separatism. Frelimo's message must also convince Mozambicans that the work they do in an independent Mozambique will now benefit them and not foreign interests. Consequently, two of the three most often repeated watchwords of the Frelimo transition government have been "unity"

¹⁴ This is a somewhat impressionistic analysis as gleaned from his comments and the observations of journalists, see "Frelimo men have to wait for the fruits of victory," *The Star* (Johannesburg), Dec. 21, 1974.

¹⁵ For a view that Frelimo's policies and actions are a parroting of those of the People's Republic of China, see Tom Lambert, "Mozambique Faces Fateful Freedom," *Los Angeles Times*, Mar. 21, 1975.

¹⁶ Machel's speech, "Mozambique: People's Victory."

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

and "work". (The third is "vigilance".) Since the establishment of the transition government, Frelimo has carried out a program of *mentalizacao* ["mentalization"] along with attempts to secure control in the southern and middle sections of the country. Portugal's attempts to force its culture on Mozambique will in all likelihood make the Frelimo government sensitive to foreign imports. So while Frelimo may pattern some of its economic development plans on Asian and Tanzanian models, it will probably be keenly against transplanting a foreign national culture to Mozambican soil.

MOZAMBIQUE POLITICAL TRANSITION UNDER FRELIMO

Politically, Mozambique will no doubt be a one-party state, but the extent of the army's influence, as mentioned above, is uncertain. At this time it is unclear whether Frelimo will allow elections of party officials to government posts as in the case of Tanzania's ruling party, TANU [Tanganyikan African National Union]. During the transition period from Lisbon's rule to independence—September 7, 1974–June 25, 1975—Frelimo has exercised a growing control over individual pursuits in Mozambique. One striking example, yet in tune with Frelimo's anti-exploitation thrust, involves the outlawing of prostitution and dispatching prostitutes from the city to the countryside. Machel, in fact, holds "that the city is one of the centres of vice and corruption and of alienating foreign influences".¹⁸

MOZAMBIQUE ECONOMIC TRANSITION

Economically, an independent Mozambique will emphasize agricultural development in subsistence crops in order to feed itself and in its customary cash crops of cashews, cotton, and sisal for export. This will entail resettlement of urban dwellers and cooperative farms (but may allow for individual shambas, or "plots," as was done during the war). Already the Government has provided tools and seeds to the unemployed in the capital. Plans include the transformation of 250 *aldeamentos* (fortified villages built by the Portuguese Army) into communal farms. Industrial development and mineral extraction are presently to be given a lesser priority.¹⁹ The sale of hydroelectric power from the Cabora Bassa Dam on the upper Zambezi to neighboring states will provide some foreign currency. The generators are to begin producing power this August. The largest share of electrical power is slated for the Republic of South Africa. Should Mozambican-South African relations deteriorate over Pretoria's internal policies toward Africans, then this source of revenue could be jeopardized.

In all technical fields, agriculture, industry, medicine, banking, veterinary science, there exists a critical dearth of qualified personnel. Even during the war years—the high point of Lisbon's development efforts—the shortage was acute. With the coming of the armistice and transition government, some 52,000 settlers, of an estimated white population of 200,000, fled the territory in fear. Despite the return of some, the scarcity of sufficient numbers of skilled workers will further impair even slow development progress.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ CFM News and Notes, No. 31 (May 1975), p. 2.

FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Most certainly, an independent Mozambique will require both financial and technical assistance. During the war for independence, Frelimo received aid from African States, Scandinavian countries, international organizations such as the World Council of Churches and U.N. agencies, private foundations such as the Rowntree Foundation in the United Kingdom, the People's Republic of China, and the Soviet Union. Most donors furnished nonmilitary assistance, but Russia and China supplied arms. The Chinese provided military training in southern Tanzania and China. Presently, aid and technicians from the Communist bloc countries continue to arrive in Mozambique.²⁰ The United States furnished assistance either directly to Portugal in the form of loans (which freed funds for the prosecution of the wars in Africa) or indirectly through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.²¹ Since the cessation of fighting, the United States has given a large grant for food production materials.

Continued and expanded American assistance would have a positive impact on improving U.S. relations with the independent Government of Mozambique. From the point of view of Washington, it could introduce a positive image of the United States in an area almost devoid of an American presence. At a time when American policy is undergoing a thorough reevaluation as a result of the fall of South Vietnam, it would do well for the United States to come down on the side of national independence and colonial revolution, concepts which Americans have begun to celebrate bicentennially.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much. It is an appropriate ending.

Let us go right on to hear all three papers before we have questions. That way we can have more of a discussion.

Prof. Norman Bailey of Columbia.

[Professor Bailey's biography follows:]

BIOGRAPHY OF NORMAN A. BAILEY, M.I.A., PH. D.

Professor at the City University of New York, Economic/Political Consultant to governments, government agencies and private agencies and corporations. Author, co-author or editor of four books and over eighty articles on international politics, economics, business and finance, including *Portuguese Africa* (1969), "Local and Community Power in Angola" and "Alternative Futures in Angola" (paper prepared for Department of State, January, 1975). Frequent lecturer in Portugal, former advisor, Banca Totta e Acores and Research Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington.

STATEMENT OF PROF. NORMAN BAILEY, CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Mr. BAILEY. One correction before I begin. Even though I am a graduate of Columbia University I am a professor of political science at the City University of New York, not the city of New York.

We are bankrupt too.

Senator CLARK. Are you?

Mr. BAILEY. I have a very short statement. The statement is short for two reasons. One, because the situation in Mozambique is a rela-

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.

²¹ For a scathing attack on the U.S. economic and military assistance to Portugal, see William Minter, "Portuguese Africa and the West" (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972). For a critical analysis of American policy, see John Marcum, "The United States and Portuguese Africa: A Perspective on American Foreign Policy," *Africa Today*, vol. 18, No. 4 (October 1971), pp. 23-27.

tively simple one compared to the tragic situation we have now in Angola, for example, and secondly, because I think the foreign policy implications for the United States are also relatively simple. I have aimed my testimony at what I assumed were the present concerns of the committee and of the Senate, which are the static implications of the independence of Mozambique to the United States.

In any case, that is my specialization.

Mozambique is a territory of approximately 300,000 square miles, bounded on the east entirely by the Indian Ocean, on the north by Tanzania and on the west and south by Malawi, Zambia, Rhodesia, Swaziland and the Republic of South Africa. Of the total population of 7,000,000+, there are perhaps 80,000-90,000 Portuguese left, 35,000 mulattoes and 25,000 East Indians, Pakistanis and Chinese.

I should point out the East Indian population which, to a large extent controls retail trade, may in the future be a bone of contention in Mozambique as it has been in other countries of East Africa.

Of the black population, the largest ethnic groups are the Makua-Lomwe, perhaps 2,500,000 in the center-north, the Shona, 1,600,000 strong in the center, and the Thonga, about 1,300,000 in the south. The population is divided religiously between the Moslems North of the Zambezi River and the Christian or pagan south. Mozambique, unlike Angola, is still overwhelmingly rural and tribal, and knowledge of the Portuguese language is not widespread outside the urban centers. Additionally the Portuguese population of the territory, in contrast to Angola, has always been predominantly made up of either peasants or functionaries of the government or of metropolitan corporations. Thousands of these have left in the past year. In any case, the entrepreneurial spirit was largely lacking.

I might make an additional statement that about the only thing that is common between Angola and Mozambique is the fact at one time they were Portuguese territories. In just about every other respect they are totally different.

Mozambique was a net economic plus for Portugal, second only to Angola in its profitability. Between 1970 and 1973 the territory contributed 2,178 million escudos to Portugal (approximately U.S. \$87 million) despite substantial military expenditures. This figure is profit after military expenditures as well as all other expenditures in the territory.

Although thus far little has been found in the way of mineral wealth in Mozambique, the territory is diversified agriculturally, being self-sufficient in foodstuffs and producing cotton, sugar, cashews, tea, copra, and sisal for export. Nevertheless, in the last year we have figures for, 1972, Mozambique ran a 3 billion escudo trade deficit, which was more than overcome by a 4 billion escudo surplus in the services and capital accounts.

ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, MILITARY FUTURE OF MOZAMBIQUE

And herein lies the great questionmark hovering over the economic and political future of Mozambique. Mozambique lives from transportation, port facilities, tourism, the export of native labor to the mines of South Africa, and presumably the export of electricity from the giant dam at Cabora Bassa on the upper Zambezi, due to begin func-

tioning shortly. This in itself would not necessarily constitute a problem, except for the fact that the principal users of these invisible exports are Rhodesia and especially South Africa.

Militarily, a naval base in Mozambique in the hands of a strong sea power could readily control access to the Mozambique Channel. This in itself, however, is not very important in Indian Ocean terms due to the close shielding of Mozambique by the Malagasy Republic offshore. In terms of Southern Africa, Mozambique of course, flanks both Rhodesia, and to a lesser extent, South Africa. If the territory of Mozambique were to be used as a guerrilla base against either country, the effect could be damaging. Also to be noted would be the possible effect on an already chaotic world monetary structure by withdrawal of Mozambique labor from the South African gold mines and/or guerrilla sabotage of the mines. As an offset, however, it must not be forgotten that the southern one-quarter of Mozambique, including the capital, Lourenco Marques, and inhabited by a people heavily dependent on money earned in the mines and with few ties to Frelimo, is an absolute military hostage to South Africa, which could cut it off from the rest of the territory in hours, occupy it and defend it with little difficulty.

The political process that will culminate with the declaration of the independence of Mozambique on June 25th began 15 years ago. In 1960 an organization called Udenamo was founded, dedicated to the achievement of eventual independence. In 1962 Udenamo joined with other groups to form Frelimo, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane, a U.S.-trained sociologist who had worked for the United Nations. I might add he was in my class at Oberlin College.

SENATOR CLARK. In your class at Oberlin?

MR. BAILEY. Yes, sir.

Mondlane established his headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. In 1964 Frelimo began guerrilla warfare. In 1965 a rival group, Coremo (Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique), was founded, but never fielded substantial guerrilla forces. In 1969 Mondlane was assassinated by disaffected Frelimo elements and leadership passed to a troika of Samora Machel, Marcelino dos Santos and Joaquim of Mosano, currently President, Army Commander and Premier of Mozambique respectively.

In theory Frelimo has never been tribally based, and its constitution forbids racial discrimination in any form. In practice, guerrillas were recruited almost exclusively from the relatively small Makonde and Nyanja ethnic groups of the far north and northwest (perhaps 350,000 people in all) and guerrilla activity confined to the far North and the upper Zambezi, using Tanzania and Zambia as refuges. In fact, not until late 1973 can Frelimo be said to have had any substantial military success. It has been claimed that vocal settler discontent with army response to this offensive contributed to the formation of the armed forces movement which staged the April 25, 1974 coup in Portugal.

Mozambique is very lucky in reaching independence in an atmosphere of peace and governed by a single independence movement. Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that Frelimo was little known in central and southern Mozambique prior to last year and the largest ethnic group, the Makua, are traditionally hostile to the Makonde.

PRESENT INTERNAL SITUATION OF MOZAMBIQUE

The internal situation of Mozambique appears satisfactory at present. Internally repression has been moderate. Of perhaps 300 political prisoners about a quarter have been released, and it has been announced that not even the most longstanding opponents and defectors such as Joana Simiao, Lazaro Kavandame, or Uria Simango will be executed. A feeble attempt at UDI—unilateral declaration of independence—was put down last year and thousands of Portuguese have left the country. They have been invited back and guarantees offered by Frelimo to those who have stayed.

In its external relations Frelimo has exhibited moderation as well. President Machel has declared that Mozambique will be neutral in its foreign policy. Mozambique will attempt to apply the U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia, however, and has been applying for aid from the Organization of African Unity, the Soviet Union, China, Great Britain, and elsewhere to soften the economic effects of applying the sanctions. It should be noted, however, that the closing of the Port of Beira to the Rhodesians will strengthen the Zambian and South African efforts to force a political settlement on Prime Minister Smith.

Machel has recognized his economic strategic position vis-a-vis South Africa and has declared that economic relations will continue. He has also declared that electricity will be supplied to South Africa from Cabora Bassa, which would be entirely uneconomic otherwise.

A continuation of a pragmatic approach internally and externally would bode well for the future of Mozambique as an independent country. Whether such an approach can continue is at this time unknown, and depends on external as well as internal factors, notably the success or failure of the Vorster/Kaunda détente initiatives in southern Africa.

U.S. FRIENDSHIP AND ASSISTANCE TO MOZAMBIQUE

There is no reason, in my opinion, why the policy of the United States toward Mozambique should not be equally pragmatic. I see no reason why the United States should not offer Mozambique friendship and assistance, while opposing the establishment of a Soviet naval or "fishing" base. Most important, every encouragement possible should be given to the Kaunda/Vorster initiatives. This may well be the year of decision of southern Africa and the last opportunity to take advantage of moderation and reason on the part of key leaders in order to achieve a peaceful settlement of outstanding conflicts.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much.

We will hear next from Professor Isaacman, Department of History, University of Minnesota.

Do I have the right school?

BIOGRAPHY OF ALLEN F. ISAACMAN

Born January 26, 1943; New York City, New York.

1. Academic Degrees

- (A) B.A. (with honors) C.C.N.Y., 1964.
- (B) M.A. in African History, University of Wisconsin, 1966.
- (C) Ph. D. in African History, University of Wisconsin, 1970.

2. Academic Positions

Instructor, University of Minnesota, January 1970–June 1970.
 Assistant Professor, University of Minnesota, June 1970–March 1972.
 Associate Professor, University of Minnesota, March 1972–present.

3. Publications

Mozambique: The Africanization of a Portuguese Institution, The Zambesi Prazos, 1750–1902 (University of Wisconsin Press, June 1972).

The Anti-Colonial Legacy in Mozambique (University of California Press, 1976).

"The Prazos da Coroa 1752–1830—A Functional Analysis of the Political System," *Studia*, 26 (1969), pp. 149–178.

"The Origin and Early History of the Chikunda of South Central Africa," *Journal of African History*, XIII (1972), pp. 143–1963.

One hundred hours of translated, transcribed, and annotated oral traditions deposited with African Studies Association Oral Data Archives, Indiana University, March 1972.

"The System of Adopted Dependency among the Zambesian Peoples" in *Slavery in Africa* (tentative title, University of Wisconsin, 1975).

"Madzi-a-manga, Mhondoro and the Use of Oral Traditions: A Chapter in Barue Religious and Political History," *Journal of African History*, XIV (1973) pp. 395–404.

"The Prazero as a Transfrontiersman," *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, N. 9, No. 1 (1975).

4. National Awards

At the African Studies Association meeting this year my book, *Mozambique*, was presented the Melville J. Herskovitz Award as the most distinguished publication in African Studies for the year 1972–73.

Member, Board of Directors of the African Studies Association.

5. Major Grants

Guggenheim Foundation, 1966.

Foreign Area Fellowship, 1967–1970.

Graduate School, University of Minnesota, 1971–1973.

American Philosophical Society, 1972.

National Endowment for the Humanities, 1973–74.

Social Sciences Research Council, 1973–74.

6. Overseas Experience

1. Research in Mozambique and Portugal—1967–1969.

2. Research in Mozambique—1971.

3. Research in Zimbabwe—1972 (Rhodesia).

STATEMENT OF PROF. ALLEN ISAACMAN, DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

MR. ISAACMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I appreciate this opportunity to summarize the long struggle of the Mozambican people for independence and to examine U.S. policies in response to their quest for self-determination. Within this broad framework, I would like to focus on the long-range goals of Frelimo, the hostile position of the United States toward the liberation movement, and the achievements of the transitional government during the past year. In conclusion, I will recommend some fundamental policy changes which are necessary if the United States is to adopt a progressive posture toward Southern Africa.

FRELIMO AND THE ANTICOLONIAL STRUGGLE

On June 25th, Mozambique will become independent after a decade of armed conflict. Although attention has been focused on the recent

war of liberation, the desire for independence is deeply rooted in a long anticolonial tradition which dates back to the 16th century. Persistent efforts to resist the Portuguese constituted a vital chapter in Mozambican history, despite repeated efforts by the Salazar and Caetano regimes to distort the past through the myth of multiracialism.

Although the long tradition of resistance falls outside the scope of the Senate committee's interests, it is important to recognize that, as early as 1550, there was a concerted effort by the indigenous peoples of Mozambique to dislodge the Portuguese. This pattern continued over the next 300 years, culminating in a protracted series of wars around the turn of this century. Only after they were crushed was Lisbon able effectively to occupy most of Mozambique.

The imposition of colonial rule, characterized by a brutally repressive regime, failed to silence African opposition. On the contrary, the historical record is replete with examples of anticolonial manifestations ranging from localized protests of peasants and urban laborers to the Pan Zambesian rebellion of 1917. Expressions of discontent were most oppressed. Organizations of educated Africans were founded as early as 1920 to protest the racial discrimination and social and economic abuses inherent in the colonial system. Their commitment to nonviolence and their willingness to try and reform the repressive system were frustrated, however, by the Salazar regime (1932-68) which was determined to destroy all forms of opposition. It is only against this backdrop of oppression and the long tradition of resistance that the genesis and subsequent success of Frelimo becomes intelligible.

Frelimo was formed in 1962 out of the union of three anticolonial organizations, Udenamo, Manu, and Unami, under the leadership of Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, an American-educated anthropologist (M.A. and Ph. D. from Northwestern University) who had previously worked for the U.N. Department of Trusteeship. From its inception, the liberation movement was governed by three overriding principles to which it has adhered with remarkable consistency during the 10-year struggle. The cornerstones of Frelimo's policy, enshrined in the 1962 constitution, are (1) an unyielding commitment to independence and majority rule; (2) the creation of a unified democratic society devoid of ethnic ("tribal"), and racial discrimination, and (3) the restructuring of the nation's economy to insure that its resources are used for the benefit of the Mozambican people.

Of these three overriding concerns, the movement toward independence logically enjoyed the highest priority. The undisputed corollary of this policy was the need to wage an armed conflict to drive the colonial regime out of Mozambique. Given the repeated unwillingness of the Salazar regime to agree to even modest reforms, efforts to achieve decolonization through negotiation were dismissed as unrealistic and dangerous. A network of small groups was established within Mozambique to mobilize public sentiment in favor of the revolution and raise the political consciousness of the peasants. At the heart of Frelimo's policy was the belief that an armed struggle without the support of the rural population was doomed to failure. In September 1964, the first liberation forces crossed into Mozambique, initiating a decade of armed struggle.

By the time of the coup against the Caetano regime in April 1974, the liberation forces had achieved a number of important victories.

According to a U.N. report published in 1973, Frelimo had been able to liberate a substantial region in the North and was making major inroads in Tete district where the strategically important Cabora Bassa Dam is located. An offensive launched in 1973 in the central region of Manica and Sofala represented the first serious threat to the large European population of this area including those residing in Beira, the second largest city of Mozambique. In short, although Lisbon's defense remained strong in the southern part of the colony, the balance of power was clearly shifting to the liberation movement. Equally important, Portugal had incurred enormous economic and social costs in its futile efforts to contain Frelimo which, in turn, generated growing hostility to the war among both Portuguese civilians and elements within the military. By the end of 1973, it was obvious to all but a tiny minority in Lisbon that the colonial war in Mozambique was draining both the metropole and the colony of vital resources and that a resolution of the conflict was imperative. Viewed from this perspective, it could be argued that Frelimo indirectly helped to precipitate the April coup to liberate the Portuguese people from the totalitarian regime of Marcelo Caetano.

Frelimo's success on the battlefield occurred despite a number of serious handicaps. Not only did the liberation forces initially have difficulty acquiring an adequate supply of modern arms but they suffered from serious logistic problems created by the indifferent attitude of the neighboring Malawian Government and the great distance between their bases in Tanzania and Zambia and the battlefronts in Central Mozambique. Moreover, they faced a colonial army estimated at 60,000 soldiers armed with sophisticated weapons provided by NATO and other western sources, including the United States. During the latter phases of the war, armed forces from the racist regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia directly intervened in the conflict. Frelimo also had to contend with the Portuguese subversive activities which culminated in the defection of several prominent leaders including Uria Simango, the former Vice President, and the assassination of Dr. Eduardo Mondlane. Frelimo's success against such overwhelming odds must be viewed as a testimony to both the vitality of the movement and the support which it enjoyed among the local population. It also totally discredits the myth propagated by Lisbon, and uncritically accepted with important segments of the American Government, that Frelimo was merely an "ineffective band of Communist terrorists."

FRELIMO RESOLUTION TO CREATE INTEGRATED NATION

From the outset of the revolution Frelimo resolved to create an integrated nation devoid of ethnic ("tribal") divisions and racial oppression. The Constitution of 1962 is explicit on this point: "Frelimo is a political organization consisting of Mozambicans with no discrimination as to sex, ethnic origin, religious creed or locality of domicile." The liberation movement recognized that the cultural and linguistic heterogeneity of the Mozambican population required a concerted effort to avoid the ethnic fragmentation which divided other African nations on the eve of independence. The ethnically diverse composition of the party leadership reflected this commitment to national representation,

from the very inception of Frelimo. At the same time, a massive education campaign was initiated to replace the divisive ethnic loyalties and particularism of the peasants with a new sense of common identity and a shared commitment to a free Mozambique. The acid test of Frelimo's success has been the failure of the Portuguese efforts to play off one African people against another, an activity on which the colonial regime expended a sizable amount of energy and resources.

Consistent with Frelimo's campaign against "tribalism" and regionalism has been its adamant opposition to racism of any type. The leadership has repeatedly reaffirmed its goal of creating a multi-racial society and has carefully differentiated the European population from the repressive colonial regime. Throughout the struggle, moreover, there have been close links with progressive whites, a number of whom provided valuable assistance to the liberation movement. The clearest expression of Frelimo's refusal to engage in the self-destructive racial game came from its president Samora Machel:

There are no superior and inferior races. But it is not enough to talk about racial harmony for everyone to get on well together from one day to the next. What is needed is the political work of constant explanation, a conscious effort to make people of the different races which go to make our people live together in harmony. . . . There are no minorities, there are no special rights or duties for any sector of the Mozambican people: we are all Mozambicans, with the rights that work gives us, and with the identical duty of building a united, prosperous, just, harmonious, peaceful and democratic nation.

Given this concern it is not surprising that since the announcement of independence Frelimo has worked hard to encourage whites to remain in Mozambique, and Europeans are currently represented at the highest level of the government.

RESTRUCTURING COLONIAL ECONOMY TO SERVE MOZAMBICANS

From its inception Frelimo has rigorously adhered to the proposition that the resources of the country belong to the Mozambican people. The liberation movement resolves to restructure the economy in order to end the abusive exploitation of African labor and expropriation of Mozambique's wealth by a small Portuguese elite allied with multinational corporations. During the last years of colonial rule, for example, Portugal earned approximately \$40 million per annum from the exportation of Mozambican labor to the gold mines of South Africa.

Discriminatory laws fixed the value of agricultural products—sugar, cotton, tea and sisal—at prices well below the world market value and restricted the development of local industry. The effect of these laws was to exacerbate balance of payments problems and intensify rural stagnation and underdevelopment. In the words of President Samora Machel, "we inherited a colonial economic structure in which the productive factors did not serve our country or our people, but foreign domination."

Within the liberated zones Frelimo sought to rectify the inequities and, at the same time, to create a more viable economic base through the development of a number of rural cooperatives. The exact organization of each cooperative depended on the level of political consciousness of the peasants, their previous experience with cooperatives, and the productive potential of a particular region. In some

areas all production was organized collectively, while in others peasants spent some time in their individual fields and the village collectively worked designated plots to provide food for the liberation forces and cash crops for export. Paralleling the restructured agricultural section were cooperative based trading networks which replaced the exploitative Indian and European "bush stores."

The cooperative system offered a number of advantages. Although the data is very fragmentary, there are indications that prices which the peasants received for their products rose appreciably and in some area Frelimo agronomists were able to improve the quality and yield of the produce. Moreover, by forming cooperatives and regrouping isolated individuals and small communities Frelimo was able to initiate a broad range of educational and health programs. At a time when the rate of illiteracy was well over 90 percent and rural health facilities virtually unknown such a strategy not only improved the quality of life for many peasants but demonstrated the viability of Frelimo's social revolution. Finally, the cooperatives insured peasant participation and self-assertion in the decisionmaking process—a critical factor in Frelimo's subsequent success.

PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA IGNORED BY UNITED STATES

Although the Atlantic Charter enshrined the principle of self-determination, the United States has consistently ignored this fact when formulating policy on southern Africa, in general, and the Portuguese colonies, in particular. The perceived strategic value of the Azores, and the militantly anti-Communist posture of the Salazar regime underlay both our close relationship with Lisbon and our willingness to accept almost uncritically Portugal's claim to the "backwater" colonies of Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau.

The links between the Salazar regime and the United States were first formalized in the 1943 treaty on the Azores and were reinforced with Portugal's admission into NATO in 1955. During this period the United States provided progressively larger amounts of economic and military aid to Lisbon which strengthened the position of the repressive regime both at home and in the African colonies. In 1955, for example, U.S. military aid constituted about 40 percent of Portugal's total military budget. In addition American officials like Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles felt compelled to defend Portugal's colonial policy. Their attitude was reflected in our voting pattern in the United Nations. Between 1955 and 1960 the United States either abstained or opposed every measure which implied criticism of Portuguese policy in Africa.

MOMENTARY U.S. POLICY REEVALUATION AT OUTBREAK OF ANGOLAN REVOLUTION

The outbreak of the Angolan revolution compelled the United States to reevaluate momentarily its policies in Southern Africa and particularly its blind adherence to Lisbon. There were suggestions that the Kennedy administration might abandon past American support for Portuguese colonialism. Our rebuttal of the Salazar regime during the

1961 Santa Maria incident and support for the U.N. declaration calling on Lisbon to prepare the way for the independence of her colonies were the most obvious indications that U.S. policy was under reassessment. By 1962, however, it became clear that while our Government was prepared to make greater rhetorical commitment to the principles of self-determination there would not be a substantial departure from earlier policy.

CONTINUED U.S. BETRAYAL OF PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Throughout the decade of the sixties, the U.S. policy remained premised upon two mutually contradictory suppositions. We intensified our verbal support for majority rule while simultaneously providing military, economic, and diplomatic assistance to Portugal as a NATO ally. In an effort to camouflage these obvious contradictions, U.S. officials adopted the strategy of "communications and dialog" arguing that only through such a tack could independence be achieved. This policy symbolized by the phrase "majority rule through peaceful change" was naive at best given the repressive nature of the Salazar regime. At worst, it represented a continued betrayal of our commitment to the principles of self-determination.

It is hard to avoid the harsher conclusion in light of the military assistance provided the Portuguese Government. Through a process of mental gymnastics, it was argued that U.S. military aid was part of our NATO—North Atlantic Treaty Organization—responsibility and that the material would be used exclusively for the defense of Western Europe. In reality, we lacked the mechanisms effectively to enforce the restriction and Portugal rejected this limitation, claiming that the "overseas provinces" were an integral part of her territory and vital to the defense of Western interests in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean systems. Despite Lisbon's posture, the United States provided planes, napalm, and defoliants, and trained Portuguese officers and secret police in the methods of counterinsurgency. U.S. officials also encouraged NATO allies to help equip and modernize the beleaguered Portuguese Army which only provided a token force of 18,000 soldiers for the collective defense of Western Europe. In addition to this overt military assistance, the Central Intelligence Agency helped Portugal acquire 20 B-26 bombers in 1965 for use in her African colonies. In short, despite our nominal concern for the principles of self-determination, our loyalties unmistakably lay with the Salazar regime—a strategy which was reinforced by increased American investment and explorations in Mozambique.

NIXON ADMINISTRATION STAUNCH PRO-PORTUGUESE POSITION

The Nixon administration all but abandoned the facade of sympathy for the aspirations of the Mozambican people in favor of a staunchly pro-Portuguese position. The most important indication of this shift was a \$400 million Eximbank loan, a figure substantially greater than the combined aid given to all of Africa since World War II. The financial support, which was part of the Azores agreement of 1971, came at a critical time for the Portuguese whose economy was showing the strains of nearly a decade of colonial wars.

At the same time, the United States violated its self-imposed arms embargo by providing helicopters which were to be used specifically in Mozambique and Boeing 707's and 747's which the U.S. Government knew were to be used to carry troops from Portugal to the colonies. American corporations were also encouraged to invest in Mozambique as well as in other parts of southern Africa. These actions taken together with growing U.S. economic interests in South Africa, our violations of U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia through the Byrd amendment, and our adamant refusal to recognize, or even communicate with, Frelimo, constitute a coherent policy outlined in option 2(a) of the recently published National Security Council Study Memorandum (NSSM 39). This policy option, although not as overtly hostile as others that were advanced, including armed support for the minority regimes, was designed to strengthen U.S. ties with anti-Communist regional powers in order to stabilize southern Africa—a euphemism for continued European rule.

The April 1974 coup in Portugal provided the United States with a new opportunity to redefine its policies toward both Mozambique and the other African colonies. Despite the initial efforts of the new Assistant Secretary of State Donald Easum to shift American policy in favor of majority rule, the United States tacitly supported General Spínola's efforts to co-opt the revolution and maintain a Portuguese political and economic presence in the colony. Not only did we continue to withhold recognition of Frelimo but there are indications that our embassy in Zambia offered Paulo Gumane, former president of the splinter group Coremo, financial assistance to organize a conservative anti-Frelimo coalition within Mozambique. In August 1974, the National Coalition Party was founded but was quickly discredited after its association with reactionary white settlers who participated in the abortive September coup.

NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH FRELIMO

Spínola's resignation and the commitments of the ruling Armed Forces Council to rapid independence of Mozambique compelled the United States to abandon its previous strategy and seek to normalize relations with Frelimo. Easum's unequivocal support of the principle of majority rule, which he repeated both in this country and in Africa, helped to counter Frelimo's resentment toward the United States for its unyielding support of Portuguese colonial rule. In November, he scored a major diplomatic breakthrough by conferring with President Samora Machel in Tanzania and then traveling to Lourenço Marques to be the first foreign diplomat to meet with the newly formed transitional government. These discussions held open the prospect for dramatic improvement in relations between this country and the liberation government. One tangible byproduct of the meeting was a request for \$12 million in foodstuffs to help combat the food shortages in northern Mozambique.

Despite, or perhaps because of, Easum's accomplishments, and the growing confidence he enjoyed among African leaders, he was informed that he would be replaced 48 hours after he had returned to the United States. In his place, Secretary of State Kissinger selected Nathaniel Davis, a diplomat with no experience in Africa, who had

recently been in the headlines for his role in the destabilization of the Allende government while Ambassador to Chile. Whatever Secretary of State Kissinger's intentions, African leaders unanimously condemned Davis' appointment. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Easum was removed because his pro-African policies were rejected by the Ford Administration which remains committed to "regional stability" in Southern Africa. The confirmation of Davis carried ominous signs for the future and immediately chilled relations with many African States.

MOZAMBIQUE ON EVE OF INDEPENDENCE

The transitional government led by Prime Minister Joaquim Chissano took office on September 20, 1974. It has been composed of six ministers selected from Frelimo, including a European lawyer, and three ministers designated by the armed forces movement. Although Chissano's administration has taken a low profile in preparation for independence, it has achieved a number of important accomplishments during its brief tenure.

Perhaps the transitional government's most striking success has been its ability to prevent political turmoil during this period of uncertainty. The potential for instability was enormous. The government had to deal not only with a hard core group of reactionary white settlers, former agents of the secret police, and disaffected members of the military all committed to white rule, but it faced opposition from conservative elements within the African community, many of whom had benefited from their ties with the colonial system. The rapidity with which the government aborted the UDI effort in September and diffused a "shoot out" in the capital of Lourenco Marques during the following month demonstrates both the effectiveness of the new government in crises situations and the depth of support it has received from people of all races.

The adamant opposition of the Frelimo-dominated government to any ethnic or regional elitism contributed to the diffusion of potential tensions. Throughout the struggle, Portuguese officials had sought to discredit Frelimo, characterizing it as "a tribalistic organization" dominated by Makonde. Lisbon's subversive strategy which was directed primarily at the Makua and Lomwe, who live adjacent to the Makonde, yielded few results. Nevertheless, on the eve of independence these charges were echoed once again by a small opportunistic elite who desperately sought to undercut Frelimo's popularity and divide Mozambicans along ethnic lines. Both the Commercial, Agricultural & Industrial Association of Niassa and Frecomo—Frente Comun de Mocambique—called for a privileged Makua-Lomwe position. The ethnic appeals were rejected not only by the Frelimo leadership but by a number of prominent Makua and Lomwe militants. Joana Simiao, the leader of Frecomo who had been involved in several conservative splinter groups including Gumo—Grupo Unidade de Mocambique—which enjoyed the endorsement of the Caetano regime, was totally discredited after she and her followers supported the reactionary settler coup in September.

Despite the involvement of a segment of the white population in counter revolutionary activities, both Frelimo and the transitional

government have reaffirmed their commitment to multiracialism. Indeed, during the past year, officials have repeatedly given assurances to the white community that they would be a welcome addition to the new nation as long as they were willing to become responsible and productive citizens. Although 40,000 Europeans, unwilling to give up their privileged position, have migrated in the last year, most white (approximately 130,000) have opted to become members of the new Mozambican society.

During this transitional phase, important social gains have also been achieved. One of Frelimo's highest priorities was to eliminate illiteracy and liberate Mozambique's past from the culturally arrogant and racist myths perpetuated by the colonial regime. New schools have been established in the rural areas, and curriculum has been rewritten to reflect the needs and aspirations of the Mozambican peoples. A concerted effort has been undertaken in the southern regions, where Frelimo's influence was limited until the past year. The emphasis on improving the quality of life in the rural areas is also reflected in efforts to establish health care clinics in regions which have long been without proper medical facilities. These programs, necessarily limited by available capital and skilled personnel, are expected to improve substantially within the year when the first Frelimo doctors finish their training and return home.

MOZAMBIQUE'S UNDERDEVELOPED ECONOMY

The most pressing problem facing the transitional government and its successor is Mozambique's underdeveloped economy—a devastating legacy of colonialism. For years, Mozambique's economy has been designed to insure substantial profits for Lisbon and her commercial allies. Only the cash crop sector of the rural economy was developed, and the produce was sold exclusively to Lisbon at prices well below the world market—a policy which the transitional government has sought to rectify. Portugal conspicuously avoided “unprofitable” investments designed to improve the level of production within the peasant sector of the economy which also suffered from the conscription of African labor. Coupled with this rural stagnation was the absence of any meaningful industrial growth. Portugal inhibited such development in order to insure a favorable internal market for its manufactured and processed goods. As a result, Mozambique suffers from a serious balance-of-payments problem. Despite the rigid restriction on non-essential imports imposed by the new government, it is widely recognized that there will be a very large negative balance by independence which has persuaded a number of economists and sympathetic Portuguese officials that Mozambique is on the verge of bankruptcy.

One byproduct of Mozambique's underdevelopment has been her inherited dependency on the white minority regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia. Since the 1909 Pretoria Convention, Mozambique has supplied about 100,000 laborers per annum to work in the South African gold mines. The workers were paid only 40 percent of their salary; the remainder was sent directly to the Mozambican Banco Nacional Ultramarino in gold bars using the official exchange rate of between \$32-\$42 an ounce. The Bank of Portugal then purchased the gold bars with local currency and sold it on the world market at prices

which have recently skyrocketed to \$160 an ounce, yielding a profit estimated at between \$40 and \$50 million per year. If Mozambique were to maintain this practice, taken together with the very substantial income which South Africa provides in ports and rail duties, and profits from tourism, it would enable it to eliminate a substantial portion of its balance-of-trade deficit. Anticipated earnings from electrical power generated from the Cabora Bassa Dam would further alleviate the problem. Although not quite as extensive the \$60 million which Mozambique earned from rail and port charges on goods transhipped to Rhodesia also provided an important source of foreign currency.

Mozambique's economic dependence on the South African regimes, whose racial policies and overall ideological position are diametrically opposed to Frelimo's, poses a serious dilemma for the new nation. Will the new Government be willing to jeopardize Mozambique's fragile economy in order to extend the liberation struggle, or will it be compelled to moderate its position toward the white-dominated regimes? The leadership of Frelimo has been unequivocal in its continued opposition to the outlaw government ruling Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) no matter what the economic costs may be. Both President Machel and Vice President Marcelino dos Santos have repeatedly pledged that Mozambique will do everything possible, short of direct intervention, to aid its Zimbabwean allies. A similar position was taken by Prime Minister Joaquim Chissano who adamantly declared: "There are no two ways about it in Zimbabwe. There must be majority rule." Should current negotiations between the African National Council [ANC] and the Smith regime break down, the new Government can be expected to intensify its efforts against Rhodesia by cutting off all shipment through the port of Beria in accordance with the United Nations sanctions, by providing additional sanctuaries for the Zimbabwean forces along the 400-mile border, and by supplying the liberation forces with sophisticated weapons which Frelimo acquired during the last phases of its colonial war. While waiting to see the outcome of the ANC-Smith negotiations, Frelimo has been quietly negotiating with Great Britain and the Commonwealth nations for financial aid to offset at least a portion of the \$60 million in lost revenue.

MOZAMBIQUE POLICY TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA

Mozambique is likely to adopt a more cautious policy toward South Africa, at least in the first instance. Both Mozambique's economic dependence on South Africa and enormous military might of Pretoria's Western-supplied Armed Forces (whose military budget of \$1.2 billion is more than half of Mozambique's annual GNP) probably precluded any immediate confrontation and set limits on the level of short-term assistance which could be provided to the African National Congress [ANC] in its struggle against the oppressive regime. This unfortunate political reality was acknowledged recently by Oliver Tambo, president of the African National Congress. In an interview with a Tanzanian newspaper, he recognized that ANC will have to wait for Mozambique to rebuild its shattered economy before it will be in a position to provide substantial military and logistical assistance. Nevertheless, the new Government can be expected to allow ANC to establish offices in Lourenco Marques and other parts of the

country, and to provide a limited amount of direct aid. President Samora Machel has stressed that Frelimo will never abandon ANC and has warned South Africa not to engage in economic blackmail since South Africa needs Mozambican labor as much as Mozambique needs the foreign currency it brings in. Moreover, in the event of either renewed South African intervention in the Rhodesian crisis or infringements on the autonomy of Mozambique, this policy of restraint is likely to be discarded. In the long run Mozambique will probably play an increasing role in the liberation of southern Africa, although the leaders of both ANC and Frelimo readily agree that "change must come from the oppressed people of South Africa."

TOWARD A REDEFINITION OF NEW U.S. POLICY

In light of the long history of this country's opposition to Frelimo and continued U.S. support for the oppressive regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia, is there any possibility of an improvement in relations once Mozambique becomes independent? The answer clearly depends on the attitude of the United States and its willingness to discard many of the time-honored principles which have dictated our policies toward southern Africa. My impressions are that despite our past pro-Salazar and pro-Caetano position, there remains a potential fund of good will toward the United States. The initial access of Donald Easum prior to his removal suggests that there is a basis for a more conciliatory relationship, provided that the United States adopts a progressive policy—a strategy which seems highly unlikely given our perceived short-term interests and loyalties.

Although I remain extremely skeptical that such a redefinition of policy will take place, I would like to take this opportunity to advance some broad suggestions in the hope that my pessimism proves unfounded.

1. The United States must immediately acknowledge Frelimo as the legitimate representative of the Mozambican people. The logical extension of position would be the recognition of the independence government on June 25th, cessation of any covert support to elements either within or outside of Mozambique opposed to the new government, and muting of our past charges that one-party governments are by definition antidemocratic.

2. The United States must recognize the right of the new government to exploit the wealth of the country for the good of the Mozambican people. Given Mozambique's underdevelopment and dependency, the leadership will have to rebuild the economy. Toward this end, the new government will undoubtedly insist that, at a minimum, all contracts with multi-national corporations be rewritten.

3. The United States must recognize the government's right to create a new Mozambican society organized around socialist principles and committed to a policy of Third World nonalignment.

4. Either through direct assistance or preferably through a United Nations-administered program the United States should offer aid to Mozambique to enable her to enforce the United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia without suffering undue economic hardship.

5. The United States should respond favorably to requests for aid and loans from the new government, should they be forthcoming. The

initiative must come from Lourenco Marques and should be limited to material assistance which would not require an AID presence in any form.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUNDAMENTAL READJUSTMENTS IN OVERALL SOUTHERN AFRICAN POLICY

While such a set of policies would go a long way toward improving United States-Mozambican relations, it must be recognized that fundamental readjustments in our overall policy toward southern Africa are the only assurance of harmonious relations in the long run. At a minimum the United States must:

1. Reaffirm our commitment to majority rule in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa.
2. Revoke the Byrd amendment and rigorously enforce the boycott against the illegal Smith regime.
3. Support the current efforts to compel South African withdrawal from Namibia.
4. Terminate the sale of all arms, quasi arms (jeeps, aircraft, and helicopters) and potential arms (weapons grade uranium and nuclear technology) to the South African regime. Currently the United States is one of the largest suppliers of such war material to Pretoria. This assistance constitutes a direct threat to Mozambique and neighboring African countries.
5. Discourage U.S. firms from investing in South Africa. American investments currently valued at more than \$1 billion not only provide important financial assistance to the racist regime but provide the rationale for American support of the status quo in southern Africa.

IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. SHIFT IN SOUTH AFRICAN SELF-DETERMINATION POLICY

The forthcoming independence of Mozambique offers yet another opportunity for the United States to abandon its support of the white-minority regimes of southern Africa. I would urge all of you sitting in this room to consider the implications of such a shift. Until now the U.S. Government has been an active ally of repressive forces throughout southern Africa. Not only does this policy violate the principles of self-determination and majority rule, but it places us in direct opposition to the legitimate aspirations of the people of Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa in their struggle for independence. It is time to reaffirm by actions, as well as by rhetoric, the right of the southern African peoples to be free of alien rule and to have control over their own lives, resources, and ultimate destinies.

COMMENDATION OF PROFESSOR ISAACMAN'S STATEMENT

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much. That is a very complete statement and a very good one, with which I largely agree, although I am not in a position to reaffirm all of the facts that are there, obviously.

There are a number of questions, particularly about recommendations at the end, that I would like to raise with you later. Some of

these, it seems to me, we are doing. Others, I think, we are clearly not, and have the potential for doing. But let's talk in a more general way first, because I think we want to concentrate really in this discussion on what American policy ought to be on those things that you talked about last, Professor Isaacman.

EDUARDO MONDLANE'S MOTIVATIONS, U.S. SUPPORT ATTEMPTS AND
RESPONSE

I was interested in your statement, Mr. Bailey, that you knew Eduardo Mondlane. Am I pronouncing that correctly?

Mr. BAILEY. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK. I thought out of curiosity I would like to hear a little more about what his own view was in the beginning in terms of establishing a liberation movement and what his motivations were. I am particularly interested in whether or not at that point—and others here feel free to comment on anything we are talking about. We have about an hour for discussion—when there were attempts on his part to get support from the United States in 1962, 1963, 1964 and the years before he was assassinated, and what our response may have been.

Mr. BAILEY. Well—

Senator CLARK. I have asked you four or five things there. Pick out whatever you like.

Mr. BAILEY. I will try to remember all of them.

Eduardo, when he was at Oberlin, was quite pro-Portugal.

Senator CLARK. Pro-Portugal?

Mr. BAILEY. Yes, sir. He was an assimilado, of course. He came to the United States on a Portuguese Government scholarship and at the time he was studying at Oberlin he wrote a very laudatory article about Portuguese rule in Mozambique, subsequently published.

He was radicalized, if that is the right word, at Syracuse, where he went to his postgraduate studies after graduating from Oberlin.

But he remained throughout his career, until assassinated, he remained a very moderate leader, that is, his anti-American or anti-imperialism, or whatever you want to call it, rhetoric, was always modestly rated. He would much rather have gotten aid from Western countries than from either China or the Soviet Union. He obviously took aid where he could get it. He remained, however, always strictly independent in terms of his policies from the countries where he got aid.

As far as trying to get aid from the United States is concerned, he not only tried but he did, as Professor Henriksen pointed out, he got substantial amounts of aid from private U.S. associations and also from other Western countries, Scandinavian countries, and so on.

He was never given any aid by the American Government as such, which I think is not unusual. In other words, the U.S. Government by and large did not provide aid directly to independence movements around the world, guerrilla movements or what have you. I think it was tragic. His assassination was certainly a tragic development for the future of Mozambique. He was a splendid person individually, highly intelligent, well-educated, had the interest of his country very much at heart. He was by no means out for his own personal aggrandizement.

However, I must say that I think the present team in Mozambique is a very good one, and even though it would have been better in my opinion if Mondlane was there, Eduardo is still there and President of the country. I have a considerable amount of hope with reference to the policies and the ability to carry through the policies of the present regime.

ATTEMPTS TO GET WESTERN SUPPORT FOR LIBERATION MOVEMENT

Senator CLARK. Any other comments that you could make about his attempt to get support in the United States, perhaps from our Government or other sources here?

You say you feel he tended to be rather pro-Western?

Mr. BAILEY. Yes, sir, very much so. He was pro-Western. I think he would have preferred to leave out Soviet and Chinese assistance completely, but the Soviets and Chinese, as again was pointed out in one of the other papers, were the only countries that offered him military support. Support he got from private agencies in the United States and from European countries and so on was strictly in along the lines of financial support, health, education, things of that kind, which he was very happy to have, of course. But if you are running a liberation struggle you do have to have the wherewithal to do it, and consequently to accept Soviet and Chinese support along military lines and in my opinion he had no choice but to do so.

Senator CLARK. Any more comments?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. I was going to add a comment the fact that the Ford Foundation did supply some funds for the Mozambique Institute. It was operated by Mondlane's wife. And for a while we did supply and also there was some assistance to Mozambique students in this country, very early during the liberation struggle, very early 1965, 1966, and that was canceled. That was probably from pressure brought on the American Government by Lisbon. These were very feeble attempts at aid which were subsequently canceled.

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS TO ACHIEVE UNITY AND DEMOCRACY

Senator CLARK. Mr. Isaacman stated that one of the chief aims of Frelimo was the creation of a unified democratic society. What political institutions will be established in order to achieve both unity and a democracy in your judgment?

Mr. ISAACMAN. I think in the first instance the question of unity is critical because of the culturally heterogeneous composition of the Mozambican population. Frelimo has worked very hard during the past 12 years to educate the rural population and replace parochial attitudes with a commitment to a new free Mozambique in which all people regardless of religion, ethnic group, and race would participate. This education process also included a commitment to democratic principles in the sense that within the liberated zone, there has been a long history of involving the local population in decisionmaking policies at all levels. While the new government is not likely to have a democratic form as constituted in the West based on the two-party system, nevertheless, I think it is committed in the most basic sense of the word to a democracy in which the needs and aspirations of the Mozambican people are represented.

CONCEPT OF ONE-PARTY DEMOCRACY

Senator CLARK. Let's talk about that for a moment because it is an interesting concept. I can't find it in your statement but you say something to the effect that you hope we will change our attitude toward one-party rule, and there has been some discussion of the fact that Machel may favor the Tanzanian political model, that is often cited as a one-party state that is also democratic.

You go ahead and start off. Can you expand on that concept? Then we will get some other views perhaps as to how you have a one-party democracy.

Mr. ISAACMAN. I don't think that the two are in contradiction. To the extent that there is participation at all levels and by all constituency within the Mozambique nation, I think it is a democratic system. It doesn't take the form that characterized democracy in the West but there is no reason why it should. The acid test is whether the government represents the needs and aspirations of the people of Mozambique or the people of Tanzania, and clearly this is the case in both situations. So that I don't find this principle at all in contradiction.

Senator CLARK. Do you all agree with that?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. Pretty much. In fact I can expand on that. I spent yesterday looking at a Mozambican newspaper in the Library of Congress and there are a number of conditions being helped in every region, every province. It is not going to be a party rule imposed from the top. Quite the reverse, the conferences are to bring peasantry in, people, in some way, so they can have an input into the government, so that they can have some sort of say how things will be organized.

There are certain guidelines, obviously—guidelines of unity. Obviously guidelines of multiracialism, but at the same time there seem to be working relationships between the people and the government back and forth. In fact the lines are so blurred it is somewhat an injustice to speak of the two as being distinct.

Mr. BAILEY. I would basically agree with that. I think that there is altogether too little study done either by my colleagues or by government agencies, and so on of the social structure of some of these newly independent countries, and some not so newly independent, with reference to whether they are developing social systems, political systems and economic systems which are highly centralized, which in my opinion is fatal to any form of social democracy. I think political democracy is quite impossible for the time being in most of these countries, as we understand it. But examples such as what is going on in Tanzania, what is going on for that matter even in a Communist country such as Yugoslavia, the new initiatives on the part of the Shah of Iran with reference to share ownership in economic structures, private and public, by workers and by the public in general, this is the type of thing I think should be studied and should be encouraged, wherever possible, that you get a social decentralization in the country.

Mr. ISAACMAN. Could I add one other point. I think the case of Guinea-Bissau is very useful. That is, that independence is not an end in itself. The new Government of Guinea-Bissau is undertaking a social revolution which requires substantial input from all segments of the

society and as a result there is an enormous give and take. And a very substantial input by all segments of the Guinean population.

ANALYZING INPUTS FROM ALL ELEMENTS OF SOCIETIES

Senator CLARK. How does one analyze whether there is an input from all elements of societies? I am not speaking of Guinea-Bissau but in any society? Certainly there is not in this country and we have a very broad kind of democracy. I would not say there is any kind of equal input from all elements of society.

Mr. ISAACMAN. I do not want to be in a position of creating a new Utopia, but I do think that in principle the decentralized structures and the attempt to have members of the government meeting continually at all levels with people in rural areas is an effort to open direct and continual structural relationship between officials in Lourenco-Marques and all regions. In fact what we find is in some ways the opposite of the pattern in Western democracies. It is not a top-down relationship where the public then has to be educated and socialized. Rather, there is substantial input from the bottom up.

Senator CLARK. I think the point that you make—namely, that perhaps we look too much at the rest of the world from our own eccentric point of view and expect other governments to be followers of an 18th century rationalism or parliamentary government—is very well taken. But one other question in that regard.

CAN OPPOSITION EXIST IN ONE-PARTY SYSTEM?

Would you expect, then, that opposition press or opposition parties, opposition generally, could be openly expressed within this kind of one party system, say, to the press, for example. Do you think that would not exist in Mozambique?

Mr. ISAACMAN. My own impression is that there certainly would be opportunities to present divergent views at various levels. At the lowest level in the decisionmaking process, which includes the rural peasantry, I think there is a free exchange of ideas. It is from that free exchange of ideas that policy tends to move upward. In addition, I would expect there will be and some differences in detail among the leadership as the party tries to move forward toward creating social revolution, and I think we will see these opposing views or differing views blended.

Senator CLARK. Do you expect to have an opposition press, for example?

Mr. ISAACMAN. Not necessarily in the Western tradition, but I would expect to have a press that is free to criticize Government policies, yes.

Senator CLARK. Let's look at American policy. I think there are many other things that are interesting to discuss, and I do not want to shorten our time on that question.

Perhaps we could take Professor Isaacman's recommendations—the various suggestions that he makes at the end of his paper about what our policy ought to be—as a basis for a discussion for all of us. I do not think we ought to feel bound by these recommendations. We will

use these as a basis. We will hear Professor Henriksen or Professor Bailey, if you have other ideas or expansions or disagreements let's look at them for a moment.

ACKNOWLEDGING FRELIMO AS LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF
MOZAMBICAN PEOPLE

You say, first the United States must immediately acknowledge Frelimo as a legitimate representative of the Mozambican people. I am under the impression we have, have we not? What, specifically, do you mean by that?

Mr. ISAACMAN. I am under the impression that our relationships with Frelimo now are very formal and very cool and indeed the links which existed with Frelimo were due primarily to the personality and integrity of Donald Easum and his removal disrupted this process.

Senator CLARK. In other words, you are saying our Government has never taken a formal position of recognition? You say here that we do that on June 25. Can you be more specific as to just what we might do that would fulfill this recommendation?

Mr. ISAACSON. I do not think the Government has ever acknowledged the legitimacy of Frelimo as the representative of the Mozambican people. As a result, there is a substantial amount of distrust toward U.S. policy. We have had a whole year, and apart from the efforts of Donald Easum, very little has been done to formalize relationships. We have made no real gestures of friendship except for an offer of foodstuffs.

Senator CLARK. In fairness, I agree with your comments about Mr. Easum, but Mr. Easum presumably was representing not himself but the American Government in this.

Mr. ISAACMAN. That is correct. And the question that the liberation leaders will ask is why was Donald Easum removed. Since he represented the first bright spot in American foreign policy toward southern Africa, there is no way they could not have very negative feelings.

Senator CLARK. About the removal?

Mr. ISAACMAN. Especially in light of the fact in the previous decade we demonstrated a very strong pro-Portuguese position.

Senator CLARK. You are saying then, just to be very specific, that there ought to be a formal recognition made by our Government of the new Government of Mozambique on June 25, on the occasion of the independence?

Mr. ISAACMAN. Yes.

Senator CLARK. Probably a statement of purpose and so forth?

Mr. ISAACMAN. Yes.

Senator CLARK. Is that correct?

Mr. ISAACMAN. That is correct.

Senator CLARK. What are the others? Do you have anything to add to that, or are you in agreement with it.

Mr. HENRIKSEN. I am in agreement with it. I think it should have been done previously. Other governments have announced they will establish diplomatic relations on the ambassadorial level at the time of the independence.

Senator CLARK. They have said they are going to do that, and our Government has not done that?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. Not to my knowledge. Both countries in the West and in the East as well said so, they are going to do that.

Mr. BAILEY. Well, I would agree with it; it is a question really of image and public relations, if you like. I think the U.S. Government should greet the independence of Mozambique with enthusiasm and offers of friendship and support and so on and so forth, and up to the present this has not taken place.

Senator CLARK. I suspect that there is a reluctance on the part of the leadership in Frelimo to solicit that kind of statement.

I do not think that our Government, for example, has been invited to the independence celebration or independence day.

RIGHT OF NEW GOVERNMENT TO EXPLOIT COUNTRY'S WEALTH

Point 2. The United States must recognize the right of the new Government to exploit the wealth of the country for the good of the Mozambican people.

What form would that recognition take, in your judgment?

Mr. ISAACMAN. I guess my principle concern is that, as in the case of our perceptions about one-party states, so in the case of rewriting contracts, multinational corporation contracts, that we will view that as a hostile posture that Frelimo Portuguese propaganda during the last 10 years has characterized Frelimo as being a terrorist band of Communists, and any sort of an effort to rewrite contracts will re-enforce the image of the Communist nature of the Frelimo and, therefore, freeze or harden the anti-Frelimo position which I see as being prevalent within the Government at this point.

Mr. BAILEY. Is not a great deal of multinational presence in Mozambique? It is not an enormous problem as far as the country is concerned.

Mr. ISAACMAN. The last assessments are about \$35 million.

Senator CLARK. These are not necessarily all American based.

Mr. ISAACMAN. I think this \$35 million represents American investment in Mozambique. It is very small.

MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS' INVESTMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE

Senator CLARK. Would all of you encourage multinational corporations to invest in Mozambique, bring capital into that country?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. I do not speak for Frelimo. I think it would be up to them actually how the contract should be written and what they are going to accept in that sense. I think the offer should be up to the Government to decide how they want to do it.

Mr. BAILEY. I would encourage U.S. corporations. I think the future of Mozambique is relatively bright. There are a number of opportunities. Obviously, they are going to have to follow whatever guidelines the new Government sets down. I would suggest they do not try to go around bribing everybody in the Government, and so on. But I do think that they are going to be quite stable and that there are a number of opportunities, and assuming they are welcome by the Government and are willing to follow the new guidelines, I do not see any reason why they should not. I would not recommend at this point anybody put a dime into Angola even though the economic future of

Angola, leaving aside the social and political problems, would actually be much brighter than Mozambique.

MOZAMBICAN SOCIETY RESTRUCTURING

Senator CLARK. The third point here I think stands for itself. They simply should recognize their own independence and in fact form a kind of economic organization and align with whom they please.

Mr. ISAACMAN. The fact that the Mozambican Government is likely to restructure its society along socialist principles should not be confused with its desire to remain independent of the Eastern bloc. I think Mozambique is committed to a third world position of nonalignment, and again my concern is that within the U.S. Government this will be viewed also as a hostile act.

Senator CLARK. Do you not think our Government just assumes both of these things are going to happen, Mozambican society will be organized along socialist principles, and they will align themselves with the third world? I just assume that.

Mr. ISAACMAN. I guess I am concerned with the value we put on it.

Senator CLARK. The value?

Mr. ISAACMAN. Yes.

U.S. AID TO HELP ENFORCE U.N. SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA

Senator CLARK. The fourth point. Either through direct assistance or preferably through a United Nations-administered program, the United States should offer aid to Mozambique to enable her to enforce the U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia without suffering undue economic hardship. I think that that clearly is the area where presumably we could be most helpful. I do not know whether the Frelimo is interested in American aid, but they certainly would be interested in the U.N. aid, and personally, although I think there is room for bilateral aid programs, I would like to see much more of our assistance going through the U.N. In any case, I think it would be less politically oriented and in the long run would serve our interests and the world's interests. But it is my understanding, and we will be having the State Department here on Friday—but it is certainly my understanding that early on we made, first through Easum and since then we have a standing offer for bilateral aid to Frelimo and that government, if and when they feel they would be interested in having that kind of assistance. Is that not your understanding?

Mr. ISAACMAN. I am aware there are specific instances where we offered aid and foodstuffs, and Frelimo at one point seemed very interested. After Easum's removal negotiations stalled and I think Frelimo in fact has acquired food from Romania.

U.S. FOOD AID GIVEN TO FRELIMO

Senator CLARK. There was a reference in the testimony of one of the three of you about a food agreement. Is that what you had reference to? I frankly did not understand the references.

Mr. HENRIKSEN. My impression is food production material was given to the Frelimo transition government during the recent flood crisis. It was in fact given—

Senator CLARK. We gave foodstuffs?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. Yes.

Senator CLARK. I was not aware of that.

Mr. HENRIKSEN. There was some given by Rhodesia, as well as South Africa, and Romania has been mentioned and some others. My impression was, I have a citation on it, in fact there were funds transferred but I could be corrected.

Mr. BAILEY. In terms of what the Frelimo is willing to accept, I just underlined what Professor Henriksen said, and that is that Frelimo has accepted food assistance from South Africa.

Senator CLARK. You see no reason why they would not be willing to accept it from the United States?

Your fifth point, the United States should respond favorably to requests for aid and loans from the new Government, should they be forthcoming. That really is the same point we were making except you were emphasizing U.N.

Do others have other comments? Obviously in your statement you go on to make other points.

OTHER VIABLE ALTERNATIVES TO AID PROGRAMS

I am particularly interested in the alternative policy our Government could follow with regard to Mozambique.

Do any of you have other alternatives that you see open to us other than aid programs and the five points that are made here?

What might we do that would be useful and helpful?

Mr. BAILEY. I would simply urge, assuming that it is not being done, that our policies toward Mozambique be considered in the light of our policies toward the whole area, that is, southern Africa in general, and as I said in my paper, I would very strongly urge that the United States, in whatever way it can be helpful, and perhaps the most helpful way would be to stay out of it, I do not know, to give whatever aid and encouragement we can to try to insure the success of the Kaunda/Vorster initiatives toward the peaceful settlement of the problems in southern Africa.

Mr. HENRIKSEN. My concern is that the U.S. Government will treat Mozambique the same as another Cuba and, as Professor Isaacman has stated, will harden relationships between Frelimo and this country. There need not be that set of relationships established, and this is a golden opportunity for that not to happen. In fact, America can get off on the correct foot with Mozambique.

The second point is, this brings in the wider relationship of southern Africa. By giving aid and by giving recognition directly, bilaterally to Mozambique, or through the U.N., that it will signal to both Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa that the United States in a very positive way will aid governments that have policies directed so that America will in fact let it be known that it is not going to continue its policy of blindly going along with the South African regime, that in this way it is not pulling out of all of South Africa, it is not canceling corporations which may be very difficult to do in South Africa, but America will fund governments of different policies in southern Africa.

Senator CLARK. I think your point is well taken. One of the fears many people have is that our policy will harden toward Mozambique. I like the way you said it. You perhaps put it a little strongly to compare it with Cuba. I think the fact that we have offered a bilateral aid program, for example, will mean that we have not ruled out the point of cooperation, but I think you are absolutely right in saying here is the great opportunity. It is going to be much harder to do in Angola, obviously, because it is difficult to know who you will be dealing with. But in Mozambique, certainly, the opportunity is there. It is up to us to find alternative ways. I think both of you are quite right in putting a broader perspective on the whole problem of South Africa because of our attitude toward Rhodesia and toward the settlement of Namibia, and the question is going to be very much involved in attitudes that Frelimo is going to have for this country, and properly so.

U.S. SECURITY COUNCIL VETO OF SOUTH AFRICAN SANCTIONS MISTAKE

Do you think that in that respect that we made a mistake in vetoing sanctions last Friday night in the Security Council? Do you think that was a mistake? Do you think that was a negative action on our part with regard to trying to settle that problem?

Mr. ISAACMAN. Very definitely so. I think as everyone has indicated, you cannot extrapolate Frelimo and Mozambique from the global situation in South Africa.

Yet, in spite of the rhetoric of self-determination, we remain an adamant supporter of South Africa by providing South Africa with jeeps, aircraft, helicopters, and most recently, as Congressman Reuss has pointed out, weapons-grade uranium. This is a real threat and has to be viewed as such by Frelimo and the new government. So again it is an indication of our hostile posture.

VIOLATIONS OF ARMS EMBARGO WITH SOUTH AFRICA

Senator CLARK. We do have an arms embargo with South Africa.

Mr. ISAACMAN. The arms embargo is regularly violated or circumvented.

Senator CLARK. What are examples of the violation?

Mr. ISAACMAN. I do not see how you can send weapons-grade uranium, as Congressman Reuss has pointed out, during an arms embargo. The fact you send jeeps that do not have guns already mounted on them does not mean that they are not a potential counter-insurgency weapon. The United States has also sold light aircraft and helicopters. In short, I think there are numerous instances of the United States violating the spirit of the law if not always the letter of the law.

Mr. BAILEY. I would like to register my disagreement with a couple of those points.

In the first place, South Africa has plenty of money with which to buy helicopters, jeeps, or whatever equipment of that type it needs from any country in the world. If we do not sell them to South Africa, the French will sell them or the Germans or English, or somebody else.

I do not even discard the point the Soviet Union would sell them to South Africa.

In any case, as far as veto is concerned, I think that sanctions, formal sanctions would have been counterproof as far as any Namibia is concerned. I think that South African policy at the present time is to disengage itself from Namibia and that such formal action would have had a counterproof effect at this time.

Senator CLARK. Counterproof, why?

Mr. BAILEY. In terms of perhaps strengthening the opposition within South Africa and saying, look, no matter what we do, no matter what gestures we make, and so on and so forth, they are going to be totally opposed to us and consequently why do we not forget about all of that and continue to strengthen Portuguese South Africa, or whatever you want to call them.

U.S. POSITIVE ACTIONS TO IMPROVE SOUTHERN AFRICA POLICY

Senator CLARK. Do you see any positive actions that you think we should be taking with regard to South Africa that would be useful?

Let me put it in a somewhat broader context.

We have had a series of hearings here in the Foreign Relations Committee on the future of the United Nations. We have talked a good deal about this upcoming session, and we tend to talk in terms of there being three immediate problems, primarily, in the General Assembly in the U.N.

One, the whole question of commodity agreements and so-called new economic order. The other problem of exclusion of Israel from bodies within the U.N. Third, the whole problem of Namibia and South Africa. Most of us have agreed, Secretary Kissinger agreed with us in briefings last week in the committee, Mr. Moynihan in his testimony here before the committee, that we must find positive proposals to make in the U.N. with regard to southern Africa. And a couple of the agreed upon points were repeal of the Byrd amendment and others.

My question to you is what additional positive proposals could this country put forward in the U.N. or out of the U.N. that would be practical and positive and try to accomplish the kind of things that we are talking about this morning; that is, to better the relationship with Mozambique and perhaps Angola? What would we do by way of policy other than sanction. One of you gentlemen recommended sanction. Another disagreed with that.

Mr. ISAACMAN. In order to break the silence, one suggestion that comes to mind is that we open communications with the African National Congress which, of course, is recognized by the Organization of African Unity as the legitimate representative of the South African people. Whatever our long-term policies, if in fact we are committed to self-determination and majority rule, then ANC can not be frozen out, as was Frelimo, from our initial diplomatic process.

Senator CLARK. I am not quite sure specifically what you are recommending the U.S. Government—

Mr. ISAACMAN. At least begin to open communications with the ANC, the liberation movement of South Africa.

Senator CLARK. I see. Do others have other comments about what our policy toward southern Africa ought to be to accomplish a better relationship for us there? I know we talked about four or five already, but I am looking for additional—

Mr. HENRIKSEN. You mean relationship with southern Africa or Republic of South Africa?

Senator CLARK. I mean in the broadest sense of southern Africa. What are some of the things we could do, a proposal we could put forward in the U.N. and outside the forum that would bring our policy more in line with the goals that we have talked about this morning?

Mr. BAILEY. Well, I am not sure there is anything we can do in the U.N. that would be of any particular assistance.

As far as recognition is concerned, that, of course, opens a whole Pandora's box of problems all over the place—Palestinian Liberation Organization, for example, and all the problems involved with that, and so on.

I am not sure it is the business of sovereign States to go around recognizing liberation movements around the world. After all, we might develop a few liberation movements in the United States and then we would be very unhappy if Mozambique recognized them as legitimate representatives of the American people and, that sort of thing.

As far as diplomacy outside of the U.N. is concerned, I simply reiterate what I have said before, and that is I think we should give whatever quiet behind-the-scenes support we can to the present developments in southern Africa between South Africa, Zambia, and other countries in the region to attempt to come to a peaceful settlement.

Senator CLARK. Senator Griffin, at any point you have questions.

Senator GRIFFIN. I appreciate that. I am sorry that I was not able to get here earlier, so I will just listen.

MOZAMBIQUE'S CLOSEST DIPLOMATIC ALINEMENT

Senator CLARK. What nation is Mozambique likely to be closest to diplomatically? Is it naturally going to be Tanzania? What are their international relations really going to be with other African countries?

Mr. ISAACMAN. I think you can look for a very close relationship with Tanzania, and Zambia, and Guinea-Bissau, three nations who share common interests, and commitment toward social revolution.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Senator CLARK. Are they going to be able to receive economic assistance, in your judgment, from the Soviet Union, from China, from other independent African nations, from OPEC [oil producing exporting countries] countries? Where might they be able to get the assistance? You mentioned the economic problems that they have and we have talked about U.S. bilateral assistance.

Mr. BAILEY. I would think they would be able to get economic assistance from all those countries, but I should point out that there is no reason why Mozambique should become an international economic basket case.

Again, Guinea-Bissau has a lot more problems along those lines even though the leadership of that country is in my opinion absolutely brilliant compared with the leadership of some other new countries, and so on, but they do have enormous economic problems and it seems to me that much greater damage than the United States considering

Mozambique, some kind of Cuba we will simply forget about completely. Guinea-Bissau became independent last year and it disappeared from the Earth and gone off to Mars as far as the U.S. media and U.S. Government and whatnot, and I think this is the real danger that it will go independent and the U.S. Government will say wonderful, you are independent, and it will absolutely disappear.

There is little danger in the case of Guinea-Bissau because it is strategically located. I think if they need aid from the outside world they will be able to get it from the various sources.

The point I want to make, there is no real reason why they should require a large amount of financial assistance unless they attempt to cut off South Africa, that then would change the situation dramatically.

ECONOMIC NECESSITY TO DO BUSINESS WITH SOUTH AFRICA

Senator CLARK. I gather all three of you are in agreement basically that they are going to continue to do business with South Africa, that is just an economic necessity, and that it makes sense for them.

Is there disagreement?

Mr. ISAACMAN. I think in the short term they have no alternative. In the longer term as they restructure the economy, they will attempt to break the dependence and linkages on South Africa.

WORKING SOUTH AFRICAN GOLD MINES WITH RETURN PAYMENT PRACTICE

Senator CLARK. Do you think they will continue in the short run this long-term policy of sending Mozambicans to work in the gold mines and get a return payment for that?

Do you all agree with that practice?

Mr. ISAACMAN. I personally do. I think we can look to the Mozambique government to insist that contracts be rewritten in such a way to provide better working conditions for the Mozambique people and workers, but given the fact that South Africa provides approximately 40 percent of the Mozambican foreign currency there is no way they can terminate this relationship at this point in time.

U.S. PARTICIPATION IN ESTABLISHING FUND TO COMPENSATE RHODESIAN SANCTION LOSSES

Senator CLARK. What do you think of the U.S. participation in the Commonwealth proposal to try to come up with \$65 million to compensate the Mozambique Government for the loss of trade with Rhodesia. Does that make sense to you? Do you think we ought to participate in that? Apparently there is going to be a proposal made in the U.N. to establish such a fund.

Mr. BAILEY. I do not personally think you can ask a country like Mozambique to apply these sanctions without offering it some form of compensation for so doing. And if the United States is asked to participate in this effort, I think we should respond favorably.

Mr. ISAACMAN. It is my personal belief we should respond favorably because \$65 million constitutes such an important source of foreign currency. I am very skeptical, however, that this Government which refuses to lift the Byrd amendment is then going to turn around and

provide money to allow Mozambique to apply the sanction which we are violating.

Senator CLARK. In fairness you ought to say this Congress, not this Government, because it was the Congress.

Mr. ISAACMAN. You are absolutely correct.

Senator CLARK. I would like to make even more specific the House of Representatives. [Laughter.]

Senator CLARK. Hopefully we are going to change that in a year.

Mr. ISAACMAN. Hopefully.

Senator CLARK. But in any case your point is rather well taken. It is a question of whether the Congress would pass such fund and whether the administration will request such funds.

We will be talking with Secretary Davis about that. I am sure, on Friday. It is my understanding—and I want him to speak to this question—that we are, in fact, giving consideration to joining such a fund. I do think it would make good sense. It is one of the alternatives we have open to us to show friendship to that country.

MOZAMBIQUE AS BASE OF GUERRILLA WARFARE INTO RHODESIA

I gather that there may be some disagreement on the panel about the issue of whether Mozambique is going to really serve as an area of guerrilla warfare or base of guerrilla warfare into Rhodesia. I do not remember which of you talked about this. It seems to me one of you felt it almost certainly would not, and others—I think you, Mr. Isaacman—felt it very well may be a base against the Smith government.

Mr. ISAACMAN. In my judgment, unless there are fruitful discussions between ANC and the Smith government, unless there is a resolution of that crisis, Mozambique will commit itself to supporting the liberation movements of Zimbabwe.

Senator CLARK. Very actively?

Mr. ISAACMAN. I think so. Short of armed intervention. In fact, the position of the leadership has been uniform in its agreement on this issue. Almost every public pronouncement made by Frelimo officials, who have taken a low profile in other areas, carries strong support for the Zimbabwe liberation movement.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Bailey, it seems to me you had a slightly different emphasis on that. As I understand it, you think they are going to have their own problems and are not apt to become deeply involved in that?

Mr. BAILEY. Not really. It is a question of timing in the sense that I do think they will probably hold back to see whether the Kaunda-Vorster initiatives will succeed in forcing Smith to come to an accommodation.

I do not see them actively supporting guerrilla activity in Northern Rhodesia until that time.

But should these initiatives fail, in my opinion this would, in effect, be the death knell of the Smith regime and that the Mozambique Government would then actively support guerrilla activity in Rhodesia which would then, of course, be surrounded on three sides by areas of refuges for the guerrillas.

Mr. HENRIKSEN. There are indications already that Frelimo has lent its bases in Tanzania, the bases which it used during liberation war now being used by Rhodesia or Zambabwe guerrillas for training purposes.

U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT FOR PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AFRICA QUESTIONED

Senator CLARK. Mr. Isaacman, you have made several statements in your testimony about U.S. military support for Portugal and South Africa. The State Department, it seems to me, might well contest or at least we could ask them on Friday about some of these things.

Frankly, some of the statements that you have made, I just had not heard before. Let me cite some of them and listen to your evidence.

It would make the record much more complete on this.

What is the documentation for saying that CIA helped Portugal acquire 20 B-26 bombers for use in the African colonies?

Mr. ISAACMAN. There is substantial documentation. I would refer you to a book by William Minter entitled, "Portugal and the West," which he documents very clearly. Part of this incident became a cause celebre because one plane flew very close to the White House.

Senator CLARK. Our Government has never agreed to that description?

Mr. ISAACMAN. Our Government has hedged on this particular issue. It has been a source of embarrassment.

Senator CLARK. On another point, you say the United States supplied napalm and defoliant for use in the Portuguese colonies. What is the evidence for that?

Mr. ISAACMAN. There are several accounts of American-made napalm bombs.

Senator CLARK. Have they been used?

Mr. ISAACMAN. Yes sir, in Mozambique and Angola. I do not have the specific reference.

Mr. HENRIKSEN. The State Department position is that no NATO weapons have been used in southern Africa since the ban in 1961. I think is the basis. There are some pamphlets published by an organization called Angola Committee and they are called "NATO Arms in Portugal," or some such title, and they document the use of transfers of NATO weapons. Most of the supplies have come from NATO rather than directly.

Senator CLARK. Do you have any documentation other than that committee or that group?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. Minter's book that has been mentioned already.

Mr. ISAACMAN. While we were doing historical research in Zambezi on the outer edge of a war zone, the American military attaché from Lisbon came to the area primarily to examine whether there were American-made weapons used. Whatever his intentions, one man in a few days could not ascertain such information. So it is not necessarily a question of intent but whether there were mechanisms which were effectively used to enforce these prohibitions and my impression is that they were not.

Senator CLARK. Another point in your testimony; you said U.S. helicopters, 707's and 747's were being used in the colonial wars. What is the verification of that?

Mr. ISAACMAN. I think it is the Bell Corp. which sold 12 helicopters to the Zambezi authorities. A number of these helicopters were used in counter-insurgency activity. Boeing 707's and 747 sales are public record.

Senator CLARK. They were sold to the Portuguese?

Mr. ISAACMAN. Yes, sir, they were designed specifically as troop carriers. Portugal always faced a logistic problem how to get troops into Mozambique and Angola and this is one way Lisbon sought to resolve it.

NEWSPAPER REPORTS OF U.S. ASSISTANCE TO COREMO

Senator CLARK. You say the U.S. Embassy in Zambia offered assistance to Paulo Gumane. Would you expand on that?

Mr. ISAACMAN. There were articles in a Tanzanian paper and the London-Observer of March 23, 1975 which quote this and Gumane and several others have subsequently acknowledged that there was U.S. assistance.

Senator CLARK. These are newspaper reports?

Mr. ISAACMAN. Yes sir, Tanzania newspapers.

U.S. SECOND LARGEST SUPPLIER OF SOUTH AFRICA'S ARMS

Senator CLARK. The last one. I am trying to go through your testimony and find four or five major charges, it seems to me, that you have made for further verification—the United States today being South Africa's second largest military supplier.

Who is first?

Mr. ISAACMAN. I think but I am not certain that France is but—

Senator CLARK. You think we are the second largest supplier in spite of our embargo?

Mr. ISAACMAN. We are among the largest suppliers of arms to South Africa.

Senator CLARK. Do you have any evidence of that?

Mr. ISAACMAN. Again, I will be delighted to provide the subcommittee with the hard evidence.

Senator CLARK. OK.

[As of the date of publication, the information referred to has not been supplied.]

MOZAMBIQUE'S MAJOR IMPORTS

In the past what have been Mozambique's major imports? What has accounted for the balance of trade deficits? Where do they buy?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. Many imports are from Portugal, leather goods, Portuguese food, and also they did buy quite a few food stuffs from the Republic of South Africa.

Senator CLARK. A lot of that is going to end.

Mr. HENRIKSEN. If it becomes self-sufficient, I expect.

Senator CLARK. These were Portuguese in many cases who have since left to—

Mr. ISAACMAN. The transitional government has imposed very rigid restrictions on imports of goods that are not considered to be critical in an effort to deal with the balance of payments problem.

EXPORT CROP PRODUCTION

Senator CLARK. By what means were export crops produced under colonial rule in Mozambique? How will they be produced after independence? Do you expect that to continue much in the same way?

Mr. BAILEY. Well, the export crops are produced, by and large, by two means. One, where Portuguese nationals went to Angola and to Mozambique under various colonialization schemes, relatively small plots. The bulk of it, however, was produced by subsidiaries of Portuguese companies, trading companies, and others and on large plantation-style agriculture. Judging from the statement these will be continued on a large-scale basis for efficient reasons using a cooperative form of production.

COOPERATIVE FARMING

Senator CLARK. One of you talked about the organization of agriculture under the new regime, what it would be apt to be like, and you talked about the possibility of—I do not know whether the term was collective farm but some kind of cooperative farm. Was that you?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. Yes.

Senator CLARK. Can you expand on that?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. I would just like to pick up where Professor Bailey left off. There are some foreign companies that produce foodstuffs in Mozambique which are continuing. I mentioned the Sena Sugar Estates, which are an English firm, and they are allowed to continue, so that lots of things will be allowed to go forward. On the communal aspect Mozambique will attempt programs such as are being used in Tanzania of communal developments and I think the reason being that in this way, technical aid, from the government, that equipment can be shared communally better than with individual small farms. On the other aspect, they will allow individual small plots for farmers, it will not be totally in a sense communal or cooperative, but there will be some few individuals or even private farming along with larger communal controls, but again this will work within the fabric of traditional Africa. It is communally based so it is not a significant departure. It will be larger and better organized perhaps than has been the tradition but it will not be a significant departure from African society.

Senator CLARK. Any other comments?

Mr. BAILEY. If the chairman will excuse me, I have a lunch engagement. I had no idea the hearings would go on.

Senator CLARK. That is fine. I think we have covered the questions rather thoroughly. I wonder if Senator Griffin would have any questions?

Senator GRIFFIN. No.

Senator CLARK. We are very appreciative of your taking your entire morning coming here and your testimony has been very helpful to us. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA

Mozambique

FRIDAY, JUNE 13, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Dick Clark (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senator Clark.

Senator CLARK. The hearing will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

Today we are holding our second day of hearings on Mozambique, a former Portuguese territory whose independence will be celebrated in just 12 days, on June 25.

These hearings on Mozambique are part of a series which the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations is holding on southern Africa, an area of Africa on which the eyes of the world are focused as two new nations emerge and bring new pressures on the countries of Rhodesia, South Africa, and Southwest Africa, or Namibia.

It is important for the United States to recognize the importance of Mozambique in this context. Its independence day falls on the anniversary of the founding of Frelimo, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, which fought for the nation's freedom from Portugal and will govern it after June 25. There is every indication from what we have heard from our previous witnesses day before yesterday—Professors Bailey, Henriksen, and Isaacman—that this government will be dedicated to the propositions of improving the quality of life for the Mozambican people, both black and white, that it will make every effort to bridge racial and cultural differences, and that it will make all of the people truly Mozambicans, which I think is one of the phrases used by one of the witnesses day before yesterday.

From the point of view of U.S.-Africa relations, U.S. policy toward the Portuguese territories during their struggle for independence was, I think, to put it bluntly, essentially bankrupt. This country's commitment to self-determination became a victim of the cold war. The United States, it seems was overly cautious about offending its NATO ally, Portugal. Given the tremendous cost to the Portuguese people of the colonial wars and the apparent unpopularity of those wars, the

United States would have been a much better friend to Portugal had it pressed harder for independence of the colonies. While the importance of Portugal's sensitivities on this issue was exaggerated, policy-makers failed to appreciate the importance of the nonaligned nations of Africa and the strength of their feelings about colonialism.

Such attitudes resulted in a policy of giving little diplomatic or substantive support to the effort to end Portuguese colonialism in Africa. As previous witnesses pointed out, the United States frequently abstained or voted "no" on the issue of Portuguese colonialism in the United Nations. There was no meaningful communication between the U.S. Government and the future leaders of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. And the United States provided only minimal assistance to the efforts of the liberation movements to prepare for the task of running their governments and developing their countries economically.

This country has already paid a high price in its relations with the African states for its policy toward Portuguese colonialism. It will continue to pay a high price.

The purpose of these hearings is not to examine past policy in detail, to debate decisions that were made long ago, or to assign blame. Rather, their purpose is to examine the current situation in southern Africa and to try to define policies that will promote better relations with all the African states.

Members of this subcommittee want to work with and support the administration in efforts to establish good relations with the new Government of Mozambique.

On Wednesday, witnesses with considerable expertise on Mozambique agreed that there was in that country and among its leaders a tremendous amount of good will toward the United States. They made a number of suggestions of policies this country could pursue to tap that good will. These proposals included both economic assistance and diplomatic attitudes they believed the United States should adopt. Today, we want to consider with you these proposals and others to find out how Congress can help in the effort to build better relations with Mozambique.

We are pleased to have before us today, the Honorable Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Nathaniel Davis, and Mr. Dennis Conroy, Director of the Office of African Regional Affairs of the Agency for International Development.

If you will proceed, Mr. Davis, I assume that you are going to be first.

STATEMENT OF NATHANIEL DAVIS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY ALFONSO ARENALES, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN AFFAIRS, AND DENNIS E. CONROY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF AFRICAN REGIONAL AFFAIRS, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.

I welcome this opportunity to meet with the subcommittee for the first time since my appointment as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. I would like to begin by saying that I look forward to frank and constructive exchanges with you on all aspects of our

relations with the nations of Africa. In dealing with the many complex issues involved in our relations with these nations I shall hope for your advice and cooperation and your help, sir.

This is a particularly opportune time for us to discuss Mozambique, which, as you pointed out, will become independent in less than 2 weeks time.

I would first like to submit for the record the following brief summary of economic data. During the course of my remarks I will touch briefly on the economic development of Mozambique and on the role that the United States could play in assisting that development. Mr. Dennis Conroy from the Agency for International Development is with me here today, as you know.

[The information referred to follows:]

**ECONOMIC SUMMARY ON MOZAMBIQUE SUBMITTED BY THE AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

The economy of Mozambique must be looked at as two separate but inter-related entities. What might be called the modern sector revolves around the cities, ports, railroad, agricultural exports and processing industries and remittances from workers abroad; the subsistence sector, involving 85% of the population of roughly 9 million people, has scarcely been touched by progress and the outside world except for the insurgency during the last decade.

There are limited facts available about either aspect of Mozambique's economy. Neither A.I.D. nor the World Bank has yet had a survey team in Mozambique: the International Monetary Fund had a small Mission in Lourenco Marques in April and the report, when released, will contain considerably more macro-economic data than is now available.

With the caveat on data, we provide the following brief analysis. Exports are made up largely of cashew nuts, cotton, sugar, tea, wood products, copra, sisal, and tobacco. They have grown from roughly \$180 million in 1972 to \$225 million in 1973 and an estimated \$240 million in 1974. Most of the goods are destined for metropolitan Portugal, industrial Europe, the United States, Canada and South Africa. Imports consist of machinery, metal, transportation equipment, foodstuffs (wheat is the major food import), etc. They too have been rising: \$310 million in 1972, \$340 million in 1973 and an estimated \$390 million in 1974.

The trade deficit has been largely made up by service earnings, primarily transport payments for rail and port services from South Africa, Rhodesia, and Zambia and Malawi and remittances from the approximately 100,000 workers in South Africa's gold mines.

When the Transitional Government took office there was a potential danger of a crisis situation brought about by rising imports accompanied by substantial capital repatriation. However, exports have increased somewhat largely through higher commodity prices, imports have fallen far below expected levels and payments for services have increased. Therefore, as far as our information goes, the current account deficit was not a major one in 1974 and might well be covered by assistance obtained from various donors. While not currently a crisis situation, it is our view that Mozambique has a chronic balance of payments problem. The country has been added to those "most severely affected" by recent oil crisis. A.I.D. is willing to consider balance of payments assistance, if requested, subject of course to Congressional authorization and appropriation.

We have inadequate data on Mozambique's foreign debt. Discussions have been held in April between the Transitional Government and the Government of Portugal regarding the debt but at this time we can only note the public announcement by Foreign Minister Antunes that Mozambique owes no debt to Portugal; presumably this referred to government debt and not commercial credits and arrears. A large share of Mozambique's external debt is owed to South Africa for the Cabora Bassa Dam.

The population of Mozambique in 1974 is estimated at 8.9 million with a per capita GNP in 1973 of \$334. This figure is not very significant in terms of the future since it includes Portuguese military expenditures and was heavily skewed in favor of the then large resident Portuguese population. The modern

sector will be affected severely if there is an exodus of Portuguese skilled labor. Agricultural processing and railroad and port operations should suffer heavily with an adverse impact on the balance of payments. On the favorable side is the going on stream of the Cahora Bassa Hydroelectric Dam this year and the foreign exchange which will be earned by sale of electricity to South Africa. The amount of revenue will obviously depend upon the price per kilowatt hour which will be negotiated; one estimate is that power sales could contribute \$50 million a year by 1980.

Any developing country must be concerned about the viability of its modern sector to achieve growth but equally important is development of the rural areas. There are strong indications that Mozambique leaders will concern themselves with a transformation of Mozambique society. A preference has been expressed for a socialist society based on equality in order that the majority of the people who have been bypassed by progress will share the fruits of increased food production and better health. The job is momentous in itself. In addition, Mozambique is faced with the need to resettle over a hundred thousand persons who fled to neighboring states during the last decade and to provide help to about 275,000 families who were displaced and regrouped within Mozambique during the war in settlements (aldeamentos) established for the purpose. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has asked for contributions to assist in such a program and A.I.D. hopes to respond if funds are available.

The Transitional Government of Mozambique has received a considerable amount of foreign aid since assuming power. We estimate that as of mid-May over \$80 million has been pledged, with Sweden, Holland, Portugal and the UN and special agencies the largest contributors. We believe this generous response as well as the limited administrative capacity to deal with the large number of donor teams who have visited Lourenco Marques were elements in the Transitional Government's inability so far to set a date to receive an A.I.D. economic survey team.

The Transitional Government has quite naturally turned initially for assistance to the UN system and to countries with which their leaders have had close relations over the past years. We do not know what their desires are in terms of U.S. assistance. We know that U.S. aid—particularly in the areas of agricultural research and extension relating to food production—has been particularly effective in many African countries, including some of Mozambique's neighbors. We also believe our public health system possesses an expertise which can make a contribution. Training programs in the U.S. and Africa have played a key role in manpower development in Africa since 1961; we have already approved a program for Portuguese speaking Africa in which Mozambique can participate immediately.

In Section 50 of the Foreign Assistance Act last year the Congress indicated its interest in Mozambique and the other African countries who are becoming independent following rule by Portugal. We concur in this mandate and believe that U.S. assistance, if desired, can make a contribution toward the peaceful and orderly transition of Mozambique to independence and a realization of an improved quality of life for its people.

SELF-DETERMINATION, MAJORITY RULE THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS ENCOURAGED

Mr. DAVIS. U.S. policy toward Mozambique has been predicated on the principles of self-determination and majority rule. It has also been our policy to encourage the achievement of these goals by peaceful means. Therefore, the United States established an embargo on arms shipments to both sides in the Portuguese colonial wars after the outbreak of hostilities in Angola in 1961, 2 years before the U.N. called for a similar embargo. We also began at that time asking for and receiving assurances from the Portuguese that any military equipment supplied them would not be used outside the NATO area, an area which has not included their African colonial territories.

It was in accordance with our hope for peaceful resolution of southern African problems that we, along with the rest of the world,

heartily welcomed Portugal's decision after April 1974 to recognize the right of self-determination in Mozambique and in the other Portuguese territories in Africa. In Mozambique, the process of negotiation led the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, the group representing the peoples of Mozambique, and Portugal on September 7, 1974, to sign an agreement setting June 25, 1975, as the date for Mozambican independence. The same agreement provided for a provisional government to lay the groundwork for that independence and to administer the country in the interim. We immediately sent a letter of congratulations to the provisional government, made up of both Frelimo and Portuguese representatives, to mark this dramatic development in the decolonization effort.

PRESIDENT FORD'S STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD MOZAMBICAN INDEPENDENCE

President Ford stated our Government's policy toward Mozambican independence in his toast to Zambia's President Kaunda on April 19. Speaking of all the former Portuguese colonies, President Ford said:

We have been following developments in southern Africa with great, great interest. For many years the United States has supported self-determination for the peoples of that area and we continue to do so today. We view the coming independence of Mozambique, Angola, and the island territories with great satisfaction, just as we viewed the independence of Guinea-Bissau just last year . . . America stands ready to help the emerging countries . . . and to provide what assistance we can.

In the spirit of the President's remarks, we are now looking forward to a cooperative relationship with the new Mozambique. It is a country of dynamism and potential. Its leaders are already participating in efforts to seek a solution to the problem of Rhodesia. The United States will recognize this new nation on its independence and seek a mutually beneficial relationship.

MAJOR ADMINISTRATIVE AND DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES FACING MOZAMBIQUE

We are aware of the major administrative and development challenges which face Mozambique. It is basically an agrarian nation—with 85 percent of its population living in rural areas—and its new leaders have indicated that they will concentrate their efforts on rural development and the agricultural sector. Mozambique's development plans will also emphasize other areas, in particular health care but also education and training. We are ready to give a prompt and sympathetic response to an expression of interest in U.S. assistance and cooperation in these areas. We are also ready to consider balance-of-payments support and Public Law 480 assistance, subject to congressional authorization and appropriation. The United States has discussed these questions with Frelimo's President, Samora Machel. My predecessor met with President Machel in October 1974, and indicated our willingness, within our means, to assist the new nation. In January we offered to send an economic survey team to study developmental problems and assistance potential. We are hopeful that a date will be set for consultations with Mozambique on this subject before or soon after independence.

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO MOZAMBIQUE

As a further indication of our attitude, I would like to mention that the United States has contributed \$275,000 in disaster relief funds over the past year, to aid victims of the September disturbances in Lourenco Marques and to aid victims of flooding in the Limpopo Valley area; we indicated that we were prepared to consider a request for Public Law 480 assistance from Mozambique; the Export-Import Bank approved both a \$4.5 million credit and equivalent guarantee for the purchase of locomotives by Mozambique; and we are now considering a contribution to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) appeal for a refugee resettlement program. In more general terms, the Congress has demonstrated its interest in the former Portuguese territories by appropriating funds under the Foreign Assistance Act for the specific purpose of aid to these areas. The fiscal year 1975 appropriation was for \$25 million for Portugal and the territories, not less than \$5 million of which would go to Cape Verde and not less than \$5 million for Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Angola. Under this appropriation \$400,000 has been obligated for a development-oriented training program for nationals of Portuguese-speaking Africa; \$1 million has been granted to the UNHCR for resettlement of refugees in Guinea-Bissau; and we hope to sign a \$1 million grant and a \$3 million loan with the Cape Verde islands this month. We also hope to add another \$1 million grant to Cape Verde early in fiscal year 1976, but this will require special authorization under the continuing resolution.

I believe these actions illustrate U.S. interest and concern for all the Portuguese-speaking African nations in general and for the new nation of Mozambique in particular. The role that they will play and the effect they will have on stability and progress in southern Africa, with its many problems—some of which will be subject of later hearings by this committee—make their peaceful and successful transition to independence of great concern and importance to all nations which favor peace with justice in southern Africa.

The United States numbers itself among nations that take this approach. We look forward to the evolution of stable and prosperous nations in southern Africa—under principles of human dignity and self-determination. We believe that Mozambique will play a major role in the achievement of these objectives. Therefore, we offer our congratulations and extend the hand of friendship to the government and people of Mozambique.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much. I congratulate you on the series of initiatives that have been taken as you have outlined here.

PORTION OF APPROPRIATION SPENT FOR PORTUGAL AND TERRITORIES

A couple of questions in that regard. You might return to your statement just to expand on the record a little bit, it reads:

The fiscal year 1975 appropriation was for \$25 million for Portugal and the territories, not less than \$5 million of which would go to Cape Verde and not less than \$5 million for Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Angola.

Tell me how this money has been spent. Without a calculator here, what part of the \$25 million has been spent under the appropriation?

Mr. DAVIS. Of course the \$25 million, as you know, was to be divided between Portugal and Portuguese Africa.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Mr. DAVIS. I wonder, as I do have a colleague here from AID, perhaps he would be willing to run down those figures, sir. Would you?

Senator CLARK. I am particularly interested in the totals to the colonies. I would like to ask what part of that Portugal received or did not get, and so forth.

Mr. CONROY. The total for the colonies, Mr. Chairman, on the grant funds, is \$400,000 for a development training project and \$1 million for Guinea-Bissau obligated. We also plan to obligate this month another \$1 million for Cape Verde islands, a total of \$2,150,000.

The reason we cannot obligate more than \$1 million this month is because of the 20-percent rule in the Appropriations Act which limits us to 20 percent of the obligations in the final month of the fiscal year.

Senator CLARK. I do not understand that. Would you be a little more specific?

Mr. CONROY. Section 102 of the Appropriations Act limits AID to obligations of no more than 20 percent of the grant funds of any appropriations item in the final month of the fiscal year.

Senator CLARK. Why could you not simply have done it in May to avoid this problem?

Mr. CONROY. Sir, the Appropriations Act was passed on March 26, 1975. We met with the Cape Verdians at the end of March and sent a team to the islands at the end of April. This is a requirement for a 15-day congressional notification period, and effectively that gave us only 6 weeks to do everything, to obligate in May, and there was simply not enough time to do more than we have done.

Senator CLARK. To get back to the major question, then, of the \$25 million appropriated for Portugal and its territories, how much has been spent or obligated? How much will have been spent by the end of the fiscal year, in your judgment?

Mr. CONROY. Sir, \$3,150,000 in grant funds will be obligated by the end of the fiscal year.

Senator CLARK. \$3,150,000?

Mr. CONROY. That includes \$750,000 for Portugal.

Senator CLARK. Of which \$750,000 went to Portugal itself?

Mr. CONROY. Yes.

Senator CLARK. Now, what was that grant?

Mr. CONROY. That was for consulting services and training for Portuguese.

Senator CLARK. Can you expand upon that at all? Do you recall what that was?

Mr. CONROY. That is not in my area, but generally we wanted to provide funds for feasibility studies and for the training of Portuguese in some specific areas that they were interested in. I think transportation and the infrastructure.

Senator CLARK. Could you have the people responsible for that area provide that for the record at this point?

Mr. CONROY. Certainly, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

GRANT AID TO PORTUGAL IN FISCAL YEAR 1975

[Agency for International Development]

A grant agreement of \$750,000 was signed by the Governments of Portugal and the United States on February 28, 1975 in Lisbon. The purpose of the grant is to provide financing of short-term U.S. consultants and training of Portuguese in fields critical to the success of Portugal's development program. Such technical cooperation is intended to demonstrate U.S. confidence in the development efforts of the new Portuguese Government.

This agreement provides grant financing to cover the costs of: (a) contracts with United States private firms, universities, individuals or other organizations to conduct studies, to provide advisory services, or to prepare projects for implementation; and (b) training programs in development fields of high priority to the Portuguese Government. It is anticipated that these services will be concentrated in fields such as agriculture, rural development, health, tax collection, education, and public and business administration. One-third of the grant (\$250,000) has been initially set aside for technical assistance to Portugal's critical and expanding low income housing industry.

Senator CLARK. Good. That means that of the \$25 million, almost \$22 million remains unspent, or will not be spent this year?

LOAN AUTHORIZATION PORTION OF \$25 MILLION APPROPRIATION

Mr. CONROY. I am sorry, sir. I just have addressed only the grant portion. On the loan authorization of \$20 million, \$1 million was obligated for feasibility studies in Portugal, and a \$13,250,000 loan is planned for signature this month with Portugal.

Senator CLARK. A \$13 million loan?

Mr. CONROY. Yes, sir, \$13,250,000. This would be for a housing program, a low-cost housing program in Portugal.

We also hope this month to obligate, to sign a \$3 million loan agreement with the Cape Verde Islands for a rural works program, and this would leave at the end of the month \$2,750,000 uncommitted of the \$20 million loan funds.

Senator CLARK. So all but \$2,750,000 are going to be spent of the appropriated funds?

Mr. CONROY. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK. What is the division between Portugal and the colonies in that \$22 million?

Mr. CONROY. Portugal obtains a total of \$15 million. In other words, the \$10 million that was specifically mentioned for Africa in the Appropriations Act has been reserved for Africa and the \$15 million is going to Portugal.

Senator CLARK. Fine. That is what I wanted to know.

U.S. RECOGNITION OF NEW GOVERNMENT OF MOZAMBIQUE

Several suggestions were made on Wednesday of specific things that this country could do to further good relations with Mozambique. I would like to have your comment on these. One point that was suggested is that the United States should announce, or should have announced, but I guess we cannot go back beyond today, should announce before independence that it plans to establish diplomatic relations with Mozambique. They have mentioned that other countries have done this. Why has not the United States? I interpreted your statement today to say that we would, am I correct? Have you an-

nounced previously that you were going to recognize the new government of Mozambique, or are you doing so today?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, sir, in this regard I think it might be worthwhile to refer to what President Ford said in this regard.

Senator CLARK. We welcome their independence?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, that we have welcomed their independence, and that we stand ready to help them, and I think that inherent in what he said is a fairly clear indication of our desire to establish a constructive relationship with the newly independent country. I can certainly assure you that the U.S. Government does intend to recognize the state of Mozambique on its independence.

Senator CLARK. It is your position, as I understand it, explained in your statement at any rate, that this includes offers of support and assistance?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK. To the new government?

Mr. DAVIS. And the President, of course, made that publicly clear in April.

U.S. DESCRIPTION OF ATTITUDES TOWARD ONE-PARTY GOVERNMENT

Senator CLARK. There was a somewhat more debated issue here on Wednesday on whether the United States, to quote directly, "should mute past charges that one-party governments are by definition anti-democratic." What is the U.S. description of the attitudes toward one-party government? Do we have any position that you could elaborate on with respect to that point?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, I think that I am unaware of official U.S. Government spokesmen making charges of this nature about African governments, certainly in recent times.

I am not quite sure what they have in mind in this regard.

Senator CLARK. It is my recollection that some of the witnesses, I think Mr. Isaacman in particular, made the point that we should publicly acknowledge or operate on the assumption that one-party governments were not necessarily undemocratic. As I understand your answer, you are saying that you know of no one in the U.S. Government who has taken the position that you would not want to deal with one-party governments or give assistance to them? You did not express yourself as to their democratic or antidemocratic nature?

Mr. DAVIS. I am certainly unaware of any recent statements by U.S. Government spokesmen to which the professor might have been referring.

Senator CLARK. We deal in any case with a lot of one-party states and give assistance to a great number of them, including the old Government of Portugal and many, many others.

RIGHT OF INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENTS TO REWRITE CONTRACTS WITH MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS

Another proposal that was made was that the United States should recognize the right of the new government to rewrite contracts with multinational corporations. Given the fact that these contracts were written by the colonial power rather than by independent govern-

ments, I assume that the U.S. Government attitude toward rewriting these contracts in Angola and Mozambique, would be that you would not be opposed to that, that it would be up to the local government to decide, would it not?

Mr. DAVIS. Well my own thought in this regard is that United States—again, I am not quite sure what the professor was getting at, because the book value of direct U.S. investment in Mozambique has been estimated at only \$15 million and there are three firms.

Senator CLARK. Would you list those?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, sir, Mobil Oil has an investment of about \$4.8 million, mostly in oil terminal facilities. Caltex has an investment of about \$4 million, also primarily in oil terminal facilities. And General Tire has an investment of \$3.2 million in a tire plant. Now several U.S. firms are interested in obtaining petroleum exploration concessions and I really do not quite know what the professor would be urging us to do in this regard.

Senator CLARK. Regardless of the size of the investment, I think what he is urging us to do is to recognize the right of this new government of Mozambique to rewrite contracts with these multinational corporations, that you have listed in terms of arriving at new contract arrangements with them, what our Government's attitude toward that would be.

Mr. DAVIS. Well, I think that regarding the U.S. Government attitudes toward investment, and toward the responsibilities of a host country in connection with investment, I think that I should note that U.S. policies in this regard are rooted in international law, and that the U.S. policies do have worldwide applicability. I am not sure what the professor is suggesting that we do, but I think that we should all bear in mind that a position that the U.S. Government takes in terms of the posture of our Government on investment questions is not one that we can take in one single country in the world, and that we must consider the worldwide implications, and the consistency of position which any government must bear in mind as it considers the situation in any particular country.

Senator CLARK. Could you be more specific? I am not sure I understand that.

Mr. DAVIS. For example, in investment policies around the world there are standards. If a host country does, for whatever reason, make a decision, for example, to nationalize the properties of another country, of the nationals of another country—

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Mr. DAVIS [continuing]. The U.S. Government has never taken the position that that is not within its right. The U.S. Government's position has been that if a country does that, then it does have certain obligations under international law for prompt and effective compensation. And now there is a very broadly established set of principles under international law, and there are very broadly established policies in the U.S. Government as to what our view of our own obligations, the view of what international law requires in this whole area, and I guess my point was that I do not, in honesty, think that it is practical for the U.S. Government to set up a special set of rules for a particular country.

Senator CLARK. Oh, no. I understand that. I do not know whether the witness was suggesting that. Let me not suggest, at any rate, that there be a special relationship between the United States and Mozambique in that respect. But as I interpret this, we are talking about whether we recognize the right of the new government of Mozambique to rewrite contracts, not nationalize, to rewrite the contractual relationship with our corporations.

Mr. DAVIS. Then I suppose my problem is that you have me a little in over my head in terms of what the legalities of the situation are, and what I would suggest is that I see if I can get a clarification that can be inserted in the record.

Senator CLARK. I think that is a good idea. In other words, you are just not sure what our government's position is with regard to contracts with local countries and our corporations?

Mr. DAVIS. And I would hesitate, in testimony, to try to indicate in a highly technical legal question what our possibilities might be.

Senator CLARK. I must say I do not know the answer to that either, although I would certainly think that a new government would have the right to determine their relationship with the corporations that do business in their country. I would hope, for example, when the U.S. Government broke away from Great Britain 200 years ago they were not bound forever by the contracts that Great Britain made with other countries or companies. I guess there were no multinational corporations at that time, but the principle would be the same. I do not see why the new government [Frelimo], would have to be bound by the Portuguese contracts with Americans or other kinds of multinational corporations.

Mr. DAVIS. I think, though, that this is a legal question in which, if I am informed, there are a good many precedents.

INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CASES OF MULTINATIONAL OBLIGATIONS WITH NEW GOVERNMENTS

Senator CLARK. Is there such a thing as international law that is abided by in such cases as this?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, I think again I speak from far less than certain knowledge, but when a new government assumes responsibilities in a territory, I have some impression that that new government certainly takes into consideration whether it is going to assume a posture toward ongoing obligations that have been inherited, and so I am not sure that this is a real issue. But in any case, as I say, I think that I would be on much sounder ground if I did get an informed and a thoughtful answer for the record.

Senator CLARK. Yes; Fine. We would like to have that.

[The information referred to follows:]

LEGALITY OF GOVERNMENT OF NEW STATE REWRITING CONTRACTS

[Supplied by State Department]

Whether the government of a new State, such as the People's Republic of Mozambique, is legally entitled to rewrite contracts entered into on that State's behalf by its predecessor turns on a number of factors, including the content of the law the new State inherits, the law of that State as its new government revises it, the nature and terms (including governing law) of the contracts in question,

and the responsibility of States under international law for the treatment of alien property rights. Without consideration of these factors it is not possible to decide, in a particular case, whether a government of a successor State is entitled to rewrite a contract with a foreigner. It is certainly possible that, under domestic law (if it be governing), as it is inherited by or revised by the government of a successor State, that government would be entitled to revise contracts with aliens. In that event, however, under the rules of international law, it would not be entitled arbitrarily to impose revisions on other contracting parties, nor would it be entitled to seize property rights and interests arising out of the contractual relationship without payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation. In practice, U.S. companies having contracts with foreign governments generally have demonstrated considerable willingness to renegotiate those contracts in the light of changing circumstances.

FRELIMO RIGHT TO CREATE SOCIALIST SOCIETY, THIRD WORLD NONALIGNMENT POLICY

Senator CLARK. I am still going through the list of suggestions that we had, and again, this is a rather amorphous kind of thing to describe. Let me read it to you. "The United States must recognize the government's right," speaking of Mozambique, "to create a new Mozambican society organized around socialist principles and committed to a policy of third world nonalignment." What is your response to that suggestion?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, I think that President Ford's expression of welcoming Mozambique's independence, and his expression of a readiness to be as helpful as we can was made in the full knowledge of the fact that every prospect is that Mozambique will regard itself as a nonaligned country, and in every recognition of the nature of the Frelimo, and of the political positions that have already laid forth by the Frelimo's leader.

Senator CLARK. That it be independent?

Mr. DAVIS. It has made it entirely clear over an extended period of time that they regard themselves as Socialists and Marxists, so that I think that the assurance that our welcoming of their independence and our desire to be helpful is made entirely within the context that you are talking about.

U.N. FUND TO ASSIST COMPLIANCE WITH SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA

Senator CLARK. It has been further suggested that the United States should contribute to the fund, some people refer to it as the commonwealth fund, to help Mozambique comply with economic sanctions against Rhodesia. What is your view of this?

Mr. DAVIS. Our understanding of the present state of play is that efforts are underway to promote a U.N.-sponsored appeal to provide assistance to Mozambique to deal with the impact of its imposing United Nations sanctions on Rhodesia, of its decision to join those countries enforcing sanctions. And, at this point, we have no indication what this appeal would be, as to what form this appeal would take. In fact, such indications as we have are that assistance granted to Mozambique would be regarded as in the context of what the effort underway in the United Nations would envisage, if you see what I mean.

Senator CLARK. No; I am not sure that I do.

Mr. DAVIS. Well, if a country were to give assistance to Mozambique directly, such direct assistance would be regarded by the organizers of this effort in the United Nations as falling within the context of what they are asking countries to do.

Senator CLARK. Yes; I understand.

Mr. DAVIS. And so we are ready, independent of the question of whether it is in the context of the sanctions or in the context of our general willingness to try to be helpful to Mozambique, to consider providing Mozambique with development assistance.

Senator CLARK. So you do not rule this out as a possibility that we would contribute to such a fund? You have it under consideration?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, in terms of the form that such assistance might take, the discussions in New York have not gotten to the point where we can see very clearly what the request will be. So, I would say that the desire to be helpful to Mozambique, whatever the context, is there.

Senator CLARK. Good. It seems to me entirely possible that for one reason or another you may end up not giving very much direct aid to Mozambique, perhaps simply because the request is not made, or the details of the negotiation are not worked out, but that this other avenue might be open to us through the United Nations, should that appeal be made. As I interpret your answer, you indicate that you have a positive attitude in aid toward Mozambique, and that it might take the form of direct aid, or that it might take the form of assistance through the fund, is that correct?

Mr. DAVIS. If the considerations in New York produced a request for some kind of U.N. fund, we would certainly give it consideration.

Senator CLARK. I see. Is it too much to say that it is under active consideration now?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, I think that the terms of the U.N. consideration of this matter are not to the point where a U.S. Government response is the current question. Now, in terms of active consideration of how we can be helpful to Mozambique, that certainly is true.

MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE TO MOZAMBIQUE ADVANTAGES

Senator CLARK. It seems to me that there are a number of advantages to this kind of multilateral assistance at this point with Mozambique. It does not rule out bilateral assistance, but if for one reason or another, because of our past relationship with Frelimo, we were not able to work out a bilateral agreement, than this kind of multilateral assistance and other kinds might be a very good beginning. Do you share that view?

Mr. DAVIS. In this regard, I would simply say that we hope that we can find useful ways to be helpful to Mozambique as it comes to independence.

Senator CLARK. That does not seem to me to be very responsive to what I am asking. Let me try to put it another way. I am trying to be more specific in simply saying that because of our policies toward the Frelimo in the past, because of the policy followed regarding the NATO alliance with Portugal, which I outlined in my opening statement, there is a natural reluctance on the part of Frelimo party to be eager to accept aid from the United States. But

certainly they are going to be interested, I should think, in accepting aid through the United Nations, through various development programs, and the very logical beginning for us in trying to extend our hand of friendship to this new country would be through multilateral aid programs of various kinds. The Commonwealth fund would be one, but there are many others. Any means which we could find to give assistance in a multilateral way would be a very logical and a very important thing. That is what I am really asking you to comment on.

Mr. DAVIS. Well, I would have one or two comments. One, to say that my understanding of the situation in New York is at present that there is no decision to structure such appeal as there may be to a request for donations to one or another U.N. fund. Now, if there were to be such a request, and I certainly have to say in frankness that there is none, now there is no U.S. position yet formed. There is also the additional consideration that the ways in which the U.S. Government can make donations of appropriated funds are subject to the limitations of legislation, and as I understand, and I will ask Mr. Conroy to confirm or correct me in this regard, that our possible sources of funding to the U.S. Government are determined by those available funds which the Congress has authorized.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Mr. DAVIS. Which means that we cannot simply automatically take some funds that may be available within the AID appropriation and convert them to a donation to a voluntary contribution to the United Nations.

Senator CLARK. No; but you could ask for it in the next budget request.

Mr. DAVIS. That certainly is true. But there is also the obvious questions of timing as this situation unfolds. If what is desired will be dependent on the budget request in the next budget cycle, there are a whole series of considerations that we would have to take into account as we try to form our position.

Now, am I right in my description of the legislative situation, Mr. Conroy?

Mr. CONROY. Yes, sir.

U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD MULTILATERAL AID

Senator CLARK. I guess what I am really trying to get you to say, and I do not think you are going to say it, is that it would seem very forthcoming for our Government to be prepared to say that we are more than anxious to help through every multilateral source possible to assist Mozambique, and whenever, and however that may be done that is consistent with our goals. It just seems to me that that is the logical beginning since we have not been successful in our very preliminary negotiations with the Frelimo bilaterally.

Mr. DAVIS. But you understand my problem?

Senator CLARK. I understand that you cannot fill a specific request that has not been made. I am not asking that you do that.

Mr. DAVIS. Then you also understand my problem that I cannot commit funds to a contribution to an international organization that may not be appropriated?

Senator CLARK. I am not sure I understand that. I mean, we contribute funds certainly to most of the international organizations. We do not contribute to the African Development Fund, unfortunately, but I do not understand that the Congress prevents you from contributing. In fact, we are a regular contributor to many of the multi-lateral organizations.

Mr. DAVIS. Oh, I understand that entirely. But what I mean is that in order to make a commitment for a contribution to a U.N. organization, we must have the appropriations to do so authorized by the Congress to make that contribution through that channel.

Senator CLARK. I understand. But there are many ways of doing that, and historically, the administration has found many ways to get money to people, consistent with the law. In fact, you could offer an amendment to the current AID bill that we passed. Maybe the Congress would not do that, and admittedly you have to have Congressional authority at some point to do those things. I do not expect you to violate the law to do them, but rather to simply be prepared to offer an amendment to the current AID bill, or to take whatever measures are necessary, if the will is there to do it. I guess I am really asking about the will to do it rather than the technical, legal requirements to do it.

Mr. DAVIS. Well, what I certainly can say is that we do have under consideration what ways that we can be of assistance to Mozambique. And I guess I have to say in honesty that I cannot now tell what our course of action might be.

Senator CLARK. Fine.

Mr. DAVIS. Incidentally, there are a number of channels through which we can do it, such as the U.N. High Commission for Refugees, a program which we now have under active consideration and, of course, the UNDP (United Nations Development Program) to which we do regularly contribute.

U.S. CONTACT WITH LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

Senator CLARK. One of the witnesses yesterday expressed concern about the lack of contact between the U.S. Government and the liberation movements during the colonial wars. They suggested this mistake not be repeated in our relation with the liberation movements in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa. What kind of contact has the United States had with the liberation movements in Mozambique from the founding of the Frelimo on? I do not necessarily want you to go back to talk about the history of that, but can you just briefly, at least in the recent period talk about what those contacts might have been. I ask you to do that really in preparation for a further question so that we can keep it in that context of what kind of communications we may now have with the liberation movements in Rhodesia, Namibia, or South Africa?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, perhaps with your permission I might take the second question first?

Senator CLARK. Fine. Fine. That is really the question that I want to ask in any case.

Mr. DAVIS. As you know, I have not been in office very long myself since I was sworn in on April 1. But during that very brief time I have

had an opportunity personally to meet and talk with Bishop Muzorewa, Reverend Sithole, Canaan Banana, and other leaders of the Rhodesian, or Zimbabwean black leadership, and I also have had the opportunity to meet and talk with the head of SWAPO, the liberation group in Namibia, so I can assure you that the U.S. Government does not have a position of declining to have contact with the senior and responsible leaders of black movements in either place.

Senator CLARK. How about in South Africa?

Mr. DAVIS. South Africa. I have not had an occasion during this time to meet personally, and neither, might I say, have requests been made to me.

Senator CLARK. But you would not be opposed to that?

Mr. DAVIS. I do believe that other officials of the U.S. Government most certainly have met with black leaders.

Senator CLARK. And of those—I am sorry.

Mr. DAVIS. Perhaps Mr. Arenales can give more answer in that regard.

Mr. ARENALES. We have had very occasional contact with members of the South African nationalist movements, principally at the medium level through our embassies in Dar-es-Salaam and Malawi. It has been very occasional, and they have not sought contact with us to any significant degree.

Senator CLARK. Fine.

Mr. DAVIS. I might say that I do not mean to express the position about a request that had not been made. I simply do not know what, to be honest—

Senator CLARK. You do not know whether you would meet with leaders of the South African Government if they would ask you? You want to wait until they have made that request before you consider that, is that what you are saying?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, to be perfectly honest, having been in office only slightly over 2 months, the question has not come up, and in the relatively short time I have been in this job, I have discovered that there is a fair amount of theology in many questions that do come up, and I would just as soon not simply speak off the cuff as to what the situation or the position of the U.S. Government would be, because as I say, I am just simply uninformed, and the question has not come up, and I have not addressed it.

MEETINGS WITH LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

Senator CLARK. Let us talk about the meetings that you have had. Did you find those useful?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, I did indeed.

Senator CLARK. On Namibia?

Mr. DAVIS. I did indeed.

Senator CLARK. I guess the basis of my question is whether we are going to repeat the same error—or at least in my judgment with regard to the Frelimo in Mozambique—in Rhodesia, or in Namibia or in South Africa. I interpret your answer to be no. We are going to have regular contact, at least, or we have had some contact in the case of Namibia and Rhodesia or Zimbabwe, and you think that is useful and helpful?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, sir.

IMPACT OF MOZAMBIQUE COMPLIANCE WITH SANCTIONS ON
RHODESIAN NEGOTIATIONS

Senator CLARK. What will be the impact of Mozambique's compliance with sanctions on the Rhodesian negotiations, in your judgment?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, I thought that my colleagues had prepared some rather specific material on the effect of sanction. Where is the list of countries and what would happen to them?

If I understand your question, it is essentially what would be the effect of the Mozambique's closing the port in terms of the impact?

Senator CLARK. That is correct.

Mr. DAVIS. On Mozambique itself or neighboring countries?

Senator CLARK. No, on Rhodesian negotiations.

Mr. DAVIS. Oh, I am sorry. Excuse me.

What I think is certainly very clear is that a closing of the Mozambique ports and transit facilities to Rhodesian traffic would have a very large impact on the economic situation in Rhodesia, and so that that cannot help but affect the political climate on which negotiations and discussions would go forward.

Senator CLARK. And you think that would amount to a favorable impact on the kind of solution that our Government would like to see in Rhodesia?

Mr. DAVIS. Certainly that is the basic premise of the U.N. economic sanctions that have the full support of my government.

Senator CLARK. Good.

Mr. DAVIS. Of our government.

REVIEW OF NSSM 39

Senator CLARK. There has been a lot of discussion about this memorandum, NSSM 39. Is it fair to say that that memorandum is now under review, particularly in light of the new independence of Mozambique and the pending independence of Angola, or did it ever have any real status, in your judgment?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, of course the controversy that surrounded NSSM 39 antedated my coming to these responsibilities. My understanding of that history is that the memorandum itself was widely misunderstood and widely misinterpreted, and that if I understand it correctly, that the action decisions that were imputed as to be a part of that memorandum were not, in fact, taken. So that this really I think is, in a sense, a nonissue as to whether the actions that were alleged to have been taken should now be reviewed.

Senator CLARK. I think I will not pursue that any further.

IMPORTANCE OF MOZAMBIQUE PORTS TO U.S. SHIPPING, U.S. NAVY

How important is the capital city of Mozambique which is about to be renamed, or has it just been renamed, I think—Can Phumo—to U.S. shipping or to the U.S. Navy?

What is your assessment of that port?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, Mozambique has 1,500 miles of coastline on the Indian Ocean. Perhaps I could broaden the discussion to mention both, or mention Lourenco Marques, Beira, and Nacala which are the three principal ports.

Senator CLARK. Good.

Mr. DAVIS. The U.S. Navy has used Lourenco Marques in the past at an average frequency of some four times a year as a bunkering, ship visit, and shore leave port. And certainly its closing to us would no longer enable us to do this. The nearest African port on the Indian Ocean north of Mozambique is the Kenyan Port of Mombasa, and that would represent the necessity of steaming further in order to obtain bunkering. The other alternative, of course, is to get bunkering at sea by tanker, and this is—

Senator CLARK. Is to do what?

Mr. DAVIS. To get bunkering at sea by tanker. In other words, refueling afloat, and this essentially is a question of somewhat increased costs.

Senator CLARK. So you do not see it as an enormously strategic or of great strategic military importance, as I understand your answer?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, certainly under present circumstances, I think the way the port has been used has been principally for the purposes I have indicated.

SOVIET UNION NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING USE OF MOZAMBIQUE PORTS

Senator CLARK. Right. You may have noticed yesterday a report, and I will just identify it as a story that I read last night in the Washington Star that there may be negotiations underway between the new Government of Mozambique and the Soviet Union with regard to using some of the ports there for refueling or other kinds of uses. Are you aware of those reports, or do you know anything about them?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, perhaps the only comment that I could make, obviously it is up to the new Government of Mozambique as to what facilities it wishes to make available to whom. But I would say only this, that my understanding of the general posture of the Government of Mozambique is that it wishes to enter into every sense into the nonaligned group of countries, and there is at least some sentiment in Africa that the African nations do not, and of course, it depends on what would be the nature of the relationship between Mozambique and whatever great powers that it might make arrangements with. But I do not think that one should assume automatically that the Government of Mozambique is going to rush into extensive arrangements with the Soviet Union, certainly without more clear evidence that that is their intention.

TERMS OF U.S. OFFER OF WHEAT TO COMBAT SHORTAGES

Senator CLARK. I am switching subjects here. What is your understanding in terms of the United States offer to send wheat to combat the shortages caused by the war of independence and the flooding of the Limpopo River Valley? What were the conditions to that wheat offer? Can you explain that at all?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, sir.

The United States' preparedness to consider requests from Mozambique for any title I, Public Law 480 wheat reflected our desire to reflect the then projected shortfall in wheat requirements, but was not directly related to the flooding of the Limpopo Valley last February.

We separately provided \$250,000 in flood relief assistance, of which \$225,000 was given through the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization for seed purchases and transport, and \$25,000 was made available directly to the U.S. Consul General in Lourenco Marques.

Since the Mozambique transitional government did not request Public Law 480, title I wheat, there was no need to develop specific conditions for an agreement.

If an agreement had been concluded, it is probable that we would have offered the most generous terms permitted under the act; that is, 40 years repayment including a 10-year grace period at 2 percent during the grace period and 3 percent thereafter. Such terms would be less favorable than the 20,000 metric tons of wheat which Sweden provided on a grant basis, but considerably more favorable than the accepted Romanian wheat transaction for 100,000 metric tons which we understand involved shorter-term commercial credits.

We believe the wheat purchased from South Africa was also essentially a commercial transaction, concluded for timing of availability purposes to meet an immediate need.

Finally, Mozambique wheat requirements are reportedly met until January 1976. The United States remains prepared to consider a Mozambique request for Public Law 480, title I wheat for delivery in 1976, and the indicative Public Law 480, title I program for fiscal year 1976, which has been forwarded to the Congress, include 25,000 metric tons of the wheat for Mozambique.

Senator CLARK. I hope that you will not consider this remark too critical or in too critical a light, but you have obviously considered very carefully all of the terms of the contract that you would make to Mozambique for a wheat request without them ever having made the request, and yet in the case of the fund, you are unwilling to take it under consideration until a request is actually formalized and brought forward. What is the difference in the two situations?

Mr. DAVIS. I would say that one difference is that we have a position on the wheat question. I did say that we were not considering the other question, but I do not have a position that I can give you, Sir.

Senator CLARK. But you think if Mozambique had asked for wheat that they would have gotten wheat under title I of Public Law 480 under the most favorable terms possible?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK. And you are open to that request now from Mozambique, and if you knew the Mozambique Government in the period between now and June 25, or following June 25 would make such a request, do you think that our Government would look favorably upon it?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, sir. I might also say that another element in the difference, of course, is that the form and structure of what may be decided and acted upon in the U.N. forum is not yet clear.

HEARING PROCEDURE

Senator CLARK. I have been getting urgent messages passed to me that we are having a live quorum call on the Senate floor, and that the leadership expects everyone to be there. Since this is about the third one, I think I better go over and answer the live quorum. I will be

right back. I think we can conclude the hearing certainly by 12 o'clock, or slightly before. But if you will excuse me, we will stand in recess for about 7 or 8 minutes.

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, sir.

[A recess was taken.]

Senator CLARK. I have been advised that under unanimous-consent agreement committees are not to meet during the Resolution 166, so this hearing will have to end.

Let me just say that I would like to have you provide for the record two or three things. One, the number of students that have been educated through our Government's assistance to the African American Institute so that we might have it for the record with the country breakdowns. We are particularly encouraged that there is renewed interest in that program. I think that it is a good program.

[The information referred to follows:]

STUDENTS EDUCATED THROUGH U.S. ASSISTANCE TO AFRICAN AMERICAN INSTITUTE
 [Supplied by Department of State]

The African-American Institute (AAI) has trained (a) 95 Rhodesians under the African Scholarship Program with American Universities (ASPAU), and (b) 4 Rhodesians and 1 Mozambican under the African Graduate Scholarship Program (AFGRAD). Both these programs were financed by AID, with American universities waiving tuition costs and some fees.

AID has also provided funds for administering a scholarship program by the Association of African Universities under which 18 refugees from Southern Africa were sponsored by the Organization for African Unity. We do not have the country breakdown.

Senator CLARK. The other item that I wish you would have prepared for us to have inserted in the record is the report that the State Department has been asked to make, I think, in the last AID bill as to aid to Africa and, indeed, whether Africa is getting a fair share of that aid request. We can give you more details on the exact data. Are you familiar with the report that I speak of?

Mr. DAVIS. I am sure Mr. Conroy is.

Mr. CONROY. Yes.

Senator CLARK. We would like to put that in the record at this point. We have a strong feeling that Africa may not really be getting a fair share of the very limited bilateral aid we give in this country. We would like to have that put in the record at this point and consider it particularly in the light of the forthcoming AID program or AID bill.

[The information referred to follows:]

AID REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SEC. 49 OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1974
 [Supplied by Department of State]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
 AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
 Washington, D.C., June 27, 1975.

HON. NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER,
 President of the Senate,
 Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Pursuant to section 49 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, I am pleased to inform the Congress on efforts to provide African countries with an equitable share of development economic assistance administered by the Agency for International Development.

Section 49 calls for greater emphasis on development programs in Africa. The Agency's immediate response to this mandate is an intense effort to expand

programs which meet the pressing needs arising from the drought emergency. The special funds provided by the Foreign Disaster Assistance Act of 1974 substantially increased the funds available to Africa. Beyond the effort made possible by these funds, A.I.D. has sought to be responsive, within limits of available funds, to the special needs arising from the energy crisis and the attendant dramatic increase in basic commodity prices, particularly fuel, fertilizer and food prices.

The work of A.I.D. is now directed to seeking the incorporation of both the new directions and the greater volume of funding available as a result of the Sahel crisis into the overall regular development program. To this end, the Development Assistance Programs (DAPs) stress the concerns of the Congressional mandate to address particularly the problems of the rural poor and to create, to the extent possible, conditions in which the target population can contribute to the alleviation of chronic food shortages while simultaneously achieving a greater share of the benefits of growth. To a significant extent, this change in emphasis leads to the A.I.D. Africa Bureau developing activities in countries which have not been, in the past, countries of A.I.D.'s principal concern and where, especially in French-speaking Africa, other donors have long been the principal donors.

A.I.D. is, therefore, particularly concerned with bringing about close collaboration with such other donors, primarily the French Ministry of Cooperation, the European Development Fund, and the World Bank, and to address in concert with them the major problems whose solutions transcend the capabilities of individual donor agencies. With this objective, A.I.D. has sought bilateral meetings with the French and the European Fund and has, jointly with the French, taken the initiative of calling on the DAC to provide leadership in forming a Consultative Group among donors, initially for the Sahel States. It is envisaged that under this leadership major programs of river basin development along the Senegal and Niger Rivers and in the Lake Chad Basin will be formulated and jointly implemented. A.I.D.'s contribution in such joint efforts will be made in those fields where U.S. technology and expertise have a particularly important part to play, such as in range management, water resource development, dry land agriculture, all supported by the ERTS technology in which the United States has world leadership.

In developing these programs jointly with others, A.I.D. is not neglecting opportunities for bilateral action aimed at improving the welfare of the rural poor target population in the least developed African countries. We are making headway through a variety of programs with shorter lead times, aimed at increasing crop and livestock production, and relating the achievement of these specific objectives to improved services in health and education. In this respect, A.I.D. is deeply conscious of the need to reconcile, both in the short run and over the longer term, conflicts between the goal of rapidly increasing food production and the humanitarian and equity concerns for the deprived rural populations in most of the developing countries of Africa which are implicit in the Congressional mandate.

While the Agency is thus sensitive to the need to increase rapidly the resource flow to African countries, there are some difficulties in bringing about substantial increase in the assistance volume in the short term. These can be summarized as follows:

A. Limited absorptive capacity, caused by:

Lack of trained manpower, and lack of local financial resources to finance on-going recurrent costs of development projects.

B. Changes in the country focus:

There is new focus on countries, especially those of the Sahel and others of Francophone Africa, where the U.S. has been until recently only quite marginally involved and now needs to define its role in relation both to host countries and the traditional major donors.

C. Some elements of the operational guidelines set out in the Congressional Mandate:

The Mandate calls for a more explicit commitment to the service of the needs of the rural poor than is typical of the development approaches of most host country governments in Africa.

The Mandate includes restrictions on the allocation of funds to the development of physical infrastructure, in the presence of often critical needs for basic transport, communication and administrative services to permit the development of agricultural, health and education projects especially in rural areas.

Despite these constraints, there are good reasons to expect that resource flows to Africa can be substantially increased in the coming years. The bold, generous and effective U.S. response to the drought calamity has led to increased confidence in A.I.D. as a dedicated contributor to African development. The formulation of national development plans by African countries and A.I.D.'s own major effort to formulate multi-year DAPs provide an analytical framework within which an expanding assistance strategy can be built. Beyond that, the drought and the energy crisis have led to a sense of increased urgency among African governments concerning the need to strengthen their rural production base and to undertake major structural changes through major river basin development schemes and the eradication of the most destructive endemic diseases. Lack of progress in these areas has precluded the exploitation of vast land areas throughout Africa for crop and livestock production.

Excluding drought assistance provided by special Congressional action in FY 1975, the FY 1976 A.I.D. request for Africa for regular development assistance does reflect an increase over FY 1974 and FY 1975. We anticipate that this trend will continue dependent particularly upon the momentum of the drought recovery programs.

Sincerely,

DANIEL PARKER,
Administrator.

Senator CLARK. Let me say that we do look forward to working with you on this subcommittee, and to hopefully making small contributions to better relations with southern Africa particularly in the context of these hearings. We will probably ask you to come back again early next year to see what kind of progress we have made with regard to Mozambique, Angola, and the other countries of southern Africa, to see, indeed, whether our proposals have been carried out. These hearings will, of course, continue. I know, Mr. Secretary, that you are going to be traveling to Africa in the next few days, and that others in the State Department will be here for our hearings on Angola next week, and then later on Rhodesia and South Africa. We wish you very well in your new job and look forward to meeting with you.

This hearing will end.

[Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the hearing was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA

Angola

MONDAY, JUNE 16, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m. in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Dick Clark (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senator Clark.

Senator CLARK. The committee will come to order. I have asked the three panelists today to come up to the table.

I have a brief opening statement, after which we are going to hear from John Marcum, first, I think; then Douglas Wheeler, and then Gerald Bender.

OPENING STATEMENT

On November 11, Angola will become an independent state. It will be a nation rich in natural resources: Petroleum, copper, diamonds, iron, manganese, and the fourth largest coffee exporter in the world. Although the Portuguese did little to develop Angola's health and educational facilities or the infrastructure needed for broad-based economic development, the country's natural resource wealth should enable the new Government to rapidly improve living standards. Angola already has one of the highest per capita GNP's [gross national product] in Africa.

Yet this tremendous promise could go unrealized for many years. Angola could be thrown into a long and tragic civil war at or before independence. The first years of Angola's independence could be years of destruction rather than development, of suffering rather than improved living standards for the people. The deep political divisions within Angola have already marred the period of transition of independence. This was to have been a time for uniting the three liberation movements in a joint effort to map out Angola's economic and political future. Instead, there have been frequent clashes between the liberation movements in which hundreds have died, thousands have been injured.

It would be tragic indeed if the people of Angola, having suffered so long under colonial domination, were catapulted at independence into a civil war. Many of Angola's friends are working hard to prevent this from happening. Portugal is making a real effort to assure that Angola will achieve unity and peace before independence. Many

African nations are trying to mediate the dispute among liberation movement leaders. The meeting of these leaders that is now taking place in Nairobi is an indication that they themselves are still trying to find ways to resolve their differences and prevent civil war.

The most important question before this subcommittee today is what this country can do to help Angola achieve independence as a unified, peaceful nation. It is also important that we understand what this Government must avoid doing so that it will not aggravate the divisiveness of Angola. Policymakers here must explore every possible source of U.S. influence over the parties involved and their backers and determine how this influence could be used to encourage peace. The U.S. Government must also give support and encouragement to those nations which are trying to bring about reconciliation among the parties.

The witnesses today—Prof. John Marcum, Prof. Douglas Wheeler, and Prof. Gerald Bender—are all well-known experts on Angola. If anyone in this country can provide answers to the many and complex questions concerning the situation in Angola and what U.S. policy should be there, they can. Hopefully, the subcommittee can discuss with them today U.S. policy toward Angola, U.S. interests there, the nature of the liberation movements and the character of their leaders, the interests of other countries in Angola and their policies, and the economic future of Angola. At the end of these hearings, we hope to have a fairly clear idea of what specific actions the U.S. Government could take to improve the prospects of peace and unity in Angola and also of the rationale supporting these actions.

First, I think we will hear all three papers, and the remainder of our time, until 12 noon if necessary, will be spent on discussion.

We will hear, as the agenda says, first Dr. Douglas Wheeler, professor, University of New Hampshire; then John Marcum and Gerald Bender.

[Professor Wheeler's biography follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL MATERIAL ON PROF. DOUGLAS L. WHEELER

Personal

Born: July 19, 1937, St. Louis, Mo.

Married: June 13, 1964 (Katherine Wells).

Children: two (aged 5 and 8): Lucille and Katherine.

Education

St. Louis Country Day School, St. Louis, Mo. (High School Certificate), 1955.

A.B. (History), Dartmouth College, 1959.

M.A. (History), Boston University, 1960.

Ph. D. (History/African Studies), Boston University, 1963.

Fellowships—Grants

NDEA fellowship, 1959–63 in African Studies, to prepare as teacher of African History in College, Boston University's African Studies Program.

Fulbright fellowship, 1961–62, to University of Lisbon, to do research in Portuguese colonial history (first group of American students in program sent to Portugal).

Fulbright-Hays Faculty Research Fellowship, 1969–70; to study Portugal and Angola, travel, research.

Research grants, University of New Hampshire, 1966, 1974–75 for Angolan and Portuguese History.

Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation (Lisbon) grant for research on Portuguese modern history, 1972–73.

Grant from Gulbenkian Foundation, awarded March 1975, for advancement of modern Portuguese studies in U.S.A. (under aegis of academic association (Conf. Group on Modern Portugal)).

Teaching positions

Part-time lecturer, History, Morgan State College, Baltimore. (Spring 1965).
 Assistant Professor (1965-69); Associate Professor (1969-1975).
 Professor of Modern African and Iberian History, Department of History, University of New Hampshire, Durham (1975-present).
 Visiting Lecturer, History, University College, Rhodesia, Spring, 1967.
 Visiting Associate Professor, African History, African Studies Center, Boston University, Fall, 1969; Spring, 1972.
 Chairman, Department of History, University of New Hampshire, 1971-74.

Membership: Professional associations

African Studies Association.
 Phi Alpha Theta (Honorary, Historical fraternity).
 Iberian Social Studies Association (U.K.).
 Society of Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies.
 International Conference Group on Modern Portugal (since 1972, co-Chairperson).
 American Association of Univ. Professors (at various times since 1965).

Publications

Books.—ANGOLA (with M. René Pélissier) (New York: Praeger, London: Pall Mall, 1971).

Articles.—A number of articles in scholarly journals such as:

The Journal of Modern History (June 1972).

The J. of African History (1968).

African Historical Studies (1968, 1969, 1970, etc.).

B. of Missouri Historical Society (1961, 1962).

Foreign Affairs (July 1970: "Thaw in Portugal").

Chapters in books on Africa (seven), 1966-73.

Collier's Encyclopedia (1967; 1972; 1975-6 editions).

Merit Student's Encyclopedia (same).

Articles on Angola, Mozambique, Guinea and Portugal: book reviews, in *Race, J. of Af. History, J. of Mod. Hist.*, etc.

Recent Articles:

American Policy Toward Southern Africa: Critical Choices. *Issue. A Quarterly Journal of Africanist Opinion* (IV, no. 2, Summer, 1974), pp. 4-8.

"Re-thinking Southern Africa," *The Christian Science Monitor* (August 1, 1974).

"Portuguese Africa on rocky path to self-rule," *The Christian Science Monitor* (Sept. 9, 1974).

"Portugal," *The Christian Science Monitor* (Feb. 20, 1975).

"Portugal," *The Christian Science Monitor* (April 7, 1975).

"Portugal: what the U.S. should do," *The Christian Science Monitor* (May 28, 1975).

"The First Portuguese Republic: a Mini-History," *The Portuguese Times* (New Bedford, Mass., June 5, 1975).

Book in progress

"*Politics in the Portuguese Republic, 1910-1933*".

Consulting work

Council on Foreign Relations (1973; 1974).

Department of State (1974).

Center for Strategic and International Studies (1968).

Hoover Institution (1972).

The Christian Science Monitor (1974-75).

Newsweek (March 1975).

Historical research, residence in foreign countries

Portugal, 1961-62; 1964, 1967, 1969, 1970, 1972-73; 1974; 1975.

Southern Africa (including Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, S. Africa) 1966-67.

Europe, 1962, 1969, 1973.

STATEMENT OF PROF. DOUGLAS L. WHEELER, UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Mr. WHEELER. I would like to thank the subcommittee for inviting me to testify before it on the subject of Angola.

In this presentation, I shall make six major points. Briefly, and in summary, they are the following:

One, the historical record of Angola, both remote and recent, suggests that there are deep roots to the current political fragmentation and conflict in that country and that, even under good conditions, political unity and stable government will be difficult to establish.

Two, the Alvor Agreement, signed on January 15, 1975, between Portugal and the three major Angolan nationalist parties is, on paper, a masterful piece of diplomacy and compromise; its provisions should be studied and enforced.

Three, the reasons why portions of this important agreement are not being honored lie in a fierce power struggle among the nationalist parties and in the way that the military provisions of the Agreement have worked in practice.

Four, Angola is now experiencing aspects of a limited, ephemeral but bloody civil war which could burgeon into an Angolan variant of the Spanish Civil War with grave international repercussions.

Five, U.S. policy in the remaining months before Angola's scheduled independence should strictly avoid any form of intervention in Angola's internal affairs and should support the Portuguese Government's efforts to enforce the provisions of the Alvor Agreement.

Six, I believe that what the Angolan people require now and in the near future is not military aid but massive economic and humanitarian aid, law and order, and the peace necessary to begin their age of independence in dignity and calm.

HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS OF CURRENT POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND CONFLICT

I shall now discuss each major point in order and at greater length.

First, the historical dimensions of the current political fragmentation and conflict. Angola's political history has been largely tragic: centuries of slave trade and wars, slavery, forced labor, and severe repression of the African opposition by the Portuguese. Adapting Conor Cruise O'Brien's memorable saying and applying to Angola's history, it can be said that the study of Angola's history is like sitting on the cat—its surprises leave their scars. For both colonizers and the colonized in this massive territory there were many surprises in store. For centuries, Africans were surprised that the Portuguese could survive in their coastal foothold and conquer an area of 80,000 square miles. In early 1961, when insurgency exploded in northern Angola, the Portuguese were surprised. When there was a military coup in Lisbon on April 25, 1974, Angolans of all races were surprised to see dictatorship collapse and to see the process of decolonization begin.

Angolan nationalism has suffered from more than narrow political environment of a 400-year-old colony. The fragmentation of its nationalist parties has roots which lie in ethnic, racial, ideological, regional and even personalist differences. In view of these truths, in

Angola, political unity and stable government will be, at best, difficult to establish.

THE ALVOR AGREEMENT

Second. The Alvor Agreement, which I have appended to my testimony, in English—the English version put out by the Portuguese Government—the treaty which set up the rules for the area of transition between colony and independent state, is, on paper, a masterpiece of carefully calculated diplomacy and compromise. It is the product of nearly 8 months of tedious negotiations between Portugal and the Angolan nationalist parties, of pressures and aid from several major African leaders in Zambia and Kenya. The treaty attempts to strike a fair balance among the three Angolan nationalist parties recognized by Portugal as the only legitimate representatives of the Angolan peoples: MPLA [Popular Movement For the Liberation of Angola] UNITA [National Union For the Total Independence of Angola] and FNLA [National Liberation Front of Angola]. By promising a grant of independence on November 11, 1975, Portugal solved the problem of a timetable and limited the final decolonization process to a little over 9 months. The key structures of the Transition Government, which took power on January 31, 1975, are: an executive college of three "Presidents," each representing one of the three legal nationalist parties. This unusual college, together with a cabinet distributed equitably among the three parties and the Portuguese Government, will run daily affairs and administer the territory in the era until independence. Three areas of responsibility, however, were delegated to other agencies: foreign affairs will be conducted by Portugal, and external and internal defense and security by a National Defense Committee, which has authority over all armed forces and the police. The National Defense Committee is composed of the High Commissioner, Portugal's chief representative, the College or Committee of Presidents, and a Unified General Staff.

The chairman of this key organism is the High Commissioner. The missions of this committee are: To carry out military policy, insure and safeguard the present frontiers of Angola, guarantee peace and security and public law and order, and to promote the safety of persons and property.

While this Alvor Agreement is a landmark in the history of Portugal, of Angola, and, indeed, of Africa, it has not worked as it should have and some of its provisions have not been enforced. Two basic problems have arisen: An authority problem and a security problem. The structure of the presidential committee or college does not provide for the exercise of power by one executive, like a premier, or prime minister. With conflict among the presidents, the government thus lacks authority and centralized force. Armed conflict has led to serious security problem.

POWER STRUGGLE AMONG ANGOLAN PARTIES

Three. There has been a power struggle among the Angolan parties which has resulted in a heavy loss of life and in the Luanda area and in rural areas northeast of that capital city. In the months since the

transition government entered power, there has been armed clashes among partisans of the nationalist parties in three bursts: Late March/early April; April 28–May 3; and most recently, early June. A conservative estimate of the dead is at least a thousand, the wounded, several thousand. While there are no reliable exact casualty counts, it is clear that the hospitals of Luanda have become, reluctantly, the charnelhouses of Central Africa.

The National Defense Committee has been unable to fulfill its missions of peace, security, and public law and order because of a number of interrelated factors: The irresponsible distribution of firearms to many persons not enrolled in the Portuguese Armed Forces or in the mixed forces, that is the future Army of Angola; this handing out of firearms was carried out by more than one nationalist party; the failure of the Angolan nationalist parties to cooperate among themselves; the lack of coordination between the nationalist leaders and the mass of their followers, some of whom have taken the law into their own hands. As a result, many innocent civilians have been slaughtered.

The Portuguese High Commissioner, General Silva Cardoso, by most accounts, has been making a real effort to carry out the provisions of the Alvor Agreement. Although he has an armed force of some 24,000 Portuguese troops, the Portuguese forces are subject to the pressures of fear, war-weariness, indiscipline, and insubordination. Still, according to accounts in the press, this officer has shown himself to be a tireless and skilled arbiter. As a result of the armed clashes I mentioned above, agreements have been signed ordering the disarming of the population in the Luanda area, the removal of the nationalists' armed forces from the capital, and a general ceasefire. Just what efforts these measures will have cannot be safely predicted.

CIVIL WAR SPREADING DESPITE CEASEFIRES

Four. The ephemeral civil war of recent months—despite a number of ceasefires—has spread from the suburbs and African neighborhoods of Luanda into that city and beyond. There have been outbreaks in the districts to the north and east of the city and some disturbances in the district or enclave of Cabinda. If the power struggle in Angola gets out of control, if the structure set up by the Alvor Agreement disintegrates, it is possible that the conflict could spread and affect a wider area of Central Africa. With the known and potential petroleum, iron, copper, diamonds, and manganese resources in Cabinda and Angola, international groups, both public and private, may become involved. It is therefore important to realize the geographic, economic, and strategic significance of Angola, what the present High Commissioner has referred to as “the enormous potentialities of this young state.”

It is to be hoped that several possible disaster scenarios may be avoided. An Angolan variant of the Spanish civil war might have grave international repercussions. Or, a spreading conflict in Angola could result in a war similar to that fought between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Biafra, 1967–70; or, a variant of the Congo crisis of 1960–64, when the United Nations force intervened. Some may suggest that the United Nations become involved in the decolo-

nization process in Angola. In my view, under present conditions, this would be a serious error.

I believe that the best hope for a reasonably progressive and stable transition, in the remaining months, lies in full support for the Portuguese Government, the High Commissioner in Luanda, and the National Defense Committee, to carry out the provisions of the Alvor agreement with the interest of as many Angolans as possible in mind.

PRESENT TRANSITION GOVERNMENT BEST HOPE FOR SOLUTION

Senator CLARK. I want to interrupt you for a number of questions.

You are saying you think the best hope for a solution is continuation of the present system?

Mr. WHEELER. Yes, I believe that we should. If there is any activity on the part of international groups, and our Government is to attempt to put into affect the Alvor Treaty and keep the structure and improve upon it they have set up.

Senator CLARK. Very good.

U.S. POLICY BEFORE ANGOLA'S SCHEDULED INDEPENDENCE

Mr. WHEELER. Five. In my personal opinion, American policy in the time before November 11, 1975 should concentrate on encouraging and backing the established machinery of the agreement in order to maintain peace, law and order. By all means we should avoid any form of intervention in Angola's internal affairs. We should adhere to the spirit of the Security Council resolution of August 9, 1960 regarding the United Nations' Force in the Congo; namely, that we "will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise."

I believe that it would be in the interests of the peoples of Angola that we support the Portuguese Government, the High Commissioner and the established structures laid out by the Alvor Agreement. Most important we would attempt to support these elements in their effort to hold free elections for a Constituent Assembly by the end of October 1975. The problem now is not whether Angola will become independent. It is the manner in which this independence and the required political machinery are established. If there is a real effort to uphold the rule of agreed-upon laws, and the value of the ballotbox, the interests of the Angolan peoples will be well served.

Senator CLARK. Under point five that you have just completed, we are discussing only American policy in the time between now and November 11, are we not.

Mr. WHEELER. Yes.

ECONOMIC, HUMANITARIAN AID REQUIRED FOR INDEPENDENT ANGOLA

Point six, my final point: Not military aid, but massive economic and humanitarian aid are required for Angola as she begins a new era. The country has suffered the ravages of over the 13 years of war and the recent civil strife. There has been an arms race among the nationalist groups, and the importation of arms by foreign powers, while the real needs of the people are quite different.

Angola requires fundamental improvements in education, commerce, agriculture, industry, mining, and many other sectors. As I have suggested before, Angola's economy has great promise and potential. The development of large resources of petroleum and agriculture here could help alleviate food and fuel shortages in other parts of tropical Africa.

I believe that our Government should be prepared to provide important economic and technical aid to an independent Angola. Careful study of the real needs of this hard-working and long-suffering people must be undertaken.

EDUCATIONAL AID

We can begin with educational aid. I know of a number of universities whose faculties would be willing to help cooperate with Angolan institutions. I can speak only for a part of the University of New Hampshire, but I am certain that some faculty members in the College of Liberal Arts and in the College of Life Sciences and Agriculture would be eager to cooperate and help. A member of this subcommittee, Senator Humphrey is already on record concerning educational aid to Angola. In a speech in the Senate and in a letter of August 27, 1974, to Secretary of State Kissinger, Senator Humphrey advocated an expansion of educational aid to Angola, and to other Portuguese-speaking states, of two programs: (I have a footnote which gives the House hearings last year on the United States-Portuguese relations. That is where the text comes from.) The southern African student program, under the Department of State, and the southern African training program. I fully endorse this kind of aid and I would urge this subcommittee to consider supporting more programs of this kind which could be of lasting importance to the future of Angola and her peoples.

ANGOLA IMPORTANCE TO UNITED STATES

There is an ancient saying about Africa that, "Something new is always coming out of Africa." I would like to paraphrase this and say that, "something important is always coming out of Angola." Americans, in general, know little about this huge and important country.

The news media rarely gives it a line, unless there is a crisis and then only sporadically. But I have a strong feeling that America will befriend the peoples of Angola and in the future will have closer relations in many areas. Some may wonder why the United States should care about what happens in Angola. But I suggest that there is in Angola a fund of economic, geographical, and social elements whose importance for us transcends such elements in a number of countries in southeast Asia, where we expended so much blood and treasure in the past two decades. Americans need to be reminded that there is also an historic link between Angola and the United States. A significant proportion of the ancestors of black Americans originated in Angola, once called the black mother of the New World. With Angola we have promises to keep. But for now, let us keep one promise. Let us base our new diplomacy and aid programs not on a "balance of power" principle. Let us base it on the principle of human rights.

[Professor Wheeler's prepared statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF PROF. DOUGLAS L. WHEELER

ANGOLA

I would like to thank the Subcommittee for inviting me to testify before it on the subject of Angola.

In this presentation I shall make *six* major points. Briefly, and in summary, they are the following: *one*, the historical record in Angola, both remote and recent, suggests that there are deep roots to the current political fragmentation and conflict in that country and that, even under good conditions, political unity and stable government will be difficult to establish. *Two*, the Alvor Agreement, signed on January 15, 1975, between Portugal and the three major Angolan nationalist parties is, on paper, a masterful piece of diplomacy and compromise; its provisions should be studied and enforced. *Three*, the reasons why portions of this important agreement are *not* being honored lie in a fierce power struggle among the nationalist parties and in the way that the military provisions of the Agreement have worked in practice. *Four*, Angola is now experiencing aspects of a limited, ephemeral but bloody civil war which could spread further in Angola and could burgeon into an Angolan variant of the Spanish Civil War with grave international repercussions. *Five*, United States' policy in the remaining months before Angola's scheduled independence should strictly avoid any form of intervention in Angola's internal affairs and should support the Portuguese Government's efforts to enforce the provisions of the Alvor Agreement. *Six*, I believe that what the Angolan people require now and in the near future is not military aid but massive economic and humanitarian aid, law and order, and the peace necessary to begin their age of independence in dignity and calm.

I shall now discuss each major point in order and at greater length. First, the historical dimensions of the current political fragmentation and conflict. Angola's political history has been largely tragic: centuries of slave-trade and wars, slavery, forced labor, and severe repression of the African opposition by the Portuguese. Adapting Conor Cruise O'Brien's memorable saying and applying to Angola's history it can be said that the study of Angola's history is like sitting on the cat—its surprises leave their scars! For both colonizers and the colonized in this massive territory there were many surprises in store. For centuries Africans were surprised that the Portuguese could survive in their coastal foothold and conquer an area of 480,000 square miles. In early 1961, when insurgency exploded in northern Angola, the Portuguese were surprised. When there was a military coup in Lisbon on April 25, 1974 Angolans of all races were surprised to see the dictatorship collapse and to see the process of de-colonization begin.

Angolan nationalism has suffered from more than the narrow political environment of a 400 year old colony. The fragmentation of its nationalist parties has roots which lie in ethnic, racial, ideological, regional and even personalist differences.¹ In view of these truths, in Angola political unity and stable government will be, at best, difficult to establish.

Two. The Alvor Agreement,² the treaty which set up the rules for the era of transition between colony and independent state, is, on paper, a masterpiece of carefully calculated diplomacy and compromise. It is the product of nearly eight months of tedious negotiations between Portugal and the Angolan nationalist parties, of pressures and aid from several major African leaders in Zambia and Kenya. The treaty attempts to strike a fair balance among the three Angolan nationalist parties recognized by Portugal as the only legitimate representatives of the Angolan peoples: MPLA, UNITA and FNLA.³

By promising a grant of independence on November 11, 1975 Portugal solved the problem of a timetable and limited the final de-colonization process to a little over nine months. The key structures of the Transition Government, which took power on January 31, 1975 are: an executive college of three "Presidents", each representing one of the three legal nationalist parties. This unusual college, together with a cabinet distributed equitably among the three parties and the Portuguese government will run daily affairs and administer the territory in the era until independence. Three areas of responsibility, however, were dele-

¹ For material on Angolan nationalism see John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution* (MIT Press, 1969), vol. I; and Douglas L. Wheeler and Rene Pellissier, *Angola* (New York, 1971), Chaps IV-XI.

² For full text of the Alvor Agreement, see Appendix to this paper.

³ MPLA—Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola; UNITA—National Union for the Total Independence of Angola; FNLA—National Front for the Liberation of Angola.

gated to other agencies: foreign affairs will be conducted by Portugal, and external and internal defense and security by a National Defense Committee, which has authority over all armed forces and the police. The National Defense Committee is composed of the High Commissioner, Portugal's chief representative, the College or Committee of Presidents and a Unified General Staff. The Chairman of this key organism is the High Commissioner. The missions of this Committee are: to carry out military policy, insure and safeguard the present frontiers of Angola, guarantee peace and security and public law and order, and to promote the safety of persons and property.⁴

While this Alvor Agreement is a landmark in the history of Portugal, of Angola, and, indeed, of Africa, it has not worked as it should have and some of its provisions have not been enforced. Two basic problems have arisen: an authority problem and a security problem. The structure of the Presidential Committee or College does not provide for the exercise of power by one executive, like a Premier, or Prime Minister. With conflict among the Presidents, the Government thus lacks authority and centrifugal force. Armed conflict has led to a serious security problem.

Three. There has been a power struggle among the Angolan parties which has resulted in a heavy loss of life in the Luanda area and in rural areas north-east of that capital city. In the months since the Transition Government entered power there have been armed clashes among partisans of the nationalist parties in three bursts: late March/early April; April 28-May 3; and, most recently, early June. A conservative estimate of the dead is at least a thousand, the wounded several thousand. While there are no reliable exact casualty counts, it is clear that the hospitals of Luanda have become, reluctantly, the charnel houses of Central Africa. The National Defense Committee has been unable to fulfill its missions of peace, security and public law and order because of a number of inter-related factors: the irresponsible distribution of firearms to many persons not enrolled in the Portuguese Armed Forces or in the Mixed Forces, that is the future Army of Angola; this handing out of firearms was carried out by more than one nationalist party; the failure of the Angolan nationalist parties to cooperate among themselves; the lack of coordination between the nationalist leaders and the mass of their followers, some of whom have taken the law into their own hands. As a result many innocent civilians have been slaughtered.

The Portuguese High Commissioner, General Silva Cardoso, by most accounts, has been making a real effort to carry out the provisions of the Alvor Agreement. Although he has an armed force of some 24,000 Portuguese troops the Portuguese forces are subject to the pressures of fear, war-weariness, indiscipline and insubordination. Still, according to accounts in the press,⁵ this officer has shown himself to be a tireless and skilled arbiter. As a result of the armed clashes I mentioned above, agreements have been signed ordering the disarming of the population in the Luanda area, the removal of the nationalists' armed forces from the capital, and a general cease-fire. Just what effects these measures will have cannot be safely predicted.

Four. The ephemeral civil war of recent months—despite a number of cease-fires—has spread from the suburbs and African neighborhoods of Luanda into that city and beyond. There have been outbreaks in the districts to the north and east of the city and some disturbances in the district or enclave of Cabinda. If the power struggle in Angola gets out of control, if the structure set up by the Alvor Agreement disintegrates, it is possible that the conflict could spread and affect a wider area of Central Africa. With the known and potential petroleum, iron, copper, diamonds and manganese resources in Cabinda and Angola international groups, both public and private, may become involved. It is therefore important to realize the geographic, economic and strategic significance of Angola, what the present High Commissioner has referred to as "the enormous potentialities of this young State."⁶

It is to be hoped that several possible disaster scenarios may be avoided. An Angolan variant of the Spanish Civil War might have grave international repercussions. Or, a spreading conflict in Angola could result in a war similar to that fought between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Biafra, 1967-70; or, a variant of the Congo crisis of 1960-64, when a United Nations Force intervened. Some may suggest that the United Nations become involved in the de-

⁴ For full provisions of the Treaty's Chapter IV, see Appendix.

⁵ See interview of General Silva Cardoso, *Expresso* (Lisbon), May 17, 19—.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.

colonization process in Angola. In my view, under present conditions, this would be a serious error. I believe that the best hope for a reasonably progressive and stable transition, in the remaining months, lies in full support for the Portuguese Government, the High Commissioner in Luanda, and the National Defense Committee, to carry out the provisions of the Alvor Agreement with the interests of as many Angolans as possible in mind.

Five. In my personal opinion, American policy in the time before November 11, 1975 should concentrate on encouraging and backing the established machinery of the Agreement in order to maintain peace, law and order. By all means we should avoid any form of intervention in Angola's internal affairs. We should adhere to the spirit of the Security Council resolution of August 9, 1960 regarding the United Nations' Force in the Congo;⁷ namely, that we "will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise."

I believe that it would be in the interests of the peoples of Angola that we support the Portuguese Government, the High Commissioner and the established structures laid out by the Alvor Agreement. Most important we would attempt to support these elements in their effort to hold free elections for a Constituent Assembly by the end of October 1975. The problem now is not whether Angola will become independent. It is *the manner in which* this independence and the required political machinery are established. If there is a real effort to uphold the rule of agreed-upon laws, and the value of the ballotbox, the interests of the Angolan peoples will be well served. *Point Six*, my final point: not military aid, but massive economic and humanitarian aid are required for Angola as she begins a new era. The country has suffered the ravages of over thirteen years of war and recent civil strife. There has been an arms race among the nationalist groups, and the importation of arms by foreign powers, while the real needs of the people are quite different.

Angola requires fundamental improvements in education, commerce, agriculture, industry, mining and many other sectors. As I have suggested before, Angola's economy has great promise and potential. The development of large resources of petroleum and agriculture here could help alleviate food and fuel shortages in other parts of tropical Africa. I believe that our Government should be prepared to provide important economic and technical aid to an independent Angola. Careful study of the real needs of this hard-working and long-suffering people must be undertaken.

We can begin with educational aid. I know of a number of Universities whose faculties would be willing to help cooperate with Angolan institutions. I can speak only for a part of the University of New Hampshire, but I am certain that some faculty members in the College of Liberal Arts and in the College of Life Sciences and Agriculture would be eager to cooperate and help. A member of this Subcommittee, Senator Humphrey is already on record concerning educational aid to Angola. In a speech in the Senate and in a letter of August 27 to Secretary of State Kissinger,⁸ Senator Humphrey advocated an expansion of educational aid to Angola, and to other Portuguese-speaking states, of two programs: The Southern African Student Program, under the Department of State, and The Southern African Training Program. I fully endorse this kind of aid and I would urge this Subcommittee to consider supporting more programs of this kind which could be of lasting importance to the future of Angola and her peoples.

There is an ancient saying about Africa that "Something new is always coming out of Africa." I would like to paraphrase this and say that "something important is always coming out of Angola." Americans, in general, know little about this huge and important country. The news media rarely gives it a line, unless there is a crisis and then only sporadically.

But I have a strong feeling that America will befriend the peoples of Angola and in the future will have closer relations in many areas. Some may wonder why the United States should care about what happens in Angola. But I suggest

⁷ As cited in Conor Cruise O'Brien, *To Katanga and Back*. A UN case history (New York, 1966 ed), p. 60 (from doc. S/4426).

⁸ The text of Senator Humphrey's letter and Secretary of State Kissinger's reply is found in: Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, *The Complex of United States-Portuguese Relations: Before and after the Coup* (Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Africa . . . Ninety-Third Congress; Second Session (March 14, October 8, 9 and 22, 1974 (U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1974), pp. 239-240. For one view on American policy toward Southern Africa, see my article on that subject in *The Christian Science Monitor* (Aug. 1, 1974) and a piece in *Issue. A Quarterly Journal of Africanist Opinion* (IV, no. 2; Summer, 1974), pp. 4-8 with maps.

that there is in Angola a fund of economic, geographical and social elements whose importance for us transcends such elements in a number of countries in Southeast Asia, where we have expended so much blood and treasure in the past two decades. Americans need to be reminded that there is also an historic link between Angola and the United States. A significant proportion of the ancestors of black Americans originated in Angola, once called the black mother of the New World. With Angola we have promises to keep. But for now, let us keep one promise. Let us base our new diplomacy and aid programs not on a "balance of power" principle. Let us base it on the principle of human rights.

APPENDIX

[From Ministry of Mass Communication 1975]

ANGOLA—THE INDEPENDENCE AGREEMENT

The Portuguese State and the Angolan National Liberation Movements—the National Angolan Liberation Front (F.N.L.A.), the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (M.P.L.A.) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (U.N.I.T.A.)—having met at Alvor, in the Algarve, from 10 to 15 January 1975, to negotiate the procedure and the calendar of the access of Angola to independence, have agreed to the following:

CHAPTER I

ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA

Article 1.—The Portuguese State recognizes the Liberation Movements—National Angolan Liberation Front (F.N.L.A.), the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (M.P.L.A.) and the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (U.N.I.T.A.)—as the sole legitimate representatives of the people of Angola.

Article 2.—The Portuguese State solemnly restates its recognition of the right of the people of Angola to independence.

Article 3.—Angola forms one indivisible unit, within its present geographical and political boundaries, and in this context Cabinda is an unalienable component part of Angolan territory.

Article 4.—The independence and full sovereignty of Angola shall be solemnly proclaimed on 11 November 1975 in Angola by the President of the Portuguese Republic or by a specially appointed representative of the President.

Article 5.—Until independence is proclaimed, the power shall be wielded by the High Commissioner and by a Transitional Government, which shall take office on 31 January 1975.

Article 6.—The Portuguese State and the three Liberation Movements formally affirm, under this agreement, a general ceasefire, already being observed de facto by their armed forces throughout Angolan territory.

After this date, any use of force other than as decided by the rightful authorities to prevent internal acts of violence or acts of aggression from outside the country shall be considered to be illicit.

Article 7.—After the ceasefire the armed forces of the F.N.L.A., the M.P.L.A. and the U.N.I.T.A. shall take up positions in the regions and places where they are at present stationed, until such time as the provisions laid down in Chapter IV of this Agreement shall be put into practice.

Article 8.—The Portuguese State undertakes to transfer progressively, no later than the term of the transitional period, all the powers it enjoys and wields in Angola to the Angolan organs of sovereignty.

Article 9.—With the conclusion of this Agreement, an amnesty is held to be granted to cover all the effects of the patriotic acts performed in the course of the national liberation struggle in Angola which would have been considered to be liable to punishment under legislation in force at the time of their performance.

Article 10.—The independent State of Angola shall exert its sovereignty fully and freely, both internally and on the international plane.

CHAPTER II

ON THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

Article 11.—During the transitional period the President of the Republic and the Portuguese Government shall be represented in Angola by the High Commissioner, who shall defend the interests of the Portuguese Republic.

Article 12.—The High Commissioner in Angola shall be appointed and released from office by the President of the Portuguese Republic, by whom he shall be sworn in and to whom he is politically responsible.

Article 13.—It is for the High Commissioner to:

- (a) Represent the President of the Republic, ensuring and guaranteeing, in full agreement with the Transitional Government, the observance of the law;
- (b) Safeguard and guarantee the physical security of Angolan territory, in close co-operation with the Transitional Government;
- (c) Ensure the fulfillment of this Agreement and of such others as may come to be made between the Liberation Movements and the Portuguese State;
- (d) Guarantee and promote the process of decolonization of Angola;
- (e) Ratify all acts which concern, or refer to, the Portuguese State;
- (f) Attend the meetings of the Council of Ministers, when he thinks fit, where he may participate in their discussions but without the right to vote;
- (g) Sign, approve and have published the decree-laws and the decrees drafted by the Transitional Government;
- (h) Ensure, together with the Presidential Committee, the direction of the National Defence Committee, and to direct the foreign policy of Angola during the transitional period, aided in this by the Presidential Committee.

CHAPTER III

ON THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT

Article 14.—The Transitional Government is chaired and directed by the Presidential Committee.

Article 15.—The Presidential Committee comprises three members, one from each liberation movement, and its main task is to direct and co-ordinate the Transitional Government.

Article 16.—Whenever it thinks fit, the Presidential Committee may consult the High Commissioner on matters concerning the work of the Government.

Article 17.—The decisions of the Transitional Government shall be taken by a majority of two-thirds; the members of the Presidential Committee shall chair it in turn.

Article 18.—The Transitional Government shall comprise the following Ministries: the Interior, Information, Labour and Social Security, Economic Affairs, Planning and Finance, Justice, Transports and Communications, Health and Social Affairs, Public Works, Housing and Town-Planning, Education and Culture, Agriculture, Natural Resources.

Article 19.—The following Offices of Secretaries of State are hereby instituted:

- (a) Two in the Ministry of the Interior,
- (b) Two in the Ministry of Information,
- (c) Two in the Ministry of Labour and Social Security,
- (d) Three in the Ministry of Economic Affairs, to be known respectively as the Secretary of State for Trade and Tourism, the Secretary of State for Industry and Power and the Secretary of State for Fisheries.

Article 20.—The Ministers of the Transitional Government shall be appointed in the same proportion by the National Angolan Liberation Front (F.N.L.A.), the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (M.P.L.A.) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (U.N.I.T.A.), and by the President of the Republic and shall be sworn in by the High Commissioner.

Article 21.—Bearing in mind the transitional nature of the Government, the distribution of the Ministries shall be as follows:

- (a) The President of the Portuguese Republic shall appoint the Ministers of Economic Affairs, of Public Works, Housing and Town-Planning and of Transports and Communications;
- (b) The F.N.L.A. shall appoint the Ministers of his Interior, of Health and Social Affairs and of Agriculture;
- (c) The M.P.L.A. shall appoint the Ministers of Information, of Planning and Finance and of Justice;
- (d) The U.N.I.T.A. shall appoint the Ministers of Labour and Social Security, of Education and Culture and of Natural Resources.

Article 22.—The Offices of the Secretaries of State provided for in this Agreement shall be distributed as follows:

- (a) The F.N.L.A. shall appoint one Secretary of State for Information, one Secretary of State for Trade and Tourism;

(b) The M.P.L.A. shall appoint a Secretary of State for the Interior, a Secretary of State for labour and Social Security and a Secretary for Industry and Power;

(c) U.N.I.T.A. shall appoint a Secretary of State for the Interior, a Secretary of State for Information and the Secretary of State for Fisheries.

Article 23.—The Transitional Government may institute further posts of Secretary and Under-Secretary of State, but in their distribution the rule of political heterogeneity shall be observed.

Article 24.—It is for the Transitional Government to:

(a) Further, and co-operate in, the successful management of the process of decolonization until total independence is reached;

(b) Superintend the whole field of public Administration, ensuring its functioning and promoting access of Angolan citizens to posts and positions of responsibility;

(c) Conduct internal politics;

(d) Prepare and guarantee the holding of general elections for the Constituent Assembly of Angola;

(e) Perform through decree-laws the legislative function and draft decrees, regulatory decrees and instructions for the proper implementation of the laws;

(f) Guarantee, in co-operation with the High Commissioner, the safety of persons and property;

(g) Carry out the judicial reorganization of Angola;

(h) Define economic, financial and monetary policy and create the structures needed to ensure the rapid development of the economy of Angola;

(i) Guarantee and safeguard individual or collective rights and freedoms.

Article 25.—The Presidential Committee and the Ministers are jointly responsible for the acts of the Government.

Article 26.—The Transitional Government may not be dismissed on the initiative of the High Commissioner; any change in its composition shall be effected by agreement between the High Commissioner and the liberation movements.

Article 27.—The High Commissioner and the Presidential Committee shall seek to solve all the difficulties arising from the work of the Government in a spirit of friendship and through reciprocal consultations.

CHAPTER IV

ON THE NATIONAL DEFENCE COMMITTEE

Article 28.—A National Defence Committee is hereby set up, composed as follows:

The Higher Commissioner,
The Presidential Committee,
A Unified General Staff.

Article 29.—The High Commissioner shall inform the National Defence Committee of all matters concerning national defence, both internally and abroad, so as to:

(a) Define and carry out the military policy arising from this Agreement;

(b) Ensure and safeguard the present frontiers of Angola;

(c) Guarantee peace and security and public law and order;

(d) Promote the safety of persons and property.

Article 30.—The decisions of the National Defence Committee shall be taken by a simple majority; the High Commissioner, who will chair the Committee, shall have a vote.

Article 31.—A unified General Staff is hereby set up, which shall comprise the commanders of the three branches of the Portuguese Armed Forces in Angola and three commanding officers of the liberation movements.

The unified General Staff shall be placed under the direct authority of the High Commissioner.

Article 32.—Armed forces belonging to the three liberation movements shall be integrated to the same total number with the Portuguese forces in the mixed military forces, on the following numerical basis:

8000 men belonging to the F.N.L.A.,

8000 men belonging to the M.P.L.A.,

8000 men belonging to the U.N.I.T.A.,

24,000 men belonging to the Portuguese Armed Forces.

Article 33.—The National Defence Committee shall effect the progressive integration of the armed forces in the mixed military forces specified in the previous article; in principle the following calendar should be respected:

Between February and May, inclusive, and per month a total of 500 men from each of the liberation movements will be integrated and 1500 men of the Portuguese Armed Forces.

Between June and September, inclusive, and per month, a total of 1500 men from each of the liberation movements will be integrated and 4500 men of the Portuguese Armed Forces.

Article 34.—Such Portuguese Armed Forces contingents as exceed the quotas laid down in art. 32 shall be evacuated from Angola by 30 April 1975.

Article 35.—The evacuation of the contingent of the Portuguese Armed Forces integrated in the mixed military forces shall begin after 1 October 1975 and shall be completed by 29 February 1976.

Article 36.—The National Defence Committee shall organize mixed police forces to maintain public law and order.

Article 37.—The unified police command shall have three members, one from each of the liberation movements, and leadership shall be put in commission, the chair being taken by each member in turn. The force shall be placed under the authority and supervision of the National Defense Committee.

CHAPTER V

ON REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

Article 38.—Immediately after the swearing-in of the Transitional Government, mixed equal-representation committees shall be set up, on nominations by the High Commissioner and by the Transitional Government, to plan and prepare the structures, means and procedure necessary to deal with Angolan refugees.

The work of these committees will be supervised by the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs.

Article 39.—Those persons housed in the Peace Villages may return to their own villages and homes.

The mixed equal-representation committees shall propose to the High Commissioner and to the Transitional Government social, economic and other measures to assure a speedy return to normal ways of life of displaced persons and the reintegration of the various forms of activity in the economic life of the country.

CHAPTER VI

ON GENERAL ELECTIONS FOR THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF ANGOLA

Article 40.—The Transitional Government shall organize general elections for a Constituent Assembly within not more than 9 months from the date of its installation, that is, 31 January 1975.

Article 41.—Candidates to the Constituent Assembly shall be put forward exclusively by the liberation movements—F.N.L.A., M.P.L.A. and U.N.I.T.A.—as the sole legitimate representatives of the people of Angola.

Article 42.—Once the Transitional Government is installed, a Central Committee shall be instituted, with equal representation of the liberation movements, to draft the Basic Law and to prepare the elections to the Constituent Assembly.

Article 43.—When the Basic Law has been approved by the Presidential Committee, the Central Committee shall:

(a) Draft the Electoral Law;

(b) Organize lists of voters;

(c) Register the lists of candidates for election to the Constituent Assembly put forward by the liberation movements.

Article 44.—The Basic Law shall remain in force until the Constitution of Angola comes into force, but it may not run counter to the term of this Agreement.

CHAPTER VII

ON ANGOLAN NATIONALITY

Article 45.—The Portuguese State and the three liberation movements—F.N.L.A., M.P.L.A. and U.N.I.T.A.—undertake to co-operate to eliminate all the consequences of colonialism. On this topic, the F.N.L.A., the M.P.L.A. and the U.N.I.T.A. stress their policy of non-discrimination, according to which the quality of Angolan citizenship is definable by birth in Angola or by domicile

therein, always provided that those domiciled in Angola identify themselves with the aspirations of the Angolan Nation through a conscious choice.

Article 46.—The F.N.L.A., the M.P.L.A. and the U.N.I.T.A. hereby undertake to consider as Angolan citizens all individuals born in Angola, provided that they do not declare, on the terms and within the time-limits to be laid down, that they wish to maintain their present nationality or to choose another one.

Article 47.—Individuals not born in Angola but settled there may seek Angolan nationality in accordance with such rules governing Angolan nationality as come to be laid down in the Basic Law.

Article 48.—A mixed committee with equal representation will study special agreements to regulate the forms of concession of Angolan citizenship to Portuguese citizens domiciled in Angola, and the status of Portuguese citizens resident in Angola and of Angolan citizens resident in Portugal.

CHAPTER VIII

ON ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL TOPICS

Article 49.—The Portuguese State undertakes to regularize with the State of Angola the situation arising from the existence of property belonging to the latter outside Angolan territory, so as to facilitate the transfer of such property, or the equivalent value, to the territory and ownership of Angola.

Article 50.—The F.N.L.A., the M.P.L.A. and the U.N.I.T.A. declare themselves ready to accept the responsibility arising from the financial undertakings assumed by the Portuguese State on behalf of, and relating to, Angola, always provided that they have been assumed in the real interest of the people of Angola.

Article 51.—A special mixed equal-representation committee, composed of experts appointed by the Provisional Government of the Portuguese Republic and by the Transitional Government of the State of Angola, shall list the property mentioned in art. 49 and the credits referred to in art. 50, shall effect such acts of valuation as it thinks fit and shall put before the two Governments such solutions as it holds to be just.

Article 52.—The Portuguese State undertakes to provide the Committee specified in the previous article with all the information and data at its disposition and which the Committee may need in order to reach well-thought-out conclusions and to propose equitable solutions within the principles of truth, respect for the legitimate rights of each party and the cost loyal co-operation.

Article 53.—The Portuguese State will aid the State of Angola in setting up a Central Issue Bank. The Portuguese State undertakes to transfer to the State of Angola the powers, the assets and the debts of the Angolan Department of the Bank of Angola, on conditions to be agreed in the mixed committee for financial topics. This committee will also consider all questions related to the Portugal Department of the same bank, proposing just solutions to the extent that they concern and affect Angola.

Article 54.—The F.N.L.A., the M.P.L.A. and the U.N.I.T.A. undertake to respect the property and the legitimate interests of the Portuguese citizens domiciled in Angola.

CHAPTER IX

ON CO-OPERATION BETWEEN ANGOLA AND PORTUGAL

Article 55.—The Portuguese Government on the one hand, and the liberation movements on the other, agree to set up between Portugal and Angola links of constructive, lasting co-operation in all fields, specifically in the cultural, technical, scientific, economic, commercial, monetary, financial and military spheres, on the basis of independence, equality, freedom, mutual respect and reciprocity of interests.

CHAPTER X

ON MIXED COMMITTEES

Article 56.—Technical mixed equal-representation committees will be set up by the High Commissioner, in agreement with the Presidential Committee, to research and propose solutions for problems arising from decolonization and to lay down the foundations of active co-operation between Portugal and Angola, especially in the following spheres:

- (a) Cultural, technical and scientific;
- (b) Economic and commercial;
- (c) Monetary and financial;

(d) Military ;

(e) The acquisition of Angolan nationality by Portuguese citizens.

Article 57.—The committee mentioned in the previous article shall carry out their work and negotiations in a climate of constructive co-operation and loyal spirit of compromise. Their conclusions shall be put as quickly as possible before the High Commissioner and the Presidential Committee for their consideration and for the drafting of agreements between Portugal and Angola.

CHAPTER XI

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 58.—Any questions arising as to the interpretation and application of this Agreement which cannot be solved on the items of art. 27 above shall be settled by negotiation between the Portuguese Government and the liberation movements.

Article 59.—The Portuguese State, the F.N.L.A., the M.P.L.A. and the U.N.I.T.A., true to the social and political ideals repeatedly stated by their leaders, reaffirm their respect for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and also actively repudiate all forms of social discrimination, especially apartheid.

Article 60.—The present agreement shall come into force immediately after it has been approved by the President of the Portuguese Republic.

The delegations of the Portuguese Government, the F.N.L.A., the M.P.L.A. and the U.N.I.T.A. stress the climate of perfect co-operation and cordiality in which the negotiations took place and feel great satisfaction at reaching this Agreement, which will meet the just aspirations of the Angolan people and of which the Portuguese people are rightly proud; henceforth they will be linked by ties of profound friendship and common desire for constructive co-operation for the progress of Angola, of Portugal, of Africa and of the world as a whole.

Signed at Alvor, Algarve, on 15 January 1975, in four copies in Portuguese.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much for an excellent statement. It is a good background.

John Marcum, provost, Merrill College, University of California at Santa Cruz. Will you proceed please.

[Professor Marcum's biography follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

John Arthur Marcum.

Born: San Jose, California, 21 August 1927.

Address:

Office—Office of the Provost, Merrill College, University of California, Santa Cruz, California 95064.

Home—Provost's House, Merrill College, University of California, Santa Cruz, California 95064.

Family: Wife (Gwendolyn) and three children (Andrea, Edmund, Arthur)

Education:

Stanford University, 1946–1949 and 1950–1952. A.B. 1949 "With Great Distinction"; Ph. D. April, 1955.

Columbia University, 1949–1950. M.A. 1951.

Institut d'Etudes Politiques, University of Paris, France, 1952–1954 (auditor).

Ph.D. Dissertation: "French North Africa in the Atlantic Community." The military and political relationship of French North Africa to France, NATO and other Atlantic powers. Research done in Paris and North Africa, 1952–54.

Professional experience:

Teaching Assistant, Stanford University, 1951, 1952, 1964 (political science); Research Assistant, Stanford University, 1954–55 (political science, study of British Parliament).

Staff Associate, Hoover Institute, Stanford: Program on Overseas Development (conference under auspices of International Cooperation Administration) June–September, 1955.

Colgate University :

Intern under Ford Fund for Advancement of Education, political science, 1955-56; Instructor, 1956-57; Assistant Professor, 1957-67; subjects taught: comparative government, political theory, international relations, international organization, American foreign policy, African politics. Research in French North Africa, summer 1956; Research and participant in Experiment in International Living, Nigeria, summer 1957.

Ford Foundation Fellow in French West and Equatorial Africa, International Relations Program 1958-59.

Leader, Crossroads Africa student work-study project, Senegal, June-August, 1960 (Rev. James H. Robinson, Director).

Assistant to Governor W. Averell Harriman, tour of West Africa and Congo, August-September, 1960.

Lincoln University, Pennsylvania :

Director of African Program and Professor of Political Science, 1961-68, Director African Language and Area Center, 1965-68. Related travel to Congo, Central and Southern Africa, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966-67.

Occasional lecturer, Regional Seminar on Africa, School of Foreign Affairs, Department of State, 1961-63.

Member, Board of Directors, African Student Service (World University Service), Boston, 1962-66.

Visiting Lecturer, Political Science, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1962-63 and Autumn 1963 (graduate seminar).

Member, Advisory Council on African Affairs to the Dept. of State, 1963-68.

Member, discussion groups on Africa, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1963-64, 1968.

Peace Corps. Director of Cross Cultural Studies, Tanzanian Peace Corps Training Program, Lincoln University, Autumn 1964. Also lecturer in Peace Corps training projects at University of Wisconsin (Milwaukee), Syracuse University, Dartmouth College and Lincoln University, 1965.

Visiting Lecturer, Seminar on African Development, East African Program, Syracuse University, July 1965 and August 1966.

Fulbright-Hays Grant, 1966-67. Study of Regional Interstate Cooperation in Africa. Research carried out in France and West, Central and East Africa.

Member, Advisory Committee on Investment in Southern Africa to Executive Council of the Episcopal Church, 1968.

Member, Research Liaison Committee, African Studies Association, 1968-70; 1972.

Postdoctoral Fellow, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Autumn 1968.

Visiting Professor, Merrill College, University of California, Santa Cruz, January 1969-June 1970.

University of Denver :

Visiting Professor, Center on International Race Relations, Graduate School of International Studies, 1970-72. Executive Editor, *Africa Today*, 1970-72; Editorial board 1968-.

Inclusion (1971) on list of 36 "experts" selected by the UN Secretariat Division of Human Rights (Res. 1330 XLIV) and made available to member governments for advice on matters concerned with slavery and "slavery-like practices on apartheid and colonialism."

Consultant to Portuguese African Project, African Studies Center, University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), 1971-74.

African Studies Association: Member, Board of Directors, 1972-73; vice president, 1973-74; president 1974-75.

University of California, Santa Cruz :

Provost and Professor of Politics, Merrill College, 1972-. Advisory Board, South Pacific Studies Center. Observer at 14th South Pacific Conference, Rarotonga, September, 1974; Member Joint Regents-Faculty Committee for Selection of UCSC Chancellor, 1973-74; Member statewide ad hoc committee on Africa for UC Education Abroad Program; Participant, 3rd International Congress of Africanists, Addis Ababa, December, 1973.

Member, Institute of International Education Selection Committee for Fulbright-Hays Grants, France and Belgium, December 1972.

Affirmative Action Consultant, African Studies Program, University of Illinois, 1973-.

Member, Editorial Board, *Journal of African Studies* (UC Press).

Participant in Colloquium on Portuguese Africa and speaker at "Secretary's Open Forum," Department of State, Washington, D.C., March 1974.

Honors:

Phi Beta Kappa, Stanford (1949); Stanford "honors scholarship" 1950-51 and 1951-52; Fulbright scholarship, Paris, France, 1952-53 and 1953-54; Ford Foundation International Relations Fellowship, Africa, 1958-59.

Partial List of Publications:

(1) *Books and Monographs:*

The Angolan Revolution: Vol. 1, The Anatomy of an Explosion 1950-1962. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969. 380 pp.

The Politics of Indifference: Portugal and Africa, a Case Study in American Foreign Policy. Syracuse, N.Y.: Eastern African Studies, Syracuse University, 1972, 41 pp. Republished in *Issues* (African Studies Association), Vol. III, No. 3, Fall 1972, pp. 9-17. Also Dutch translation in *Internationale Spectator* (The Hague), Vol. XXVII, No. 3, Feb. 8, 1973), pp. 97-106.

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(2) *Anthologies:*

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**STATEMENT OF PROF. JOHN ARTHUR MARCUM, PROVOST,
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA CRUZ, CALIF.**

Mr. MARCUM. Thank you very much. I also very much appreciate the opportunity of appearing before you this morning.

After a 15-year colonial struggle, Angolan nationalists are on the verge of realizing or destroying an independent Angolan state. With the collapse and exit of the old colonial regime, three rival liberation movements have been left to compete for political ascendancy. It may be useful therefore to focus briefly on first, the genesis and character of this political tripolarity, on second, the tendency for it to encourage extensive external intervention, and on third, some thoughts concerning what, under the circumstances, might constitute an appropriate American response.

**ANGOLA'S NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS PRODUCTS OF PORTUGAL'S INTEGRAL
COLONIALISM**

I. Angola's nationalist movements are products of and responses to the extreme conditions of what might be termed Portugal's integral colonialism. After the Second World War, while Britain, France, and Belgium were reluctantly permitting Africans under their rule to organize and gain increasing measures of political power, Portugal still blocked even the organized expression of African cultural life. The government of the late strongman, Premier António Salazar, ruthlessly rooted out and destroyed groups and individuals suspected of nationalist activity and sympathies.

Underground political groups were decimated by the police. Few survived. Those that did were deeply impacted by the anxieties and distrust of clandestine politics. And they were unable to extend their organizing beyond constructive regional limits, were unable to build a cohesive nationalist movement extending to a pan-Angolan structure and vision.

As nationalist leaders or would-be leaders from the thin ranks of Angola's tiny educated elite—1 to 5 percent African literacy—sought refuge abroad, they reaggregated along regional and ethnolinguistic lines. The insecurities and frustrations of exile tended to reinforce parochial loyalties among them. And colonial authorities, infiltrators, and money manipulated divisive political ambitions within them.

Angolan nationalists did manage to organize among other refugees, émigrés and laborers in neighboring African territories. From exile they helped to trigger and then sustained more than a decade of small scale anticolonial insurgency inside Angola. During those years, however, they were never able to fully transcend their constricted origins and harsh conditioning. They clustered within three major movements, each of which was anchored in a different one of Angola's three major ethnolinguistic regions. And over time each movement developed its own military force and sources of external support. As each movement sought military and political advantage in the conflict with Portugal it collided with its competitors. The result was a complex three-way struggle for revolutionary primacy interspersed with fratricidal clashes and suffused with a profound and bitter political rivalry.

When the government of Salazar's successor, Marcello Caetano, fell to the anticolonialist armed forces movement in 1974, no Angolan group had yet achieved the sort of clearcut preeminence that Frelimo insurgents had won in Portugal's other large colony, Mozambique. Under pressure from Portugal's new military government and African States, Angolan nationalists did agree to form a tripartite coalition government pending general elections in autumn 1975. But the goal of merging three separate armies and melding three separate parties into new national structures promised to be elusive.

Twice the size of Texas, Angola possesses subsoil—oil, iron, diamonds—and agriculture wealth on a scale that suggests great economic potential for a unified state. But will Angola emerge as a unified state? By scheduling October elections in advance of November independence, Lisbon placed a premium on political process, on coalition building and transethnic alliances. By creating the need to reach out, mobilize popular electoral support and organize on a national scale, Lisbon encouraged the constitution of a single polity. And by placing each Angolan Government ministry under a tripartite team of nationalists, Lisbon provided representatives of the three movements with an opportunity to gain positive intergroup experience and to work, compromise and, hopefully, coalesce across party lines. As they transformed themselves from exile/guerrilla movements into legal political parties, moreover, the movements brought into their ranks new leadership unscarred by the long years of exile and fratricidal competition. Older leaders who were locked into the quarrels and grudges of the exile years would be replaced in due course by a new, internally generated leadership. But would this new leadership itself emerge from

a peaceful process of national consolidation or as the result of civil war and/or partition? The answer, it seemed, would depend in part upon external forces.

INFLUENCE OF ZAIRE SUPPORTING FNLA

II. As Lisbon withdraws its war-weary forces—and not to do so could provoke mutiny—Lisbon's capacity to umpire the zero sum gaming of Angola's contending movements must decline. Contrarily, the influence of neighboring African States, notably Zaire, must increase. Since 1960 successive Zaire—Congo—Governments under Patrice Lumumba, Cyrille Adoula, and Mobutu Sese Soko have supported the National Liberation Front of Angola—FNLA—which draws its principal backing from among the 600,000 to 700,000 Bakongo people of northern Angola. Under the leadership of Holden Roberto, an Angolan émigré and Mobutu's brother-in-law, the FNLA has become an extension or branch of Zairian politics. When Mobutu turned to Peking in 1973, Roberto followed just behind and ended up with a Chinese military mission training his largely Bakongo army at bases in Zaire. The exclusive recipient of Zairian backing, Roberto's FNLA was able to recruit and arm a military force of between 15,000 and 21,000 which now controls much of Angola's northern coffee country and possibly petroleum-rich coast. It appears unlikely that Mobutu would willingly let the Bakongo north, border areas such as the diamond center of Dundo, or the Benguela Railroad which links mineral rich—Katanga—to the Atlantic, fall into what he considered unfriendly hands. Indeed, reports that dissident guerrilla forces are still or once again active in eastern Zaire, give reason to speculate that the government in Kinshasa will continue to relate to much or all of Angola as properly as Zairian "sphere of influence." In the view of the former Angolan High Commissioner and leftwing critic of Mobutu, Admiral Rosa Coutinho, a progressive regime in Angola would constitute a "terrifying prospect" for President Mobutu. Consequently, Coutinho believes the Zaire Government is attempting by all means to prevent the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola [MPLA] from coming to power in Angola. According to him, a progressive Angola under MPLA rule would quickly "spell the end of Mobutu."

Mobutu's commitment to the FNLA has not prevented him from also extending backing to secessionists who would detach the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda from Angola. Like a Danzig astride the tip of Zaire's "Polish corridor" to the sea, Cabinda, whether to be annexed or satellized, is certainly a prime target for Zairian political-economic control.

Just how far Mobutu would be willing to extend his prestige and purse in quest of Cabinda or in support of the FNLA is unclear. But he is in a position to intervene through the FNLA so as to at least minimize chances for the rival MPLA to assume power outside the Luanda region, election or no election.

PORTUGUESE LEFT, SOVIET UNION SUPPORT FOR MPLA

The MPLA, centered among 1.3 Mbundu and mesticos in Luanda and its hinterland, benefits from the support of both the Portuguese

left and the Soviet Union. Intercession by Lisbon's new leftwing government in effect blocked maneuvers from Kinshasa to eliminate the MPLA by urging the recognition of dissident elements who had challenged the legitimacy of MPLA leadership under the Marxist poet and physician, Dr. Agostinho Neto. And Soviet arms shipments have given the MPLA a capacity to slug it out with FNLA military units in Luanda and elsewhere—at a cost of untold hundreds of lives.

NATIONAL UNION FOR TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA

The third movement, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), has received less external support than its two rivals. With leadership from and roots in the central and southern regions of Angola among the 2 million Ovimbundu and smaller ethnic groups of those areas, UNITA has relied more upon political than military action. And during the last years of the war, its Ovimbundu leader, Jonas Savimbi, lived and led a small guerrilla force inside eastern Angola—not from exile. Since 1974, his political acumen and charisma have enabled him to build alliances and support among diverse groups, including resident Portuguese. And he has won diplomatic backing from President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. A long-time ally of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), UNITA has continued to enjoy a cooperative association with Namibia's principal nationalist organization. But contrary to speculation, it does not favor the cession of Ovambo (or Kwanyama speaking) areas of southern Angola to Ovamboland (Namibia). And the Government of South Africa has little or no reason for favoring or fearing it over one of the other two movements.

EXTENSIVE EXTERNAL INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA

External support, especially arms, for the FNLA and MPLA is fueling the flames of incipient civil war. The result could well be a four-way partition: Cabinda under local secessionists (FLEC) [Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave], the Bakongo north under the FNLA, the Luanda-Mbundu region under the MPLA, and the vast (two-thirds of the country) central/southern regions under UNITA. Another possible scenario could well be an FNLA-UNITA alliance aimed at shutting out the MPLA, that is, an uneasy two-party coalition which would probably face chronic and violent Mbundu resistance from an MPLA gone underground. Efforts by Lisbon and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to persuade the Angolans to hold together in coalition and build a unified state under their transitional government represent a countervailing influence. Civil war or partition could only be destructive of Portuguese economic interests in Angola and disruptive of African diplomatic and political efforts to advance the political cause of black Africans in white-ruled Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa. But what are American interests in all this?

U.S. RESPONSE TO PRESENT ANGOLAN SITUATION

III. According to Denis Herbstein writing in the *Sunday Times* (London, May 18, 1975), the United States has already intervened in the Angolan imbroglio. "Today, Robert," he alleges, "receives support

from the United States." Other accounts would have the United States covertly supporting Zaire's efforts to eliminate the MPLA or have the Gulf Oil Co. self-servingly engaged in conducting its own foreign policy in support of Cabinda secessionists.

What is the basis for such speculation? Others are better placed to answer this question. Presumably, those to whom you will be talking on Wednesday. But such speculation is encouraged in part by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger when he professes to be gloomy about the spread of "Marxist ideologies and preceptions of the world which are contrary to our values" and proceeds to read dangers and threats into foreign situations that for us should be of little or no concern. Indeed, perhaps the most important thing the American Government can do in Angola is to refrain from projecting parochial or ideological intolerance into its perception of the situation there. Washington should, above all, avoid the trap of overreacting to hostile rhetoric and socialist advocacy and of identifying potential "enemies." Necessarily, all Angolan liberation movements resent American aid to Portugal during the years of insurgency. And if one, the MPLA, is particularly distrustful of American economic and political motives and itself beneficiary of substantial aid from the Soviet Union and other Communist sources, even it presents no real threat, no cause for alarm. The United States should find it just as possible to have mutually advantageous economic relations with a Marxist regime in Angola as with a European Marxist state such as Yugoslavia. Flexibility and caution coupled with a cultivated bent for trap aversion should protect us from getting caught up in an internal conflict in which we have no vital interest.

That said, the United States can and should seize the opportunity to exert its diplomatic influence on behalf of a political as over against a military solution to Angola's political crisis. In doing so, it should limit itself to modest and constructive support of efforts by Lisbon and the Organization for African Unity to further the cause of a unified state. It should set a big power example and desist from any overt or covert intervention, thus putting it in a credible position to discourage such intervention on the part of others, except for possible peace-keeping action by the OAU. American economic technical or educational assistance should be provided but through multilateral (UN [United Nations], OAU, ECA [Economic Commission for Africa]) efforts and Washington should be enthusiastically supportive of Portuguese-African cooperation based upon mutuality of interest.

Mutuality of interest should, in fact, be the guiding principle behind all our future relations with Angola (as well as other African states). Even American strategic interests can thereby be best served. A relationship based upon equitable commerce and reciprocal trust would be the most likely to see an accommodation of any legitimate future need for American naval or aircraft to use Angolan facilities. Contrarily, the case of Thailand shows how quickly action that violates this principle of mutuality of interest can render useless expensive bases and formal alliances.

Senator CLARK. That is a good point.

Mr. MARCUM. During the months immediately ahead, the United States should unobtrusively but wholeheartedly encourage efforts by Libson or the OAU to promote Angolan unity and discourage civil

war. It should also be openly and convincingly prepared to establish respectful relations with those who end up governing Angola, whoever they may be. Thank you.

Senator CLARK. That is an excellent statement. It goes into the kind of detail that is most useful in terms of examining the three liberation movements and their relationships with one another and with other African states.

Let us go on to the testimony of Gerald Bender. Proceed in any way you think proper.

[Professor Bender's biography follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GERALD J. BENDER

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Born: 27 November 1931; Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Marital Status: Married.

Address: 3218 Cheviot Vista Place, Los Angeles, California 90034.

Phone: (213) 839-3242.

EDUCATION

BA (cum laude), University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, 1963.

Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, summer, 1964.

MA, Political Science, UCLA, 1965.

PhD, Political Science, UCLA, to be awarded summer 1975. Dissertation: "The Myth and Reality of Portuguese Rule in Angola: A Study of Racial Domination."

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Assistant in American Government and Comparative Government, four semesters, 1963-65.

Peace Corps Lecturer in Politics of Nigeria, Fall, 1966.

Instructor, Department of Political Science, UCLA, 1970-71.

University Extension, UCLA, Fall, 1974.

FIELD WORK

Conducted study for Senior Honors Thesis—"Community Development in Nigeria," 145 pp.—in Nigeria during summer, 1962.

Dissertation research in Portugal and Angola, July 1967 to June 1969.

Portugal, March-April, 1972.

ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERIENCE

Director of the Interdisciplinary Research Program on Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau at UCLA, June 1971 through August 1974. The IRP was funded through a \$350,000 grant from the Ford Foundation for the purpose of conducting a series of research projects related to the Portuguese colonies in Africa.

PUBLICATIONS

Articles

"Political Socialization and Political Change," *The Western Political Quarterly*, vol. 20, no. 2, part 1 (June 1967), pp. 390-407.

"Realities of the Angolan Struggle," (written anonymously) *The New African*, vol. 6, no. 2 (October 1967), pp. 10-14.

"The Limits of Counterinsurgency: An African Case," *Comparative Politics*, vol. 4, no. 3 (April 1972), pp. 331-360.

Portugiesische Siedlungspolitik in Angola (Bonn: ISSA, 1974), revised translation of "The Limits of Counterinsurgency..."

Portugal in Africa: Bibliography of the UCLA Collection, Occasional Paper No. 42, African Studies Center, UCLA (August 1972).

"Planned Rural Settlements in Angola: 1900-1968" in *Social Change in Angola*, ed. Franz-Wilhelm Heimer (Munich: Weltforum Verlag, 1973), pp. 236-279.

"Portugal and Her Colonies Join the Twentieth Century: Causes and Initial Implications of the Military Coup," *Ufahamu*, vol. 4, no. 3 (Winter 1974), pp. 121-162.

"Whites in Angola on the Eve of Independence: The Politics of Numbers." with P. Stanley Yoder, *Africa Today*, vol. 21, no. 4 (Fall 1974), pp. 23-37.

"Quantos brancos há em Angola?" *Diário de Lisboa*, February 10-14, 1975. Portuguese translation of "Whites in Angola. . ."

"The Changing Historiography of Angola and Mozambique," to appear in Christopher Fyfe, ed. [Title undecided] (Longman, 1976).

Reviews

"Armed Struggle in Africa." by Gérard Chaliand, *Africa Report*, vol. 15, no. 5 (May 1970), pp. 34-36.

"Angola: History, Insurgency and Social Change," *Africa Today*, vol. 19, no. 1 (Winter 1970), pp. 30-36.

Book review of Ronald H. Chilcote, *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa: Documents*, *American Political Science Review*, vol. 68, no. 1 (March 1973), pp. 296-297.

Recent Seminars, Conferences and Other Activities

Presented two lectures at State Department seminars on "Change in Portugal and the Portuguese Colonies." May and October 1974.

Participant in meeting of the Gulbenkian Foundation on educational and social problems associated with Portuguese decolonization in Africa. Lisbon, Portugal, 20-22 January 1975.

Presented paper entitled "White Settlers in Angola" at UCLA African Studies Center Colloquium on "Political Change in Portuguese-speaking Africa," March 6, 1975.

Participant in Seven Springs Center, Yale University, "Symposium on Change in Contemporary Southern Africa," May 9-11, 1975, Mt. Kisco, New York. Presented paper entitled "Portugal, Angola and Mozambique: A Year Later."

"U.S. Panic Premature and Unwise," *Los Angeles Times*, March 30, 1975.

"Estados Unidos: pânico imprudente e prematuro." *Expresso* (Lisbon), 12 April 1975. Portuguese translation of "U.S. Panic Premature and Unwise."

STATEMENT OF PROF. GERALD J. BENDER, LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

Mr. BENDER. In addition to our discussions today of the current situation in Angola, I would like to direct my remarks to the question of what role, if any, the United States should play with regard to Angola, and concretely, how the Congress can assist in the formulation and execution of a responsible American policy toward Angola. We have all learned a number of important lessons from recent revelations about the conduct of American policy in Southeast Asia, about Government coverups such as Watergate, corporate bribery of foreign officials and political parties, and about the illegal and unacceptable activities of the CIA as described in the Rockefeller Commission report and elsewhere. Certainly, we can apply some of these lessons to our present consideration of U.S. policy toward Angola. Hopefully, we will learn the vital facts and ask the necessary questions now, rather than, as has too often been the case, after the fact.

A lengthy appendix of my views on the current situation in Angola (through May 1975) is attached. I hope that it can be made part of the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

VIEWS OF GERALD J. BENDER

APPENDIX: AN OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN ANGOLA¹

What this country lacks is a national consciousness. The people should be Angolans first and then militants of this or that party. Precisely the opposite is occurring. . . . The problem must be faced

¹ This assessment of the current situation in Angola is an updated (through May 1975) version of part of a paper I delivered at the Seven Springs Center Symposium on Change in Contemporary Southern Africa, 9-11 May 1975. The original paper is entitled, "Portugal, Angola and Mozambique: One Year Later."

squarely: if the movements give their full support to the Government, it will be able to govern. If there are reservations, the Government ceases to be the Government because it must be able to execute the decisions it takes.

—Diógenes Boavida, Minister of Justice in the Angolan Transitional Government. Quoted in *Espresso* (Lisbon), 3 May 1975.

For 15 years we have built up a great hatred of each other . . . and now, all of a sudden, we have to work together. Violence is almost inevitable if you have come straight from the maquis to the Palace without a preparatory period.

—Johnny Eduardo, Member of the Presidential Council. Quoted in *The Sunday Times* (London), 18 May 1975.

Since the very beginning of the nationalist struggle in Angola in 1961, fear has been expressed about the prospects of chaos and bloodshed after independence. Blacks and whites, radicals and reactionaries have all pointed to racial, ethnic, class, regional, and ideological cleavages as evidence for the possibility of disunity and violence once Angolans achieved ultimate control over their own land and destinies. During the thirteen years of armed warfare, it was as difficult to find an optimist about Angola's future as it was to find an African in the upper echelons of the Angolan colonial service. The tragedy of Angola as she approaches independence (scheduled for 11 November 1975) is that these cleavages became more pronounced during the long struggle and today more than ever the country seems destined to fulfill even the most lugubrious prognostications.

An economic drain on Portugal for centuries, Angola finally blossomed in the late 1960s and was booming at the time of the coup. Her mineral wealth of oil, diamonds and iron ore, and the fourth largest coffee production in the world helped to push her GNP to nearly \$2 billion. In 1974 exports increased more than a third over those of 1973 despite the uncertainty which prevailed throughout most of the year following the April coup. The economic stakes have been extremely high, especially for the Portuguese and foreign investors and the approximately 325,000 Portuguese living in the colony.² Furthermore, the whites' economic control and political power had never been so extensive or dominating as it was in April 1974 and they were determined not to relinquish one iota of their dominance.

During General Spínola's five months in office, there were few genuine or meaningful steps taken in Angola toward decolonization. Angola's first Provisional Government was headed by an indecisive and conservative General, Silvino Silvério Marques, and was almost totally white. It showed little resolve to stop whites in Luanda (led by the taxi drivers) from attacking the slums and killing hundreds of Africans throughout the summer of 1974. Africans finally took the law into their own hands and retaliated by attacking white and Cape Verdian shopowners in the slums and burning their stores to the ground. Luanda proved to be the racial keg of dynamite so many had feared it would be and its fuse is still uncomfortably short.

The racial violence undoubtedly would have continued and grown had it not been for the arrival of the nationalist parties on the political scene in the early fall, thereby shifting the focus of violence from an interracial to an interparty basis. Angola's three principal nationalist groups (FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA) had been reluctant to stop the war and openly enter the country until Lisbon's intentions concerning the future were clarified. The replacement of High Commissioner Silvério Marques with Admiral Rosa Coutinho (a key member of the Armed Forces Movement [AFM] and a strong critic of Spínola) in late July and Spínola's removal from office a month later made it quite clear that the AFM intended to grant unconditional independence. One by one each of the nationalist parties set up its headquarters in Luanda with branches in other major cities. Then the Algarve agreement, signed in Portugal on 15 January 1975 by the three parties and the Portuguese government, limited the number of legitimate political parties to the FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA. The internecine conflicts which had dominated relations among Angolan nationalists for the past two decades were resumed. In previous years their attacks on each other had been generally verbal, carried out in foreign languages in the pages of international newspapers and periodicals; occasionally they had fought physically on the

² Given the recent exodus, there were approximately 250,000 whites remaining in Angola as of early June, 1975.

battlefield in remote parts of the colony. However, once they were able to campaign openly for support, the insecurities, distrust, fears and hatred which had been nurtured during the long years of underground and exile politics threatened to engulf millions of Angolans of all races.

Any brief summary of the nationalists' history, background, ethnic and regional strengths, economic and political orientations, and international support must overgeneralize and simplify and therefore courts misunderstanding. There is an exception to almost every rule. With this caveat in mind and at the broadest level of generalization, it can be said that each of the parties is closely identified with one of the three major ethno-linguistic communities, which are regionally based, and each receives competing sources of external support.

The FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) is deeply rooted among Kikongo speaking peoples in northwestern Angola and Southwestern Zaire. Before 1974 there were less than half a million Kikongo in Angola; estimates of the number of refugees and émigrés in Zaire range between 500,000 and 1,500,000. The latter estimate emanates from the FNLA and has raised concern in Angola that they are attempting to increase their power base by incorporating Zairien Kikongo into FNLA political and military ranks. Until early 1975 the FNLA had remained an almost exclusively Kikongo movement. The few non-Kikongo cadres it attracted had either resigned (e.g., Jonas Savimbi) or had been imprisoned, e.g., Rosário Neto). FNLA leader Holden Roberto capitalized on the large Angolan population in Zaire, the strong support he has always received from the governments of Zaire (with the exception of Tshombe), and his relationship (through marriage) and close personal friendship with President Mobutu Sésé Séko to firmly ensonce the FNLA within the parameters of Zaire's political system.

The FNLA is widely assumed to have the support of the United States. Mobutu's close association with the U.S. has reinforced this belief, which was further nurtured by the Azores meeting between Spínola and Nixon (which Rosa Coutinho argues resulted in Spínola's hardened anti-communist attitudes), followed by the Cape Verde meeting of Spínola, Mobutu and Roberto in mid-September. Presumably, it was agreed during the latter meeting that the FNLA would play a dominant rôle in Angola's transitional government—this presumption was an important catalyst in the AFM's removal of the General two weeks later.

Roberto has taken a militantly anti-Soviet stance, condemning the "imperialist designs" and "social fascism" of the Russians, and has bitterly attacked the socialist policies promulgated by the Armed Forces Movement in Portugal, vowing to resist their imposition on Angola. Yet, in addition to Zairien support, Rumania and China have recently supplied most of the FNLA's arms and munitions and China has sent over one hundred instructors to Zaire (including a Chinese major general) to train the FNLA army.

The FNLA's strong identification with the Kikongo speaking community and the internal and external interests of Zaire mitigate the party's political appeal within Angola. Its strength lies principally in its large and well equipped army, numbering approximately 20,000. Except for the Portuguese army, scheduled to be fully withdrawn by February 1976, the FNLA army has no rival in Angola. Moreover, Roberto has rarely hesitated to flex his military muscles in political controversy.

The incorporation in February 1975 of a dissident faction of the MPLA, led by Daniel Chipenda, will certainly reinforce the FNLA military dominance since Chipenda brought approximately 3,000 troops with him (reputed to have been the best trained and most experienced in the MPLA army). Chipenda, who was appointed Secretary-General of the FNLA, is an Umbundu. His appointment and the inclusion of two Kimbundu in executive positions represent the FNLA's most serious effort since the mid-1960s to expand its ethnic appeal. Whether this will enable the party to significantly augment its support beyond northern Angola remains to be seen, although there have been some signs of incipient Kimbundu support. Certainly, by elevating Chipenda to an important leadership position, the FNLA has inextricably identified itself with an individual whom the MPLA views as the "most dangerous" and "number one traitor" in Angola. Already mortal enemies, the Chipenda affair placed the FNLA and MPLA on a violent collision course which, in February of this year, finally brought them to gun battles in Luanda's slums. While there have since been occasional lulls, the fighting between the two parties has been almost continuous. By the end of May it had spread beyond the capital to engulf dozens of cities and towns in northern, eastern and central Angola.

Historically, the MPLA (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) has drawn most of its support from the intellectuals—blacks, mesticos, and at most a couple thousand whites—and the approximately 1.5 million Kimbundu speaking peoples, most of whom are concentrated within a radius of 150 miles of the capital, many actually living in Luanda's slums. Headed by Dr. Agostinho Neto, the MPLA leadership is well educated, urbane, multiracial, and politically radical—qualities which helped the party gain the overwhelming support of most African nations, the USSR, the countries of eastern Europe, progressive Portuguese and most of those in western Europe and the U.S. who supported the liberation of the Portuguese colonies. Ironically, the very qualities of leadership which projected the MPLA into international prominence may not be well suited to contemporary Angolan politics. Since the Portuguese coup Dr. Neto and the party have been increasingly criticized for being out of touch with the people and these accusations appear to have cut into some of the MPLA's traditional support.

A more serious blow to the MPLA was the internal dispute which, after April 1974, left the party with three separate factions, each claiming to be the only true representative. The Chipenda faction ("Eastern Revolt") eventually merged with the FNLA. A second group of dissidents ("Active Revolt"), which accused Neto of being too authoritarian and secretive, appears to have reached an uneasy reconciliation with their former nemesis, although few have actually returned to Angola to rejoin the party. The strong support Neto received from the AFM helped him to keep his grip on the controls of party power. In fact, Roberto, Chipenda, Savimbi, and Mobutu were so outspoken in their criticism of High Commissioner Rosa Coutinho's unmitigated support of Neto that Portugal was forced to replace Coutinho after the Algarve accord. His replacement, General Silva Cardoso, has attempted to follow a strictly neutral policy toward the three parties, which has resulted in a sharp reversal of MPLA and FNLA attitudes toward the role of the Portuguese High Commissioner. Whereas Holden Roberto and Rosa Coutinho had exchanged charges almost daily, the FNLA President praises Silva Cardoso's conduct as "exemplary." Neto, on the other hand, is deeply resentful of the High Commissioner's reduced support and his frequent charges that the MPLA has been distributing sophisticated weapons to teenagers and other civilians in Luanda.

The MPLA has also criticized the Portuguese army, claiming that it has been passive and vacillating in the maintenance of security (i.e., not preventing FNLA armed attacks). This charge has elicited denials and countercharges from some of Neto's (formerly?) strongest backers in the Portuguese cabinet, including Melo Antunes, Almeda Santos, and Vitor Alves. By early June this situation had deteriorated to the point that Neto, in a message sent to a pro-MPLA rally in Lisbon, declared that the "internal reactionary forces" in Angola were serving imperialism and attacking the people "with bloodthirsty fury." He added that these forces enjoyed the support of Silva Cardoso who, Neto claimed, had abandoned all pretense of neutrality with his open opposition to the MPLA. Recently, MPLA soldiers have been shooting at Portuguese air force planes flying over areas where they and FNLA troops were fighting—a further manifestation of the breakdown in relations between the MPLA and the Portuguese military forces in Angola.

The MPLA's present attitude toward the Armed Forces Movement is almost schizophrenic. On the one hand, the party is convinced that the Portuguese troops in Angola are trying to crush it as part of an imperialist plot to eliminate "the only progressive party in the country;" on the other hand, the MPLA continues to praise the "anti-imperialist" policies of the Revolutionary Council of the AFM. Unquestionably, there are strong personal and ideological bonds between the MPLA and the AFM but these may be eclipsed by an apparently growing belief among the Portuguese officers that a more neutral approach is necessary to restore the peace. The AFM's recent attempts to normalize relations with Zaire are a manifestation of this apparent change. Moreover, Neto's bitter attacks on the High Commissioner and the Portuguese military in Angola appear to have offended the professional pride of Lisbon's ruling soldiers, including some who are considered to be Marxists. If an open break between the MPLA and the AFM develops, the MPLA's situation could become extremely precarious.

The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) was founded by Jonas Savimbi in 1966, two years after he had bitterly resigned from the FNLA. UNITA's strength is concentrated in Angola's central highlands and southern plateau areas, especially among the Umbundu speaking peoples who constitute a third of Angola's population. The party lost its only external base

(Zambia) in 1967 which necessitated the establishment of all operations inside the colony. Without sufficient external support to equip and train a military force comparable to the FNLA's or MPLA's, UNITA expended most of its efforts on political mobilization of the peasantry.

While Umbundu is his mother tongue, Savimbi learned to speak a number of other Angolan languages during the seven years he spent in the Angolan bush; he also speaks impeccable Portuguese, English and French. He manifests the rare ability to relate as comfortably with wealthy intellectuals as with humble peasants, a quality which has helped him win the support of perhaps as much as half the country, including from a good number of whites.

The absence of external patrons has enabled UNITA to eschew ideological questions and concentrate on pragmatic policies which could swell its ranks. The party has tried to steer a middle course between the MPLA and FNLA, using the rhetoric of "African socialism" but leaving little doubt that this would more closely resemble Kenya's than Tanzania's brand of African socialism. Until late May Savimbi had adeptly managed to keep UNITA out of the MPLA/FNLA battles; in fact, UNITA's soldiers frequently joined the Portuguese troops in separating the fighting parties. This action has reinforced UNITA's image as a mediating force in the country which, combined with its leader's charisma, the importance of its Umbundu ethnic base, and its broad political platform, has catapulted the party from partial obscurity before the coup into the position of being perhaps the strongest political force in Angola.

UNITA's new and growing popularity has rekindled old MPLA antagonisms toward the party. Moreover, UNITA's peace keeping activities with the Portuguese forces have brought it into more frequent conflict with the MPLA, especially in those instances when the fighting has been initiated by the latter. These confrontations have reinforced the MPLA's belief that both the Portuguese and UNITA's armies are conspiring with the FNLA to eliminate it from the Angolan scene. Finally, the marked white support which UNITA has received has confirmed the MPLA's conviction that the former has always worked closely with reactionary Portuguese factions. The MPLA's increasingly hostile attitude toward UNITA was translated into action in late May and early June with its launching of heavy attacks on UNITA headquarters and other installations, resulting in the deaths of dozens of UNITA partisans. Not surprisingly, this has pushed UNITA closer to the FNLA in what almost appears to be an MPLA self-fulfilling prophecy. It can not yet be determined whether any lasting alliance is possible between the FNLA and UNITA since there are many important factors which militate against this prospect.

The Algarve agreement carefully tried to balance the distribution of power among the three nationalist parties and the Portuguese, but the transitional government has been immobilized by the intra- and interparty conflicts. This has produced a power and authority vacuum in which no party or personality is recognized as legitimate in all parts of the country or by all ethnic groups. Each of the parties has attempted to fill the vacuum in its zones of control and influence by expanding the presence of its army. Moreover, the National Defense Commission (comprised of the Portuguese High Commissioner, three Portuguese officers, one representative from each party and the Presidential Council, the latter counting as one vote) has charged both the FNLA and MPLA with premeditated attempts to eliminate their rivals in their respective zones of influence. Today, the two forces are roughly separated by an imaginary line running between Luanda and Malange.

The Algarve agreement had called for the gradual creation of a national army to be made up of forces from the four signatory parties. Many hoped it would be strong enough to impose order on the country, if necessary, after independence in November. The feeble beginning of the national army was barely a month old, however, when in the March fighting the FNLA and MPLA contingents fled the integrated ranks to join their respective sides. Since that time the two parties have been reluctant to commit any more soldiers to the new army. Their reluctance to merge their forces with UNITA in a united army has shifted the burden of peace-keeping squarely onto the shoulders of the Portuguese army.

The Portuguese have avoided imposing order on Angola since that could easily embroil them in another war, especially now that the violence has reached such a high level. One of the AFM's initial and principal goals had been to bring the troops home before risking any more Portuguese lives in Africa. If Portuguese casualties mount and more troops are needed to restore the peace in

Angola, some of the AFM's popular support at home could be jeopardized. Moreover, few Portuguese soldiers are willing to risk their lives trying to separate the three fighting armies, especially when each of the parties has strongly criticized the comportment of the Portuguese military. Roberto in fact, has blamed Portuguese military and civilian sympathy for the MPLA as the cause of recent fighting. The increased peace-keeping chores are also a heavy burden on the already strained Portuguese economy. Finally, the AFM has been meticulously careful not to incur any charges of paternalism, which a heavy-handed attempt to impose law and order would certainly invoke.

On the other hand, the AFM is committed to an orderly transition to independence in Angola and it is increasingly clear that unless Portugal enlarges its military forces and extends their activity, full fledged civil war could be imminent. The AFM also feels a strong responsibility toward the Portuguese who have remained in Angola thus far and whose situation has become extremely precarious. In addition, the recent massive white exodus could have disastrous economic consequences for both Angola and Portugal if it continues.

Since April 1974 whites in Angola have vacillated almost monthly in their decision to stay or leave. In the first few months following the coup, the majority of Angola's whites feared "another Congo." Reassured by General Spínola's reluctance to grant independence for "at least a generation," they gravitated toward the reactionary political policies he came to represent. Not surprisingly, Spínola's removal from office in the fall of 1974 caused many whites to flee Angola. Then, unexpectedly, a number of them began to return or cancelled their departure plans after the three nationalist parties welcomed the presence of those whites "who are capable of adapting themselves to majority rule."

The escalation of the interparty fratricide following the Algarve accord dramatically reversed this trend. By early June Portuguese Information Minister Jorge Jesuino indicated that about 60,000 whites had already left Angola while half of those remaining had applied to return to Portugal. Within Angola many Portuguese are fleeing from towns in the interior to the capital as it becomes apparent that neither the transitional government nor the Portuguese military is capable of protecting their lives or property. Those in Luanda have not fared much better; hundreds of Portuguese homes have been sacked and dozens have been killed in the fighting. The panic of the whites is no longer alleviated by the appeals of nationalist leaders to stay; for many the appeals no longer sound as sincere or reassuring. When asked for his reaction to the flight of whites in mid-May, Neto offered the following:

If an appeal is necessary from us that they should not leave our country, and if such an appeal from us will be heeded, then we would like to make it here—wholeheartedly calling on them to stay on in the country, with our assurances that we shall try our best to insure that their lives and property are protected and guaranteed.

Two weeks later a Portuguese official in Angola observed that the white population felt that the appeals "were not being translated into acts. On the contrary."

As each party consolidates its geographical sphere of control, the whites' identification with a particular party will increasingly correspond to their own regional location. Because past analyses of Angola have emphasized the racial dichotomy, the importance of white regional identification has been overlooked, yet it was extant long before the coup, especially in the central highlands. This trend is reminiscent of those British civil servants who stayed on in Nigeria following independence and whose strong loyalties to the northern, eastern, or western regions often matched those of Nigerians.

As though she were divinely chosen to be Africa's Job, Angola must face further tribulations as a result of the separatist movement in the oil rich enclave of Cabinda. Most of the approximately 80,000 Cabindans, the whites in the enclave, and the oil interests have rallied around rival factions of the Cabindan Liberation Front (FLEC) which are indirectly supported and encouraged by the governments of Zaire and Congo-Brazzaville (where each faction maintains its respective headquarters). Gabon also appears to be interested in Cabinda. The nearly \$450 million annual oil revenues as well as a rich timber industry and fertile coffee lands make Cabinda a lucrative prize.

The fortunes of Cabindan secession vacillate but appear to improve in an inverse relation to the degree of Angola's governmental stability. The secession movement reached its apex during Spínola's presidency when FLEC was actually encouraged by the General who met with its representatives on several occasions.

The AFM's ouster of Spínola and Rosa Coutinho's tightly run government were serious blows to Cabindan secession since the AFM stands solidly with the liberation movements in supporting Angola's territorial integrity. While only a handful of Angolans would benefit from Cabinda's secession, the interests of the governments of Zaire and Congo and possibly the United States and France, the multinational oil corporations (especially Gulf Oil), and the potential division among the Angolan parties over the enclave's future status all promise to make the final settlement of Cabindan secession troublesome unless a strong central power emerges in Luanda. In this sense the possibility of secession in Cabinda is not unlike the secession question in other parts of the country; the chances are heightened by interparty fighting, political and economic disorder, and the absence of a national army with a monopoly over coercive force.

The fighting among the three liberation movements in Angola today involves more than a struggle to see who will assume the reins of power when independence becomes a reality in November. The fighting, especially between the MPLA and FNLA, has taken on the proportion of a jihad in which each side believes that the elimination of the other is requisite for peace and tranquility in the country. The FNLA views the MPLA as a tool of Russian and Portuguese "fascism" and "imperialism" while the latter is convinced that the FNLA is merely a front for Zaire and American "fascism" and "imperialism. In other words, each party views the other as the devil incarnate, incapable of redemption, part of an international plot directed against itself, and purposefully accelerating the conflict in order to create a climate of chaos which could facilitate a seizure of power by force. At the same time, both the MPLA and FNLA see UNITA as a captive of the Portuguese settlers and therefore a barrier to the complete takeover of power by Africans.

The interparty battles are not confined to the respective armies. Each party has a number of ancillary branches (i.e., trade unions, youth organizations, medical corps, women's auxiliaries, etc.), all of which have come into conflict with their counterparts in the other parties. For example while all three parties profess a strong commitment to "the workers," the attempt to manifest this support by a one-day nationwide strike (during a belated May Day celebration) failed when the FNLA and UNITA labor unions objected to the fact that the strike had been called unilaterally by the MPLA trade union.

There were occasions during the long year following the coup when the Armed Forces Movement was concerned about the possibility that a countercoup could be precipitated by the Portuguese in Angola. While an Angolan inspired countercoup no longer seems to be a threat a massive influx into Portugal of Portuguese from Angola will present many difficult problems for the AFM. For example, if the white exodus from Angola continues at the present level (approximately 500 a day), the new arrivals could almost double the present rate of unemployment in Portugal, presently estimated to be between 8% and 10%. Furthermore, less than a quarter of the immigrants are skilled, which makes their economic reabsorption even more difficult. Finally, most of the returning Portuguese blame the AFM for their plight and represent a potentially dangerous source of opposition.

The AFM's commitment to expand its efforts to restore peace in Angola is not shared by a majority of Portugal's citizenry who believe that enough lives and money have already been expended in Angola. Lt. Col. Correia, a member of the Portuguese Revolutionary Council and one of the most important AFM officials connected with Angola, recently argued that "the dynamics of the Portuguese revolution may be affected by events in Angola."

Finally the prospects for international organizations such as the UN or OAU assisting in the restoration and maintenance of peace in Angola are not encouraging. Each of the three movements has expressed bitter resentment about the presence of international observers and each has vowed to resist the presence of international armed forces. Moreover, the OAU is deeply divided about Angola; conflicting loyalties of the member countries to the competing parties exacerbates the difficulty of achieving a common African position. While the UN has not become involved in the conflict the same type of conflicting loyalties threaten to obviate any potential peace-keeping role it might play.

Since the three parties view the UN, the OAU, and the Portuguese Government with great suspicion, they may be forced to resolve the conflict themselves. Tragically, almost all of the previous attempts to resolve conflicts among the Angolan nationalists have broken down into armed warfare. The difficulty in convincing the three leaders to even agree to a summit meeting to discuss their differences does not leave much hope that Angola's problems will be resolved soon or peacefully.

Senator CLARK. It will certainly be made a part of the record.

U.S. INVOLVEMENT OR ASSISTANCE TO ANGOLAN POLITICAL PARTIES

Mr. BENDER. It provides the background for my conviction that the United States should not contemplate—let alone provide—overt or covert assistance to any Angolan political party, faction, or pressure group. It is no secret that Angola is sitting on a powder keg which has been threatening to erupt for months. The Portuguese authorities in Luanda and Lisbon and all major nationalist leaders acknowledge this fact.

The causes are also clear: Angola is afflicted with deep racial, ethnic, regional, class, and ideological cleavages; intense distrust and personal animosity among the nationalist leaders; and the active interest, and occasional involvement, of major and minor foreign powers. For most, the only mystery is exactly when and where the eruption will occur. Our concern should be to guarantee that the United States is not directly or indirectly involved in any Angolan conflicts if or when they take place.

The 1970 National Security Council study of American policy in southern Africa (NSSM 39) noted that the United States had no strategic interests in Angola which were vital to our security. Subsequent events—especially the recent opening of the Suez Canal—have made Angola even less important to American strategic interests.

Moreover, the total value of fixed U.S. investment there is very small—under \$70 million—an overwhelming majority of it by one company, Gulf Oil. Therefore, regardless of the outcome of the present struggle for power in Angola, the United States in reality has very little to win or lose by remaining resolutely neutral unless we mistakenly assume that what is good for Gulf Oil is good for the United States.

This should not suggest, however, that all of the feuding factions in Angola look equally favorable upon American foreign policy objectives or the presence of U.S. corporations in the country. In fact, we have a host of journalists, scholars, and ideological soothsayers who have provided us with convenient, if grossly misleading, shortcuts to an understanding of the ideological configurations of the nationalist parties.

IDEOLOGY OF ANGOLAN NATIONALIST PARTIES

The MPLA is usually labeled Marxist or pro-Communist, the UNITA is alleged to follow the Maoist line, while the FNLA is said to be strongly pro-West. Yet, for every piece of evidence which supports these labels, there is a fact which contradicts it.

For example, although UNITA is alleged to be the Maoist party, it not only receives very little support from China but there is no trace of “Chinese economics” in the party’s endorsement of a vigorous private sector or its rejection of any attempt to reorganize the rural peasantry.

In fact, the bulk of China’s support—including weapons, numerous military instructors, and financial aid—has been directed to the “pro-Western” FNLA whose economic policies are even less Maoist than UNITA’s.

Similar contradictions obtain with respect to each party’s position toward whites. Before the April 1974 coup in Lisbon, conventional

wisdom held that the MPLA was strongly multiracial, while both the FNLA and UNITA were almost exclusively oriented toward Africans. Today, the MPLA is increasingly accused of being "antiwhite." UNITA is often portrayed as the rallying point of most white settlers, and even the FNLA is said to have considerable financial support from whites as well as a number of Portuguese serving as its uniformed soldiers.

There is considerable evidence supporting both the old and new views of the economic, racial, and other policies of the three nationalist parties; we should therefore be extremely cautious in accepting simplistic analyses which predict how any of the parties would proceed once in power. Whereas each party has proved to be inflexible on many issues, all have manifested a degree of pragmatism in adapting to Angola's economic, regional, racial, and ethnic exigencies.

This should not be surprising to those who have followed the policies of the Vietcong—especially their initial reluctance to abolish the private sector or undertake massive retribution against their former foes in South Vietnam after their recent victory. How many "experts" foresaw this, and how many warnings did we receive to the contrary?

The point I wish to emphasize is that it is simply not possible for anyone to predict with certainty which Angolan party would best serve the interest of Angola, or the United States. Naturally, our views are conditioned by our own perceptions of Angola's or America's interests and whether we are looking at the long or short range.

However, even within these parameters, the present fluidity of Angolan politics is such that any prediction, and especially one based on the recommendations of professional diviners, is hazardous at this time. I believe that this reality may account for why we see so little urging, in or out of Government, that the United States overtly support one of the contending parties.

U.S. COVERT ACTIVITIES IN ANGOLA

Covert support, however, is another matter, and this is precisely where Congress must exercise its responsibility to monitor and sanction the covert activities of American intelligence agencies—a responsibility which has been abdicated too often in the past. One cannot overemphasize the potential dangers which Angola presents for the United States, the most important being the peril of becoming embroiled in yet another civil war through the covert activities of Government agencies or private corporations.

Therefore, those in Congress who agree that it is both imprudent and dangerous for the United States to support any of the factions in Angola, have a special obligation to insure that neither the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], nor any other intelligence agency or private corporation is currently providing covert assistance to any of the Angolan parties.

Let us find out now where we might be "committed" or compromised in Angola so that there will not be a necessity later to carry out yet another painful autopsy, to produce even more "Pentagon Papers" to discover how and why we became involved. If the United States is in the process of becoming committed or actually is com-

mitted in the Angolan struggle, let us not only find out now but publicly debate the policy to see if it has general support.

Concretely, many respectable people are convinced that the United States is aiding the FNLA, and possibly FLEC, presumably through our connections in Zaire. In recent months, this charge has appeared in the world press almost daily. Because the accusation is so ubiquitously accepted, we are associated with this policy. Therefore, this committee, the Senate (Church), or House (Stanton) committees on intelligence activities or some other congressional committee, should investigate the charge to determine its validity.

I can only speculate about it from my personal ("soft") information and knowledge that U.S. intelligence agencies have intervened in a number of countries in the developing world, such as Iran, Guatemala, Cuba, and in ways ranging from the fielding of an entire army of (Meo) mercenaries in Laos to the expenditure of over \$8 million to "destabilize" the Allende regime in Chile. The Congress, however, is in a position to do more than speculate on U.S. covert activities related to Angola. For example, it should be possible these days to inquire if the CIA, DIA, or any of the other dozen or so Federal agencies which have intelligence-gathering functions are involved in assisting any of the legitimate or illegitimate Angolan parties, and if so, determine who authorized such support and under what policy. For the Congress to fail to exercise this power and responsibility now would constitute a gross act of negligence.

COVERT ACTIVITIES OF U.S. CORPORATIONS IN ANGOLA

The dangers of American covert intervention are not confined to our various intelligence agencies. U.S. and multinational corporations have shown themselves to be equally disposed to providing covert funds for foreign leaders, parties, and pressure groups. Significantly, the corporation which is among the most notorious in this respect is Gulf Oil, the same company which accounts for nearly three-quarters of total U.S. investment in Angola.

Because of the prominence of Gulf's operations in Angola and its proven tendency to provide covert corporate funds for political bribery, it is vital that there be a thorough investigation of Gulf's activities in Angola. This is especially important because Gulf is almost certain to be a focal point of conflict in Angola's future, no matter who comes to power and even if the company is not providing covert assistance.

In fact, it is so probable that Gulf will present problems for the U.S. Government in the future—their installations could be attacked any day or they may be nationalized—that the Government should determine now whether the company is committed to any of the partisans in the present power struggle. In a hypothetical example, if it were discovered that Gulf had been helping to finance the advocates of Cabindan secession (FLEC) and the secession attempt failed, what would be the responsibilities of the U.S. Government to protect the company against possible retributions by one or all of the Angolan nationalist parties?

I put this example hypothetically, but it is commonly believed that Gulf is doing precisely this as well as possibly providing assistance to the FNLA. What is not hypothetical is that over the past 6 to 8 months,

Gulf has been threatened publicly or privately by FLEC, FNLA, and the MPLA, and these threats have included blackmail; that is, if the company does not provide money, their installations will be destroyed. Exactly 1 month ago today, Gulf president, Bob Dorsey, sat here before another Senate committee and explained that the company's covert payoffs in Korea, Bolivia, and Italy resulted from situations where "we were subject to pressures which were simply not possible to resist." The "pressures" in these three countries do not appear to exceed those the company faces in Angola where the magnitude of Gulf's investment is not appreciably smaller than that in Korea, where \$4 million was under the table. The Senate should investigate to see if there are any parallels between Gulf's financial machinations in Angola and those in Korea, Bolivia, and Italy.

Gulf should not be singled out, however. Other large American corporations, such as Texaco and General Tire, have millions of dollars invested in Angola and operate in politically sensitive areas there. The *Mayaguez* incident illustrates how a private corporation can involve the United States in a military conflict when it sails into troubled waters. The oil-rich waters off Angola's coast are clearly troubled.

A congressional investigation into the covert activities of American corporations in Angola would clarify whether these companies are undertaking any political activities which may be contrary to U.S. interest. It could also serve as a forum for Congress to investigate the general question of how to deal in the future with pressures on American companies abroad.

If it is true that "the hard fact is that even the most powerful multinational corporation is almost helpless when it comes to even the smallest banana republic or dictatorship" demanding undercover payoffs, as former Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Charles E. Walker recently argued in the *New York Times*—June 8, 1975—then such an investigation should be welcomed by the corporations. Clearly, there is a need for the Congress to examine fully this difficult problem and hopefully draft legislation which can help the corporations manage future pressures which are "simply not possible to resist."

A brief word on possible U.S. humanitarian assistance to Angola.

Senator CLARK. As a member of the Multinational Subcommittee of the full Committee on Foreign Relations, I think your suggesting having the Multinational Corporation Subcommittee look into the possibility or the relationship particularly of Gulf Oil in Angola is a wise one. I will be happy to discuss that with the chairman and the committee, and see if there is any information that has come to light to date with regard to any relationship between Gulf Oil and Angola.

Mr. BENDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I hope that it is clear that my motivation is not to punish Gulf or put Gulf on the chopping block. It appears that there is a real problem with American corporations, and if that problem exists, Gulf probably has experienced it more than anybody right now because they are under real pressures.

Senator CLARK. I think you make the point well and relate it well to what the president of Gulf Oil told us, sitting in the same chair you are sitting in, 2 weeks ago. The pressures that occur on multinational corporations and the fact that, I think he was speaking very honestly and very frankly in saying that their major or paramount considera-

tion is their stockholders, not necessarily the national interests of the United States. I think it is well put, and it certainly warrants further investigation.

U.S. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO ANGOLA

Mr. BENDER. A situation could develop before or after Angolan independence making it necessary for some outside power to help restore the peace. At present, Portugal is almost overtaxed in its capacity to do appreciably more than its excellent performance during the past difficult months. It is likely that there will be suggestions or demands that the United States make a contribution to any peacekeeping efforts. I strongly suggest that if we offer humanitarian assistance, we do not undertake it bilaterally. The U.N., OAU, or Portugal itself offer the best channels for directing our support. Portugal presently has very close ties with Zambia and Tanzania, among other African countries, and is in contact with Zaire. They are in the process of trying to improve their relations with Zaire right now.

In addition to the Portuguese general knowledge of Angola, this suggests that it would be wise to work very closely with Portugal with respect to any potential American assistance. In fact, the U.S. Government may wish to explore with the Portuguese Government the means by which we could assist with the costs or logistical problems attendant to any expanded peacekeeping efforts. This would help Portugal and Angola at the same time, while maintaining a low profile. It would not be unlike the recent British offer to assist Mozambique with the added financial burdens which will occur from the imposition of U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia.

REASSESSMENT OF U.S. POLICIES IN AFRICA

Mr. Chairman, the United States is presently undergoing an agonizing but healthy reassessment of our foreign policy throughout most of the world, from Russia and China to Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and even Cuba. We are realizing that many of our past policies and approaches are not well suited to the world we find in 1975. Africa, however, appears once again to be forgotten in this reassessment. Yet, nowhere in the world is a major reassessment more in order than with respect to Angola and Mozambique. Our policy in the past toward these former Portuguese colonies is a source of little pride for Americans. Thus, it appears worth while to briefly review that policy up to now in order to appreciate better the full context in which these hearings are taking place.

From the late 1960's until the Portuguese coup, U.S. policy toward Angola and Mozambique was based on two mutually exclusive goals: To express sympathy with the aspirations of Angolans and Mozambicans for self-determination; and to help support Portugal, a NATO ally.

In pursuit of the former goal, the United States adopted a policy of "communication" and "dialog" under the assumption that the most efficacious means for realizing self-determination was communication, not violence. The assumption was naive, at best, and hypocritical because no one honestly believed that Salazar or Caetano could be convinced through "communication" of the need for self-determination

in the colonies. In fact, no example in the public or private record indicates that the United States ever successfully moved the Portuguese an inch closer to granting independence to Angola, Mozambique, or Guinea-Bissau. Furthermore, the policy of communication was not extended to the nationalist movements, who were generally ignored so as not to offend the Portuguese. This fear of offending Portugal actually prompted American consulates in the two colonies to maintain minimal communication with the African populations.

Pursuit of the second goal, to assist our NATO ally, was less hypocritical. The United States trained Portuguese officers here and supplied Portugal with airplanes, equipment which could serve either military or civilian purposes, large Ex-Im credits and loans, napalm, herbicides, and, most importantly, moral support. There was always a sophistic explanation of how each example of U.S. aid to Portugal could be interpreted in two ways, but the sum total of American actions left no doubt about which side the United States actually supported in the struggles for independence in the Portuguese African colonies. If there were any doubts remaining by 1974, they were removed when the National Security Council Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39) came into the public domain. This study of American policy in southern Africa submitted to President Nixon by Henry Kissinger in early 1970, details a number of options for the United States in that area. Regardless of whether or not the infamous option 2—now I understand it was probably 2A—was ever officially recommended or adopted, it clearly approximated the scenario for U.S. policy in the 1970's. The United States placed its bets on the tenacity of the Caetano regime and the white settlers to hold the line in Angola and Mozambique, and lost.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD ANGOLA FOLLOWING PORTUGUESE COUP

Following the Portuguese coup, the United States had the opportunity to launch a fresh policy toward the Portuguese African colonies. A month before the Armed Forces Movement toppled the Caetano regime, Donald Easum was sworn in as the new Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Easum sought to shift the focus of American policy toward "using our influence to foster change" rather than continuing to "preserve the status-quo."

Despite the long American record of opposition to the nationalists in the Portuguese colonies and the ambivalence toward normalizing relations with the liberation movements in the months after the coup, Mr. Easum engineered a diplomatic breakthrough with Frelimo in early November 1974. Following a frank and important meeting with Frelimo President Samora Machel in Dar es Salaam, Mr. Easum traveled to Mozambique and was the first foreign diplomat to hold a formal meeting with the transitional government.

However, less than 48 hours after his return to the United States, Mr. Easum was informed that he would be replaced, after only 9 months in office.

Secretary Kissinger selected Nathaniel Davis, who had no diplomatic experience in Africa, and who served as Ambassador in Chile during the Allende overthrow, to replace Mr. Easum. Predictably, concern was immediately expressed that the United States might implement the politics of destabilization in Africa. Moreover, Mr. Davis'

nomination was strongly and unanimously condemned by the Organization of African Unity. There have been many explanations for this sudden and unorthodox change, including Secretary Kissinger's statement to columnist Carl Rowan that the change emanated solely from the fact that the Secretary realized he "had no African policy" and, therefore, decided to shake up the African bureau from top to bottom.

Many, including Frelimo, believed that under Mr. Easum the United States had finally developed an African policy which was more sympathetic to the goals and aspirations of Africans. Now that Mr. Davis has been confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State, presumably the United States will change the direction of its present—non?—policy.

Mr. Mulcahy of the State Department will appear before this committee the day after tomorrow, and I hope you will have the opportunity to discuss any new directions in American policy, especially with respect to Angola and Mozambique.

GENERAL SUMMATION OF WITNESS' TESTIMONY

Senator CLARK. It is an excellent statement. All three statements I thought were really very, very good. I appreciate the time and effort coming here and presenting them. I thought your historical summary at the end, Mr. Bender, was a very accurate one. I think very concise and at the same time, a fair one.

So many areas have been covered. It is difficult to know how to spend our remaining half hour.

There is one area I would like to hear more discussion of from all three of you, and this is just a discussion, so I hope that the three of you will interrupt one another and feel free to join in. It is really a separate question of American policy. What do we do? Where do you go from here? Let me state what I understood the three statements to have said and then let us see if there is agreement.

It seemed to me all three of you were saying that we should not become covertly or overtly involved in the civil strife both before November 11, and after. That we should not support any one of the three liberation movements, overtly or covertly. It seems to me that you limit American actions, policies, attitudes, really to the possibility of humanitarian aid. That all three of you agreed upon that.

It seemed to me that Mr. Wheeler did not rule out bilateral aid, as I recall the statement, but that the other two witnesses talked exclusively of multilateral aid.

I assume Mr. Wheeler would not be opposed to that either?

Mr. WHEELER. No.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE THROUGH BILATERAL, MULTILATERAL AID

Senator CLARK. But that our total alternative for action rests with humanitarian assistance through bilateral, perhaps multilateral aid.

Is that a fair statement, or would you take exception to that?

Mr. BENDER. No; that is fair.

Senator CLARK. You all three agree on that?

Mr. BENDER. I would like to say it is not going to be easy to go the route of multilateral aid because so far all three movements have gone on record strongly opposing any intervention of the OAU or the U.N. When both tried to send just observers the reactions surprised me

and therefore, while I grant that it is not going to be easy to go that route it is probably easier than trying bilaterally.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Mr. WHEELER. However, to some extent the exclusive multilateral aid might bind our arms under certain conditions. I think it is hard to predict. There may be a situation again—this is hypothetical—where the current U.S. relations with Portugal, in Lisbon, would lead to an agreement that would help them put into effect the Alvor Agreements, for example. What if there was no pay for the Portuguese troops, a basic problem which the Portuguese might have to deal with, or just the problem of training. But this is the kind of thing where again I stress the Alvor Agreement and Portugal's executing it, and if we could help multilaterally, along these lines that we mentioned, I totally agree on the philosophy of both my distinguished colleagues on this policy, that there should be a view of hands off.

Again, some might say if you try to help the Portuguese put in the Alvor Agreement are you not internally intervening again? You can get into semantics, I think, in terms of saving lives and helping people and health and welfare, that area. We should try to do what I said in my statement.

EDUCATIONAL TRAINING ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Mr. MARCUM. Just reenforcing what you say, Senator, I think there has been a tendency in American responses to independence for Angolan and other ex-Portuguese colonies to think in terms of jumping in very quickly with educational assistance, training programs, programs which can be misconstrued as seeking to quickly gain some kind of a political influence. There is a linguistic problem. The lingua franca of Angola is Portuguese. Training people in this country, at this juncture in English does not seem to be terribly appropriate.

I would, in that sense, again stress working through multilateral programs with others. Any training programs should, if possible, be developed in cooperation with the Portuguese. Yet one of the first things that did come up on the American Government agenda was the notion of reviving the old unilateral southern African scholarship project [SASP].

Senator CLARK. You have some question about that?

Mr. MARCUM. I do have at this juncture very real questions about that.

Senator CLARK. Because it might be interpreted as interference or attempt to get a political foothold?

Mr. MARCUM. Get a leg up on somebody else, and I do not think that is necessary or useful.

Mr. BENDER. I fully concur with that. I think there are lots of problems involved and particularly the past history has not always been one which we would have liked to have. But more importantly, I think that there are other ways to do it, that we can get more mileage, so to speak, for the dollar.

For example, just hypothetically, if we were to establish an agricultural school in Luanda, or outside of Luanda, because they do not really have an adequate one now, that is where the Angolans seem to want it, and for the amount of money it takes to train a student in the

United States for linguistics it seems is not a very efficacious way to spend our money right now.

Senator CLARK. You are not advocating we establish an agricultural school bilaterally?

Mr. BENDER. No; I was going to expand on that. The Portuguese, for example, right now are trying to work out a tropical agricultural school in Lisbon. That might be one way we could do it. At one time, I do not know about now, they had all three liberation movements agreeing to it. That probably would no longer be true. But maybe with help the Portuguese could do that because they should be the ones and there are a couple of American agriculture schools that are very interested in getting involved with that sort of thing.

Senator CLARK. Professor Wheeler, I gather that you are not in agreement on this point with your two colleagues about the question of Americans perhaps African American Institute or other kinds of programs educating Angolans for mutual development of their country.

Mr. WHEELER. I am not that familiar with the history of the actual results of the training programs of educational programs, but I do know it is a fact that probably a hundred Angolans have been educated in the United States since 1960. Perhaps more than 100. I do not have the figures. I think we could include Mozambique itself quite a large number in various fields some in high schools, some in universities. Some at my university, in fact, and this is a contribution to the future of Angola, whatever you feel about the educational policies. This is partly an image problem. I do not feel that we should worry that much about image. I am worried about substances.

What have we contributed, what can we contribute to Angolans in education? The people fear we are going to intervene. I am not that worried about that. I think part of our problem in foreign policy has been worrying about image and not substance. If we have trained a doctor to go into the Luanda suburbs and work from Temple University, this is reality, this is a fact. I do know that there are problems of image. I certainly do not see it as that important. Certainly we should not rush into training programs or immediately continue the old ones, but we can revise them or maybe no one will be interested in them.

Senator CLARK. Working with the new Angolan Government, if there is one?

Mr. WHEELER. Yes, and with the Portuguese as well. There is always another possibility. That is there will be a break, a clash between the Angolan Government and Portugal, the transitional government, and the current Portuguese regime. There may be a change in Portugal. If this occurs our entire aid program of using the Portuguese as a mediating arbitrating influence may collapse. So again it is a very complex issue on the multilateral-bilateral point.

U.S. PROBLEM OF SUPPORT FOR PORTUGAL AND LIBERATION PARTIES

Senator CLARK. One of the problems with supporting Portugal and the agreements that have been made with the liberation parties is our relationship with Portugal. If we are not in a position to develop a closer kind of relationship with the Government there, then it is going to be difficult for us to support them in trying to develop a

unified country in Angola. To date our policies there have been, it seems to me, not uniquely our attitude toward liberation movements in Africa. We immediately seem to identify it as a Marxist movement and really as a result of that have developed a very poor relationship with the armed forces movement in Portugal.

In any case, it is your recommendation, as I heard you testify, that the Alvor Agreements be the basis for this. The only question I have about that is whether it really has worked very successfully.

It seems to me that those agreements to date may be our only hope for some kind of unified peaceful solution. To date they have not had the influence of power to avoid civil strife. Any hope they will have, it seems to me, after November 11 will be much less. The Portuguese will be gone. The Army will be gone, presumably within 3 or 4 months of that. After that civil war is inevitable.

Mr. BENDER. General Silva Cardoso in a long interview he gave a couple of weeks ago mentioned they are now in the process of trying to revise the agreements to make them fit into reality and I suspect that the new agreement will look somewhat different because the present one, as you suggest, just is not working.

NORMALIZATION OF UNITED STATES PORTUGUESE RELATIONS THROUGH ANGOLA ISSUE

I want to come back for a second to your point about Portugal. We are not here to talk about Portugal today or our policy toward that country but at least one point is in order:

As I suggested in my statement, maybe I should state my underlying premise, which is I believe that we should begin to normalize our relations with Portugal and this might be one very useful way to do it. We should, in a very low-keyed manner discuss with the Portuguese how we might be able to help them help Angola. And I think that whereas maybe up to a month ago people would argue or could have argued that in effect this would mean helping the MPLA, this is no longer true because Portugal has adopted a more neutral policy.

Therefore, I believe that the issue of Angola might be a good place for us to start normalizing relations with Portugal.

Mr. WHEELER. A point of information on that. In fact, the current High Commissioner, General Silva Cardoso, was specifically appointed because he was not favorable toward any one movement and was seen to be neutral. Admiral Rosa Coutinho in fact was very pro-MPLA. From all of the evidence one reads he was to return to Lisbon because he was considered to be backing the MPLA to a great extent.

Cardoso in a recent interview, has pointed out on three occasions that he blames the MPLA for some of the greatest amount of arms distribution to the population and he specifically mentioned that party three times and not the other parties. This suggests to me that he has both the courage and perhaps foolishness because I am sure that the MPLA attacked him for that. It also suggests he is more neutral than other high commissioners might be.

STOPPING ARMS SUPPLIES TO ANGOLA

Senator CLARK. Let's talk for a minute about this question of arms coming into the area. It seems to me one or two of you implied the Soviet Union is sending arms to the MPLA and that there is a possi-

bility that the United States is giving some support. I do not know that any of you said arms but some kind of support. It seems to be fairly established that the Chinese are training and probably giving arms too.

How can we stop this? Do we have any impact at all on that? Is it just something that is beyond our control or should we go to the United Nations, the OAU, or what can be done to try to stop this?

Mr. WHEELER. Another point of information, again the structure of the Alvor Agreement provides that this area of arms would come under the National Defense Committee and there is one documented case that I know very well where this worked, and the prevention of arms in importation was carried out in the case of the Yugoslavian ship which was about to land in Luanda harbor and the Portuguese High Commissioner or some official refused to allow it to land and it was sent away, it could not get rid of this, it could not land its arms cargo. That is one case where the structure worked to carry out the idea of keeping arms out of the hands of those who—

WHY DO ALL THREE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS HAVE OWN ARMY?

Senator CLARK. Let me ask you a very basic question. Why do each of these three liberation movements have their own Army? Why couldn't the Alvor Agreements eliminate that practice? Does it just not have the strength to do it or did this just start? It seems to me that Alvor Agreement deals with that problem?

Mr. MARCUM. I think it is simply a political military historical fact that they have them. Those armies were fighting over a long period of time. And really you put your finger on it when you said no one has the authority to disband them. Those who might feel they would not win an election but might be able to hold out hope for themselves through military force would not want to disband their army.

Perhaps pressure can be brought. I think, in regard to your earlier question about arms shipments, every effort should be made to encourage a political solution, thus the merging of armies, not sending in arms. Where arms do come in and where there is recourse to military action, I suppose publicity is one of the best ways of trying to discourage shipments and violence. Quiet diplomacy on the part of the United States with world powers who are presumed to be involved in sending in arms would I think be called for. Again it would be effective only if we were very credible in our own position of hands off.

U.S. SHIPMENT OF ARMS TO ANGOLA

Senator CLARK. We have no evidence, do we, that the United States is actually shipping arms into that area?

Mr. MARCUM. No. Certainly I have no evidence of that.

Mr. BENDER. It would be nice if you could look into that. There are lots of people alleging it but I have not seen any evidence of it.

ECONOMIC EFFECT OF CABINDA SECESSION ON REST OF ANGOLA

Senator CLARK. Let me switch topics now to the economic question. Suppose that in Cabinda an independent movement developed. I think Professor Marcum talked about this a good deal. What kind

of economic effect would that have on the remainder of Angola? A very large percentage of the wealth of Angola comes from that enclave, does it not? What effect would that have, in your judgment?

Mr. MARCUM. That would clearly deprive Angola of what would be an important resources as it moves into independence.

It would, on the other hand mean, that the per capita income of people in Cabinda would be something, as I recall, on the order of \$5,000 a year. Cabinda has a very small population. And with secession, revenue from petroleum resources would be left for use only in that small enclave.

Now, perhaps oil along the north coast will be found in sufficient quantity to provide Angola proper with considerable revenue, but that is not yet proved. Thus the stakes are on the order several hundred millions of dollars per year for development programs which could not be funded should Cabinda secede.

Mr. BENDER. I believe in 1973 Angola derived \$91 million from the oil operations in Cabinda. In the course of the rise in oil prices it may make that over \$100 million now. Furthermore, they are pumping out more oil today. Cabinda secession would not be a disaster but that is a lot of money to lose. I believe the last census I saw there are only 80,000 Africans in Cabinda.

EFFECT OF OUTSIDE INFLUENCE ON ANGOLA PROBLEM OF STABILITY

Senator CLARK. Let's talk for a moment about these three or four liberation movements: MPLA, FNLA, UNITA and FLEC. It is generally said that to a greater or lesser degree they are dependent upon Portugal. Could you discuss for a moment the effect of this outside influence on the current Angolan problem of stability? Where specifically does this support come from, in your judgment? Is there really any hope of eliminating this kind of support to the various movements and bring about some support under the Alvor Agreement? Where does the support for FLEC come from—exclusively from Mobutu?

Mr. BENDER. No; it also comes from the Congo, and apparently from Gabon. There have been strong allegations the last couple of weeks that France has been providing some money for them, although the French have denied it. At least one report I saw was rather convincing.

There are allegations that Gulf Oil is supporting FLEC as well.

I read about Angola for hours every day and I still do not understand the significance of all the external support. Take one example, China. Everybody always thought China was supporting the UNITA until the FNLA started receiving assistance in 1973. Recently, in the last three weeks I believe, there have been trips to China, first by UNITA, then by MPLA. After each trip it was said that China was switching: first back to UNITA and then it was said they switched to the MPLA, however, nobody knows to what magnitude, if any. It is very confusing. Maybe China will be in a position to be a mediator because they are the only ones who get on with all three movements. There are also reports the Soviet Union has been reducing its support of the MPLA because they do not think MPLA can make it any longer. The Soviet Union may be trying to get out of the whole thing because they do not want to get caught up and it goes on and on but

I do not think that it is terribly helpful to think about these movements in terms of their external support, and I might add just this one thing—financial aid does not seem enough to make them totally obligated to some patron abroad. I think most of UNITA's support is coming from whites in Angola and their arms are alleged to have been given over by militia that was recently disarmed. So that is another kind of parameter that may be even more important than the Soviet Union or China or the United States, or whatever. But I sometimes get very depressed how discussions of Angola break-down into consideration of who is supporting whom and what does that mean. Because I frankly have not been able to find out myself what that means yet.

Senator CLARK. Because of the major powers involvement of, everybody thinks that from the major powers' point of view of the cold war, what effect it is going to have on strategic interest? What are the real interests of the Soviet Union, United States, and China? I would not think they would be very great.

Mr. BENDER. Well, as I said, I do not think they are very great at all. It is ironic, you know, before the Portuguese coup in 1974, we never heard anything from this Government about how important Angola was strategically. Now suddenly we are concerned that our ships might not be able to stop there. Presumably, these ships were not stopping there for anything important before, so why should it be important now?

But my own view is that there are people in government who can find strategic interests in any corner of the world if they look hard enough, and I am sure that somebody is going to make a case about how strategic Angola is to our national interest, but I, myself, am not convinced at all about that.

Mr. MARCUM. Could I make one comment on this? I am quite in agreement with what Professor Bender said. I think the external factor variables tend to exacerbate some of the cleavages. In that sense they are important. The other point I might make here is that it does seem to me that over time one should expect that African interests and particularly those of Zaire—which is a large important and regionally powerful country—will have a considerable influence on events in Angola. How Zaire responds, the degree to which it recognizes and accepts Angolan independence or, contrarily, the degree to which it tries to create an Angolan sphere of influence may have a lot to do with the future political health of Angola.

ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY ROLE IN ANGOLA

Senator CLARK. Let me get from each of you just what the Organization of African Unity can do in all of this.

They have sent an observer to Angola. Do they have any role in peace-keeping? It seems to me they, after all, represent all of the States of Africa. They have an interest in not seeing the kind of Balkanization of Angola. Do they have any role in this or not?

Mr. BENDER. I think one way we can get at this is to look at their role in attempting to arrange a summit meeting. We see on the one hand Mobutu is apparently backing FNLA; Zambia UNITA; and Tanzania and the Congo are apparently backing the MPLA. Other coun-

tries have their own interests. I think that African countries are deeply divided on this and it is going to preclude—maybe not preclude, that might be too strong, but certainly inhibit—any kind of an organized OAU effort in this regard. I am sure if there were a necessity to send OAU troops to Angola, debates would go on for years as to what kind of arms and where they should go.

Senator CLARK. How about the other?

Mr. MARCUM. Well, I think I might differ a little bit on that. It seems to me there are indeed differences of perception on the part of African States. But the OAU provides exactly the forum in which some of those differences and interests can be mitigated. And should the situation deteriorate, should there really be large-scale civil strife and imminent danger of partition, I think the OAU is the logical organization in which African continental powers can attempt to find a solution or to encourage a solution in terms of a United Angolan State with which they can all live. Such a solution would not maximize the interest or desires of any particular country outside of the OAU, but would not threaten such countries either.

U.N. ROLE IN ANGOLA

Senator CLARK. How about the United Nations? One of you suggested you felt that was very important.

Mr. MARCUM. I think in the first instance the OAU. If they fail, the United Nations might be brought into the picture. First, the Africans are going to want to try to solve that situation.

Mr. WHEELER. On the United Nations I feel that if there were a failure of the OAU, that might be a fall-back position. But the United Nations, since the Congo force in the early 1960's, has really not done the kind of work that might be—in other words, they are not, for example, the language problem alone. They would have to set up a Portuguese-speaking command system and there are all kinds of other problems they would have to deal with that I don't think the U.N. is prepared aside from the ideological cleavages that might come out in the open because of, say, a Soviet position or how would you feel on a force of U.N. troops, who would you choose? I would prefer the OAU. That if the Portuguese structure collapses, there should be definite interest in the OAU for one major reason, and that is the reason which made OAU interested in the Biafra conflict, although they failed in the long run to mediate it. They did mediate other similar problems where there was a danger that partition would occur or a frontier fight would occur, and a frontier or border would be changed because of war. Algeria, a Morocco, a Salhalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, and the Biafra conflict suggested that the majority of OAU nations would do almost anything to prevent a major alteration of the colonial frontiers as they were as of 1961 when most nations became independent. I would say over half of almost ideological persuasions believe that partition is not out and they would do anything, almost. In the case of Cabinda, you would have a stronger case for the OAU to support the Alvor Agreement and, after all, historically, it was the African mediation which led the Portuguese and the three Angolan parties to the table. They were the ones that set up the conditions and the shape of the table.

Senator CLARK. You are more optimistic about the necessity than, seems to me, Professor Bender.

Mr. WHEELER. I concede Professor Bender's point about there are ideological differences in cleavages in the OAU and the African nations certainly have their differences, but I think this is one point, preservation of the colonial boundaries, which would include Angola, Cabinda, and this is, of course, a major party of the treaty. In reading the Alvor Agreement, it is about the first article, we will keep Cabinda as a part of Angola, period. We will fight for that and at the present time, parties who have signed this treaty must agree to that or there is nothing else. OAU possibly could help in that area.

Mr. MARCUM. One quick point. I think in addition to Zaire there is one other African country that has a potential, has a large army, that might merge in the OAU as important—and that is Nigeria.

Mr. BENDER. I am not totally pessimistic. The necessity is there, it is the ability which is in question.

MILITARY SOLUTION MORE APT TO OCCUR IN ANGOLA THAN POLITICAL SOLUTION

Senator CLARK. It is a very pessimistic outlook that all of us have. At least it seems to me in listening to you. Portugal is going to leave on November 11, or very soon thereafter, I assume. I don't think they want to say they have a lot of economic and other problems of their own. On the other hand, intervention by the Soviet Union or China or the United States doesn't seem to involve anything in this case any more than any other. If there isn't any great hope for the Organization of African States or the United Nations, it would seem that civil war is almost inevitable. In other words, the military solution is much more apt to occur in Angola than a political solution.

Do you want to comment on that?

Mr. BENDER. I want to say that I tried for hours to think of something optimistic to say. I am sorry I haven't come up with anything.

Senator CLARK. I guess truth is a higher goal.

Mr. BENDER. I think one encouraging sign perhaps is that in the last couple of weeks the Portuguese Army has been going more on the offensive. They are going in and taking arms away from the movements and they are trying to literally impose the Alvor Agreement. It is very difficult because there are so many arms and large arms in fact. They seem to be committed to carrying this out and it could embroil them in a very serious conflict that might be a very encouraging sign and—

DOES ALVOR AGREEMENT PROVIDE FOR DISARMING?

Senator CLARK. Does the Alvor Agreement provide for disarming?

Mr. BENDER. Yes it does. It limits the number of troops that they can have under arms to 8,000 apiece. Of course nobody has observed that.

RESULTS OF FREE ELECTIONS IN ANGOLA

Senator CLARK. Let me ask you a very hypothetical question. You may not want to answer it but it would be interesting to hear your view.

If free elections were held, which party, in your opinion, would win. Who has the greater support in Angola in your judgment?

Mr. MARCUM. Let me just take a stab at that. I don't think any party is likely to win a majority. One would have at best a plurality in a three-way split. Results would follow roughly along the lines of the linguistic communities in which the parties are primarily based. It's conceivable under those circumstances that one might come out with this order: UNITA first, MPLA second, and FNLA third. A coalition government would be essential if civil conflict were to be avoided.

POSSIBILITY OF COALITION GOVERNMENT IN ANGOLA

Senator CLARK. Do you think it is possible?

Mr. MARCUM. On that I was trying desperately to think of a good reason why it might not happen and I suppose in a way it is a little bit like why we haven't had an atomic war. Maybe there is a possibility of a kind of "balance of terror." The fact that the kind of fighting that is already taking place indicates what could happen on a larger scale, it might cause some of the leadership to think twice before involving itself further in a sort of zero sum gaming that insists on the elimination of any one of the other parties.

Second, I do think there are a good number of new and younger people, those that I referred to earlier as those who have not been scarred by the year of exile and patricidal war during the insurgency against the Portuguese, who have come in and inevitably are going to change the nature of these movements. They are trying to work together in the transitional government and presumably have a sense of national purpose and need which transcends the more parochial nature of the movements which led the fight. Angola is entering a different kind of historical period. So in a little time one might hope that nationalist thinking and the wisdom that may be fostered by the horror that civil war would bring will be sufficient, given proper external encouragement, to prevent the worst from taking place.

Mr. WHEELER. Again it is in the realm of speculation in terms of who might win an election. I think the first point should be will it be a free election, that is, can a free election be carried out in these conditions?

Now, in view of the April 25 election in Portugal, the way it was carried out, the armed forces movement acted as a safeguard of a free election process.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Mr. WHEELER. Actually the way it worked was encouraging.

Now, if they do that in Angola and if you look at the ethnic statistics and you look at some of the recent evidence that UNITA, because it hasn't been involved in some of the fighting has some more popularity, it is possible UNITA would win, not just the greatest number of arms but perhaps even a slight edge on a plurality or majority, then I would say the second party would be MPLA and the FNLA third. But there are so many variables: one can vote, the electoral law, which is always crucial in Portuguese history. The electoral law excludes people who have been refugees. In Angola out of every five Angolans two are Ovimbundu.

I think in that view UNITA is a crucial party on the ethnic basis. This is in the realm of speculation.

Mr. BENDER. I would concur with what Professor Wheeler said, basically because of their ethnic base but also because of the wide white support they receive, although with the exodus going on now that may not be important to UNITA very long.

I want to add one thing to what Professor Marcum said. I don't think it is just young people who may be the hope but perhaps Africans who were inside Angola during the war. In the beginning of my appendix on the current situation I quote one of the ministers, the minister of Justice, Diogenes Boavida, who is presumably a MPLA person, but he was inside Angola during the whole war and was not an open MPLA partisan. And his statement, which probably is worth reading, indicates a kind of attitude or at least a change in attitude. He said on the third of May, that "what the country lacks is national consciousness. The people should be Angolans first and then militants of this or that party. Precisely the opposite is occurring . . . The problem must be faced squarely: if the movements give their full support to the government, it will be able to govern. If there are reservations, the government ceases to be the government because it must be able to execute the decisions it takes."

And in that same interview a reporter asked him if the violence was happening only because of outside intervention and provocateurs and so forth. He said, no, and he dismissed that kind of attitude which is different from those hardened by the exile experience Professor Marcum refers to but maybe they have become so caught up in the fight that there isn't any reason to hope that they can mitigate the conflict.

Senator CLARK. Right. We have a couple of minutes. Are there any final points that any of you would like to make that you feel may not be made adequately, or you would like to reemphasize?

SIZE OF EDUCATIONAL SECTOR IN ANGOLA

Mr. WHEELER. I think there is one very positive happy point that I could end on and that is the size of the educational sector, the number of educated Angolans in higher education carried to say, other countries, which experienced great troubles in the early independence period. For example, in the Congo, Leopoldville, then Zaire, had approximately 30 university graduates, some statistics say 17, as well as 500 people who were priests, educated in theology schools, which is equivalent of an A.B. But Angola in 1975 the mass was considerably more educated, Angolans of all races, and I think I wouldn't care to estimate but it would be in the hundreds and perhaps a few thousand trained people in various professions, technical professions, and so forth. Some of them have been tragically killed off in the last year, in the civil strife, some of them outside of Angola, some of them are in the United States, but the fund of educated Angolans I think is a very positive and really promising point to end on.

HERALDING THE END OF COLONIALISM REGARDLESS OF DIFFICULTIES AHEAD

Mr. MARCUM. Just one brief comment. However, painful and difficult this period is going to be, it does herald the end of colonialism. I

think it is important to take full note of the fact that the colonial era has ended, that Angola is on the brink of a new era. It seems to me that in our response not only to Angola but to Mozambique and to Portugal—we have tended to be terribly dourful and to have great fears and anxieties and see forces that are threatening. I don't mean to put aside the kinds of problems we have talked about this morning, but I do hope that we can generate in our Government and in the private sector some sense of enthusiasm for the kind of opportunities that lie ahead and identify whatever ways we can appropriately and unobtrusively relate to them.

WRONG U.S. ACTION MAY BE WORSE THAN INACTION

Senator CLARK. I gather though there is common agreement that American action may be worse than inaction, if it is the wrong kind.

Mr. BENDER. That is my final statement.

Senator CLARK. I am sorry I made it.

Mr. BENDER. That is fine. I totally agree with Professor Marcum that we sometimes tend to get ourselves oriented in the wrong direction and I think that we are in danger of doing that now. Therefore, any efforts to stay out or anybody who can influence that would be wise.

Senator CLARK. We are very grateful to all three of you for making this effort to come down. It has been helpful, very expert, and very interesting. We thank you for it.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]

U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA

Rhodesia

WEDNESDAY, JULY 9, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Dick Clark (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Clark and Biden.

Senator CLARK. The committee will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

One of the most critical challenges the United States faces today in its Southern Africa policy is whether it will play an effective and constructive role in the resolution of the Rhodesia problem.

The minority regime there—representing about 250,000 whites in a nation of almost 6 million blacks—until now has been able to survive in spite of tremendous international and internal pressure. It has not been recognized by any government in the world. It has been subject to United Nations economic sanctions. It has been under ever-increasing military pressure from nationalist movements within the country.

It is clear now, however, that the survival of this regime is only a matter of time. The independence of Mozambique makes it likely that that country, as well as Zambia, will be used for staging areas for the nationalist movements. There is also a real possibility that Rhodesia will no longer be able to use Mozambique ports and transportation facilities for its trade. The liberation movements are now united, are militarily stronger than ever, and can look to the African nations and outside countries for even greater support because the wars in the Portuguese territories are over. South Africa, which has long supported Rhodesia economically and militarily, is putting greater pressure on Ian Smith to reach a negotiated settlement with the liberation movements. Apparently, South Africa's concern now is to avoid a major conflict in the area.

OUTCOME OF RHODESIAN CONFLICT

The question now is not whether majority rule will replace racial domination in Rhodesia. It is how soon and in what way this change

will come about. In my judgment it could be brought about peacefully, through a negotiated settlement between the Smith regime and the ANC. Or it could come only after a long and bitter struggle resulting in tragedy for both whites and blacks. The efforts of the U.N. and the African nations to bring about a peaceful resolution of this conflict could finally pay off. Or the world community could discover how accurate it was in labeling Rhodesia a "threat to international peace and security" as a Rhodesian conflict grew to involve surrounding African nations and non-African States as well.

U.S. INTERESTS CONCERNING RHODESIA

It is clear that the U.S. interests lie in strongly supporting those who seek an early, peaceful, transition to majority rule and racial justice in Rhodesia. This country's future relations, not only with Zimbabwe but with all the African States, will be profoundly affected by the strength of U.S. commitment to human rights, racial equality, and self-determination in Rhodesia. U.S. economic relations with this rich country will be determined by whether we demonstrate now a genuine commitment to the well-being of all its people.

As Bishop Muzorewa pointed out when he was here, "When we are deciding where to sell our chrome, we will first ask, 'Who were our friends when we needed them most?'"

PAST U.S. ACTIONS WITH REGARD TO HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITMENT

Unfortunately, U.S. actions in the past have not entirely reflected a commitment to human rights and peace in Rhodesia. While this country supported the imposition of sanctions against Rhodesia in the U.N., it is also the only country in the world that has passed a law requiring that those sanctions be violated. Today, under that law, the United States is importing large quantities of chrome and ferrochrome from Rhodesia. Sanctions have also been circumvented in the sale of U.S. aircraft to Rhodesia and in interline agreements between American and Rhodesian airlines. In March 1970, the United States cast its first veto in the history of the U.N. on extending sanctions against Rhodesia, an action that was unnecessary because Britain had already vetoed. It was seen as particularly significant by the African nations that the United States chose this issue on which to reverse its policy of never vetoing a resolution that had the strong support of the world community.

This country has also abstained on several security council resolutions urging all States to fully implement sanctions and has voted against several General Assembly resolutions reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination, freedom, and independence.

Such actions have been viewed by the African States as a reflection of extreme insensitivity to their deep concern about racial oppression in Rhodesia. These actions have also undermined the credibility of this country's commitment to the United Nations and its vital role in encouraging the peaceful resolution of world problems. It is important now that the United States make a positive contribution to this international effort to bring peace and majority rule to Rhodesia, rather than simply vetoing, abstaining, and violating sanctions.

POSSIBILITY, U.S. PROMOTION OF PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO MAJORITY RULE

The most important questions before us today are whether a peaceful transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe is still possible and what this country can do to help promote such a settlement. This committee and Congress as a whole must determine what specific actions the United States can take to demonstrate clearly its commitment to human rights and racial equality for the people of Rhodesia.

WITNESSES, HEARING PROCEDURE CONCERNING RHODESIA

The witnesses today are well qualified to outline what those actions should be as well as to evaluate the possibility of a peaceful settlement. We will be having other private witnesses tomorrow as well as witnesses from the State Department, Assistant Secretary Davis and William Buffum, Assistant Secretary for International Organizational Affairs. We have tried to select our witnesses with a good deal of balance so that we hear various points of view with regard to this question. We will want to explore with them the possible impact of various policy options open to the United States. Mr. Good, Mr. Rotberg, and Mr. Hutchinson have all spent considerable time in Rhodesia and the neighboring African states and have devoted much time and thought to the question of what U.S. policy there should be.

We hope to keep this hearing almost in the form of a discussion.

We will hear from Mr. Good, Mr. Hutchinson, and then Mr. Rotberg, and spend the remainder of our time in open discussion. I will try not to interrupt too much along the way.

We are operating under somewhat of a time problem because when the Senate turns to the business of the New Hampshire question we are going to be ordered to close down. That could occur as early as 1 hour from now. I think each of you have been instructed that you can speak about 20 minutes. It would be ideal if you could possibly hold it down to even 12 or 15 minutes. That would simply give us more time for discussion. Do the best you can within those time constraints. I am not going to limit anybody but if you could possibly limit yourselves to around 12 to 15 minutes, I think it would give us even more time.

Mr. Good, you are first.

[Mr. Good's biography follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF ROBERT C. GOOD**PERSONAL AND EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND**

Mr. Good was born April 7, 1924, in Mount Vernon, New York. He received the B.A. degree from Haverford College in 1945, the B.D. degree from Yale University Divinity School in 1951, and the Ph. D. in International Relations from Yale University in 1956. Mr. Good is a member of Phi Beta Kappa. He is married and has three children.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION EXPERIENCE

Mr. Good worked in Italy in 1946 with the American Friends Service Committee and the Italian Mission of UNRRA. In 1947 he directed the American Friends Service Committee's operation in Frankfurt am/Main, Germany, and during 1948 was Administrator of the Committee's International Student Seminar Program.

ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE

From 1953-1958, Mr. Good was Instructor, then Assistant Professor of International Relations, at the Social Science Foundation, the University of Denver.

In addition to teaching both undergraduate and graduate courses in international relations, he was in charge of the Foundation's radio and television programming, offering a weekly fifteen minute radio commentary on international developments and preparing approximately forty half-hour telecasts on problem areas in world politics. In 1959, he wrote the TV series, *Twentieth Century Revolutions in World Affairs*, which won national honors in the annual educational television competition sponsored by the National Association of Educational Broadcasters.

From 1958-1961, Mr. Good was Research Associate at the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, affiliated with the School of Advanced International Studies, the Johns Hopkins University. During 1959-1960, he travelled in Europe and Africa on a Rockefeller Foundation research grant.

From September 1960 to June 1961, he was Director of the Carnegie Endowment Seminars in Diplomacy in Washington, D.C., a program of studies in international politics for diplomats from the embassies of countries having acceded to independence since World War II.

In December 1960, Mr. Good served as Director of President-elect Kennedy's Task Force on Africa.

From January 1969 to September 1970, after a period of government service (see below), Mr. Good returned to the School of Advanced International Studies on a grant from the Ford Foundation to write a book on the Rhodesian rebellion of 1965.

Since September 1970, he has been Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies and Director of the Social Science Foundation at the University of Denver.

GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCE

In September 1961 he was appointed Director of the Office of Research and Analysis for Africa in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

In 1964 he received the Department of State's Superior Honor Award.

In March 1965 he was named United States Ambassador to Zambia. He resigned in January 1969.

COMMUNITY EXPERIENCE

From 1961 to 1965, Mr. Good was President of Neighbors, Inc., an interracial organization of some 2,000 members seeking to establish a stable racially integrated community in Washington, D.C. Throughout this period the organization employed a professional staff and operated on an annual budget of \$25,000 raised from local community and from foundations.

CONSULTANT TO AND ON THE BOARD OF . . .

Department of State, 1969, 1970.

Office of Education, HEW, 1972, 1973, 1974.

Center for War/Peace Studies, 1974-

Council on Religion in International Affairs, 1975- and Contributing Editor of *Worldview*.

Group for Global Perspectives in American Education, 1974-

Patterson School of International Diplomacy and Commerce, University of Kentucky 1975-

PUBLICATIONS

Author, *U. D. I.: The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion* (Faber and Faber, Princeton University Press, 1973).

Co-editor with Roger Hilsman and co-author, *Foreign Policy in the Sixties: Issues and Instrumentalities* (Johns Hopkins, 1965).

Co-author, *The Mission of the Christian College in the Modern World* (Council of Protestant Colleges and Universities, 1962).

Co-author, *Neutrality and Non-alignment: The New States in World Affairs* (edited by Laurence W. Martin, Praeger, 1962).

Author, *Congo Crisis: The Role of the New States* (Monograph: The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, 1961).

Co-editor with Harry R. Davis, *Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics* (Scribner, 1960).

Co-author, *Alliance Policy in the Cold War* (edited by Arnold Wolfers, Johns Hopkins Press, 1959).

Numerous articles on international subjects in various learned journals and journals of opinion.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT C. GOOD, DEAN, GRADUATE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF DENVER, DENVER, COLO.

Mr. GOOD. Thank you, Senator. I will do my best within your time constraints.

The least that we may say after the extraordinary turn of events of the last 8 months is that at last, in the Rhodesian case, there is something to speculate about. For 9 years following the illegal declaration of independence of the Rhodesian white minority government of Ian Smith, the situation was at impasse. It was characterized by the stubborn recalcitrance of Salisbury, a self-destructive divisiveness among Rhodesian African nationalist organizations, the unobtrusive but very real assistance of South Africa (not to mention Portugal) to the white minority regime in its rebellion, and repeated evidence of Britain's inability, regardless of which party was in power, to solve this lingering and vestigial colonial problem.

Suddenly last December—the result of backstage maneuvers that had been in progress for months—everything seemed to break loose at once. Mr. Smith released from detention or prison Rhodesian African nationalist leaders who had been in custody for more than a decade; the feuding Rhodesian African nationalist organizations agreed to coalesce and to stand down their guerrilla forces; both sides agreed in principle to attend a constitutional conference; and South Africa said it would withdraw the paramilitary units that had been assisting the Rhodesian forces contain guerrilla forays in the Zambezi valley.

What had happened to cause the apparent dismantling of the barricades on all sides? The watershed event of course was the coup in Lisbon of April 25, 1974, from which flowed an astonishing reversal of almost five centuries of Portuguese colonial policy.

A glance at the map indicates the geopolitical importance of these events, especially the independence of Mozambique under a movement which, barring only the case of Algeria, had staged Africa's most successful guerrilla war for freedom and which now controls Rhodesia's ingress and egress through Beira and Lourenco Marques, as well as the flow of petroleum products from the important SONAREP refinery in the latter city.

SOUTH AFRICA'S POLICY OF DÉTENTE

Faced with the collapse of a white buffer zone, the South African Government turned to the policy of détente. It was the antidote to new relationships (Black Africa with South Africa). In Lusaka, the possibility of supping with the devil who now seemed to see Ian Smith as an intolerable obstacle to détente was eyed, however warily, with fascination. Perhaps there was a way after all of effecting a transition to majority rule in Rhodesia without recourse to escalating violence.

CONTINUITIES IN THE FACE OF RAPID CHANGE

In the midst of such rapid change, it is important to reflect on some continuities. South Africa's policy of détente was a refinement of what for years has been called the outward policy, one fruit of which

had actually been the establishment of diplomatic relations between the white supremacist Government of South Africa and the black African Government of Malawi. Moreover, South African economists had long been writing about the creation of a kind of South African managed coprosperity sphere encompassing black and white controlled states in the southern third of the continent. Ten years ago South Africa advised against UDI (unilateral declaration of independence) and has favored a settlement ever since, letting it be known that it was not necessarily against a black government in Salisbury provided it was not hostile to Pretoria.

President Kenneth Kaunda for his part has quietly tested the possibility of dialog with South Africa for a number of years and has understood better than most African leaders the grim consequences of escalating racial conflict. Moreover, the preference of black Africa for a negotiated settlement has been explicit ever since the eloquent Lusaka manifesto of 1969. Equally important, the operative concept for most African leaders has never been immediate independence under majority rule for Rhodesia but rather NIMBAR, an acronym introduced by President Julius Nyerere in 1966 signifying "No independence in Rhodesia before majority rule." The interim period, according to Kaunda and Nyerere, might run as long as 4 to 5 years before actual majority rule with independence might be achieved. The present situation thus has significant links with the past.

ACTORS, SCENARIO, ORCHESTRATION OF EVENTS IN RHODESIAN SITUATION

What is fundamentally new, following the initiatives announced last December, is that after 9 years we have at last correctly identified the primary actors and placed them in the proper juxtaposition. As important as their responsibilities no doubt remain, the primary actors include neither the United Kingdom nor the United Nations. The primary actors rather are the Smith regime and the Rhodesian African nationalists. The secondary actors of consequence are the South Africans and those African Presidents able to exercise the most influence over the Rhodesian African nationalists: President Kaunda and Nyerere, together with Presidents Seretse Khama of Botswana and Samora Machel of Mozambique.

The scenario outlined in December was disarmingly simple. The black presidents would pressure the fractious African nationalists into a coalition and toward the negotiating table. At the same time, Prime Minister Vorster would elbow Ian Smith into meaningful negotiations. The process would be facilitated by the desire of both Pretoria and Lusaka to avoid stepped-up guerilla activities and by the realization that Mozambique in the hands of Frelimo was capable not only of vastly strengthening the sanctions squeeze on Rhodesia but opening a 700-mile boundary to guerrilla incursions perhaps assisted by its own battle-tested freedom fighters.

Anyone familiar with the vagaries of the Rhodesian situation, however, should have known that in Southern Africa the shortest distance between two points is never a straight line. The coalition of nationalist movements keeps exploding in the hands of the African presidents. Fratricidal conflict among Rhodesian African nationalists continues both inside Rhodesia and among the exiled nationalist groups. The

fissures open not really along ideological lines and not exclusively along tribal lines, though the latter must not be discounted. They reflect also differences in tactics and these differences reflect the struggle for leadership which intensifies as the anticipated time of transition approaches. And Prime Minister Vorster continues to have as much trouble with the slippery Mr. Smith as do the African presidents with their clients. Each excess of the feuding nationalists plays, as it always has, into Smith's hands. Vorster has virtually all the levers of crude power in his hands, but cannot be seen to use these openly without affording Smith the opportunity to appeal over his head to the South African white electorate, or himself to be contributing to and thus validating a program of international sanctions. Samora Machel, the new president of Mozambique has inherited a parlous economy and the enormous task of turning Mozambique into a going concern politically as well as economically. And there are measurable prices to be paid for not maintaining correct relations with Pretoria at this stage.

Thus the orchestration of events and the manipulation of actors present problems of exquisite delicacy. The dangers, consequently, are enormous.

What Vorster wants most is a negotiated transition to majority rule which he himself is perceived to have facilitated. What Vorster wants least is a transition to majority rule achieved as a direct result of successful international sanctions and, even worse, of guerrilla warfare. Yet to achieve the desired goal, the threat of the undesired one—even in measured degree its reality—must be operative. This suggests a further ripening process and the resulting ferment might either produce the desired mixture or explode the keg.

The last 6 months have borne out this thesis. Neither the African Presidents nor Mr. Vorster has been able to pressure the African National Council or the Rhodesian Front into accepting the last viable fall-back position of the other. Indeed, substantive meetings have not even taken place. Meanwhile South African paramilitary units so far as we know remain in Rhodesia. There is no real ceasefire. And many political prisoners are still in custody. Though the primary actors have been identified and the dynamics of an ultimate solution are now clearer than ever before we must not underestimate the difficulties.

DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATED TRANSITION TO MAJORITY RULE

The problem today is what it has been from the outset. In a word, it is to effect a colonial transition in Rhodesia without an imperial arbiter. Never having deployed forces on the ground in Rhodesia, Britain has never exercised imperial authority. South Africa has become the surrogate for such authority. But under what circumstances can Vorster now get Smith to sign the instrument that obliges the regime to self-destruct in 3 years or in 5 years or can provide guarantees of irreversibility to the Africans?

Vorster has called the alternative too ghastly to contemplate, meaning presumably a rapid escalation of guerrilla warfare leading to an attempt at all-out military solution on both sides which could trigger a racial cataclysm well beyond Rhodesia's frontiers. He is right. It is ghastly indeed. The chief hope in the present situation is that Vorster's fears are shared by the African Presidents, creating the tenuous alli-

ance of convenience between Pretoria and Lusaka. Outside this consensus stand certain Rhodesian African nationalists, principally ZANU—Zimbabwe African National Union—which has spearheaded the most successful of the guerrilla incursions, and possibly—we do not know for sure one way or the other—Ian Smith himself.

Not inconceivably, Smith might feel that rapidly escalating violence might reverse the process of détente—in the realization of which continued white rule in Salisbury is the most serious stumbling block—and draw South Africa into a decisive confrontation with the guerrillas and more importantly with the countries giving them sanctuary. If that were to happen we would find ourselves in a brandnew ball game.

ELEMENTS INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA

How then does one get a negotiated settlement? I suggested before that the situation must ripen further. That means a continuation of more of the same, and possibly repeating the cycle of stepped up violence leading to renewed attempts at negotiations, perhaps several times over. How long this will take, I for one cannot predict. We have been imposing ill-conceived deadlines on events in southern Africa for years. The only deadline no one thought to predict was the one that came in consequence of the unpredicted coup in Lisbon—independence for Portuguese Africa. In December and January the conventional wisdom was that a settlement would be in hand prior to Mozambican independence. My instinct is that it could take another 1 to 3 years.

The following elements must remain or be brought into play. First, there must be a continuing liaison between Pretoria and Lusaka, between Prime Minister Vorster and the African Presidents. Second, the African Presidents must continue to pressure the Rhodesian African nationalists into a willingness, once the situation matures, to enter into a transitional arrangement which will involve under some international guarantee independence under majority rule within roughly 4 to 5 years. Third, Vorster must keep equivalent pressure on Smith and the Rhodesian Front. Fourth is the ingredient that is as dangerous as it is indispensable, Mozambique must gradually increase the sanctions squeeze and preparations must proceed apace to increase the effectiveness of African guerrilla forces.

The object of the latter moves of course is to erode further the structure of white power in Rhodesia by increasing the costs of moving exports and imports through the sanctions barrier and by increasing the difficulties of gaining access to the international money market and of recruiting expatriate skills, thus hastening the next exodus of whites from the country. As a result, the regime will become the more brittle as time goes on. The object equally is to demonstrate that the alternative too ghastly to contemplate can and will in time become a reality. As these developments proceed, Vorster's ability to place added pressure on Smith ought to achieve growing acceptance within the South African white electorate. His maneuverability in this respect is already far greater now than it was several years ago.

BRITAIN'S ROLE IN RHODESIAN CONFLICT

Britain's formal role in all of this remains as substantial as its real role remains negligible. It is the Parliament at Westminster that must

finally validate independence normalizing Rhodesia's—by then Zimbabwe's—relations with the international community. But Britain's actual role in achieving a political transition can only be marginal and facilitative. We need, incidentally, no longer fear a British deal with Smith aimed at disengagement. The situation has moved beyond that. There can be no return to the status quo ante. In any event, the precedent of the Pearce Commission in 1971 with its finding against the settlement proposals of the Conservative Foreign Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home—a procedure for which the British Government deserves more credit than it has received—obviates the danger of a sellout.

U.S. ROLE IN RHODESIAN SITUATION

What about the United States? One hopes, almost wistfully, that the Byrd amendment can be repealed before there is majority rule in Rhodesia. It is in fact important that this be accomplished with dispatch. In company with the gradually expanding involvement of Mozambique in the sanctions campaign, it would send a significant signal to Salisbury at a psychologically important moment. Second, the United States should be willing to join an international effort to compensate Mozambique for any loss of revenue involved in its sanctions against Rhodesia. Third, we should initiate immediately programs of humanitarian assistance to the Rhodesian African nationalists. Beyond this, there is little that we can do directly.

There is however much that we can do contextually, if I may put it that way—seeing Rhodesia in the larger context of southern Africa. In general we must begin to understand, and give more consistent expression to that understanding, that the issues of southern Africa are grave and may gravely affect American interests. I say this with such certainty, as I have said it before, because I believe that in this age of immediate communication and instant involvement, it is inconceivable that two great racial revolutions (in America and in southern Africa) can climax at roughly the same point in history without finally each affecting, exciting, and probably aggravating the other.

Exactly how this interaction will work itself out is I think unpredictable. But that there will be a significant interaction I would consider inevitable.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Good's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT C. GOOD¹ ON RHODESIA

The purpose of my statement is to place recent events in perspective and to speculate in broad terms about forthcoming developments as these may affect or be affected by U.S. policy. Other commentators are much better positioned than I to present detailed statistical evidence and to estimate near term developments based on the most recent facts.

The least that we may say after the extraordinary turn of events of the last eight months is that at last, in the Rhodesian case, here is something to speculate about. For nine years following the illegal declaration of independence

¹ Mr. Good is Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies and Director of the Social Science Foundation, the University of Denver. From 1965-1968 he served as U.S. Ambassador to Zambia. He is the author of *UDI: The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion* (Faber and Faber; Princeton University Press, 1973).

of the Rhodesian white minority government of Ian Smith, the situation was at impasse. It was characterized by the stubborn recalcitrance of Salisbury, a self-destructive deviousness among Rhodesian African nationalist organizations, the unobtrusive but very real assistance of South Africa (not to mention Portugal) to the white minority regime in its rebellion, and repeated evidence of Britain's inability, regardless of which party was in power, to solve this lingering and vestigial colonial problem.

Suddenly last December—the result of backstage maneuvers that had been in progress for months—everything seemed to break loose at once. Mr. Smith released from detention or prison Rhodesian African nationalist leaders who had been in custody for more than a decade; the feuding Rhodesian African nationalist organizations agreed to coalesce and to stand down their guerrilla forces; both sides agreed in principle to attend a constitutional conference; and South Africa said it would withdraw the paramilitary units that had been assisting the Rhodesian forces contain guerrilla forays in the Zambesi valley. An added fillip to this heady concoction, Black African leaders urged upon British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan a leading British role in convening the prospective constitutional conference—the same British administration almost to a man that had previously brought us the extravaganzas on board HMS *Tiger* (1966) and HMS *Fearless* (1968), each producing settlement terms endorsed by the British government and roundly denounced by most African leaders as a “sell out.” (While Harold Wilson was willing to “sell,” Ian Smith as it turned out was unwilling to “buy” and the impasse continued.)

The turn of events in December was momentous. What had happened to cause the apparent dismantling of the barricades on all sides? The watershed event of course was the coup in Lisbon of April 25, 1974, from which flowed an astonishing reversal of almost five centuries of Portuguese colonial policy. Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique have already become independent under Black leadership. Angola, with whatever attendant dangers, will achieve its freedom on November 11—four hundred years after the advent of colonial rule in that region and ironically on the tenth anniversary of Ian Smith's rebellion.

A glance at the map indicates the geopolitical importance of these events, especially the independence of Mozambique under a movement which, barring only the case of Algeria, had staged Africa's most successful guerrilla war for freedom and which now controls Rhodesia's ingress and egress through Beira and Lourenço Marques, as well as the flow of petroleum products from the important SONAREP refinery in the latter city.

Faced with the collapse of a white buffer zone, the South African government turned to the policy of “detente.” It was the antidote to new dangers (racial confrontation) and the route to new relationships (Black Africa with South Africa). In Lusaka, the possibility of supping with the devil who now seemed to see Ian Smith as an intolerable obstacle to “detente” was eyed, however warily, with fascination. Perhaps there was a way after all of effecting a transition to majority rule in Rhodesia without recourse to escalating violence.

In the midst of such rapid change, it is important to reflect on some continuities. South Africa's policy of “detente” was a refinement of what for years has been called the “outward” policy, one fruit of which had actually been the establishment of diplomatic relations between the white supremacist government of South Africa and the Black African government of Malawi. Moreover, South African economists had long been writing about the creation of a kind of South African-managed co-prosperity sphere encompassing Black and White controlled states in the southern third of the continent. Ten years ago South Africa advised against UDI and has favored a settlement ever since, letting it be known that it was not necessarily against a Black government in Salisbury provided it was not hostile to Pretoria.

President Kenneth Kaunda for his part has quietly tested the possibility of “dialogue” with South Africa for a number of years and has understood better than most African leaders the grim consequences of escalating racial conflict. Moreover, the preference of Black Africa for a negotiated settlement has been explicit ever since the eloquent Lusaka Manifesto of 1969. Equally important, the operative concept for most African leaders has never been immediate independence under majority rule for Rhodesia but rather NIBMAR, an acronym introduced by President Julius Nyerere in 1966 signifying “No independence [in Rhodesia] before majority rule.” The interim period, according to Kaunda and Nyerere, might run as long as four to five years before actual majority rule with independence might be achieved. The present situation thus has significant links with the past.

What is fundamentally new, following the initiatives announced last December, is that after nine years we have at last correctly identified the primary actors and placed them in the proper juxtaposition. As important as their responsibilities no doubt remain, the *primary* actors include neither the United Kingdom nor the United Nations. The primary actors rather are the Smith regime and the Rhodesian African nationalists. The secondary actors of consequence are the South Africans and those African Presidents able to exercise the most influence over the Rhodesian African nationalists: Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere, together with Presidents Seretse Khama of Botswana and Samora Machel of Mozambique.

The scenario outlined in December was disarmingly simple. The Black Presidents would pressure the fractious African nationalists into a coalition and towards the negotiating table. At the same time, Prime Minister Vorster would elbow Ian Smith into meaningful negotiations. The process would be facilitated by the desire of both Pretoria and Lusaka to avoid stepped-up guerrilla activities and by the realization that Mozambique in the hands of FRELIMO was capable not only of vastly strengthening the sanctions squeezed on Rhodesia but opening a seven hundred mile boundary to guerrilla incursions, perhaps assisted by its own battle-tested freedom fighters.

Anyone familiar with the vagaries of the Rhodesian situation, however, would have known that in Southern Africa the shortest distance between two points is never a straight line. The coalition of nationalist movements keeps exploding in the hands of the African Presidents. Fratricidal conflict among Rhodesian African nationalists continue both inside Rhodesia and among the exiled nationalist groups. The fissures open not really along ideological lines and not exclusively along tribal lines, though the latter must not be discounted. They reflect also differences in tactics and these differences reflect the struggle for leadership which intensifies as the anticipated time of transition approaches. And Prime Minister Vorster continues to have as much trouble with the slippery Mr. Smith as do the African Presidents with their clients. Each excess of the feuding nationalists plays, as it always has, into Smith's hands. Vorster has virtually all the levers of crude power in his hands to bring the Rhodesian Front to heel, but cannot be seen to use these too openly without affording Smith the opportunity to appeal over his head to the South African white electorate, or himself to be contributing to and thus validating a program of international sanctions. Samora Machel, the new President of Mozambique, is also no free agent. He has inherited a parlous economy and the enormous task of turning Mozambique into a going concern politically as well as economically. And there are measurable prices to be paid for not maintaining correct relations with Pretoria at this stage.

Thus, the orchestration of events and the manipulation of actors present problems of exquisite delicacy. The dangers, consequently, are enormous.

What Vorster wants most is a negotiated transition to majority rule which he himself is perceived to have facilitated. What Vorster wants least is a transition to majority rule achieved as a direct result of successful international sanctions and, even worse, of guerrilla warfare. Yet to achieve the desired goal, the threat of the undesired one—even in measured degree its reality—must be operative. This suggests a further ripening process and the resulting ferment might either produce the desired mixture or explode the keg.

The last six months have borne out this thesis. Neither the African Presidents nor Mr. Vorster has been able to pressure the African National Congress or the Rhodesian Front into accepting the last viable fall-back position of the other. Indeed, substantive meetings have not even taken place. Meanwhile South African paramilitary units so far as we know remain in Rhodesia. There is no real ceasefire. And many political prisoners are still in custody. Though the primary actors have been identified and the dynamics of an ultimate solution are now clearer than ever before we must not underestimate the difficulties.

The problem today is what it has been from the outset. In a word, it is the effect a colonial transition in Rhodesia without an imperial arbiter. Never having deployed forces on the ground in Rhodesia, Britain has never exercised imperial authority. South Africa has become the surrogate for such authority. But under what circumstances can Vorster now get Smith to sign the instrument that obliges the regime to self-destruct in three years? or in five years? or can provide guarantees if irreversibility to the Africans?

Vorster has called the alternative "too ghastly to contemplate," meaning presumably a rapid escalation of guerrilla warfare leading to an attempt of

all-out military solution on both sides which could trigger a racial cataclysm well beyond Rhodesia's frontiers. He is right. It is ghastly indeed. The chief hope in the present situation is that Vorster's fears are shared by the African Presidents, creating the tenuous alliance of convenience between Pretoria and Lusaka. Outside this consensus stand certain Rhodesian African nationalists, principally ZANU which has spearheaded the most successful of the guerrilla incursions; and possibly—we do not know for sure one way or the other—Ian Smith himself.

Not inconceivably, Smith might feel that rapidly escalating violence might reverse the process of "detente"—in the realization of which continued white rule in Salisbury is the most serious stumbling block—and draw South Africa into a decisive confrontation with the guerrillas and more importantly with the countries giving them sanctuary. If that were to happen we would find ourselves in a brand new ball game.

How then does one get a negotiated settlement? I suggested before that the situation must ripen further. That means a continuation of more of the same, and possibly repeating the cycle of stepped up violence leading to renewed attempts at negotiations, perhaps several times over. How long this will take, I for one cannot predict. We have been imposing ill-conceived deadlines on events in Southern Africa for years. The only deadline no one thought to predict was the one that came in consequence of the unpredicted coup in Lisbon—independence for Portuguese Africa. In December and January, the conventional wisdom was that a settlement would be in hand prior to Mozambiquan independence. My instinct is that it could take another one to three years.

The following elements must remain or be brought into play. First, there must be a continuing liaison between Pretoria and Lusaka, between Prime Minister Vorster and the African Presidents. Second, the African Presidents must continue to pressure the Rhodesian African nationalists into a willingness, once the situation matures, to enter into a transitional arrangement which will involve under some international guarantee independence under majority rule within not more than four to five years. Third, Vorster must keep equivalent pressure on Smith and the Rhodesian Front. Fourth is the ingredient that is as dangerous as it is indispensable: Mozambique must gradually increase the sanctions squeeze and preparations must proceed apace to increase the effectiveness of African guerrilla forces.

The object of the latter moves of course is to erode further the structure of white power in Rhodesia by increasing the costs of moving exports and imports through the sanctions barrier and by increasing the difficulties of gaining access to the international money market and of recruiting expatriate skills, thus hastening the net exodus of whites from the country. As a result, the regime will become the more brittle as time goes on. The object equally is to demonstrate that the alternative "to ghastly to contemplate" can and will in time become a reality. As these developments proceed, Vorster's ability to place added pressure on Smith ought to achieve growing acceptance within the South African white electorate. His maneuverability in this respect is already far greater now than it was several years ago.

Britain's formal role in all of this remains as substantial as its real role remains negligible. It is the Parliament at Westminster that must finally validate independence normalizing Rhodesia's (by then Zimbabwe's) relations with the international community. But Britain's actual role in achieving a political transition can only be marginal and facilitative. We need, incidentally, no longer fear a British deal with Smith aimed at disengagement. The situation has moved beyond that. There can be no return to the status quo ante. In any event, the precedent of the Pearce Commission in 1971 with its finding against the settlement proposals of the Conservative Foreign Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home (a procedure for which the British government deserves more credit than it has received) obviates the danger of a "sell-out."

What about the United States? One hopes, almost wistfully, that the Byrd amendment can be repealed *before* there is majority rule in Rhodesia. It is in fact important that this be accomplished with dispatch. In company with the gradually expanding involvement of Mozambique in the sanctions campaign, it would send a significant signal to Salisbury at a psychologically important moment. The United States ought to be willing, as well, to join an international effort to compensate Mozambique for any loss of revenue involved in its sanctions against Rhodesia. Third, we should initiate immediately programs of humanitarian assistance to the Rhodesia African nationalists. Beyond this, there is little that we can do directly.

There is however much that we can do contextually, if I may put it that way—seeing Rhodesia in the larger context of Southern Africa. In general we must begin to understand, and give more consistent expression to that understanding, that the issues of Southern Africa are grave and may gravely affect American interests. I say this with such certainty, as I have said it before, “because I believe that in this age of immediate communication and instant involvement, it is inconceivable that two great racial revolutions (in America and in Southern Africa) can climax at roughly the same point in history without finally each affecting, exciting, and probably aggravating the other. Exactly how this interaction will work itself out is I think unpredictable. But that there will be a significant interaction I would consider inevitable.”

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much, Mr. Good.

Unless Senator Biden has questions now we will go on—

Senator BIDEN. No.

Senator CLARK [continuing]. And hear from Mr. Hutchinson.

Professor Hutchinson?

[Mr. Hutchinson's biography follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF JOHN EDWARD HUTCHINSON

Date : January 1, 1975.

Address : 1234 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Apt. 811.

Phone : 202-347-5234 (Home) ; 202-785-6246 (Office).

Birthdate : January 29, 1921.

Birthplace : South Shields, England.

Marital Status : Divorced, three children (22, 18 and 15).

Degrees : B.Sc. (Econ.), 1950 London University, Economics and Government ; M.A., 1952 UCLA, Political Science ; and Ph. D. (Econ.), 1963 London University, Industrial Relations.

WORK EXPERIENCE

1938-39 : Clerical Officer, Ministry of Education, London.

1939-46 : Able Seaman and Executive Officer, Royal Navy.

1946-50 : Executive Officer, Ministry of Education, London (Passed Administrative Class Examination, 1950).

1950-52 : Teaching Assistant, Department of Political Science, UCLA.

1952-53 : Director of Research and Organizer, Officer Employees International Union, Los Angeles.

1953-55 : Graduate Research Political Scientist, Institute of Industrial Relations, UCLA.

1955-64 : Coordinator of Labor Programs and Assistant Research Political Scientist, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley.

1964-70 : Associate Professor of Industrial Relations, Graduate School of Management, UCLA, and Research Political Scientist, Institute of Industrial Relations, UCLA.

1970-present : Professor of Industrial Relations, Graduate School of Management, UCLA, and Research Political Scientist, Institute of Industrial Relations, UCLA.

1973-75 : Visiting Professor of International Relations, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C.

1973-74 : Visiting Fellow, Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Washington, D.C.

COURSES TAUGHT

Political Science I, American Government, 1950-52.

Political Science II, Comparative Government, 1950-52.

BA 150, Elements of Industrial Relations, 1964- .

XL 150 (Extension), Elements of Industrial Relations, 1964- .

BA 251, Management of Industrial Relations, 1964- .

BA 253, Settlement of Industrial Disputes, 1964- .

BA 255, Comparative Industrial Relations, 1969- .

BA 258, Labor History, 1970- .

BA 421, Business, Labor and Government, 1968- .

COMMITTEE SERVICES

(a) Student Committees: Various M.A., M.Sc. and Ph. D. committees.

(b) Committees of the Academic Senate; chairman or member of various *ad hoc* committees; member, Committee on Public Lectures, 1967-69; member, Committee on Privilege and Tenure; and chairman, Committee on Privilege and Tenure, 1972-73.

(c) Administrative Committees: Member, Committee on International and Comparative Studies, Subcommittee on Atlantic and West European Studies, 1968-69 and member, Nonacademic Personnel Appeals Committee, 1967.

(d) College, Departmental or Other University Committees: Member, Committee on Doctoral and Specialists Master's Program, GSM, 1964-65; member, Library Committee, GSM, 1965-66; member, Executive Committee of Staffing Committee, GSM, 1966-67; member, Advisory Committee to Division of Research, GSM, 1968-72; chairman, Task Force on Reviews Procedure, GSM, 1968-69; member, University-Wide Faculty Conference, 1968; and chairman, Academic Evaluation Criteria Committee, GSM, 1969-70.

ADMINISTRATIVE APPOINTMENTS

(a) Associate Vice Chairman, Industrial Relations, GSM, 1966-68.

(b) Chairman, Industrial Relations, GSM, 1968-70.

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

1. Member, Department Whitley Council (Negotiating Committee), Ministry of Education, London, 1946-48.

2. Member, Youth Employment Committee, Oakland, California, 1957-59.

3. Consultant, California State Assembly Committee on Industrial Relations, 1959.

4. Chairman, Senior Staff Training Program (Western States), Bureau of Employment Security, U.S. Dept. of Labor, 1961-68.

5. Member, Panel of Arbitrators of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and of the American Arbitration Assn. and arbitrator in maritime, trucking, aircraft and aerospace, manufacturing, mining, construction, printing, automobile, steel, oil, communications, rubber, retail, distributive, food and other industries, public employment and the Department of Defense, 1957 to date.

LECTURING AND OTHER ACTIVITIES

1. Member, radio and television weekly public affairs panel "World Opinion", American Broadcasting Company, 1950-52.

2. Lecturer or panelist in numerous labor, management, academic or community programs, and on radio and television, 1955-

3. Lecturer in UCLA Series, "Britain Today", 1965.

4. Instructor in GSM Executive Training Program, 1965-

5. Instructor in GSM Lecture Series on "Current Economic Issues", 1968.

6. Lecturer, UCLA Business Forecast, 1967.

7. Lecturer, "Trade Union Ethics", Western Management Association, Monterey, 1968.

8. Lecturer, "The Prospects for Industrial Relations", Oregon State University, Corvallis, 1969.

9. Chairman, seminar series by the Rt. Hon. Fred Mulley, M.P., Berkeley, 1961 and UCLA 1971.

10. Chairman, public lecture by the Rt. Hon. Frank Cousins, former British Minister of Productivity, UCLA, 1968.

11. Chairman, UCLA lecture series by Herbert Hill, Labor Secretary of the NAACP, on "Black Labor in White America", 1970.

12. Lectures to various groups of foreign visitors, Berkeley and UCLA, 1955 to present.

EDITORIAL BOARDS

Member, Board of Editors, Industrial Relations, 1964.

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS AND SCHOLARLY SOCIETIES

Member, Political Science and Social Science Honorary Societies.

Member, American Political Science Association.

Member, Industrial Relations Research Association.

COMMUNITY SERVICES

Secretary, Association of California Consumers, 1957-58.
 Fund-raising for Israeli-Arab health services in Gaza and the Sinai, 1971-72.
 Intermittent youth activities.

AWARDS AND HONORS

Moore Prize Scholar, South Shields High School, England, 1937.
 London County Council Major County Award, L300, 1949.
 UCLA Committee on Research, \$1,391 for research on John L. Lewis, 1965.
 Graduate School of Management, Division of Research, and UCLA's Chancellor's committee on International and Comparative Studies, \$4,765 for research in Britain on industrial relations, 1966.
 GSM, Division of Research, and UCLA Senate Research Committee, \$2,500 for research on John L. Lewis and British trade union legislation, 1970-71.
 Nomination for Pulitzer Prize in History, 1972.
 Ford Foundation grants for research on John L. Lewis, \$3,500 (Summer 1973), \$35,000 (1973-74), and \$8,750 (1975).

OTHER CONSULTATIVE AND PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Ford Foundation Lecturer, Montana, 1952.
 State Department Visiting Specialist, Australia, 1963.
 State Department Visiting Specialist, Viet Nam and India, 1966.
 State Department Visiting Specialist and Guest of the South Vietnamese Ministry of Labour, 1969 (Visit aborted because of illness).
 Guest Lecturer, University of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 1969.
 Guest Lecturer, Trade Union Council of South Africa, 1969.
 Guest Speaker, Rhodesian Manufacturers Association, Salisbury, 1969.
 State Department Visiting Specialist, Lebanon, 1969.
 Guest Researcher, Tel Hashomer Government Hospital, Ramat Gan, Israel and Gaza City, Gaza, and El Arish, Sinai Peninsula, 1971.
 Guest Speaker, Industrial Relations Center, University of Tel Aviv, 1971.
 Guest Speaker, "American Labor and Politics", House of Commons, London, December 1972.
 State Department Visiting Specialist, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Malaysia and India, 1974.

PUBLICATIONS

(a) Books:

Hutchinson, John, *The Imperfect Union: A History of Corruption in American Trade Unions*, New York: E. P. Dutton, 1970, 477 pp. (Paperback edition, 1972).

(b) Chapters in Books:

1. Hutchinson, John, "Trade Unionism and The Communists", in William Peterson (Ed.), *The Realities of World Communism*, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall 1966, pp. 164-187. (Reprinted by Institute of Industrial Relations, Berkeley, 1963).

2. Hutchinson, John. "The AFL-CIO and the Negro". in Arthur M. Ross and Herbert Hill, *Employment, Race and Poverty*, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1966, pp. 403-431.

(c) Monographs:

1. *An Evaluation of Internship and Student Training Programs in South California* (with Ernest A. Englebert and others), Los Angeles: Joint College-Federal Service Council, 1953, pp. 66.

2. *Health Insurance* (with Richard N. Baisden), Los Angeles: UCLA Institute of Industrial Relations, 1955, pp. 29.

3. *Health Insurance: Group Coverage in Industry* (with Richard N. Baisden), Los Angeles: UCLA Institute of Industrial Relations, 1956, pp. 76.

(d) Professional Journal Articles Published:

1. Hutchinson, John, "Corruption in American Trade Unions", *Political Quarterly* (London), July, 1957. (Reprinted by the Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley, 1957).

2. Hutchinson, John, "The Constitution and Government of the AFL-CIO", *California Law Review*, December 1958. (Reprinted by the Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley, 1959. Reprinted in Richard L. Rowan and Herbert R. Northrup, *Readings in Labor Economics and Labor Relations*, Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, 1968, 1972.

3. Hutchinson, John, "Captain of a Might Host: A Note on the Retirement of John L. Lewis", *Yale Review*, December 1960 (Reprinted by Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley, 1961. Permission given to reprint in a textbook on the art of biography by Paul H. Craven, with Dickenson Publishing Company).

4. Hutchinson, John, "Labour and Politics in America", *Political Quarterly* (London), Spring 1962. (Reprinted in Walter Fogel and Archie Kleingartner, *Contemporary Labor Issues*, 1966 and 1972).

5. Hutchinson, John, "Industrial Relations and Employment Security", *Proceedings*, IAPES Convention, Wyoming, 1962.

6. Hutchinson, John "Employment, Labor Costs and Collective Bargaining", *UCLA Business Forecast for the Nation and Southern California in 1968*, GSM, 1967.

7. Hutchinson, John, "The Anatomy of Corruption in Trade Unions", *Industrial Relations*, February 1969. (Reprinted by Institute of Industrial Relations, UCLA, 1969).

8. Hutchinson, John, "Hoffa", *California Management Review*, Summer 1969. (Reprinted by the Institute of Industrial Relations, UCLA, 1969).

9. Hutchinson, John, "George Meany and the Wayward", *California Management Review*, Winter 1971. (Reprinted by the Institute of Industrial Relations, UCLA, 1972).

10. Miscellaneous:

(a) Contributing editor on British and American labor issues, *YEAR*, 1951-53.

(b) Contributing editor on U.S. industrial relations, *The Economist* (London), 1956-57.

(c) Hutchinson, John, "Labor Reform Legislation". Testimony in *Hearings*, House Committee on Education and Labor (86th Cong., 1st sess.) 1959.

(d) United States correspondent, *The Northern Press* (England), 1973- .

(e) Hutchinson, John, "For U.S. Support of a Rhodesian Settlement", *New York Times*, March 2, 1974.

(f) Hutchinson, John, "The Obstacles to Trust Between Black and White Rhodesians", *The Times* (London), May 22, 1974. (Reprinted in *The Rhodesian Herald*, May 23, 1974).

11. Book Reviews:

(a) Clegg, H. A., *Trade Union Officers* and Barbash, Jack, *Labor's Grass Roots*, reviewed in *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, July 1962.

(b) Pain, George, et al, *Social Stratification and Trade Unionism*, reviewed for *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, accepted for publication in 1975.

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

1. *John L. Lewis*, a biography of the late President of the United Mine Workers of America. Publication date 1976.

2. *Labor in South Viet Nam* (with Tran Than Dang), a monograph on the economic, political and military aspects of agricultural and industrial labor in South Viet Nam. First draft completed.

3. *Naval Strategy and Leadership*, an examination of the naval and maritime strategic needs of the United States in the wake of the oil embargo and other basic strategic changes, with emphasis on the problems of recruitment, training, discipline, professional standards and morale.

4. *Comparative Industrial Relations: A Functional Approach*, an edited study of the functional aspects of comparative industrial relations, e.g., comparative grievance procedures, comparative vocational training, comparative collective bargaining, comparative health and welfare programs, comparative labor politics, and industrial relations in the multinational firms.

5. *Labor and Political Change*, an edited study of the role of indigenous labor movements in peaceful or relatively peaceful political change.

6. *Labor at War*, an edited study of the role of indigeneous labor movements in circumstances of general war, occupation, guerrilla warfare, civil wars and wars of independence.

7. *Profiles in American Labor*, a volume of essays on American labor leaders.

I have already published three separate essays on John L. Lewis, George Meany and James R. Hoffa.

STATEMENT OF JOHN EDWARD HUTCHINSON, VISITING PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, D.C., AND PROFESSOR OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, GRADUATE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES, LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I am grateful for the opportunity to speak briefly today about a somewhat maligned and certainly neglected country whose future is related to ours.

I have placed a formal statement in the record, and with your permission will add only a few supplementary and summary remarks, which should take only 9 minutes to read.

A colleague of yours has suggested that you might wish to hear additional testimony in executive session, and I will, of course, be glad to supply that.

Last year I paid two visits to Rhodesia for a total stay of nearly 3 months. I went in January 1974 on my own account to study the prospects for a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia. During that time, I was fortunate to meet with Prime Minister Ian Smith, with Bishop Abel Muzorewa—the president of the African National Council—and with a cross section of African and European labor, business, political, and community leaders.

1974 NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ANC RHODESIA

In April 1974, I went back to Rhodesia at the invitation of an officer of the African National Council. In subsequent discussions, it was agreed that I would render what help I could to the ANC in its current negotiations and relations with the Rhodesian Government, and in the event of an agreement would visit various African capitals and London and Washington to discuss the merits of the agreement and—a most vital question—the representativeness of the ANC.

On May 7, 1974, it was agreed between Mr. Smith and Bishop Muzorewa that certain constitutional proposals would be placed before the central committee of the ANC for its consideration. I received a copy of the proposals the following day, and for the next 4 weeks was privy to a number of discussions of the proposals by both African and European leaders.

Later in the month, I was asked on several occasions to relay certain suggestions or proposals between the African National Council and the Government, and I did so. I was thus a witness to the process of disintegration in will and trust and communication which killed any prospect for an agreement. On June 2, 1974, the central committee refused to accept the proposals and increased its own demands.

There has been speculation that the Rhodesian Government did not anticipate the consequences of the Lisbon coup in the raising of African expectations and demands, and that the African National Council failed to maintain its own internal communications and cohesion and finally bowed to the very real intimidation from outside Rhodesia.

I do not want to add to that speculation, but it should be known that there was a sad reality then that is still a reality—that is poorly appreciated abroad—and about which the United States is probably the only power which can do anything useful and corrective.

AFRICAN/EUROPEAN APPREHENSION AT SIGNING AGREEMENT

The reality is fear. The Europeans fear that they will eventually be swamped and oppressed and rejected and even liquidated by the Africans. The Africans fear that the Europeans will renege on an agreement once it has been ratified by the Parliament of the United Kingdom.

Both the Africans and the Europeans are apprehensive that any agreement they sign will not be respected at their borders and by the international community. They are well aware that most of the outside world is blind to the conditions for peaceful political and economic development in Rhodesia and essentially indifferent to the wishes of the Rhodesian people in the matter.

The Rhodesian predicament is serious, but the international—including the British and American—debate on Rhodesia is largely irrelevant. The necessity for the transition of Rhodesia into a society of equality—in law and consideration and opportunity—is not open to practical doubt.

However, I have strong reservations about the term majority rule, since it contributes hardly at all to an understanding of the political systems characteristic of Africa. There are no free societies in Africa. We would do well to discipline our terminology and make uniform our standards when discussing African political change.

I personally doubt if any country in modern times has been preached at for so long and with such piety by so many nations so poorly qualified to censure or proscribe.

I doubt if anything approaching recognition has been given to the European contribution to Rhodesian development and to the European right to survival and reward.

I doubt if any sustained thought has been given abroad to the proposition that the African people in Rhodesia should choose their own destiny rather than have it thrust upon them from outside.

The fact is that until the recent and most praiseworthy initiative of Zambia and Tanzania and Botswana to reinforce and maintain the representativeness of the ANC, the pressure of international opinion and action on Rhodesia has been directed, not toward a negotiated agreement, but toward capitulation by the Government or war.

U.S. ROLE IN SETTLING RHODESIAN CONFLICT

Rhodesia does not need any more intimidation. The issues of sanctions and the Byrd amendment are symbolically important to both sides, and I respect the legitimacy of their concern; but both issues are almost irrelevant to the problem of negotiating a responsible and stable agreement in the short time there is left before the negotiating table is deserted for the bundu and battlefield. It is not wise for the United States to expend still more energy and time and taxpayers' money on that idle, most infertile debate.

As it is, enough destructive intimidation will probably be provided—unsolicited and free-of-charge, against both Africans and Europeans in Rhodesia—across the Mozambiquan border by professionals. Given its philosophical basis, I find it hard to regard the recent violent change of power in Mozambique as a blow for liberty.

What Rhodesia needs is the confidence that a negotiated settlement will be respected by other countries and given a chance to work. It needs a sense of augury, the feeling that some nation with power to influence has a practical interest in the good faith administration of an agreement with Rhodesia. Only the United States can provide that confidence.

I asked Prime Minister Smith if he would welcome such help, and he said he would. I asked Bishop Muzorewa if he would welcome such help, and he said he would. I asked every African and European leader I met in Rhodesia if they would welcome such help, and they all said they would.

It is not a matter of interfering in the internal affairs of another nation. It is simply and only a matter of providing good offices where they are needed and wanted. We have shown not the slightest interest in offering or providing such limited but crucial assistance.

Our stock and stolid policy seems to be that it is a British problem. So it is, to some extent. The British must ratify any agreement, but they need help in persuading other nations to respect it. In any event, with Northern Ireland still on fire, they have no need for further troubles in Rhodesia. I know enough members of the Government and Parliament of my native land to suspect that they would be delighted with our assistance on Rhodesia, provided it was offered with the normal political and constitutional properties. They have accepted 1776, but retain their sensitivities.

PROFESSOR HUTCHINSON'S SUGGESTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY IN RHODESIA

Let me summarize here the suggestions I have made in my formal submission.

First, the stability of Southern Africa—with Rhodesia as the litmus test of our ability to contribute in welcome and useful ways—is of political and economic and strategic consequence to the United States.

Second, the probable result of current British, American, and international policy toward Rhodesia will be a war between extremists rather than a negotiated settlement between reasonable men.

Third, the African National Council should be encouraged to unify its structure and policy to justify its claim to be the prime representative of the African people in Rhodesia.

Fourth, we should declare now and firmly—in advance of further negotiations—that any agreement reached between the Government and the Council and ratified by the British Parliament will be supported by us in the U.N. Security Council, in the U.N. General Assembly, and before the Organization for African Unity.

Fifth, the United States should make available any assistance—whether in mediation, in constitutional research, or in discussions on the economic future of Rhodesia within the regional development of Southern Africa—that may be requested.

Sixth, the President of the United States—as an augury of his interest in peace and fraternity in Southern Africa—should send an envoy to Rhodesia and to the rest of Southern Africa to study the means whereby the United States could contribute welcome help to the pursuit of political cooperation, regional economic development, and racial justice in Southern Africa.

I am not aware of anything useful that the United States has done in Southern Africa in recent years. We have wasted a great deal of time on denunciations but have contributed nothing but banalities to conciliation. We have tolerated and even joined in the hypocrisies about Rhodesia by the worst of political and racist overlords, and have condoned the weakening of traditional international law and custom. We have properly declared ourselves for racial equality in Southern Africa, but have done nothing at all to gird its weak foundations.

This subcommittee will have rendered fine service to the United States and all the people of Southern Africa if it directs the attention of the President and the Congress away from the ceremonies of censure and boycott toward the most urgent need for negotiation and settlement. In so doing it might provide us with the option of peace instead of the certainty of war.

[Mr. Hutchinson's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN HUTCHINSON

The United States has an interest in Rhodesia. We have ignored or neglected that interest at the cost of justice for Rhodesia, of constancy and equity in international law, of racial harmony and political stability in a Southern Africa friendly to this country and of the political honor, the material well-being and the national security of the United States.

The American interest in Rhodesia lies in the encouraging of a negotiated settlement rather than an internationally imposed subjugation; the treatment of Rhodesia according to traditional standards of international law and behavior applied equally to those who sit in judgment; the protection of Rhodesia as a small nation—the rights of Rhodesia are equal to those of Israel, and both countries are in equal danger from the arrogances of major powers and collections of minor ones; the promotion of commerce in goods and services and ideas between our two countries for the welfare of both; the building of a stable non-racial free society in Rhodesia which will help to stabilize a Southern Africa which controls ports and sea lanes and natural resources needed for our security; and the inclusion of Rhodesia in a venture in sub-continental economic development which will do more for racial justice and the general welfare than all the strictures of a most imperfect outside world.

But Rhodesia is an international outcast. In the formal British view it is in rebellion against the Crown, a crime with which Americans are familiar. In the legal fiction of the United Nations it is a threat to the peace—perhaps the only case in the law of war of guilty non-belligerence. In the conventional hypocrisies it is an Aryan fascist state; it is of course a European autocracy, but it is an amateur in oppression compared with half the member states of the United Nations.

The British claim sovereignty over Rhodesia, despite a long history of *de facto* Rhodesian autonomy and an effective declaration of independence on November 11, 1965.

We support that policy, probably for fraternal reasons which have nothing to do with the merits. I do not wish to abuse the point, but will observe that our attitude does not sit well with the Bicentennial celebrations of 1776. If we are right on Rhodesia, we ought to withdraw recognition from every Communist state on earth, since none of them came to power by peaceful or constitutional means. Neither should anybody recognize us, since by those standards we are illegitimate, a bastard state. It is ridiculous, and the British are probably sorry they painted themselves into such a constitutional corner in the first place.

Recognition is not a moral judgment. It is a recognition of fact, and in the case of Rhodesia would be no more a defense of white supremacy than the Declaration of Independence in 1776 was a charter for its slave-owning signatories.

But let it pass. The British will hasten to ratify a *bona fide* agreement in Rhodesia and accord both independence and recognition to that country. The question here is whether the United States is helping to bring about such an agreement, and whether if it comes we are prepared to defend it abroad and thus promote peace in Southern Africa. I will argue that on both counts we are not, and that thereby we are derelict in our duty to international law and equity and order, and to our own national interests.

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The problem in Rhodesia is the struggle of its African people for equality in law and consideration and opportunity, and the determination of its native European population to protect its personal security and to maintain the continuity of government and the economy.

There are two general alternatives: war, and a negotiated settlement. It is unfortunate that, in contributing little but bromides to the latter, we have contributed immeasurably to the likelihood of the former.

We are not alone. The Commonwealth persists in its aberrations on Rhodesia. Last year Canadian Foreign Minister Mitchell Sharp advocated a Commonwealth military occupation of Rhodesia—presumably to give birth to peace and freedom, perhaps with the winsome President of Uganda in command; one does not rush to assume that he would welcome a similar gift for separatist Quebec. Prime Minister Gough Whitlam of Australia—the oldest white supremacy in the Commonwealth—condones the boycott and hot battle for the freeing of all black men save his Aboriginal own. Indira Gandhi, the new Empress of India, suspends her case for civic freedoms in Rhodesia while she guts them in her own caste-ridden land. Prime Minister Forbes Burnham of Guyana preaches racial fraternity for Rhodesia from the fireside of fratricide at home; he is joined in homilies by Prime Minister Lee Yuan Kew of Singapore, an ethnic autocrat who runs the tightest little island in the world. Prime Minister Errol Barrows of mighty Barbados openly calls for bloodshed in Rhodesia, but one does not expect to see him at the front. Only Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana have eschewed the conventional hypocrisies and spoken of late for regional peace in Southern Africa; and only the United Kingdom has recently sent an emissary to Salisbury, presumably bent on conciliation, but one can not be wholly satisfied of that, such are the votes his leader in the Mother of all Parliaments must count.

Now, in monumental irony, the Commonwealth has decided unanimously to subsidize the Maoists of Mozambique, newly come to power by the gun; the purpose is not at all to feed the hungry of that bedraggled country, but to put the garotte to Rhodesia by closing off the railways and the ports. The measure is unlikely to succeed, since the Mozambique outlets are not vital to Rhodesian survival but the gesture has the odor of the Nazi-Soviet pact to kill off Poland. That helped to start a war. Perhaps the strategy of this one—with neither South nor North nor Northwest from new Mozambique immune—will be drawn up in the corridors of Peking.

That is the point. The inarticulate brutal premise of Commonwealth and American and international policy towards Rhodesia is not an intelligent and durable agreement between freely consenting parties, but a capitulation by the Government of Rhodesia to forces yet unspecified; the liquidation of the present African leadership in Rhodesia which would prefer a peaceful transition to a free and equal society; and not inconceivably the Vietnamization of Rhodesia by armed forces supplied and directed from abroad. Under present circumstances, the major instrument of political change in Rhodesia is less likely to be the polling booth than the panga.

But capitulation to whom? The only Rhodesian forces who demand capitulation by the Government are based in other countries, mainly Marxist in persuasion and committed to violent revolution, divided not only on tribal grounds but also over Peking and Moscow as the sources of cosmic truth, and in disarray. They are not elected, and have no clear constituencies. They no longer enjoy the hospitality of Lusaka, and seem to have taken to killing each other. They have no chief nor central leadership, nor anyone to whom a head of state could bow. Prime Minister Ian Smith of Rhodesia is himself an unlikely candidate for surrender; but even if he was there is no one he could hand his weapons to.

The infinitely preferable alternative is peaceful political change through a

negotiated settlement. We have done nothing to encourage that either, but the elements of success are there.

The African National Council of Rhodesia is the only body in Rhodesia with the faintest claim to legitimacy as the main representative of the African people in that country. A year ago it was without contest or rational contradiction the prime African political organization in Rhodesia. Since then it has accrued the formal allegiance of the two main African liberationist organizations, the Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Since then, also, it has benefitted from the efforts of Zambia and Tanzania and Botswana and perhaps Mozambique to maintain and strengthen its credentials. Unfortunately there have been rumors of defection from the ANC, notably of representatives of ZANU, bringing into question abroad its claim to representativeness at home. It is dile to insist that the Rhodesian Government negotiate an agreement if it has no one to negotiate one with.

One hopes that the ANC will maintain or recover its stature. It is insistent on political and civic equality, but does not demand capitulation. It does not espouse bloody revolution, but rather transition by consent to whatever form of government all the citizens of Rhodesia will support. It is essential to peace and freedom in Rhodesia. Any agreement signed by the Rhodesian Government with any other current African organization would not—in British law and international opinion—be worth the energy of the signatures.

However, a further step could be taken to add to the credibility of an agreement between the Government and the ANC. It was evident last May, after the year-long negotiations between the Prime Minister and Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the President of the ANC, that had an agreement been signed it would have attracted the swift endorsement of virtually every African and European labor, business, political, community and tribal organization. Such an assemblage of support in the future would constitute far more persuasive evidence of the representativeness of an agreement than the claims of self-appointed exiles or the polls of visiting commissioners. It would be a presumptuous foreign power or agency which challenged the legitimacy of an agreement so negotiated and endorsed.

What are the alternatives? It is fashionable to talk of Armageddon in Rhodesia, and to discount the durability of the Rhodesian Government; but it would be foolish to ignore the realities. The Rhodesian borders are long, and in the long run indefensible unless the sentinels are patriotic Africans. The land is generally flat and without natural barriers. The Zambesi is easily fordable in many places at the right time of year, particularly along the Mozambiquan border. The European farms are easy to isolate, and the water and power supplies to the cities are most vulnerable targets. The ratio of Africans to Europeans is some 21 to one, and not all of the latter are Rhodesians by birth or reliable commitment. Mozambique will be a Marxist state. If it is true to its credentials, it will support violent revolution in Rhodesia *and* elsewhere in the sub-continent whenever it is convenient to do so. It is not hard to imagine Beira as the Hanoi of Southern Africa. Rhodesia, black and white, might well without our help yet share the fate of South Vietnam.

It is *chic*, in the parlors of the Left, to contemplate the violent capture of Rhodesia as a triumph for the forces of democracy. It would be nothing of the sort. It would be conducted by Marxists armed and trained by the Communist powers. The first row of casualties would be the leaders of the African National Council and ZANU and ZAPU and of the African community who would prefer representative government in a free society. The second row of casualties would be the leaders of the European community who are needed for the political and economic continuity of Rhodesia into whatever form of government the people of Rhodesia choose to have. The final and most tragic casualty would be the hope that Rhodesia might have emerged as the one equalitarian democracy in all of Africa.

It is a ritual, in the *salons* of the Right, to bemoan the passing of the European stewardship in Rhodesia as the last rites of dutiful Empire. The nostalgia is natural but idle. Rhodesia is a society in necessary and major transition. The change must be to equality, and the deliberations must take place with speed, otherwise the winds of change will soon become a gale.

The rhetoric speaks of majority rule, but that is a poor phrase for Africa. Majority rule is a legend, a mask for the elite. Africa is a continent of autocracies, either ethnic or party or personal, often benevolent but sometimes malign and

in one or two cases barbaric. In every state there is a shortage of civil liberties, of due process and open debate; in fact there is more public dissent in Rhodesia than in the majority of African countries. No African state can fairly call itself a free society. No African country has any meaningful universal suffrage. One man, one vote has no more meaning in most of Africa than it has in Bulgaria.

What indeed is the goal? We have no right to interfere in the internal affairs of Rhodesia, nor to prescribe any particular form of constitutional evolution and arrival. But we have an interest in political kinship, and have a preference for open societies over the dictatorships of doctrine or pigment or arms.

Representative government is a reasonable and reachable goal for Rhodesia. The notion is implanted in its institutions. The problem is to extend its embrace to include both Africans and Europeans on terms acceptable to both. It is emphatically here we should not interfere, least of all in insisting on some plebiscitary formula which apes our Western doggerel but which might be unsuitable to Rhodesian traditions and preferences. We should confine ourselves to encouraging the African and European people of Rhodesia in jointly determining their own political future, free of foreign piety and force.

The immediate problems are mistrust and fear. The Europeans fear the Africans and mistrust the British Labor Party. The Africans fear the Europeans and mistrust the British Conservative Party. I don't know what they think of the Liberals, but they all fear and mistrust the violent liberators outside. In particular, and perhaps most crucially of all, they have little confidence that any agreement they signed would be respected by the member states of the United Nations and the Organization for African Unity, not to speak of the revolutionary Communist world.

It is here that we can help. We should make it plain, first of all, that we favor—not disintegration, not capitulation, not invasion, not conquest, not bloody revolution, not racial supremacy nor Marxist imperialism—but self-determination for Rhodesia by democratic means.

We have not done that very loudly or in words that carry strength to anxious men. We are silent on our preferences and countenance the pratings in the UN Plaza's endless, cheap charade. We are timid at the rhetoric of the barkers for the underground, and have not tried at all to point the way. Our only act of consequence in recent times has been to bring back home the only men we had in Salisbury who could tell us vital truths.

We should offer our services to the people of Rhodesia in any peaceful fashion that they might find acceptable. Those services could involve mediation, or constitutional consultation, or discussions on Afro-European cooperation in the economic development of Rhodesia. It might turn out that those services are not needed or wanted, but at least we will have extended our hand.

We should also declare to the Rhodesian people that an honorable agreement reached in Rhodesia and ratified by the Parliament of the United Kingdom would be supported by us in the UN and throughout the international community.

That statement should be made now, and it should be made firmly. It would be a most important step. It would be welcomed by both the Rhodesian Government and the African National Council. It would encourage agreement. It would test the sincerity of the UN General Assembly's professed belief in democratic self-determination. It would permit the revocation of legal absurdities and the restitution of normal diplomatic and commercial relations between Rhodesia and the rest of the world and thus help to build both political and economic confidence within that country. It would also place on the Organization for African Unity—assuming that body survives the assault on its sanity and credentials that the chairmanship of General Amin will soon inflict—the primary responsibility for the protection of the borders of Rhodesia while the agreement is given a chance to work.

We should then make known our interest in the peace and prosperity of Southern Africa as a whole; our concern that Rhodesia should play its part in the cohesion and development of the region; and our willingness to contribute our own efforts and resources to the tranquility of the sub-continent.

* * * * *

Southern Africa, more than any other part of the world, has been associated with white supremacy, but the reality is changing. The danger is that the decline of white racism might be accompanied by the rise of black racism of violent and dictatorial propensities.

So far the common assumptions about political change in Southern Africa have been morbid, built on the expectation of warlike rather than peaceful change,

of the advent of new autocracies for old, of exchanges of racial domination rather than their elimination. The process of succession in Mozambique is a morbid precedent. Rhodesia will be a major test of American good will and ingenuity to avoid a blooding of the spears. South Africa remains the giant question, the great arena for the most intractable problem of human society.

There is, perhaps, a lamp to be lit. Southern Africa is a natural economic region. The industrial resources of South Africa are of immediate consequence to the sub-continent at large. In particular, it is the only prospective customer for the water and power to be generated by the Cabora Bassa Dam in Mozambique and is—through the employment of migratory labor—Mozambique's only source of hard currency. Mozambique itself is almost devoid of natural resources, and will probably rely heavily on South Africa for both raw materials and skills.

Rhodesia has enough resources to be economically important to all of the countries surrounding it. Zambia and Rhodesia have had complementary economies since colonial days; the latter is a natural conduit for the transportation of Zambian goods to the sea; and both countries have suffered since the closing of their mutual border in 1972. Rhodesia also has an immense and efficient agricultural economy, and could well serve as the granary for all Southern Africa. Zambia, Botswana and Southwest Africa all have great mineral wealth, some explored but much untapped. All the countries of Southern Africa can benefit from economic cooperation. All the *races* of Southern Africa can benefit from mutual economic interest: the passions of prejudice do not long survive the lure of money. Economic growth is the strongest stimulus to economic opportunity. The demand for labor is the precondition of its elevation. The economics of Southern Africa might prompt a historic change in its politics.

We have recently concluded a disastrous military intervention in Southeast Asia at uncountable cost in lives and national wealth. Atonement is unnecessary, but it would be well to demonstrate that we are as generous in peace as we were profligate in war. The pursuit of regional economic cooperation in Southern Africa might achieve the peace we sought so vainly in Vietnam. We should declare, soon and strongly, that we are anxious to contribute to the economic prosperity and thus the political stability of what might otherwise be the situs of the next large war.

* * * * *

Rhodesia should share in the welfare of Southern Africa. At present its prospects are gloomy, except perhaps for the murderer and the mortician. It needs a negotiated settlement between two major representative groups, supported by all of its African and European organizations of consequences. It needs a time of peace in which to nurture the transition to political and economic justice. It needs good will and unmolested borders. It needs, not the selective indignation of pious strangers, but the understanding of a strong country. It needs our help.

It seems such a small thing to ask. Our interest in Rhodesia and Southern Africa is the interest we should have in avoiding war and encouraging racial harmony and protecting our economic and strategic interests; but we murmur the banal and do nothing of substance at all. Yet an early and useful contribution to a Rhodesian settlement could be set in train during a slack hour on a wet afternoon on Foggy Bottom, or perhaps in the White House.

It would involve no risk of hostilities, no contributions of arms, no affront to international law, no offense to the larger detente, no dereliction of duty and very little ingenuity.

It would involve an announcement. Not indeed one of the platitudes of yesterday, but a declaration of intent. There have been occasions in recent history when other declarations of intent by the United States might have kept the peace.

We could do so here. If we choose to offer only a little of our native justice and magnanimity, we might help Rhodesia towards its own domestic tranquility and lift a standard for all of Africa. If we elect to stand aside, we will share the guilt for tyranny and future wars. The Rhodesians, black and white, will be called upon to pay the highest price.

Inkosi ababusisi ibagcine ibatc ukuthula.

Mwari ngaavakomboreye agovachengeta agovopa runyararo.

The Lord bless them and keep them, and give them peace.

JOHN HUTCHINSON.

[From the New York Times, Mar. 2, 1974]

FOR U.S. SUPPORT OF A RHODESIAN SETTLEMENT

(By John Hutchinson)

WASHINGTON.—There can be an early settlement in Rhodesia if we encourage it. There might be a lasting settlement in Rhodesia if we support it. There will probably be a war in Rhodesia, if we stand aside. If war comes, we will be greatly affected.

Rhodesia, formerly a self-governing colony of Britain, broke away and declared independence unilaterally in 1965—a move that Britain considers illegal. Efforts by Britain and Rhodesia to come to an agreement on independence have been frustrated over the issue of African rights. The white-minority Government and African representatives have been meeting in private for several months on the terms of a settlement.

American help is wanted in Rhodesia—by both Africans and Europeans, by both blacks and whites—because Americans alone are believed strong enough to insure the international acceptance of a domestic bargain in Rhodesia; because the vast majority of Rhodesians, black and white, do not want to be liberated by men they do not choose; because the leaders of Rhodesia, black and white, believe that probably the chance for self-determination is now at hand; and because, as yet, neither side fully trusts the other.

Such help can be offered to Rhodesia, immediately and properly, by stating our readiness to support an agreement in Rhodesia that is ratified by the British. If we did that, we would bring confidence to the negotiators, support to the British, and respect to international law.

That is what I believe, having just spent a month in Rhodesia. I interviewed Prime Minister Ian D. Smith at length, met four times with Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the chairman of the African National Council and the leading African spokesman in Rhodesia, and talked with every available labor, business, farm and political leader in the country. There was no obstacle to any meeting, no unwanted witness, no visible fear of open talk. Every man wanted American help.

If Mr. Smith and Mr. Muzorewa reach an agreement soon, it will almost certainly be accepted by the African National Council, endorsed by every African organization of political strength, and supported by the overwhelming majority of the Rhodesian people, black and white.

The agreement would thus meet the prime British condition for independence—namely, that any agreement must be acceptable to the Rhodesian people as a whole. Presumably the British Parliament would ratify it. If it did not, there would be a war.

If it did, the British and, it is hoped, the United States and others would ask the United Nations Security Council to rescind the international boycott against Rhodesia. The issue is more political than legal. Even if one or more permanent members of the Council used the veto, Rhodesia would no longer be such an economic and political pariah.

The attitude of individual Communist and African countries is a much more serious matter. The Communists arm and train terrorists now crossing the Mozambique border, the Africans give them sanctuary as well. Other countries and private organizations lend help. Unless there is an international stand down on Rhodesia, a breathing space for the agreement, there will be no self-determination for her.

The conditions for self-determination will not last much longer. There is imported violence at the border, moving inland. The minority Europeans are ready to negotiate, but they will fight to the death for what they regard as their homeland. The African National Council is at present united and commands an irrefutable majority; but there are tensions within it and a call from abroad for killing. Much more delay will tear it apart, destroy the prospect of an internationally acceptable agreement and bring back tribal violence.

Terrorism would escalate into insurrection and invite invasion. South Africans would fear for their borders and would hardly sit around. African leaders to the north might try to redeem their pledge to liberate Rhodesia. There would be death on a very wide scale and possibly the disintegration of modern Rhodesia. One result would be the loss of American moral, material and military resources in southern and central Africa.

Our intelligence on Rhodesia is poor, since we have nobody there; it is probably better on Albania. We do not understand the variables or the need and hope

for help. It is clear that government by multiracial consent in Rhodesia is a possibility largely dependent on the active goodwill of the United States; that an encouraged settlement now could resolve the British dilemma, protect American interests, and keep the African peace; that an enduring agreement will require an international understanding on Africa, and that by general agreement in Rhodesia the man best equipped to act now and effectively in the matter is Secretary of State Kissinger.

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[From the Times, May 22, 1974]

THE OBSTACLES TO TRUST BETWEEN BLACK AND WHITE RHODESIANS

The men in Rhodesia might be ready for peace—readier than we are. I am in Rhodesia for the second long stay this year. On one occasion or another I have talked at length with Prime Minister Mr. Ian Smith, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the President of the African National Council, Dr. Elliot Gabeliah, the Vice-President of the ANC, and every available African and European leader.

I do not know when a settlement will come. The mood in Salisbury changes from day to day, and the obstacles to trust are enormous. But the facts are that the Prime Minister and the Bishop have been meeting frequently and cordially, that the ANC has given Muzorewa a mandate to negotiate an agreement, but the discussions are about details, and that both men have recently spoken optimistically about their talks. It would be wrong to predict an agreement, but it would be well to prepare for it.

For a further fact is that the quality of an agreement might depend greatly upon anticipated reception. Mr. Smith and Bishop Muzorewa do not yet trust each other. The Africans and the Europeans do not yet trust each other. None of them has abounding faith in the world outside. They need to know what the world will do if they agree.

The six principles represent the British conditions for a ratifiable agreement. They require eventual majority rule, guarantees against retrogressive constitutional amendments, immediate improvement in the political status of Africans, progress towards ending racial discrimination, the acceptability of a settlement to the people of Rhodesia as a whole and the protection of minorities against the majority.

The essential point now is that—with the exception of the fifth principle, requiring majority support—the six principles are no longer appropriate as a condition of ratification. They were honourably conceived by a British Government acting as agent for the African people in Rhodesia. Now the African National Council is the agent, the uncontested majority representative of the African people in Rhodesia, quite capable of—and indeed insistent upon—negotiating its own terms of settlement.

The fifth principle can be satisfied. Under present conditions, whatever Bishop Muzorewa and Dr. Gabeliah negotiate should be endorsed by the national executive of the ANC. What the national executive endorses will be acceptable to the overwhelming majority of the African people in Rhodesia.

If the ANC is accepted as the majority African organization for the purposes of a settlement, the British constitutional duty will end with the satisfaction of the fifth principle. Its interest, of course, would not. What of the other five principles?

I see no great difficulty in providing against retrogressive amendments and the abuse of minorities: there is a reciprocal interest involved, a mutual desire for security. Further, one simply assumes that there will be provisions for African political advancement and the abatement of racial discrimination; otherwise there is no point to the exercise.

The expectations, of course, should be realistic. Africa is a graveyard of fine documents. There are no rights an emergency will not impair. There are no constitutions a *coup d'etat* will not amend.

There remains the matter of majority rule. It is not much of a phrase for Africa, or for most of the world. In many countries it is another word for the symbolic elite. In a few places it is a cloak for barbarism. There is independence, no doubt, but democracy, only sometimes.

Minority rule, on the other hand, is a proper phrase for Rhodesia. The country is dominated by the few Europeans, claimed by the many Africans. Both would

prefer to rule, but both have realized that a sharing of authority is the only alternative to tyranny.

They do not know, and neither does anybody else, what governmental forms that sharing should assume in the changes necessary for a constant peace. What we should therefore look for is not some immaculate constitutional conception, but rather for a fundamental document which will, nevertheless, permit the evolution of constitutional wisdoms and adjustments within a system of government of continuing appeal to the Rhodesian people as a whole.

It does not matter much what name it has; Representative Government might serve. Both bodies want stability with change, and forms of government built to suit themselves. It might yet be the achievement of Rhodesia—with domestic goodwill rather than fear, and international encouragement rather than calumny—to devise a machinery of government by consent, inferior to none anywhere in Africa.

What should be done? British ratification is all-important, but other help is needed. The British Government should make it plain now that American endorsement of a ratified agreement will be welcome in Britain. That assurance is needed in Congress and in the Department of State. It would also be very welcome in Rhodesia—the Prime Minister and the bishop told me so in Salisbury and Nyadibi—and might well encourage an acceptable agreement.

The United States should then indicate that, in support of the United Kingdom, it will argue for the acceptance of the agreement by the organization for African Unity and the United Nations.

The OAU and the General Assembly, in turn, should affirm their unselective commitment of self-determination and declare that they will respect an agreement endorsed by the African National Council.

International support for an agreement would then put the burden for peace and progress on the Rhodesians.

They are tired of hate, fear and isolation, and hope for life and liberty and the pursuit of a happiness of their own choosing. Perhaps we can help them towards fraternity. It is a nobler cause than war.

JOHN HUTCHINSON.

The author, visiting Professor of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C., is now in Rhodesia at the invitation of Bishop Muzorewa.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much. We will be evaluating your six recommendations as well as Mr. Good's recommendations at the end of his statement. But first let us hear from Robert Rotberg.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT I. ROTBERG, PROFESSOR OF AFRICAN STUDIES, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

Mr. ROTBERG. Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, I will summarize as severely as I can and supplement as briefly as I can.

Rhodesia is a strategically located colony with great potential. Whether called Rhodesia or Zimbabwe, it has a valuable resource base and could, under favorable circumstances, serve once again as the fulcrum of a prosperous and progressive Southern Africa.

Certainly real stability in Southern Africa is impossible without a satisfactory resolution of the Rhodesian problem, and it is for this reason that both black and white Africans have been working so assiduously together during the past year to bring about a negotiated settlement to the Rhodesian conflict.

I think, despite what has been said already, that we must ask ourselves why Rhodesia is so important.

First of all, it is there. Surrounding Rhodesia are Mozambique, South Africa, Botswana, and so on. It is the center of a—so far—troublesome and troubled region of Africa.

Second—and I need not remind the senatorial committee of this—Rhodesia does have natural resources. You are all too familiar with its base metals and American interest in the export of one of those raw materials. Rhodesia holds 86 percent of the free world's known reserves of high quality chromium and mines significant quantities of copper, nickel, asbestos, gold, iron, coal, and so on.

Obviously, under the more auspicious economic conditions than currently obtain there, Rhodesia could greatly increase its production of these and other valuable materials.

In presanction days Rhodesia was a major producer of corn, sugar, and tobacco, and could be again. Short staple cotton has also been grown with promising yields. Indeed, given the expert level of Rhodesia's farmers, if irrigated water supplies are available in sufficient acre-feet, there is no limit to the cropping potential of Rhodesia.

Rhodesia also served as a transport hub. Opening up its routes to the sea would restore a critical transportation link for Zambia, and insure the export of copper and the import of machinery and consumer goods.

Rhodesia has a population more highly educated than were the comparable populations in countries to the north at the moment of their own independence. It has an untapped potential for the growth of service industries for the region. It could also count upon visible earnings from a well-organized tourist sector. After all, few other African countries can boast ruins the equal of Zimbabwe and Inyanga, waterfalls as exciting as Victoria, or highlands as salubrious as the eastern ones near Umtali. And few African countries have such highly developed infrastructures and well-arranged, when sanction-free, economies.

As developing nations go, Rhodesia is potentially rich and well-situated for progress. It also holds the very frightening potential for all-out racial war.

POPULATION BALANCE IN RHODESIA

Let us examine the population balance: there are 6 million Africans and 270,000–250,000 whites, plus a few thousand coloreds and Asians. If we estimate that there are 50,000–65,000 white heads of families or others normally eligible to defend white rule in any total conflict, we can perceive immediately the dimensions of the problem. Even if one-third of this number were committed to battle and to support for battalions in war, what would happen to the local economy? What would happen to the very way of life which whites cherish in Rhodesia?

A siege economy could not be endured for long. Morale would sag. It would not take too many battlefield reverses or much urban sabotage to deplete the white ranks in the army and make it impossible to sustain war.

Remember, too, that at least one-half of all the whites in Rhodesia have immigrated there since World War II. Their situation is very different from the situation of white South Africans.

Senator CLARK. I did not realize that.

Mr. ROTBERG. I do not want to exaggerate. It could be much higher than that. I will try to be conservative.

Therefore, unlike white South Africans, most white Rhodesians could, if they wished, return to relatives in Britain, Portugal, Greece,

Cyprus, and South Africa. Presumably, many would go to Australia and New Zealand as well.

This is not to say that they will need to. There are more whites in Kenya and Zambia now than at the time of independence. They probably earn more per capita in real terms than they did then. So there is an augury in favor of whites in Rhodesia given the kind of negotiated settlement that we are talking about. I think there are seven factors, however, which still make an all-out racial war possible.

ELEMENTS ENHANCING ALL-OUT RACIAL WAR

An all-out racial war is enhanced by—

Frelimo's victory over the Portuguese in Mozambique.

The consequent availability of guerrilla camps and staging zones across the Rhodesian border in Mozambique as well as Zambia.

South Africa's refusal to continue its support of Rhodesia militarily—and probably economically—and its willingness to withdraw troops already there.

South Africa's clearly enunciated refusal to be sucked into the vortex of a Vietnam-like conflict in southern Africa. That is, it does South Africa's self-interest no good to engage in a war which cannot be won or which can only focus hostility toward it, and away from Rhodesia. Furthermore, should South Africa and Rhodesia somehow prove victorious, would the whites of South Africa want to swell their own black population with 6 million more? I think not. The white population of South Africa is not yet 4 million.

Zambia and Tanzania's decision to support the African National Council's liberation army if negotiations fail.

The promise of the British Commonwealth to back Mozambique if it ends traffic from Rhodesia to the sea, and otherwise tightens the economic noose.

The ability of the militant black nations of Africa to focus their attention upon Rhodesia now that Guiné, Mozambique, and Angola have been liberated. And in this connection, I think we must be fully aware of the role Zambia has played in persuading its fellow militant nations that South Africa means to cooperate and bring about a peaceful conclusion to the Rhodesian situation, and therefore, that it is worthwhile avoiding hostility toward South Africa for the time being in order to focus attention on Rhodesia. They need not look as fully as before at the Namibian situation in the hope of solving the Rhodesian problem first.

It is true in balancing the odds on whether war is likely that there is dissension in the black Rhodesian camp. Despite the strenuous efforts of Samora Machel, Kenneth Kaunda, Julius Nyerere, and Seretse Khama, the main opposing wings of the Rhodesian struggle—the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)—have not been united except in name and form. The African National Council (ANC) is an umbrella organization which successfully revived domestic dissent in 1971-72 and has tried to bring together the opposing ideologies and end conflicts over power that have existed between ZANU and ZAPU (latterly also FROLIZI [Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe] since about 1962—

63. There still remains a serious chance of fratricidal conflict among Rhodesian blacks on the Angolan model, although at this point the arms resources are not available and the individual groups are not all together in place.

I want to add one point here, which is that it would be wrong for us to think of this as a tribal struggle, pure and simple. Instead this is a struggle over power and we have seen for the past 6 months a maneuvering in order to gain access to power after a future settlement. This is a reasonable approach given the history of the groups. In fact, one sees that neither group's executive includes leading members of the royal Ndebele house. However, a member of the ZANU executive is a fairly close member of the Ndebele ruling house. Moreover, ZAPU has always had prominent Shona members and at one point had more Shona members of its executive than of any other ethnic group.

Can these groups remain unified, can the efforts of Zambia, Tanzania, and so on bring about the unity that we have wanted for so long?

There is one consideration in terms of all-out racial war which we must talk about for a moment. That is that the African National Council military wing is under the command of those ZANU forces which have already demonstrated their ability to fight a guerrilla war before and since the coup in Portugal. After years of faltering, the ZANU guerrillas opened up an important front in northeastern Rhodesia in late 1972 and have maintained pressure upon the army of Rhodesia since then. Their most well-publicized successes came in late 1973 and early 1974. If negotiations fail, this reorganized guerrilla movement will have access to more arms and ammunition, better training, and better logistical support than before. They will also have the psychological advantage of Frelimo's success. What are the chances of a victory for either side? I think that it is impossible to say.

Without massive firepower, the Government of Rhodesia could not and cannot defeat a concerted rural guerrilla effort backed by Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania, and so forth. This is not to say that the guerrillas can win, either, but they have already demonstrated an ability to tie down a local defensive force indefinitely. They can again harass isolated areas. They may probably have the ability to do so to such an extent that a white exodus will begin. Any panic would surely mean the end of a credible defense force. And a further level of warfare could engulf the cities, which now are white redoubts.

No one—African, South African, Zambian, or Mozambican—wants Rhodesia engulfed by violence. Least of all do the Rhodesian whites want violence. But for 12 years the Rhodesian whites have resisted the transfer of power to blacks with surprising success.

HAS ARMAGEDDON COME?

Has Armageddon come? Encircled by unfriendly neighbors and with its transportation needs dependent upon them, Rhodesia seems finally to have run out of luck. But such an analysis rests on Mozambique's decision to cut the Rhodesian routes to Beira and Lourenço Marques, from the south, and South Africa's determination to do little to make the new single line link from Beit Bridge to Rutenga anything more than a thin, temporary expedient.

As in so many other matters, South Africa's attitude is crucial. It has pushed Ian Smith's government very far. Its efforts presumably

were responsible for the release from prison of the leaders of ZANU and ZAPU, and for encouraging the Smith regime to agree to a cease-fire. But as you know, Mr. Chairman, the great expectations of December have been followed by the circumlocutions, evasions, and stallings of January through July. There has as yet been no constitutional conference, and much successful maneuvering on the part of the Smith government. The guerrilla war continues, and several of the leaders of ZANU are unable to return to Rhodesia or are under restraint in neighboring territories. It is not clear, pending the actions of Mozambique, how far South Africa can and will go in using its undoubted economic leverage to make the Smith government negotiate an end to the Rhodesian conflict and begin the hard and, for whites, painful task of transferring power to blacks. I do not see, as Ambassador Good does, a 3- to 5-year period, but I think things if they do happen will happen much faster than that.

Mr. GOOD. One to three, I said.

Mr. ROTBERG. Fine.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Nobody knows, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROTBERG. There is no doubt that South Africa would prefer a comparatively rapid devolution of power to blacks, but it is not clear how far it is prepared to go (for domestic political reasons) in compelling such a result. Nor is it clear how much more time the black governments will give South Africa to bring whites and blacks fruitfully to the conference table. There is a tendency to think that the Smith government favors one over another of the three or four main liberationist political groups, and that it has been trying to wait until that group gains strength within the country before talking with blacks about the future. South Africa may be a party to this endeavor. So may Zambia. But it is not clear that such a strategy can provide more than temporary solace, or whether it may not lead to the kind of Angolan conflict which it is in everyone's interest to avoid.

Whatever the short-term outcome of these manipulations, maneuverings, and evasions, it is in the interests of all parties to negotiate a settlement and avoid conflict. Let me hedge this last, however. It may well be that it is not in ZANU's interest to avoid conflict now, given the distribution of power which could result from an immediate constitutional agreement. But if it is in ZANU's interest to maintain the war, so it must be in white Rhodesia's interest to settle.

The Prime Minister of Rhodesia has recently reiterated his oft-quoted statement that the colony will not be governed by blacks in his lifetime. But that is an unrealistic statement given the ability of his neighbors to strangle Rhodesia economically and fiscally, and the presumed ability of black states and states of the Eastern block to back a well-organized guerrilla movement almost indefinitely. It follows, I think, that it is best to do now what must be done eventually—that whites can obtain more security and better transitional arrangements now rather than later. But are the whites of Rhodesia equipped to perceive their self-interest in the same way? I think so, and do not believe that Pollyanna is talking. Indeed, I think, once Mozambique's attitude is clear and the priorities of South Africa are reiterated to Rhodesia, that we may see some rapid movement in this direction. Admittedly, a change in the leadership of the Rhodesian front may first be required, but I am not prepared to say, either, that such is a necessary precondition. Self-interest, not altruism, and very little

avoidance of conflict has always characterized the political perceptions of the white leadership in Rhodesia.

U.S. LEADERSHIP IN AFRICAN AFFAIRS

If the above premises are reasonable, then it follows that it is in the self-interest of this country to enhance those initiatives which would bring about a peaceful resolution of the Rhodesian question. As President Kaunda said in the White House in April, it is time for the United States to resume its leadership of the West in African affairs. I submit that we can do so by supporting the Zambian and South African attempts to avoid conflict in southern Africa and by encouraging the present white government of Rhodesia to discuss the kinds of terms for a transfer of power which will make most sense for the future good of all of the inhabitants of that territory. We might even explore ways in which we could with African support assist in making the transition from white to black rule as successful as possible.

Thank you.

[Professor Rotberg's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT I. ROTBERG

Mr. Chairman, Members of the subcommittee, I am grateful for this opportunity to appear before you and to testify about Rhodesia.

Rhodesia is a strategically located colony with great potential. Whether called Rhodesia or Zimbabwe, it has a valuable resource base and could, under favorable circumstances, serve once again as the fulcrum of a prosperous and progressive Southern Africa.

Mr. Chairman, within the last 15 months prospects for development and the resolution of conflict in Southern Africa have increased tenfold. You have already heard testimony on Angola and Mozambique and are aware of the dramatic alteration in the state of southern Africa since the coup d'état in Portugal in April 1974. We have seen Guiné and Mozambique attain independence. If the threat of civil war can be contained, Angola will follow in November.

These are significant milestones which resulted from the coup. Without Portugal's willingness to devolve responsibility after 500 years, independence would have been achieved much more painfully and laboriously, if at all. Certainly the transition would not have been accomplished peacefully.

South Africa has been directly affected by the events of the past 15 months. Although many observers would have predicted that South Africa, true to its foreign policy for the past two decades and the public statements of its leaders, would have tried covertly, and, if necessary, overtly to retard independence in Mozambique and Angola, in fact, South Africa reacted to the coup in Portugal with an attitude of positive neutrality and an unaccustomed posture of comparative complacency. Moreover, when South Africa could materially have assisted blacks and whites opposed to Frelimo in Mozambique, it studiously refrained from even the semblance of interference.

This was the face of the new, severely pragmatic, South Africa. For it, the most important need was and is stability in southern Africa. It sought—as part of its reaction to the Portuguese coup—to buy time (say 10 years) with space. It reckoned that the end of conflict in southern Africa would provide South Africa with an interval long enough to alter her own internal and quasi-internal policies (I refer to the homelands) regarding blacks. To have intervened in Mozambique or Angola would have forfeited the kinds of relations it sought and needs with black Africa and her newly independent or soon to be independent black neighbors. Also, conflict would have been escalated. And the likelihood of a spillover from such conflict into South Africa would have been made much more certain. South Africa, therefore—but not without serious debate within the ruling echelons of the National Party—refused to meddle in Mozambique and Angola for two reasons.

1. To do so was seen to be too risky.
2. From carefully calculated self-interest.

South Africa is no less aware than we here today must be of the strategic as well as the political significance of détente in southern Africa. In this respect the attitudes and interests of South Africa suddenly—but not surprisingly—coincide with the interests of black Africa, and especially with the Republic of Zambia. With the end of Portugal in Africa, Zambia saw an unheralded opportunity—the first in nine years—to satisfy its own political and economic requirements for developmental time and cross-border stability. Thus South Africa and Zambia not only both appreciated the importance of stability in southern Africa, but also took the unusual step of talking together about it.

Both are and were aware that real stability in southern Africa is impossible without a resolution to the Rhodesian problem. Without a deescalation of conflict, stability in the region will prove unattainable. Hence, about ten months ago, South Africa and Zambia began working together, along with the transition regime in Mozambique and the governments of Tanzania and Botswana, to articulate and concert a viable policy about and for the future of Rhodesia.

I need not remind a Senatorial committee of Rhodesia's natural resources. You are all too familiar with its base metals and the American interest in the export of one of those raw materials. Rhodesia holds 86 percent of the free world's known reserves of high-quality chromium. It also mines significant quantities of copper, nickel, asbestos, gold, iron, and coal, and lesser quantities of forty other minerals. Obviously, under more auspicious economic conditions than currently obtain there, Rhodesia could greatly increase its production of these and other valuable minerals.

Rhodesia in pre-sanction days was a major producer of corn, sugar, and tobacco, and could be again. Short-staple cotton has also been grown with promising yields. Indeed, given the expert level of Rhodesia's farmers, if irrigated water supplies are available in sufficient acre-feet, there is no limit to the cropping potential of Rhodesia.

From the time of Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence to the present, her chrome, copper, gold, asbestos, tobacco and maize have, despite sanctions, been exported via Mozambique and South Africa to China, Japan, the Soviet bloc states, Holland, Switzerland, and, as we know for chrome, to the United States. Corn has been sent to Zambia and, I presume, Zaire. Her imports, especially the gas and oil without which the colony would long ago have ground to a halt, also reaches Rhodesia via Mozambique and South Africa.

Rhodesia also served as a transport hub. Opening up its routes to the sea would restore a critical transportation link for Zambia, and ensure the export of copper and the import of machinery and consumer goods.

Since UDI, Rhodesia's light and medium manufacturing sectors have prospered in ways reminiscent of the 1950s. These two sectors could once again supply neighboring states with processed agricultural goods and manufactured commodities now typically imported either from South Africa or from overseas. Within a warfare-free southern Africa, a new Rhodesia (probably called Zimbabwe) could prosper as it did when—as the hambazonke of the Central African Federation—it supplied the bulk of the requirements of consumers in Zambia, Malawi, and southern Zaire.

Rhodesia has a population more highly educated than were the comparable populations in countries to the north at the moment of their own independence. It has an untapped potential for the growth of service industries for the region. It could also count upon visible earnings from a well-organized tourist sector. After all, few other African countries can boast ruins the equal of Zimbabwe and Inyanga, waterfalls as exciting as Victoria, or highlands as salubrious as the Eastern ones near Umtali. And few African countries have such highly developed infrastructures and well-arranged (when sanction-free) economies.

As developing nations go, Rhodesia is potentially rich and well-situated for progress. It also holds the very frightening potential for all-out racial war. Let us examine the population balance: there are 6 million Africans and 270–250,000 whites, plus a few thousand coloureds and Asians. Let us estimate that there are 50–65,000 white heads of families or others normally eligible to defend white rule in any total conflict. (I am aware that blacks now fight alongside whites in the Rhodesian armed forces. But this collaboration need not necessarily continue in all circumstances.) But if even one-third of that number were committed to battle (and support for battalions at war), what would happen to the local economy? And what would happen to the very way of life which whites cherish in Rhodesia? A siege economy could not be endured for long. Morale would sag. It would not take too many battlefield reverses or much urban

sabotage to deplete the white ranks in the army and make it impossible to sustain war. Remember, too, that at least one-half of all the whites in Rhodesia have immigrated there since World War II. Unlike white South Africans, most white Rhodesians could, if they wished, return to relatives in Britain, Portugal, Greece, Cyprus, and South Africa. This is not to say that they will need to. There are more whites in Kenya and Zambia now than at the time of independence. They probably earn more per capita in real terms than they did then.

The prospects for an all-out racial war are enhanced by:

1. Frelimo's victory over the Portuguese in Mozambique.
2. The consequent availability of guerrilla camps and staging zones across the Rhodesian border in Mozambique as well as Zambia.
3. South Africa's refusal to continue its support of Rhodesia militarily (and probably economically) and its willingness to withdraw troops already there.
4. South Africa's clearly enunciated refusal to be sucked into the vortex of a Vietnam-like conflict in southern Africa. That is, it does South Africa's self-interest no good to engage in a war which cannot be won or which can only focus hostility toward it, and away from Rhodesia. Furthermore, should South Africa and Rhodesia somehow prove victorious, would the whites of South Africa want to swell their own black population with 6 million more? I think not. (The white population of South Africa is not yet 4 million.)
5. Zambia and Tanzania's decision to support the African National Council's liberation army if negotiations fail.
6. The promise of the British Commonwealth to back Mozambique if it ends traffic from Rhodesia to the sea, and otherwise tightens the economic noose.
7. The ability of the militant black nations of Africa to focus their attention upon Rhodesia now that Guiné, Mozambique, and Angola have been liberated. (In this connection Zambia has apparently persuaded its fellow militants that South Africa means to cooperate in bringing about a peaceful conclusion to the Rhodesian situation, and that it is worthwhile avoiding hostility toward South Africa for the time being.)

It is true that there is dissension in the black Rhodesian camp. Despite the strenuous efforts of Samora Machel, Kenneth Kanda, Julius Nyerere, and Seretse Khama, the main opposing wings of the Rhodesian struggle—the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)—have not been united except in name and form. The African National Council (ANC) is an umbrella organization which successfully revived domestic dissent in 1971-72 and has tried to bring together the opposing ideologies and end conflicts over power that have existed between ZANU and ZAPU (latterly also Frolizi) since about 1962-63. There still remains a serious chance of fratricidal conflict among Rhodesian blacks on the Angolan model.

But it is equally true that the ANC's military wing is under the command of those ZANU forces which have already demonstrated their ability to fight a guerrilla war before and since the coup in Portugal. After years of faltering, the ZANU guerrillas opened up an important front in northeastern Rhodesia in late 1972 and have maintained pressure upon the army of Rhodesia since then. Their most well-publicized successes came in late 1973 and early 1974. If negotiations fail, this reorganized guerrilla movement will have access to more arms and ammunition, better training, and better logistical support than before. They will also have psychological advantage of Frelimo's success.

Without massive firepower, the government of Rhodesia could not and cannot defeat a concerted rural guerrilla effort backed up by Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania, etc. This is not to say that the guerrillas can win, either, but they have already demonstrated an ability to tie down a local defensive force indefinitely. They can again harass isolated areas. They may probably have the ability to do so to such an extent that a white exodus will begin. Any panic would surely mean the end of a credible defense force. And a further level of warfare could engulf the cities, which now are white redoubts.

No one—African, South African, Zambian, or Mozambique—wants Rhodesia engulfed by violence. Least of all do the Rhodesian whites want violence. But for twelve years the Rhodesian whites have resisted the transfer of power to blacks with surprising success.

Has Armageddon come? Encircled by unfriendly neighbors and with its transportation needs dependent upon them, Rhodesia seems finally to have run out of luck. But such an analysis rests on Mozambique's decision to cut the Rhodesian routes to Beira and Lourenço Marques (the colony's main outlet), Botswana's willingness to limit the use of the old main line to Bulawayo from

the south, and South Africa's determination to do little to make the new single line link from Beit Bridge to Rutenga anything more than a thin, temporary expedient.

As in so many other matters, South Africa's attitude is crucial. It has pushed Ian Smith's government very far. Its efforts presumably were responsible for the release from prison of the leaders of ZANU and ZAPU, and for encouraging the Smith regime to agree to a ceasefire. But as you know, Mr. Chairman, the great expectations of December have been followed by the circumlocutions, evasions, and stallings of January through July. There has yet been no constitutional conference, and much successful maneuvering on the part of the Smith government. The guerrilla war continues and several of the leaders of ZANU are unable to return to Rhodesia and/or under restraint in neighboring territories. It is not clear, pending the actions of Mocambique, how far South Africa can and will go in using its undoubted economic leverage to make the Smith government negotiate an end to the Rhodesian conflict and begin the hard and, for whites, painful task of transferring power to blacks.

There is no doubt that South Africa would prefer a comparatively rapid devolution of power to blacks, but it is not clear how far it is prepared to go (for domestic political reasons) in compelling such a result. Nor is it clear how much more time the black governments will give South Africa to bring whites and blacks fruitfully to the conference table. There is a tendency to think that the Smith government favors one over another of the three or four main liberationist political groups, and that it has been talking with blacks about the future. South Africa may be a party to this endeavor. So may Zambia. But it is not clear that such a strategy can provide more than temporary solace, or whether it may not lead to the kind of Angolan conflict which it is in everyone's interest to avoid.

Whatever the short-term outcome of these manipulations, maneuvering, and evasions, it is in the interest of all parties to negotiate a settlement and avoid conflict. Let me hedge this last, however. It may well be that it is not in ZANU's interest to avoid conflict now, given the distribution of power which could result from an immediate constitutional agreement. But if it is in ZANU's interest to maintain the war, so it must be in white Rhodesia's interest to settle.

The Prime Minister of Rhodesia has recently reiterated his oft-quoted statement that the Colony will not be governed by blacks in his lifetime. But that is an unrealistic statement given the ability of his neighbors to strangle Rhodesia economically and fiscally, and the presumed ability of black states and states of the Eastern bloc to back a well-organized guerrilla movement almost indefinitely. It follows, I think, that it is best to do now what must be done eventually—that whites can obtain more security and better transition arrangements now rather than later. But are the whites of Rhodesia equipped to perceive their self-interest in the same way? I think so, and do not believe that Pollyanna is talking. Indeed, I think, once Mozambique's attitude is clear and the priorities of South Africa are reiterated to Rhodesia, that we may see some rapid movement in this direction. Admittedly, a change in the leadership of the Rhodesian Front may first be required, but I am not prepared to say, either, that such is a necessary precondition. Self-interest, not altruism, and very little avoidance of conflict has always characterized the political perceptions of the white leadership in Rhodesia.

If the above premises are reasonable, then it follows that it is in the self-interest of this country to enhance those initiatives which would bring about a peaceful resolution of the Rhodesian question. As President Kaunda said in the White House in April, it is time for the United States to resume its leadership of the West in African affairs. I submit that we can do so by supporting the Zambian and South African attempts to avoid conflict in southern Africa and by encouraging the present white government of Rhodesia to discuss the kinds of terms for a transfer of power which will make most sense for the future good of all of the inhabitants of that territory. We might even explore ways in which we could with African support assist in making the transition from white to black rule as successful as possible.

Senator CLARK. Thank you.

Senator BIDEN. Do you have any questions?

Senator BIDEN. I do.

Senator CLARK. Go right ahead.

Senator BIDEN. The professor looks like he wants to say something.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Beg your pardon.

Senator BIDEN. Do you have a statement, sir?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I wanted to add something, if I might.

Senator CLARK. Go right ahead.

MOZAMBIQUE SUCCESS AT SHUTTING OFF RHODESIA

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I would like to say a short word about Mozambique.

I think it would be well to bear in mind that should Mozambique succeed in shutting off Rhodesia—and its capacity to do that is not proven—it would impose punitive costs on the economy of Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, and Zaire. Rhodesia would not be the only casualty.

I also think it is idle to talk about substantial Commonwealth assistance to Mozambique when most of the countries involved are too broke to help themselves. Least of all is Britain capable of rendering substantial assistance. Perhaps the Barbados can bail out Mozambique.

I think it is particularly unfortunate that we should be discussing the subsidizing of a protomaotist, revolutionary and dictatorial regime in Mozambique in order to strangle a country which does have a parliamentary inheritance.

I am well aware of the imperfections of government in Rhodesia, but it seems to me that if we talk less about the pat formula of majority rule and more about representative government and the free society, we might do something to help Rhodesia maintain that parliamentary inheritance in whatever form of government Rhodesia might in the future assume. It is a precious inheritance and should not be killed off for symbolic reasons.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD RHODESIA

Senator CLARK. Did either of you want to respond to that?

What I really would like to look at first is the specific recommendations that each of you made. You have made, I think, three at the outset, Mr. Good, and Professor Hutchinson 6 or 8, and in the last paragraph of your statement, you have some comments about directions for American policy. I wonder if we might spend 3 or 4 minutes—and any or all of you may comment before we do that—on what you perceive to be American policy now for Rhodesia.

Briefly, what is our policy toward Rhodesia, as you understand it?

Ambassador Good, you look like you might be ready to speak to that.

Mr. Good. Our policy toward Rhodesia, Mr. Chairman, has been to keep the British out in front. We have insisted, I think with historical justification, that it is not an American problem, it was and remains a residual British colonial problem. Our policy has been to support the British in their attempts to mount a program of sanctions against Rhodesia through the United Nations. We have unfortunately, since 1971, been ourselves in violation of an important aspect of the sanctions program: namely, chrome. We do not need to elaborate on that.

I think what we are seeing in the dialog that is shaping up here this morning is a quite different view put forward by myself, on the one hand, and if I understand him, by Professor Rotberg, and on the other by Professor Hutchinson.

My view would be that the United States ought not now at this late date to take some sort of critical initiative as proposed by Mr. Hutchinson. I think that would be unavailing. I think the main dynamics that apply, as I have suggested in my statement, are dynamics indigenous to the region, Smith and his regime on the one hand and the Africans of Rhodesia on the other; and that those who can influence these primary actors most effectively already have made their will known and already have set in play their various initiatives. These again are the black presidents, on the one hand, and South Africa on the other. Our role in all of this, it seems to me, remains indirect, although I would not underestimate the importance of the indirect actions that we can now take. Obviously, repealing the Byrd amendment I don't find to be trivial, as Mr. Hutchinson does. I find that to be essential not only in terms of the coherence and integrity of American policy vis-a-vis the U.N. and world community but also in terms of the signal that it would send at this moment to Salisbury. I think it might be possible that we could intervene helpfully at the same time with regard to strengthening Mr. Vorster's determination to see transition in Rhodesia, although I don't really think that is necessary.

I think beyond that we must give a very clear signal as to where ultimately we stand with regard to events in southern Africa. One day we shall have to make up our minds as to whether we are going to be solidly in favor of the continuation of white supremacy or solidly in favor on the other hand of some sort of transition to a greater participation and ultimately ascendancy on the part of black majorities.

I think that it is not useful to talk about whether majority rule means a continuation of parliamentary rule, freedom, and justice for all. Frankly, I think we stand in the face of historical events that are moving far beyond our capacity to influence in that respect, but it is important for us to know whether ultimately our interests and indeed our values lie with the side of the majority populations in these areas or on the side, on the other hand, of small and resistant white minorities.

Senator CLARK. Professor Rotberg, you have not spoken yet. Do you want to go next?

Mr. ROTBERG. Surely. I think that what Ambassador Good has said is exactly the situation that we should be following. I think our posture in recent years, in recent months, has been one of watching and waiting, which has been appropriate to the situation.

It is important for us at the present time to appreciate and support the initiatives for peace. This is an unusual situation in that we can appreciate the mutuality of purpose of Zambia and South Africa. There has not been unity of purpose in Southern Africa between these two countries until recently. The context is very important. We also can show our support in a number of specific ways from time to time but there is nothing dramatic in my view that we could or should do at the moment. Here I again agree with Ambassador Good, providing our signals are correct and appropriate for the long-term future of Southern Africa.

Senator CLARK. What are those signals?

Mr. ROTBERG. By signals I am in a sense underlining and repeating what Ambassador Good has said. As a partial response to what President Kaunda said in the White House in April on Patriots' Day,

we must make clear that our own revolutionary heritage argues in favor of a shift away from even tacit support to minority regimes—in this case minority regimes in Southern Africa—and that we are prepared to see the transition to majority rule to which we have always paid lip service. In many instances, of course, we have done more than pay lip service: Our attitude on investments in Namibia has been appropriate and we have spoken in the right forums in favor of transitions to majority rule.

The Byrd amendment of course, has been unfortunate. I think as the weeks go by the repeal of the Byrd amendment will become less and less important in that events will overtake us. We have missed an opportunity to repeal the amendment because I think events will go so fast, if this week's meeting is the argury I think it is, that the transition in Rhodesia will be made before we get around to doing a great deal about chrome.

Senator CLARK. Professor Hutchinson, the basic question again is what is our policy toward Rhodesia.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I don't think we have a policy on Rhodesia of any consequence at all, Senator, or which bears any valuable relationship to our stated wishes about Rhodesia and Southern Africa.

We say we are for peace and self determination but do nothing to encourage the conditions for that most desirable development.

With every respect I think there is a contradiction in what my distinguished colleagues say in the matter. They appear to say that we should lay off Rhodesia but also make clear where we stand, and I don't think we can have it both ways, unless what we say is unimportant.

It seems to me also we talk a great deal about self determination and liberation but pay astonishingly little attention to the quality of that liberation.

U.S. INITIATIVES IN RHODESIA

On the matter of U.S. initiative in Rhodesia, I think we should not attempt to impose our judgment on the Rhodesians, but I am willing to take at their word the many leaders in Rhodesia, black and white, who expressed great anxiety that the United States would show an interest in their capacity to determine their future for themselves. We do not show that interest and they can look to nobody else for help in that direction. It is not a joke with them at all. They feel isolated, as they are. They feel attacked and maligned, as they are. They feel without resources to develop their own political salvation. We do not help them in that at all. The only people who are likely to visit their attentions on Rhodesia, in the absence of our solicitude, are the enemies of Rhodesia—certainly the enemies of anything worthy of the name of a free society—and I would have thought we would be interested in that.

We have played the Pharisee on Rhodesia for an awfully long time. I would have thought, particularly with the approach of our own Bicentennial, it would have been well to assert an active concern and to do what we probably can to help the people of Rhodesia, black and white, to determine without force, without international ostracism, their own future. At the moment we are doing nothing at all to help.

Senator CLARK. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Professor, what you said sounds very impressive but I am not sure I understand it. I do not know what the heck we always talk about on the eve of our Bicentennial. I do not think of the African people in terms of that rekindling of faith.

I do not fully understand your comment. Can you specifically delineate for me what we can do?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. There is one step, Senator, which we could take immediately and which I believe would have an early, strong, and beneficial effect.

I came quickly to believe in Rhodesia that the greatest obstacle to a negotiated agreement in Rhodesia is the absence of confidence on both sides that such an agreement would be observed by the international community in general, and specifically by guerrillas at their borders. They do not believe it. That is why I in turn believe that what they need is not interference, not a determination or even recommendation by us as to what kind of agreement they should have or system of government they should adopt but some show of interest on our part in giving any agreement in Rhodesia a testing period.

Senator BIDEN. How do we do that, specifically?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. By saying so. By saying that if there were agreement in Rhodesia between the government and the African National Council—and I think it would obtain the endorsements of all organizations of consequence in Rhodesia—we would argue upon the Security Council, upon the General Assembly, and upon the Organization for African Unity that they respect that agreement, give it a chance to prosper and to become stable, give the Rhodesians a chance to develop their own political institutions.

Senator BIDEN. You are not suggesting that we guarantee their borders, are you?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. No. We have had some unfortunate experiences in Southeast Asia which we do not want to repeat.

Senator BIDEN. The extent to which you are suggesting that we do that is that we say in an international forum like the U.N., that we have in fact encouraged other members of the U.N. to honor whatever agreement is arrived at internally by the Rhodesians, right?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. And which was ratified by the British Parliament, as it must be. That it should be respected and given a trial period by the international community before anyone attempted to destroy it by force.

Senator CLARK. I wonder if I might ask, to be sure I understand your answer. Are you talking about ZANU and ZAPU within the ANC?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. They are already included. That is their problem, not ours.

Senator CLARK. You are speaking of an arrangement with all of these, not simply the ANC as it existed separately from ZANU and ZAPU?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Let me say something further to that, Senator. Last year, in my opinion, the ANC was, without any question at all, the prime African organization in Rhodesia, and was entitled to negotiate an agreement, and the government was willing to negotiate one with the ANC. The ANC has since obtained the affiliation of ZANU and ZAPU, but there have been rumors of defections. I think there is

a need to demonstrate the representativeness of the ANC. Any agreement must under present circumstances be signed between the government and the ANC. Last year it was very clear that if an agreement had been signed it would have received the swift endorsement of every substantial African and European organization in Rhodesia. That, it seems to be, would be the best evidence of legitimacy. We have no right to proscribe such a ceremony. I think we should look upon it with favor. It would be a better certificate of legitimacy than the opinions of visiting commissioners or outside observers or self-appointed liberators.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Good.

Mr. Good. If I may, Senator, Mr. Chairman, I think there is a point of some agreement here between Professor Hutchinson and myself, at least. I would agree that the absence of confidence that any agreement reached would in fact be endorsed or be enforceable or not subject to subversion is a very real problem in a situation like this. I would say, however, that it is more important in assuring the irreversibility of any agreement reached in Rhodesia between the white regime and the black organization to have the concurrence of neighboring Zambia, Mozambique, and Botswana, on the one hand, and South Africa on the other.

Now it is conceivable, as I said in my statement, that the United States might be able to play some useful role at the appropriate moment in joining some sort of international guarantee, the exact outlines of which I could not now predict. I would not agree with Professor Hutchinson that it would be productive for the external world to end its ostracism of Rhodesia. Indeed I would say, and I think this is a point of danger in the whole situation, but a necessary danger, that this ostracism not only be continued but be increased. I think that the fear of the alternatives as too ghastly to contemplate must be there if you are going to get the kind of movement on the part of the Rhodesian Front and the conservative whites in Rhodesia to meet the minimal conditions of the blacks. I am in favor, therefore, of more of the same, more ostracism. I think the repeal of the Byrd amendment still has a role to play in the situation, but I think beyond that there must be the credible threat that an alternative to a negotiated settlement may well involve this alternative too ghastly to contemplate. That, unfortunately, I am afraid, is a part of the political reality of a situation like this. I don't like it but I recognize it as being there.

Senator BIDEN. Professor Good, that is the point I want to move on to. You seem to be saying, and I think you just reiterated it, that that threat of the ultimate sanction is one of the primary ingredients you see toward any move? Without that, I get the impression you feel that it is not likely there would be much movement on the part of white Rhodesians to make any accommodations to the blacks. And, to quote from your statement, you say, "Mozambique must gradually increase the sanctions squeeze and preparations must proceed apace to increase the effectiveness of African guerrilla forces."

I am wondering what you mean by that? Do you mean that they should be encouraging the increase of guerrilla warfare, or encouraging the use of Mozambique as a sanctuary for the training of guerrillas?

Mr. Good. To begin with, may I make clear that my position would not be that the United States as a Government ought to have a policy with regard to guerrilla warfare in central Africa. Surely we should not be giving military assistance to the African nationalist movement. I am saying as a political scientist, viewing the forces in that region of the world, that it is important to hold as a possibility the threat of increased guerrilla warfare as one essential ingredient to get the white regime in Rhodesia to move far enough to enter into a meaningful negotiated settlement. That is all I am saying.

Senator BIDEN. To hold it as a threat and to increase its effectiveness seems to me to be two different things. I do not think it is a semantic difference.

UNITED STATES AS PARTY TO SANCTION THREAT

But you have answered my next question. You do not feel that the United States should in any way be a party to either holding the threat and/or increasing the effectiveness of the guerrilla movement, is that correct?

Mr. Good. That is correct. Senator, I do not feel that we should. I think, alternatively, we should, on the other hand, find ways of seeing whether some form of humanitarian assistance would not be acceptable from the United States to the African National Council outside Rhodesia, educational aid, medical aid. This, of course, would have to pass through Tanzania and Zambia and be acceptable to their governments. It might well not be. But it seems to me that ought to be investigated. I think the symbolism of investigating this is important.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO RHODESIAN AFRICAN NATIONALISTS

Senator CLARK. Could you expand on that a little more. How would that work on the aid.

I noted one of your recommendations concerns humanitarian assistance to Rhodesian African nationalists. Just expand on what you just said there about how that might work and who it might go to.

Mr. Good. I think my recommendation on that would be that our Government ought to consult first with President Nyerere in Tanzania and President Kaunda to see whether from their point of view an approach along these lines—let me cite two examples, educational aid and maybe medical assistance would be useful. If they would endorse the usefulness of such an approach then it would seem to me we should, if we can, reach Bishop Muzorewa on one of his trips outside of Rhodesia, go directly to him, or otherwise to his representatives in London, in Lusaka, in Dar-es-Salaam, and find out whether it would be useful from the point of view of the organization itself if we were to tender aid along the lines I have suggested.

Senator CLARK. The thing I am not sure of, Ambassador Good, this educational aid would go to people within the movement and ANC, aid within the boundaries of Rhodesia.

Mr. Good. I would not recommend, even if the opportunity were now available to us, any aid within Rhodesia. I am talking about the exiled arms of the movement.

By the way, there is precedence for this. We have in the past extended educational facilities to political refugees from Southern Africa.

Senator CLARK. Thank you.

ECONOMIC SANCTION, GUERRILLA WARFARE THREATS CLARIFIED

Mr. ROTBERG. I want to add one or two points to clarify some of the answers to Senator Biden's question.

We are talking about two things. One is the ultimate sanction, that is, the strangling of Rhodesia economically and logistically. That is one of the threats that is on the horizon.

The second one is that the forces of Southern Africa are poised for a reopening of full-scale guerrilla warfare.

If negotiations fail—which we hope they would not—and if the sanction threat is not sufficient—there will be two realities on the horizon for the white government of Rhodesia. All the governments in the area are aware of these realities. What is happening now is an attempt, with these two anxieties on the horizon to impel the kind of negotiations which would bring about the kind of a settlement which both black and white would find sufficient.

If this settlement should come about, and I think if it does the forces of change will be relatively rapid, then we may have a situation obtaining fairly soon, that is, within 2 years, in which aid within Rhodesia could again be given for humanitarian assistance, educational needs, and so on. Such aid could be as realistic a possibility as aid to Rhodesians outside of Rhodesia.

EXTENT OF OUTSIDE INFLUENCE BEYOND AFRICAN CONTINENT

Senator BIDEN. Gentlemen, I have several more questions and they relate to things we have not touched on yet. I do not think we have yet anyway. If you have commented on them, I will read the record and you need not repeat it.

Something occurred to me after reading in a memo that was prepared by the committee staff, and from discussions I have had with others with regard to the liberation movements and fighting particularly in Angola and in turmoil which has existed for some time in Rhodesia. What is the extent of outside influence beyond the African Continent?

For example, I am talking about Moscow and Peking. Is there any direct training of guerrilla forces by any other nations and, if so, to what extent? What impact is there on the Rhodesian situation we are discussing today with regard to any interference, influence, or aid by China or Russia? Does it exist or is it mythical?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I think if you read the liberationist literature, you will find a strong Marxist orientation to it. The chief division seems to be over Peking or Moscow as the sources of cosmic truth. There is a museum in Salisbury of weapons captured by the Rhodesian armed forces. Unless it is a fake, and I don't believe it is a fake, all of the weapons are of either Soviet or Chinese manufacture. I do not see how we can be indifferent to the ideology of those who would like to liberate Rhodesia.

HUMANITARIAN AID TO RHODESIAN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

I must dissent strongly from Ambassador Good's notion that we should provide humanitarian aid to what might be terrorist organizations. If the alternatives are too ghastly to contemplate, we should not contemplate them. My own experience in industrial relations and bargaining is that those who bargain under stress, particularly if they are going to be shot, do not bargain very intelligently.

I also think it is quite unfair to say that the Rhodesian Government has been unwilling to bargain. Prime Minister Smith and Bishop Muzorewa bargained over a year, from 1973 to 1974, and came up with a set of proposals. I would say if there was any single major cause for the defeat of that prospective agreement it was not the inadequacy of the proposals, although they can be accused of that, but the threat from outside, and I do not mean threat of boycott or isolation, but of death. I was there, if I might say so, when they were discussed, when the recent recipients of the threats of death were discussing what they might do. Our humanitarian aid to the guerrillas should be confined to blank ammunition and rubber knives.

CLIMATE OF DEATH DESTROYS POSSIBILITY FOR NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT

We say we are for negotiated settlement in Rhodesia and seem to be doing everything we can to destroy the climate which would make it possible.

Senator BIDEN. It seems to me we are going into Ambassador Good's suggestion, which may be the proper way to go. It gets into a tricky business when you start sitting back and deciding that what you are going to do in the name of peace is to threaten war. But that is ultimately what we are saying. In the name of peace we are going to threaten you with the ultimate reprisal, which is death. And that may be necessary. Maybe that is the way to go. But it seems to get pretty hairy when you get down to that. That is why I asked for the Ambassador to speak to it, and to see if he might buy the increase in the effectiveness of African guerrilla forces.

We sit here on this little platform and we hear witnesses all the time on a number of different subjects. They tend to be the people who are the most erudite. These people represent particular interest groups and power. Lots of times I get the feeling that we don't hear, nor can we—I don't know how we can facilitate it—what that average white guy living in Salisbury working in the factory or working in a jewelry store or working at the grocery store, thinks about things and what that average black working out in the fields thinks about issues.

You have said you spent some considerable time in Rhodesia. What kind of feeling do you get from others than leadership people. I mean does the white community in South Africa—

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Rhodesia.

Senator BIDEN. Excuse me—feel the imminent danger of loosing their heads, like it could happen tomorrow? Is that the cloud under which they operate? Are the blacks in the fields waiting for tomorrow to come to take up their hoes and strike their white brethren? What is the feeling?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. They don't go around biting their nails, Senator. They seems to be very phlegmatic people. But a lot of them have already been killed, both black and white, no joke, no doubt about that at all.

I was up in the northeast area where the insurrection, or whatever it is, is taking place, and it is not a vacation for anybody. The threat of death is a very real one for moderates in Rhodesia, black and white.

The greatest contribution we could make would be to add to their sense of security. If you are going to kill a man he is not too prone to sit down and talk sweet reason with you.

GRASSROOTS SUPPORT FOR BLACK REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

Senator BIDEN. One last question in this area. I realize this is so darn broad. I wish I were more articulate to be able to frame my questions in a way to elicit a specific response, but I am not.

With regard to the feeling of the majority of the black population not part of the leadership by its superstructure, if there was some new-found unity and cohesion in the black national groups and they suddenly got together and had a meeting and said, okay, we are going to conduct a full-scale guerrilla war now, not piecemeal. We are going to make a frontal attack. What kind of reception do you think that would receive among the general black population? Would it have the popular support of that man and woman who has three kids and works in the field? It seems to me every revolutionary movement around the world has succeeded only when it has gotten to the roots. It succeeds when it has gotten to the point where they are willing to take up the hoe and go at it. Is there that kind of feeling? Do you sense that? Or is it just at the leadership level? Where does it come from?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. There has been no popular insurrection among the African people in Rhodesia, Senator.

Senator BIDEN. I know there has not. I am saying if the black leadership decided that the unthinkable should occur, in effect if there were a declaration of war and we will eliminate the white population, what kind of feeling or kind of reception would they receive from the general population?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. When you point a gun at a man he tends to respect your intelligence. I think whatever were imposed by force would attract some following. But why must we consider that alternative? Why should we try to predict what the response would be to declaration of insurrection? Why not try to do something to avoid such a necessity?

Senator BIDEN. I will tell you why. If, in fact, your response to me was that the vast majority of the black population of Rhodesia was champing at the bit to go to it, and eliminate the white population, that would have suggested to me a considerably greater sense of urgency to the situation than I now feel. On the other hand, if you had said to me, no, the average black in Rhodesia does not feel so inclined and would go to great lengths to avoid a frontal confrontation with guns, killing people, then in fact it suggests to me that we deal with another set of circumstances.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I do not believe at all that the African people of Rhodesia are crying out for war. The main purpose of the African

National Council was to achieve political transition in Rhodesia, which is not in doubt, by peaceful means, and it attracted very quickly and very visibly the open support of what seems to be an overwhelming majority of African organizations in Rhodesia.

I talked, I think, to representatives of every open African organization of substance and they are all supporters of peaceful transition in Rhodesia. They have no preference for war. They engage not at all in terrorist or guerrilla activities. They support the ANC, which itself is dedicated to peaceful ways.

No, I know of no evidence to justify the assumption that anything like a majority of the African people in Rhodesia prefer armed revolution.

Senator BIDEN. Professor Rotberg.

LOSS OF PRIVILEGE RATHER THAN LOSS OF LIFE OVERRIDING FACTOR

Mr. ROTBERG. Yes, I think I would like to make several comments, if I may.

I do not think anybody anywhere has a preference for war overreaching a goal that one desires by peaceful means. The Rhodesian blacks and whites are no different in this respect from any other people. I think our conversation got off on a slightly wrong tack, gentlemen, when we talked about threats of death in any direct personal sense. There is the threat of a generalized warfare which everyone is trying to avoid.

Senator BIDEN. If I were a white settler there and if in fact things are as you describe them to me, I would be thinking in terms of whether or not if the thing was not resolved whether I was going to get my rear end blown off.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. A number of them have already had their rear ends blown off.

Senator BIDEN. That is why I don't think it was off the wall.

Mr. ROTBERG. I do not want to minimize the numbers but we must put this in perspective. The number of white settlers killed in the Northeast have been 17. That is a large number, but it is not enormous, given the population. I don't want this to be misinterpreted but we are not talking about colossal numbers yet. The number of blacks killed has been much, much greater on both sides. This is exactly the same as during Mau Mau in Kenya when the number of white settlers killed was 32. Obviously the alarms involved in those deaths were much larger than the absolute number.

But I think that there is every willingness on the part of the black contending parties to avoid war at almost every cost. Negotiations have continued, obviously, for a long time and Smith is a very successful negotiator—going back to an earlier point—and I think in terms of bargaining skills the long discussion about where the conference should be held is an indication of the skill of bargaining—of focusing on an important but not critical point. Similarly the shape of the table presumably will be the next negotiating question.

We are talking, I think, not about imminent threats of death but loss of privilege. Loss of privilege is what is the key in the situation and the reverse is also true. Africans want what they have seen whites have: that is, good jobs and equality of opportunity—some of the

old things we talked about for many years in this country. We are really talking about what has happened elsewhere in formerly settler Africa: quality of income and closing the gap between black and white incomes.

In no case, let me say parenthetically, have the income gaps been closed all that much, but at least some movement has been made. And this is what I think Africans are concerned about. They are also concerned about an increase in the availability of hospital care and medical care, schools, at the secondary level and in the end, of course, an end to the kinds of social segregation which have existed for a long time. That is why I think we are talking about loss of privilege more than loss of life in the imminent sense.

HOW CLOSE IS ALL-OUT CONFRONTATION IN RHODESIA?

Senator BIDEN. That was the very point I was trying to get at, really, how much down the road is it?

I want to make one thing clear. I used the example of were I the white settler. Were I a black man in the fields, I would be equally concerned, too. I do not mean to imply that I viewed it as the white minority worrying about being slaughtered. I am just wondering how close all-out confrontation is since we repeatedly used the phrase and the threat of the "unthinkable." All three of you spoke about in your statement and every one who talked about Rhodesia mentioned it—the threat and fear of total war.

Mr. ROTBERG. I think that is a critical point. And I would like to say one other thing: Both whites and blacks in Rhodesia have always had a certain regard for their own self-interest. That is why I would assume that there would be an erosion of white privilege before there will be a resort to all-out war, which must remain the ultimate sanction. What the argument is about at the moment, as it must be, is how fast does a white minority Government lose control of the power of Parliament, the ability to make laws, and the ability to run the civil service. These are the issues. Africans on their part clearly want to get both feet in the door as quickly as possible. They want the transition to be shorter than whites would like. I still think that the chances of avoiding this holocaust are so far substantial. It is in our interest to support these moves, to make it clear that this is what we hope to come about, and to deemphasize the popularity of warfare that we have talked about.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

Professor GOOD. did you want to comment at all? I do not necessarily want you to.

Mr. GOOD. Thank you, Senator. Nevertheless, I will say a word or two if I may.

It has been suggested that we hold out the threat of death. We hold out nothing, if by "we," we mean the United States. I suggest that the threat of escalating racial conflict is a real threat.

I further suggested as a clinical social scientist that probably the existence of that threat remains an important inducement to gain the settlement. I stay with that judgment.

You asked what is the attitude of the African in Rhodesia. That is very difficult to know, particularly for an outsider, particularly for a

non-African. In Rhodesia, one speaks with great caution to outsiders. One speaks as an African with great caution to whites in Rhodesia. Notwithstanding, I would say that whereas in the early years of guerrilla incursion it could be taken for granted that Africans living in the area where the incursions took place would report the existence of "alien Africans" in their area to the authorities, that no longer, since about December of 1972, is the case. The guerrilla fish is finding water to swim in, in Rhodesia. This is so for two reasons. It is partly because the guerrillas who are terrorists—and this must be the case under these circumstances as it has always been under such circumstances—have more effectively terrorized the African living in those areas. But it is also the case, in my opinion, based upon conversations that I have had in Rhodesia with people I consider to be knowledgeable, that the situation gradually is shifting and that there is a greater sympathy on the part of larger numbers of Africans to the incursion of armed forces into their country.

Senator BIDEN. That was the very point I was trying to get at.

Mr. ROTBERG. This is simply an opinion. It will be contradicted by other observers, I am sure, but my judgment is that we are seeing a gradual shift in the willingness on the part of more and more Africans in Rhodesia to give some quiet tacit support to guerrilla incursions in their country if they see that as the only means of bringing about effective change.

May I say that Ian Smith has been Prime Minister for 12 years. There has been no effective change for 12 years.

ENCOURAGING CHANGE FROM STATUS QUO WITHOUT SANCTIONS

Senator CLARK. May I just ask or add to that? Maybe you and Professor Hutchinson both would want to comment on that.

If there were no military threat and no sanctions, what would be the encouragement to change the status quo? Why would Mr. Smith want to change?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. One assumes that the history of the last 10 years has produced a greater willingness on the part of the Rhodesian Government to negotiate with the representatives of the African people because of a multiplicity of factors. My own view is that there is now sufficient awareness on both sides of the odds and of the ghastly alternative to a peaceful settlement to encourage fruitful negotiations if the fruits of those negotiations is likely to be protected. I think we have gone far enough with intimidation. What we should do now is to encourage.

On the matter of African support of guerrillas, which is anybody's guess, I must observe that if you give guerrillas and terrorists an increasing number of arms, if you give more arms to more gunmen, they will shoot more of their brethren, and their brethren will be accordingly more intimidated.

It is terribly difficult to assess with any intelligence at all the current state of African opinion, but my guess is based on the fact that the African National Council and every other African organization I know of inside Rhodesia is elected, that they do collectively represent a wish for peace and not for violence. It is up to us to encourage them in that.

SUPPLIER OF RHODESIAN GOVERNMENT'S ARMS

Senator CLARK. Professor Hutchinson, where do the Rhodesian Government's arms come from? Are they produced within that country?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I do not know.

Senator CLARK. I was thinking of airplanes, helicopters, guns, and that sort of thing—

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I have no idea.

Senator CLARK. Any of you have any idea whether Rhodesia's arms are produced within Rhodesia, domestically? Are they produced and purchased from France or someplace else?

Mr. ROTBERG. Well, I do not think anyone knows in precise detail, but there is a South African small arms industry which is presumably available, and there is celebrated purchase of airplanes and helicopters through third parties either in Europe, which presumably came from surplus stocks in Europe, or elsewhere in the world. There is as we know a flourishing secondhand arms industry. So I do not think obtaining arms has been a problem. It is paying for them that has been a Rhodesian foreign exchange problem, and this is where South Africa does have enormous leverage as a conduit in the event that Mozambique refuses to continue playing its previous role.

INCENTIVES FOR CHANGE WITHOUT USE OF SANCTIONS, MILITARY THREAT

I think it is striking, if I may go back to your previous question, to what incentive there would be, I do not think—

Senator CLARK. What incentives there would be if the sanctions or military threat did not exist?

Mr. ROTBERG. I think the answer is none. There would be no incentive to negotiate.

Let me just add if I may that on June 25, Prime Minister Smith said for the first time, to my knowledge, that he could, after all, contemplate seeing a black government in Rhodesia in his lifetime, so the awareness of the things you have just mentioned has reached Salisbury as well as Washington.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Nobody is denying that there has been military activity on the part of guerrilla groups and that it has had an effect. The question is whether it should be increased. I think there is enough evidence to justify the hope that the willingness, the propensity, to bargain is there without further killing. Zambia has indicated, as have Botswana and Tanzania, that negotiations should now be tried. I do not know why we do not follow their advice instead of talking about shoring up the apostolate of violence in Mozambique. I do not know why we do not encourage the Rhodesians to talk.

U.S. SELF-INTEREST IN RHODESIA

Senator BIDEN. One question that has been asked already I would like to go back to, and I would like each of you to respond to it. Then I will not ask any more questions. It has been mentioned time and again, that a peaceful solution to the situation in Rhodesia is in the self-interest of the United States. What is the naked self-interest, if there is any, in a Machiavellian sense, that the United States has in

Rhodesia? You mentioned chrome. Beyond that, what if you look at it from a Machiavellian standpoint, what is in our self-interest to be involved in any way in Rhodesia? I am not talking about the implementation of force or even use of the good offices of the United States. Where does our self-interest lie in that sense?

Mr. ROTBERG. Well, this may not be the answer you are looking for, Senator, but it is clearly in our interest to avoid the kind of warfare which would willy-nilly involve us one way or another. An all-out racial war would involve South Africa and Zambia and would obviously involve the big powers. I suggest that we want to avoid anything like that which would involve us in a zone where we would not particularly want to be involved and where others would be involved who we would not want to be involved. That is why I think stability, not at all costs, but stability given the present circumstances, is so important.

The second point is for the benefit of the people, white and black, in Rhodesia and in Southern Africa generally—any warfare, even fratricidal black conflict, would be inimical to the interests of all parties—to all colors in that zone—and would involve neighboring nations that are now trying so desperately to modernize themselves. I think that it is in our profound interest and in the interest of the nations of the world to enhance the potential for modernization and development, wherever it is, particularly in southern Africa, and it would be impossible to do so if there were warfare there.

I think the third point is the point you were leading up to—that there are resources which can be tapped for the development of the free world.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Well, Senator, the national interest of any country is hard to define. There is substantial commerce between us and southern Africa. Southern Africa has resources of interest to our own welfare and stability. It has ports and sealines which might well be of high consequence to us in the not far distant future. But what we have an interest in is not simply a return to more traditional norms and standards and patterns of behavior in international law which would affect the future of small nations such as Israel as well as Rhodesia. What we should also bear in mind is the possibility which I have personally believed in for a long time of Rhodesia emerging as something of a model for the rest of Africa, as a nonracial free society. I believe the elements for that are there. I am an equalitarian in racial matters. I do not hold a special brief for either the Rhodesian Government or the African National Council, but I do believe, that Rhodesia could show Africa and other countries in other continents an example of the way in which major political change could be peacefully achieved.

Mr. GOOD. Senator, our interest clearly is in a negotiated peaceful transition in Rhodesia. There is no question in my mind about that. It has been suggested that perhaps we are not as a government, or perhaps the allusion was to this panel, taking that objective seriously. I think we are. I know of no statement by the Government of the United States that would suggest otherwise. Of course we are in favor of a negotiated peaceful transition in Rhodesia.

To the chairman's earlier question, of course sanctions and the ostracism which have characterized the international community's approach to the Rhodesian situation must continue. Our best author-

ity for that is Bishop Muzorewa himself, and I am sure he made that clear when you spoke with him.

The reason why a peaceful transition is of such importance, if it can be brought about—I am not saying it will be brought about, but if it can be brought about—is that the feedback into American domestic society of serious racial conflict in southern Africa will be serious in deed. There is no question about that whatsoever.

Envision for a moment instead of the Vietnam war played out in American livingrooms every evening racial conflict in southern Africa being played out every evening in American homes.

Now it may be—speaking as an historian—that one has got to pass through that kind of travail. I do not say it can be avoided but it must if we possibly can. If it cannot be avoided then it seems to me the next question is whose side will we be on, and that is a very fundamental question indeed.

HEARING PROCEDURE

Senator CLARK. We have a live quorum. We are going to adjourn for about 7 or 8 minutes long enough to go over and answer. We will be right back and continue with the questioning.

Mr. GOOD. I have an obligation at the State Department. I wonder if I could be excused?

Senator CLARK. You certainly may. We appreciate very much your attendance here. You have submitted an excellent statement and a very good analysis.

[A recess was taken.]

Senator CLARK. The meeting will come to order.

I would like to ask some rather specific questions about American policy.

REPEAL OF THE BYRD AMENDMENT

First, we talked a lot about sanctions and the Byrd amendment. I would like to ask each of you very briefly to state whether the Byrd amendment ought to be repealed or not and why you think so. I have a great number of questions. I guess we only have about 20 minutes, but I want to get both of your responses on each of these, if I may.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I did not come prepared to talk about the Byrd amendment or sanctions and do not regard myself as qualified on the details of the matter. I simply think that the expenditure of further public time on this issue is not going to be productive. I understand and appreciate the attitude of the Rhodesian Government and the African National Council on the matter. They have opposing views about it. I am personally inclined to think that the subcommittee would far more appropriately divert its attention to other matters.

Mr. ROTBERG. Senator, in my view if the Byrd amendment could be repealed immediately, it would be worth the effort expended thereupon. In the 6 or 8 months or perhaps a year it would take realistically to get it repealed I do not think it would be worth the effort expended simply because by that time I have a hope that we will have moved beyond the point where repeal is relevant.

Senator CLARK. That is only a hope?

Mr. ROTBERG. That is a hope.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I might observe I was told by both European and African sources in Rhodesia that Rhodesia can sell all of the chrome

it wants to sell and that some of it by one means or another finds its way to the Soviet Union, while we evidently continue to buy allegedly inferior Russian chrome.

I have also been informed that the Russians have jacked up the price of their chrome and that they are now enjoying a nice struggling monopoly pricing system which I would think (hardly) was to our advantage; but I would also think that the chrome issue is not terribly important to Rhodesia, that it is not terribly important to the steel or ferrochrome industry in the United States, that it is not going to make much difference in Rhodesia in the short run, and that the short run is what we have to worry about.

COMPENSATING MOZAMBIQUE FOR REVENUE LOSSES INCURRED BY
RHODESIAN SANCTIONS

Senator CLARK. What about the recommendation which Mr. Good, I think, made that the United States ought to be willing to join in an international effort to compensate Mozambique for any losses of revenue involved in its sanctions against Rhodesia?

Mr. HUTCHINSON?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I am opposed to that, Senator, on doctrinal and other grounds. I think there is an awful irony in the evidently unanimous decision of the Commonwealth nations to subsidize Mozambique, not for the prosperity of the citizens of Mozambique—that would be more acceptable—but only to destroy Rhodesia and in the process inevitably cause increasing misery to the African people of Rhodesia.

As I said before, I do not welcome or look upon the violent transition of power in Mozambique as a blow for liberty. This is not to defend the Portuguese colonial regime—there is no defense for that: but that does not mean to say we have to regard the successor regime as a gift to human society.

If I had to choose between the preservation of Rhodesia and the subsidization of Mozambique I would choose Rhodesia.

Senator CLARK. Maintain the present regime?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. We do not have to talk about maintaining the present regime.

Senator CLARK. I am just trying to clarify what you say.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I do not believe we should subsidize a Maoist regime to destroy what could become a nonracial free society. If I had to take a risk, to place a bet, I would infinitely rather place it on Rhodesia than on Mozambique.

Senator CLARK. Which of the opposition groups would you identify as Maoist?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Frelimo.

Senator CLARK. You are speaking of Mozambique?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Yes. I am talking about a choice between subsidizing the Frelimo government or not, and I would not. I think there is a contradiction involved in terms of our own purposes. There would be a diminution of our own national interests not least our strategic and trade interests.

I would opt for Rhodesia, the promise of Rhodesia as a nonracial free society in Africa with our help, and also with the help of the United Kingdom, to be hopeful.

SENATOR CLARK. Would you see Frelimo as being closely associated with the Maoist or Chinese rather than the Soviets?

MR. HUTCHINSON. They have said no. I do not of course know what the real kinship is. I do not particularly care which of those awful brethren they choose, but my impression from what I have read in Britain as well as here—from listening to Frelimo's own representatives in Britain in 1973—my impression is that it regards itself as a child of Maoist doctrine.

SENATOR CLARK. Do you want to comment?

MR. HUTCHINSON. I do not think it has tried to hide its identity or convictions at all.

MR. ROTBERG. Yes, Senator. I think that although Frelimo receives substantial assistance from China and the Soviet Union, as far as we know, and from other countries also in terms of arms and materiel, I do not think that we need assume or characterize the Government of Mozambique as Maoist at this time, nor is it helpful to do so. Mozambique, like so many other countries of Africa—and new nations particularly—is attempting to modernize and integrate as rapidly as possible. The initial published statements of the leaders of Mozambique lead me to assume that they will be as pragmatic as most other leaders of Africa have been about the future of their own development.

I think that goes to the premises of the answer to your question. I said earlier and I repeat, I think it made very good sense for the commonwealth of nations to encourage Mozambique to forgo income it desperately needs by promising to subsidize that loss if Mozambique decides to cut the Rhodesian railway links to Beira and Lourenco Marques. It would be, I think, an indication of support if the United States were able to assist the united efforts of the commonwealth in this way.

Let me add a footnote to correct something that was said earlier. The cutting of transport links to Rhodesia would not affect the economy of Malawi in any way nor would they affect the economy of South Africa. It would have the effect of enhancing the port availabilities for both these countries. Under present circumstances it would also help the economy of Zambia.

GREATER U.S. SUPPORT FOR AFRICAN NATIONAL LEADERS IN RHODESIA

SENATOR CLARK. What about the idea that is sometimes expressed here that there are ways that the United States—I address this to you Mr. Rotberg so Professor Hutchinson does not have to take every question first—could or should express greater political or diplomatic support for African national leaders in Rhodesia? In your judgment should we leave that alone?

MR. ROTBERG. Well, I do not see how we can do anything very dramatic. From some point of view it is far too late to do anything dramatic. From another point of view the support which has been apparent since the coup in Portugal, the backing for these national movements and the national movements in Rhodesia, has been sufficiently substantial. There is a unity of purpose, as I said before, between South Africa and the surrounding black nations and indeed most of black Africa. Obviously it is much more important to indicate what our future attitudes will be and express willingness to help in the transition period in the ways we have helped elsewhere in transi-

tion periods than to involve ourselves in any, I think, forceful way with the national movement at the moment.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I think that is a central question, Senator. We have talked freely and indeed glibly about rendering aid, humanitarian aid to external terrorist organizations. Now the question arises whether we should help national organizations in Rhodesia—which ones? I do not think we should choose sides within Rhodesia.

It is a fact that the African National Council is the prime African organization. We did not have to opt for ANC. It has opted for itself. Otherwise I do not think we should do anything to change the balance of power within Rhodesia, anything to indicate whom we prefer and whom we do not. That would be interference in the internal affairs of Rhodesia. What we should do—to return to a much repeated point—is to indicate to them, to the principal parties in Rhodesia, that if they agree we will help them to make that agreement live.

TRANSITION FROM WHITE TO BLACK RULE

Senator CLARK. Mr. Rotberg, I noticed in your statement you say there are “ways in which we could with African support assist in making the transition from white to black rule as successful as possible.”

How might we do that?

Mr. ROTBERG. This implies an agreement, of course, say an agreement and a movement from the present stage to a transition to majority rule. Well, I think there are a number of ways. There are educational and training schemes that we have used before, that we could use again, to assist the government to be, or the government in transition. There will be a great need for middle level technical assistance. Some of it will have to be supplied from outside. Some will have to be supplied by indigenous persons being trained or retrained (or upgraded), rather rapidly. I think some of the most outstanding successes in the 1960's were in those countries just about to become independent where there were individuals at the middle level or top leadership level that were exposed to new ways of handling problems within bureaucracies, within educational systems and within the technical branches. There will obviously be during any transition period a desire on the part of Africans to replace whites at various levels of the hierarchy and some of the necessary training will have to be supplied either from outside physically or by outside sources setting up training institutions within the country. We can be very helpful in that latter regard.

There are other humanitarian ways, using that word, in which we would normally be willing, I think, to assist Rhodesia when it becomes possible to do so inside the country.

UNDESERVED LABELING OF MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT

Mr. HUTCHINSON. If I may return briefly to the question of Mozambique. I do not want to put an undeserved label on the government of the country, it might turn out to be for all I know a gentle institution. It may also transpire that the mutual economic interests between Mozambique and South Africa which are very real and extremely important to Mozambique will temper the international behavior of the new Government of Mozambique, but I do think we

should help Mozambique feed its own poor but I do not believe we should bribe Mozambique to destroy Rhodesia.

U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO WAR IN RHODESIA

SENATOR CLARK. We have a vote so we have about 5 minutes and then we will adjourn.

You said in your statement, Professor Hutchinson, "There are two general alternatives: war, and a negotiated settlement. It is unfortunate that, in contributing little but bromides to the latter," that is to the negotiated settlement, "we have contributed immeasurably to the likelihood of the former," namely the war.

In what ways has the United States contributed to war in Rhodesia?

MR. HUTCHINSON. We have allowed the development of circumstances which are military in propensity, Senator.

We have given encouragement to those who would take power in Rhodesia by violence. Ambassador Good stated that we are on record in favor of a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia. I would agree with that. But I would also say just as flatly that we have done nothing to encourage the conditions for a peaceful settlement. We talk about giving help to outside guerrilla organizations. I do not think that is a very parliamentary attitude. I do not think it will encourage those people, Africans and Europeans, within Rhodesia to talk instead of to fight.

We talk now of subsidizing a revolutionary regime in Mozambique which will need no invitation to cross the border itself should it find such an errand profitable to its own interests.

We are talking about a peaceful settlement but not encouraging it at all. We are in fact or by implication encouraging those who seek power in Rhodesia by violence.

SENATOR CLARK. If I understand your position, then—I will say it briefly and you correct me—you say that our responsibility in Rhodesia is to become involved to the extent that we are prepared to guarantee a settlement, apparently most any settlement which the African National Council and the Rhodesian Government would arrive at themselves.

MR. HUTCHINSON. I would put it otherwise. I would say that the prime parties for agreement in Rhodesia are, of course, the government and African National Council. One hopes that any agreement they reach will be supported by all organizations of substance, black and white, in Rhodesia. One also hopes that it will be ratified by the British Government.

I did not say that we should guarantee the settlement. We are not in a position to do that. What I did suggest was that the settlement would have a better chance to live if we urged upon the member states of the international community that they respect the agreement and not interfere with it, that they allow it to prosper in peace and not destroy it by the encouragement of infiltration across the Rhodesian borders.

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD RHODESIA

SENATOR CLARK. That would be our central policy toward Rhodesia, as you see it, and noninterference in all other respects.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. That is right; we should not interfere in the internal affairs of Rhodesia.

Senator CLARK. I am going to ask you if you will try briefly to summarize what you think our policy should be.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I think our policy should consist of signaling the kind of support we are prepared to give to a settlement in Rhodesia and to make it very clear that from our point of view the tranquility and stability in Rhodesia can best be assured by the relatively rapid transition from a minority government to a nonracial government without warfare and with conditions of greatest security for both sides, not least for the minority populations, and that we want not so much to guarantee agreements but to use our good offices and our moral intelligence in the United Nations and among its member states for peace and self-determination in Rhodesia.

Senator CLARK. How would you say your exclusion or your recommendation would differ from that Mr. Hutchinson?

Mr. ROTBERG. I start from a premise which is fundamentally different.

I heard Mr. Hutchinson say that the greatest obstacle to peace is to support what he calls terrorists. I am saying something—

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I do not mean that at all.

Senator CLARK. I had understood you to say support of terrorist guerrilla forces from outside.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I did not say that was the greatest obstacle to peace. The greatest obstacle to peace is the absence of assurances to the Rhodesian Government and African National Council that what they negotiate will be respected outside of their own borders. That is the principal obstacle to agreement. Terrorist intrusion is only one element in that.

Mr. ROTBERG. I disagree fundamentally, not that this would not be a good point if it were important. I do not believe that it is important. I do not believe that it is important because there is no threat of border warfare. There has not been any significant warfare outside of Somalia, Ethiopia, and one or two other places—Mali and Upper Volta. There has been very little border warfare in Africa at any time since independence. Settlement in Rhodesia cannot be reached in my view without the acquiescence if not the support of the South Africa, Zambia, Botswana, and Tanzania, the countries most closely involved. Therefore, the issue is how we can get from the present very unsatisfactory in-between stage—and it must be unsatisfactory for all parties because it is a period when one does not know quite what is going to happen next. The best assurance of peace I think for whites as well as blacks is a rapid movement to majority rule leading to independence with a transitory period with sufficient safeguards for all parties.

Senator CLARK. I am sorry that the time has expired and I must answer the vote. We are very appreciative to both of you for taking the morning and coming here. It was very instructive. Thank you very much.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you.

Mr. ROTBERG. Thank you.

[Whereupon at 12:35 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]

U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA

Rhodesia

THURSDAY, JULY 10, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:40 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Dick Clark (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Clark, Biden, and Javits.

Senator CLARK. The hearing will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

It appears that a negotiated settlement of the Rhodesia problem is now a real possibility. But, as yesterday's witnesses agreed, it is by no means certain that the minority regime there will in fact willingly give up its power and privilege for a transition to majority rule.

While the United States is not one of the major actors in the effort to bring about an early, peaceful transition to majority rule in Rhodesia, this country could do far more to encourage and support that effort. The U.S.-Rhodesia policy must be partly implemented in our bilateral relations with the surrounding African nations that are most involved in this problem and with the Zimbabwe African Nationalists. And it must be partly implemented in our actions in the United Nations. For the problem of Rhodesia has been from the beginning a problem of the entire world community in which the U.N. has been involved.

The subcommittee will therefore discuss U.S. policy toward Rhodesia with both Ambassador Davis, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and Ambassador Buffum, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. We will want their views on a number of recommendations that were made yesterday for the United States to play a more effective and constructive role in the transition to majority rule in Rhodesia. I might say that among the recommendations that were made yesterday, which I will be asking you about, are these: The United States should return to full compliance with international sanctions against Rhodesia—repeal the Byrd amendment. I was so happy to see that the House International Relations Committee yesterday voted out of Committee, the repeal of the Byrd amendment. Second, this country should support

Mozambique's effort to comply with sanctions. There should be an immediate offer of humanitarian assistance to the African nationalists. The United States should clearly support majority rule in Rhodesia. This country should give every encouragement to current efforts to reach a negotiated settlement. The United States should offer technical and educational assistance for the transition period. Basically, those were the recommendations that came from the three witnesses yesterday.

Reverend Lockwood, who will testify after the administration witnesses, has also made several specific suggestions on how sanctions could be tightened as a way of increasing this country's support for a negotiated settlement and majority rule in Rhodesia. It would be useful if Ambassador Davis and Ambassador Buffum could comment on his suggestions as well. I will read some of those to you in the period after your statements.

Finally, it is important for members of this subcommittee to know exactly what the administration intends for its policy to be on this complex and critical problem in the months ahead.

Ambassador Davis, if you will proceed with your statement. Then we will hear from Ambassador Buffum and then go on to questions.

STATEMENT OF HON. NATHANIEL DAVIS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Ambassador DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, I welcome this opportunity to meet with the subcommittee again—this time for an exchange of views on the situation in Southern Rhodesia. Ambassador William B. Buffum, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, is here with me today.

As you know, Rhodesia is technically a self-governing British colony in revolt against the British Government. Its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) of 1965 has not been formally recognized by any country. The regime of Ian Smith, representing less than 5 percent of the total Rhodesian population, has since 1965 taken steps to perpetuate white minority rule and to exclude the African majority from meaningful participation in the political and economic life of the country.

For the better part of 10 years the Rhodesian problem has evaded every solution, despite repeated efforts of the British Government, supported by the United Nations, which imposed mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia in 1966 and 1968.

MOZAMBIQUE INDEPENDENCE CHANGES SITUATION IN RHODESIA, SOUTHERN AFRICA

Since the accession of Mozambique to independence the situation in Southern Africa including Rhodesia has changed. As you know, Mozambique, a nation with a 700-mile common border with Rhodesia, became independent just 2 weeks ago.

The independence of Mozambique and the possibility of the closing of its borders to Rhodesian trade has placed additional pressure on the Smith regime. It is estimated that some 80 percent of Rhodesian exports and imports go through Mozambique. There are some indica-

tions of an increased perception within the minority regime that its present course can only lead to further violence and tragedy and that it would be preferable to enter into serious negotiations with representatives of the African majority on the future of Rhodesia. Leaders of the neighboring States of Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Botswana, and South Africa are seeking to exert influence toward the promotion of peaceful solution in Rhodesia. Preliminary talks between the Smith regime and the Rhodesian nationalists, who formally united in December under the African National Council, are continuing, despite deadlocks, interruptions, and procedural difficulties. The formal unification of Rhodesian nationalists is a significant development, encouraged by Presidents Kaunda, Seretse Khama, Nyerere, and Machel. The preliminary talks, which resulted from the December agreement in Lusaka, are designed to pave the way for a full-fledged constitutional conference.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE POSSIBILITY

Thus, there are some encouraging signs—including the fact that the United Kingdom sent an emissary to Salisbury late in June to discuss with the Smith regime and with Rhodesian nationalist leaders the timing and modalities of a possible constitutional conference. Nonetheless, Mr. Chairman, I think it would be a mistake to be overly optimistic. A Rhodesian settlement is still far from accomplishment at this point and there is every likelihood that there will be a period of hard negotiations ahead.

PRESENT U.S. POLICY TOWARD RHODESIA

The main lines of our policy toward Rhodesia have followed from the illegal Rhodesian UDI, based on minority rule. In brief, we do not recognize the Rhodesian regime's claim to independence; we continue to regard the British Crown as the lawful sovereign in Rhodesia; we support the U.N. and the UK—United Kingdom—in their efforts to influence the Rhodesian regime to negotiate a peaceful settlement based on the principles of self-determination and majority rule in Rhodesia. To this end we voted for and support the U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia. I might add, Mr. Chairman, that while our record of sanctions enforcement has been good, there is a major gap in this enforcement created by the Byrd amendment, allowing the importation of chrome and certain other materials from Rhodesia. In addition to providing the regime in Salisbury with much needed foreign exchange, the Byrd amendment has also provided moral and psychological support to that regime. I would like to stress again the administration's support for legislation repealing the Byrd amendment (H.R. 1287) currently being considered by the Congress. As you noted, we are very encouraged by the progress of the repeal bill, voted out of the House International Relations Committee yesterday. Early repeal not only would enable the United States to comply fully with its international obligations, but, we hope, would add an important increment of influence on the Smith regime to move into serious negotiations regarding Rhodesia's future.

Mr. Chairman, we strongly support self-determination for the people of Rhodesia, and hope that current efforts to arrive at a settlement

acceptable to the population of Rhodesia as a whole will be successful.
Thank you.

Senator CLARK. Ambassador Davis, I understand that Senator Javits has some questions at this point.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you very much.

CONTINUED OAU OBJECTIONS TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE DAVIS

Mr. Chairman, I am not a member of this subcommittee.

I am very grateful to the chairman for allowing me to ask some questions and I am not going to ask the questions on Rhodesia. I happen to be with the Department's position. I always have been on the subject and will do my utmost as a senior member of this committee to give the Department some action. I came especially this morning about this flap in the Organization of African Unity respecting you.

I was a party to your confirmation. We did it in the teeth of those objections. I do not know whether it has ever been described to you as to why we did, but we thought you were a competent professional, that you would show objectivity and skill in your decisions and that this was a national decision for us to make and that it was not good discipline in terms of international responsibility for the Organization of African Unity to lodge a protest against an official within the State Department in whom we had confidence for the purpose of administering African affairs. Really, it was a protest by us. They took exception to your approval as you had been a party, because of your duty, to actions in another country of which they thoroughly disapproved and which many of us disapproved, including myself. That does not necessarily mean you are guilty. If that is true, then we cannot have people serve in any post as professionals. But nonetheless, it has caused us a lot of trouble.

Another aspect of our approval of you was that we felt that like a pilot who has had one crash you were a lot better pilot and that you would learn from your experience and this learning would be of value to the United States. Nonetheless, protests have not died down since. If anything, they have become more strident.

I take this opportunity with the kind permission of the chairman, for the benefit of all of us on the committee, to have you, because you happen to be appearing this morning, on a subject which is in your line. Give us your views and ideas and defense, or whatever you like on the record so that we may have it before us as to whether our judgment was right or wrong in this matter which was made, again I repeat, in the teeth of the protests which have since grown more than less strident.

Ambassador DAVIS. Senator, I am not sure I understand altogether to what you did wish me to address myself when you say that I should give my defense. I do not know if you would like to direct—guide me in terms of what you want specific answers to.

Senator JAVITS. That is exactly right. I want you to give me your reaction to the continued protests of the OAU about you and our confirmation of you and also whether in your judgment time has confirmed or not confirmed our judgment in confirming you.

Ambassador DAVIS. Well, sir, so far as continued protests are concerned, I might say that I have taken the occasion since I assumed the responsibility as Assistant Secretary for African Affairs to make

two trips to Africa and in carrying out my duties to establish contacts with a number of African leaders both on the African continent and in the United States. I have been deeply grateful and very much gratified with the degree of both courteous understanding and also the degree to which I have been able to establish contact and work with Africans on both sides of the Atlantic.

In this regard it is certainly my hope that I can first represent my country and can also establish understanding and cooperative relations with the leaders of those African countries where I have responsibilities.

Senator JAVITS. Do you feel that their continued protests are justified?

Ambassador DAVIS. I am a little perplexed as to what you are referring, sir, in terms of continued protests.

Senator JAVITS. You read about it in the press, when they get together they pass resolutions that the United States should not have you as its Assistant Secretary.

Ambassador DAVIS. I do not believe that I am aware of any resolutions.

Senator JAVITS. There is not such activity as far as you know; is that correct?

Ambassador DAVIS. I know of no resolutions since what was, as I understand it, described as the consensus resolution of the OAU, which is what you originally referred to.

Senator JAVITS. Which was before you were confirmed.

Ambassador DAVIS. Yes.

Senator JAVITS. What about the newspaper stories that they are still jumping up and down about you.

Ambassador DAVIS. Well, as I say, my nomination and confirmation, as you were aware, was controversial.

Senator JAVITS. Right.

Ambassador DAVIS. It is my hope that as a professional Foreign Service Officer, in discharging my duties with honesty and with integrity that I can do the best job I know how in establishing good relationships with the African nations and people.

PRESENT U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFRICA

Senator JAVITS. What is, in your judgment, the foreign policy of the United States toward Africa now?

Ambassador DAVIS. I would say there are several elements in the U.S. policy toward the African continent. One element of the U.S. policy is a desire to be helpful in African development. Also in humanitarian terms, we have sought to be helpful as in, for example, the tragedy of the drought in the Sahel and other areas that have affected African nationals. During my recent travels to Africa the nature of our cooperation with African states in the developmental questions certainly was a very central concern to the African countries and it must be a very central concern to those of us who are concerned with African policy.

U.S. POLICY REGARDING AFRICAN TRADE QUESTIONS

Another question that is of very real importance to the African countries is the attitudes of the U.S. Government toward trade ques-

tions, and in particular they are very much interested in the review of U.S. policy that has been going on in connection with our attitudes toward primary products in which the Africans clearly have an interest.

As you are aware and as our Secretary of State has said in several recent and quite important speeches, that he has reflected on the consideration that the U.S. Government has been giving to commodities questions as well as the general economic field.

U.S. INVESTMENT ROLE IN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT

The third element that is of particular interest to African countries is the nature of the role that U.S. investment can play in African development, and in this regard the view of the American Government that investment can play a useful role both in terms of the transfer of technology and in terms of the transfers of resources for development. But it is also the view of the United States Government that the rules of investment and the acceptance of investment are a decision for the African nations themselves and we have no desire to force American investment on the African countries that might not wish it. It is only in those countries in which there is a desire to receive American investment that we would certainly believe that it can play a useful role.

U.S. NEGLECT OF AFRICAN CLAIM

Senator JAVITS. It is often claimed that our policy is most heedless of Africa among all the continents, that we neglect, that we more or less leave it to the Europeans. Do you think that is justified.

Ambassador DAVIS. I am certainly aware that there have been sentiments expressed by quite a few Africans that the attention that the U.S. Government has given to African questions has not been what they would hope it might be.

I might say in this regard that in the recent months, since I have had these responsibilities, I do think that the U.S. Government, and I think that our President and Secretary of State have made some particular efforts to demonstrate the concern of the U.S. Government for African questions.

ROUNDUP OF AFRICAN POLICY WITHIN STATE DEPARTMENT SUGGESTED

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Davis, in the course of your incumbency would this be a good time for me to suggest to the chairman of this subcommittee that in the exercise of legislative oversight there ought to be a roundup of African policy in the State Department and what is being done about it and what is recommended, or do you still need more time to get your feet wet?

Ambassador DAVIS. I think that it's up to you, sir, as to what you wish from us.

Senator JAVITS. What do you think?

Ambassador DAVIS. Certainly I am still learning in terms of my association with African questions but I am prepared to respond as best I can to whatever you wish.

Senator JAVITS. I am asking you about the timing. What do you think would be the right time to seek that kind of a review of African

policy. There are lots of considerations. There may be meetings going on, the State Department may be rethinking its position. It has not sent up, for example, its aid package. I would like your opinion of the timing when you think we should ask for it.

Ambassador DAVIS. I think it could perhaps be a little more useful 2 or 3 months from now, sir.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you very much.

U.S. APPRECIATION OF COMPLEX POLITICAL ISSUES CONCERNING
AFRICANS ACKNOWLEDGED

Ambassador DAVIS. Could I just add one other element, because when you were asking me about the concerns of U.S. policy vis-a-vis Africa, I did start out by naming several questions of the economic relationships and I do not want to close this discussion without acknowledging and without noting the very great importance that the independent African states place on the complexity of issues concerning the southern end of the African Continent.

Senator JAVITS. Good.

Ambassador DAVIS. In view of the very great importance of these issues, which, of course, are the subject of these hearings, I did not want the discussion to close with any sense that we do not appreciate the importance of these complex political issues that are of the deepest concern to all Africans and are obviously of concern to the U.S. Government.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CLARK. We appreciate your presence, Mr. Buffum.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM B. BUFFUM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador BUFFUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In supplementing what Ambassador Davis has already said I might review briefly for the committee some of the key developments in United Nations' consideration of Southern Rhodesia and the U.S. position with regard to those actions.

As has already been recalled, the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence from Great Britain on November 11, 1965. Great Britain, interested in granting independence to a multiracial state governed by majority rule, requested United Nations' assistance in dealing with the Smith regime's persistent illegal claim to independence. The Security Council decided on November 12 and 20, 1965, to set in motion a program of voluntary economic sanctions directed at Southern Rhodesia at the request of the United Kingdom calling on all states to refrain from assisting the illegal Smith regime and to do their utmost to break all economic relations with it, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products.

RHODESIAN SANCTIONS PROGRAM

Early in April 1966, attempts were made to circumvent the voluntary oil embargo. On the grounds that such action, specifically the

arrival of the oil tanker *Joanna V* at the Port of Beira, Mozambique, could lead to a collapse of the entire sanctions program against Southern Rhodesia, the United Kingdom urgently requested a meeting of the Security Council on April 7, 1966. The British submitted a resolution before the Security Council describing the situation in Southern Rhodesia as "a threat to peace and security" and it was adopted on April 9. The United States had participated in the voluntary sanctions. If you wish I can supply this committee with a brief chronology of U.S. actions taken during 1965 and 1966. The United Nations Security Council responded again to British requests for a meeting in December of 1966 and on December 16 again decided that the Rhodesian situation constituted a threat to the peace. The United States concurred in these Security Council findings because we believed that a United Nations policy of passivity in the face of the Rhodesian rebellion would sharpen existing tensions in the southern half of Africa, encourage extremism on the part of both black and white communities in African states, and make possible exploitation of the situation by extremists of the left and right.

At the request of the United Kingdom, members of the United Nations Security Council concluded that selective mandatory sanctions should be applied against the Rhodesian regime. This was particularly significant, Mr. Chairman, because it was the first time in the history of the U.N. that a mandatory sanctions program had been instituted. The prevailing hope was that the sanctions would induce the leaders in Rhodesia to agree to majority rule, a step which would clearly reduce the potential for violence in a very sensitive area of the African continent. While it was uncertain at the time what the actual effect of mandatory sanctions on the Smith regime might be, the U.S. support of this decision was based on the hope that the mandatory sanctions would assist the United Kingdom in its effort to create a more equitable political situation in the British territory.

U.S. POLICY ON APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS

However, I might point out for the benefit of the committee that our position on the application of sanctions is not without certain limits. In March of 1970, the United States first exercised its veto on a proposal to include further mandatory provisions to the effect that all states should sever all ties with the Smith regime, including means of transportation, postal service, and all forms of communication. The U.S. representative, Ambassador Yost, pointed out that this Government shared the desire to achieve an equitable solution to this problem, but that the question arises whether these more extreme measures which have been suggested would be sufficiently supported by the international community, especially those most directly concerned, to make them in fact effective. He further pointed out that the United States has consistently attached great significance to the maintenance of communications even where relations were strained since we would view most seriously the prospect of leaving the U.S. citizens anywhere in the world without the means to travel and communicate.

U.S. ACTIONS CONCERNING SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL
DECISIONS

As to the U.S. actions pursuant to the Security Council decisions, on January 5, 1967, President Johnson issued Executive Order 11322 which implemented for the United States the Security Council's Resolution 232 of December 16, 1966.

The Security Council reconvened on the question of Southern Rhodesia, and on May 29, 1968, unanimously adopted Resolution 253 which reaffirmed the 1966 resolution, expanded the scope of the sanctions, and in addition, established a committee of the Security Council—commonly referred to as the Sanctions Committee—to monitor the implementation of the sanctions. The United States has been, and is, an active member of the Sanctions Committee, and we submit quarterly reports regarding trade—medical and educational materials are permitted—and investigations of possible violations. To date, there have been 237 cases of alleged sanctions violations, by various States. Thirty-three of those cases involve U.S. importation of Rhodesian chrome.

Needless to say, the status of the Byrd amendment and its repeal are inextricably a part of U.S. participation in the Sanctions Committee. In November 1971, President Nixon signed into law the Military Procurement Authorization Act of which section 503 was the Byrd amendment. The Byrd amendment permits the importation into the United States of certain strategic and critical materials including those from Rhodesia. A key item included in this category is chrome. This legislation had, as a stated objective, the lessening of U.S. dependence on the Soviet Union as a source of chromium imports. During the period before 1972, the United States had imported from the Soviet Union about one-half of its metallurgical-grade chromite. We imported virtually no chrome ore from Rhodesia from 1968 through 1971 inclusive, and no ferrochrome before 1972. Since 1972, our metallurgical grade chromite imports from Rhodesia have remained steady at approximately 10 percent of total U.S. imports of this material.

However, imports of Rhodesian chromite seem to have replaced declining purchases from other countries rather than to have displaced imports from the Soviet Union, as had been one of the original hopes of the act. In general, importation of this material from areas other than Soviet Union has fallen while the Soviet Union has maintained its relative percentage of total U.S. imports.

REPEAL OF THE BYRD AMENDMENT—IMPORTANCE, TIMING

A few days after assuming the Presidency, President Ford stated his full commitment to the repeal of the Byrd amendment. Secretary Kissinger has declared that he is personally convinced that the Byrd amendment is not essential to our national security, brings us no real economic advantages, and is costly to the national interest of the United States in, and conduct of, foreign relations. His statement is particularly pertinent to the U.S. posture in the United Nations and the Security Council's Sanctions Committee. We share very much the

gratification expressed for the action taken yesterday in the House International Relations Committee and I would take this opportunity, if I may, Mr. Chairman, to venture the hope also that the Senate will again see its way clear to repeal the Byrd amendment, assuming that the House shall have acted favorably on this committee's report.

In providing this brief review of U.N. concerns on the question of Rhodesia and the U.S. position regarding those concerns, some questions may have occurred to you. You have already noted to us several questions raised in public testimony yesterday which bear on this and I should be very happy in association with Ambassador Davis to try and be as responsive as possible to any questions the committee may have.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much. I think your statement is very helpful. I appreciate learning of some of the developments, the historical facts, and certainly the President's statement and Secretary of State's statement here.

I think I might just say incidentally that in view of the House committee action yesterday, it is our feeling that the Byrd amendment should be introduced into the Senate. We felt, after conferring with Members of the House, it would be wisest to wait for that until they acted, so that will be introduced in the Senate sometime in the next day or two.

I would like to discuss the repeal of the Byrd amendment. Both of you emphasized that a good deal in your statements. I would like to spend a little time on that at the outset this morning.

Former Ambassador Good, who was here yesterday, said he believed the repeal of the Byrd amendment now would, quoting him, "send a signal to Salisbury at a psychologically important moment." Do you both agree with that assessment?

Ambassador DAVIS. Yes, I think in my statement I said roughly the same thing, that we do believe that the repeal of the Byrd amendment will exert an influence that we believe will be useful.

Senator CLARK. Either of you may answer this. There was a strong feeling here yesterday, with at least two of the witnesses—I think the third did not necessarily agree with this—that it was important that this be done very quickly otherwise it might be too late to have any great impact there. In other words, if we wait 3, 4, 5, or 7 months, then in fact events may pass us by.

Is it your feeling that expeditious repeal is terribly important?

Ambassador DAVIS. Certainly I think that the sooner the House and Senate find it useful to act, I think, probably the better.

IMPACT OF RESTORATION OF U.S. COMPLIANCE WITH SANCTIONS

Senator CLARK. What is the impact of a restoration of U.S. compliance with these sanctions? What impact do you see that having on the situation?

Ambassador DAVIS. I think that, for one thing, the existence of the Byrd amendment has been a very considerable encouragement to the Ian Smith regime in terms of their perception of U.S. posture and U.S. attitude and I think that the repeal of the amendment bringing us back into full compliance with the U.N. sanctions, will be important in this regard.

Of course, the other element is that it will have an obvious economic impact as we cease the importation of principally chrome products.

ADMINISTRATION ACTIVITY IN SUPPORT OF BYRD AMENDMENT REPEAL

Senator CLARK. I think, then, the other thing that I want to talk with you about is how actively the administration intends to support this repeal?

As you know, it is one thing to take a position on an issue. It is another thing to become very actively involved. I would say the administration has become very actively involved in the question of arms embargo to Turkey. The President called in 140 Members of Congress. In other words, there are various ways of taking a position on a question.

In view of the renewed interest in Africa which you expressed to Senator Javits, let us talk for a moment about some of the things that the administration could very actively do with regard to this question.

One of the things it seems to me, that could be done would be for U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs—I am not suggesting how you do your job, I am simply presenting some alternatives—would be to go to Members of Congress and explain to them, as you have to us this morning, the importance of this issue in United States-African relations.

Would you think that would be a good idea, to personally visit with, and talk to, and lobby for repeal of the Byrd amendment.

Ambassador DAVIS. I have already visited with and talked to a number of the Members of the Congress.

Senator CLARK. Good.

Ambassador DAVIS. And I am certainly entirely ready and prepared, as it may be appropriate and as may be useful, to explain the position of the administration to any Members of the Congress who would desire information or who would welcome it.

Senator CLARK. You would be willing to actively go out and seek that rather than have them come to you?

Ambassador DAVIS. I am quite prepared to be helpful with the Members of the Congress, as it might be useful.

Senator CLARK. Maybe this question could be responded to by Ambassador Buffum. It is my recollection that Ambassador Scali put in countless hours in an effort like this. I think he even contacted a Senator recovering in the hospital and worked very, very hard in the Senate to be certain that each Senator understood the importance within the U.N. of this issue. I think that had a great deal to do with the vote we had in the Senate.

Do you see that as a practical kind of thing that might occur again?

Ambassador BUFFUM. Yes, I think it is a real possibility. The administration is firmly committed to seek the repeal of this amendment and we would certainly be delighted to take any steps which seem appropriate and instructive in trying to achieve the result.

I have not had an opportunity yet to discuss this particular problem with Ambassador Moynihan, he only had 1 day in Washington since he took office, and he is now attending the Economic and Social Council in Geneva. It will be one of the subjects of high priority that I will take up with him on his return.

I would be delighted to convey this as a suggestion from the Chair and certainly endorse that enthusiastically on my own part.

Senator CLARK. Fine. We appreciate your strong support, both Ambassador Davis and Ambassador Buffum.

IMPACT OF BYRD AMENDMENT ON U.S. RELATIONS WITH U.N.

I wonder, Ambassador Buffum, would you explain in your judgment what impact the Byrd amendment has had on U.S. relations with the United Nations, on the credibility of the United States say to the U.N. What has been the impact of U.S. abstentions and vetoes on Rhodesia resolutions?

Ambassador BUFFUM. Mr. Chairman, from the vantage point of my particular bureau this has been one of the great liabilities with which we have to cope. The fact that the Byrd amendment was adopted and thereby permitted a major loophole in the sanctions program, did in fact create a major credibility gap among many members of the U.N., and most particularly the African members, about the seriousness of our commitment to the original determination that mandatory sanctions should be applied.

Now, we have of course, sought to explain that the position of the administration has been to seek the repeal of the amendment but people look to performance not words in the U.N., as in the Congress, and, therefore, it has been one of the elements which I regret to say has rather soured our relationships with African members. This is unfortunate because it has exacerbated relationships which at best were difficult for reasons which Senator Javits mentioned in his earlier remarks, particularly the sense on the part of a number of Africans that the United States has neglected that continent perhaps in our preoccupation with Southeast Asia at that time, perhaps for other reasons. In any event it was just one more irritant at a time when we see increasing tensions between the developed world and the less-developed world, largely on economic development issues. To have a fundamental question of this kind added to the other strains just made for an additional burden which I think it is fair to say adversely affected the totality of the U.S. relationship with the large majority of U.N. members. This is from the vantage point of my particular bureau, although it is admittedly a subsidiary element. For us, the important element is the improvement we are confident this will bring to the general standing of the United States in the U.N.

IMPACT OF U.N. VOTES ON OTHER RHODESIAN-RELATED RESOLUTIONS

Senator CLARK. I wonder if I might just follow up on that somewhat over and above the question of repeal.

What, in your judgment has been the impact of the U.S. abstention and vetoes on other Rhodesian-related resolutions? You mentioned, for example, our first veto. That obviously is a more difficult and complex area than the repeal. But what effect do you think that has had on our position in the U.N.?

Ambassador BUFFUM. Well, if I might comment on that one par-

particular decision, Mr. Chairman. Since I happened to be there at the time I can speak from some personal experience about the impact.

Needless to say, as a general political matter, any time the United States finds it impossible to support a measure requested by the African states to cope with what they consider to be a very serious problem in southern Africa, they are disappointed. However, in this particular instance I believe we made it abundantly clear that our commitment to the basic program of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia was being maintained, that we were fully supportive of efforts on the part of the United Kingdom to try and reestablish its authority and bring about a situation where majority rule would prevail and that our action was taken only because of the highly technical measures imposed, which we felt would impact very directly on the welfare of American citizens, particularly missionaries who were still working in Southern Rhodesia. Therefore, I do not feel that the impact of that particular veto was especially harmful.

Naturally we must see this in the context of the votes we take on other related African issues, such as our stand on South Africa, Namibia, the expulsion issue, and Apartheid. All of which is merely to say that I think it is the overall posture which we adopt, our general policy toward these problems, rather than any individual vote which is determining, although it is axiomatic in any instance where we have to oppose, particularly with a veto, that we do provoke a certain degree of irritation and sentiment.

RHODESIAN SANCTIONS, CUBAN SITUATION POLICY CONSISTENCY

Senator CLARK. I think in a sense your defense in the statement and here of the veto is well worth considering. It is a very, very difficult area obviously in terms of whether it is wise or unwise to even break off relations with a country. Mandatory sanctions become more difficult. I am curious, and I say this simply as a theory statement, as to whether we would have pursued this, had we not vetoed the mandatory sanctions, the stronger sanctions in effect, whether our relations would have been any different than they are with Cuba.

Did we not break off all communications with Cuba in our actions there or did we keep open some kind of communication? Third, I guess I am really asking whether our policy is consistent in those two cases or not, in your judgment. I know that did not occur through the U.N. I doubt that you are necessarily to be held responsible or have specific knowledge of that.

What would your impression be?

Ambassador BUFFUM. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, I really just do not know the facts about the communication with Cuba. In the instance of Southern Rhodesia it was very precise, it specified postal communications, telephonic communications, transport in and out of Rhodesia. What unilateral measures we took with regard to specific communications with Cuba unfortunately I am not familiar with but I shall be very happy to get that information from our division of Latin American affairs and supply it for the committee record.

Senator CLARK. I think that might be helpful. I would appreciate that.

[The information referred to follows:]

COMPARISON OF RHODESIAN AND CUBAN RESTRICTIONS

(Supplied by Department of State)

The question of travel and communications restrictions between the United States and Rhodesia and Cuba, respectively, has been treated differently because different considerations predominate in the two cases. With Rhodesia, the principal objective was to encourage the regime to agree to majority rule so as to reduce the potential for violence in this sensitive area of Africa. It was felt that cutting off transportation, postal service, and all forms of communication might impede this objective rather than serve it, as it would detract from efforts of individuals and groups abroad to encourage members of the regime to change their policies.

With Cuba, in contrast, the principal objective of restricting travel and communication was to make it more difficult for the Government of Cuba to intervene in the internal affairs of other American states. Thus, the U.S. supported Resolution III of the 12th Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (1967) which recommended, *inter alia*, that the member states restrict sea and air transport with Cuba, apply strictly earlier recommendations relating to the prevention of propaganda and movement of funds and arms from Cuba, and strengthen controls on travel to and from Cuba. Consistent with this approach the United States has maintained restrictions on the transfer of funds, travel and transportation as well as a general economic denial program.

We would observe, however, that the United States has never sought to cut off all forms of communication with Cuba. Thus, postal services, telephonic and telegraphic communication ties remain. We have permitted journalists, scholars, and certain other categories of citizens to travel to Cuba in order to facilitate communication.

LIKELIHOOD OF PROMPT U.N. CONSIDERATION OF RHODESIA-RELATED ISSUES

Senator CLARK. In your judgment, Ambassador Buffum, are Rhodesia-related issues likely to be brought up in the U.N. in the near future?

Ambassador BUFFUM. Mr. Chairman, we have not seen concern recently for the Rhodesia problem occupying a high priority among the African members of the United Nations. I think this is, in part, because they believe a dialog is possible outside of the institution and because the United Nations has already taken what you might call the maximum step. It has used its ultimate weapon already, chapter 7, the most extreme measure open to the institution is mandatory sanctions and, therefore, I do not believe they consider they can expect a great deal more from the U.N. as an institution. What they are looking for is good faith compliance with the measures already adopted by the U.N. rather than additional U.N. action, and that is why the repeal of the Byrd amendment becomes so important to us.

U.S. SUPPORT CONCERNING U.N. COMPENSATING MOZAMBIQUE
FOR SANCTION COMPLIANCE

Senator CLARK. Yes. Let me suggest one possibility that might occur there, as I understand it, in a somewhat indirect way. I gather there is a likelihood that there will be an effort to establish a multilateral fund to compensate Mozambique for the cost of complying with sanctions if it chooses to stop traffic from Rhodesia, to follow up on what happened at the commonwealth countries. If an opportunity were to present itself for the U.N. to participate in compensating Mozambique for participating in the sanctions, in effect, do you think that is something we ought to consider supporting?

Ambassador BUFFUM. Mr. Chairman, it would be a new policy issue for us to address and I am afraid I would really need to take council with my colleagues in the Department, a number of whom would be involved in such a decision, before I could provide the committee with a meaningful response.

Senator CLARK. We have had Ambassador Davis' response on that at our last hearing on Mozambique. If the United States should offer to help compensate Mozambique for compliance with sanctions against Rhodesia—I think perhaps I should ask Ambassador Davis if he has anything to add to what he told us 2 or 3 weeks ago—have there been any further considerations to that possibility, to your knowledge?

Ambassador DAVIS. Well, sir, as of this moment, as I understand it, the U.N. has not been seized with the question of what action would be desired by the Government of Mozambique. As I think you know, this subject came up at the British Commonwealth conference.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Ambassador DAVIS. In other than the U.N. context.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Ambassador DAVIS. So that the present situation, as I understand it, is that neither Mozambique (and, of course, they have not been an independent state for very long) nor other interested parties have, as yet, referred this to the U.N. Thus, the question of what role the U.N. might play is, I think, still ahead of us.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD COMPENSATION OUTSIDE U.N.

Senator CLARK. What about our policy or our attitude toward compensation outside of the U.N. Have you considered that?

Ambassador DAVIS. If what you mean is the posture of the U.S. Government toward giving assistance to Mozambique?

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Ambassador DAVIS. The answer is that our attitude is entirely positive.

Senator CLARK. I am speaking, for the moment, of compensation to Mozambique for cutting off an importation or shipment through their country exclusively. I am not talking about general assistance programs.

Ambassador DAVIS. Well, I think, as we discussed briefly the last time I was here, there are some constraints on the authorities of the U.S. Government as to how we give assistance to Mozambique and that, as I understand it, our current authorities, under AID are cast in such a way that the most immediately available instrument open to us, under legislation, is in the AID context.

Senator CLARK. Do I interpret that to mean that you feel the administration could not legally give compensation to the Government of Mozambique in a way similar to what the commonwealth countries have proposed?

Ambassador DAVIS. Well, actually if you are referring to what some of the commonwealth nations have promised to do—as I understand it, that has been essentially in the same bilateral context that I am talking about.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Ambassador DAVIS. And that, therefore, although the motivations for making assistance available have been cast by some British Commonwealth countries in the very clear context of the desire of those countries to assist Mozambique, should she decide to adhere to the U.N. sanctions program, that the form of that assistance is essentially the same as the assistance that we have indicated a receptivity and full inclination to accord to the Government of Mozambique.

Senator CLARK. I am not quite sure technically what your answer means. I guess my question put simply is: Is your judgment that it would be illegal, it would be impossible for you under the existing law to give bilateral assistance to Mozambique in compensation for cutting off transportation through their country from Rhodesia?

Ambassador DAVIS. Well, I should not go beyond what I know and I think perhaps if your question is: Is it contrary to the law—

Senator CLARK. Yes; that is my question.

Ambassador DAVIS [continuing]. For the United States to give Mozambique a compensation that is legally tied to the U.N. sanctions. I think—

Senator CLARK. No, I did not ask that. I did not ask if it was tied to the U.N. sanctions.

Ambassador DAVIS. I suppose part of my difficulty is that as I see what some British Commonwealth countries have done, they have operated in the context of their existing authorities to give assistance to Mozambique in the same way that we have indicated that we are prepared to give assistance to Mozambique. So that if I understand the actual technical situation, the essential difference between what they have promised to do and what we have indicated an interest in doing is in terms of the public rationale in which they have tied this very specifically to compensate for sanctions. We, on the other hand, have in the more general context, indicated a desire and willingness to be helpful. I am not sure that the legal question arises in terms of the policy justification that is publicly given for the action taken.

Do you follow me?

Senator CLARK. No, I do not.

[Laughter.]

Ambassador DAVIS. Somebody in the U.S. Government could get up, and, assuming we have agreement to give assistance to Mozambique, could make public declaration that the purpose of this was to compensate Mozambique for observing U.N. sanctions. That would put us in essentially the same position that members of the British Commonwealth are. So it is not a legal question, it is a question of what somebody states publicly as our motivation. You could take this another step. That is, what people tie this to in terms of public policy and how much they make a link between Mozambique action vis-a-vis sanctions and a willingness to be helpful. What we essentially have made, is an unconditional statement that we would like to be helpful.

Senator CLARK. Let me go back one more time.

All I am really asking in the simplest kind of way is whether it is possible for the State Department to decide that they would like to compensate Mozambique, quite aside from the sanctions, quite aside from the U.N., quite aside from any other reason they would simply like to give assistance to Mozambique for the direct reason of com-

pensation. Is there something legally in the AID bill that would prevent us from doing that? It seems what you were saying at the outset, given the existing law, you would not have authority to do that.

Ambassador DAVIS. No, if I said that I misspoke. Because what my understanding of the situation is, we have authority under the AID bill to give assistance.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Ambassador DAVIS. And if there are any legal impediments to saying we are giving this assistance as a direct compensation for an action on the part of the Mozambique government, to be honest I would have to research this to know whether there are legal impediments or not, and I simply do not know.

Senator CLARK. You do not know of any?

Ambassador DAVIS. Certainly I am not aware of any at this point.

Senator CLARK. That is really all I was asking, whether or not if this Government decided it wanted to compensate Mozambique, whether we could do it, outside of the U.N.

Ambassador DAVIS. I suppose my unease is that there are fairly extensive legislative guidelines that do govern the granting of assistance under the AID program and I would want to research as to whether there are some constraints.

Senator CLARK. Would you give us an opinion on that?

Ambassador DAVIS. Yes.

[The information referred to follows:]

GUIDELINES GOVERNING POSSIBLE U.S. ASSISTANCE TO MOZAMBIQUE

[Supplied by Department of State]

The provision of U.S. assistance to Mozambique explicitly tied to underwriting a Mozambican sanctions program against Rhodesia would not be possible if the aid were provided in the form of "Development Assistance." Aid in the form of "Security Assistance" could be provided to underwrite a sanctions program. However, "Security Supporting Assistance" is limited to 12 countries worldwide, and the provision of such assistance to any country legally precludes that country's receiving development assistance during the same fiscal year.

EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE EXPANSION TO RHODESIAN AFRICAN NATIONALISTS

Senator CLARK. There was a proposal made yesterday by one of the witnesses, I believe by Ambassador Good, and I just quote from it. It is a somewhat vague recommendation but I asked him to expand upon this and we can do that in our discussion. He said the United States should: ". . . initiate immediately programs of humanitarian assistance to the Rhodesian African nationalists." There was some opposition to this on the panel. I know Professor Hutchinson opposed it.

He was speaking, as I understand, specifically about educational assistance and medical assistance. He pointed out, I believe, that some educational assistance was already being given, or had been given, through various programs.

Is the administration considering expanding educational assistance to the Rhodesian African nationalists as it has to the Portuguese territories?

I think we discussed this the last time you were before this committee.

Ambassador DAVIS. Yes. I might say that I have had actually two meetings with leaders of the ANC. In both of those meetings the question of U.S. assistance in the educational field did come up. We do presently carry on a program in which scholarships are accorded to people from Rhodesia as well as from other areas of southern Africa, and we do have presently under active consideration the question as to whether we should be taking more vigorous measures in this regard and as to whether there is the possibility of expanding U.S. efforts.

Senator CLARK. You are speaking exclusively of educational assistance in this case, are you not?

Ambassador DAVIS. This is the principal thrust of what we are doing now, as I understand it.

MEDICAL, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE EXPANSION

Senator CLARK. Yes. What about the expansion of that to medical or humanitarian assistance. Would you feel that that would be possible?

Ambassador DAVIS. You mean the according of medical supplies to people within Rhodesia or people outside?

Senator CLARK. People outside. His recommendation clearly was people outside of Rhodesia who are a part of the opposition movement, as I understood him.

Ambassador DAVIS. In terms of some kind of medical insurance?

Senator CLARK. Medical assistance, medical supplies. I assume food.

Ambassador DAVIS. Are there large concentrations of people who are in immediate and serious need of medical equipment?

Senator CLARK. That was my understanding of his recommendation. It would be helpful to them to have medical and other humanitarian kinds of assistance.

Ambassador DAVIS. Certainly would be happy to look into what the needs and what might be possible.

Senator CLARK. As I recall, when Bishop Muzorewa and Reverend Sithole were here 3 or 4 months ago they talked about the expansion of educational assistance and any other forms of humanitarian assistance.

Did you visit with them when they were here?

Ambassador DAVIS. Yes.

Senator CLARK. Do you know anything of that kind?

Ambassador DAVIS. Yes; the thrust of their interest was in the educational field rather than in the medical field.

Senator CLARK. So you do not recall anything beyond the educational?

Ambassador DAVIS. I do not recall their having raised a medical program with me.

Senator CLARK. Ambassador Good said that President Kaunda and President Nyerere should be consulted about the possibility of such

assistance because obviously these organizations existed within their sovereign boundaries.

You did not raise this question, I gather, with President Kaunda or Tanzanian Government then on the occasion of your visit?

Ambassador DAVIS. No, sir, but, as I indicated, we certainly can look into it.

Senator CLARK. Fine.

U.S. SUPPORT OF EFFORTS TO REACH NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT

Now, another recommendation that was made, again is somewhat vague, this was yesterday—that the United States should support current efforts to reach a negotiated settlement of the Rhodesia problem. I gather from your statement today that the United States formally and publicly supports these efforts to reach a negotiated settlement of the Rhodesian problem. Is that what your statement says, in substance?

Ambassador DAVIS. Yes.

Senator CLARK. Is it your understanding that the President expressed to President Kaunda support for the efforts he was making toward a negotiated settlement on the occasion of his visit here?

Ambassador DAVIS. Yes.

Senator CLARK. Has the United States made any informal response to the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration of the OAU?

Ambassador DAVIS. I am not aware of any public statement by the U.S. Government, but the general posture of the U.S. Government I think has been stated.

U.S. DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN RHODESIA

Senator CLARK. As I understand it, one of the immediate barriers to a negotiated settlement appears to be the presence of South African military in Rhodesia.

Has the United States said anything to the South African Government about this? Have we discussed their military presence in Rhodesia, or would you consider that a wrong course for the United States to take?

Ambassador DAVIS. I would like to, if you would allow me, to insert in the record what is the history of any discussions that we may have had with the South African Government on this particular question.

Senator CLARK. Fine. I think that will be helpful.

[The information referred to follows:]

DISCUSSIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ON PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES IN RHODESIA

[Supplied by Department of State]

The presence of South African forces in Rhodesia has been the subject of a number of informal discussions with South African officials, both here and in South Africa. Former Assistant Secretary Easum specifically raised this subject during his visit to South Africa last year.

U.S. STATEMENT CONCERNING MAJORITY RULE FOR RHODESIA

Has the United States made a clear statement that the results of these negotiations should be majority rule for Rhodesia?

Ambassador DAVIS. This is certainly our position.

Senator CLARK. It is your position clearly and you have stated it again this morning, as I understand it?

Ambassador DAVIS. Yes.

U.S. WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH GREAT BRITAIN ON RHODESIAN ISSUE

Senator CLARK. Has the United States been working closely with Great Britain on the issue of Rhodesia? After all, they have a primary responsibility here. Have we been discussing the problems and questions and working closely with the government of Great Britain?

Ambassador DAVIS. We certainly support their efforts.

Senator CLARK. Sir?

Ambassador DAVIS. We certainly support their efforts.

Senator CLARK. Have you been working closely with them, consulting with them?

Ambassador DAVIS. Yes, we have consulted with them.

U.S. ASSISTANCE IN TRANSITION FROM WHITE TO BLACK RULE

Senator CLARK. Another recommendation that was made yesterday was that the United States should offer to give assistance in making the transition from white to black rule as successful as possible.

As I recall, Professor Rotberg suggested that some of our most successful programs in Africa in the early 1960's were those that provided educational and technical assistance to Africans assuming responsibility for the government.

Could you give us any more details on these programs. Would such programs be helpful, in your judgment, in Zimbabwe?

Ambassador DAVIS. Well, sir, if you were talking about programs outside of Rhodesia then this does to some degree overlap with the educational program we have talked about.

NUMBERS OF PEOPLE IN EDUCATIONAL TRAINING PROGRAMS REQUESTED

Senator CLARK. I wonder if you might expand a little more in terms of number and amount of people we are talking about training in the educational programs?

Ambassador DAVIS. At the present level one of my colleagues could help me.

Guess I had better insert that in the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR RHODESIANS

[Supplied by Department of State]

There are two ongoing scholarship programs under which the United States provides educational and training opportunities for students from Southern Africa, including Rhodesians.

The first, the Southern African Students Program (SASP) is funded by the Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and administered by

the African American Institute. Under SASP some 194 Rhodesian students to date have received university-level training in the United States—both at the graduate and undergraduate level.

The program is currently operating at the level of 10 new students per year for post graduate training.

The second program, the Southern African Refugee Education Program (SAREP) provides training opportunities in Africa for up to 100 students at the secondary level and an additional 45 students at the post-secondary level, including vocational training. The program, formerly funded by AID is now funded by the Department's Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs and is administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the African American Institute. To date some 300 Rhodesian students have been trained under this program.

U.S. ROLE IN MEDIATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSULTATION

Senator CLARK. Professor Hutchinson yesterday, as I understood his recommendation, said that the United States should become more involved in mediation and constitutional consultation in Rhodesia, while the other witnesses felt it was more appropriate for the United States to support the African countries already involved, such as Zambia and Tanzania and Botswana and Mozambique, and South Africa.

What is your own judgment on this? Do you agree it ought to be operating through these other governments or—

Ambassador DAVIS. I would tend to support the view that it is more useful for the United States to support Great Britain and others already involved in exerting constructive influence rather than to seek to mediate the question ourselves.

Senator CLARK. Do you think we should not become as directly involved? Do you think we ought to supply support to the efforts that are being made there now?

Ambassador DAVIS. I think we can be more useful giving support to those who, and in particular Great Britain, have a somewhat more direct responsibility.

U.S. ROLE INSURING AGREEMENT BETWEEN ANC AND RHODESIAN GOVERNMENT

Senator CLARK. What would you think of the argument that our government is really the only one in a position or strong enough to take a leading role in insuring in effect a decision which would be arrived at between the African nationalist movement and the African National Council and the Rhodesian Government—simply assuring them or insuring that any agreement that they might reach would be in effect carried out?

I am not being very articulate. Do you understand what I am saying?

Ambassador DAVIS. Well, at least I will try to answer, sir.

Senator CLARK. All right.

Ambassador DAVIS. The first useful move that I think we can take we have already discussed, which is to repeal the Byrd amendment and to return to a situation of full compliance with sanctions.

As to the present status of the U.S. presence or more accurately absence in Rhodesia is, of course, we maintain no post there.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Ambassador DAVIS. We essentially regard, as I have noted, the territory as a continuing dependency of Great Britain and, therefore, for us to kind of step into the middle of that situation would be, I think, a very considerable departure from the general posture that we have assumed.

IDEOLOGICAL UNDERPINNING OF CERTAIN NATIONALISTS EFFECT ON U.S. ATTITUDE

Senator CLARK. Let me ask you one other question that stems from Professor Hutchinson's recommendations in the discussion yesterday.

He was concerned about what he called the "ideological underpinning" of certain of the Rhodesian nationalists.

Does such a concern in any way affect U.S. attitude toward these Zimbabwean nationalists groups?

Ambassador DAVIS. I think we are gratified that the ANC does formally unite a number of movements in the territory of Zimbabwe or Rhodesia. If what he is suggesting is that we have a concern about ideological currents in those movements, the answer is, I think we can say with full confidence that we respect the leadership of the ANC. The head of it, as you know, is Bishop Muzorewa, a man, I think, who commands very great respect in the world.

CASES INVOLVING U.S. VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS

Senator CLARK. Let me ask you just a few questions of a more specific nature. I am particularly interested in getting your judgment. Ambassador Buffum certainly should feel free to come in on these questions as well if he can add any light to the problem.

There have been a number of allegations that there are cases in which we have violated international sanctions against Rhodesia. One case is the export of a DC-8 aircraft now being used in Rhodesia. Are you familiar with that?

Ambassador DAVIS. Yes; I do know—

Senator CLARK. Would you address yourself.

Ambassador DAVIS [continuing]. I know something of the history of that case which did occur some time ago. It was prior to the time in which I had responsibilities in this area.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Ambassador DAVIS. The aircraft in question was sold to Gabon which subsequently leased it to Affretair, I think is the aircargo company that was involved. At the time of the sale, we had adequate assurances in terms of the use of the aircraft. Upon learning of the use that Affretair was making of the plane, the Department of Commerce embargoed any export of equipment and spare parts for this aircraft, and that embargo remains in effect.

Senator CLARK. I understand there is another case which involves the export of three Boeing 720's and spare parts that are now being used by Air-Rhodesia.

Do you know of that particular case and could you address yourself to it.

Ambassador DAVIS. Well, perhaps my colleague.

Do you know of the case?

**STATEMENT OF TEMPLE G. COLE, COUNTRY OFFICER FOR
SOUTHERN RHODESIA**

Mr. COLE. Mr. Chairman, my name is Temple G. Cole. I am country officer for Southern Rhodesia. We will be very glad to furnish a complete record of the 720's sale and how they got to Air-Rhodesia.

Senator CLARK. That would be very helpful.

Mr. COLE. In general, at the time of the sale, as I recall—I will have to double check with the record—these planes were not sold to Air-Rhodesia. They were sold to a company in a European country which subsequently and without receiving permission of the Department of Commerce or the U.S. Government, sold the aircraft directly to the Rhodesian airline.

Senator CLARK. Which European country?

Mr. COLE. This is why I would like to double check before making a statement.

Senator CLARK. I think it would be helpful in each of these cases, I have a couple of others to ask about. If you would submit for the record at this point precisely what has happened in each of these cases and what our Government's reaction has been, whether we have gone back to the Government, the Government of Gabon and the European government mentioned here—just exactly what is involved so we have it clearly on the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

SALE OF 720'S TO AIR RHODESIA

[Supplied by Department of State]

In April, 1973, Jet Aviation (Basel), a Swiss company, sold the 720 aircraft and related spare parts and equipment to Mr. Mervin Eyett, a Southern Rhodesian national who was the General Manager of Air Rhodesia but who had been posing as an agent representing a South African air charter firm.

There is no conclusive evidence that at the time of the sale, Jet Aviation had been aware of Mr. Eyett's connection with Air Rhodesia.

Nonetheless, it has been determined that in transferring the parts, the firm violated the U.S. export license issued for the export of these parts to Switzerland. Accordingly the Department of Commerce moved to suspend the station license of Jet Aviation and of a related firm, Jet Aviation (Geneva) SA. Any future application by these firms to buy U.S. products would have to be fully documented and would undergo careful scrutiny.

Senator CLARK. The license to import Rhodesian currency in his personal name, which he used in fact to run an Air-Rhodesia office in New York.

Do you know anything of that particular case?

Mr. COLE. Yes. Mr. Cowley did have a license to use unblocked Rhodesian currency in this country for the Air-Rhodesia office. Mr. Cowley's license to use such funds was revoked, I believe, in May of 1974 by the Department of Treasury after they determined that Mr. Cowley was misusing his license. The Air-Rhodesia office, run by Mr. Cowley, in fact was closed at that time.

Senator CLARK. In fact, a regulation for bidding interline agreements between U.S. air carriers was promulgated in 1968 and not enforced until 1974. Do you know the explanation of that?

Mr. COLE. I do know that in 1974 that upon indications that there had been violations of the interline agreement and that a number of

travel agencies were booking tickets directly on Air-Rhodesia flights, the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] made a specific attempt, and I believe it was a successful attempt, to notify all airlines that were operating in the United States and all U.S. travel agencies of the fact that these regulations were in existence. They reiterated their intentions to enforce them rigidly, and to my knowledge since that time there has been no violation of the FAA regulations.

I do know in any case where there is a suspected or reported violation that the FAA makes a very thorough investigation of it, sir.

Senator CLARK. More specifically, why was not the special Federal Aviation regulation 21, which prohibits interline agreements with Air-Rhodesia, not enforced until 1974?

Mr. COLE. I believe the answer to that is the knowledge or the indications that there were violations of that specific regulation did not come to the attention of the authorities until 1974, at which point FAA moved rapidly and quickly to plug the loophole.

Senator CLARK. It first came to their attention in 1974?

Mr. COLE. This is my understanding.

Senator CLARK. Are there any existing interline agreements between the U.S. airlines and Air-Rhodesia?

Mr. COLE. None that we are aware of; no, sir.

Senator CLARK. You indicated that Mr. Cowley's licenses to import Rhodesian currency has been rescinded?

Mr. COLE. Yes, sir, has been revoked by the Department of the Treasury.

Senator CLARK. On the question of the 720's and spare parts, we would like to have for the record whether or not there was any indication that the Boeing Co. was aware when it sold the spare parts that the 720's were being sold to Rhodesia, whether or not our Government talked with Boeing about that, whether in fact they were deceived or whether they knew about it, and if they knew about it, what kind of penalties or action our Government has taken with regard to Boeing Co.

Mr. COLE. We will supply that.

Senator CLARK. Will you supply that for the record?

Mr. COLE. Certainly.

[The information referred to follows:]

BOEING COMPANY'S KNOWLEDGE OF SALE OF 720'S TO AIR RHODESIA

[Supplied by Department of State]

There is no evidence which would suggest that the Boeing Company knew of or was in anyway involved in the sale of the 720's or spare parts to Air Rhodesia.

Senator CLARK. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize, gentlemen, for being late and not hearing your testimony. I have had an opportunity to go over your written statements, and I may tread on some questions that have already been asked. If in fact I do, please indicate, and I will read it in the record rather than having you repeat yourselves.

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO MOZAMBIQUE TO COMPLY WITH RHODESIAN SANCTIONS

Yesterday we heard testimony, as you probably are aware, from three professors who in various degrees indicated a position which I think is consistent with that of the State Department. They said it is in our best interest and in the best interest of Rhodesia from our standpoint that there be an accommodation and majority rule concept in Rhodesia. Some of the suggestions that were made in order to help accommodate that end were some things I would like to question you about, Mr. Secretary, as I recall from the testimony, they said, Mozambique should be encouraged and maybe even reimbursed to close off its borders and prevent any material from crossing into Rhodesia. Apparently, this would work some hardship on Mozambique, and there was talk about means by which Mozambique would be reimbursed for that effort.

What is the feeling of your Department with regard to that and should the United States be taking any action with regard to encouraging Mozambique to do that?

Ambassador DAVIS. Well, sir, this has been the subject of some exchange between the chairman and myself. Briefly, as to the probability of a U.N. fund to compensate Mozambique, the U.N. has not yet been seized with the question. To date, so far as I know, neither the Government of Mozambique nor other interested friendly governments, such as British Commonwealth governments, have carried this question to the United Nations.

What has occurred, if I remember the sequence, is that the British Commonwealth continues attending the Kingston Conference indicated a desire to be helpful to Mozambique and that a number gave indications they would be prepared to give support to Mozambique in light of Mozambique's situation.

The U.S. Government has also said, and President Ford indicated this publicly in his White House toast at the time of Kuanda's visit here, that not only do we welcome Mozambique's independence, we stand ready to give assistance to the Government of Mozambique. Perhaps the difference between the position of some of the British Commonwealth countries and the position of the U.S. Government is that they have more directly tied this desire to be helpful to the Government of Mozambique to the sanctions question while the position of the U.S. Government has been essentially an expression of willingness to be helpful to Mozambique in a more general context.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO EDUCATION AID FUND FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA

Ambassador Buffum, if my memory serves me correctly, there is a fund to supply money for aid for education in southern Africa. I think that the United States, within the U.N., if I am not mistaken, could contribute. I think the United States has not contributed to that fund in the last 4 or 5 years. I may be mistaken about that.

First of all, do you know whether or not we have contributed to that in the last 5 years.

Ambassador BUFFUM. I would need to check the record, Senator. Without benefit of having done that it is my impression we have been contributing until quite recently, at any rate, at a level of something like \$50,000 a year. But I will provide that for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS TO U.N. FUNDS FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA

[Supplied by Department of State]

In 1974, the United States contributed \$50,000 to the U.N. Fund for Namibia. This fund was established by the General Assembly to provide assistance to Namibians and to finance educational and training programs to enable Namibians to assume future administrative responsibilities in their territory. In 1975, the United States contributed \$50,000 to the U.N. Educational and Training Program for Southern Africa (UNETPSA). The United Nations General Assembly established UNETPSA to provide assistance for education and vocational training to students from the minority ruled territories of Africa denied educational opportunity in their own country. Both of the above funds sponsor training conducted outside the minority-ruled countries.

Senator BIDEN. Assuming that we are not—maybe you cannot answer this—in light of recent developments do you not think maybe we should begin again contributing to this fund?

Ambassador BUFFUM. I would certainly agree that with the very rapid evolution of developments in southern Africa circumstances would indeed warrant a review of our attitude toward such a program.

CHINESE, SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN ARMING BLACK INSURGENCY GROUPS

Senator BIDEN. One question I raised yesterday and it may seem off the wall, I have no substantiation other than a few verbal statements made to me outside of this hearing and, Mr. Secretary, Ambassador, whichever member would like to respond I would appreciate it if you would respond. There has been some talk that some of the black insurgency groups within Rhodesia and outside of Rhodesia, have been supplied, particularly Zanu, with weapons and material by Peking and Moscow. I do not know whether that is off the wall or whether there is any verification of that. If there is any verification of that is there any evidence of any deeper involvement from Moscow and/or Peking in any of the movements that have been discussed here?

Ambassador DAVIS. What I would like to do is to check as to whether we have any information in this regard and insert it in the record, sir, if we can give you any information that is accurate regarding this question that you raised.

Senator BIDEN. I would appreciate that very much. As I said, there may be no substance to it at all. I do not know.

[The information referred to follows:]

SOVIET AND CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN RHODESIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

[Supplied by Department of State]

There are indications that the Rhodesian liberation movements have, in fact, received Soviet and Chinese military equipment—supplied largely through the Liberation Committee of the OAU [Organization of African Unity]. It should be noted that the mere acceptance of such equipment does not automatically also imply the acceptance of any particular ideology.

RHODESIAN ARMED FORCES STRENGTH TO WAGE ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATIONS

Prime Minister Smith told Parliament, apparently on June 3,

That unless some genuine indication is received in the very near future from the ANC of a decision to make a ceasefire effective, antiterrorist operations will be pursued until Rhodesia is rid of this curse.

How effective do you think Rhodesia's armed forces are in carrying out this promise? Do they have strength enough where they could in fact wage antiterrorist operations and rid Rhodesia of the curse, as the Prime Minister allegedly has stated.

Ambassador DAVIS. Well, I would say in this regard that there is, of course, one I think very important element in this and that is that less than five percent of the population of that territory consists of the whites who support or who are the principal element constituting the Ian Smith regime, and so you do have a situation in which the very overwhelming majority of the people of that territory is black.

You also have a situation where you have recently emerged the independent state of Mozambique which has, if I remember correctly, something like a 700-mile common border with the territory of Rhodesia. That is, I would say, an element that the leaders of the Ian Smith regime would have to take into account in any effort of the kind that you described. I suppose what I am saying is that I am somewhat skeptical that what you describe is really very likely to happen.

RENEWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN GUERRILLA WARFARE ALONG ZAMBEZI RIVER

Senator BIDEN. Do you have any information or could you give me an opinion as to whether or not you think South Africa is likely to be drawn into a renewal of guerrilla warfare along the Zambezi River? There was talk yesterday that it is not very much in the interest of South Africa now. South Africa has apparently soft-pedaled its support for the Smith regime. Smith has sort of lost his ability to go over the heads of the South African leadership and appeal directly to the South African population. There was discussion about that.

Does the Department have any feeling or information about that?

Ambassador DAVIS. Well, I think in recent times the Government of South Africa has played a role that is constructive in terms of being among those countries that have been working to encourage a peaceful settlement. South Africa's contribution has been to influence the Ian Smith regime toward negotiations, just as Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere have played a highly constructive role in influencing the leadership of Zimbabwe—the black leadership in that territory—

Senator BIDEN. I do not have any further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.

I would like to ask just two or three more questions. Then I am going to summarize as best I can Lockwood's testimony and give you 8 or 10 sentences of it and ask you to comment generally on it.

STATE DEPARTMENT VIEW CONCERNING LUSAKA MANIFESTO

First, I wondered does the Department of State still believe that the Lusaka Manifesto speaks to peaceful solution rather than violent means to the Rhodesia problem?

Ambassador DAVIS. Well, if I could, if I could put it in a broader context, I think that the view of the Department is that the African community is supporting the efforts on a number of sides to reach a negotiated solution. I think that the view of the African community, as I understand it, is essentially that they believe it is worthwhile to try to achieve a negotiated solution. They also make it clear that the alternative in their view is violence.

U.S. CORPORATIONS ACTIVELY OPERATING IN RHODESIA

Senator CLARK. A question along a somewhat different line. What U.S. corporations are still active in Rhodesia? Do you know anything about them? What their network is? Are they there legally, in your judgment?

Ambassador DAVIS. Perhaps Mr. Cole can help me on that one too.

If you do want a rundown on U.S. corporations and their assets and so on perhaps I could submit it for the record.

Senator CLARK. That would be very helpful.

[The information referred to follows:]

HOLDINGS AND ACTIVITIES OF U.S. CORPORATIONS IN RHODESIA

[Supplied by Department of State]

There are no U.S. companies now operating. At the time of the Rhodesian UDI [Unilateral Declaration of Independence] in 1965, it was estimated that U.S. investment in Rhodesia amounted to some \$55 million—concentrated largely in mining activity and minerals holdings. There has been no further investment since sanctions were instituted and there has been no repatriation of other capital or profits. The operations of these concerns have been assumed by the Rhodesians.

STATE DEPARTMENT COMMENT ON MR. LOCKWOOD'S TESTIMONY

Last, let me read to you various sentences from the testimony of Mr. Lockwood who is going to be testifying after you leave, and that is why I want to get your comments. I am particularly interested in trying to get the Government's comments and response to proposals that are being put forward. I will just quote these verbatim. I would like to have separate responses on all of them, but I think time does not permit. I think I can give the thrust of what he is saying by doing it in this way.

"Rhodesia is not a country to which the Secretary of State has forbidden Americans to travel," or again, "The Treasury and Commerce Departments have not stopped innumerable, apparently, illegal tour bookings to Rhodesia."

Do you want to comment on these individually? I will be happy to supply them, and you can do that for the record? I want to get some oral response first.

Do you have copies of this before you? I did not realize that.

Ambassador DAVIS. No; I do not.

Senator CLARK [reading]. "The Treasury Department has not acted against American hotels and tourist businesses which allow their trademarks and names to advance the interests of the Rhodesian tourist industry."

Or again, "Any American tourist can cash American Express checks in Rhodesia, use his or her Diners Club card or American Express card, a practice to which the Treasury Department has turned a blind eye."

Again, "Notwithstanding Section 5 (a) and (b) of Security Council Resolution 253, the State Department has not consistently refused visas to known agents of Rhodesian business, including tourism."

Again, "Perhaps the most dangerous and damning instance of U.S. laxity is the ease with which Rhodesia has been able to recruit mercenaries in this country."

Perhaps it is difficult to summarize. I am going to let you try to handle those as best you can and see what happens. I think if that is not satisfactory, we would appreciate having your written responses to this.

Ambassador DAVIS. Well, these came a little fast but I think I will perhaps try to address two or three of them and then I think that it would be a good idea for us to insert in the record—

Senator CLARK. Good.

Ambassador DAVIS [continuing]. A systematic response to these questions.

Senator CLARK. Good.

Ambassador DAVIS. In terms of travel, my understanding is that Rhodesia stands in the same status of countries like North Korea and certain others in which it has been the historical practices of the U.S. Government to discourage travel, and my understanding in all of these cases at this point is as a result, I believe, of a Supreme Court decision the authority of the Department of State to prohibit travel to these areas was withdrawn and the result is that the United States is not in the position to enforce the restrictions in U.S. passports against travel to such areas of the world.

Senator CLARK. Forbidden by a court decision of the Supreme Court?

Ambassador DAVIS. I believe the power of the Department to restrict passports and not permit travel to areas of the world—Albania and there were a number of others—that this had been the practice of the Department and that this authority was overturned by, as I say, my understanding is of a Supreme Court decision, and so that this is, I think, the background of the ability of the American citizens to travel to Rhodesia if they wish.

We certainly do discourage travel to Rhodesia.

The other question, which perhaps because it is of particular recent interest in the press, is this question of the so-called mercenaries. It might be useful to say where that stands now. First, we are looking into this matter very closely to determine whether there has been a violation of U.S. law, and among the relevant laws the Foreign Agent Registration Act, Foreign Service Enlistments Act, and, of course, the Rhodesian sanctions regulation.

We understand that the organization in Colorado that was allegedly involved has indicated that it was no longer recruiting. I should add that any U.S. citizen who joins the armed forces of another country runs the possible risk of criminal prosecution under the Foreign Service Enlistments Act. This act subjects those violating it to prison terms up to 3 years and fines up to \$1,000.

I believe also that we do not presently have evidence of any American citizens actually serving in the Rhodesian forces.

Senator CLARK. Have you attempted to gather that evidence?

Ambassador DAVIS. Yes; we have tried to look into it and we do not presently have evidence of American citizens who are doing so. If there is anyone who does have such evidence we would be happy to have it.

Senator CLARK. What about Brown? Was he actively seeking mercenaries, in your judgment, from your investigation?

Ambassador DAVIS. Well I think, of course, this does involve us in a question of law and as I say we are very actively looking into the question of whether violations of law occurred.

Senator CLARK. If violations occurred, do you intend to pursue that?

Ambassador DAVIS. Yes.

Senator CLARK. Any other comments on any other parts you care to make at this point?

Ambassador DAVIS. To some degree I think we covered the illegal booking question, if I understand the thrust of it.

Senator CLARK. The thrust of the other two questions dealt with the Treasury Department.

Ambassador DAVIS. Yes. To be honest, I simply do not know if you can take a Diners Card and process whatever it is through regular international channels, and certainly we will look into it and supply and answer for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

FRANCHISE OPERATIONS AND USE OF CREDIT CARDS IN RHODESIA

[Supplied by Department of State]

It should be emphasized that the so-called American franchise operations in Southern Rhodesia, such as Holiday Inn, are not franchises of the American companies of the same name. Instead they are subsidiaries of wholly-owned South African companies. In this regard the transfer of goods or funds for investment from the United States to these operations in Rhodesia is not permitted.

Insofar as the use of credit cards and travelers' checks are concerned, the Department of Treasury takes the position that since private American citizens are able to travel to Rhodesia, it would not be appropriate to prohibit the transfer of funds for their maintenance while there. However, the Treasury Department does prohibit the issuance of American travelers' checks by Rhodesian banks for use by Rhodesian citizens and residents outside of Rhodesia.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much, both Ambassador Davis and Ambassador Buffum. If we have further questions, we will submit those in writing. We will be glad to review the material you submit for the record and appreciate your taking the morning to come here. We will probably, Ambassador Davis, ask you to come back with regard to our hearing on Angola which has been postponed because of the activity on the floor. I see they have been rescheduled for Monday morning at 9:30, July 14. Then again later as we continue this series of hearings on South Africa we will look forward to seeing you here.

Ambassador DAVIS. Yes.

WITNESS

Senator CLARK. We are going to hear next from Edgar Lockwood, from the Washington Office on Africa and lastly from E. F. Andrews, vice president of materials and services, Allegheny Ludlum Industries in Pittsburgh.

Mr. Lockwood, I am sorry that time will allow us only to take 10 or 15 minutes in the opening statement. Whatever you want to summarize I would be happy to hear your responses to the Assistant Secretary's comments or whatever you would like to cover in an opening statement, then we will have time for questions.

**STATEMENT OF EDGAR LOCKWOOD, DIRECTOR OF THE
WASHINGTON OFFICE ON AFRICA, WASHINGTON, D.C.**

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I will just hit the high spots. I think some of the things I have touched on in the written statement have already been covered.

I appreciate very much this opportunity to meet and present our views on what the United States should do to encourage political progress in Rhodesia.

We have been very impressed, Mr. Chairman, with the earlier hearings before the subcommittee and with your own perceptive and decisive stand on African policy questions since you have accepted the chairmanship of this subcommittee.

In 1975 marks perhaps the last moment in which the United States can demonstrate by action rather than merely lip service that we support majority rule. As majority rule comes closer to reality in Rhodesia, and as it now becomes clearly evident that the minority regime is both doomed and morally bankrupt, the opportunity for the United States to reestablish its credibility will last for only a little time longer.

For at least 5 years the United States has pursued a double-faced policy toward Rhodesia—openly claiming to support the demand of the 96 percent African population for majority rule but covertly giving a steady stream of material and psychological support to the illegitimate minority regime.

I will not touch at the moment on the situation in Rhodesia, which has been covered before very thoroughly. In the main, I agree with the assessment of the situation by other witnesses and your own statement.

**AFRICAN POPULATION RESPONSE TO GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS, ARMED
LIBERATION STRUGGLE**

I would like, however, to touch on the question that Senator Biden raised yesterday in regard to how the African population is responding to the guerrilla movements and to the liberation armed struggle.

One of the factors involved is the repressive measures taken by the Rhodesian regime to put people in what are called protective villages. These are similar to the "aldeamentos" in Mozambique, similar to the so-called strategic hamlets in Vietnam. I would like to read from a Catholic document which was brought back by Dean Clinton Bamberger earlier this year when he went out as an observer to the Sithole detention trial—so-called trial.

Here is the conclusion of the report by the Catholic commission about these villages :

The reports here presented reenforce each other in that all stress the major problems. The general impact is one of great dissatisfaction and unhappiness which is apparently exacerbated by the government's claim that the move into the protective villages has been in their interest and that they are happy to have been moved to safety. Many of the people who spoke distrust the security forces and many, in fact, look to the guerrillas as their liberators. To the people of Chiweshe, what the government regards as "security" is regarded by many as simply another collective punishment following on that of the collective cattle fines.

The immediate feeling, which during the last three years the events in Chiweshe have had on the people, is a great intensification of political awareness, and this includes women as well as men. In fact, a spirit of resistance is discernible in the tribal trust lands.

Then, in another quotation, "that the government plans to put other tribal trust lands in the north and east of this country also into protective villages. This could necessitate the resettling of some 2 million people".

I think when we are talking about the current situation we should not ignore this particular question of protective villages.

IMPROVING U.S. POLICY REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS

Let me go on to American policy.

Evidence offered by the 1969 National Security Study Memorandum 39 suggests the United States has indeed intentionally weakened its implementation of sanctions while trying to maintain a good image for the benefit of black African states and United States critics.

What could the United States do now to improve its Rhodesian policy? We already touched on the question of the Byrd amendment, which is a statutory legal violation. It is unique as far as the international community is concerned.

I believe that if the administration sincerely wanted to repeal the Byrd amendment, it could indeed accomplish this in a space of a few months.

Second, as you, Mr. Chairman, have recommended, the United States should contribute to some multilateral fund to compensate Mozambique for the loss of revenues incident to the cutting off of Rhodesian trade.

Third, the Congress should examine the administration of the sanctions to determine what needs to be done to create a unified, energetic, and effective program of implementation. Our implementation of the sanctions program has been lethargic. In effect, it has been passive at best and such action as has taken place has been as a result of the citizen pressure rather than administrative initiative.

I would like to mention several examples: Testifying recently in support of the Byrd amendment repeal, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury David R. MacDonald stated that an amendment in the bill calling for certification of the origin of third-country steel mill products would lead to a "suspension of imports" and he said, "the problem would be increased, if, as seems likely, we were also compelled to suspend imports of ferrochrome from these same countries."

Secretary MacDonald's statements on ferrochrome imports run counter to the Treasury Department's own regulations issued to im-

plement the sanctions program in 1968. Subsection 530.201 of the Regulations, prohibits "the importation into the United States of ferrochrome produced in any country from chromium ore or concentrates of Southern Rhodesian origin."

Enactment of the Byrd amendment suspended the effect of this regulation but the result of repealing the amendment, with or without this provision that Mr. MacDonald was commenting upon, would be to restore that provision.

So we have to ask if the administration intends to overrule or to ignore these regulations.

Next to minerals one of the most important foreign exchange earnings for Rhodesia, possibly the second most important, is tourism. U.S. tourists are 20 percent of Rhodesia's tourist trade and this influx nets Rhodesia \$16.3 million per year.

The text of the Security Council Resolution 253 of 1968 specifically calls on States to prevent nationals from supplying funds or other financial or economic resources to tourist enterprises, among other things. Notwithstanding these very clear provisions, the United States allows a flourishing tourist trade to go on. The Treasury and Commerce Departments have not stopped innumerable apparently illegal tour bookings to Rhodesia.

The Federal Aviation Agency has directed all U.S. airlines to discontinue making bookings on Air Rhodesia through interline agreements but steps are now being taken to evade these regulations.

At a secret meeting of the U.S. travel agents held on March 23 of this year at the Gotham Hotel in New York City, Mr. Traves Nettleton, who is manager of United Touring Co., a Rhodesian corporation, representing all Rhodesian tourism, openly advocated the evasion of the sanctions by fraudulently marking tickets. One travel agent present told those in attendance that he had been amazed at how easy it was to get licenses from the Treasury for group tours.

There is not even a color of justification necessary under the humanitarian exceptions.

The Treasury Department has not acted against American hotels and tourist businesses which allow their trademarks and names to advance the interests of the tourist industry.

In December 1973, Rhodesia's first Holiday Inn opened in Bulawayo. According to Tourama of October 1973, a 10-person Holiday Inn sales team was in Rhodesia for a sales blitz in September. The management underwent a 3-week training course at the Holiday Inn University at Memphis, Tenn., which is required of all Holiday Inn managers.

The Holiday Inn at Bulawayo is listed in the May-September 1975 official Holiday Inn Directory. But the Treasury Department takes the position that it is legally impossible to stop this practice because it is only a franchise operation.

Any American tourist can cash American Express checks, as I have said, or use his or her Diners Club card or American Express card. The Treasury licenses for these things have been generously given and when the licenses are violated, as in the case of Renton Cowley, there have been no prosecutions.

I would be glad to submit an exchange of letters, for example, between the Center of Social Action of the United Church of Christ,

which submitted massive documentation in regard to Mr. Cowley's activities to the Treasury Department, and those documents which came from Air Rhodesia which establish that in fact there has been political influence used, including a Senator of the United States, apparently, in seeing to it that the license for Mr. Cowley was rather loosely given and that in fact he was able to obtain a rather easy hearing from the Treasury Department.

Senator CLARK. We would be interested in anything of that kind for the record that you might be prepared to submit.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I would be glad to supply those documents.

[Committee staff note. At time of publication the material requested had not been received.]

Notwithstanding section 5 (a) and (b) of Security Council Resolution 253, the State Department has not consistently refused visas to known agents of Rhodesian business, including tourism. How is it possible that Mr. Traves Nettleton, whom the State Department knows to be a principal agent of Rhodesia's tourist industry, was allowed to enter the United States to make his pitch in New York for breaking sanctions in March of this year? All entry points should have a list of known agents of Rhodesian businesses and they should be prohibited entry.

We have gone through the case you have mentioned, the case of Air Rhodesia in regard to the Boeing 720's. I could say it was Mr. Carl Hirschmann, a Swiss banker, who has large business interests in Europe, Africa, and the United States, who acted as middleman. Hirschmann had obtained U.S. export licenses in 1970 for the purchase of these planes, and in 1973 for spare parts worth over \$500,000. These licenses contained a standard clause that the U.S. Government must authorize all resales. The United States did not consent to the resale, but little or nothing has been done to either prosecute Hirschmann, or indeed to prevent him from making sales again.

We have mentioned the DC-8. I think we should also mention that apparently another DC-8 has been sold to Gabon, notwithstanding the fact Gabon, who had already violated the previous agreement regarding the first DC-8, was allowed another one to be sent to the President of Gabon, supposedly for his personal use.

Perhaps we should mention Mr. Brown's activity. I welcome the statement of Secretary Davis and of the State Department generally that they are prepared to look toward a prosecution of Mr. Brown. I think the evidence suggests his activities are illegal on several grounds.

We believe the United States should shut down all operations in this country which promote Rhodesia, and I think in this connection it is a crying shame that it is the only country in the world where the Rhodesian Information Office is allowed to operate.

Furthermore, the United States allows the "Journal of Commerce" to continue to publish advertisements which promote activities which are clearly in violation of sanctions; namely, investment and business dealings with Rhodesia.

Senator CLARK. I am a little unclear on that point. The "Journal of—

Mr. LOCKWOOD. The "Journal of Commerce" is a journal in New York City and there have been advertisements in that journal which

promote doing business with Rhodesia. The administration has in effect said that it is true that if the advertisements were responded to, there would be a violation of the law, but there is nothing wrong with such advertisements, that they are not illegal per se.

Senator CLARK. What do you mean by responded to? I am not quite sure I understand that.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. When the question was raised, for example, in the Carnegie Endowment study of 1973—I have a copy of it here—as to the activities of the “Journal of Commerce,” they go into that question of what promotion is. In other words, as I understand the sanctions regulations, you are not supposed to promote illegal dealings with Rhodesia, and specifically the provision of economic resources, investment funds, and this sort of thing.

The advertisements did do that, but you take a narrow view of what a promotion is and say, “Well, that is not really a promotion, it is just an advertisement. It has to be something like a contractual deal.” That is the position, as I understand it.

Senator CLARK. I see. I think I will let you go ahead and finish your statement before I start questions.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. In short, the United States has done only a very bare minimum to enforce even those sanctions which still exist. It has generally not acted unless and until it has been forced to do so through alert citizen action. Congress should not let its hands be tied by administration inaction, and indeed we think the Congress can do much by conducting a rigorous examination of sanctions enforcement and by acting to close loopholes in legislation.

I think the examination has been very useful this morning, precisely the sort of questions that you are asking.

No one much likes sanctions but they are an alternative to war and their success or failure may mean the success or failure of the United Nations. Certainly this country is in no position to cast stones at developing nations for hypocrisy and double-dealing when it has achieved an unenviable record of repudiating, openly or covertly, its commitments to international law to serve the commercial advantages of a few companies. To argue that honesty is better than hypocrisy begs the central question.

Are we prepared to oppose massive racial discrimination, racism solidified into political structure, by implementing sanctions designed to attack that problem by means short of war? If we are not prepared to exert the effort to make them work, then we can expect to find that Africans will draw the conclusion that in the end nothing counts with us but money and profit.

U.S. CREDENTIALS TO INTERVENE IN SETTLEMENT TALKS

Given the record of sanction compliance which we and others have outlined, we do not think that the United States has any good offices to offer in assistance to the Rhodesian negotiations. It would seem to be disqualified from acting as a neutral referee.

At the present time there seems to be no prospect that the Zimbabwe African National Union is prepared to take part in settlement talks. Without ZANU involvement, no meaningful settlement can possibly

be reached, we believe. So the question is also moot, even if this country had the credentials to intervene.

Clearly, we would be in no position to do so unless all parties, including ZANU, wanted it.

On the other hand, as our bicentennial draws near, we can renew our strength not only as a people who revolted against a colonial power as Rhodesia has done, but as a people who have struggled also to rid our land of racism and to establish equality.

To the extent that we show the people of black Africa that we understand and share their struggle against racism, against colonial domination, we will have an opportunity to share in the economic resources of that continent and to create a network of mutually supportive relationships with the emerging nations.

To the extent that we do not, we shall find ourselves outvoted at the United Nations on issues that concern this country, and denied access to African resources and markets, including those of Rhodesia where majority rule is an inevitable reality. Rhodesia is a test case for our intentions.

Thank you very much.

[Mr. Lockwood's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EDGAR LOCKWOOD

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much this opportunity to present our views on what the United States should do to encourage political progress in Rhodesia.

Since the establishment of the Washington Office on Africa in the fall of 1972, we have devoted much of our efforts to working with sympathetic members of Congress and citizens across the country to improve United States policy toward Rhodesia and specifically to repeal the Byrd Amendment, which three-and-a-half years ago created a statutory violation of this country's treaty obligation to comply with the United Nations sanctions program. So we are pleased to participate in hearings on southern Africa and especially this one on Rhodesia.

Mr. Chairman, I have been very impressed with the earlier hearings before this Subcommittee, and with your perceptive and decisive stand on African policy questions since you accepted the chairmanship of the African Affairs Subcommittee. We appreciate your courageous vote against the nomination of Nathaniel Davis as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, which reflected your responsiveness to the views of African leaders and many Americans concerned about United States policy toward Africa. Your statement on U.S. policy toward Mozambique on June 25 showed an awareness of and a sensitivity to the requirements for a new turn in our relations with African states.

1975 marks perhaps the last moment in which the United States can demonstrate that it supports majority rule in Rhodesia by action rather than by mere lip service. As majority rule comes closer to reality in Rhodesia, as it now becomes clearly evident that the minority regime is doomed as well as morally bankrupt, the opportunity for the United States to re-establish its credibility will last for only a little time longer.

For at least five years, the United States has pursued a double-faced policy toward Rhodesia—openly claiming to support the demand for the 96% African population for majority rule but covertly giving a steady stream of material and psychological support to the illegitimate minority regime. This hypocritical policy was based on the view that the United States could balance irreconcilable interests in an area, since white rule and African aspiration for political rights were at a stand-off. Now, decisive changes have come to southern Africa, and there is no question that the United States has to choose on which side it will stand: with the oppressed majority or the illegitimate minority.

During the last year, a dramatic shift in the power relations in southern Africa has demonstrated that majority rule will soon come to Rhodesia. After twelve years of protracted fighting, Portugal opened negotiations with the libera-

tion movements in 1974 and provisional governments were established in Mozambique and Angola. Mozambique, with which Rhodesia shares its 700-mile eastern border, became independent on June 25; Angola, to the west of Rhodesia, will follow on November 11.

When Portuguese colonialism collapsed, black Rhodesians began to demand with new intensity: "If Africans in Mozambique and Angola have succeeded in gaining independence, why shouldn't we?"

Independent Mozambique represents concrete as well as psychological support for the struggle in Rhodesia. Independent Mozambique has pledged to cut off Rhodesias' sanctions-breaking traffic through Beira and Lourenco Marques if it can get financial assistance to compensate for the loss of revenue from Rhodesian trade.

Furthermore, Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa has recognized that the new situation demands that Rhodesia grant majority rule soon. To consolidate its own position, South Africa seems prepared to withdraw its para-military forces from Rhodesia and to lessen its economic support if the Rhodesian Front regime remains recalcitrant. It was South Africa which forced Smith to open negotiations with African nationalists in December. When the Rhodesian Front regime detained and "tried" the President of the Zimbabwe African National Union, the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, in March, it was again South African pressure which forced Smith to release him so that he might attend the crucial Organization of African Unity meeting held at Dar es Salaam on April 10.

Meanwhile, the African nationalist groups of Zimbabwe have been working to achieve a united front. On December 17, the four major movements (ZANU, ZAPU, FROLIZI and ANC) signed a declaration of unity that they would struggle together for the total liberation of their country. While there have been many setbacks, caused mostly by the recalcitrance of the Smith regime, there has been undeniable progress toward a political settlement in Rhodesia over the last seven months. Soon there may be a constitutional conference to try to work out an acceptable path to majority rule. If peaceful negotiations are blocked, however, the African nationalists will intensify their armed struggle, with new unity and strength, and with increased support from independent African countries. Whatever path it takes, political change and true independence will come soon to Zimbabwe, and the United States will stand accountable for its past support for the minority regime.

I wish I could say that America's two-faced policy toward Rhodesia has been the result of administrative oversight or political laxity by a few American officials. But evidence offered by the 1969 National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39) tells a different story: that the U.S. Administration has intentionally weakened its implementation of sanctions while trying to maintain a good image for the benefit of Black African states and U.S. critics. Option 2 of NSSM 39, which is generally accepted to have laid the basis for Nixon's policy toward southern Africa, states that the United States should "be more flexible in [its] attitude toward the Smith regime" "without openly taking a position undermining the U.K. and the U.N.," and specifically states that the U.S. should "gradually relax sanctions." Perhaps even more telling was Mr. Kissinger's letter to then-President Nixon in January, 1970: "Recommendation: . . . (2) that State, Treasury and Commerce begin to formulate for your consideration alternative approaches concerning U.S. participation in sanctions if other nations continue to relax or withdraw."

Actual implementation of sanctions during the Nixon Administration, and also in the Ford Administration, suggests that this is exactly what was done.

The current precarious state of U.S. relations with Mozambique should tell us that the United States cannot get by with a two-faced policy in southern Africa. Constant U.S. statements of support for self-determination in Portugal's African colonies did not mask its military and economic support for the Portuguese regime. Now we are paying the diplomatic price: the U.S. government was not invited to Mozambique's independence celebration and Mozambique has not yet recognized the American diplomats assigned there. If the U.S. does not act now to put its house in order by improving its policy toward Rhodesia, we may again suffer the consequences when Zimbabwe becomes independent.

What can the United States do now to improve its Rhodesian policy?

First and foremost, the Congress should end the one statutory violation of sanctions by repealing the Byrd Amendment. Considerable testimony has already been given in both houses of Congress on this matter, so I need not go into the details of it here today. The fact is that so far the Administration has refused

to give the bill the kind of active support which lets members of Congress know that it is serious. For example, although President Ford proclaimed his support for sanctions in August of last year, in December, when the sanctions bill was to come to a vote in the House, he declined at the last minute to send personal letters of support to the Hill, as he had promised the bills' co-sponsors he would do. I believe that, if the Administration sincerely wanted to repeal the Byrd Amendment, it could accomplish it in the space of a few months. And it would represent a refreshing example of co-operation between the White House and the Congress and an end to lip service on this issue.

Secondly, the United States should contribute to a multi-lateral fund to compensate Mozambique for the loss of revenues incident to the cutting off of Rhodesian trade. Reliable estimates indicate that as much as 80 per cent of Rhodesia's sanctions-breaking traffic goes through Beira and Lourenco Marques.

We were very pleased that, in the *Congressional Record* of June 25, the day of Mozambique's independence, you, Senator Clark, called on the United States to contribute to the international fund to support Mozambique's decision to cut off its ports to Rhodesian traffic. In view of the evasive and non-responsive answer of Assistant Secretary Davis on this issue, we believe that Congress should not wait for Administration initiatives but should include on its own initiative authorization and appropriation in the foreign aid measures for this purpose in the forthcoming fiscal year.

Thirdly, the Congress should examine the administration of the sanctions to determine what needs to be done to create a unified, energetic and effective program of implementation. Our implementation of the sanctions program has so far been lethargic, ineffective and passive at best. As we have already indicated, NSSM 39 and other evidence suggests that the Executive Department may have had since 1970 a deliberate policy of softening sanctions enforcement. Such action as has taken place has been the result of citizen pressure rather than administrative initiative. And even after citizen action, tightening of sanctions has been spotty.

I would like to mention several examples of lax implementation which concern us deeply:

We note with alarm the apparent erosion of the Administration's position on the importation into this country of ferrochrome made with Rhodesian chrome ore in third countries such as South Africa. While the Administration has blamed the violation of sanctions by the Byrd Amendment on Congress, it appears that it is now preparing to weaken these regulations by administrative action should the statutory language be repealed. Testifying in support of the Byrd Amendment repeal on June 19, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, David R. MacDonald, advised the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House International Relations Committee that an amendment calling for certification of the origin of third-country steel mill products could lead to "suspension of imports" from such countries and would constitute "an impediment to our normal trade relations with affected foreign countries." "The problem would be increased," he said, "if, as seems likely, we were also compelled to suspend imports of ferrochrome from these same countries."

Secretary MacDonald's statements on ferrochrome imports run counter to Treasury regulations issued to implement the sanctions program in 1968. Subsection 530.201 of the Rhodesia Sanctions Regulation, 31 CFR, Ch. V, Part 530, prohibits, among other items:

"(5) the importation into the United States of ferrochrome produced in any country from chromium ore or concentrates of Southern Rhodesian origin."

The enactment of the Byrd Amendment, of course, suspended the effect of this regulation and the result of repealing the Amendment would be to restore it. Does the Administration intend to over-rule or ignore its own regulations? Searching questions need to be asked in this regard.

Furthermore, Mr. MacDonald needs to be asked whether, when sanctions are restored, he will follow past practice in investigating reported violations of this regulation. In the past, there have been such investigations in regard to South African ferrochromes alleged to have been made with Rhodesian material. (See, e.g., the letter of Assistant Secretary of the Treasury John M. Hennessy, March 15, 1973 to Chairman Charles Diggs of the former House Subcommittee on Africa, published at page 149, Hearings of the Subcommittee on Africa, et al. Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 93rd Cong. 1st Sess., Feb. 21, 22, March 15, 1973.)

In this connection, it may be relevant to point out that Union Carbide, which has had enormous influence on Rhodesian policy with the Administration since

the election of President Nixon, is building a new 50 million dollar ferrochrome plant in South Africa. According to the Bureau of Mines chrome expert, South African low-grade material can be upgraded to produce acceptable ferrochrome without the use of Rhodesian material, which has been traditionally used to beneficiate the South African material. What process will Union Carbide, which has chromium mines and a major ferrochrome plant in Rhodesia, use? If its exports of Rhodesian ferrochromes are halted, will it ship chrome ore from its Rhodesian mines to South Africa for incorporation in ferrochromes made in its South African plant?

The question therefore is whether the Administration is now changing its position under pressure from Union Carbide to in effect say: "We are in favor of repealing the Byrd Amendment but we will not stop imports of Rhodesian chrome if it is refined in South African ferrochrome plants. That may make political sense but it would show that the sanctions "exercise" is just that, a charade.

Next to minerals, one of the most important foreign exchange earners for Rhodesia is tourism. A recent study by the Corporate Information Center of the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility indicates that U.S. tourists are 20 per cent of Rhodesia's tourist trade and that this influx nets Rhodesia at least \$16.3 million per year in foreign exchange.

In 1973, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace prepared an extensive report on sanctions implementation which pointed to massive violations of sanctions in such areas as airline bookings, car rentals, tourism, use of credit cards and open advertisements in the United States for investment in Rhodesia. Later the Rev. Donald Morton of the United Church of Christ Center for Social Action presented testimony on many of these violations before the United Nations sanctions committee. No prosecutions have been initiated, however, and most of these violations are still going on.

The text of section 4 of Security Council Resolution 253 of 1968 (the sanctions program for which the United States voted) provides that:

"all States members of the United Nations shall not make available to the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking, *including tourist enterprises*, in Southern Rhodesia any funds for investment or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any person within their territories from making available to the regime or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within Southern Rhodesia except payments exclusively for pensions or for strictly medical, humanitarian or educational purposes or for the provision of news material and in special humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs." (Emphasis added)

Notwithstanding these very clear provisions, the United States allows a flourishing tourist trade to go on. How does this happen?

... *Rhodesia is not a country to which the Secretary of State has forbidden Americans to travel.* An American passport states that it is not good for travel to Cuba, North Vietnam, or North Korea. Some way or another, we seem to find the legal authority to ban travel to Communist countries even though they are not under international interdict, which we cannot find legal grounds to restrict travel to Rhodesia. The most effective way to prevent American travelers from spending money in Rhodesia in violation of Resolution 253 would be to restrict their right to travel under passport to that country.

... *The Treasury and Commerce Departments have not stopped innumerable apparently illegal tour bookings to Rhodesia.* Following detailed revelations of the inefficacy of the Administration's procedures for implementing these provisions, the Federal Aviation Agency wrote to all U.S. airlines directing them to discontinue making bookings on Air Rhodesia through interline agreements. To the best of our knowledge, U.S. airlines are now complying with this directive. However, steps are now being taken to evade these regulations. At a secret meeting of U.S. travel agents held on March 23 of this year at the Gotham Hotel in New York, Mr. Traves Nettleton, Manager of United Touring Company, a Rhodesian corporation, who held himself out as representing all Rhodesian tourism, openly advocated evasion of the regulations by fraudulent marking of tickets so as to make it appear that space was booked on other airlines, or that it could be booked as ground travel and flight on Air Rhodesia booked by cash payment.

One travel agent present at the meeting told those in attendance that he had been amazed at how easy it was to get a license for the transfer of funds for group tours to Rhodesia from the Treasury Department. It takes only an average of six days. There is apparently no demand on the part of Treasury for even the color of a justification on humanitarian or other grounds.

... *The Treasury Department has not acted against American hotels and tourist businesses which allow their trademarks and names to advance the interests of the Rhodesian tourist industry.*

In December, 1973 Rhodesia's first Holiday Inn opened in Bulawayo. According to *Tourama* of October, 1973, a 10-person Holiday Inn sales team was in Rhodesia for a sales blitz in September. The manager underwent a three-week training course at the Holiday Inn University at Memphis, Tennessee which is required of all Holiday Inn managers.

The Holiday Inn at Bulawayo is listed in the May-September 1975 official Holiday Inn Directory. But the Treasury Department takes the position that it is legally impossible to stop this practice because it is only a franchise operation.

Clearly the use of the Holiday Inn logo and trademark, the use of management training here in the United States and the listing of the Rhodesian hotel does represent a making available of an "economic resource" to a tourist enterprise in Rhodesia (to quote from the Security Council Resolution 253 referred to above). We believe that Treasury is disregarding the plain intent of the sanctions program by narrowly defining the concept of "economic resource" or, to use the language of Executive Order 11419, "commodity" or "product."

... *Any American tourist can cash American Express checks in Rhodesia, use his or her Diners Club card or American Express card, a practice to which the Treasury Department has turned a blind eye. We will be glad to furnish documents which establish that these transactions continue in 1975 despite exposure two years ago.*

... *Notwithstanding Section 5 (a) and (b) of Security Council Resolution 253, the State Department has not consistently refused visas to known agents of Rhodesian business, including tourism.* How is it possible that Mr. Traves Nettleton, whom the State Department knows to be a principal agent of Rhodesia's tourist industry, was allowed to enter the United States to make his pitch in New York for breaking sanctions in March of this year? All entry points should have a list of known agents of Rhodesian businesses and they should be prohibited entry. If the State Department is not able to construct such a list, we will be happy to assist by supplying the Department with pertinent pages of the *Rhodesian Herald*, although we believe that the State Department has its own airmail subscription.

As links to the outside world are cut off, we can expect Rhodesia to try to expand its air traffic. She is limited only by her ability to get aircraft on the international market. And the evidence suggests that the United States has given government-owned Air Rhodesia its most significant boosts to date. In 1973 the Rhodesia airline, through its assistant general manager, Mervin Eyett, purchased three Boeing 720s from Carl Hirschmann, a Swiss banker who has large business interests in Europe, Africa and the United States. Hirschmann had obtained U.S. export licenses in 1970 for the purchase of these planes and in 1973 for spare parts worth over \$500,000. The licenses contained a standard clause that the U.S. government must authorize all resales by the licensee. The U.S. did not consent to the resale, but little or nothing was done to prosecute Hirschmann or to prevent him from making such sales again. His firm, Jet Aviation, was taken off the "station license" list, but this does not necessarily mean that he will not be able to buy or export U.S. planes again. (See article by David Ottaway, *Washington Post*, Jan. 25, 1974, A 23; Peter Deeley and Bruce Oudes, *The Observer*, London, "How Smith got his Boeing Jets through the Blockade".) The Boeings have boosted Rhodesia's traffic to Johannesburg by 53% and to Durban by 62% for the year ended June, 1974. Captain Pat Travers, the chief of Air Rhodesia, is quoted by the *Johannesburg Star* as saying: "The impact of the Boeings has been far greater than we ever imagined... beyond our wildest dreams." Air Rhodesia had a neat \$705,600 profit in a year which was a disaster for most airlines. (See *Johannesburg Star*, October 12, 1974. Airmail edition.)

The Boeings are not the only aircraft which have slipped through the open mesh of the U.S. sanctions net into the hands of Rhodesia's air services. According to an article in the June 28, 1975 edition of the *Johannesburg Star*, a D.C. 8 sold to the Gabonese government under a U.S. license which stipulated that it could not be diverted to other uses is in fact being used to bring Rhodesian meat to Gabon and European machinery and spare parts to Rhodesia. Apparently a second D.C. 8 has been ordered by President Bongo for his personal use. While American officials are asking for and getting written guarantees that the planes will not enter Rhodesia, there is no way to ensure that diversion will not in fact take place in either case. Earlier reports implicated the Flying Tiger Corporation as seller and one Captain Jack Malloch, a Rhodesian citizen and director of a

Gabonese company, Affretair, were involved in the same or a similar operation. (See *Observer*, London, August 26, 1973; *Africa Netos*, Durham, N.C. Sept. 6, 1973.)

Perhaps the most dangerous and damning instance of U.S. laxity is the ease with which Rhodesia has been able to recruit mercenaries in this country. The operations of Robert K. Brown of Arvada, Colorado have only recently received even the promise of investigation although his activities have been known to the State Department at least since early March, 1975.

We believe that there is sufficient evidence to warrant an investigation with a view to prosecution of Mr. Brown on the following legal issues:

Is not Mr. Brown acting as an agent of a foreign "country" or regime? Should he not be prosecuted for failure to register with the Justice Department? In response to an inquiry from our office the Justice Department officer in charge of the registration of foreign agents stated that his office did not investigate such matters, that this was up to the FBI, and that there was no proof of agency. We contend on the contrary that Mr. Brown is holding himself out as an agent of Rhodesian military units by the act of assisting U.S. citizens to join Rhodesian units. We contend that when Rhodesia accepts the fruits of his efforts, as it has, its actions amount to a confirmation of his agency. We call for a complete and thorough-going federal and state investigation of this notorious soldier of fortune's connections, contacts, accounts and business dealings.

Further, we believe that the committee of the Senate investigating the CIA should be asked to question Mr. Brown on the issue of whether the Agency itself may be involved in his activities. We say this because of Mr. Brown's previous admitted history of involvement in Cuban revolutionary activities, anti-Castro activities and plots to overthrow or assassinate Duvalier in Haiti.

Is not Mr. Brown promoting the military and financial interests of the illegal Rhodesian regime in violation of sanctions? His promotional literature spells out various details which on the face of it constitute promotion of sanctions breaking. He states that Rhodesia will send an accepted recruit air passage to Rhodesia. He states that mercenaries can bank their salaries in foreign banks outside Rhodesia. He offers to keep in touch with recruits and assist them. We call for prosecution of Mr. Brown for promoting violations of sanctions, and investigation of the methods of transfers of funds he has advertised to see that they are discontinued in these and any other circumstances.

The United States should shut down all operations in this country which promote Rhodesia. The United States, to its shame, is the only country in the world which permits a Rhodesian Information Office to operate. Furthermore, the United States allows the *Journal of Commerce* to continue to publish advertisements which promote activities which are clearly violations of sanctions, namely investment and business dealings with Rhodesia. The First Amendment clearly does not give persons the right to openly promote violation of the law. The case for dealing with this advertising more vigorously has been argued persuasively and extensively in the Carnegie study, referred to above (see pages 19-31). But nothing has been done about it.

In short, the United States has done only a very bare minimum to enforce even those sanctions which still exist. It has generally not acted unless and until it has been forced to do so through alert citizen action.

We have tried to indicate what could be done to restore some measure of credibility to the U.S. posture on the Rhodesian question. We are extremely skeptical that the present Administration has any intention of acting to restore its credibility, but Congress should not let its hands be tied by such inaction. We think Congress can do much by conducting a rigorous examination of sanctions enforcement and by acting to close loopholes in legislation.

African liberation movements in Zimbabwe do not expect the United States to send it arms and ammunition. They do require that we cease collaboration with the Smith regime by vigorously acting to deny it the economic resources it needs to stay alive. This is a bare minimum.

Dr. Hutchinson, who was invited to testify here on July 9, has in times past advocated that the United States offer its good offices to settle the dispute between the parties in Rhodesia.

Given the record of sanctions compliance which we and others have outlined, we do not think that the United States has any good offices to offer in assistance to the Rhodesian negotiations. It would seem to be disqualified from acting as a neutral referee. Prime Minister Vorster who has been mentioned as a possible chairman for negotiations has at least achieved some measure of limited credi-

bility by putting some successful pressure on Mr. Smith. Furthermore, the United States should certainly not intervene in the negotiations unless *all* parties involved participate in both the talks and the request for U.S. involvement. At the present time, there seems to be no prospect that the Zimbabwe African National Union, ZANU, is prepared to take part in settlement talks. This is wholly understandable in view of actions taken by the Smith government against the ZANU top leadership. Without ZANU involvement, no meaningful settlement can possibly be reached. So the question is also moot even if this country had the credentials to intervene. Clearly we would be in no position to do so unless all parties including ZANU wanted it.

No one much likes sanctions, but they are an alternative to war. Their success or failure may mean the success or failure of the United Nations. Certainly, this country is in no position to cast stones at developing nations for hypocrisy and double-dealing when it has achieved an unenviable record of repudiating—openly or covertly—its commitments to international law to serve the commercial advantages of a few companies. To argue that honesty is better than hypocrisy begs the central question. Are we prepared to oppose massive racial discrimination, racism solidified into political structure and designed to attack that problem by means short of war. If we are not prepared to exert that effort to make them work, then we can expect to find that Africans will draw the conclusion that in the end nothing counts with us but money and profit.

On the other hand, as our Bicentennial draws near, we can renew our strength not only as a people who revolted against a colonial power as Rhodesia has done, but as a people who have struggled also to rid our land of racism and to establish equality. We have never wholly succeeded in that struggle, but neither have we wholly failed. We have a chance to make good our promises both here at home and abroad. To the extent that we show the people of black Africa that we understand and share their struggle against racism, against colonial domination, we will have an opportunity to share in the economic resources of that continent and to create a network of mutually supportive relationships with the emerging nations. To the extent that we do not, we shall find ourselves outvoted at the United Nations on issues that concern this country, and denied access to African resources and markets, including those of Rhodesia where majority rule is an inevitable reality. Rhodesia is a test case for our intentions.

Senator CLARK. Thank you.

As I understand what you said at the end of your statement, you would not support the idea of active American involvement in the negotiating process. You feel that we are not in an objective position to do that and we ought to take a kind of hands-off policy toward the situation?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes, sir.

MR. LOCKWOOD'S COMMENTS ON SECRETARY DAVIS' TESTIMONY

Senator CLARK. Do you have any particular response to what Secretary Davis said in general comment on your recommendations? Comment on comment?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Comment on comment?

Well, I think it is perhaps a little premature to comment too much on it. I guess I am not familiar enough with the Supreme Court decision that he referred to in regard to passports to know what are the limits of that and what are the rights of American citizens put down in that decision.

I do know that my own passport, which I got only recently, very definitely states on the face of it that I cannot go to North Korea, to North Vietnam, or Cuba. The Peoples' Republic of China has been removed, my earlier passport did have that.

Senator CLARK. But Rhodesia is not mentioned.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. That is right, that is what I am referring to. There is no open and visible discouragement. I do not think there is any open

and visible discouragement that keeps however many tourists there are from visiting Rhodesia. I think it is something on the order of 16,000 we know went to Rhodesia last year.

Senator CLARK. I think that is something that the staff ought to check into with the Department of State and see if there are any inconsistencies on policy.

I did not quite understand the point of that before. You did respond as I recall to the Secretary's statement about pursuing the recruitment of mercenaries.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes. Again, they knew about it, it is just that the publicity which we helped to generate then gets them active. We will be monitoring Brown's activities, we will be looking for a prosecution. The record on prosecutions is not very good. I think there have been two cases that I know of. Reynolds Metal Co. was prosecuted for importing petalite, a very small amount for some laboratory purposes, and there was a Vermont fertilizer firm.

The massive kind of things that I have been talking about really have not been acted upon. There is no indication that Cowley's activities were investigated seriously. Cowley should have been prosecuted.

U.S. LEGAL AUTHORITY TO CARRY OUT SANCTIONS PROGRAM

Senator CLARK. The last question I had is basic to my understanding of this.

What authority does the U.S. Government really have to prevent, let us say, the Holiday Inn from listing a Holiday Inn in Rhodesia? What legal authority do we have to go to the Holiday Inn Corp. and say you cannot do that, or to the Journal of Commerce, that you mentioned earlier, and say you cannot carry an advertisement. Do we have the legal authority, as you understand it, to do that?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. We not only have the legal authority, I think we have the legal obligation to carry out the United Nation's sanctions program. The terms of the resolution which we voted for very specifically provides that member states shall not make available to the illegal regime in southern Rhodesia or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking, including tourist enterprises in southern Rhodesia, any funds for investment or any other financial or economic resource.

Now, in my view the use of that logo, which everybody knows worldwide as being a Holiday Inn, is a provision of economic resource and the problem is that we have interpreted that phrase in a narrow sense rather than a broad sense, and I think we can interpret the word "commodities", for example, or "products", in the sense that if you franchise the use of your name, the use of your script, the use of that trapezoidal form, and if you take the manager and train him in your training university in Memphis, you are providing economic resources, and that is a violation of the sanctions that we voted for. It is a violation of our treaty obligation to carry out in terms of the law. It is a violation, I think, of section 5 of the U.N. Participation Act.

CONFLICT WITH BASIC CIVIL LIBERTIES, FREEDOM OF SPEECH

Senator CLARK. You do not feel that that gets into an area of, let us say, basic civil liberties or basic freedom to publish? Do you see any conflict there with freedom of speech?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Freedom of speech? I think that there can be a restriction on freedom of speech where you are in fact advocating and promoting a violation of the law. I think that would hold true of promoting drunken driving, for example, that sort of thing. I think that we are in a gray area, certainly, but I see no reason that we cannot prevent the promotion of Rhodesian trade.

RHODESIAN EXPORT OF PRODUCTS DESPITE SANCTIONS

Senator CLARK. Let me ask you a quite different kind of question. In your judgment, how has Rhodesia managed to export its products despite the sanctions? Have there been that many people cheating?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I think they have the active cooperation of Portugal and South Africa. Portugal is removed as a possibility and presumably, as you have indicated, 80 percent, I think, of the trade has gone out through the Mozambique ports.

Now, the question is: Is South Africa prepared to do the massive rewriting of bills of lading that the Portuguese authorities and Portuguese business people previously provided to Rhodesia? You have to have stuff that will show that it is not of Rhodesian origin, so the question I think is whether the South African Chamber of Commerce and so on is prepared to escalate from 20 percent to 100 percent. They have been carrying about 20 percent of the load now.

Are they going to take 100 percent? That is how it has been done primarily—by rewriting.

The other thing is, it is quite clear from an examination of the import and export trade statistics that, for example, Japan has a very bad record in regard to chrome. Import statistics of Japan do not match with the export statistics of South Africa. Japanese figures show that an average of South African chrome has been used, it has been said to be South African chrome, but in fact it was Rhodesian chrome. And Mr. Andrews, who is going to testify, can tell you that, I am sure.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much for coming up.

We are going to hear from Mr. E. F. Andrews.

Will you proceed?

STATEMENT OF E. F. ANDREWS, VICE PRESIDENT, MATERIALS AND SERVICES, ALLEGHENY LUDLUM INDUSTRIES, INC., PITTSBURGH, PA.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Senator.

My statement is only three pages and it takes about 7 or 8 minutes. That is the easiest way, although I may stop along and comment to some of the things I have listened to this morning.

As I said, I am E. F. Andrews. I am vice president, Materials and Services, Allegheny Ludlum Industries, Inc. I do appreciate this opportunity to speak to the matter before this subcommittee.

My understanding is that the subcommittee's intention is to have a general review of southern Africa, with certain days set aside to examine the current U.S. relationship with individual countries. I have come to the Hill many times, speaking for my company and my industry on specific economic matters pertaining to Rhodesia.

Since the purpose of these hearings is broader, I must make it clear that I do not necessarily speak for my company or my industry at this time. What I have to say will be primarily my own judgment and opinion, based upon several years of observing and visiting that part of the world in the conduct of my company's business.

I was in Rhodesia during the so-called cease-fire last December. I was there during the Sithole trials this April, and I was there 2 weeks ago during the Mozambique independence celebration. On each occasion, I talked with the leadership on both sides.

I am anxious that the policies our Nation adopts will serve to foster long-term, good relations with all the countries of southern Africa.

Rhodesia presents a very complex and multifaceted problem that cannot be examined in a vacuum but must be examined in its relationship with the countries that surround it.

I could spend time going into the history of Rhodesia, beginning with the Mashona tribe, the invasion of the Matabele tribe, followed by Cecil John Rhodes and the European-British colonialism, and the declaration of independence 10 years ago, as the American colonists did 199 years ago.

But, I have been asked to keep my remarks as brief as possible. In so doing, I realize that I run a serious risk of not fully developing the points I wish to make and the further risk of being accused of gross oversimplification. I am prepared to expand any point you wish.

PRESENT U.S. POLICY TOWARD RHODESIA

It is my opinion that the U.S. policy toward Rhodesia for the past 10 years, consisting primarily of (a) withholding recognition of the Smith regime as a government, and (b) economic sanctions in support of the United Nations, has been negative, nonconstructive, detrimental only to ourselves and, to some degree, to the black farmers in Rhodesia; is hypocritical and has proven to be ineffective. Sanctions, as an instrumentality designed to effect political change, have a record of failure throughout history. They failed us in China. They failed us in Cuba, and they have failed in Rhodesia.

RHODESIAN PROSPERITY DESPITE SANCTIONS

All one needs to do is go to Rhodesia and see the prosperous shoppers going in and out of stores stocked with merchandise from many nations. Shiny new cars—formerly American, now European and Japanese—crowd the streets of their cities.

All people, blacks and whites, mingle casually in the parks, shops, and big, new hotels. Better hotels than we have in Pittsburgh, and I am not counting the Holiday Inn there either.

There is little question that the European leadership in Rhodesia has brought about civilization, comparative peace, unbelievable progress and, in comparison to many other nations of Africa, one of the highest standards of living and literacy for its African population; 40 percent of the university enrollment is African.

Since the unilateral declaration of independence and imposition of sanctions, Rhodesian G.N.P. has tripled. Its agricultural, mining, manufacturing, and construction output have risen remarkably, and

the average earnings of both Europeans and Africans have risen by 60 percent.

Rhodesia counts among its trading partners most of Europe, Japan, Russia, China, and much of Africa, including Zambia, Zaire, Malawi, Mozambique, Gabon, and others. I think we are kidding ourselves. The sanctions are against the United States and even we, I hear this morning, are having trouble in enforcing some of them in spite of the Byrd amendment. We cannot trade. We cannot buy. We cannot own. We cannot invest. We can only buy strategic materials, so we are right today more strongly enforcing the sanctions than possibly any other nation on earth.

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CLOSING MOZAMBIQUE-RHODESIAN BORDER

Now, there were those who believed that when the Frelimo government under President Machel took over, the Mozambique-Rhodesian border would be closed. Examining the economic factors of southern Africa, it is my opinion that the border will not be effectively closed nor have a disastrous impact on Rhodesia. For several reasons I will be glad to speak to the question of compensation, which is not in my text.

Rhodesia has already, of necessity because of jam-ups, rerouted a high portion of its exports to other routes. The outside world has grossly overestimated the percentage of export that still goes through Mozambique.

Also, closing the border would have serious impact upon Rhodesia's neighbors, Botswana, Malawi, Zaire, and Zambia, as well as Mozambique, all of whom depend upon Rhodesia for a very large portion of their food—maize, beef, tobacco, et cetera and other supplies, such as coal to Malawi.

President Machel said in his inaugural address that restoring the economy of Mozambique is his first order of business. Closing the border to his miners who work in the mines and are paid in gold, stopping the tourism, the rail and port revenues, the Cabora Bassa power station income, and the new rail line to Nacala would bring high unemployment and would be counterproductive to his No. 1 objective. I think we can look to Mr. Machel to look north in a political and ideological leaning, but look south for his economic well-being.

To stop Zaire and Zambia from shipping their copper and zinc through Rhodesia would bring serious economic damage to those countries, by forcing them to ship north through war-torn Angola, or pay 100 percent surcharge and experience delays of over 100 days by shipping to Dar-es-Salaam.

The economic impact on Malawi and Botswana would be even more severe. This is the main reason all four of the leaders of these nations have pushed hard for peaceful settlement and détente. Our policy toward Rhodesia cries out for similar review.

TWO COURSES OF ACTION OTHER THAN SANCTIONS SUGGESTED

It seems to me there are two courses of action, other than sanctions.

First is to support military overthrow. This has been the history of the nations north of Rhodesia, starting with the Mau Mau in

Kenya many years ago, up to the present conflict in Angola. Pursuit of this course has led to a spilling of African blood, rapid exodus of European technical skills, resulting in 18 military dictatorships and 17 civilian dictatorships, many with a powerful minority getting rich as it oppresses the people.

It has resulted in a one man, one-vote, one-time. It is sadly true that the countries to the north of Rhodesia present many examples of African power groups that have brought advancement only to the members of the power group and retrogression to the majority of the citizens.

There should be no doubt but that there are certain African power seekers in Rhodesia who intend to control their fellow man from an ever narrower base than that ever dreamed of by the Europeans or their Matabele predecessors.

Seeing the obvious failure of this approach, even the majority of the OAU has now expressed a willingness to try a third approach, that of negotiated, multiracial self-government, leading to majority rule, while protecting the rights of all minorities. We keep talking a great deal about majority rule in this country. We have majority rule. We have gone way out of our way lately to make sure of the rights of our minorities, or have tried to, and we may not have gone as far as we need to but we have tried to do that.

They are fully aware that the same divergent factions that are presently warring in Angola exist in Rhodesia under different names. In Angola, it is the FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA. Africans warring with Africans. Sitting before the House committee hearing, Reverend Canaan Banana told the House hearings yesterday, yes, indeed, ZANU had been financially and militarily supported by Peking. That is in the Congressional Record of the House, representative from the ANC.

In Rhodesia you have the militant left ZANU under Mr. Sithole who says talks will never work and the less militant ZAPU under Mr. Nkomo, who is willing to try. Both are now loosely organized following the Lusaka talks under the nonviolent ANC under Bishop Muzorewa. Bishop Muzorewa—I have talked to him many times, he is embarrassed by the military acts that get accredited to his name and he is fearful that there will be an exodus of European skills and talents that will leave the country in retrogression rather than progression.

Senator CLARK. Who were you speaking of?

Mr. ANDREWS. Bishop Muzorewa.

Dr. Gordon Chavunduka, university lecturer and Secretary to the ANC, recently said, "Our long-term goal remains majority rule. How we get it is a matter for discussion. We want equal opportunity but we do not want to interfere with property rights and the future so that the future will be secure for all of our citizens."

On June 24, 1975, Bishop Abel T. Muzorewa, president of the ANC, said, "let us all rededicate ourselves and vow to create a society here where all races can live together in harmony, peace and cooperation in the near future. No true ANC followers should be mixed up with any senseless disturbances, violence, or any other form of hooliganism, being planned as a trap against the ANC."

Both sides agree to transitional change. Timing is the point of contention. Many of the responsible African leaders privately admit that they are probably not prepared to govern immediately and time for development of skills would be desirable. Mr. Smith has said that he

is willing to accept majority rule provided it is a responsible majority, a qualified majority, capable of ruling.

Senator CLARK. What do you interpret a qualified majority to mean?

Mr. ANDREWS. I suppose he means qualified people are qualified to make the judgment as to what is going on. I suppose that is what he means.

Senator CLARK. It seems to me conceivably might be a contradiction in terms, qualified majority.

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, he put it to me this way one time, sir, and I think it expresses what he says. In conversation with him—I do not like to directly quote either party except where it has been published, and that was. He was saying to give the vote presently to the entire mass of Rhodesians overnight, would be like asking the United States to extend the voting privilege to everyone over 10 years old.

Senator CLARK. Then a qualified majority?

Mr. ANDREWS. In the sense of ability to read, write, understand, and so forth. That is what he means, people qualified to make the judgment, and the qualifications incidentally that they now have, by law they have qualifications, of course, by law over their income, education. The qualification for black vote is substantially less than it is for the white vote.

Senator CLARK. It seems to me that would be more a qualified minority than a qualified majority. If you have a high standard of something that excludes 51 percent of the electorate from voting, you are really talking about a qualified minority.

Mr. ANDREWS. I believe he says in here he is willing to accept a majority provided the majority is qualified.

Senator CLARK. Given that qualification it is only one percent of the population.

Mr. ANDREWS. Not if the majority is qualified. I think he said what we need to work to do is qualify the majority, then we can have a majority rule. I think that is what he is saying—I do not like to put words in his mouth—I am quoting him. Now, both sides have been far apart. Both sides have made mistakes. Both sides have not been able to live up to a cease-fire, and both sides anguish over this.

You have two men here, I think, who are indeed honestly and conscientiously trying to solve the very complex problem.

Therefore, I recommend that we accept this challenge from both sides, recognize the Smith government—I recognize the responsibility of the British Government, and so forth, and so does Mr. Smith, for indeed Rhodesia has for years demonstrated that it meets the criteria for recognition, that it is in control of its economic, military, and political life and capable of meeting its world commitments, more so than many other nations that received much quicker recognition. Let us again show leadership in the United Nations and totally lift the sanctions and accept Rhodesia's invitation to invest, to create jobs, to build trade schools, to educate, to unionize, and to build an economically healthy and responsible African middle class, qualified to vote under existing laws.

There are only approximately 90,000 registered voters in Rhodesia, 10,000 of which are African. It is estimated that perhaps another 20,000 are qualified and could be registered if urged to do so. Many of these

received their training at and worked for formerly U.S.-owned companies.

Thus, by investing, we would create the African middle class and by registering on 1 percent of the population they would have African majority rule without bloodshed, economic stability, and a country in Africa to be envied by the dictatorships of the north.

In so doing, I would think we would develop in the southern part of Africa a long-term friendship with a group of countries that control a large percentage of the world's supply of many strategic and critical materials. To follow our present course plays into the hands of those terrorist and power-seeking factions of Rhodesia supported by Peking and/or that part of the OAU led by General Idi Amin of Uganda.

To your question of whether they are getting guns, I have seen Japanese weapons picked up from the field. I have seen Russian weapons picked up from the field, and have pictures of them.

Senator CLARK. These are Rhodesian—Ian Smith——

Mr. ANDREWS. Guerrilla weapons.

Senator CLARK. My question yesterday was where does Ian Smith get his weapons?

Mr. ANDREWS. I do not know. South Africa?

Senator CLARK. South Africa?

Mr. ANDREWS. I would think so. From what I have seen. I have seen many of them. I am not that much of an expert on weapons. When it is written Chinese all over the barrel you have a pretty good idea.

Senator CLARK. Japanese?

Mr. ANDREWS. I do not know that. Did I say Japanese? I mean to say Russian. Chinese and Russian. I am sorry. I did not mean to say Japanese.

It is time for a new course. A course of noninterference or idealistic meddling in the internal affairs of a foreign country. Let Rhodesians solve Rhodesian problems. Let us adopt a policy of detente-trade for the economic improvement of all, similar to the policy we are following in many other parts of the world with equally unacceptable internal practices.

I think we can then help build Rhodesia without the exodus of European skills, without the retardation and retrogression. Even today one of Dr. Kaunda's major projects is to attract the white farmer back to Zambia who has been gone for ten years, because his agricultural program is in chaos and he knows it.

Thank you.

Senator CLARK. Thank you, very much.

We appreciate having your paper and your point of view.

I wonder if we might visit a little bit. You have obviously spent a lot of time in Rhodesia?

Mr. Andrews. And much of the rest of Africa.

RHODESIAN POLITICS, SOCIETY, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

Senator CLARK. In your observations of Rhodesian politics, society and economic structure, what is your general impression of it? Do you feel that that is the kind of society, political and economic system that you could subscribe to?

Mr. ANDREWS. As an economic system, yes.

They are less government controlled, if I can use that word, and more for free enterprise, the kind for motherhood and apple pie approach, than probably we are.

You must remember that the dissident forces that you are hearing from and that you see the majority of the people talking about, the African now in Rhodesia is better fed, better housed, got a better job, driving a car, with a television than most of the rest of places I have been in Africa.

Now, the problem is the vote, it is not the economy.

Senator CLARK. Let us look at the economic situation.

Mr. ANDREWS. Strong.

DISCRIMINATORY ECONOMIC PRACTICES

Senator CLARK. I am under the impression, and you can certainly check me, that there are discriminatory practices economically?

Mr. ANDREWS. No, sir.

Senator CLARK. Within Rhodesia? In other words, an African may own property and—

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK [continuing]. And has every economic privilege that a white Rhodesian has.

Mr. ANDREWS. It goes even farther than that. I think, sir, what you are talking about is what happens in South Africa. A recent dissertation in the House suggested we have got to put the sanctions back on Rhodesia because they have apartheid, the black toilets and white toilets, and blacks cannot stay at certain hotels and cannot hold certain jobs in South Africa. Such as a black man cannot be a hot metal crane operator, that is a white man's job. There is no such exclusion in Rhodesia. If that black man gets that job he gets the pay.

Senator CLARK. There is no economic discrimination against blacks in Rhodesia?

Mr. ANDREWS. As such, no.

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN RHODESIA

Senator CLARK. What about social?

Mr. ANDREWS. What do you mean by that? You mean cannot stay in the hotels?

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. No, sir.

Senator CLARK. Is there any kind—

Mr. ANDREWS. A black, for example, they have not had and do not have racial discrimination on the athletic field that you have in South Africa and black men were playing on the soccer field of Salisbury before Jackie Robinson was ever on a baseball field in New York.

Senator CLARK. There is complete integration?

Mr. ANDREWS. As a society, of course, as there is a segregation here in the sense they tend to live, but last time I was there a man and woman in the next room to me in the hotel was a black man and his wife and two children. You sit next to them in the restaurants. They mingle in the park. They go in the swimming pools. In South Africa they cannot do that.

VOTER QUALIFICATION FOR BLACKS

Senator CLARK. You were going to pass on, when I interrupted you, to the economic-political equality.

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, there is no question but that the crux of the problem is the franchise and they have set the qualifications for voting and most of the Africans do not even bother to register to vote.

Senator CLARK. Do they have the same qualifications for registration?

Mr. ANDREWS. By law if they can meet certain qualifications and they are rather slight—they must have 2 years of secondary school and an income of what would be equivalent of about \$800 a year, something like that. It is about half what it is to be a white registered voter.

EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES

Senator CLARK. If one of the qualifications is education, do they have equality of educational opportunities?

Mr. ANDREWS. No. For example, the white child is required to go to school, as he is in the United States. The black child is not required to go to school, although education for blacks and whites is the second largest item in the Rhodesian budget.

Senator CLARK. You say blacks are discriminated against in terms of educational opportunities?

Mr. ANDREWS. I would not say in-opportunity, in-encouragement. It costs a man 25 cents a semester to send his kids to school.

Senator CLARK. About 25 cents?

Mr. ANDREWS. So he will have some input into it, so he will have some responsibility.

PERCENTAGE OF EDUCATED BLACK PEOPLE

Senator CLARK. What percentage of the educated people are black people? Do you have any rough idea?

Mr. ANDREWS. I do not know. I do know they have an 80 percent literacy among the black population, which is I think the second highest in all of Africa.

Senator CLARK. Eighty percent of the black population in Rhodesia?

Mr. ANDREWS. Literate.

Senator CLARK. Can read and write?

Mr. ANDREWS. That is the statistic I have heard many times.

Senator CLARK. That does not qualify them to vote?

Mr. ANDREWS. No, because the law says 2 years of secondary school.

VOTER STATISTICS. BLACK REPRESENTATION

Senator CLARK. According to your figures, there are approximately 90,000 registered voters in Rhodesia of which 10,000 are Africans?

Mr. ANDREWS. I would say it is under 10—9—

Senator CLARK. So it is about 1 out of every 9 or 10—

Mr. ANDREWS. Who have qualified and bothered to register.

Senator CLARK. One out of every 9 or 10 registered voters are black?

Mr. ANDREWS. That is right.

Senator CLARK. And one out of every 21 or 24, I think I read, Rhodesians are white?

Mr. ANDREWS. 300,000 to 6 million.

Senator CLARK. One out of 20. Let us round it off.

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, sir.

Incidentally, the blacks have 16 seats in the House and 50 white, and there are 10 black senators and 13 white senators, and I think the Republicans would like to have that in the Senate if they could.

Senator CLARK. Does that mean anything?

Mr. ANDREWS. I think they would like to have that close majority.

Senator CLARK. Does that representation in the Parliament really have any effect?

Mr. ANDREWS. Indeed it does. The whole thing is this and that is why what is going on over there now has nothing to do with economics. They are having constitutional meetings. They are meeting to rewrite their constitution. They have black senators elected from among the chiefs and so forth. They have white senators, but there are three appointed by the President.

FUTURE OF RHODESIAN POLITICAL SITUATION

Senator CLARK. Do you believe the Smith regime will go on well into the future, that the present kind of arrangement will continue? Do you see the situation changing? Do you think there will be majority rule in Rhodesia, using the term "qualified majority," in which black adult Africans will be allowed to participate? I am trying to get your feeling as to where we are going to go. You say it is not going to remain the same. Do you expect some kind of agreement with the African National Council?

What do you see in the future?

Mr. ANDREWS. We have several problems, and I will try to be as brief as I can. I think a lot of people do not understand this.

There is, indeed, as was raised here earlier, some question whether the ANC indeed represents the majority of the African people of Rhodesia. I seriously doubt that they do—not because they do not agree with that position—they do not care.

I asked Bishop Muzorewa one time, let's you and I go down to your office and walk down the street and we will stop the first 100 Africans we come to and ask them what the sanctions, what the Byrd amendment is, and what chrome is, and how many of them will be able to tell me.

Senator CLARK. I do not know how many in this country could.

Mr. ANDREWS. I doubt very many. You have the political strata of Rhodesia, I call them the Bolowalo farmers, which are the conservative Afrikaner trying to pull Smith to the right and to reimpose the sanctions will stiffen Smith's right wing. He is pragmatic enough to know that change is coming. He is going to lead that change, if he can, without giving up their standard of living and going into a retrogression. And I cannot really fault him for that.

On the other side you have the ZANU, which is saying and has said that we will not stop until there is not a white man left between Salisbury and Cape Town, and Muzorewa has to contend with that.

Senator CLARK. Whose statement was that?

Mr. ANDREWS. ZANU. Sithole made it, it is purported. It is on the record.

Senator CLARK. Can you provide that for us?

Mr. ANDREWS. I do not know. I haven't got it with me, but think I can.

Senator CLARK. We would like to have the documentation.

[Committee staff note. At the time of publication, the information referred to had not been received.]

Mr. ANDREWS. This is the thing in point that is causing South Africa's problem of what is going on in Rhodesia; you have these extremes and the various strata in between. The mere question of does ANC represent all people of southern Africa, why did the black man throw a hand grenade into Muzorewa's house a couple-3 weeks ago? Why is he going around with armed guards? He is not afraid of having Smith shoot him. The worse thing that could happen to Smith would be to have Muzorewa get killed. I do not mean to treat it lightly. I think the second thing I would like to inject here is the Afrikaner of Rhodesia is a very different man than the Portuguese of Mozambique. I envision many as a kind of rugged individualist, if you will, that pioneered the West of this country and slept with a rifle to keep the Indians and wild animals off of him. He is that kind of a person in makeup. He will fight if he has to. I think we should get out of the way, and Dr. Kaunda and President Nyerere and President Machel have all I think tried to say this. They have recognized that the economic facts of life mean that Rhodesia that sets in the middle of that economic community must survive, and therefore, they are pushing for some sort of transitional multiracial outcome that will guarantee the rights of the minorities that are left, and all of the minorities are not white people.

Example: In Uganda, the Asians were run out of the country.

Senator CLARK. As I understand, you support these efforts by the various people you mentioned in the various nations?

Mr. ANDREWS. Absolutely. I have said in a statement before the House when Lusaka talks occurred Smith had tried and made three deals with Bishop Muzorewa, none of which were to be sold and stood up. They walked away from three deals and thought they had it.

POLITICAL CHANGEOVER IMPACT ON FUTURE CHROME SALES TO UNITED STATES

Senator CLARK. Bishop Muzorewa was here. I heard him say before the House, not in an official hearing, I think this is his quote: "When we have decided where to sell our chrome," meaning after they came to power, "we will ask first who were our friends when we needed them most."

Mr. ANDREWS. Right.

Senator CLARK. Do you suspect that if the bishop or others come to power, that will be the end of chrome sales in the United States?

Mr. ANDREWS. Absolutely not. Let us think about it. If you were the bishop, who has helped them the most and who has hurt them the most? Ask him personally if the sanctions have been effective? His answer will be no. He says he would like to see them kept on because they aggravate Smith. They failed. I think the amount of chrome you are going to shut off is nothing in their exports compared to their tobacco, beef, gold, corn, asbestos, all of which are bigger crops than chrome.

Senator CLARK. You say more of the income of the Rhodesian Government comes from the other sources.

Mr. ANDREWS. With the Byrd amendment, you are going to shut off \$4 million worth of chrome, \$300 million export, that is what you are going to do to them. Let us ask the question, who was the friend, the biggest friend of Smith? The Americans who said, look, we will put the sanctions on, and we left them on for 5 years, and the only guy that got hurt was us. We shut down three ferrochrome plants in the United States, and go ask the man out in Steubenville, Ohio, or Marietta, Ohio, who is out of a job because of it; who got hurt?

Now, that is all. We have the sanctions stronger imposed on them than any other industrial, major industrial nation right today, and we said in the Byrd amendment in one sentence, we will not cut our throat on strategic materials if everybody else is cheating.

Now, go down there. The Russians, the Chinese, the blacks of Africa, the most of Europe, are all trading. They are trading in beef, trading in textiles, trading in coal, trading in chrome, trading in asbestos, Rhodesian asbestos. There are two German firms that have built automobile assembly plants since the sanctions went on. The Japanese have built a ferrochrome plant there since the sanctions went on.

Now, who is the one that has really hurt them the worse? If they end up all of a sudden in power—

Senator CLARK. You would predict that if the bishop comes to power, that he would be anxious to sell his chrome?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes; I think he will. I do not think he is coming to power. He does not want the job.

ALLEGHENY LUDLUM'S IMPORTATION OF CHROME

Senator CLARK. Do you import chrome in your firm?

Mr. ANDREWS. Allegheny Ludlum's importation of its raw materials, mainly chrome, from Rhodesia represents substantially less than 5 percent of our needs. Yes; we have brought a little bit in to prove the point.

U.S. DEPENDENCY ON RHODESIAN CHROME FOR STRATEGIC PURPOSES

Senator CLARK. Are we indeed that dependent on Rhodesian chrome for strategic purposes? I noticed in Ambassador Buffum's statement this morning—you were here?

Mr. ANDREWS. I did not read his statement.

Senator CLARK. He said we imported virtually no chrome ore from Rhodesia from 1968 to 1971.

Mr. ANDREWS. Of course not. It was against the law.

Senator CLARK. No ferrochrome before 1972.

Mr. ANDREWS. Of course not. They did not have any.

Senator CLARK. Since 1972, our metallurgical chromite imports from Rhodesia have remained steadily at approximately 10 percent of the total U.S. imports of this material.

Mr. ANDREWS. I am surprised at that. This shows what the State Department has been doing time and time again, and they have not bothered to find out what the problem is.

Let me answer your question, sir. There are two things—chromite, and there is ferrochrome. Two different things.

Now, when the sanctions were put on in 1968, it was against the law to bring chromite into the United States. That is why there was none imported.

There were six ferrochrome plants in the United States. Three of them were dependent upon Rhodesian chrome for its ore supplies to make ferrochrome. Two of them are dependent upon Russian chrome ore to make ferrochrome. The biggest one got its chrome from Russia and one from Turkey.

Now that is where we got our chrome ore from. And I said to the State Department in 1968, when they told me that the Smith government would not last but 6 months, we would be out of this business, if you left the sanctions on for 3 years you would bring irreparable damage and destruction to at least up to 50 percent of our ferrochrome industry.

In 1968 the Rhodesians did not make ferrochrome. They had no ferrochrome industry because their mines were owned by U.S. industries who had ferrochrome plants in the United States.

Now, when the sanctions were put on, of course, chrome ore stopped coming in from Rhodesia but the amount that had come from Russia from 1960, 1961, 1962, etc. kept on coming in, serving the three plants so of course it did not go down.

What happened was the three ferrochrome plants that were dependent upon Rhodesian chrome, went out of business.

Now, when the sanctions came off—I am kind of surprised, you know, how come there is up to 10 percent ore coming in? The Russians have fallen short of their shipments and doubled the prices. Even some of the Russian buyers have started buying from Rhodesia. They have found the Russians to be unreliable.

In the meantime the profits were accruing to U.S. industries in Rhodesia on those chrome mines which they couldn't ship to the United States, but shipped to everybody else.

What do you do with that money? So Smith built a ferrochrome industry, which he did not have. He built it with Japanese help and German and Italian equipment, and I was there and saw it go up every year from a green field until where now the ferrochrome industry in Rhodesia is bigger than our ferrochrome industry. This was built, with our locked-in money, that is against the law to come out, while we shut down three plants here. Look at your imports of ferrochrome from Rhodesia—30,000 tons last year, zero in 1971. Of course, we are not bringing chromite ore.

Senator CLARK. I am still waiting for you to answer my question.

Mr. ANDREWS. I thought I did.

Senator CLARK. The question is do you think that a complete sanction would affect us strategically?

Mr. ANDREWS. Certainly.

Senator CLARK. Ten percent?

Mr. ANDREWS. I was told when I came here, Senator, that this was not to discuss chrome and the Byrd amendment, and please not bring it up, so I do not have a lot of statistics and a chart.

Senator CLARK. Who told you not to bring it up?

Mr. ANDREWS. The staff.

Senator CLARK. Our staff?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, sir. They said that was not what the subject was about. I get highly identified with this subject because of my fight in the House and so forth over there on H.R. 1287, so I think they were afraid I would use this platform to make a speech on the Byrd amendment.

Senator CLARK. I am giving you an opportunity.

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, you are.

The point is if you have 2 hours I can talk for 2 hours on this subject.

Senator CLARK. As a matter of fact, I have only got 2 minutes.

Mr. ANDREWS. Eighty-seven percent of the world's chrome comes out of Southern Africa.

Senator CLARK. I do not want a lecture on chrome.

What I really want to know is the strategic question. If ten percent of our chrome—

Mr. ANDREWS. Chrome ore?

Senator CLARK. Chrome ore.

Mr. ANDREWS. Chrome ore.

Senator CLARK. Comes from Rhodesia, and if that were cut off, do you think there is no other source? Could we not increase other sources? Do you think the 10 percent is strategic?

Mr. ANDREW. You cannot make steel with chrome ore. You need ferrochrome. So what you are talking about, the 10 percent that comes supports 50 percent of our needs. What about the other 50 percent that is imported ferrochrome?

Senator CLARK. How did we exist in the period when it was cut off?

Mr. ANDREWS. We had inventories. We saw the sanctions coming and we took the stockpile down from its highest point in history of 6 million tons down to 2.5 million tons with the stockpile because you could see it coming.

Soft sanctions went in 1965-66.

Senator CLARK. To be specific, if we had permanent sanctions for the next 5 years what would be the adverse strategic effects?

Mr. ANDREWS. Adverse strategic effects would be you would drop to probably 30 percent ferrochrome, self-sufficiency. In the United States you would move up to 70 percent imports. I have predicted that the price of chrome would go from the normal world price of \$70 now, \$140 by the Russians, to \$500.

Senator CLARK. That is strategic? That is what happened in oil.

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK. I do not see that as a strategic question.

Mr. ANDREWS. I think you would then be dependent because of your lack of ability if you did enforce and say no ferrochrome that contains Rhodesian chrome comes in, you would then shut down the stainless steel industry, as you did the ferrochrome industry, or a major portion of it.

And chromium, by definition, is the most strategic material in the United States, and we have none indigenous to the United States.

Senator CLARK. Carry that on through.

Mr. ANDREWS. You cannot build an airplane, and build a power station, cannot build a hospital, cannot build a food processing plant, cannot build a train.

Anywhere you want corrosion resistance you need chrome. It has been defined as the most unsubstitutable metal we have. It is the most strategic material.

U.S. SURVIVABILITY WITH IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS

Senator CLARK. From your judgment, if we were to impose such sanctions, we really could not survive as a country?

Mr. ANDREWS. It would depend on a lot of things. If the rest of the world would quit buying, I think you have to ask your question, can you afford to go offshore for your corrosion resistance tool steels and material, especially the steel industry, as a strategic policy.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much for coming.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you for your time, sir.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]

U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA

Angola

MONDAY, JULY 14, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Dick Clark (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Clark and Biden.

Senator CLARK. The hearing will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

Angola on the eve of independence is a nation of great potential. It is already one of the richest countries in Africa. This wealth could now be used to improve the quality of life for all its people.

After 500 years of colonial domination, they will finally have the opportunity to work together as equal citizens of a free nation to shape their own future. But independence could also bring civil war and years of tragedy, as this last weekend of terror has so clearly revealed.

It is essential that U.S. policy toward Angola be supportive of peace and unity in that nation. Of course, it is for the Angolans themselves to resolve their internal differences—with the help of neighboring African States and Portugal.

What the United States can and must do is to help assure that outside interference by major powers will not aggravate the divisions within Angola.

It must be clear that the United States wants good relations with whatever government finally takes power in Angola, and that this country will not interfere in determining what the nature of that government will be.

This was the first and strongest recommendation made by all three public witnesses on Angola. As Professor John Marcum put it, "Perhaps the most important thing the American Government can do in Angola is to refrain from projecting parochial or ideological intolerance into its perception of the situation there." It is true that the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have given military support to different liberation movements in their struggle for independence.

Many believe that the United States has been covertly supporting one of the liberation movements. A cold war view of the world might dictate that the United States should give military support to one of the movements.

It might be argued by some that this would be the only way to protect American strategic and economic interests in Angola.

But the U.S. experience in dealing with independent African nations should have taught us that such intervention would be a serious mistake.

African leaders are most interested in maintaining policies of non-alignment, in establishing good relations with all the major powers and avoiding any foreign control over their policies. Undoubtedly, this same desire to preserve their independence will shape the foreign policies of future leaders of Angola as well.

If the United States establishes a clear, evenhanded policy toward the liberation movement leaders in Angola and, if it makes every effort to establish communications and good relations with all of them, it will probably be able to work constructively with any future government.

The United States does have to overcome its lack of support for the struggle against colonialism—a choice this country made because it feared offending a NATO ally, Portugal. In my opinion, it would be unwise to compound these past mistakes by again basing U.S. policy toward Angola on cold war assumptions.

It is also important to remember that the issue of territorial integrity is a particularly sensitive one in Africa. African countries are committed to maintaining colonial borders and building unified nation-states within them. All of them have regional and ethnic divisions that must be overcome.

Any outside country that attempts to aggravate these divisions in Angola jeopardizes its relations with all the nations of Africa.

As a democratic nation that is interested in helping make democracy work in other countries, the U.S. interests clearly lie with unity and stability in Angola.

The Alvor agreement includes a provision that there will be democratic elections for a constituent assembly.

The chances of these elections taking place are much better if the liberation movements are unified and can work out acceptable ground rules for them.

On the question of U.S. strategic and economic interests in Angola, it is certainly not in this or any other country's interests that Angola's economy be disrupted by civil war. Nor is it in U.S. interest that instability and conflict with major power intervention continue.

REQUEST FOR ADMINISTRATION COMMENT ON PUBLIC WITNESS' SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS

The public witnesses on Angola made several specific suggestions on how the U.S. could help promote unity and stability in that country. It would be useful if the administration witnesses today could comment on the following suggestions:

First, the United States should support the efforts being made by Portugal and the OAU to promote unity among the liberation movements and keep peace in Angola.

The witnesses even suggested that the United States might offer to help pay the cost of maintaining Portuguese troops in Angola if they are needed longer than was originally expected.

Second, the United States must avoid any covert support for any one of the liberation movements. This recommendation applies not only to Government support, but also to American corporations in Angola that might be pressured to give financial assistance to the liberation movements or the Cabinda secessionist movement.

It was recommended that the Government investigate the possibility that Gulf Oil or other corporations are under this kind of pressure.

Third, the United States should make it clear that it can deal with any government that might take power in Angola. A special effort must be made to establish communications with all the liberation movement leaders and to convince them that the United States is impartial.

Fourth, offers of U.S. assistance, bilateral as well as multilateral, must be the kind that will encourage unity among the liberation movements and will not favor any one of them. The witnesses felt it was important to work in close cooperation with the Portuguese Government on this matter. There may well be development projects that have the endorsement of all three of the movements. It is encouraging that in its educational assistance to Angola, the United States has offered an equal number of scholarships to all three of the movements.

Fifth, if it is clear that the United States is not in any way intervening on behalf of one of the liberation movements, it could play a role in encouraging the Soviet Union and China to cease their intervention.

It might be useful to call to the attention of the international community the difficulties outside military assistance is causing in the effort to bring about a peaceful resolution of this problem.

Finally, Professor Marcum recommended that U.S. policy toward Angola be clearly based on a "mutuality of interests." While this recommendation may seem vague, there is in fact a great difference between basing policy on a mutuality of interests and basing it exclusively on the promotion of short-term American interests.

For example, the U.S. Government could encourage American companies in Angola either to be inflexible in their dealings with the new Government, or to try to work out a relationship that would be beneficial to Angola's own economic development.

The contracts for these investments were made with the Portuguese colonial government, which had very different interests than an independent government will have.

The United States could demand that Angola's foreign policy be consistent with our own positions as a condition for establishing close relations. Or it could support Angola's efforts to develop good relations with all countries, thus assuring its genuine independence.

The United States could make judgments critical of the new government's internal economic and political policies. Or the United States could work with that government in supporting those policies that will improve the quality of life for its citizens. The area where it is most important that the United States base its policy on a mutuality of interests, is the use of Angolan ports for U.S. and other government naval visits.

WITNESSES

Today, witnesses from the Bureau of African Affairs and from AID, will outline for the subcommittee current U.S. policy toward Angola. Hopefully, they will also comment on the above suggestions that have been made by some of the foremost U.S. scholars on Angola.

Ambassador Davis, we welcome you and the other witnesses. You may proceed in any way you are prepared.

**STATEMENT OF HON. NATHANIEL DAVIS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to meet with the subcommittee for an exchange of views on the situation in Angola.

Angola, as you know, will be the last of Portugal's African colonies to attain its independence, which is scheduled for November 11 of this year. Unlike the situation in the other territories, where a single liberation movement existed when Portugal embarked on its policy of decolonization last year, three major liberation groups have existed in Angola for some years. In addition to agreement with Portugal, the three groups had to agree among themselves on the modalities for independence. This was done last January, and a transitional government composed of representatives of the three movements and of Portugal was installed on January 31.

COMPETITION AMONG THREE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN ANGOLA

The basic problem posed by the separate identities of the three groups and the strong competition between them for ultimate leadership of Angola was not resolved; and as you know, there have been recurring serious outbreaks of violence since January. The three movements divided by ethnic, ideological, and personal differences, have made several efforts to reach political accommodation and to insure a peaceful transition to independence, but fighting among them has continued. A second "summit" meeting between leaders of the three groups took place in Nakuru, Kenya, during June 16-21, under the sponsorship of President Kenyatta. We sincerely hope that the three leaders—Agostinho Neto of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), Holden Roberto of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and Jonas Savimbi of the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)—will continue to make serious efforts to resolve their differences through negotiations. The agreement reached on June 21 pledged each of them to sharing in the preparations for independence without additional bloodshed. Fighting between MPLA and FNLA broke out again late last week, however.

U.S. POSITION TOWARD FUTURE INDEPENDENT ANGOLA

Our own position toward the future independent Angola was stated by President Ford at the White House dinner for President Kaunda of Zambia on April 19, when he said:

We have been following developments in southern Africa with great, great interest. For many years the U.S. has supported self-determination for the peoples of that area and we continue to do so today. We view the coming independence of Mozambique, Angola, and the island territories with great satisfaction * * * as we viewed the independence of Guinea-Bissau just last year * * * America stands ready to help the emerging countries * * * and to provide what assistance we can.

I would add that we hope to enter into mutually beneficial relations with independent Angola at the appropriate time.

Although the problems now facing Angola and its leaders are profound, the country has a great potential which can only be realized if peace and order prevail. Angola's natural and human resources will, in the long term, make it a politically important and economically viable member of the family of nations. We look forward to welcoming Angola into the international community and wish the leaders success in reaching a peaceful resolution of their differences.

Mr. Dennis Conroy of the AID will review Angola's economic potential and possible assistance needs.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CLARK. Thank you.

We welcome you, Mr. Conroy. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF DENNIS E. CONROY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF AFRICAN REGIONAL AFFAIRS, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Conroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is a pleasure to appear today before the subcommittee on behalf of the Agency for International Development to discuss the economy of Angola and the implications for U.S. assistance.

LIMITED ROLE FOR AID IN ANGOLA SEEN

I would like to comment right away that we visualize a limited role for AID capital assistance in Angola. The country is by far the richest of Portugal's overseas territories which are becoming independent and in 1975 apparently enjoyed the third highest per capita income among independent African countries. It should be apparent from the brief economic data that follow why we do not anticipate providing capital development assistance.

An unofficial estimate for 1973 put Angola's GNP at \$2.8 billion, and with a 6.2 million population, the per capita GNP would then be over \$490. Oil income is the major reason; in 1975, oil revenues were estimated at about \$425 million. Angola's other mineral resources are also impressive. Diamonds rank second in importance as a mineral export, and in 1974 revenues from diamonds were \$72 million. Iron is mined, and while the high grade ore currently exported may be exhausted by 1978, lower grade deposits are available for development in the southern part of the country. Manganese, copper, and phosphates are also found in quantity, although the exact extent of resources will require a mineral survey.

ANGOLA RICH IN AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES

Angola's agricultural resources are also impressive, and the agricultural sector presents the most significant opportunity for raising living standards. More than three-quarters of the population are employed in agricultural production with coffee, cotton, and sisal the chief exports and important sources of export earnings. Coffee earnings alone in 1974 are estimated at \$172 million. The country grows many other crops: bananas, tobacco, sugar, oilseeds, wheat, and rice. Many livestock are raised and Angola could support a major livestock industry. Ocean fishing is also an obvious resource. Although Angola had run balance-of-payments deficits, up until 1973, the substantially increased export earnings from petroleum and coffee that year reversed the situation and a significant surplus is estimated for 1974. The future economic level could well be affected by the uncertain political situation now prevailing, so future economic activity is difficult to predict.

AGRICULTURE STATISTICS FOR ANGOLA, 1975

Senator CLARK. If I may interrupt you for a second, Mr. Conroy, in terms of the statistics that you gave above, what is your judgment on how accurate those will be in 1975 with all of the political upheaval? It seems to me I have been reading that the economic situation has taken a rather downward turn with the civil war—civil war is too strong a word—the activities that are occurring.

Are these trends that have been occurring in the last year?

Mr. CONROY. I do not think we have information, sir, exactly on the data for last year, for 1975. By and large it is very possible they have been. I am not sure they will be reversed but they are not going to be favorable.

Of course, a large part of the export earnings are from oil revenues and it could be that those actually have increased in dollar volume.

I don't think they have been affected.

PERCENTAGE OF OIL EXPORT EARNINGS

Senator CLARK. What percentage of their export dollars are derived from oil?

Mr. CONROY. I believe that it is about 60 percent in 1974. The price goes up and production has gone up in 1975, so this could counter that. If oil exports were affected, this would be a major factor in terms of the economy. But it is true, the present economic situation will not continue as it did in 1974.

Senator CLARK. Go ahead, I'm sorry.

AID ASSISTANCE NEEDS TO INDEPENDENT ANGOLA

Mr. CONROY. We have limited data about the status of the Angolan African population but we know that education and training has been limited; illiteracy runs 85 to 90 percent; and although more farmers play a role in the cash economy than in many African countries, subsistence agriculture is paramount. Government agricultural programs to date, with the possible exception of coffee, have not emphasized the rural areas and the whole concept of rural development,

with farmer training, extension, and research needs to be introduced. Industry and commerce have been dominated by the Portuguese segment of the population. The serious shortage of skilled black Angolans means that skilled advisers and operational personnel will be needed to keep the economy operating—while training programs for Africans are mounted. Primary and secondary education will carry on if a sufficient number of teachers remain. However, staffing of university departments will be a critical problem and technical education must be developed from the ground up. Health will be a pressing social need in rural and urban areas, and the new government will require extensive help in planning and operating programs to meet the needs of an independent country.

AID TECHNICAL HELP, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT ASSISTANCE

AID has programmed funds for training of Angolans under the \$25 million authorized in fiscal year 1975 for Portugal and the Portuguese colonies in Africa gaining independence. We have signed a contract for a regional development training program with the African American Institute and at least 40 training grants in either Africa or the United States have been made available this year for selection through the Ministry of Education in Luanda. We have requested additional funding for this program in the fiscal year 1976 congressional presentation and could expand the number of participants next year if candidates are found.

We also wish to respond if a request comes from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to assist with a resettlement program similar to that received for Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. There are hundreds of thousands of persons who fled their homes during the 10-year insurgency—some to neighboring countries—who must be helped to return to their land and given food, seeds, handtools, and minimum health care to enable them to plant crops and become self-sufficient. The program may total \$7 to \$10 million of which the United States might contribute 25 percent.

In this connection, I would like to mention a practical programming problem with which the African offices in State and AID have been faced over the past 2½ months with this special category of funds. While the Appropriations Act signed in late March 1975 provided that not less than \$10 million of the \$25 million authorized be used in Africa, only \$5 million of the funds authorized in December 1974 were made available to make grants. African requirements and the requests received have required grant funding; training, resettlement of refugees, assistance to Cape Verde are not appropriate for loans.

We could have been more responsive more rapidly in obligating funds if the entire African appropriation had been available on a grant basis.

In summary, Angola should not require large amounts of capital assistance but the United States should be in a position to provide technical help and resettlement assistance. The problems facing an independent Angola in rural development, agricultural research, technical training, university level education, and administration will be great.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much, Mr. Conroy.

Either of you may answer questions as we go along.

TOTAL VALUE OF U.S. FIXED INVESTMENTS FOR ANGOLA

Senator CLARK. I have some questions. Senator Biden, feel free to break in at any time you may have questions.

I wonder, Mr. Conroy, or Mr. Davis, do you know the total value of the U.S. fixed investments in Angola?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, I do have some figures in that regard.

American investment in Angola is estimated between \$300 million and \$400 million, most of which is concentrated in petroleum exploration and production.

Gulf Oil Co.'s investment in the development and exploration of the Cabinda offshore oilfield is by far the largest single U.S. investment in Angola and may account for 90 percent or more of the total U.S. investment in the territory.

Other American oil companies currently holding exploration concessions in Angola as reported include Texaco, Exxon, Argo Petroleum Co. of Los Angeles, and Amerada Hess Corp., Sun Oil Co., and Cities Service.

None of these concessions have entered into production. However, an older concession jointly held by Texaco and a Belgium company is producing about 30,000 barrels per day. U.S. companies with modest investment in concessions in exploration operations in the mining field reportedly include Chromalloy American Corp., United States Steel Corp., and Tenneco.

In the industrial commercial field, General Tire & Rubber Co., ITT, and First National City Bank have small or modest investments.

U.S. imports from Angola, primarily petroleum and coffee, rose from \$166 million in 1973 to \$378 million in 1974. Much of this increase was the result of sharply higher petroleum prices.

U.S. exports to Angola climbed from \$38 million in 1973 to \$62 in 1974.

Senator CLARK. Fine.

What is the total value of U.S. investments?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, in terms of trade, in 1974 the imports were \$378 million and the exports were \$62 million. And, of course, petroleum was most of the imports.

U.S. POLICY CONCERNING PROTECTION OF GULF OIL INVESTMENT

Senator CLARK. It appears that 90 percent, I think, was the figure you used—90 percent or more of this investment is Gulf Oil.

Is it our policy that the U.S. Government has a responsibility to protect the Gulf Oil investment in Angola?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, I think—

Senator CLARK. Would you qualify that in some way or describe what our policy would be?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes.

I think that U.S. policy toward investment is that we recognize the full right of the host country, whatever it may be; first, to regulate investment abroad and, second, to go to the point of nationalization of a U.S. investment if that is their decision.

What we do assert is that international law is clear that if a host country to U.S. investment does nationalize U.S. investment, that they

do have an obligation to prompt, adequate, and effective compensation for the investment nationalized, and this is the position I think that we have taken fairly consistently around the world.

U.S. POLICY RE RENEGOTIATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT CONTRACTS WITH
NEW GOVERNMENT

Senator CLARK. Since the current contracts for foreign investors in Angola were made with Portugal, do you believe that the new government has the right to renegotiate these contracts so that foreign investment will contribute more to the country's internal economic development, or do we as a Government have a policy? One of the public witnesses here made quite an issue of that as we talked about Angola. What is your judgment? What is our policy?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, I think that what usually happens when there is a change of government and change of jurisdiction is that the normal practice is that the government which assumes the responsibility of sovereignty generally does accept the general international obligations of the previous sovereign power.

Now, this does not mean that a new government would not have the right and the opportunity to review such arrangements as might have been made before, and, for example, a decision to nationalize is certainly a very sharp example of a decision of a government, whether it be in a new government or otherwise, to change the terms of reference under which a foreign company is operating in that territory. And I think that we certainly do recognize that the new government of any territory has the right and opportunity to review such arrangements as there might be and, obviously, has the power and right and opportunity to change them in accordance with its general obligations and its obligations under international law.

FLEC, FLNA, MPLA THREATS TO GULF OIL

Senator CLARK. Mr. Bender, one of our witnesses, stated that there had been threats—he never evidenced this, as I recall, with any specific evidence—but said there had been threats to Gulf by the FLEC and FLNA and MPLA. If they didn't provide money to them, its installations would be destroyed. Are you aware of any such threats as that?

Mr. DAVIS. I have no knowledge of such activities. I would say that, as he, I have heard such things.

Senator CLARK. But the State Department does not have specific knowledge?

Mr. DAVIS. No, I have no knowledge of specific threatening negotiations or what have you.

INVESTIGATION OF THREATS TO GULF OIL

Senator CLARK. And you have not conducted an investigation into that possibility? You haven't had any discussions with Gulf Oil?

Mr. DAVIS. No, sir.

Senator CLARK. I am a member of the Multinational Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee, before which Gulf Oil has testi-

fied they gave money to North Korea and Bolivia under this kind of pressure.

I am curious whether you had any information of that kind with regard to Angola.

Mr. DAVIS. No, sir, I do not have. As I say, I have heard such allegations but I do not have hard information.

U.S. POLICY CONCERNING ASSISTANCE TO LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

Senator CLARK. Both the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China, as I understand it, are providing assistance to different Angolan liberation movements. Does this in any way affect the decision within the administration on whether the United States should provide assistance to those movements?

Mr. DAVIS. We have maintained for some years now, since an arms embargo on the former or present Portuguese territories, and my understanding is this arms embargo which was instituted, I believe under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, and that this gave these authorities to the President to control arms exports, and then he made a Presidential determination under them, and my understanding is that this determination continues fully in force.

ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET-CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA

Senator CLARK. Just how serious do you believe the Soviet-Chinese involvement in this conflict to be? Have we made any assessment of that? Do we really know much about the involvement of either of those two parties?

Mr. DAVIS. I think that clear hard information is, as I am sure you can imagine, somewhat hard to come by. I think that the indications are that very considerable military assistance is being given by countries in Eastern Europe to MPLA and that some degree of assistance has been given by an Asian power to FNLA.

INCREASED SINO-SOVIET COMPETITION OVER AFRICA

Senator CLARK. This is a judgmental question, I guess. Do you believe that the Soviet and Chinese interest in Angola reflects an increased Sino-Soviet competition over Africa?

Mr. DAVIS. Whether their positions are reflective of an increasing competition, I am not sure. There have been elements of let's say lack of coordination of their views in a number of places in Africa.

Whether this is basically on the increase, I am not so sure.

SOVIET INTEREST IN AFRICAN MILITARY, PORT FACILITIES

Senator CLARK. Do you have any evidence or any feeling that the Soviet interest in Angola is in any way tied to an interest in African military or port facilities?

Mr. DAVIS. I do not have any evidence that the Soviet Union is seeking port facilities in and around Angola, if that is the import of what you are saying.

Senator CLARK. Yes, that is.

U.S. STRATEGIC NAVAL INTEREST IN ANGOLA PORT FACILITIES

In your judgment, what would be the impact on U.S. strategic interest in Angola if the Angolan ports were closed to the United States and made available to the Soviet Union? Would that have any great impact, as you understand, on our strategic interests in that part of the world?

MR. DAVIS. Well, I think that if what you are talking about is a U.S. naval—

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Mr. DAVIS [continuing]. Naval travel around Africa? There are two or three things that might be considerations in this regard.

One of them is, of course, the recent opening of the Suez Canal which does open up the possibility of U.S. naval vessels at least up to a certain size not having to go around the full extent of the African Continent.

My understanding of the situation of our Navy is that some of our naval vessels can pass through the Suez Canal and some cannot.

Insofar as those vessels that need to go around the African Continent, we are, as I am sure you are aware, our practice is not to put into South African ports, so that then the question comes as to into what ports can these vessels put in as they go around the African Continent, and in the past it has been true that they have been putting into what were the Portuguese territories both on the west coast and on the east coast and with the coming of the independence of both of those countries that prospect has been altered very sharply.

Now, there are some possible alternate places for them to put in and there is always the possibility of their fueling at sea and this then becomes a matter of the economics of the situation as to what it costs to get tankers out there to fuel at sea. But these are the kind of considerations which the Navy would have to take into account.

Senator CLARK. Is it fair to say that you see no great strategic loss if that occurs?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, I am not sure whether I speak for my colleagues across the river in the Pentagon as to their evaluation of the utility of access to these ports.

U.S. ACCEPTANCE, COOPERATION WITH WHATEVER GOVERNMENT TAKES POWER

Senator CLARK. One of the recommendations that was made that I read to you earlier said something to the effect that the United States should demonstrate clearly and convincingly that it will accept and work with whatever government takes power in Angola—I guess any of the three liberation movements or any combination of them.

Do you tend to agree with that?

Do you think our Government can do that consistently?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, I think that the President, when he stated in his general view about the emerging territories that had been under Portuguese rule, he said that the attitude of the U.S. Government was favorable to their coming independence and he also expressed a general view that we would seek to establish a constructive relationship with the countries that emerged, and we are certainly open to being helpful to them.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

Senator CLARK. Would you just generally describe our policy toward the liberation movements?

Have we tried to stay in contact with them? Have we tried to stay out of them? How would you describe what our relationship is toward the liberation movements as such?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, I think that our general policy toward all of the liberation movements in southern Africa. I think that it has been set forth, I am sure, there are some theologies in this matter and I am relatively new to these questions.

Perhaps I should get a little help from Mr. Arenales, as to what kind of position we have established.

STATEMENT OF ALFONSO ARENALES, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Mr. ARENALES. For some years, during the decade of the 1960's and 1970's, it had been our practice to receive and to be in communication at the medium level through our embassies in neighboring African countries with representatives of the various liberation movements in all of the southern African countries.

With the coming into being of Portugal's decolonization policy last year, our policy toward contact with liberation group members and leaders was looked at and a decision was made—I think it was in September of last year—to upgrade the level at which these contacts could take place so that our various ambassadors in the countries were then free to deal directly with the leadership of these movements.

That decision has guided our contacts with liberation groups and their leaders ever since with regard to Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia, Namibia and other liberation groups that exist.

As you know, only two of the three Angolan liberation group leaders are in Angola and—

Senator CLARK. Two of the three leaders are in Angola?

Mr. ARENALES. Yes, sir, and our Consul General has been in contact with the leadership of all three of the movements as represented in the transitional government from the outset, from its installation last January.

Senator CLARK. So it is fair to say you are in touch with the three divergent movements?

Mr. ARENALES. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK. And their leadership?

Mr. ARENALES. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. I might add in connection with that that I have not as yet had the opportunity to talk to any of the three heads of the liberation movements. However, I thought I would mention that in connection with other liberation movements in southern Africa I have had the opportunity to talk with Bishop Muzorewa and others of the leaders of the liberation movement in Rhodesia and have had the opportunity to talk with the head of SWAPO, that it is not that the leadership of the bureau is not perfectly prepared to have personal contact with liberation movements as it may be appropriate.

Senator CLARK. Senator Biden?

U.S. INTEREST IN RELATION TO THREE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to pursue the question of the three divergent nationalist groups.

Is it in our interest that one should come to the fore rapidly? Do we care which it is?

Is it in our interest that any particular one, in fact, should assume the reigns of power in Angola? Or is it in our interest for the confusion to be prolonged? Where does our interest lie and what do we do about it?

Other witnesses have suggested that the United States—and you may have mentioned this already—should help the Portuguese with the cost of maintaining troops in Angola, if need be, while the civil war is being sorted out.

Where should we go? What should we be doing, just keep hands off and see what develops?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, I might try to answer your question, Senator, in two or three ways, one of which is that we certainly see that the responsibility for Angola between now and November rests with the Portuguese Government and so that now what came out of the Alvor agreement was a transitional government in which the transitional government would be chaired by the Portuguese and in which all three of the liberation movements would participate.

PREDICTIONS OF CIVIL WAR UPON INDEPENDENCE

Senator BIDEN. Is not everyone predicting there is little or no hope of that participation lasting very long? Everyone I have ever spoken to suggests that upon independence on November 11, what is likely to happen is an all-out civil war, until one of the factions prevails. I apologize for not being here to hear all of your statements.

Does that have any validity?

Mr. DAVIS. That would not be our view of what would be desirable.

Senator BIDEN. Is that your view as to what is most likely to happen? Is that a realistic view of the factions?

Mr. DAVIS. What I think is that right now, for example, the Foreign Minister of Portugal, Mr. Melo Antunes, is on his way to Luanda and I can only assume that his mission will include an effort to dampen down the present violence and to reestablish the viability of the transitional arrangements of government.

Senator BIDEN. I am not suggesting that in fact that is not his intent. Every time Dr. Kissinger gets on a plane and goes to the Middle East it is his intention to bring peace to the Middle East. Sometimes he is more optimistic than other times.

I am trying to get the "non-State Department" answer. I am trying to get a "straight" answer. I am trying to get a realistic appraisal by you if whether as commentators have been saying for some time now, that there is little or no possibility for a peaceful transition. Further, if the coalition that is envisioned as forming as of November 11 is not likely to hold and whether there is going to be a continuation of, or increase in Angola's civil war?

Which do you think is most likely? I am looking for the best judgment call, not what you hope for. What do you think? If you were a bookie sitting there, where would you put your money?

Mr. DAVIS. Well I think that, if you will allow me to give you a slightly State Department answer——

Senator BIDEN. OK.

Mr. DAVIS. I think that it is only fair to the situation on the ground, that it is only fair to the serious and real efforts of Foreign Minister Melo Antunes and of those people who are working for a peaceful transition in Angola to certainly give all of the benefit of the doubt that we can give to the efforts of those people who would like to see a better solution than to that situation degenerating into civil strife.

Senator BIDEN. It was probably an unfair question.

Obviously, if you tell me what your actual assessment is it could very well undermine the efforts of people who are trying to bring about that peaceful transition.

But from what I have read and the people I have spoken to have told me, it seems to me like a long shot. I guess I am not going to be able to get to the next question and get a realistic answer.

If in fact my premise is correct, that it is a long shot, is there any one of those three warring factions we should have a greater interest in? So I will pretend I did not ask that question. You do not have to answer it. I'll move on to something else.

ROLE OF OIL AS CONSIDERATION IN ANGOLA

Oil is a consideration it seems. I am wondering how much oil we are all considering—"we" in an editorial sense. I do not mean the United States, necessarily.

How much oil is at issue? How big a stake is there in Angola with regard to oil. Can it play a major role in the world's oil picture or is it minor?

Mr. DAVIS. As I understand it, the Gulf investment is something over \$300 million.

That in 1974 the Cabinda field, which is by far the largest field in Angola, produced 54 million barrels of oil of which 27 million barrels or exactly 50 percent was exported to the United States. Cabinda currently supplies about 2.25 percent of the total U.S. imports of oil.

So I do not know if that gives you some approximation of what you want?

ARMS SUPPLIES TO LIBERATION GROUPS

Senator BIDEN. That does answer the question. Thank you.

It has been suggested by some, including recently by Mr. Ottaway of the Washington Post in an article on Sino-Soviet rivalry in Angola, that appeared sometime last week, that rivalry seemed to be concentrated on the supply of arms to the liberation groups. Obviously the supply of arms is going to prolong or at least intensify any conflict that exists there.

Do you think that the United States should in any way intervene with either good offices, and/or supplying Angolan troops with arms or taking any kind of action under the large umbrella that we have to try to discourage the warring factions from taking arms from the Soviets or Chinese?

Maybe you could comment on the whole area of arms supply to the liberation groups.

Mr. DAVIS. So far as the question of arms supply, this did come up, sir, before you joined us.

Senator BIDEN. Then I will read it in the record. There is no need to repeat yourself.

Mr. DAVIS. I did point out that we do maintain an arms embargo for the export of arms to Angola so far as the U.S. Government is concerned.

So far as good offices are concerned, I think that there is certainly a very widely held feeling that it would be a very good thing if the supply of arms from outside of Angola could be—that something could be done about it so that it does not develop into a scramble in terms of supplying more and more arms to one faction or another.

I think in terms of the utility of leadership in this regard, I might, I suppose, point out a really rather evident fact, and that is that Angola is part of the African community and that I perhaps express the hope that the African community itself might interest itself in—I do not mean to say that they have not—but I do think that multilateral interest in the possibility of bringing Angola back to a more peaceful road could be a useful thing.

STATE DEPARTMENT INVESTIGATION CONCERNING GULF OIL ROLE
IN ANGOLA

Senator BIDEN. I am going to probably tread on a little thin ice here but I am going to give it a shot anyway.

Has anyone in the State Department conferred with officials of Gulf Oil Corp. or any other corporation that has an interest in the Angolan oil fields to find out whether or not—any demands for financial support have been requested by any of the liberation groups and whether any demands have been met or entertained? Additionally, what position would the State Department take with regard to demands being made by liberation groups on Gulf Oil Co. or any other for financial support for the purchase of arms or anything else?

Mr. DAVIS. If any official of the State Department has conferred with Gulf along these lines I do not know of it, sir.

[The following information was subsequently supplied:]

The Department does, of course, keep in close touch with Gulf officials concerning developments in Angola.

Senator BIDEN. I am not an official member of the Multinational Subcommittee. I am what they term an ex officio member, and I have had the opportunity to attend several of their closed hearings. Were I in the State Department, or were I Dr. Kissinger, I would suggest to you or someone they should sit down with Gulf Oil or someone else and find out what is happening with regard to their corporation in Angola. From what I have learned thus far it would amaze me in fact if Gulf Oil Corp. and other oil companies in Angola have not had some contact somewhere along the road with the liberation groups.

In countries where there has been an established independent government for a significant length of time like Italy, it amazes me that tens of millions of dollars have gone not to warring political factions but rather to flat out payoffs. If it happens there I suspect you might find a little bit here. I suggest it should be explored. I would hate to see a situation where our national policy is not to side with any one

liberation movement or another and then find out that Gulf Oil was supporting one of the liberation groups and while our stated policy was nonsupport. The outcome of this pending civil war, might affect the U.S. position with regard to Angola significantly because I doubt whether many Africans, or many Angolans, whether they be involved in the conflict or not, make a distinction between Gulf Oil and the United States. Although I pray to God they would make that distinction, I doubt very much whether they would. I would hope you would certainly at least inquire of Gulf Oil and others as to what role they are going to play or have been asked to play or have resisted from playing internally in Angolan politics.

This is more of a little diatribe than it is a question. If you sat in the hearings we have been having in the Multinational Subcommittee, I suspect you might come to similar conclusions. It should be investigated.

One more question, if I may, then I will cease, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CLARK. Keep going.

U.S. RESPONSE TO DEMONSTRATION OF PORTUGUESE REFUGEES
REQUESTING HELP

Senator BIDEN. Portuguese citizens in Angola demonstrated in front of the American Consulate General, I understand, to request American help to fly out an estimated thousand refugees still trying to leave Angola.

What has been our response to that demonstration?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, sir, I think that, as I understand the situation with flights between Portugal and Angola, that the Portuguese Government—and I do wish to repeat—that they are the power that is responsible in that place and that the Portuguese Government has made no request of the U.S. Government for the provision of aircraft or what have you and, in fact, I believe that the Portuguese Government has been maintaining its rather regular schedules of regular commercial airlines.

Now considering that these are mostly Portuguese citizens, considering that they wish to go to Portugal, and considering that this is a question that is in the first instance within the purview of the Portuguese authority, I think that we would perhaps look first to them for their view as to what is the appropriate way to handle this particular problem because, of course, where they want to go is Portugal.

Senator BIDEN. I concur fully. I always find it fascinating that citizens of almost every country in the world look to us for help, no matter what happens. They want to burn the flag one time. Then they have their hands out the next time they want our help. I found it fascinating when I read the account that Portuguese citizens were demonstrating in front of the U.S. consulate in a Portuguese colony requesting the United States to fly Portuguese to Portugal and somehow viewed us as being insensitive for not doing it. I think it is a fascinating world. I do not understand it all.

But anyway I appreciate your response.

DOES U.S. SUPPORT ANY ONE LIBERATION MOVEMENT OVER ANOTHER?

I am going to make one last shot, just so I have asked it for the record. Does the U.S. Government support any one liberation movement over another in the Angolan dispute?

Mr. DAVIS. It is our hope that the Portuguese who are in charge of the place and that have worked out a transitional government that includes all three of the Angolan liberation movements, and it is our hope that the Portuguese authorities will be successful in bringing a degree of peace back to the city of Luanda and that the efforts of Foreign Minister Melo Antunes to bring these movements back into a cooperative arrangement which will allow them to move forward as the three movements indicated, most recently at the Nakuru meeting in Kenya, that they would be looking forward to free and peaceful elections, which was their original commitment under the Alvor Agreement and, in our view if the three movements can work out electoral arrangements and hold peaceful elections and have a peaceful transition that would be the best solution in Angola.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Secretary, you are an amazing man on a gloomy Monday like this in Washington. For a man to have that much hope about anything deserves our cooperation on this committee. I think you are an amazing fellow to hope that much. I just hope the Portuguese can decide who owns Portugal, let alone what happens in Angola. But at any rate, I am delighted with your optimism. I'm sorry I had to come in late and I have to leave early.

Thank you very much.

U.S. ARMS EMBARGO TO ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE

Senator CLARK. Mr. Secretary, I would like to return to the question of the arms embargo, which you mentioned briefly.

I understood you to say that we intended to maintain this arms embargo. I am speaking of Angola. Is that an accurate statement as to what you said earlier, the United States has an arms embargo? I think you said Angola and Mozambique both?

Mr. DAVIS. I think what our situation is, and I think that this is a policy that is of some years standing, in point of fact—

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Mr. DAVIS. That the embargo, you can probably tell me how many years it has been a fact—

Mr. ARNALES. 1961.

Senator CLARK. One could certainly assume this will be our policy following the November 11 so-called freedom of independence day for Angola, would it not?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, when such countries receive full independence I think that the provision of the embargo, as I understand it, referred to territories: did it not?

Mr. ARNALES. That is correct. The experience of the territories which have become independent, such as Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, have not shown what will happen with regard—

Senator CLARK. In other words, our policy toward Mozambique is not continuing an arms embargo?

Mr. DAVIS. Do you know what the technicality is, where it stands in that regard. I think perhaps what I had better do is look into that, sir, and insert an answer in the record, if I could.

Senator CLARK. And would you say the same for Angola?

Mr. DAVIS. I think the question so far as Angola is concerned between now and when it achieves its full independence on the 11th of November, that the current situation is clear and that, as I understand it, that under law there is a Presidential determination.

Senator CLARK. I meant the period after November 11.

Mr. DAVIS. Yes.

Senator CLARK. It is not necessarily the case that we are going to continue the arms embargo in Angola after November 11 any more than it is necessarily the case that we are continuing it today in Mozambique?

Mr. DAVIS. Let me look into it legally and the situation with regard to both countries, sir, and put something into the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

TERMINATION OF ARMS EMBARGO TO INDEPENDENT AFRICAN STATES

[Supplied by Department of State]

At the direction of the President we have maintained since 1961 an embargo on the sale and shipment of arms and military equipment either to Portugal for use in its African territories or directly to Portugal's present and former African territories. This embargo remains in effect even in those countries which were formerly Portuguese possessions which have now become independent. Termination of the embargo, either in its entirety or with regard to any individual country affected, would require a further decision by the President. If such a decision were taken, military exports to any affected country would, of course, remain subject to generally applicable United States export control laws and regulations.

NAVAL SHIPS CALLING AT ANGOLAN, MOZAMBIQUE PORTS THIS YEAR

Senator CLARK. Something further on the ports themselves. We talk about the strategic importance or unimportance of the Angolan ports. Do you know if any of our naval ships called at Angola for Mozambique this year.

Mr. DAVIS. Yes. I think they have and I think that the last call to the port of Luanda was a few months ago.

Mr. ARENALES. It was actually the Port of Mocamedes in Southern Angola. I think the last call was in May of 1975.

Senator CLARK. I wonder if you would mind providing that for the record. The port visits of U.S. naval ships in Angola and Mozambique.

[The information referred to follows:]

PORT FACILITIES IN ANGOLA

[Supplied by Department of State]

General information on the available facilities at Angola's three-deep water ports (Luanda, Lobito, and Mocamedes) is provided below. Because of recent port strikes and slow downs in Angola, some of these facilities or services may not be currently available.

LUANDA

Luanda, the capital of Angola, is the country's second largest port. The port is a natural sheltered tidal harbor. There are no reported hazards or difficulties

in the harbor approaches. The depths in the central part of the harbor range from 36 feet to over 100 feet. Deep water berthing facilities are provided at the main pier. Berthing depths range from 25 to 39 feet on the east side of the pier. Fuel, oil, water and telephone services are available through the main pier. Provisions are usually available. There are no major shipyards or repair installations at Luanda; however, the Luanda railroad shop and foundry can perform minor, above-the-waterline repairs.

LOBITO

Lobito is Angola's largest port and the Atlantic coast terminal of the Benguela Railroad which extends inland to Zambia. Lobito has a natural coastal harbor, protected by a peninsula. There are no obstructions on the approaches to the harbor and the controlling depth of the entrance is 78 feet. Vessels entering the harbor must use tugs. Vessels may anchor off the port captain's office in water depths of over 100 feet. There are two deep water wharves in the port with adjacent water depths of 32 to 34 feet. Fuel, diesel oil and water are reportedly available. Lobito has no major ship repair facilities; however, minor repairs can be performed by small, local machine shops.

MOCAMEDES

Mocamedes, Angola's third largest port, is located on the country's arid southern coast. Mocamedes has a natural harbor partially protected by the configuration of the coast. The access to the harbor from the north is reportedly easy, with a minimum depth of 45 feet. The harbor provides safe anchorages at depths of 42 to 56 feet. The main pier is 900 yards long and provides good berthing space with a water depth immediately alongside the pier of 30 feet; however, the water becomes much deeper a short distance out from the pier. Bunker "C" fuel is reportedly available. Fresh water is apparently in very short supply. Good quality provisions are apparently available locally. Mocamedes has no ship repair facilities.

As will appear from the listing of calls by U.S. Naval vessels during the past two years, both Luanda and Mocamedes have been placed at the disposal of our shipping. There appears to be no reason why all three of the ports described above could not be utilized in the future.

U.S. NAVY SHIP VISITS TO ANGOLA (1973-75)

[Supplied by: Department of State]

| Port and ship ¹ | Purpose ² | Dates |
|------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Angola—1973 | | |
| Luanda—NOA DD-841 | F/P/R | Feb. 9, 1973 to Feb. 12, 1973. |
| Luanda—Fiske DD-842 | F/P/R | Do. |
| Luanda—Adams DDG-2 | F/P/R | Aug. 23, 1973 to Aug. 25, 1973. |
| Luanda—Stribling DD-867 | F/P/R | Sept. 21, 1973 to Sept. 25, 1973. |
| Luanda—Ingram DD-938 | F/P/R | Sept. 24, 1973 to Sept. 25, 1973. |
| Angola—1974 | | |
| Luanda—Paul DE-1080 | F/P/R | Mar. 24, 1974 to Mar. 25, 1974. |
| Luanda—Mullinix DD-944 | F/P/R | Do. |
| Luanda—Koelsch DE-1049 | F/P/R | Apr. 22, 1974 to Apr. 24, 1974. |
| Luanda—Brumby DE-1044 | F/P/R | Do. |
| Luanda—Aylwin DE-1081 | F/P/R | July 11, 1974 to July 13, 1974. |
| Luanda—Hawkins DD-873 | F/P/R | Do. |
| Luanda—Paul DE-1080 | F/P/R | Aug. 10, 1974 to Aug. 11, 1974. |
| Luanda—Mullinix DD-944 | F/P/R | Do. |
| Luanda—Hawkins DD-873 | F/P/R | Nov. 20, 1974 to Nov. 21, 1974. |
| Luanda—Aylwin DE-1081 | F/P/R | Do. |
| Mocamedes—Lawrence DDG-4 | F/P/R | Oct. 23, 1974 to Oct. 25, 1974. |
| Mocamedes—Montgomery DE-1082 | F/P/R | Do. |
| Angola—1975 | | |
| Mocamedes—Trippe DE-1075 | F/P/R | Jan. 30, 1975 to Feb. 1, 1975. |
| Mocamedes—Hewes DE-1078 | F/P/R | Do. |
| Mocamedes—Brownson DD-858 | F/P/No liberty | May 12, 1975 to May 13, 1975 |
| Mocamedes—New DD-818 | F/P/No liberty | Do. |

¹ Ship code: DD equals destroyer; DDG equals guided missile destroyer; DE equals destroyer escort.

² Purpose code; F equals fuel/bunkering; p equals fresh provisions; R equals crew liberty/ recreation.

U.S. NAVY SHIP VISITS TO MOZAMBIQUE (1973-75)

[Supplied by Department of State]

| Port: Ship ¹ | Purpose ² | Dates |
|-------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|
| Mozambique—1973: | | |
| Lourenco Marques: | | |
| Fiske DD-842 | F/P/R | Feb. 19-21, 1973. |
| NOA DD-841 | F/P/R | Do. |
| Ingram DD-938 | F/P/R | April 28, May 15, 1973. |
| Inchon LPH-2 | F/P/R | Aug. 9-11, 1973. |
| Adams DDG-2 | F/P/R | Sept. 1-4, 1973. |
| McCandless DE-1084 | F/P/R | Do. |
| Ingram DD-938 | F/P/R | Sept. 1-16, 1973. |
| Stribling DD-867 | F/P/R | Do. |
| Mozambique—1974: | | |
| Lourenco Marques: | | |
| McCandless DE-1084 | F/P/R | Dec. 31, 1973-Jan. 6, 1974. |
| Adams DDG-2 | F/P/R | Do. |
| Paul DE-1080 | F/P/R | Apr. 2-3, 1974. |
| Mullinix DD-944 | F/P/R | Do. |
| Brumby DE-1044 | F/P/R | Apr. 13-15, 1974. |
| Koelsch DE-1049 | F/P/R | Do. |
| Paul DE-1080 | No fuel/P/R | Aug. 1-3, 1974. |
| Mullinix DD-944 | No fuel/P/R | Do. |
| Mozambique—1975 | | No visits. |

¹ Ship code—DD=destroyer; DDG=guided missile destroyer; DE=destroyer escort; LPH=helicopter carrier.² Purpose code—F=fuel/bunkering; P=fresh provisions; R=crew liberty/recreation.

Senator CLARK. How about Mozambique; can you speak to this?
Mr. ARENALES. None this year.

ASSISTANCE TO CABINDA SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS

Senator CLARK. I wanted to talk again a bit about Cabinda in particular, about the secession movement there, and any assistance that might be going in that direction from this Government unwittingly. It's often claimed, as you know, that Zaire provides assistance to FLEC, the Cabinda secessionist movement.

Mr. DAVIS. I think there are actually two such movements.

Senator CLARK. Does any U.S. military assistance to Zaire go to leaders of those two movements?

Mr. DAVIS. The situation, as I understand the situation on the ground—Mr. Arenales can correct me if I am wrong—I believe the two movements are split. And that one of them is ideologically somewhat closer to the government in Congo-Brazzaville, and the other is somewhat ideologically closer to the government in Kinshasa now.

You say did any of our—

Senator CLARK. We give assistance, as I understand it, to Mobutu in Zaire. Did any of that assistance find its way to those two movements?

Mr. DAVIS. My understanding, and I tell you the background of why I can only believe not, is that my understanding is that when either FMS [foreign military sales] or MAP [military assistance program] provide assistance of the United States, either foreign military sales or military assistance program, military, whatever it is, whether it be materiel or what is provided to a country, that there are explicit arrangements barring the transfer of that materiel outside the country to other recipients, and that this can be done, as I understand it, only under certain special conditions, which include the drawing up of a

new agreement between the recipient, the original recipient country and the United States. Also, the drawing up of an agreement between the second recipient country and the United States. And I believe there is a reporting requirement to the Congress and so on.

I'm certain to my knowledge that no such occasion has arisen.

Senator CLARK. As you know, agreements of that kind are sometimes violated, as in the case of Turkey, which is a different kind of agreement, but an agreement that none of our military assistance would be used in a war against another ally and yet it was. Nothing, to your knowledge?

Mr. DAVIS. I have no knowledge of violation of the agreement.

U.S. POSITION ON SECESSION OF CABINDA

Senator CLARK. Has the United States taken an official position—

Mr. DAVIS. Taken what?

Senator CLARK [continuing]. An official position on the possible secession of Cabinda? Has the administration expressed any public support for the agreement among the liberation movements that Angola should remain whole, or have we taken any position of any kind with regard to the secession?

Mr. DAVIS. My understanding is that there is a unanimity of view of all of liberation movements in Angola that Cabinda should remain an integral part of that territory. There has also been a rather long-standing view of the OAU in the African continent that supports the territorial integrity of States in Africa, as established by their previous boundaries, so I can assure you that the United States is giving no support to Cabinda separatism.

Senator CLARK. It would be our public policy position that Cabinda should remain part of Angola?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, we are essentially not a party issue.

Senator CLARK. I understand. We do not take a public policy position with regard to this except we are not supporting any secessionist movement?

Mr. DAVIS. Whether we have made some public pronouncements on this particular question; to be honest, I don't know.

AID ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ENDORSED BY FNLA, MPLA, UNITA

Senator CLARK. About the aid program. In determining possible U.S. assistance to Angola, is an effort being made to find economic development projects that have been endorsed by all three of the liberation movements? Have any such projects been agreed upon in the interim government, Mr. Conroy?

Mr. CONROY. To my knowledge, no such projects have been agreed upon in the interim government, and if they have been, we have not been approached by the transitional government for assistance in that. The one program we have which is benefiting Angola, which you alluded to, Senator Clark, is the training program which we are administering through the African American Institute. In this case, its all three of the liberation movements are providing or nominating candidates for selection.

UNITED STATES-PORTUGUESE COOPERATION REGARDING ASSISTANCE TO NEW
GOVERNMENT

Senator CLARK. Can you tell me, in our anticipation of aid to Angola, are we working in any way through Portugal or with Portugal? Have we had any discussions with the Portuguese Government, that you are aware of, with regard to assistance to the new government in Angola?

Mr. CONROY. As far as I know, Senator Clark, we have had no discussions with Portugal regarding assistance to Angola; and in terms of the evolvement of aid in the former Portuguese territories, for instance, in Mozambique and Cape Verde Island, while we have consulted with Portugal, the negotiations have really been with the transitional government who were given the authority by Portugal.

Senator CLARK. Rather than Portugal?

Mr. CONROY. Yes, sir.

PORTUGUESE STUDY OF WORLD DEVELOPMENT IN ANGOLA

Senator CLARK. It's my understanding that Portugal did an extensive study of agricultural development in Angola and established certain goals and a program for development. Are you aware of that study? Is there an extensive study the Portuguese have for Angola?

Mr. CONROY. No; I'm not. We will be looking into that kind of thing but I had not known about it and perhaps we should obtain a copy of it.

POSSIBILITY OF ELECTIONS FOR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

Senator CLARK. Secretary Davis, what is the likelihood that, in your judgment—and this is a purely judgmental question—that there will be elections for a constituent assembly as provided for in the agreement. Do you think that will come forward?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, I guess this is a little bit along the same lines of Senator Biden's question and I do feel, I think quite fundamentally, that the useful and constructive posture of all those who are interested in a peaceful and constructive solution of the Angolan question, that all of us should be directing our efforts to maximize the possibilities of such peaceful outcome, and so it would be, and I realize that I'm casting my answer in the direction of what is essentially both hope and also what I believe to be the only constructive posture that our Government can take—which is to support the efforts of and including the efforts of the Portuguese authority and hopefully the possibilities it will go forward this way, because this is imbedded in both the Alvor agreement and the more recent Nakuru agreement, and it obviously is the best thing for the territory.

IS POLICY TOWARD ANGOLA AFFECTED BY POLICY TOWARD PORTUGUESE
GOVERNMENT?

Senator CLARK. Is our policy toward Angola any way affected by our policy toward the Government in Portugal? Has that been a problem on assistance?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, the profound change in the orientation of the Government in Portugal is what set in motion this entire process.

Senator CLARK. I was speaking really of the last 3 or 4 months of that, not so much the original reason for decolonization. Have we had any occasion to ever discuss Angola with the Portuguese Government, that is to say, within the last 3 or 4 months?

Mr. DAVIS. I'm sure there have been occasions in which the question of Angola has come up in Amabassador Carlucci's conversation with various Portuguese officials and as far as I know he would continue to indicate our favorable attitude toward the Portuguese Government's efforts to promote peaceful transition to independence of Angolan territory.

PORTUGUESE EFFORTS TO PROMOTE PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE

Senator CLARK. There is every indication, at least as I have observed it, that Portugal is anxious to see a unified government emerging there so they can disengage themselves. Do you have the same feeling?

Mr. DAVIS. That is, I think, a large part of the reason the foreign minister is going to Luanda right now.

UNHCR APPEAL FOR HELP FOR REFUGEES FLEEING LUANDA CONFLICT

Senator CLARK. Recently there have been reports of a large number of refugees, both Africans and Portuguese, fleeing areas of conflict from around Luanda. Has the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees appealed for help for these people to our Government?

Mr. DAVIS. My understanding of that situation is that the High Commissioner for Refugees is awaiting a request from the transitional government in Angola for assistance in this regard, and I believe that it was perhaps in Mr. Conroy's statement, was it not, in which he indicated here this afternoon that if the High Commissioner for Refugees were to direct a request to the U.S. Government to participate in efforts to assist the Angolan refugees that our attitude would be favorable. I think we would be prepared, as I remember it, to 25 percent of the total is roughly the indicated percentage I think in such matters has become the pattern of U.S. support.

Senator CLARK. It's my recollection that you have recently visited Kenya.

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, sir.

KENYA MEDIATION EFFORTS IN ANGOLA

Senator CLARK. Did you have occasion then to discuss with the governmental officials in Kenya the liberation movement? Were we able to give any support to Kenya mediation efforts on that occasion?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, actually I visited Kenya arriving just as the Nakuru conference was closing.

Senator CLARK. I see.

Mr. DAVIS. I did express to President Kenyatta my own personal gratification and admiration for his initiative in having brought together these Angolan leaders and having produced the result that that conference produced.

AFRICAN STATES APPEAL TO STOP ARMS SHIPMENTS TO ANGOLA

Senator CLARK. I know that David Ottaway reported on July 7 a joint communication issued after the Kenya meeting. I noted one of the main causes of the present political crisis was the intrusion of large quantities of arms into Angola.

I'm wondering, to your knowledge, have the African states appealed to the U.S.S.R. or China and others to stop the arms flow?

Mr. DAVIS. If they have I'm unaware of it, sir. Perhaps I might check. Mr. Arenales?

Mr. ARENALES. That is right.

QUESTION OF RAISING ARMS ISSUE WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS AND U.N.

Senator CLARK. Should the United States raise that issue with these governments, in your judgment, or would that be the kind of interference that you prefer not to engage in?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, I think when this question came up slightly tangentially before, I am certainly very much aware that Angola is part of Africa and is to become a part of the African community, and if you want my own personal view I have some feeling that some kind of a multilateral effort in this regard might be more effective than for us to act alone.

Senator CLARK. Has this question been raised in the U.N., to your knowledge?

Mr. DAVIS. If it has, I'm not aware of it.

Senator CLARK. We have not taken it up with let us say Mobutu?

Mr. DAVIS. I don't recall a U.S. request to Mobutu to try to induce him to cut off the flow of arms.

PORTUGUESE REQUEST FOR AID FOR SECURITY PURPOSES

Senator CLARK. I think Portugal has not, as I understand it, requested any aid for security purposes in Angola from us, have they?

Mr. DAVIS. No, sir; I don't believe so.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Ambassador, I think that covers the questions I wanted to discuss with you.

We appreciate your appearance, Mr. Conroy, Mr. Arenales. Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]

U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA

South Africa and Namibia

WEDNESDAY, JULY 23, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Dick Clark (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senator Clark.

Senator CLARK. The hearing will please come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

For many reasons, the political, economic and social oppression in South Africa today is particularly offensive to the rest of the world.

First, it is a system of racial domination, a white minority of 3.8 million rules over a majority of 17.5 million blacks and 2 million "coloureds" and Asians. The vast majority of South Africans do not participate in electing the Parliament or formulating the laws that govern their lives.

Second, the South African government's exercise of its political control is extremely thorough, internal security forces are large and efficient in suppressing opposition. The African political parties that once sought to change the system of apartheid through nonviolent means have been banned. Political, religious, student and union leaders are banned or imprisoned if they appear to seriously challenge the system. The government has and uses the authority to arrest and detain citizens without charge and without trial. There is no bill of rights, no constitutional restraint on majority decisions of the Parliament.

Third, economic oppression in this industrialized state is systematic and thorough. Although Africans make up more than 70 percent of the population, they have been assigned only 13 percent of the land. These African homelands, or bantustans are fragmented, seriously overpopulated and desperately poor. The 53 percent of the Africans who live and work in white areas are treated as transient laborers. They must carry a pass at all times. They cannot own property there. They can be expelled at any time for violating one of the many regulations that governs their lives. Those who have entered white areas since 1968 can remain for only a year at a time and have to live in unisex hostels. This system of migrant labor has disrupted African family life tremendously.

The gap between the affluent whites and the impoverished Africans is large and growing. It has been reported recently that in the mines, whites earn 12 times what Africans earn, and that in industrial production, whites earn five times what Africans do. African wages in agriculture are even lower. Because of the severe limitations on African labor unions, it is difficult for them to bargain for higher wages; and union leaders are subject to arrest if they become too powerful. It is also difficult for an African to advance in his occupation; 57 percent of all Africans have received no education, and in urban areas primary instruction must be in an African language rather than in one of the two languages used by whites in business. The requirement that Africans return to their homelands after a year in white areas makes the development of skills difficult. It is forbidden by law for an African to be in a position where he will give orders to a white. Some occupations are reserved by law for whites alone.

Fourth, racial domination and oppression in South Africa are expressed socially in the color bar. Africans, whites and coloureds have separate and unequal educational, medical, transportation and recreation facilities. Intermarriage is illegal. The minor changes that have occurred in petty apartheid practices in recent months are themselves indicative of the all-inclusive nature of the color bar. In February, the government announced that Africans and whites would share the same facilities in parks, museums, libraries and at the zoo.

The International Community has attempted in many ways to exert nonviolent pressure on the South African government to end its practice of racial domination. The International Court of Justice has determined that South Africa's occupation of the league mandate territory of Namibia is illegal. It was over the issue of Namibia that a voluntary arms embargo was imposed on South Africa and that the General Assembly voted to exclude South Africa from its activities. The U.N. has called on South Africa to grant Namibia independence as a unified state.

The United Nations has also frequently expressed concern in various resolutions about the system of apartheid within South Africa itself. A U.N. Committee Against Apartheid has been established to collect and distribute information about conditions in South Africa and to bring this problem to the attention of national governments. Finally, South Africa has been excluded from the olympics and other international competition in protest against its domestic policies.

Clearly, the United States must be on the side of human rights, racial equality and majority rule in South Africa. To do otherwise would be to abandon this country's moral principles on an issue of great concern not only to the black African states but to most of the nations of the world. However, sincere and well-informed people disagree on how these principles could be most effectively furthered in U.S. policy toward South Africa.

Some argue that it is best not to try to ostracize South Africa or to be very critical of its policies. They believe that such actions only serve to harden the positions of the South African whites. They recommend instead greater communication with the South African government and people. They would encourage foreign investment in order to expose South Africans to more enlightened labor policies. They might argue for an end to the arms embargo in order to counter South Africa's sense of military isolation and halt the growth of

its large domestic arms industry. And, above all, they would argue for increased dialogue and cultural exchange with South Africans in order to demonstrate that there are alternatives to racial domination. In reasoned discussions, they believe, South African whites could be convinced that continuation of the present system is not in their economic or political interest.

Many of the Americans concerned about the South African problem, on the other hand, argue for increased isolation of that country from the rest of the world as the only means of applying effective pressure for change. On the international level, they would argue for expulsion of South Africa from the U.N., a mandatory arms embargo and perhaps even international economic sanctions. In U.S. bilateral relations with South Africa, they would argue for the withdrawal of all U.S. investment, recalling the ambassador and not exporting to South Africa goods that support the system of internal oppression.

Many observers who support increased international pressure on South Africa also argue that withdrawal of investment and international economic isolation are not feasible or desirable. But they do believe that foreign investment in South Africa can and should be used more effectively to change the system from within. They point out that America corporations operating in South Africa can do much more to improve the conditions of Africans and give them greater economic power. Even now, Africans are moving more and more into skilled jobs as there are too few whites to fill them. The economic power of such skilled workers is enhanced by the fact that they cannot be easily replaced when they strike. Corporations can encourage this process by providing greater educational opportunities for their African employees and putting more of them in skilled positions.

They can provide equal pay for equal work and hire Africans for many higher level jobs. They can provide greater health benefits to their employees. They could pressure the South African Government to change those laws that deny Africans equal economic opportunity. Most important, they can do much to encourage the growth and influence of African labor unions.

A convincing argument is made that South Africa's economic dependence on black labor is going to force it to make substantial economic and political changes in the future. Americans investing in South Africa should be at the forefront of this change rather than merely supporting the status quo.

This is only a brief summary of the problems in South Africa, of what different observers believe to be the impact of current U.S. policy on those problems, and of new directions that have been suggested for U.S. policy. The witnesses today, Mrs. Goler Butcher, Donald McHenry, and Leonard Thompson, have all done considerable research on South Africa and have been particularly concerned about U.S. policy there.

They will be able to comment in much greater detail on the many arguments that have been put forth on this subject and hopefully, will make specific policy recommendations of their own.

First, we are going to hear from Mrs. Goler Butcher, attorney here in Washington. Please proceed, Mrs. Butcher, in any way you prefer.

Certainly your entire statement, as with the other witnesses will be put in the record.

[Mrs. Butcher's biography follows:]

RÉSUMÉ OF MS. GOLER TEAL BUTCHER

Born—Philadelphia, July 13, 1925.

Married—4 children.

Education—Philadelphia High School for Girls—1943; recipient of Latin prize, Greek prize, Phi Beta Kappa award.

A.B.—University of Pennsylvania, 1946, with Major Honors; Phi Beta Kappa.

LL.B.—Howard University, 1957, Summa cum Laude; Editor-in-Chief Howard Law Journal.

LL.M.—University of Pennsylvania, 1958. Major concentration: international law. Master's thesis: "The Choice of Law Rules Applied to International Sales Transactions".

Employment—Former positions:

Law Clerk for Judge William Hastie, Court of Appeals for 3d Circuit, September 1958—May 1959.

Legal Aid Society Attorney, 1960–1962.

Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, February 1962–October 1963. Legal analyst; Assistant to Editor of Revised edition of *Constitution Annotated*; Fair Employment Practices Counselor.

Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State Attorney Adviser (International)—1963–May 1971. As an attorney in the Office of the Legal Adviser: for the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (1963–1967); for the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (1967–71; for the Bureau of African Affairs (1969–71).

House Foreign Affairs Committee—Consultant and Counsel to the Subcommittee on Africa—May 1971 to April 1974.

Present position: Private law practice with White, Fine & Ambrogne, 1156 15th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005.

Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law, School of Law, Howard University—1973, 1974: (course taught: International Commercial Transactions).

Professional memberships: American Society of International Law; Member of the Executive Council of the Society.

Bar of the District of Columbia Federal Bar Association. Federal Communications Bar Association.

Affiliations: Member, Democratic Foreign Affairs Task Force; Cochairman, Democratic Study Group on Africa.

Member, Board of Trustees, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; Member, Africa Legal Assistance Project Subcommittee.

Member, Committee on Social Responsibility, Executive Council of the Episcopal Church.

Member, the Disciplinary Board of the Bar of the District of Columbia.

Member, International Advisory Council, African-American Institute.

Member, National Conference of Black Lawyers.

Member, National Association of Black Women Attorneys.

STATEMENT OF MRS. GOLER TEAL BUTCHER, ATTORNEY, WHITE, FINE & AMBROGNE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mrs. BUTCHER. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I will excerpt the significant parts from my statement.

Senator CLARK. All right.

Mrs. BUTCHER. Mr. Chairman, I wish to express appreciation for the invitation to appear before the committee. It is Congress that must take the lead to end what is essentially a coverup of U.S. policy on southern Africa. The Congress must insist on:

- (1) A frank statement of the facts on the situation in South Africa;
- (2) An open analysis of U.S. interests in that area;
- (3) Progress toward a therapeutic confrontation, discussion, debate, and analysis of what U.S. policy should be;

(4) Change with a view toward developing an honest, sensible and rational U.S. policy—consistent with U.S. interests—toward South Africa.

"COVERUP" OF U.S. POLICY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

If there is any doubt as to the phrase "a coverup," NSSM 39, the National Security Council Study Memorandum of 1969 on Southern Africa, reveals a deliberate policy in action considerably divergent from the oral pronouncements. The resulting gap was cloaked by verbal expressions of abhorrence of apartheid and support of majority rule. Obviously, discrepancies were explained away by the position that our Government could not support nonpractical or extremist courses of action. Now, the revelations of the secret NSC [National Security Council] study have revealed our actual commitment to the status quo. Regrettably, the public has tended to abet this coverup because of:

(1) Our general willingness to face the fact of Government duplicity or insensitivity for the repression in South Africa and

(2) Our willingness to be led astray by the Communist bug-a-boo and the battle cries to protect the cape sea lanes for the West;

(3) Our willingness to be deluded. How else can our applause for the changes taking place in South Africa be explained, when those changes relate to park benches, opera houses, or even a few more pennies in the pay check, but not to basics? How else can be explained the public's, to a large extent, condoning the triple veto against South Africa's expulsion from the United Nations or later the veto of a mandatory arms embargo? There should have been public calls for our Government to come forward with positive alternatives which would do two things; (1) Get the message to South Africa that we do not and will not support apartheid, and (2) put the United States in a defensible positive position rather than the unfortunate position of defender of the status quo; racism and minority rule—a position which in the long run is not only inimical to our foreign policy interests, but is untenable, given America's own racial composition.

Yes, the public has abetted this coverup by its complaisance. Moreover, in a democracy there is a special responsibility on the people through their elected representatives to present not only criticism but practical, viable alternatives to executive policy. Thus these hearings have a special significance.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA

After a brief review today, first, of the facts on South Africa, and second, of U.S. interests in that area, I will concentrate on the essential ingredients that a sane U.S. policy must address now and also on practical positions which the United States can and should support—all in the hope that the necessary public analysis and debate can be held openly and frankly—on what U.S. policy should be on South Africa—with our policymakers—a debate which has been all the more elusive because our policymakers, unfortunately, themselves have become mesmerized by their own words of inaction.

In assessing U.S. policy toward South Africa, it is critical to realize the complexity of South Africa. Too often, American visitors go to South Africa and see only a few of the pieces, become transfixed by these, and misgauge the situation there. The outspoken critics of petty apartheid, such as the English-language newspapers and the Progressive Party, are but a minute part of the scene. Even these few atypical voices do not challenge the fundamentals. There are many faces of

South Africa. For example, the play, "Sizwe Bansi Is Dead"—as graphically as it presented influx control, the total limitation on movements of the African and utter inhumanity of apartheid—gives but one part of the picture of the unparalleled repression of that Government. An equally relevant picture relates to the will of the Africans to overcome the situation, such as that portrayed in May as the trial of the SASO (South African Student Organization) defendants began. When the young black South African students arrested for planning to sponsor pro-Frelimo rally last October were brought to court after having been held for months and months and after finally having been charged under the Terrorism Act, they came into trial singing their songs of liberation each with his arm held high to testify their invincible spirit.

Sophistication is needed in dealing with the complexities of that society to avoid becoming confused by sleight-of-hand maneuvers. Last October, Prime Minister Vorster, in a desperate effort to get support from the United States, Britain, and France to stave off expulsion from the U.N. by the Security Council, promised astonishing changes within 6 months. Those looking at the South African scene have to be careful lest they are beguiled by such announcements or by Vorster's recent one respecting certain land rights for the urban African. Even the South African journal, the Financial Mail, stated that as a result of these projected changes: "Two steps back and one forward, brings the urban African to where he was 8 years ago" through the restoration of the principle of 30-year leasehold rights.

What we must do is to look first at certain verities in this situation if we are going to have any understanding of the South African scene. I would suggest that the first relates to participation in the political process: "What is being done so that all people in South Africa, regardless of race, can participate in the political process?" The answer is: "Nothing." A second verity is that South Africa is rushing diametrically in the opposite direction from one multiracial society to effectuate the Bantustan policy, whose essence is the denial of citizenship in South Africa for the vast majority of South Africans.

Under the laws of that country, the majority has no freedom of movement, or residence, of employment, no right to land, to family life, to education, or to participate in the government.

RECENT CHANGES OCCURRING IN SOUTH AFRICA

Whatever changes may have occurred or may be occurring in South Africa, they have not reached these fundamentals. Vorster's promise as to change in South Africa must be viewed against the backdrop of these facts. And what has happened since last fall:

Minute, inconsequential changes; vague announcements about restoring rights to urban Africans;

The deliberate decision made that the totally anomalous status of the colored under separate development would continue;

The denial of certain minimum assurances to the homeland leaders so that, with the exception of the head of the Transkei, the homeland leaders took a position against the proposed independence of the Bantustans;

The Government announcement, under the Affected Organizations Act, declaring the Christian Institute an affected organization, thus crippling a key antiapartheid organization;

The expropriation of the Black Theological Seminary, a multiracial institution, which I visited with Congressman Diggs' Codel and whose presence opposite Fort Hare, now a "tribal" Xhosa University, was an embarrassment to the Government after previous attempts by the Government to buy out the seminary and to threaten and to silence it had failed;

The arrest, detention for months without charge, and torture of SASO members to silence all meaningful opposition, black and white.

All this has happened. The facts on the international scene with respect to South Africa should be critical in determining U.S. policy because the issue of racism, and particularly apartheid, transcends all other international issues for the African countries and is a key issue for the third world in general. There is no more effective way for us to alienate these countries than by giving comfort to the enforcers of apartheid. The heightening of international concern about U.S. actions has been simultaneous with recent events which have sounded the death knell for minority rule.

INTERNATIONAL FOCUS ON U.S. POLICY

The sharpening international focus on U.S. policy is seen in the outspoken concern of the Organization of African Unity on the appointment of Nathaniel Davis to be Assistant Secretary of State. President Kaunda's use of the occasion of his toast to President Ford to voice his disquietude with U.S. policy toward Africa is also on point.

The revelations of last summer, some 5 years after the fact, of NSSM 39—other than being remarkable for showing the lack of clairvoyance or political perceptiveness of our foreign affairs experts in their premise that the whites are in southern Africa to stay—showed little that the watchers of U.S. policy were not aware of; namely, that since 1969, U.S. policy—whatever the verbal pronouncements on abhorrence of apartheid and support of majority rule may have been—U.S. policy has been supportive of the status quo.

U.S. INTERESTS WITH RESPECT TO SOUTH AFRICAN POLICY

Any assessment of what U.S. policy should be with respect to South Africa must come to grips with U.S. interests. The first imperative here is that we realize that our interests in cold, hard practical terms are coterminous with our interest with respect to human rights. This is very often overlooked because our policymakers have a way of stating our concern about repressive minority rule in South Africa only as an aspect of our concern for the violation of human rights and our desire to see a better deal for the majority in that area. But the truth is that for a major power as is the United States, no situation such as that brewing in South Africa, a veritable caldron of racism, repression, fear, and violence by a 17 percent minority against an 82 percent majority can exist without a substantial threat to U.S. interests. Further, a consideration of the geographic, economic, natural

resources, and industrial facts on South Africa makes it clear that it is in the interest of the United States to have South Africa a friendly country and to have the people of South Africa friendly toward the United States. Although the present South African Government is friendly, it is clear that this present situation of minority rule cannot last. The minority can buy time, but while doing so, it is building up the explosives in the situation. We can go along with their policy of staving off the inevitable with the domestic jurisdiction excuse. But casting our fortunes with South Africa jeopardizes our substantially greater interest in black Africa: economically, in access to raw materials, oil, minerals, commodities, and in markets; and strategically, with respect to Africa as a whole. It may have been a few years ago that as the big power with the big stick, we could take the Machiavelian approach, but the present fact of interdependence means otherwise. Can we not at least learn out of the debacle of Vietnam that we cannot cast our lot with a repressive status quo with impunity and without great damage to larger U.S. interests?

The prerequisite here is to define U.S. objectives. For a number of years our policy objective has apparently been to give the message to those concerned in the United States, in the United Nations, and in Africa and the third world of the U.S. support for majority rule. But the actual message conveyed to South Africa was not one of concern by the United States. This is so even allowing for irritations to South Africa present in our bilateral relationship from the arms embargo policy and restricted policy on promotional activities. Further, South Africa has been able without fail to count on us to do our utmost to bail her out of difficulties in the international arena. Our credibility with black Africa and the third world has been shredded. Obviously this Janus-headed policy has failed; and it is time for our Government to decide what our objective is. Is it merely to remove ourselves from the taint of support of an actual ally? It is submitted that this is not only an unworkable policy, but is inconsistent with our interests.

It is submitted that a more realistic objective would be to refuse to be a supporter of minority rule even if we are not prepared to give actual support to a change to majority rule.

The fundamentals of such a policy would be:

- (1) To oppose not only the system of apartheid but the government which institutes such a system; and
- (2) Be supportive of the majority and liberal elements in their struggle to rid their country of the evil of apartheid.

PRACTICAL, PEACEFUL STEPS SHOWING U.S. SUPPORT FOR MAJORITY RULE

There are a number of practical peaceful steps which we can take to show our support for majority rule and opposition to minority rule.

A first recommendation is that U.S. officials cease being apologists for the South African regime. This is the way we are viewed:

When we insist on finding encouragement in the inconsequential changes announced by that Government; or

When we, without the use of any of the famed Yankee ingenuity, first resort to the vote in the name of the principle of consistency and then raise questionable legal justification for our policy position, when alternatively the United States could have supported suspension; or

When we veto the application of charter VII to South Africa's illegal occupancy of Namibia.

A second recommendation is that the U.S. constituent agencies must adhere to stated policy. The sorry picture of the military's meeting with South African Government officials should be ended.

The commandant of the South African defense forces, Admiral Biermann, visited the United States and saw the then American Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Moorer, and the Secretary of the Navy, Secretary Mitterdorf. Meetings by American military officials are contrary to stated policy; yet a group of American admirals are said to have dined with Admiral Biermann.

Moreover, in connection with certain congressional and staff visits to South Africa, it is reported that these have been paid for by South African private businessmen and organizations, such as the South African Agricultural Union.

I have here an article from Business Week on these congressional visits.

Great care must be exercised there because of article I, section 9, of the Constitution and under the Foreign Gifts Act, which goes to the legality of these visits as well as to the wisdom. Our Founding Fathers rightly banned emoluments from foreign governments.

SOUTH AFRICAN PROPAGANDA INITIATIVE TOWARD ENDING ARMS EMBARGO

The South African propaganda initiative has been stepped up enormously in the past few years and it is directed squarely at the U.S. policymakers, the Congress, and the military, all toward an ending of the arms embargo. The South African Minister of Information was here recently and made a very interesting presentation along these lines: the South Africa Government is trying to do its best as a member of the free world to protect the sealanes around the cape to insure the freedom of the seas for the West, notwithstanding the growing Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. He called on the Western Powers to "shoulder their responsibility" in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

First, it is nonsense both that South Africa with 87 percent of its population rightless and voteless is a part of the free world and that our only recourse to protect our interests is to protect its brand of fascism. We have been seduced by this argument before to our detriment. Second, the case has not been proved as to the Soviet threat in the Indian Ocean. Note, the South African case rests on the self-serving presentation: an alleged Soviet threat, the available South African port of Simonstown, and the industrially developed structure of that country, all militating toward the conclusion that we need South Africa. There are also some self-interest factors present with respect to the Navy, the chief domestic proponent on this issue. Even assuming that the Soviet Union will make the Indian Ocean an area of confrontation, there are other viable alternatives we would have to consider because of the great price that we would pay if we bed down with South Africa. Such an alliance would surely bring retaliation: jeopardize overflight rights. In fact, it might well help to do what we fear most with respect to Chinese and Soviet influence in the area and help the Soviets get the submarine base in Nacala. Further, such an

alliance would hurt us in a number of other critical areas with respect to negotiations on various raw materials and commodities.

Similarly, we must avoid NATO embroilment in the South Atlantic. We must not fall prey to the South African game to use a Soviet threat to inveigle us into a defense relationship which, in turn, would be a guarantee of the minority's maintenance of power.

We must insist that the United States adhere to its own fundamental tenet of U.S. policy with respect to Africa—to keep the continent free from big power rivalry.

The South Africans' efforts to break the arms embargo by getting sonobuoys sound detection equipment was turned down, as were their efforts to get the P-3 Lockhart Orion Naval Patrol Aircraft to monitor Soviet naval movements in the ocean, and thus, to bring into reality United States-African intelligence and military cooperation. These would also be a fundamental breach of the arms embargo as it has existed since 1963: to refuse to become entangled militarily with South Africa, whether or not the particular situation was posed as one relating to apartheid or to the enforcement of apartheid. This is true whether what is proposed is with respect to the domestic enforcement of apartheid or with respect to external threats because the arms embargo from 1963 on has not made any distinction between external and internal threats. Further, the arms embargo against South Africa should be tightened, not relaxed whether or not the relaxation since 1969 in the "gray" areas has brought South Africa significant equipment, the very fact of relaxation has carried a significant signal of comfort to the national regime. The arms embargo should bar sales to South Africa of all military equipment, and it should bar the sales of all items for the use of the South African military, whether lethal or not.

The sale of weapons-grade uranium to South Africa and nuclear collaboration with South Africa should be ended. Congressman Diggs' bill, H.R. 6032, would bar such cooperation and end the transfer of nuclear materials to countries, such as South Africa, that have not ratified the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty.

PLACING SOUTH AFRICA'S POLICY OF "DETENTE" IN PERSPECTIVE

Another imperative is to place in perspective South Africa's policy of "détente." Although this term, generally used for United States-Soviet relations, has been borrowed here, the situation is very different. South Africa, whose security situation has been radically altered by the developments in the former Portuguese areas of Mozambique and Angola as a result of the Portuguese coup, is desperately trying—

To substitute the crumbling ring of buffer states—Mozambique, Angola, and Rhodesia—with free African states that will not harbor terrorists;

To keep the other states in line by economic and military domination; and

To insulate its internal situation from outside changes to give itself time to effectuate its apartheid blueprint, the time schedule for homeland's independence has been updated; and, thus, for the white South Africans to prevail through divide-and-rule tactics.

It is with these perspectives that we have to view the South African support for moderate groups in Rhodesia, moves toward the balkani-

zation of Namibia and South Africa's economic overtones toward other African countries. It is not a matter of détente from a sense of live and let live, but an effort to buy time for South Africa's own policy of racial repression and to allow minority domination to triumph. In a nutshell, détente is the game of minority rule survival and U.S. policy-makers must not allow themselves to be diverted from the basics as to the situation in South Africa by this charade.

HOMELAND INDEPENDENCE

It is equally crucial that we understand that independence of the homelands is not decolonization and cannot be equated with the independence of former colonial territories. Homeland independence is not self-determination; for the affected people have had no freedom of choice in the matter. The homeland policy is a gigantic heist. Even though we all cheer how magnificently some of the homeland leaders are carrying forward their strategy—strategy devised on the basis of their subservient position, the Bantustans are essentially a sham as well as a diversion from the main point: a free South Africa for all South Africans regardless of race, majority rule of the whole of South Africa and not of bits and pieces for the 72 percent black majority, and not the present situation where the 17 percent white minority strives to continue its domination over 88 percent of the territory of South Africa. The United States should clearly state and adhere to the position that the Bantustans are illegal under international law, which requires the participation in the government of that country of all people without distinction as to race and color.

GOVERNMENT SUPPORT OF INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

Our Government must realize that the presence of U.S. investment renders it hostage to apartheid. And yet, given the 25 million black Americans, U.S. support of South Africa in a military confrontation might be suicidal to our own form of government. Our country might survive, but the repression necessary to contain black Americans would be the end of democracy as we know it.

At a minimum, therefore, the U.S. Government should take a stand against expansion of U.S. investment. Finally, the Government should advise American companies doing business there that they do so at their own risk, that we will not protect them.

It cannot be gainsaid that these investments in South Africa provide a financial underpinning for South Africa and give it respectability in the world. Therefore, a position advocating withdrawal is the only logical one. The argument that since American business employs the African, its presence helps the African misconstrues the key fact on foreign investment by focusing on its meaning to the majority rather than on its meaning to the minority. It is foreign investment and its capital, technology and technical know-how which enables the minority to entrench itself against the majority.

With respect to what can be done now, first the Government should use its leverage to see to it that at the minimum U.S. businesses do not exploit their employees. A labor attache should be assigned to our embassy with this special responsibility. Second, the legislature should put teeth in such efforts. Congressman Diggs has introduced legisla-

tion to influence U.S. companies in South Africa to follow certain basic standards of fair employment by making this a condition of eligibility for U.S. Government contracts.

It is further submitted that our representation in South Africa should be downgraded to the charge level. But at a minimum our ambassador should be recalled so long as South Africa refuses access to any U.S. Congressman.

Let us be clear. These types of measures have nothing to do with the change needed in South Africa, namely majority rule. But it would bring U.S. Government leverage to end exploitation by U.S. firms of the majority and it might serve to put the children of the relatively few employees of U.S. firms in better position to contribute to the attainment of majority rule.

Government support through loans or guarantees or other facilitation of investment or business in South Africa should be curtailed; yet certain expanded facilities for the Export-Import Bank of the United States are available to South Africa. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has just announced the establishment of a new \$1 million line of CCC—Commodity Credit Corporation—credit to finance export sales of U.S. beef and breeding cattle to ranchers in South Africa.

Finally, the 1960's U.S. program of support to Southern African refugees has been withering away since 1969. It should be given new life.

In summing up recommendations with respect to policy towards South Africa, let me underscore the need for the assignment of responsibility among Government agencies. As it is now, State enunciates one policy, but the Pentagon, Commerce, CAB—Civil Aeronautics Board—Treasury, Export-Import Bank, NASA—National Aeronautics and Space Administration—even the Post Office go their own separate ways. An effective policy requires executive coordination by a single agency with central responsibility.

QUESTIONS OF TAX CREDITS, CHAPTER VII RESPECTING NAMIBIA

With respect to Namibia, I wish to look quickly at two distinct questions: tax credits and chapter VII. I wish to urge the introduction of a bill similar to that introduced last session by Senator Mondale to provide for the disallowance of tax credits for taxes paid to any country or political entity where (1) such an administration has been held to be illegal by the International Court of Justice and (2) the U.S. Government has accepted such opinion.

The United States still permits U.S. companies doing business in Namibia and therefore paying taxes to the illegal administering authority, South Africa, to credit such taxes against taxes owed to the United States. Such tax credits should be ended. The Treasury has determined that it lacks the authority to end such credits under the applicable Internal Revenue Code provision, 26 U.S.C. section 901, consistent with the U.S. legal duty to recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the invalidity of its acts concerning Namibia. That it took the Treasury Department from March 1972, when it received a communication from 27 U.S. Senators and Representatives, to May 1973 to determine that it lacked discretion to disallow the tax credit strongly suggests that the decision that "existing

tax credit legislation did not provide discretion to deny the tax credit" was itself discretionary. So clarifying legislation should be introduced and should be passed.

But, a most important element in communication to South Africa that her continued presence in Namibia is no longer acceptable is the willingness to use the Charter machinery designed for dealing with acts of aggression, threats to the peace and breaches of the peace. That South Africa's occupation of Namibia constitutes an act of aggression cannot be gainsaid. The contemplated program here put forward is a step-by-step scenario designed to induce real movement by South Africa. A first step would be to seek the creation of a special ad hoc subcommittee (a) to study the problems of and (b) to devise a plan of implementation of pro tanto sanctions against South Africa—that is, a trade embargo (i) on goods destined to and originating from Namibia, (ii) on that proportion of South Africa's trade allocable to Namibia, and (c) to report to the Council by a given date, say 9 months later. The second step would be for the Security Council to seek an immediate article 39 determination that South Africa's continued presence in Namibia is an act of aggression, but without moving to an article 41 decision to apply sanctions. Rather, the third step contemplates the Security Council proceeding, pursuant to article 40 and calling upon South Africa to comply with certain provisional measures, using charter VI instead of charter VII action to attempt negotiation with South Africa. At this point, the United Nations would be dealing with South Africa from a position of strength and determination since the ad hoc subcommittee would be working out implementation for pro tanto sanctions and the requisite chapter VII determination would have been made. It would be clear to South Africa that such palliatives as announcements of multiracial talks with no scheduling would not do.

Further, the forecast independence of parts of Namibia would clearly be seen as totally unacceptable. It should be clear that in the whole proceeding during this interim period the only subject of negotiation is South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia and the restoring of fundamental freedom to Namibians. The impetus for meaningful action by South Africa would lie in the knowledge that once the ad hoc subcommittee had reported, the United States was prepared to support a Security Council resolution imposing pro tanto sanctions against South Africa.

In conclusion, we fought World War II successfully out of the conviction that Nazism and everything it stood for must be ended. Yet now our policy, wittingly or unwittingly, gives comfort to a country whose leader was held as a Nazi during that war and even more whose government continues the practices of racism and monstrous inhumanity of man against man.

If it were the human rights of black South Africans only that were imperiled, the call would still be for America to act at least with all available peaceful means. But it is the interests of the United States itself both in the foreign policy area and domestically that are at stake. The necessity is that the Congress push, pull, tug, and legislate our Government into a rational policy toward South Africa.

[Mrs. Butcher's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GOLER TEAL BUTCHER

Mr. Chairman, I wish to express appreciation for the invitation to appear before the Committee. It is Congress that must take the lead to end what is essentially a "cover-up" of U.S. policy on southern Africa. The Congress must insist on:

- (1) a frank statement of the facts on the situation in South Africa,
- (2) an open analysis of U.S. interests in that area,
- (3) progress towards a therapeutic confrontation, discussion, debate, and analysis of what U.S. policy should be,
- (4) change with a view towards developing an honest, sensible and rational U.S. policy—consistent with U.S. interests—towards South Africa.

If there is any doubt as to the phrase "a cover-up", NSSM 39, the National Security Council Study Memorandum of 1969 on Southern Africa, reveals a deliberate policy-in-action considerably divergent from the oral pronouncements. The resulting gap was cloaked by verbal expressions of abhorrence of apartheid and support of majority rule. Obvious discrepancies were explained away by the positions that our Government could not support non-practical or extremist courses of action. Now, the revelations of the secret NSC study have revealed our actual commitment to the status quo. Regrettably, the public has tended to abet this cover-up because of:

(1) Our general unwillingness to face the fact of government duplicity or insensitivity to the repression in South Africa.

(2) Our willingness to be lead astray by the communist bug-a-boo and the battle cries to protect the Cape Sea Lanes for the West.

(3) Our willingness to be deluded. How else can our applause for the changes taking place in South Africa be explained, when those changes relate to park benches, opera houses or even a few more pennies in the pay check, but not to basics. How else can be explained the public's to a large extent condoning the triple veto against South Africa's expulsion from the United Nations or later the veto of a mandatory arms embargo. There should have been public calls for our government to come forward with positive alternatives which would do two things: (1) get the message to South Africa that we do not and will not support apartheid, and (2) put the U.S. in a defensible positive position rather than the unfortunate position of defender of the status quo, racism and minority rule—a position which in the long run is not only inimical to our foreign policy interests, but is untenable, given America's own racial composition.

Yes, the public has abetted this cover-up by its complaisance. Moreover, in a democracy there is a special responsibility on the people through their elected representatives to present not only criticism but practical viable alternatives to executive policy. Thus these hearings have a special significance.

After a brief review today, first, of the facts on South Africa, and second, of U.S. interests in that area, I will concentrate on the essential ingredients that a sane U.S. policy must address now and also on practical positions which the U.S. can and should support—all in the hope that the necessary public analysis and debate can be held openly and frankly (on what U.S. policy should be on South Africa) with our policymakers—a debate which has been all the more elusive because our policymakers unfortunately themselves have become mesmerized by their own words of inaction.

THE FACTS ON SOUTH AFRICA

In assessing U.S. policy towards South Africa, it is critical to realize the complexity of South Africa. Too often, American visitors go to South Africa and see only a few of the pieces, become transfixed by these and misgauge the situation there. The outspoken critics of petty apartheid, such as the English language newspapers and the Progressive Party are but a minute part of the scene. (Even these few atypical voices do not challenge the fundamentals.) There are many faces of South Africa. For example, the play, "Sizwe Bansi Is Dead"—as graphically as it presented influx control, the total limitation on movements of the African and utter inhumanity of apartheid—gives but one part of the picture of the unparalleled repression of that government. An equally relevant picture relates to the will of the Africans to overcome the situation, such as that portrayed in May as the trial of the SASO Defendants began. When the young Black South African students arrested for planning to sponsor a Pro-Frelimo rally last October were brought to court after having been held for months

and months and after finally having been charged under the Terrorism Act, they came into trial singing their songs of liberation with an arm held high to testify to their invincible spirit.

Sophistication is needed in dealing with the complexities of that society to avoid becoming confused by sleight-of-hand maneuvers. Last October, Prime Minister Vorster, in a desperate effort to get support from the U.S., Britain and France to stave off expulsion from the UN by the Security Council promised astonishing changes within 6 months. Those looking at the South African scene have to be careful lest they are beguiled by such announcements or by Vorster's recent one respecting certain land rights for the urban African. Even the South African journal, the Financial Mail stated thus as a result of these projected changes: "Two steps back and one forward, brings the urban African to where he was eight years ago" through the restoration of the principle of 30 year lease-hold rights.

What we must do is to look first at certain verities in this situation if we are going to have any understanding of South African scene. I would suggest that the first relates to participation in the political process: "what is being done so that all people in South Africa regardless of race can participate in the political process?" The answer is: Nothing. A second verity is that South Africa is rushing diametrically in the opposite direction from one multiracial society to effectuate the bantustan policy whose essence is the denial of citizenship in South Africa for the vast majority of South Africans.

Other verities: South Africa is a country:

Where the African majority is deprived of all fundamental freedoms by a government whose policy is admittedly to keep South Africa under the domination of the white man and to continue to secure to the whites an abundant supply of cheap labor;

Where some 4 million whites have relegated unto themselves complete authority over 17 million Africans and over some 2 million Coloureds;¹

Where this 17% white minority receives more than 70% of the national income, even though they comprise less than 20% of the economically active population;

Where the gap between white and non-white income is steadily growing. Notwithstanding statistics cited on the increasing wages of the African, the true picture is that in real terms his economic lot is deteriorating;

Where the whites are said to have one of the highest, if not, the highest standard of living in the world, and the African in industrially developed South Africa is worse off than Africans in many of the developing countries of Africa.

Where the distribution of income is the most unequal in the world;

Where the Black laborer has no rights;

Where it is a crime, an act of terrorism "to embarrass the administration of the affairs of the State".

In the South African Government itself there is no participation whatsoever by any group except the whites, and that government has completely despotic power over all the people of that country. The laws of South Africa deprive the African majority of all basic rights; for a person's race is determination of every aspect of his life. Under the laws of that country, the majority has no freedom of movement, or residence, of employment, no right to land, to family life, to education or to participate in the government.

Under the Security laws, including the infamous Terrorism Act and notorious Suppression of Communism Act, the Government can exercise its power arbitrarily against anyone, Black or white who steps out of the mold and unparalleled rigidity of that society. The government can through its banning authority, exercise unfettered power to silence opposition.

But, it is in the educational sphere that the most pernicious inequities exist. Education is free for the white and coloured child. A Black child must pay for tuition and other costs related to schooling—such as textbooks and costs of building *if* he can get a place in the relatively few, overcrowded, double and triple shift schools for African children.

These, plus the living death of influx control, groups areas implementation, removals and the thousands of daily arrests for violation of the pass laws are

¹ Out of a total population of 24,887,000, there are: 17,712,000 Africans, 4,100,000 whites, 2,306,000 Coloureds and 709,000 Asians.

the basic attributes of apartheid, or separate development as it is euphemistically known. Whatever changes may have occurred or may be occurring in South Africa, they have not reached these fundamentals. Vorster's promise as to change in South Africa must be viewed against the backdrop of these facts. And what has happened since last Fall:

Minute inconsequential changes, vague announcements about restoring rights to urban Africans;

the deliberate decision made that the anomalous status of the Coloured under separate development would continue;

the denial of certain minimum assurances to the Homeland leaders so that, with the exception of the head of Transkei, the homeland leaders took a position against the proposed independence of the Bantustans;

the Government announcement, under the Affected Organizations Act, declaring the Christian Institute an affected organization, thus crippling a key anti-apartheid organization;

the expropriation of the Black theological seminary, a multiracial institution, which I visited with Congressman Diggs' Codel and whose presence opposite Fort Hare, now a "tribal" Xhosa University, was an embarrassment to the government after previous attempts by the Government to buy out the seminary and to threaten and to silence it had failed.

the arrest, detention for months without charge and torture of SASO members so silence all meaningful opposition, Black and white.

All this has happened. The facts on the international scene with respect to South Africa should be critical in determining U.S. policy because the issue of racism, and particularly apartheid, transcends all other international issues for the African countries and is a key issue for the Third World in general. There is no more effective way for us to alienate these countries than by giving comfort to the enforcers of apartheid. The heightening of international concern about U.S. actions has been simultaneous with recent events which have sounded the death knell for minority rule.

The sharpening international focus on U.S. policy is seen in the outspoken concern of the Organization of African Unity on the appointment of Nathaniel Davis to be Assistant Secretary of State. President Kaunda's use of the occasion of his toast to President Ford to voice his disquietude with U.S. policy towards Africa is also on point. The domestic concomitant of the developments in southern Africa and of the demonstrated bankruptcy of U.S. policy towards Portugal and its still reverberating boomerang is an expanding southern African constituency here in America.

This growing concern is attested by the number and level of conferences on southern African questions: the University of Wisconsin four-day conference on Namibia, the Temple University Conference on Southern Africa, the Yale Conference on Change in Contemporary Southern Africa and a series of meetings on southern Africa by the Council on Foreign Relations, to mention a few. The Brookings Institute is now contemplating including Africa in its areas of study.

The revelations of last Summer, some five years after the fact, of NSSM 39—other than being remarkable for showing the lack of clairvoyance or political perceptiveness of our foreign affairs experts in their premise that the whites are in southern Africa to stay—showed little that the watchers of U.S. policy were not aware of: namely that since 1969, U.S. policy, whatever the verbal pronouncements on abhorrence of apartheid and support of majority rule may have been, U.S. policy has been supportive of the status quo.

U.S. INTERESTS WITH RESPECT TO SOUTH AFRICA

Any assessment of what U.S. policy should be with respect to South Africa must come to grips with U.S. interests. The first imperative here is that we realize that our interests in cold, hard practical terms are coterminous with our interest with respect to human rights. This is very often overlooked because our policymakers have a way of stating our concern about repressive minority rule in South Africa only as an aspect of our concern for the violation of human rights and our desire to see a better deal for the majority in that area. But the truth is that for a major power as is the United States, no situation such as that brewing in South Africa, a veritable cauldron of racism, repression, fear and violence by the 17% minority against an 82% majority can exist without a substantial threat to U.S. interests. Further, a consideration of the geographic,

economic, natural resources and industrial facts on South Africa makes it clear that it is in the interest of the United States to have South Africa a friendly country and to have the people of South Africa friendly towards the United States. Although the present South African Government is a friendly Government, it is clear that this present situation of minority rule cannot last. The minority can buy time, but while doing so, it is building up the explosives in the situation. We can go along with their policy of staving off the inevitable with the domestic jurisdiction excuse. But casting our fortunes with South Africa jeopardizes our substantial greater interest in Black Africa: economically, in access to raw materials, oil, minerals, commodities and in markets; and strategically, with respect to Africa as a whole. It may have been a few years ago that as the big power with the big stick, we could take the Machiavellian approach, but the present fact of interdependence means otherwise. Can we not at least learn out of the debacle of Vietnam that we cannot cast our lot with a repressive status quo with impunity and without great damage to larger U.S. interests?

ESSENTIALS FOR A RATIONAL U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA

The prerequisite here is to define U.S. objectives. For a number of years our policy objective has apparently been to give the message to those concerned in the United States, in the United Nations and in Africa and the Third World of the U.S. support for majority rule. But the actual message conveyed to South Africa was not one of concern by the United States. This is so even allowing for irritations to South Africa present in our bilateral relationship from the arms embargo policy and restricted policy on promotional activities. Further, South Africa has been able without fail to count on us to do our utmost to bail her out of difficulties in the international arena. Our credibility with Black Africa and the Third World has been shredded. Obviously this Janus-headed policy has failed; and it is time for our Government to decide what our objective is. Is it merely to remove ourselves from the taint of support of an actual ally? It is submitted that this is not only an unworkable policy, but is inconsistent with our interests.

It is submitted that a more realistic objective would be to refuse to be a supporter of minority rule even if we are not prepared to give actual support to a change to minority rule.

The fundamentals of such a policy would be:

(1) to oppose not only the system of apartheid but the government which institutes such a system and;

(2) be supportive of the majority and liberal elements in their struggle to rid their country of the evil of apartheid.

There are a number of practical peaceful steps which we can take to show our support for majority-rule and opposition to minority rule.

A first recommendation is that U.S. officials cease being apologists for the South Africa regime. This is the way we are viewed:

When we insist on finding encouragement in the inconsequential changes announced by that Government;

Or when we, without the use of any of the famed Yankee ingenuity first resort to the veto in the name of the principle of consistency and then raise questionable legal justification for our policy position, when alternatively the U.S. could have supported suspension,

Or when we veto the application of Chapter VII to South Africa's illegal occupancy of Namibia;

A second recommendation is that the U.S. constituent agencies must adhere to stated policy. The sorry picture of the military's meeting with South African government officials should be ended.

The Commandant of the South African Defense Forces, Admiral Biermann, visited the United States and saw the American chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Moorer and the Secretary of the Navy, Secretary Mittendorf. Meetings by American military officials are contrary to stated policy; yet a group of American admirals are said to have dined with Admiral Biermann.

Moreover, in connection with certain congressional and staff visits to South Africa, it is reported that these have been paid for by South African private businessmen and organizations, such as the South African Agricultural Union. Great care must be exercised there because of Article I, Section 9 of the Con-

stitution² and under the Foreign Gifts Act, which goes to the legality of these visits as well as to the wisdom. Our founding fathers rightly banned emoluments from foreign governments.

The South African propaganda initiative has been stepped up enormously in the past few years and it is directed squarely at the U.S. policymakers, the Congress, and the military, all towards an ending of the arms embargo. The South African Minister of Information was here recently and made a very interesting presentation along these lines: the South Africa government is trying to do its best as a member of the free world to protect the sealanes around the Cape to insure the freedom of the seas for the West notwithstanding the growing Soviet Naval presence in the Indian Ocean. He called on the Western Powers to shoulder their responsibility in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

First, it is nonsense both that South Africa with 87% of its population rightless and voteless is a part of the free world and that our only recourse to protect our interests is to protect its brand of facism. We have been seduced by this argument before to our detriment. Secondly, the case has not been proved as to the Soviet threat in the Indian Ocean. Note, the South African case rests on a self-serving presentation: an alleged Soviet threat, the available South African port of Simonstown and the industrially developed structure of that country, all militating towards the conclusion that we need South Africa. There are also some self-interest factors present with respect to the Navy, the chief domestic proponent on this issue. Even assuming that the Soviet Union will make the Indian Ocean an area of confrontation, there are other viable alternatives we would have to consider because of the great price that we would pay if we hedged down with South Africa. Such an alliance would surely bring retaliation: jeopardize the access of our naval vessels to the ports in East Africa: jeopardize over-flight rights. In fact, it might well help to do what we fear most with respect to Chinese and Soviet influence in the area and help the Soviets get the submarine base in Nacala. Further, such an alliance would hurt us in a number of other critical areas with respect to negotiations on various raw materials and commodities.

Similarly, we must avoid NATO embroilment in the South Atlantic. We must not fall prey to the South African game to use a Soviet threat to inveigle us into a defense relationship which in turn, would be a guarantee of the minority's maintenance of power.

We must insist that the U.S. adhere to its own fundamental tenant of U.S. policy with respect to Africa—to keep the continent free from big power rivalry.

The South Africans' efforts to break the arms embargo by getting sonobombs sound detection equipment was turned down as were their efforts to get the P-3 Lockhart Orion Naval Patrol Aircraft to monitor Soviet naval movements in the ocean, and thus, to bring into reality a U.S./South African intelligence and military cooperation. These would also be a fundamental breach of the arms as it has existed since 1963: to refuse to become entangled militarily with South Africa, whether or not the particular situation was posed as one relating to apartheid or to the enforcement of apartheid. Further, the arms embargo against South Africa should be tightened, not relaxed, as has happened after the NSSM. Without arguing whether the relaxation in the "grey" areas brought South Africa significant equipment, the very fact of relaxation carried a significant signal of comfort to the National regime. The arms embargo should bar sales to South Africa of all military equipment and it should bar the sales of all items for the use of the South African military, whether lethal or not.

The sale of weapons-grade uranium to South Africa and nuclear collaboration with South Africa should be ended. Congressman Diggs' bill, H.R. 6082, would bar such cooperation and the transfer of nuclear materials with countries such as South Africa that has not ratified the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty.

Another imperative is to place in perspective South Africa's policy of "detente". Although this term, generally used for U.S./Soviet relations, has been borrowed here, the situation is very different. South Africa whose security situation has been radically altered by the developments in the former Portuguese areas of Mozambique and Angola as a result of the Portuguese coup is desperately trying:

To substitute the crumbling ring of buffer states, Mozambique, Angola and Rhodesia with free African states that will not harbor terrorists;

² . . . And no person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.

To keep the other states in line by economic and military domination;

To insulate its internal situation from outside changes to give itself time to effectuate its apartheid blueprint, the time schedule for homeland's independence has been updated;

And thus, for the white South Africans to prevail through divide and rule tactics.

It is with these perspectives that we have to view the South African support for moderate groups in Rhodesia, moves toward the balkanization of Namibia and South Africa's economic overtures towards other African countries. It is not a matter of detente from a sense of "live and let live", but an effort to buy time for South Africa's own policy of racial repression and minority domination to triumph. In a nutshell, detente is the game of minority-rule survival and U.S. policymakers must not allow themselves to be diverted from the basics as to the situation in South Africa by this charade.

It is equally crucial that we understand that independence of the homelands is not decolonization and cannot be equated with the independence of former colonial territories. Homeland independence is not self-determination; for the affected people have had no freedom of choice in the matter. The homeland policy is a *gigantic* heist. Even though we all cheer how magnificently some of the homeland leaders are carrying forward their strategy—strategy devised on the basis of their subservient position, the Bantustans are essentially a sham as well as a diversion from the main point: a free South Africa for all South Africans regardless of race, majority rule of the whole of South Africa and not of bits and pieces for the 72% Black majority, and not the present situation where the 17% white minority strives to continue its domination over 88% of the territory of South Africa. The U.S. should clearly state and adhere to the position that the Bantustans are illegal under international law, which requires the participation in the government of that country of all people without distinction as to race and color.

Our government must realize that the presence of U.S. investment renders it hostage to apartheid. And yet, given the 25 million Black Americans, U.S. support of South Africa in a military confrontation might be suicidal to our own form of government. Our country might survive, but the repression necessary to contain Black Americans would be the end of democracy as we know it.

At a minimum, therefore, the United States government should take a stand against expansion of U.S. investment. Finally, the Government should advise American companies doing business there that they do so at their own risk, that we will not protect them.

It cannot be gainsaid that these investments in South Africa provide a financial underpinning for South Africa and give it respectability in the world. Therefore, a position advocating withdrawal is the only logical one. The argument that since American business employs the African, its presence helps the African misconstrues the key fact on foreign investment by focusing on its meaning to the majority rather than on its meaning to the minority. It is foreign investment and its capital, technology and technical know-how which enables the minority to entrench itself against the majority.

With respect to what can be done now, first the government should use its leverage to see to it that at the minimum U.S. businesses do not exploit their employees. A labor attache should be assigned to our embassy with this special responsibility. Secondly, the legislature should put teeth in such efforts. Congressman Diggs has introduced legislation to influence U.S. companies in South Africa to follow certain basic standards of fair employment by making this a condition of eligibility for U.S. government contracts. It is interesting to note that, as reprehensible as it is, South African law does not prohibit an employer from paying equal wages.

It is further submitted that our representation in South Africa should be downgraded to the Charge level. But at a minimum our Ambassador should be recalled so long as South Africa refuses access to any U.S. Congressman.

Let us be clear. These types of measures have nothing to do with the change needed in South Africa, namely majority rule. But it would bring U.S. government leverage to end exploitation by U.S. firms of the majority and it might serve to put the children of the relatively few employees of U.S. firms in better position to contribute to the attainment of majority rule.

Government support through loans or guarantees or other facilitation of investment or business in South Africa should be curtailed; yet certain expanded facilities of the Export-Import Bank of the United States are available to South

Africa. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has just announced the establishment of a new \$1 million line of CCC credit to finance export sales of U.S. beef and doing breeding cattle to ranchers in South Africa.

Finally, the 1960's US program of support to Southern African refugees, SASP, has been withering away since 1969. It should be given new life.

In summing up recommendations with respect to policy towards South Africa, let me underscore the need for the assignment of responsibility among government agencies. As it is now, State enunciates one policy, but the Pentagon, Commerce, CAB, Treasury, Export-Import Bank, NASA, even the Post Office go their own separate ways. An effective policy requires executive coordination by a single agency with central responsibility.

With respect to Namibia, I wish to look quickly at two distinct questions: tax credits and Chapter VII. I wish to urge the introduction of a bill similar to that introduced last session by Senator Mondale to provide for the disallowance of tax credits for taxes paid to any country or political entity where (1) such an administration has been held to be illegal by the International Court of Justice and (2) the U.S. Government has accepted such Opinion.

The United States still permits U.S. companies doing business in Namibia and therefore paying taxes to the illegal administering authority, South Africa, to credit such taxes against taxes owed to the United States. Such tax credits should be ended. The Treasury has determined that it lacks the authority to end such credits under the applicable Internal Revenue Code provision, 26 U.S.C. Section 901, consistent with the United States legal duty to recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the invalidity of its acts concerning Namibia. That it took the Treasury Department from March 1972, when it received a communication from 27 U.S. Senators and Representatives, to May 1973 to determine that it lacked discretion to disallow the tax credit strongly suggests that the decision that "existing tax credit legislation did not provide discretion to deny the tax credit" was itself discretionary. So clarifying legislation should be introduced and should be passed.

But, a most important element in communicating to South Africa that her continued presence in Namibia is no longer acceptable is the willingness to use the Charter machinery designed for dealing with acts of aggression, threats to the peace and breaches of the peace. The South Africa's occupation of Namibia constitutes an act of aggression cannot be gainsaid. The contemplated program here put forward is a step-by-step scenario designed to induce real movement by South Africa. A first step would be to seek the creation of a special *Ad Hoc* Subcommittee (a) to study the problems of and (b) to devise a plan of implementation of *pro tanto* sanctions against South Africa—that is, a trade embargo (i) on goods destined to and originating from Namibia, (ii) on that proportion of South Africa's trade allocable to Namibia, and (c) to report to the Council by a given date, say 9 months later.

The second step would be for the Security Council to seek an immediate Article 39 determination that South Africa's continued presence in Namibia is an act of aggression, but *without* moving to an Article 41 decision to apply sanctions. Rather, the third step contemplates the Security Council proceeding, pursuant to Article 40 and calling upon South Africa to comply with certain provisional measures, using Chapter VI instead of Chapter VII action to attempt negotiation with South Africa. At this point, the United Nations would be dealing with South Africa from a position of strength and determination since the *Ad Hoc* Subcommittee would be working out implementation for *pro tanto* sanctions and the requisite, Chapter VII determination would have been made. It would be clear to South Africa that such palliatives as announcements of multiracial talks with no scheduling will not do. Further, the forecast independence of Namibia within 10 years would clearly be seen as totally unacceptable. It should be clear that in the whole proceeding during this interim period the only subject of negotiation is South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia and the restoring of fundamental freedom to Namibians. The impetus for meaningful action by South Africa would lie in the knowledge that once the *Ad Hoc* Subcommittee had reported, the U.S. was prepared to support a Security Council resolution imposing *pro tanto* sanctions against South Africa.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we fought World War II successfully out of the conviction that Nazism and everything it stood for must be ended. Yet now our policy, wittingly or unwittingly, gives comfort to a country whose leader was held as a Nazi

during that war and even more whose government continues the practices of racism and monstrous inhumanity of man against man.

If it were the human rights of Black South Africans only that were imperiled, the call would still be for America to act at least with all available peaceful means. But it is the interests of the United States itself both in the foreign policy arena and domestically that are at stake. The *necessity* is that the Congress push, pull, tug and legislate our government into a rational policy towards South Africa.

[From A Quarterly Journal of Africanist Opinion, vol. IV, No. 3, Fall 1974]

REFLECTIONS ON U.S. POLICY TOWARDS NAMIBIA

(By Goler Teal Butcher)

United States policy towards Namibia is the one shining oasis in the veritable desert known as United States policy toward southern Africa—an area of foreign policy where a mirage of official words has tended either to obfuscate United States government actions supporting the minority government or to obscure the real significance of such actions.

United States policy towards Namibia has been a shining oasis:

—A shining oasis, first because it was in part the vision and determination of a President of the United States—that the “well being and development” of the peoples of dependent territories belonging to a defeated country form a “sacred trust of civilization”—that bore fruit in the mandates system and, in particular, in the Mandate for South West Africa. Thus resulted the special status of South West Africa as an international territory.

—A shining oasis, because it was the 1949 United States argument which was substantially mirrored in the International Court’s Advisory Opinion of 1950 on the International Status of South West Africa. The Court concluded, first, that notwithstanding the demise of the League of Nations, the international status of this territory continued with the United Nations exercising the League’s supervisory functions. Second, although the UN Charter did not impose a compulsory obligation on South Africa, the mandatory, to place the territory under a trusteeship arrangement, South Africa could not escape international obligations assumed in the League Covenant respecting the territory and the inhabitants.

—A shining oasis, even vicariously,¹ because it was Judge Jessup of the United States who in his definitive dissent termed the Judgment of the Court in the 1966 South West Africa Cases “completely unfounded in Law” and indicated the criterion to be used to determine the compatibility of apartheid with the obligations of the mandate: namely, the Charter’s premise that “friendly relations among nations” are “based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” and a world in which there is to be international cooperation “in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.”²

—A shining oasis, because it was the United States with Arthur Goldberg at the helm who, following the lamentable opinion of the court in 1966 (or rather its judicial dodge), supported the UN General Assembly in moving to act with respect to the situation—declaring the mandate disavowed, forfeited and therefore terminated. We might note that, of the three big powers, the United States alone took this action—without the comfort of its cohorts of recent date, the U.K. and France, who have continued to remain in an anomalous position even with respect to the legal status of Namibia.

—A shining oasis, because the United States joined the *Ad Hoc* Subcommittee, formed very early in 1967 after the resolution in 1966 terminating the mandate (and on which William Rogers—later to be named Secretary of State—served as the U.S. representative). Again, in 1970, the U.S. actively participated in the *Ad Hoc* Subcommittee which, *inter alia*, recommended that the Security Council request an Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on the “Legal Consequences for States of

¹ The position of the U.S. government itself on apartheid was indicated in the 30 October 1963 U.S. statement to the Trusteeship Committee:

... There is neither legal nor political basis for the apartheid laws in South Africa; there is also no moral basis for such laws anywhere in the world, let alone in a territory such as South-West Africa, which has a clear international character, which was given to the Government of South Africa as “a sacred trust of civilization.”

² International Court of Justice Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders: South West Africa Cases, 1966 (Diss. Op. Jessup), pp. 322, 428–30.

the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276."

—A shining oasis, because of the written and oral statements that the United States submitted to the Court in the fall of 1970 in connection with the 1971 Advisory Opinion and in which the United States cogently argued that South Africa is in illegal occupation of Namibia and consequently has a legal duty to withdraw; and that as long as South Africa remains in Namibia, it is legally obligated to restore the fundamental freedoms of the inhabitants of the territory.³

But unfortunately, either the oasis has dried up, or that too was a mirage.

We are now at a sorry juncture; the United States stands out not by reason of the above actions, but because, when it came to doing something concrete to enforce the above positions, not one single thing was done.

I would like now to review several reasons for this tragic situation where the hitherto commendable actions of the United States have come to a standstill. First, the American pattern of international inaction when a moral interest conflicts with commercial concerns is but a reflection of the historical dilemma of this country when ethical interests vie with material priorities. This nation may have been founded on the noble idealism conveyed in the words of the Declaration of Independence that "all men are created equal"; but it was also built on the ignominious realism of the three-fifths clause of the Constitution, enshrining and protecting slavery. Similarly, in the international arena, the United States reflects, acknowledges, and supports the words of the United Nations Charter that "international peace can only be attained on a foundation of self-determination, fundamental freedom and human rights for all without regard to race, sex, language or religion." But U.S. actions with respect to the Namibia case (internationally), are found wanting.

But the causes of this situation are more complex than the historical American dilemma between philosophy and action. Until recently, Namibian issues have come to the fore in this country primarily in the context of legal issues as adjudications before the International Court; and even with respect to UNGA Resolution 2145 and thereafter as issues directly predicated on Judicial Opinions. The United States may well be proud of its international lawyers who in 1950 led us to support a finding by the Court that South Africa is legally accountable for its administration of the territory to the international community and who, again in 1971, led us to support the Opinion:

Upholding the termination of the mandate by the political organs of the United Nations;

Reaffirming South Africa's obligation to withdraw as determined by the Security Council and holding that the duty of all states, whether members of the United Nations or not, is to refrain from any actions giving support or recognition to the illegal occupant.

Despite all these shining examples, realism compels us to acknowledge that there have always been certain limitations built into the position of the United States. For example, in 1950 the United States' Written Statement to the Court argued that international accountability continued and that South Africa had to consider the territory as coming within the concept of Chapter XI of the UN Charter (which applies to those peoples who have not yet attained self-government). But we did *not* support the position that South Africa must place Namibia under a Chapter XII trusteeship arrangement. It might even be hazarded that, had we done so (given the weight of our views), this whole question might have been more easily resolved. (As indicated earlier, the Opinion which the Court announced in 1950 paralleled in many respects the positions argued in the U.S. submission.) That we did not argue an obligation to make Namibia a trust territory was a significant shortcoming. Again, in 1966 and 1967 we supported General Assembly Resolution 2145, terminating the mandate, and we joined that little *Ad Hoc* Subcommittee already mentioned. But we did not support UNGA Resolution 2248(S-V), which established the Council for Namibia, and we never joined the Council. Now the shortcomings of the Council of those days are well-known. But had the U.S. been a member of the Council, and had it supported

³ Security Council Resolution 366 of 17 December 1974 unanimously calls on South Africa to withdraw from Namibia and to move to transfer power to the people of South-West Africa with United Nations assistance, and asks South Africa to "make a solemn declaration" that she will comply with UN decisions regarding the territory. Finally, the Security Council is to meet on May 30 to review South Africa's compliance and to consider "appropriate measures."

the kind of deliberate practical actions which might have been meaningful in the international context, and which surely would have given South Africa the message, then the result might well have been different. Again, in 1971 when we submitted our statement to the Court, we supported, as I have said, the obligation of South Africa to withdraw. But our government made a point of *not* supporting the position of the Secretary-General excluding all trade with South Africa in Namibia as well as all dealings involving licenses, titles or interests, grants, concessions and other rights purportedly granted by South Africa after UNGA Resolution 2145. Had we done so, the pressure against investment and trade with Namibia might have had impact.

Again, even when the United States accepted the Advisory Opinion, we cautiously limited this to an acceptance of the *conclusions* of the Opinion. Finally, we were supporters of that whole questionable scenario which followed the 1972 retrogressive Security Council Resolution 309 in Addis Ababa, and the ensuing dialogue—finally terminated last year by the United Nations.

With all of these shortcomings—however serious they may be—a look at the sorry stance of the United Kingdom makes the position of the United States appear relatively laudable. And indeed, the U.S. position has been an enlightened one of which we may be proud.

What has happened? The time for action has arrived, and the historical dichotomy in the United States between words and actions—or between law and pragmatism where our pocketbooks are concerned—has come to the fore. Myopia induced by present business interests reinforces the inertia which grips policy-makers when obviously selfish interests do not compel action. Although with respect to Namibia the “cat to be belled” is of relatively Lilliputian size, the United States government (because of substantial private and public involvement with South Africa) will do no more than inveigh against South Africa. It is a relative little thing to be supportive of an end to an illegal administration. It is another for our basically status quo nation to take action, even peaceful action, to end that illegal administration—unless that administration threatens our own immediate interests. Indeed, this policy of inaction is a part of the “Nixonian move”—and notice I did not use that euphemistic misnomer, “tilt”: I say “move” (a 180 degree move)—toward solid support for the status quo in southern Africa.

The U.S. hardened its position in 1969. But in 1974 things have changed with respect to the situation in southern Africa. As a result of the Portuguese coup, there has been a complete restructuring of the security situation in southern Africa. As a result of the growing strength within the United Nations of the anti-apartheid forces, the situation there has changed. Notwithstanding the unprecedented wave of repression and oppression which South Africa has conducted against SWAPO and all the Africans who have spoken out in Namibia, internal resistance is increasing. So the time has come for all of us who are concerned with a rational U.S. policy towards Namibia to start bringing forth viable—that is, peaceful—suggestions, because the United States is not going to consider anything but *peaceful* measures. Should the United States ever signal to South Africa that it is serious on the Namibian question, South Africa would have to reconsider in sober terms its position on Namibia. We are no longer at the time of National Security Council Study Memorandum 39 (1969), when it was taken as a given that South Africa could not be forced out of Namibia. That was nonsense five years ago—and it is even more absurd now, because we can let South Africa know that the cost of her presence in Namibia is not acceptable. How do we get the message to South Africa? How do we make “an offer they cannot refuse”? I would like to advance some actions for your consideration.

In May 1970 the United States made the “unprecedented announcement” that U.S. nationals who invest in Namibia on the basis of rights acquired through the South African government since adoption of General Assembly Resolution 2145 will not receive U.S. government assistance in protection of such investments against claims of a future lawful government of Namibia. That is all well and good, but I think that those of us who are interested in *change* must ask the United States to announce and enforce a policy that our government will not protect U.S. investment against the *present unlawful occupant* in Namibia; nothing less is meaningful now.

The United States still permits U.S. companies doing business in Namibia (and therefore paying taxes to the illegal administering authority, South Africa) to credit taxes paid to South Africa against taxes owed to the United States! Such

tax credits should be ended. We fought very hard last year to get an administrative determination to end this practice. Such a clarification of the applicable Internal Revenue Code provision, 26 U.S.C. § 901, by the Secretary of the Treasury would be consistent with the legal duty of the United States to recognize that South Africa's presence in Namibia is illegal and its acts respecting Namibia are invalid. It took the Treasury Department from March 1972 (when it received a communication from twenty-seven U.S. Senators and Representatives) until May 1973 to determine that it lacked discretion to disallow the tax credit. This strongly suggests that the decision that "existing tax credit legislation did not provide discretion to deny the tax credit" was itself discretionary. Senator Mondale has introduced a bill providing for the disallowance of tax credits for taxes paid to any country or political entity where (1) such an administration has been held to be illegal by the International Court of Justice, and where (2) the U.S. government has accepted such an Opinion.

The situation in southern Africa so threatens the peace and security not only of that area, but of the world, that affirmative action should be taken *now* to develop tax disincentives for doing business in Namibia.

There are other concrete actions which our government could take if it were serious. For example, we could begin to question the certification of imports mined or produced in Namibia pursuant to franchises granted by the illegal administering authority. Also, we should institute closer surveillance by the Securities & Exchange Commission to assure that material facts regarding stated U.S. policy on Namibia are included in the prospectuses of registration statements for the sale of securities relating to investment in Namibia.

The United States has treaties with South Africa. The question is, which of those treaties apply to Namibia, and for which ones do we honor such application? The extension of any such treaties to Namibians—including most favored nation treatment for products entering or leaving Namibia, as well as any extension of GATT privileges—raises questions of inconsistency with the Advisory Opinion.

With respect to the systematic repression that has prevailed over the past eighteen to twenty-four months in Namibia, the United States should not be content with oral demarches, but should make written aides-memoires and diplomatic notes of protest. We should follow these up by making our protests public, and, when nothing is done, by taking the matter to the United Nations Security Council and requesting a UN Investigating Committee.

We should monitor those U.S. corporations which insist on doing business in Namibia, pursuant to our obligations under Security Council Resolution 310 in which we recognize that U.S. corporations doing business in Namibia should adhere to the employment standards set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A routine letter calling the provision of the Security Council resolution to the companies' attention is inadequate.

Finally, the Commerce Department should end all activities relating to the harvesting of Namibian seals. The present sleight-of-hand policy by which the various departments of government fail to implement pronounced policy must be brought to an end.

On the international level, the U.S. should give full support to the UN Commissioner for Namibia, with particular emphasis on his programs for the education and training of Namibians. Further, if the United States finds the terms of reference of the Council for Namibia (as set out in Security Council Resolution 2248 (S-V)) objectionable, our government should state (1) the explicit revisions we believe necessary; and (2) our intention to join once these are satisfactorily resolved. It should then begin to work toward this end.

Most important in communicating to South Africa that her continued presence in Namibia is no longer acceptable is the willingness to use the Charter machinery designed for dealing with acts of aggression, threats to the peace and breaches of the peace. That South Africa's occupation of Namibia constitutes an act of aggression cannot be gainsaid. The measures contemplated here constitute a step-by-step program designed to induce real movement by South Africa. The first step would be to see to the creation of a special *Ad Hoc* Subcommittee (1) to study the problems of and (2) to devise a plan of implementation of *pro tanto* sanctions against South Africa—that is, a trade embargo on goods destined for and originating from Namibia, and on that proportion of South Africa's trade allocable to Namibia, and (3) to report to the Council by a given date, perhaps nine months later. The second step would be for the Security Council to seek an immediate Article 39 determination that South Africa's continued presence in

Namibia is an act of aggression—but *without* moving to an Article 41 decision to apply sanctions. The third step contemplates the Security Council proceeding, pursuant to Article 40 and calling upon South Africa to comply with certain provisional measures, using Chapter VI instead of Chapter VII action to attempt negotiation with South Africa. At this point, the United Nations would be dealing with South Africa from a position of strength and determination since the *Ad Hoc* Subcommittee would be working out implementation for *pro tanto* sanctions and the requisite Chapter VII determination would have been made. It would be clear to South Africa that such palliatives as announcements of multiracial talks with no scheduling will not suffice. Further, the forecast of independence for Namibia within ten years would clearly be seen as totally unacceptable. It should be clear that during this entire interim period the only subject of negotiation would be South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia and the restoring of fundamental freedoms to Namibians. The impetus for meaningful action by South Africa would lie in the knowledge that once the *Ad Hoc* Subcommittee had reported, the U.S. would be prepared to support a Security Council resolution imposing *pro tanto* sanctions against South Africa.

This scenario is proposed as one way for the Government of the United States (if it chooses to redeem its position that the welfare of dependent peoples is a sacred trust) to compel the Government of South Africa to realize that the cost of its recalcitrance on Namibia is escalating. Sadly, our government has strayed so far in its policy on Southern Africa that there is little hope that such a scenario will be played out. But all those interested in Africa and in a rational United States policy toward southern Africa in general and Namibia in particular have a special responsibility to assist now in continuing to develop practical alternative policies. Together we must lead, push, pull and tug our government into the support of a concrete policy towards the realization of self-determination for Namibia.⁴

[From Business Week, Apr. 21, 1975]

SOUTH AFRICA ONE MAN'S CAMPAIGN TO BOOST ITS IMAGE

Werner Ackermann, a 51-year-old Pretoria businessman, appears to be on an expensive one-man crusade to change the world's image of South Africa. In the past year, he has personally invited 39 foreign legislators and businessmen, plus their aides and wives, on all-expense-paid tours of his country. His latest guests, three U.S. congressmen, arrived home this week vowing to help South Africa's political and military interests in Washington.

"This trip has enabled me to envisage a rosy future for economic and political relations between South Africa and the U.S.," says Representative John H. Dent (D-Pa.). "I plan to inform both Congress and my constituency about the advantages of increased contact." After a side excursion that the trio took to Rhodesia, Representative Richard H. Ichord (D-Mo.), a member of the House Armed Services Committee, says he plans to support retention of the Byrd amendment, which allows the U.S. to import Rhodesian chrome despite trade sanctions by the U.N. Such a move would also benefit South Africa by reducing diplomatic pressures on that nation.

Ackermann's generosity is highly suspect. An informed U.S. official says the trips he hosts are actually paid for by South Africa's Information Dept. as part of its worldwide effort to influence opinion. Pretoria uses the pretense of personal invitations, critics say, to get around U.S. laws prohibiting congressmen from accepting gifts and travel from foreign governments. Asked why he took the trip, Ichord said: "I came to look, listen, and learn, and I'm not doing so at the U.S. taxpayers' expense. When it comes to trips like this, I'm the judge of my own ethics."

TAX DEDUCTIBLE

Ackermann and his wife, opera singer Mimi Coertze, are certainly strong supporters of the Nationalist Party led by Premier B. J. Vorster. Moreover, Ackermann admits that he has never met many of the people he invites, and that the Information Dept. makes up their tour itineraries. But he denies he is financed by the government. "What I'm trying to do is promote better understanding," he says. "I'm working to change [our] image, at my own expense."

⁴ Security Council Resolution 366 of 17 December 1974 is commended insofar as it goes, but the big question remains as to which "appropriate measures" of the Charter we will support. (Is it not sad, however, that five years after Security Council Resolution 269, setting a date for withdrawal, that this is considered promising?)

At the rate of \$3,000 per U.S. visitor for each two-week trip, that expense now amounts to at least \$120,000. Ackermann, a self-professed millionaire, claims that much of it is tax-deductible, since the visitors may benefit his businesses, which range from export-import to tourism and citrus groves.

Whatever Ackermann's backing, his campaign dovetails neatly with that of the Information Dept., particularly where the U.S. is concerned. Pretoria would like Congress to remove the ban on the sale of arms to South Africa, first imposed by the U.S. in 1962 as an anti-apartheid measure, and it wants a military agreement committing the U.S. Navy to a stronger presence around the Cape of Good Hope.

Pressure for these changes intensified early last year when Dr. Cornelius Mulder, South Africa's minister of information, visited the U.S. and spent 25 minutes talking to then-Vice-President Ford. He also met with key Defense Dept. officials and legislators.

Last May, Vice-Admiral Hugo H. Biermann of the South African navy visited Washington and talked with Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A later trip by a second South African admiral was canceled because of adverse publicity.

UNDAUNTED

In tune with the military public-relations offensive, Ackermann's guest list has been heavily larded with members of the 40-man House Armed Services Committee. Besides Ichord, the most recent tour included Representative Harold Runnels (D-N.M.), and two of the six congressmen who toured South Africa at his invitation in January were also committee members: Representative Bob Wilson of California, ranking Republican member, and Representative G. William Whitehurst (R-Va.).

Interestingly enough, former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, now an executive with *Reader's Digest*, was in South Africa at the same time as Dent's party. Laird, who was not among Ackermann's guests, caused a stir by saying at a press conference that the U.S. would review its arms embargo.

But the South Africans do not rely on two-way visits alone. They recently hired the Washington law firm of Collier, Shannon, Rill & Edwards, which has worked on the Rhodesian chrome question for the U.S. steel industry, to help them shape their responses to U.S. legislation. And they have paid for advertising aimed at lessening their isolation. One claims that the chief protection for the Middle Eastern oil that goes round the Cape of Good Hope is South Africa's naval base at Simonstown.

With the new, more liberal cast of Congress, South Africa's efforts seem likely to fall on deaf ears. But Ackermann, at least, is undaunted. To date, most of his \$3,000-a-head guests have been pro-South African already, but he plans to break new ground. "In the near future," he says, "I'll be writing letters to both Bella Abzug and Shirley Chisholm."

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much, Mrs. Butcher.

I would like to hear from each of the witnesses first. We will then have the rest of the period for questions.

We are going to hear next from Prof. Leonard Thompson, Department of History at Yale University.

STATEMENT OF PROF. LEONARD M. THOMPSON, DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, YALE UNIVERSITY

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman, it is a great privilege and honor to be asked to attend and speak here.

Perhaps I should start by saying that I have certain relevant credentials. I have spent a total of 26 years as a domiciled resident of South Africa from the age of 10 to the age of 21 and then again 14 years as a university teacher after World War II. During World War II I was in the British Navy and before that at Oxford University. Since I left South Africa in 1961 I have been teaching here in the United States.

I have revisited South Africa three times since then.

I am not going to read my statement, Mr. Chairman, but shall speak from notes. I put in three documents which I have written fairly recently about contemporary South Africa.

Senator CLARK. They will be included in the record.

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much.

[The information referred to follows:]

CHANGE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: A 1975 OVERVIEW

(By Prof. Leonard M. Thompson, Department of History, Yale University)

(Extract from a paper presented to a symposium on Change in Contemporary Southern Africa held at Seven Springs Conference Center, Mount Kisco, on May 9-11, 1975.)

Suppose we have tape recordings of discussions now taking place in the Prime Minister's office in Pretoria and the office of the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity in Dar es Salaam. Suppose, too, that in each case an official is reading aloud a memorandum, summarising the situation as it should be in Southern Africa in 1984.

The South African document might read as follows: "If we continue to play our hand as skillfully in the next nine years as we have recently, we shall have secured our vital interests by 1984. Internally, we shall have consolidated our power. Our White nation will be more united than ever before, because we shall be the most prosperous nation in the world. We shall have increased our numerical strength by incorporating the Coloured People. We shall have satisfied the leaders of the African population who reside in the Republic that it is in their interests to support us. And law and order will prevail here, because we shall have perfected our bureaucratic apparatus for the identification and elimination of radical opponents, White as well as Black.

"All our neighbors will depend mainly on us for their material well-being. Once they have got to grips with their responsibilities, the independent governments of the Homelands, of Mozambique, and of what will presumably be known as Zimbabwe and Namibia will have found themselves in very much the same position as the governments of Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland now are. By 1984 the ruling classes of these little states will have been softened up by our judicious use of financial assistance. They may still indulge in high-sounding anti-South African rhetoric in the OAU and the UN, but they will have learned that they cannot escape our economic orbit, nor challenge our military power, which will include nuclear weapons.

"By 1984 we shall have dismantled most of our so-called petty apartheid laws and regulations (without of course giving Africans or Asians a say in the election of members of our Parliament), which will have muted American and European criticisms of our policies. National and international corporations based in America, Europe, and Japan will be making even greater profits than at present from their participation in our economy; and, after reviewing its global policies following its reverses in South East Asia, the Government of the United States will have become our partners in a SATO alliance for the defence of the South Atlantic region against Communism.

"We shall, of course, experience a number of crises between now and 1984, but there is no reason to believe that we shall be overwhelmed by them, provided we keep cool heads. Internally, we have a most delicate task in the industrial sector, where we must build up a stable and loyal community of skilled African workers. This will be done by providing them with a rising standard of living, immensely superior to anything available to them elsewhere in Southern Africa, and security of domicile in the Republic, provided they refrain from political agitation. Another delicate task will be the incorporation of the Coloured People into our White nation, which is essential to offset our adverse reproduction rate vis-a-vis the Africans [See Secret Memo 47/1975]. The Hertzog people will not like, but they cannot muster enough support to wreck our strategy.

"Externally, we shall have to act with exceptional finesse in handling the decolonization of the Homelands and, especially, Rhodesia-Zimbabwe and South West Africa-Namibia. We are already making a propitious start in the Homelands: Mantanzima has opted for independence in the Transkei. If Buthezezi or-

Mangope or any of the other Homeland leaders persists in being recalcitrant, we shall find a way of removing him. In Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, our best hope is to establish a mixed regime, allowing the Whites to keep their property, but Smith has been so rigid that it is now likely that we shall have to accept a Black government. Our timing will be vital. We must declare ourselves early enough for the new government, and moderate African states to the north, to feel obligated to us for our assistance. Liberia, the Ivory Coast, Gabon, and even Zambia are providing helpful in this respect. South West Africa is still more complex. Three, our preferred option is to detach the north, with its large African population, and join it with Angola; and to establish a mixed government under White leadership in the south. But in South West Africa-Namibia, as in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, it is clear that we may have to sacrifice the interests of the local White population for the sake of the greater interest of White South Africa. In that case, we shall make generous provision for the resettlement of White refugees here in the Republic; since most of them are Protestants of northern European origin, they will be easily assimilable and valuable additions to our Nation.

"In short, our security will be based on our sound and expanding economy, the divisions among our potential enemies, and our value to the United States and its allies as a proven bastion against Communism."

Supposing that the OAU document has been drafted by the Tanzanian member of the Liberation Committee, it might read as follows: "By 1984 majority rule will prevail in Zimbabwe and Namibia as well as in Angola Mozambique; coups will have removed the collaborationist regimes in Malawi and Swaziland; and South Africa itself will be on the verge of liberation. There will have been internal struggles and secessionist movements in several of the liberated territories during the transitional period, but by 1984 the new regimes will have consolidated their power and will be restructuring their societies.

"Our priorities are now clear. First, we shall make sure that there are no obstacles to the completion of the liberation of Mozambique and Angola. Mozambique presents no serious problems—the reactionary section of the White settlers have shot their bolt and Samora Machel is reliable; but in Angola we must continue to put pressure on the leaders of the three liberation movements to sink their differences and to discipline their followers. In the last resort, if they continue their senseless strife, we must agree to give our united support to one of them. Second, we must deal with Rhodesia. This should be a fairly straightforward exercise. The Smith regime is weak and brittle: South Africa is withdrawing its support; and when Mozambique closes its border, as Machel has undertaken to do on Mozambique's independence day, Rhodesia will quickly collapse. The Presidents of Zambia, Zaire and Botswana are correct to try to achieve this task with as little bloodshed as possible, and President Nyerere can be counted on to see that there is no deviation from the principle of majority rule. Should the Smith government persist in refusing to face reality, the Zimbabwe freedom fighters, equipped with arms left over from the war in Mozambique and fresh supplies from overseas supporters, will force the whites to surrender after a short campaign. Third, there is Namibia. There, too, prolonged military operations should not be necessary, for it is not in South Africa's interest to continue to defy the United Nations on what to her is a secondary issue; but we must be prepared to cope with devious diplomatic manoeuvres from Pretoria before we shall have liberated a united Namibia. The coups in Swaziland and Malawi will be a natural consequence of the liberation of Mozambique and Zimbabwe; plans have been made for both these purposes.

"Initially, the freedom of action of the governments of the liberated countries will be seriously limited by South African economic imperialism, but by 1984 they will have gone a long way towards detaching themselves from South Africa, as Zambia has already done. They will have withdrawn their labor from South Africa and obtained aid from an international consortium to tide them over the period of readjustment. They will have radically altered the economic priorities in their territories, concentrating on rural production for high-level subsistence, following the example set by Tanzania. Consequently, they will have become less dependent on foreign trade. But there will be areas of industrial development associated with the coal-mining and manufacturing industries of Zimbabwe and the power produced by the Cabora Bassa dam. In addition, several of the liberated states will have joined Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, as well as Zambia, in an Economic Union. Free Central and Southern Africa will at last be on the road to the economic development of their African populations, as contrasted with the colonial and neocolonial economies which merely promoted the growth of export sectors for the benefit of foreigners.

"By 1984 the Republic of South Africa will be completely isolated. Its economy will be in decline because it will lack markets for its products, its cities will be rent by industrial strife, and White morale will be crumbling. Foreigners who have been contending that the South African government is capable of buying off its middle class African subjects will have been proved wrong. No concessions that the regime is capable of making will prevent the overwhelming majority of the African inhabitants of the Republic from realizing that they are oppressed and identifying their oppressors, especially as they will be exposed to stimulating broadcasts from our Radio Liberation Stations in Lourenço Marques and Salisbury. The republican bureaucracy will be running short of reliable manpower and more than half of the members of the armed forces will be Black. With military aid from overseas sympathizers, we shall be infiltrating trained guerrillas and arms into the Republic.

"Of course we shall have setbacks before South Africa is free. The progressive members of the O.A.U. must always be vigilant to prevent states like Liberia, the Ivory Coast, Gabon, and Zaïre from succumbing to the machinations of South African diplomacy. We must also be wary of allowing the great powers to use Africans as surrogates for their conflicts. In the last resort, however, South Africans themselves will be the principal agents of their liberation. But inside South Africa, as elsewhere, there are and will be traitors: tribalists who pit Africans against Africans; people who are corrupted by money and status within the apartheid system; and most dangerous of all, because most difficult to expose, woolly-minded men and women who lack a clear understanding of their real interests.

"Fortunately time is on our side. The age of imperialism and neocolonialism is ending. The oil-producing states have shown how those of us who possess scarce resources can combine to obtain fair prices. And White people throughout the world are already disenchanted with South Africa.

"I would like to close this memorandum on a personal note. I studied in the United States in the 1960s and have recently returned from duty in our Tanzanian Embassy there. I am convinced that we would be wrong to despair of America. The younger generation of White Americans is much less motivated by racial prejudice than its predecessors. Black Americans are becoming better informed about the ways in which their race is degraded by apartheid, and their influence in American politics is increasing. I believe that when the United States government has digested its experience in South East Asia, it will be better able to appreciate the difference between totalitarian communism and the human socialist society that we and other progressive African states are trying to build. Moreover, now that the policy of relying on reactionary allies has failed in Greece, Portugal, and Vietnam, the American government will be more concerned than previously to consider our interests as nonaligned nations, if only for fear of the consequences of forcing us into the Soviet camp."

CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA

(Edited by Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey Butler)

INTRODUCTION¹

The news about South Africa often seems contradictory. On the one hand, many items suggest that South Africa is an unstable country with a regime that is anathema to most of its inhabitants and condemned by the rest of the world. For example, during recent years there have been strikes of African workers in Durban, Johannesburg, and Namibia—events without precedent since African political organizations were banned and crushed in the early 1960s. There have also been disturbances in all the segregated universities that the government has created for African, Colored, and Asian students. Several of the African politicians who operate the institutions that the government has established in the "Bantu Homelands" have been demanding greater power for their administrations and also publicly articulating the grievances of the entire African population. South African athletes have been excluded from the Olympic Games and many other international sports competitions; and in 1974 a move to expel

¹This Introduction has been revised in consultation with Jeffrey Butler and in the light also of comments by Richard Elphick, David Robinson, Newell Stultz, and Absalom Vilakazi.

South Africa from the United Nations was stopped in the Security Council only by the vetoes of Britain, France, and the United States, and even so the South African delegation was then excluded from the proceedings of the General Assembly. Moreover, the guerrilla forces of the African liberation movements have been so successful in Portuguese territories that military officers seized power in Lisbon in April 1974 and began to decolonize Mozambique and Angola which, with Rhodesia, had previously functioned as buffers between the Republic and Black-controlled Africa.

On the other hand, other news items suggest that the South African regime is perfectly secure. For example, South Africa's gross national product has continued to soar; during 1974 the value of her principal export—gold—rocketed to \$190 a fine ounce. European, American, and Japanese corporations have continued to increase their highly profitable participation in the South African economy by trade and investment and through their industrial subsidiaries. Moreover, although the government has been flexible in some respects (e.g., in not preventing "homeland" leaders from speaking out), it has also been refining its extremely efficient apparatus of coercion. It has continued to eliminate potential leaders of resistance among the subject peoples by banning them, imprisoning them, or forcing them into exile. It has similarly been harassing White opponents. A commission has investigated the activities of the four White-controlled organizations that have been most critical of its racial policies—the University Christian Movement, the National Union of South African Students, the Christian Institute of South Africa, and the South African Institute of Race Relations—and parliament has passed legislation limiting access by "affected organizations" to funds from outside South Africa. And in a general election on 24 April 1974 the National party, which has held power without a break since 1948, was returned by the exclusively White electorate with an increased majority.

How do facts such as these fit together? Which of them reflect the dominant trends in South African society and point the way to the future: those that express the will and the power of the regime to maintain the essence of the present system, or those that foreshadow fundamental change? Are the White South Africans invincibly entrenched in their monopoly of real political power and their inordinate share of the wealth of the country? Or is White domination being undermined? Or are pressures building up that must eventually produce a cataclysm?

Obviously there are no simple answers to such questions. Despite some similarities with the American South as it was as recently as two decades ago, there has never been a society quite like modern South Africa, so not much is to be gained by extrapolating from other cases. A process model of the system would have to take account of continuous interactions across the major divide between White and Black, with Black as well as White initiatives and White as well as Black responses to initiatives from the other side. But if these were the only forces that the model included, it would be far from sufficient. It should also provide for interactions across the secondary divisions in South African society. Besides the numerous secondary ethnic divisions (Afrikaner-British; African-Colored-Asian; Xhosa-Zulu-Southo-etc.) the entire ethnic spectrum is cut across by cultural, occupational, and regional groupings. Finally, a model of the dynamics of contemporary South Africa could not be complete without allowance for external forces, which are themselves varied and often ambiguous in purpose and effect.

One's capacity to assess the direction of change in any society, including contemporary South Africa, is also impeded by the problem of evaluating the relative significance of events that make newspaper headlines and trends that do not. The former may merely be expressions of the established forces (e.g., election results); the latter may be altering people's interests, perceptions, and behavior (e.g., the emerging class stratifications within the African, Colored, and Asian communities, as well as within the Afrikaner community).

This book grapples with these questions. The first two sections consider the processes of change that are taking place within the White and the African communities respectively. The third section examines the instruments of White domination, the role of an intermediate group (the Asians), and interactions among the races. The final section deals with the relationships between the Republic and the external world. Each section concludes with a chapter that seeks to draw the salient threads together and to establish the principal dynamics of the present time.

Nearly all the authors have had extensive experience of life in South Africa and many have a real stake in the country. They represent a variety of ethnic backgrounds, academic disciplines, and national, social, and professional affiliations. They also cover an ideological spectrum that, in other societies, would be regarded as extending from conservatives to socialists. However, supporters of the National party were not invited to contribute, so the reader will not find any overt defense of the government that has been in power since 1948.

Two questions lie at the heart of the book: what would constitute significant change in South Africa? And, to what extent is significant change made likely by contemporary trends and events? But a resolution of these questions is impeded by underlying problems of a general character: what measures of significance do we have? How do we assess the cumulative significance of trends and events?

The contributors are, we believe, agreed that by "significant change" we mean change in the structure of South African society, that is to say *radical redistribution of power and wealth*. This formulation recognizes that political and economic factors are inextricably involved; but it is open to different interpretations, especially as to the extent of redistribution that would constitute significant change in South Africa. All would agree that significant change would result in orders no longer being given exclusively in one direction—by Whites to Blacks; but most would go further and recognize that significant change will not have occurred unless all adult members of the population participate in the central political process ("majority rule") and there is also a substantial increase in the Black share of the resources and wealth of the country. A strong minority would go further still and specifically assert that in South Africa change would not be significant unless the outcome was a socialist order.

There are four main interpretations of the trends in contemporary South Africa. First, there is the possibility that the overriding trend is an accentuation of the authoritarian features that have been present in South Africa since the nineteenth century. In support of this conclusion, there is a considerable body of evidence that the principal decision-makers in the ruling party are now concerned, above everything else, to maintain their power; that they have the will to adopt all measures that seem necessary for the purpose; and that they have the capacity to succeed for the foreseeable future. This conclusion follows from focusing on the power of the South African state: the laws in the statute-book; the bureaucratic structures that enforce the laws; the rapid identification and suppression of potential leaders of resistance and organizations that might foment resistance; and the build-up of advanced military and police technology. Within the White oligarchy, the reasoning continues, opposition to these trends is marginal; and, despite all their newsworthiness, the Bantustan politicians, the Black workers and peasants, the Black students, the new regimes in Angola and Mozambique, the South African guerrillas and exiled politicians, and the foreign critics do not have the capacity to overthrow the South African system. On the contrary, their main effect, in this interpretation, is to accentuate the authoritarian trend in South Africa by frightening the White population.

Secondly, there is the possibility that the dominant trend is what one contributor calls "reactionary reformism." By this he means that the government is indeed making "concessions" in response to internal and external pressures, but that these concessions are not promoting change in the basic structure of South African society. In support of this interpretation is the evidence that South African Blacks have recently been receiving increasing opportunities for political self-expression in the Bantustans and the Colored and Indian councils, and for material well-being in improved wages and fringe benefits. The government—this argument continues—has shrewdly drawn a distinction between those laws and practices that are essential for the maintenance of the overall system of White domination, which are being retained and enforced with the utmost rigor, and those that are not essential, which are being relaxed. In the former category are the White monopoly of the franchise for the central Parliament and White ownership of the bulk of the land, the natural resources, and the industries; in the latter, the so-called petty apartheid laws and regulations, such as those that segregate people by race in trains, buses, restaurants, hotels, libraries, and parks. It is compatible with this assessment that the Bantustans may become formally independent, that the wages of Black workers may rise appreciably, and that skilled Black workers and their families may acquire greater security of residence in the towns provided they abstain from founding organizations that could generate political power. But so long as the central government remains an exclu-

sively White institution and Whites retain control of the bulk of the land and its resources, individual Africans will be utterly dependent on Whites for their livelihood, the Bantustans will be impoverished, neocolonial satellites of the Republic with scarcely any means for independent political action, and the new regimes in Mozambique and Angola, like those in Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, will also be constrained to tolerate the *status quo* in the Republic. Skillfully applied, this policy is considered capable of defusing internal resistance, stabilizing South Africa's frontiers, disarming Western criticism, and creating ever-stronger ties between the Republic and Western political, commercial, industrial, and military interests.

The third interpretation is derived from highlighting much the same data as the second, but assessing them differently. According to this interpretation, whatever the intentions of White decision-makers may be, the Black peoples of South Africa are capable of turning the situation that now exists to their advantage, so that although current reforms may be reactionary in intent they will become revolutionary in effect. Some Black South Africans, the reasoning goes, are beginning to use the bargaining power that they have as indispensable workers in the modern industrial economy and as operators of the segregated political institutions that the government itself has created. Already they are influencing the central decision-making process and raising the political consciousness of the Black masses; and the consequence of these developments is that Blacks will inexorably generate enough power sooner or later to effect fundamental change.

Finally, there is the interpretation that the essential dynamics in contemporary South Africa are a prelude to revolution. In this view, authoritarianism has been the central feature of South Africa throughout the twentieth century, and current developments are not beginning to rid South African society of its oppressive characteristics, but are merely seducing a few members of the Black population from loyalty to their race and class and substituting a particularly vicious form of neocolonialism for the earlier forms of oppression. However, after the interlude of relative impotence that followed the suppression of African political organizations in the early 1960s, the recent strikes in South Africa and guerrilla successes in neighboring territories show that the future lies with the Black liberation movement. Already a revolutionary consciousness is pervasive and it will generate overwhelming power once the Black peasants and townsmen are provided with guns, as they soon will be as a result of the liberation of Angola and Mozambique.

The logic of the fourth—the revolutionary—interpretation may not convince people who are impressed by the power of the South African state and the manipulative skills of the government. A skeptic may doubt whether the preconditions for guerrilla-led revolution exist in South Africa. What precedent is there for guerrilla forces overthrowing a modern industrialized State? In this vein, Heribert Adams concludes his chapter with the observation that "To take full account of a complex, contradictory reality distinguishes social science from wishful thinking." However, other contributors consider that no scholar is free from ideological assumptions that are derived from his class interests and that affect the questions he asks and the conclusions he reaches, and Albie Sachs reminds us that some visionaries, such as Rousseau, Lenin, Mao Tse-tung and Castro, have made more accurate predictions than social scientists. "All revolutions," writes Sachs, "are impossible to the social scientist until they happen; then they become inevitable."

These four interpretations of contemporary processes in South Africa are not fully spelled out in this book, which is structured along different lines. Nor, for the most part, do contributors associate themselves exclusively with any one assessment of the dominant trends. Indeed, it is the editors' impression that most contributors recognize that most if not all of the interpretations have some cogency. Moreover, they are not mutually exclusive, especially when they are related to each other over time. For example, authoritarianism accompanied by conservative-inspired reforms may in fact be the dominant processes at the present time; but the ground may simultaneously be being prepared for fundamental change; either through a gradual accretion of power in the hands of Blacks, or by outright revolution, or by some combination of both these processes.

The book pinpoints a series of major questions, the answers to which will probably determine the future of South Africa. Will such restraints as exist among White South Africans (for example, in the Progressive party and among the *verlaite* Afrikaners) be overwhelmed by the authoritarian forces in White society? Will the African skilled workers and the Bantustan politicians and

administrators become satisfied with the rewards available to them as a result of the modifications that are being made in the South African system, or will they associate themselves with the demands of the African masses? Will Colored and Asian South Africans identify with the Whites or the Africans? Will Western critics continue to exert pressure on the South African government and, if so, will their effect be blunted by the division between advocates of disengagements and advocates of radical reform? Will the South African guerrilla and political organizations in exile resolve their factional disputes and develop a coherent leadership and a realistic strategy for liberation? And, when the dust has settled on the decolonization of Angola and Mozambique, will the independent African states and the Communist powers provide more substantial support for the South African liberation movement than they have in the past?

There are still many gaps in our knowledge of crucial processes in contemporary South Africa. We know too little about how decisions are made within the White oligarchy. Political scientists have likened this problem to Krenlinology. We have still less knowledge, based on systematic research, about the inner dynamics of thought and behavior among the majority of Black South Africans. If we are better to comprehend the realities of this unique society, we need more thorough investigation of such factors; but, of course, it is not easy to conduct research on the most fundamental issues in so coercive and tense a society.

We realize that there are major omissions in this book, for no one book of reasonable length could deal in depth with all the factors related to change in so complex a situation. We had intended to include a chapter on the Colored people, but we were not successful. Moreover, there is not much analysis of South Africa's military strength, nor of the strategic significance of South Africa to the Great Powers, nor of the internal structures and tendencies in the neighboring territories. Nevertheless, we hope that the book does shed light on the most vital processes within contemporary South Africa and their relationship to external processes.

The book illuminates some of the remarkable complexities of contemporary South Africa and should assist readers in making their own assessments of events as they occur. Since the central issue in South Africa is racial inequality and oppression, the problems of the country are not likely to be ignored by the present generation of Americans and Europeans who claim to have renounced racism. Moreover, it is conceivable—and some contributors think it is likely—that southern Africa is a flashpoint, like Korea, Vietnam, and the Middle East, that may become the scene of a conflagration that would provoke serious tensions if not actual conflict among the Great Powers.

WHITE OVER BLACK IN SOUTH AFRICA: WHAT OF THE FUTURE?*

(By Leonard Thompson)

INTRODUCTION

Prediction in human affairs is an extremely precarious undertaking. The variables are so many, their relationships so complex, and the injection of fresh factors so frequent that prediction is the function of the diviner rather than the scholar—if by prediction we mean forecasting events with specific results in a specific timetable.

In *Modernizing Racial Domination*, which was published in 1971, Heribert Adam showed that several of the prophecies Pierre van den Berghe had made in 1965 were false, though Adam did not highlight van den Berghe's rashest assertion of all—that "conditions will have become favorable for these [revolutionary] developments within five years at most."¹ Moreover several of the counter-assertions that Adam included in his book are themselves now looking suspect. For example, Adam was sufficiently impressed by the diplomatic offensive that South Africa was conducting at the beginning of the present decade to declare that more and more independent African countries would soon "settle for peaceful co-existence" with the Republic,² whereas in 1974 South Africa's outward policy is in disarray.

*I am grateful to Jeffrey Butler, David Robinson, and Stanley Greenberg for helpful comments on drafts of this chapter.

¹ P. van den Berghe, *South Africa: A Study in Conflict* (Middletown, 1965), p. 263.

² H. Adam, *Modernizing Racial Domination: The Dynamics of South African Politics* (Berkeley, 1971), p. 121; See also Adam's item 8 on pp. 121-2.

Nevertheless, a social scientist worth his salt understands contemporary processes in terms of his own discipline better than a layman and the authors of the previous chapters—social scientists of several disciplines—jointly possess an exceptional understanding of contemporary South Africa. Moreover change is always in large measure a product of the past. Consequently, the contributors to this book may claim to be exceptionally well equipped to assess the consequences of the process of changes that are presently discernible in South Africa.

Unfortunately, however, understanding does not produce unanimity, because subjective factors inevitably affect judgment. Even if several specialists have all reflected long and hard about South African problems and tried their best to come to "objective" conclusions about what is happening and what is likely to happen, they cannot be expected to agree. This book shows very clearly that the perceptions of a scholar are affected not only by the approach of his discipline but also by his domicile, his citizenship, and his past or present status and affiliations in South Africa society. Scholars domiciled in South Africa fall within the scope of the Republic's laws, which prescribe horrendous penalties for expressing ideas that are commonplace elsewhere: whereas many scholars domiciled outside South Africa live in milieux where it is customary to disparage people who have the responsibility for coping with the situation from within. A White person lacks the knowledge that comes from experience of life in the subordinate strata of South African society, and conversely with a Black person. Above all, it is difficult to keep one's rational faculties and one's moral sensibilities in separate compartments—to prevent one's judgment as to what will happen from being influenced by one's convictions as to what should happen. Wishful thinking and ominous forebearings are the greatest distorting factors in any attempt to peer into the future.

Consequently, for subjective as well as objective reasons, it would be foolhardy to attempt to distill from the previous chapters one or more specific scenarios, replete with timetables, for the future of South Africa. Who, a year or two ago, would have predicted that in 1974 the price of gold would soar above \$190 an ounce, or that the Caetano regime would be overthrown in Lisbon and its successor would rapidly transfer power to the African liberation movement in Guinea-Bissau and start a similar process in Mozambique and Angola? Nevertheless we hope that this chapter, concluding a book in which diverse authors have analyzed a series of particular aspects of the South African situation, may provoke thought about how the multidimensional jigsaw puzzle fits together and what it augurs for the future of South Africa. What is the resultant of the external forces now operating upon South Africa? How, cumulatively, are they affecting the structure of South African society?

In the first chapter in this section, Potholm analyses the changes that have recently been taking place in the relations between the Republic and the other territories in southern Africa. Malagasy and Zambia have recently gone a long way toward reorienting their trade away from the Republic, and even Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland are acting more independently than they were a few years ago. In addition, whereas until recently the Republic was buttressed by White regimes in Angola and Mozambique as well as Rhodesia, the Portuguese territories are now in the process of decolonization, which places White Rhodesia, too, in jeopardy. Moreover, as Potholm demonstrates, the differences between the core values that prevail in the Republic and Rhodesia and those that prevail in the other territories are becoming accentuated rather than diminished. Nevertheless, Potholm concludes that the Republic is capable of adapting to these changes in its neighborhood without itself undergoing fundamental change.

It is possible that Potholm's conclusions are somewhat weakened by his association with the systems-analysis approach to southern Africa that has recently become fashionable among American political scientists. To apply this organizing principle to southern Africa is to presuppose a degree of stability that has not existed among the territories of the region since the Republic left the Commonwealth and the British African Empire began to dissolve. No two analysts have agreed upon a list of the territories that comprise the subsystem and individual analysts have had to alter their lists to keep pace with events, or to propound intricate formulas of differential relationships to validate the applicability of the concept to southern Africa.³ Potholm himself starts his chapter by including Zambia and Malagasy "under the generic heading 'contiguous,'" but in later passages he omits them from his analysis. A model with an inherently static bias is

³ K. Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa: The Limits of Independence* (Berkeley, 1973), pp. 303-23.

not a wholly satisfactory device for explaining contemporary interterritorial relations in southern Africa.

Sean Gervasi's chapter focuses on the purpose and effect of the southern African policies of the Western powers, especially the United States and the Great Britain. Not only does he demonstrate that the Western involvement in the South African economy is large, increasing, and exceptionally profitable, but he also contends that Western governments consider they have a vital interest in preserving their access to raw materials located in South Africa and their control over the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope. For these reasons, he maintains, conservative public and private authorities in the West, alarmed at the successes of the liberation movements in the territories to the north of the Republic, have been pursuing a strategy of containment aimed at forestalling revolution. This strategy includes discreet aid to the White regime and preparations for assistance to it in the event of military conflict spreading to the Republic. It also includes a reform component, but the reforms envisaged are marginal and are not intended to undermine the structure of South African society. The strategy is made to seem humane and progressive by being presented to the public as promoting peaceful, evolutionary change through accelerated economic growth. In fact, however, Gervasi concludes, there are no grounds for expecting that accelerated economic growth will promote a redistribution of power or wealth.

Sam Nolutshungu agrees with Gervasi and takes his argument further. He regards Western pressures upon South Africa as "antirevolutionary reformism" (as distinct from "revolutionary radicalism," which he associates with Communist and Third World pressures), and he correlates the effects of such Western pressures with a class analysis of South African society. From this he deduces that since members of the Afrikaner elite are now major capitalists with international affiliations, the National party is quite willing to promote reforms of the sort desired by Western governments. Such reforms include concessions to the Black bourgeoisie (including the Bantustan politicians), who, he claims, are thereby becoming separated from the Black workers and peasants—the potential revolutionaries—and turned into collaborators.

The Gervasi-Nolutshungu propositions verge on a conspiracy theory, in which the conspirator is "international capitalism," including the major Western governments, the South African government, the Afrikaner elite, and the Black South African bourgeoisie. This theory requires careful examination.

Are we to believe that the major Western governments are irrevocably committed to policies that amount to "antirevolutionary reformism"? In terms of motives, there is no doubt that many Westerners desire modifications in South Africa because they consider that that is the best way of ensuring a continuous flow of high profits and scarce raw materials to the West. But others advocate reforms for quite different purposes: to alleviate the daily sufferings of Black South Africans and also to start a process that may snowball and culminate in a radical redistribution of power and wealth.

In terms of effects, the theory is a-historical because it ignores the fact that the consequences of actions differ—and often differ profoundly—from the motives of actors. Even reforms sponsored with the "antirevolutionary" motives that Gervasi and Nolutshungu ascribe to the West may in fact generate fundamental change in the distribution of power and wealth in South Africa. Radical changes elsewhere have usually been preceded by reforms that were intended to stabilize regimes. Reforms initiated by established authorities have been the preludes not only to the major shifts of power in modern Europe, but also to the decolonization of Francophonic tropical Africa, and there is no reason to believe that South Africa should be an exception.

The Gervasi-Nolutshungu theory also implies that nation-states and multinational corporations are static and monolithic institutions. For example, Gervasi's demonstration that the Western powers have vital interests in South Africa does not necessarily mean that Western governments and corporations will support the White regime indefinitely and at all costs. There are at least three objections to that logic. First, the internal political processes in Western countries are extremely complex, and, even if Gervasi is correct in his exposition of the motives of the Heath and Nixon administrations, both have now collapsed and their successors or their successors' successors may become more responsive to domestic antiapartheid lobbies than they were. Second, the debacles in Suez, Algeria, and Vietnam have produced domestic constraints that would make it very difficult for any British, American, or French government to intervene militarily in South Africa to prop up a racist regime threatened by popu-

lar uprisings. Third, recent events have shown that the external deterrents to Western support for the White regime may become strengthened by pressures from Arab oil producers, or from combinations of Third World producers of other raw materials. So, even if we take the most cynical view of the motives of Western governments and multinational corporations, the time may be approaching when they will deem it expedient to hedge their bets in South Africa in the hope that, if fundamental changes do take place, they will be able to do business with the new regime.

THE GUERRILLA THREAT

Despite their failure to oust the Portuguese in the 1960s, the guerrilla movements in the Portuguese African territories generated substantial power in the early 1970s. By the end of 1973 the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC) controlled one-third of Guinea-Bissau and was recognized as the legitimate government by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and over seventy members of the United Nations. In the early part of 1974 the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was maintaining a presence in northern and eastern Angola and it and the Zaire-based National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) were developing serious thrusts into the Cabinda enclave north of the lower Congo, important for its off-shore oil fields. More immediately threatening to South Africa were the operations of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) in Mozambique where, infiltrating southwards from its long-established bridgeheads in the northern provinces, it was making a series of attacks on three major railroads: Beira-Malawi, Beira-Umtali, and Tet-Cabora Bassa.

These events precipitated a crisis in Portugal, a small and relatively underdeveloped European country that had been spending about 40 percent of its national budget and 5 percent of its gross national product, and straining the loyalty of its young men, in efforts to suppress the rebellions. In February 1974 General Antonio de Spínola, a highly respected deputy chief of the General Staff and former governor-general of Guinea-Bissau, published a book in which he declared that no military victory was possible in Portuguese Africa and pleaded for a political solution with self-determination for the colonial peoples. In March junior officers circulated an underground document asserting that a political solution must "safeguard national honor and dignity as well as all the legitimate interests of the Portuguese settled in Africa," but should also "make allowances for the irreversible and undeniable reality of the deepest aspirations of African peoples to govern themselves."⁴ In April these officers overthrew the Caetano government and installed a coalition cabinet, including Socialists and Communists. The new government immediately began to negotiate with the leaders of the guerrilla movements in the three territories, evidently in the hope of transferring power to the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau but of transforming Angola and Mozambique into semiautonomous states with a loose and subordinate relationship to Portugal. However, the coup opened up a wider range of possibilities and the situation soon developed even more rapidly than it had in French tropical Africa, where French efforts to maintain the substance of power by concessions in 1956 and 1958 led to independence in 1960.

Initially, some observers expected that organized groups of White settlers and Black collaborators might seize power in Lourenço Marques and hold onto as much territory as possible, counting on South African military assistance. In that event the Pretoria government would have been faced with a difficult decision. Hawks would have argued that South Africa should intervene to acquire control over at least the southern part of Mozambique, for Lourenço Marques is the closest port to the Witwatersrand and it has been coveted by South Africans for over a century. On the other hand, doves would have reasoned that intervention would discredit South Africa's claim to be a nonaggressive state.

In fact, the White settlers offered only partial and ineffective resistance when FRELIMO representative began to participate in the government of Mozambique, and during May 1974 the prime ministers of South Africa and Rhodesia issued a joint declaration that all they wanted was "good" and "stable" government in neighboring territories and that they were not concerned about the possibility of their being Black governments. However, although FRELIMO will probably become the ruling organization in an independent Mozambique during 1975 and

⁴ *Le Monde*, cited in *The Guardian* (Manchester and London) weekly edition, 23 March 1974.

it has a strong revolutionary socialist orientation, its policy toward South Africa will be constrained by economic factors. Mozambique is a poor country. It derives a large part of its meager wealth from the earnings of its men on the Witwatersrand gold mines, and for the foreseeable future South Africa will be the only possible major consumer of power from the Cabora Bassa dam which is scheduled to begin production in 1975.⁵

In Rhodesia 260 thousand White settlers are trying to maintain control over more than 5 million Africans in a territory as large as California. Great Britain regards Rhodesia as a rebellious colony; no foreign government recognizes it; and the United Nations has imposed general economic sanctions against it. That the regime has survived as long as it has since its unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in 1965 is due primarily to South Africa, which has ignored the sanctions, contributed military aid in the guise of police, and provided moral support; and secondarily to Portugal, which has permitted it to trade through Beira and Lourenço Marques. Although sanctions have not toppled the regime, they have caused serious shortage of goods and foreign exchange; there is a crucial dearth of white manpower; and morale is brittle. In the second half of 1973 the number of White emigrants actually exceeded the number of White immigrants; and since December 1972 well-armed and well-trained guerrillas, operating from bases in Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia have been conducting small-scale but effective operations inside Rhodesia.

To maintain itself the government has resorted to increasingly desperate measures, most of them derived from South African precedents: arbitrary arrests and detentions; executions; forced removals of entire populations; group punishments on villages; and expulsions of foreign journalists and university teachers. In 1972 Rhodesia's main effort to gain British recognition was found by the Pearce Commission to be unacceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. The government's subsequent attempts to make a deal with Bishop Muzorewa's African National Council to the satisfaction of Great Britain came to nothing during the tenure of the Heath administration, which was well disposed to such an outcome. With the Labour party confirmed in office in a general election in October 1974, Rhodesia's chances of winning British recognition without fundamental change dwindled to vanishing point.

Even before the Portuguese coup, the Salisbury regime was hard pressed—politically, economically, and militarily.⁶ Now, if FRELIMO succeeds in consolidating its power throughout Mozambique, the prospects of White Rhodesia will plummet catastrophically. The territory will have become nearly surrounded by Black-controlled states and all its trade routes will be under Black control, except southwards across its 150 mile border with the Republic to distant South African ports.

In 1973 Dr. Connie Mulder, South African minister of the interior and of information, said that South Africa preferred the front line against terrorism to be the Zambezi rather than the Limpopo and Prime Minister Vorster declared that we know what to do if our neighbour's house is on fire.⁷ Nevertheless, the Rhodesian situation is under constant and anxious review in Pretoria, and the South African government may soon have to decide whether to become more fully engaged in the defense of the Zambezi line or to sacrifice White Rhodesia. No doubt there are strong demands for full military commitment, for many White South Africans have relatives in Rhodesia or have invested heavily in the territory. But there are also powerful counter-arguments that weigh heavily with the Pretoria politicians. The Smith government has not been very skillful, and it has made some of its most momentous decisions without consulting Pretoria—including the decisions to seize UDI in 1965 and to close the Zambian border in 1973. South Africa has made thorough preparations to hold the Limpopo line, which is more defensible than the Zambezi. And, by astute diplomacy and economic incentives South Africa will hope to moderate the policies of an African regime in Zimbabwe as well as in Angola and Mozambique.

As the dust settles on the changes sparked off by the Portuguese coup, the guerrilla threat to South Africa will become more serious. Indeed, if the White regime in Rhodesia collapses, South Africa (with Namibia) will face poten-

⁵ R. First, "Southern Africa after Spínola" and G. Bender, "Portugal and her Colonies join the Twentieth Century: Causes and Initial Implications of the Military Coup," *Ujchamu*, 4, 3 (Winter 1974), pp. 88-108 and 121-62.

⁶ K. Good, "Settler Colonialism in Rhodesia," *African Affairs*, 73, 290 (January 1974), pp. 10-36.

⁷ *Africa Research Bulletin* 11, 8 (August 1973), p. 2961.

tially hostile neighbors along a frontier stretching two thousand miles across the continent from the Cunene River to Delagoa Bay, and Botswana as well as Malawi will be able to reduce its dependence on the Republic, as Zambia has already done.

In these circumstances South Africa will probably have to yield at least the northern part of Namibia, where the African population has cultural and historical links with the population of southern Angola and has been held down with increasing difficulty by subservient African chiefs. Elsewhere, however, although it has been argued that guerrilla activity on the Maoist model will be the harbinger of revolution in South Africa,⁸ the Republic will probably be able to contain any such activity for some time to come, provided that that is the only threat it has to cope with. Regimes that have been overthrown by guerrilla forces were either colonies, such as Algeria and the Portuguese territories, in which the guerrillas' task was to convince a metropolitan government that it was in its interests to withdraw, or weak and corrupt political systems in preindustrial countries, such as Batista's Cuba and Chiang Kai-shek's China. South Africa is neither of these. In resisting "terrorists" its government has the ardent support of 4 million Whites who consider their very survival is at stake. South Africa has a far more powerful industrial base and far more formidable military equipment than any government that has been overthrown by guerrilla forces. It has the capacity to produce atomic weapons; the terrain in the vicinity of its borders is treeless or sparsely wooded savanna, which affords guerrillas scant opportunity for concealment. Moreover, the South African revolutionaries in exile are divided into rival factions; the capacity of Black African states to launch military expeditions against the Republic is limited by domestic economic and political weaknesses, interstate rivalries, and serious logistic problems; and neither the Soviet Union nor the People's Republic of China seems prepared to make a major commitment in southern Africa in the near future. Consequently, although guerrilla groups launched across South Africa's land frontiers may become a continual irritant to the regime, they do not seem likely to be able to overthrow it.⁹

The rulers of the major states in central Africa—President Kaunda of Zambia, President Nyerere of Tanzania, and President Mobutu of Zaire—are experienced and realistic politicians. Insofar as they are able to exert diplomatic pressure and coordinate the strategy of the liberation movement as a whole, they are likely for the foreseeable future to concentrate on assisting FRELIMO to consolidate its hold over Mozambique, on consummating the transfer of power to a predominantly African government in Angola, and on promoting fundamental changes in Rhodesia and Namibia. These goals will not necessarily be achieved smoothly or rapidly. Moreover, as the transition proceeds the new governments will be preoccupied with grave internal political and economic problems and in no condition to precipitate physical confrontations with the Republic. The South African government, in turn, while continuing to perfect its military defenses and to try to improve its reputation with the outside world, will be obliged to make serious efforts to establish normal working relationships with the new governments as they come into existence in neighboring territories. Consequently, if fundamental changes are to take place in South Africa itself in the near future, they will probably be generated primarily by pressures inside the Republic.

BLACK POWER IN THE BANTUSTANS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN CITIES

What, then, are the effects, actual and potential, of foreign influences upon domestic affairs in South Africa? Foreign criticisms have already had a profound influence on morale in the Republic. Despite its tight control over the educational system, the radio services, and the form of the political institutions, the government has not succeeded in insulating South Africans from the knowledge that world opinion virtually unanimously condemns the theory and practice of racial discrimination. Although many White South Africans discount this knowledge by accepting the official propaganda line that the policy of separate development will eliminate racial discrimination and that poverty, instability, and injustice are just as endemic in other societies, influential Whites

⁸ M. Logasstek, "Guerrilla Warfare in Southern Africa," in W. Carter and Martin Kilson, eds., *The African Reader: Independent Africa* (New York, 1970), pp. 381-400.

⁹ S. Johns, "Obstacles to Guerrilla Warfare: A South African Case Study," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 11, 2 (June 1973), pp. 267-303.

in numerous occupations are deeply concerned. Many industrialists, trade unionists, sportsmen, clergymen, intellectuals, journalists, authors, and artists have overseas affiliations and the politicians themselves are by no means isolationist, but anxious to obtain Western approval. Moreover, many of the Black leaders and potential leaders who have emerged within the government's own separatist institutions—Bantustan politicians and university and high school students—are overtly rejecting government propaganda. There seems to be no way in which the regime can stop Black consciousness from penetrating deeply into Black South African society, for the workers and peasants are well aware that their conditions are unjust.

It is much more difficult to assess the on-going effects of foreign involvement in the South African economy. The evidence is overwhelmingly strong that in the past the managements of foreign subsidiaries, with very few exceptions, have complied not only with South African law but also with South African custom in the wage rates, job allocations, and fringe benefits they have provided for their Black workers.¹⁰ Until recently, Western criticism of the performance of foreign corporations in South Africa was confined to relatively small groups of zealots closely associated with South African exile groups. Now, however, the antiapartheid lobbies are influencing larger segments of the populations of Great Britain and the United States. During the last few years the *Guardian's* exposures of the employment practices of British subsidiaries and revelations of the practices of American subsidiaries by the Diggs Committee (the Subcommittee on Africa of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States House of Representatives) have reached a wider public, with the result that Western corporations can no longer expect the behavior of their South African subsidiaries to be ignored.¹¹ These pressures may increase. In the United States, for example, it is conceivable that the 11 percent of the population who are of African descent will use the government's South African policy as a bargaining counter in domestic politics.¹²

Black South African organizations in exile and also many Westerners who are repelled by the injustices in South African society, including the World Council of Churches, have called for complete "withdrawal" or "disengagement" from South Africa. This proposal has the persuasive quality of ideological purity; but it is not realistic. The involvements of Great Britain, and even of the United States, France, West Germany, and Japan are probably too important to their national interests to be abandoned. Even if the government of one such country decided to "withdraw," it would be extremely difficult to enforce the decision on its citizens, and insofar as it managed to do so other companies, foreign or South African, would merely acquire the relinquished assets and operate them. Indeed, the prospects of general withdrawal are nebulous, for there are always governments and corporations that find ways of seizing profitable openings, as the French did when others were respecting the United Nations' embargo on the supply of arms to South Africa.¹³

Since withdrawal is unrealistic, the crucial questions are narrower ones: what are, and what are likely to be, the effects of reforms, actual and potential, on South African society? Are Gervasi and Nolutshungu correct in assuming that any conceivable reforms would merely strengthen the regime and prolong the system of White political economic domination?

It is necessary to distinguish, as Sachs and other contributors to this volume have done, between reforms that have no direct bearing upon the power structure and reforms that create new sources of power. The so-called petty apartheid laws are in the former category. For example, White domination is not directly affected if Blacks are allowed to use the same transport facilities as Whites or to participate in selected sports events with Whites, or if foreign Black diplomats are given special treatment. It is the White monopoly of political and economic power that is fundamental to the system.

In 1959 Verwoerd initiated the Bantustan policy with conservative objectives: to defuse foreign criticism and to divert African political activity from the center and fragment it along ethnic lines. Fifteen years later, as Schlemmer's chapter

¹⁰ F. First, J. Steele, and C. Gurney, *The South African Connection: Western Investment in Apartheid* (London, 1972).

¹¹ For example, see J. Simon, "Yale's First Year as a 'Socially Responsible' Stockholder," *Yale Alumni Magazine* (February 1974), pp. 17-23.

¹² C. Keto, "Black American Involvement in South African Race Issues," *Issue*, 3, 1 (Spring 1973), pp. 6-11.

¹³ To say that withdrawal is not likely to occur is not to deny that it may be tactically advantageous for antiapartheid pressure groups to call for withdrawal.

demonstrates, the effects of this "reform" are highly ambiguous. On the one hand, the Pretoria government still exerts a great deal of control over the Bantustan authorities, and even if the territories acquire formal political independence, their freedom of action will be severely limited by their continued economic dependence on the Republic. On the other hand, some of the Bantustan politicians are skilfully exploiting the possibilities that are available to them. They have won the right to substitute an international language—English—for their different vernacular languages as the principal medium of instruction in the African schools and colleges, and they are developing a degree of cooperation with one another that was not foreseen by Verwoerd. That is to say, a political program that was intended by its White creator to be a stabilizing factor has developed its own dynamics, which are already posing serious problems for the regime. Nolutshungu is surely incorrect in dismissing all the Bantustan politicians as "tribal oligarchs" and implying that as conflict develops they will all prove to be collaborators with the White regime.

Before 1973 no comparable reforms had been made in the industrial sector. Nevertheless, important changes had been taking place in the structure of the labor force. The White population of South Africa is deeply committed to continuous economic growth, but three factors have been making it impossible even to sustain the existing level of productivity on the basis of a labor force rigidly divided between permanent White skilled workers and migrant Black unskilled workers. First, the White proportion of the total population of South Africa is declining. It decreased from 21.4 percent in 1911 to 17.2 percent in 1973, and an Afrikaner economist has estimated that it will fall to 14 percent by the end of the century and to 11 percent by A.D. 2020.¹⁴ Second, more and more Whites are being drawn away from the productive sectors of the economy into the burgeoning bureaucracies. By 1973 over 360,000 Whites were employed in the central, provincial, and local administrations and the Railways, Harbours and Airways Administration.¹⁵ Subsequently, moreover, the decolonization of Angola and Mozambique has placed still higher demands on the limited pool of White manpower for military service in the frontier areas. Third, the tendency of developments in modern industrial technology is to require that an ever-higher proportion of the labor force shall possess skills that at the minimum can only be acquired by permanent and secure employment. Consequently, by 1973 the government had to cease treating the African population as an indifferentiated mass of interchangeable migrant laborers with homes in the reserves and were obligated to permit industrialists to employ an increasing number of Africans on tasks requiring skill and experience.

The 1973 strikes of African workers highlighted these developments and placed the Whites on the horns of a dilemma. To continue totally to exclude Africans from the industrial decision-making process is to incur the risk of further disturbances that are extremely difficult to foresee and suppress and that cause bad publicity overseas; whereas to allow it may be to give African workers the means to erect an organizational structure with immense power potential. Currently, this dilemma is causing vigorous debate among Whites. Sections of management and White labor are pressing for the admission of Black workers into recognized trade unions; government and other sections of management and White labor are opposing it. The government handled the 1973 strikes with a caution it had not previously displayed in similar circumstances and it subsequently provided for the creation of African works and liaison committees. In their present form these committees allow for African participation in communication with management but not in bargaining, and they are no more significant than the first steps in the "homelands" policy were in the early 1960s. But this concession, too, may prove to be a vital step in a cumulative process that will escalate beyond the intentions of its generators. Committees necessitate organization, and organization is a means to power.

Of course the government intends that any concessions it makes shall not shake the established order. As Wilson suggests, part of its strategy may be to confine the benefits of reform to the group he aptly calls "urban insiders" (Mayer's "urban core") at the expense of the "urban outsiders," who are intended to remain migrant, insecure, and unskilled, in the hope of driving a new wedge within African society by creating an upper segment of the working class with a stake in the *status quo*.

¹⁴ M. Horrell, ed., *A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1973* (Johannesburg, 1974), p. 49.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 251-8.

Nolutshungu apparently expects that this device will work—that African skilled workers, given privileges relative to the migrant workers, will become a stabilizing force for the regime. On the other hand, Mayer's researches in Soweto, a large African township on the Witwatersrand, show that already among the urban core internal class cleavages, though strong, are moderated by a consciousness of an overriding identity of interests with all who fall on the subordinate side of the major divide in South African society. It is surely premature to deduce from a Marxist analysis that the Black skilled workers (and likewise the Bantustan politicians) will collectively serve the interests of the Whites. No doubt many will do so. But since it is precisely the more privileged Africans who have rising expectations and it is these expectations that are blocked by the overriding color bar, some are likely to respond to the demands of the African masses, among whom conquest and systematic exploitation have instilled a vast reservoir of resentment.

As Adam has demonstrated elsewhere, the South African regime has a remarkable talent for controlling the direction of change.²⁰ However, its means are not limitless. Greater power is now being accumulated by Black rural authorities and urban workers than Africans have possessed in South Africa at any time since they were conquered in the nineteenth century. While it is difficult at this stage to perceive by what precise mechanisms Black power will escalate, it is also difficult to see any way in which the process of escalation can be reversed.

If this analysis is sound—if South Africa has entered into a period of internal instability pointing toward fundamental change—the use that Western public and private authorities now make of their leverage there can prove to be extremely important. It can affect, the tempo of change, the process of change, and the future alignment of a reconstructed South Africa. If they continue to act conservatively, as adumbrated by Gervasi and Nolutshungu, by the time South African Blacks have broken down the barriers of apartheid their leaders will have become completely alienated from the West. Such alienation already exists among many Black intellectuals. However, there is no reason to assume, with Gervasi and Nolutshungu, that Western authorities are either so racist or so inflexible they are incapable of realizing the opponents of apartheid have a cause that will triumph in the long run. Taking a longer view of their own interests, industrialists, for example, can apply fair employment practices in their South African subsidiaries—providing their Black workers with superior training and with job assignments, wages, and fringe benefits commensurate with their talents; and governments, which have apparently been caught unprepared by the onset of Portuguese decolonization, might deem it expedient to establish contacts with leaders of the South African liberation groups as well as with the Bantustan politicians. By aligning itself with the dynamic forces in South Africa, when fundamental changes do take place, the West will find that the successor regime will be as pragmatic in its external policies as the Black regimes in tropical Africa are now.

DIFFICULTY OF PREDICTIONS FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA

Mr. THOMPSON. I would like to start by making the point that I distrust people who have clear predictions as to what is going to happen in Southern Africa in general and in the Republic of South Africa in particular. The paper most recently written is a rather fanciful illustration of that proposition; I develop two scenarios, both of which I think are internally logically consistent. One of them suggests that as of 1984, the Government of South Africa will remain in its present form and white-controlled South Africa will dominate the rest of Southern Africa mainly for economic reasons; whereas the other equally internally consistent scenario suggests that by 1984, all the territories adjacent to the Republic of South Africa, including Namibia, will be under majority rule and also will have detached themselves from economic dependence upon the Republic of South Africa, and the Republic itself, if it has not yet made the complete breakthrough to majority rule, will be on the verge of so doing.

²⁰ This is the central theme of *Modernizing Racial Domination*.

That is just to stress the point, Mr. Chairman, of the appalling difficulties of prediction; Mrs. Butcher's very illuminating statement developed a great deal of the intricacies and complexity of contemporary southern Africa society.

ECONOMIC PREDICTIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA

The next point I would like to make is that among the predictions that have been made is the liberal economic prediction that has had a great effect upon optimistic politicians in this country and others: the prediction basically that all you have to do to affect healthy change in South Africa is to stoke up the economic machine in the expectation that ultimately economic growth will inevitably deracialize South Africa.

There are many ways of refuting this proposition, and the literature is full of refutations, but as a historian, I just take the simple line that diamonds were discovered in South Africa in 1870; since then, the economic machine has been stoked up for a century and 5 years, and far from deracializing South Africa, there have been an intensification and a routinization of white minority rule and white minority control of the economic resources throughout the country.

The next point I would like to make is that in spite of what I have said so far, I do discern very important new factors in the South Africa scene. There are changes in the external environment and, secondly, in the internal situation in the Republic of South Africa.

CHANGES IN EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA

The changes in the external environment are, of course, primarily those initiated by the Portuguese coup and the move to autonomy in Angola and Mozambique. The situation in Angola is desperate and tragic, and we cannot at this stage discern what the short-term outcome will be there.

In Mozambique, on the other hand, there is a single dominant African Liberation Party which now has control of the country, and Mozambique is the more important of these two territories for the Republic because of the very close proximity of its ports. Indeed, Lourenco Marques is the nearest port by far to the industrial heartland of the Republic of South Africa.

The Rhodesian situation is very complex at this moment. There is a great deal of negotiation and attempts at manipulation by internal and external forces, but one does expect significant change in Rhodesia toward becoming an African-controlled Zimbabwe in the near future.

Likewise, South Africa's Government is beginning to retreat from its earlier adamant position that it is destined enduringly to control southwest Africa or Namibia. That, too, is a very complex question. But one expects that Namibia to have its status changed in the reasonably near future; or at least the northern part of it, which would be the solution preferred by the South African Government.

But although the external environment has changed, I do not think we are going to see anything like an effective guerrilla movement launched into South Africa by invasion from the north, from territories such as Mozambique. I have argued in one of my papers that

guerrilla prospects of that sort in the Republic of South Africa are very different from those that existed in territories where guerrilla warfare by invasion from outside has prevailed. Nevertheless, the external environment of the Republic has changed so significantly that it is obvious that the South African Government is deeply concerned about it.

INTERNAL SITUATION WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA

Secondly, the internal situation in South Africa is changing excitingly and quite dramatically now. Black power is being built up in Bantustans. I agree with the general gloss put upon that problem by Mrs. Butcher but I would also say this—that in my judgment it would be wrong for people interested in the future of black South Africans to write off the Bantustan leaders as stooges of the South African Government. This is an attitude that has prevailed in some quarters. I think that each Bantustan politician is inexorably concerned with his own constituency of African people as well as with the present imbalance of power between himself and the South African regime.

More significant in the internal situation have been recent developments in the industrial centers of the Republic of South Africa, noticeably the Witwatersrand and Durban complexes, and to a lesser extent the Port Elizabeth and the Capetown areas.

What has happened has been that as a result of the increasing dearth of skilled white labor and also of technological developments which place an increasingly high premium upon skilled as distinct from unskilled labor in modern industrial organization, more and more black people are inextricably acquiring skills, and it is in the economic interest of white industrialists and the white community of South Africa generally to let that process continue. And it is continuing.

Furthermore, over the last 2 or 3 years there have been a series of more or less spontaneous strikes in various parts of the Republic and Namibia by black people, and what indicates the changing perception of power in the minds of the white rulers of South Africa is the fact that whereas a decade or so ago the police would have trampled upon these strikers and the government would have made no concessions to them, so that the strikers would not have gained any of their objectives, now the South Africa Government has found it expedient, indeed necessary, to attempt to conciliate black labor. Wages are rising and concessions are being made to skilled workers of a sort that have not existed over the last several years. This is a shift of policy by the government.

I believe that the changes now taking place in the external environment and the internal situation in South Africa, and around South Africa, constitute an escalation of black power in the region to an extent that has not existed since whites conquered the Africans in the 19th century.

SOUTH AFRICAN REGIME TRYING TO CONTROL EXTERNAL, INTERNAL CHANGE

Of course the South African regime, responsible as it is exclusively to a white electorate, is trying to control these complex processes of external and internal change, so that the white population shall not

sacrifice its domination of the authoritative political institutions in the Republic itself.

Hence one has *détente* (this fashionable phrase has typically been picked up by the South African Government in its propaganda), an attempt by the South African Government to establish a dialog with black African governments in the central and northern part of the continent. The other facet of the South African Government's external policies is the attempt to use its economic strength as a means for perpetuating white domination of Southern Africa's neighbors, even if they are in the formal sense politically free.

A precedent for this has existed for a decade now: Swaziland, Botswana, and Lesotho have been formally independent states for a decade but their penury is such that they are dependent upon the Republic. The planning in Pretoria is that the same will be the fate of other contiguous territories, even when the internal political control of those territories shifts from blacks to whites.

In internal policies (and Mrs. Butcher was on this point eloquent and accurate) the intention of the government is clearly to control the processes of change that I have very briefly touched on by maintaining, indeed strengthening the already very elaborate, very refined and extraordinarily efficient system of bureaucratic controls, with the police very much in evidence.

The Bantustans policy is, of course, a policy of dividing Africans politically into nine separate so-called nations, all of which will be weak, and all of which are intended to be utterly dependent upon the Republic.

In addition, there is the removal of the so-called petty apartheid laws, such as whether a black man may sit next to a white person on a bench. These sorts of concessions are being made with an eye to this august body, the U.S. Congress, in the expectation that they will be deemed to be significant concessions.

What is not intended by the government in its attempt to control the processes of change that are taking place in the region is that there should be any relation of absolute and exclusive white control over the sovereign central institutions of the Republic of South Africa.

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL PROCESSES CONSTITUTE IRREVERSIBLE ESCALATION OF BLACK POWER

A few remarks, now, if I may, about dynamics. Opinions do differ and people whose judgment I respect are of the view that the South African regime is controlling the situation and will continue to do so; that these controls that I have mentioned will prevail. However, in spite of what I said at the beginning about the difficulties of prediction, it is my judgment that the effect of the external and internal processes which I have touched upon constitutes an irreversible escalation of black power.

I would like to repeat that—an irreversible escalation of black power.

What, of course, one cannot say is when the critical stage will be reached. One would be incredibly naive as a historian, which happens to be my profession, if one attempted to do so. If Americans in the early 1770's had tried to make a prediction of the when and the how

and the consequences of imminent change, they would have been very unlikely to be near the target.

Likewise, for the French in the 1780's or the Russians, if you will, in the early 1910's.

Specific predictions about the when, the precise how, and the precise consequences of radical change are, I believe, beyond our capacity.

U.S. INTEREST IN SOUTH AFRICA

Turning to the question of U.S. interests and policy, it seems to me that the U.S. interests in South Africa can be crudely divided into two categories. First, the interests of U.S. companies. These are economic interests of specific companies, which make large profits in South Africa, but we also know that the totality of these American economic interests in South Africa constitutes only a very small proportion of the totality of U.S. foreign trade and investment.

Second, there are deemed to be U.S. national interests as distinguished from sectional economic interests. There is the question of the strategic significance to the United States of the cape route. I was in the British Navy in World War II and indeed operated for some time in the South Atlantic. I agree with what Mrs. Butcher has said that these interests do not seem to have been publicly analyzed. One has had very emotional, far-reaching assertions by senior officers, especially naval officers, but with great respect, having been a junior officer in the British Navy, my respect for the judgment of senior naval officers has not always been justified by the facts.

Senator CLARK. You are right.

Mr. THOMPSON. As when I was ordered to attack a U-boat in a position which, when plotted on the chart, was in the middle of the island of Guernsey.

The other national interest deemed to be significant to the United States is access to South Africa's extraordinary range of strategic raw materials. That again is a problem that I have not seen really systematically handled and I hope that the facilities at your disposal will make it possible for it to be objectively and penetratingly analyzed.

SHORT-TERM U.S. POLICY

As regards policy, in the context of this very summary statement of categories of U.S. interests, what I particularly want to do is to distinguish between the short term and the long term. I agree with Mrs. Butcher when she said that there is at present a clear-cut dichotomy between the rhetoric of the U.S. Government and on the southern African question and the reality of U.S. policy, and especially between the rhetoric of the U.S. Government and the reality as perceived by the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of the region.

To illustrate the point, the removal of an Assistant Secretary of State just after he had established communication with the Frelimo leadership of Mozambique, at a stage when it was about to become independent, and his succession by another officer who had been Ambassador to Chile at the time when, as we now know, all sorts of extraordinary things were going on there under the auspices of the United States—whatever the truth of the matter may be, and the public doesn't

always know the truth about personalities and their competence—the effect of that on the African mind was appalling. Hence, the OAU took that very unusual step of criticizing the U.S. administration, and in terms the Secretary of State of this country quite understandably took strong objection to the criticism as interference in a domestic matter.

If one were an American businessman with interests in southern Africa, it is of course perfectly intelligible that he would take the view that the present South African regime throws virtually no obstacles in his way provided he abides by South African law. Therefore, from the narrow and specific business perspective it is intelligible that there is an aversion to rocking the boat and disturbing the present political dispensation. Likewise no doubt from the specific professional perspective of people in the Pentagon. The present South African climate is favorable to the narrowly defined short-term interests of American businessmen and the Pentagon.

But even in the short run, the cost of this is that we are sapping the confidence of, first, black South Africans; second, black Americans; and third, the entire third world in the integrity of the United States, because of this dichotomy between rhetoric and reality.

What is seen by such persons is that present U.S. policy is analogous to the earlier policy of muted rhetorical criticism of the Salazar-Caetano regime in Portugal, and covert and not always so covert support for that regime so long as it was in power, even though it was known to be a colonial regime of a particularly nefarious sort and a corrupt and virtually totalitarian regime at home.

Likewise, it brings echoes into the minds of such persons of the whole desperately unfortunate American support for the regime now defunct in South Vietnam.

So in the short run, though there are advantages for specific categories of persons and for the Pentagon, there is a cost, and that is a cost which one has to weigh very, very seriously. Although I entirely endorse the humanitarian, the ethical color that has been put upon these things, even in a straight national-interest, material, Machiavelian type of analysis, one has to bear in mind that the Third World or parts of it are now developing muscle.

It's not wise today for the United States or any other Western power blithely to ignore the perceived interests of Third World countries. Nigeria is a major supplier of crude oil to the United States; some say, the greatest single foreign supplier of crude oil. Arab oil producers and Iran are also Third World countries which, like black South Africans and black Americans and black Africans, react adversely to overt or covert support by a Western government for a racist regime.

LONG-TERM U.S. POLICY

But all that relates to the short term. Now a word about the long term. If the United States were to continue its present policy, with an antithesis between rhetoric and substance I believe that as black power continues to escalate in South Africa the benefits of the policy will diminish and that in that longer run, when a majority regime eventually comes into power in South Africa, it will inexorably be hostile to the United States and indebted to China or Russia or whom-

ever you will, but not to the United States and not presumably to its Western allies.

This has been the experience of the United States in Portugal, in Vietnam, and in Mozambique. The new Frelimo government in Mozambique is utterly hostile to the United States and it's going to take a great deal of resourceful policy by the U.S. Government to overcome that fully understandable attitude of hostility.

It should also be borne in mind in formulating policy that the South African regime of today needs U.S. support much more than the United States needs the support of South African regime, and this means that the dice in diplomacy are loaded in favor of the United States.

U.S. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

As for recommendations, I strongly urge support for the bill sponsored by Congressman Diggs to insure that U.S. firms that operate in South Africa adhere to fair employment procedures if they are to receive U.S. Government contracts.

I believe that U.S. firms operating in South Africa should be told that they do so at their own risk.

I recommend that the United States open up communication with diverse categories of South African blacks, not only the Bantustan politicians, but also black South African intellectuals and representatives of the black South African opposition movements.

I recommend that the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria should be instructed to make its presence felt even more than hitherto, by sending representatives to all political trials that are held in South Africa from which the public are not excluded.

I also recommend that the United States should do more to provide sanctuary for political refugees from South Africa and education for South African blacks.

VIOLENT CHANGE

Finally, a note on this word which is often a balking point for all of us when we think about change in any country and especially when we think of change in South Africa: this terrible word, violence. We are all agreed we dislike violence, just as we all are or used to be agreed in endorsing motherhood. But the question is who uses it, for what reason, with what intensity, and with what results. The word violence is often used to evoke such a disturbing emotional response that people stop short in their thoughts.

As regards South Africa, one has to weigh data which we have against conjectural data.

There is the certainty that violence is practiced every day in South Africa on a very large scale upon black South Africans. In the most overt way this takes the form of police searches and bannings and other punishments for "crimes" that are merely political and have no moral content at all.

There is also the day-to-day violence experienced by black people in South Africa that is the consequence of the fact that the system as a whole results in the forced separation of families over long periods. One could elaborate endlessly on that.

So we have routine violence in South Africa which we can measure and which we know a lot about. This massive routine violence of the

present has to be weighed against the violence that will be associated with the critical stage in the transformation of power—it may be less, it may be more, we don't know—and the equally unknown extent of violence that a new regime will practice.

In conclusion, may I say that if, as a result of the rethinking that you, sir, are promoting, and parallel rethinking throughout other U.S. policymaking institutions, American policy were to become more effective in South Africa, more attuned not only to a profound moral issue but also to the totality of American interests in the short term and even more in the long term, then that will be a very important departure from what we have experienced recently, particularly if I may so say, since 1969.

Thank you.

[Questions and answers follow:]

MR. THOMPSON'S ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CLARK

Question 1. Who in the United States are the advocates of the policy to apply greater U. S. pressure on South Africa to change its internal policies? Who are the major advocates for relaxing that pressure. Has U. S. public opinion had much impact on Administration policy toward South Africa? Has African opinion had any? Has Third World opinion had any?

Answer. For greater pressure: an overwhelming majority of academics and college students who have studied the South African situation; informed Black Americans; many religious organizations; younger foreign service officers with African experience.

For relaxing pressure: conservative businessmen with South African interests; military and naval officers and Pentagon employees; rightwing groups with racial prejudices; others who fear the consequences of fundamental change in South Africa.

Impact: During the Nixon and Ford administrations the conservative impact has influenced Administration policy significantly.

African and Third World opinion were of some effect in the 1960s, but have been much less influential since 1969.

Question 2. Those who favor normal relations with China and Cuba and the Soviet Union and believe that all nations should be represented in the U.N. have a difficult time accepting the recommendations that South Africa be expelled from that world forum.

How do those who advocate isolation of South Africa reconcile this with their general position that the U. S. should have relations with all countries?

Answer. Advocates of the isolation of South Africa consider that their position is warranted by the South African Government's persistent defiance of U.N. resolutions on Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa itself. I do not myself support the expulsion of South Africa or any other member from the U.N.

Question 3. Whenever Rhodesian or South African issues are raised in Congress opponents of increasing pressure on these countries argue that human rights are being similarly violated in the communist countries and in many African states. Why single out South Africa and Rhodesia for censure? How do you respond to these arguments?

Answer. South Africa and Rhodesia differ from communist countries in basing their policies on racial discrimination. I am opposed to totalitarianism of any sort, am aware that the record of the Soviet regime's dealings with its ethnic minorities is far from clean, and do not regard the South African regime as uniquely evil. But the distinction is a real one, for South Africa and Rhodesia are the only contemporary societies that are fundamentally racist in structure. Moreover, in Rhodesia and South Africa the U.S. has the responsibility that flows from large-scale economic investment and trade.

Question 4. What impact have policies of ostracism had on South Africa, such as exclusion from General Assembly, arms embargo, exclusion from international sports?

Answer. Such policies have boosted Black morale in South Africa and caused the South African government to make changes that, though minor in themselves, may contribute to the process that will eventually result in fundamental changes.

Question 5. A basic premise of the current policy of "communication" rests on the assumption that opportunities for communication between the major ethnic groups in South Africa exist, that there is some flexibility of position between them and the government and that there are outlets for black political development. Would you comment on that?

Answer. This premise has some, but limited validity. I would not argue against communication with the South African Government. My recommendations are additive not alternative to the practice of communication.

Question 6. Another common assumption put forth with regard to change in South Africa is that "natural forces" such as economic development and industrialization would necessarily work on behalf of the gradual improvement of the political as well as the material well-being of the blacks. Is this an adequate or accurate basis for U.S. policy?

Answer. The assumption that such "natural forces" will necessarily improve the political well-being of Blacks is refuted by history; further economic growth may continue to take place within a racist system, as in the past. However, if African incomes rise significantly, African political aspirations and capacities should also develop, which may in the short run be countered by repression.

Question 7. It has been argued that "cultural exchanges" with South Africa (bringing South African citizens here and sending Americans there) help to expose American values. Do these exchanges in any way serve to encourage change within South Africa? How could they be improved?

Answer. Cultural exchanges are to be encouraged; they do have some good effects of the sort mentioned. A broader cross-section of South African society should benefit from exchanges; and Americans who visit South Africa should be encouraged to use their initiative and examine South African conditions beyond those they encounter in the programs devised for them by South African authorities.

Question 8. Americans learn about South Africa mostly through the English language publications of that country, but the National Party is predominantly Afrikaner. Can you identify the basic differences between the British and the Afrikaner and the basic differences between the British and Afrikaner elements in the government?

Answer. The Anglo-Afrikaner cleavage was substantial in the past, when most Afrikaners were farmers (Boers) and Great Britain still had considerable political as well as economic power in Southern and Central Africa. These differences have diminished greatly since most Afrikaners have become urbanized and especially since South Africa became a Republic and left the Commonwealth in 1961. The vast majority of White South Africans of both groups support the principle of racial discrimination, differing only about tactics and details: the small minority who are fundamentally opposed to racial discrimination includes Afrikaners and Jews, as well as people of British descent.

Question 9. What is the difference in your opinion between the *verligte* (enlightened) and *verkrampte* (closed off) groups of the Afrikaner Nationalists?

Answer. *Verkrampte* are Afrikaners who wish to maintain a narrow and rigid policy of Afrikaner self-interest as well as White supremacy. *Verligte* are Afrikaners who consider that it has become morally necessary and/or expedient to modify that policy, e.g., by ceasing to alienate Whites of British origin, by incorporating the Coloured People into the privileged ruling caste, and by making minor concessions to Bantu-speaking Africans; but few of them contemplate sharing power in the South African parliament with Africans, even though some acknowledge that fundamental change is desirable as well as inevitable.

Question 10. Evaluate the internal political stability in South Africa with respect to the following points:

(a) What kind of limits on his maneuverability does Vorster face from the right wing of the party?

(b) How much political support can Vorster win for even cosmetic changes in apartheid policies from the National Party, the *Broederbond* and other Nationalist or Afrikaner elite groups?

(c) What kinds of pressures is Vorster feeling from the anti-apartheid white parties?

(d) Does Vorster need pressure from the United States and other powers to keep his right wing in line?

Answer. (a) The right wing is still strong enough to make it necessary for Vorster to disguise some of his decisions, and to balance his cosmetic concessions with conspicuous harassment of people who advocate fundamental changes, White as well as Black.

(b) Time is probably on Vorster's side in winning support for cosmetic changes, for the younger generation is more disposed to regard them as necessary than the older generation; but, for the most part, only so long as it is clear that the cosmetic changes are not generating fundamental changes.

(c) Local White pressures are not powerful enough to divert him from his policy of resisting fundamental changes. Anti-apartheid Whites have not been able to come up with a program that satisfies the general White population that racial discrimination can be dismantled without endangering their security as well as their economic interests.

(d) Probably not; the dynamics of the internal situation are sufficient to keep the right wing in line.

Question 11. The South African government constantly speaks of the tribal or ethnic differences of the "peoples" of that country. Are they so different that they could not form a united front politically? Is one apt to emerge superior in leadership to the others?

Answer. Tribal or ethnic hostilities among the Bantu-speaking Africans (71% of the population) have diminished, in spite of the government's attempts to perpetuate them, because so many Africans have worked in the industrial cities where they have encountered people of different tribal backgrounds and experienced with them the same discriminatory conditions. Industrialization has broken down tribal barriers in South Africa more than in any other part of sub-Saharan Africa, though it has not wholly eliminated them. In South Africa, class and ideological differences are probably a greater threat to African unity than tribal differences. But, if they were given reasonable opportunities for political communication and organization, the Africans would have a fair prospect of creating a united front among themselves.

The Coloured People (9%) and the Asians (3%) are torn between fear of Africans and dislike of their present subordinate status. Some intellectuals advocate unity with Africans; but they do not carry the majority of their people with them.

Question 12. South Africa has developed a national arms and munitions potential sufficient both for her own needs and Rhodesia's. Rhodesia, during the period of sanction, has seen her GNP rise remarkably. In view of this, can ostracism, international sanction, or arms and economic embargoes be said to work? Are they effective?

Answer. General sanctions would certainly be effective if they were universally observed. As it is, this is not on the cards. But the United States should certainly respect the arms embargo and encourage its allies to do so.

Question 13. As of September, 1974, South Africa had diplomatic relations with only 26 nations (versus 17 in 1963), but conducts trade and investment relationships with many more, including many Black African nations. Please comment on South Africa's apparent success in this field as opposed to its diplomatic forays.

Answer. This is a natural consequence of South Africa's economic strength and geographical position, combined with the tension between ideological commitment and economic self-interest in Black Africa.

Question 14. Prime Minister Vorster said in 1972: "Because we understand Africa and its peoples better than anybody else, we are prepared to lend technical and other aid to Africa insofar as we are able." Comment on why Black African states have been so reluctant to accept South African aid but are willing to trade with it.

Answer. South Africa certainly has technical and material assets that would be useful to Black Africa, but its failure to understand Africans within its own borders makes it impossible for the South African government to understand Africans elsewhere. Vorster's boast is not accurate. People who live by racial discrimination have only a partial understanding of the people they dominate, as was the case in the Southern United States during slavery. The rulers of most Black African states are now chary of foreign aid and concerned about the conditions and implications of specific offers of aid.

Question 15. Since 1959 South Africa has waged a successful and aggressive campaign to woo foreign investments and trade ties. Does the presence of foreign investors in South Africa weaken or strengthen South Africa's internal security?

Answer. At present, the net effect of foreign investment probably strengthens South Africa's internal security; that effect might however be modified if foreign companies applied fair employment practices.

Question 16. What should U.S. policy be concerning the Bantustans?

Answer. U.S. policy concerning the Bantustans should be pragmatic and flexible, based on recognition of the fact that the Bantustan program does not mitigate the central South African problem, which is White racial domination of the remaining 87% of the area of the Republic.

Question 17. What should U.S. policy be on American investment in the border industries or within the Bantustans? How could your recommendations be implemented?

Answer. The U.S. Government should discourage U.S. investment in border industries, because they undermine the position of black urban workers and perpetuate the dependence of the Africans on white economic institutions. Consideration should be given to devising differential tariffs to restrain such investment. The U.S. Government should not prohibit private investment in the border industries or the Bantustans, or anywhere else in South Africa, if only because it would not be able to enforce the prohibition. But U.S. investors should be told that they invest in South Africa at their own risk, and U.S. companies should be required to comply with a fair employment code in any operations in South Africa, on pain of losing their right to U.S. government contracts. The same code should apply in any Bantustans that become independent, and indeed in any country in the world.

Question 18. Has the South African government been successful in encouraging industries to establish plants on the borders of the Bantustans, so fewer African workers will come into the "White Areas"? What are the changes that the South African government will be successful in this policy and force a larger percentage of the African population to live in the "homelands"?

Answer. The growth of border industries is not sufficient, and is not likely to become sufficient in the foreseeable future, to have a significant effect on the demand for African labor elsewhere in the "White" areas of South Africa.

Question 19. Can you identify the revenue resources of the Bantustans and describe their economies, present or potential?

Answer. With minor differences of degree, the Bantustans are underdeveloped, overpopulated, impoverished rural slums, that do not produce enough food to feed their inhabitants. Their economic function is as dormitories for White South African's migrant labor force and there is no prospect of significant change in the foreseeable future. They depend heavily on subsidies from the South African government.

Question 20. What is your opinion of the viability of the homelands policy? Can it work?

Answer. The "homelands" policy may work in the sense that it may divert some African political pressures and energies from the real issues of South Africa, and it may confuse some foreigners about those issues; it will not work in the sense of solving South Africa's major problem, which is gross inequality of political power and economic wellbeing. There are major objections to the "homelands" policy; but it has created new foci of political power which, however limited at present, may have consequences unintended by the South African government.

Question 21. Should the United States recognize the Transkei when it becomes independent next year? What other nations might recognize it?

Answer. Before making a decision, whether to recognize the Transkei, the U.S. government should take cognizance of the views of the governments of friendly Black African states. This would help repair the damage that recent U.S. policies have done to the confidence of the Third World in U.S. claims to be nonracist and humane. I do not know what advice they would give or what they themselves will do. However, if the U.S. delays recognition, the effect should be to encourage the South African government to grant some substance as well as the mere form of independence to the territory.

Question 22. How will the Transkei differ from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland?

Answer. An independent Transkei will be very similar to Botswana, Swaziland, and, especially, Lesotho—poor countries largely dependent on South Africa. Its main difference will be its access to the sea so that, unlike Lesotho, people and goods will be able to move into and out of the Transkei without using South African territory or air space.

Question 23. Are any American or non-American companies in South Africa pursuing desirable employment policies?

Answer. The employment practices of foreign companies in South Africa differ considerably. Some companies have improved their practices considerably in re-

cent years, but as far as I am aware none of them pursues wholly desirable policies at present.

Question 24. Do you have any recent information on how American companies in South Africa compare with others in their labor policies?

Answer. On balance, the labor policies of U.S. companies probably compare favorably with those of other major participants in the South African economy, e.g. the British. This difference may be the consequence of substantial U.S. investment in capital intensive, as distinct from labor intensive industries.

Question 25. What do you believe should be the policies of U.S. companies or their South African subsidiaries with regard to: Hiring; wages; promotion; training; educational and health benefits; and labor unions.

Answer. Congress should enact a fair employment code for application to all U.S. companies and subsidiaries in all foreign countries. The code should include provision for a minimum wage, it should prohibit racial discrimination, and should encourage opportunities for collective bargaining by all workers. The minimum wage should vary according to a standard formula, depending on the local cost of living. If any of the clauses in the code are in conflict with local law, the code should oblige the company to apply to the local government for dispensation from the law; the application and the local government's response should be reported immediately to the U.S. Government. Congress should regularly review all such reports and monitor the code.

Question 26. How can the U.S. Government most effectively encourage U.S. corporations with investments in South Africa to adopt more enlightened employment practices?

Answer. The U.S. Government should explain to such corporations how U.S. national interests are damaged when they apply racial discrimination; and it should not grant contracts to companies that fail to comply with the U.S. law enacting the fair employment code.

Question 27. How would you evaluate the recommendations that the U.S. Government require corporations with investments in South Africa to make full, annual, public disclosure of the details of their employment practices there?

Answer. It is most important that U.S. corporations should be required to make such disclosures.

Question 28. What are the prospects of African labor unions bringing about radical change in South Africa's political and economic structures?

Answer. This is unlikely in the near future, because the government has banned or arrested virtually all potential leaders and because employers have proved to be reluctant to negotiate with African organizations that are not approved by the government. However, those African unions that do exist provide a training-ground for potential industrial leadership in the future. U.S. firms should be encouraged to recognize and give legitimacy to these organizations.

Question 29. What are the major barriers to labor unions being a major force for change? What are the conditions that could make them more powerful.

Answer. The major barriers are: employers' unwillingness to recognize such unions without government approval; and government repression of trade union leaders who step beyond its narrow definition of their functions.

Employers should grant African trade unions all privileges presently granted to unions recognized under the Industrial Conciliation Act, including access to plants and facilities, deduction of union dues, and free and open negotiation of wages and working conditions. Change in the policy of the South African government may result from such action by private employers.

Question 30. Could other organizations of urban blacks also be effective in bringing about change? If so, what are the organizations and what role would they play?

Answer. African urban organizations associated with the government—such as Urban Bantu Councils—are not likely to be granted the means to be effective in contributing to substantial change in South Africa. These bodies are creatures of the government, unlike trade unions which can gain economic and political advantages through the initiative of private employers.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much.

We are going to hear next from Mr. Donald McHenry, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

**STATEMENT OF DONALD McHENRY, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE**

Mr. McHENRY. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate the invitation of the committee to appear during the subcommittee's series of hearings on the situation in southern Africa. The situation and problems of that part of the world, indeed of Africa as a whole, deserve more attention than Americans, including Members of the Congress, have given it heretofore. It will be clear from my statement that I believe it necessary to correct a number of aspects of policy which the United States has followed in South Africa, particularly in recent years. An essential prerequisite for the correction of policy is knowledge and understanding of developments there.

It has been my experience, particularly while in Government that when knowledge and interest were limited on a particular issue concerning southern Africa, policy decisions tended to reflect narrow and short-term interests rather than the broader and long-term interests of the United States. These hearings and others like them could go a long way toward assuring that there is sufficiently wide and open discussion to give overall U.S. interests greater consideration.

I have been asked to express my views on current developments in South Africa and Namibia and particularly on what, if anything, the United States can or should do to encourage a process of peaceful change within these two countries. In addition, I have been asked to comment on South Africa's attitudes and likely policies toward its neighbors.

Your committee has already explored the momentous changes set into motion by the coup in Portugal. South Africa, which was protected by a buffer of white-ruled states to the north became exposed directly for the first time to the independence movement which has swept the continent since World War II. The so-called white redoubt was dealt a crucial, but not fatal, blow. By the end of 1975 black majority-ruled governments are expected to hold power in every country in Africa except Southern Rhodesia, where approximately a quarter of a million whites unilaterally declared independence of the United Kingdom and have continued to rule 5 million blacks despite mandatory economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations; Namibia, where with an equally lopsided proportion of white/black population South Africa continues to maintain control, despite a determination buttressed by decision of the World Court that South Africa's League of Nations' mandate was terminated and its continued rule judged illegal; and of course, South Africa, where 4 million whites control over more than 20 million blacks.

SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT

One view of the South African Government is that it is stubborn and seemingly unresponsive to the changes in Africa to the north. But the South African Government is also pragmatic as events of the last year will attest. The Government immediately recognized the implications of Mozambique independence for South Africa. The South

Africans also recognized that the new Government in Mozambique and Angola, no matter how committed to majority rule in South Africa, would be faced immediately with pressing political and economic problems.

SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS WITH NORTHERN NEIGHBORS

As far as relations with its northern neighbors are concerned, South African support of the white government in Southern Rhodesia was an insurance policy to be retained and supported as long as the premiums remained low. The maintenance of a white government in Southern Rhodesia is not and never has been essential to the continuation of white minority rule in South Africa.

At least in the economic sphere, those problems were intimately connected with South Africa. South African commerce contributes heavily to Mozambique's port income; South Africa will be the major customer for power from the Cabora Bassa dam; and employment of Mozambique citizens in South African mines is a major source of Mozambique's foreign exchange. South Africa knew, as Zambia has discovered, that these economic relationships could not be altered immediately. South Africa also calculated that it might use the time during which the new governments were being established to emphasize, indeed to further, economic interdependence in the area and to establish working, albeit not warm, relations with its neighbors on the basis of noninterference in each other's internal affairs. In short, South Africa found itself in a peculiar coincidence of interest with its black neighbors. It was in South Africa's interest to distance itself from Southern Rhodesia and, if I may say so, to take some of the credit for promoting peaceful change in Southern Rhodesia.

I should also add that the Smith regime does not see its interests as the same as South Africa's and therefore has resisted South African pressure for accommodation to Rhodesia's black majority.

While there is a coincidence of interest at this time, it's obviously one which the African countries do not believe will last forever. I think no one should be misled that the African countries will give up on their objective of seeing majority rule in South Africa.

Mr. Chairman, I have examined what I believe are South Africa's motivations with regard to change in Southern Rhodesia in order to provide some indication of South Africa's approach to its neighbors. In brief, South Africa seeks to promote noninterference in internal relations while promoting an economic interdependence which, while assisting neighboring countries, would also make them pause before initiating or allowing hostile actions toward South Africa from their territory. Clearly, South Africa is capable of, and prepared to, resist hostile actions by force, if necessary.

It is important to recognize, however, that South Africa has drawn a sharp distinction between change outside its borders and change within South Africa itself and between its willingness to discuss relations between states and its willingness to discuss what it looks upon as its internal affairs. There is a tendency by outsiders to look upon South Africa's recent external policies as an indication of change within South Africa and to conclude that, however slowly, South Africa is also deliberately moving toward what I would call structural change in South Africa and Namibia.

It seems to me those who believe this are being very much misled. There are definite signs that South Africa has moved, or is moving, away from such absurd aspects of racial discrimination as separate park benches, water fountains, elevators, theaters, and the denial of the right of Africans to own land in so-called white South Africa. South Africa has devised a rationale for permitting interracial contact in sports and recently made changes in hotel accommodations. These changes should be recognized and welcomed. But, it should also be recognized unmistakably that neither in Namibia nor in South Africa has there been any change in the principle of apartheid. The South African Government continues to pursue a policy of political and economic domination of the black majority by the white minority without the participation of the majority in the decisionmaking process. The means of implementing that domination have changed from outright racism to the more sophisticated concept of "homelands" and promises to move to "independent" black states. But the concept remains the same. Moreover, there is no indication that the South African Government has moved away from its determination to enforce apartheid through passage and implementation of some of the most repugnant laws in existence. The pass laws, banning laws, the terrorism act, discriminatory labor laws, among others remain in effect. African political leaders remain banned, exiled, and jailed. Within the last year, the Government has moved to weaken and perhaps ultimately silence some of the organizations, both black and white, which have spoken out against apartheid.

In Namibia, South Africa continues to rule almost 10 years after the United Nations General Assembly terminated the mandate and declared continued South African rule illegal. South Africa claims that it is in the process of allowing the right of "self-determination," but not surprisingly it is a definition of self-determination which starts from the division of the country along tribal lines. Even if the theoretical possibility of a single government materializes, it promises to be so devised as to insure white domination.

ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES-AFRICAN POLICY FORMULATION

I would like to focus my comment, Mr. Chairman, on American policy and how that policy is formulated because I think an understanding of how that policy is formulated and the factors which go into it is necessary before we can take corrective steps which must be taken.

During the last year, some of our Government's classified papers regarding U.S. policies toward South Africa have become public.

Both Professor Thompson and Mrs. Butcher have referred to them. That is, I refer specifically to the National Security Council papers on southern Africa, National Security Study Memorandum 39, a study which technically covered southern Africa but which was largely devoted to South Africa. Not very persuasively, Department of State officials deny that the recommendations in that document ever became, or constitute, present policy. I say not very persuasively because we have seen a coincidence between the recommendations contained in that study and U.S. actions. Given the changes which have taken place in southern Africa during the last 18 months, it is time to take another look at U.S. policy.

It might be useful to look at how policy was analyzed last time against some understanding of what not to do the next time.

If you will recall, in this NSSM 39, Professor Thompson's statement about whether or not there were any interests—vital interests—of the United States was answered.

NSSM 39 ANALYSIS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGES

At this point, I would like to analyze the approach in NSSM 39 and make some suggestions of changes.

In the study, the statement is made that :

None of the (U.S.) interests are vital to our security, but they have political and material importance. Some of these interests are concrete and evident in the region itself, while others relate to our position in black Africa and the world.

There follows a seemingly standard list of what are called U.S. interests. These include: Political—insuring that U.S. policy is not considered so prowhite as to endanger U.S. relationships elsewhere in Africa on a variety of matters, including U.S. defense installations, overflight, investment, and trade—avoiding identification of U.S. racial policies at home with those of South Africa—avoiding an outbreak of violence which would make it difficult for the United States to find a middle ground between insurgent violence and counterviolence without sacrificing interests. Economic: a highly profitable direct investment of about \$1 billion—a growing trade which at the time showed a favorable balance of payments of about \$200 million—maintenance of a stable economic relationship between an important U.S. ally, the United Kingdom, and its major trading partner, South Africa; and—the orderly marketing of South Africa's gold production which was seen as important to the successful operation of the two-tier gold price system. Defense: protection of the Cape route—potential access to ports and repair facilities in South Africa and overflight rights—use of a Department of Defense missile tracking station in South Africa. Scientific: use of a NASA station in South Africa to support unmanned spacecraft—the orderly marketing of South African uranium for peaceful purposes and maintenance of influence aimed at channeling South Africa's atomic energy program toward peaceful purposes.

Perhaps in an effort to appear hardnosed NSSM 39 contained no discussion, except perhaps by implication, of a U.S. interest in the attainment of a majority rule or in the observance of international law and fundamental human rights. On the contrary, NSSM 39 holds that the racial policies are a major issue in U.S. foreign policy, not because the United States feels strongly about racial discrimination but "because other countries have made it so." For its part, the United States would be willing "to accept political arrangements short of guaranteed progress toward majority rule," albeit provided there was some assurance of "broadened political participation in some form by the whole population."

It's clear as far as that analysis was concerned, U.S. political interest in the race issue arose largely from such negative considerations as minimizing Communist influence and propaganda; protecting "tangible interests" from any retaliation which might result from a policy sympathetic or accommodating to the white governments; and ensuring that racial issues in the United Nations remain "manageable." Fur-

ther, there is the implication that U.S. interests in southern Africa might change, depending on whether violence was inevitable; whether African states could take any significant retaliatory action against the United States if we ignored our "political interests" and pursued our "tangible interests." Most important, there was the implication that definition of U.S. interests was greatly influenced by a judgment that the whites were sufficiently strong to hold out indefinitely. Presumably, an estimate that the blacks of the area might shortly attain power would have meant a re-definition of U.S. interests. The definition of U.S. interests was extremely flexible and short-ranged.

Based on this analysis of U.S. interests, the Nixon administration developed a policy of "communication" which, by "selective relaxation" of U.S. policies toward the white states and \$5 million in aid for the enclave states, was to "encourage some modification" of policies of the whites, "help to draw the two groups together and exert some influence on both for peaceful change." Consistent with Mr. Kissinger's recommendations of January 2, 1970, President Nixon ordered, and the United States began, an effort to "straddle" the black-white issues. However, whereas for the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to "straddle" meant to err on the side of distance from and coolness toward the white regimes, for Nixon "straddle" meant "partial relaxation." Thus, the United States arms embargo was not changed but reinterpreted and more so-called grey area items were allowed export and military contracts increased; full EX-IM [Export-Import Bank] facilities were made available to South Africa; and the United States switched from a posture of pained abstention on United Nations resolutions to opposition.

More important than specific actions was the changed tone of U.S. relations and the signal transmitted to blacks and whites alike. South African officials were warmly received in the White House and at the Department of Defense, sometimes without the knowledge of, and usually over the objection of, the Department of State. The American Ambassador in South Africa entertained on a discriminatory basis and, only after heavy criticism, was stopped by Washington from participating in opening of the Milan Theatre in Capetown.

If today the same approach is used to assess U.S. interests in South Africa as was used in 1969, there would be some significant changes. On the one hand, having given moral and material support, however modest, to the nationalists in their struggle, the Soviet Union and China now occupy a stronger position in Mozambique than does the United States. It might be argued that Chinese and Soviet—Communist—influence in Mozambique is a potential threat to U.S. interests. The argument could thus be made that South Africa's importance has increased, not lessened. This point of view is encouraged further by the fluid situation in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. While formerly the closure of the Suez Canal was a key factor, now the argument is being made that the opening of the Canal together with the potential denial of ports in Angola and Mozambique make the Cape route even more important; First, because the Soviets will have easier access to the Indian Ocean, thus putting them in a position to threaten crucial Western oil supplies; second, because, in any event, supertankers will have to continue to use the Cape route; and finally

because use of the Suez Canal is uncertain for cargo destined to and from Israel.

If you read Newsweek, Time magazine and if you see their ads, they have already begun to promote. It should not be long, I suggest, before there are renewed efforts both by South African military officials and within the U.S. Government, particularly from the Defense, and within Defense from the Navy, to permit sales to South Africa for defense purposes, especially for purposes of tracking submarines and observing fleet movements.

South Africa has already begun to promote this line of reasoning in advertisements in African newspapers and magazines. It should not be long before there are renewed efforts to permit sales to South Africa for defense purposes, especially for submarine tracking and observation.

U.S. ECONOMIC POLICY FORMULATION ANALYSIS

In the economic sphere, U.S. investments in South Africa have greatly increased, \$1.2 billion in 1974; U.S. exports to South Africa climbed to \$1.2 billion in 1974, up to 80 percent over 1973, and constituted a substantial favorable balance, \$700 million at a time of historically high U.S. trade deficits. The prospects are for increased South African purchases over the next decade. South Africa, riding the crest of greatly increased gold revenues and impressed by the changed political situation in the area, has already increased its military budget by a third and has accelerated its effort to become self-sufficient. Moreover, South Africa is the source of increasingly scarce natural resources, including much of the platinum used in pollution control equipment for U.S. automobiles.

I cite these to say that if one used the same kind of device for determining what should be U.S. policy in 1975, as was used in 1969, I do not doubt that the policymakers would probably come out virtually the same place with the wrongheaded policy. The only thing which would line up on the other side, to place it in balance, is probably an increase in U.S. investments in places like Botswana and the increasing importance of Nigeria and the Congo to the United States, particularly in the import of Congolese oil.

NSSM 39 APPROACH TO U.S. SOUTH AFRICA POLICY

The problem with using a NSSM 39-type approach to determining U.S. policy toward South Africa is severalfold: It quickly becomes a Christmas tree type listing of specific relations with the area in which so-called tangible interest appear more important than intangible interests, even though those tangible interests are not essential and are relatively minor in terms of overall U.S. relations:

It allows special interests within the U.S. Government, particularly Government agencies such as Commerce and the Navy to distort policy. It focuses more on short term tangible interests than on long term tangible interests:

George Ball makes this point in his book. As you know, Mr. Ball is not known as a friend of Africa.

It inevitably favors "stability," or evolutionary change, even though justice and stability itself may demand revolutionary change.

I do not doubt that it would be possible now, as it was in 1969, to find a way to rationalize the kind of policy which was adopted in 1969. It could be argued that economic and political necessity force accommodation between blacks and whites in South Africa, that economic and political reality will mitigate potential anti-U.S. views of black governments, that economic necessities and acknowledged South African military superiority will serve to postpone and/or moderate the potential for violence in the area, that no significant immediate threat is posed to South Africa which would place "important" U.S. interests in jeopardy, and finally, that blacks elsewhere in Africa and in the United States are too preoccupied with their own problems to object strenuously.

DANGERS INHERENT IN SHORT-TERM POLICY APPROACH

However, the situation in Portugal provides a graphic picture of the dangers inherent in a short-term approach which emphasizes current "tangible interests." While the U.S. policy toward Portugal gave the United States access to the Azores, African ports, and Angolan oil for an additional 5 years, the policy worked against both the United States and against Portugal. Portugal postponed and made more inevitable the agony of coming to grips with its economic, social, and political problems at home. While it did so, the very forces which Portugal suppressed organized to pursue sharply different and, comparatively, more progressive policies. The emerging Government in Portugal has already restricted U.S. use of the Azores.

The United States now is forced to refuel in the air. We have had the capability for a number of years.

The new black governments in Africa owe no debt to the United States. They may ultimately conclude that their economic and political interests require the equal access sought by American officials, but their present attitude is distinctly cool.

I think the independence celebration in Mozambique, where the United States was one of those not invited, is an indication the new Government is distinctly cool.

FUTURE U.S. POLICY APPROACH RECOMMENDED

A more useful approach to assess U.S. interests and policies in South Africa must begin with precisely the issue which NSSM 39 obviously avoided. In the first place, the United States must recognize that the one-sided scale which existed previously in the weighing of "tangible interests" is no longer accurate. The United States increasingly needs the resources and even the good will of black Africa. But second, the list of U.S. economic and military interests cannot be considered outside the context of ethical values and without including the maintenance of such values as an equally important U.S. interest.

To act on such values does not mean that the United States must, as Henry Kissinger once put it, "make the domestic policies of countries around the world a direct objective of American foreign policy." It certainly does not mean military involvement—although the willingness of the United States to resort to force on ideological grounds has not gone unnoticed. Nor does it mean taking on the responsibility

for change in South Africa. That is something that only South Africans of all races need to accomplish—and I believe ultimately will. Rather, acknowledgement of human rights as a pervasive issue in U.S. relations with South Africa and the translation of that position into policy means giving greater weight to such issues in the process of resolving conflicting interests and a willingness to go to greater lengths to uphold human rights.

I would like to conclude by citing one example which I think many of us know with regard to what kind of thing I'm talking about when I say weighing the ethical and human rights issues more seriously than we do when we list the so-called tangible ones.

In the case of the carrier *Franklin Roosevelt*, there was no question that South African ports were useful and convenient, even exciting, but the principle of equal treatment, and avoidance of domestic criticism, outweighed the cost of avoiding South African ports. With the *FDR*, it came down to a question of values; it will also no doubt be a question of values, not security, when questions such as the Cape route arise in a new evaluation of U.S. policy in South Africa.

It seems to me, if I may make some specific suggestions, that there are two things which ought to be characterizing U.S. policy toward South Africa.

The first is that the United States ought to distance itself as a Government from South Africa and from that Government's policies. We ought to maintain correct but cool relations. Translated, this means that we do not have to maintain the kinds of large Embassy staffing which we maintain in South Africa, and we do not need large commercial offices. We do not need attachés; we do not need a large military establishment there.

Secondly, that the U.S. Government ought to insure that none of its governmental actions help the South African Government. By this, I mean we should insure that South Africa does not get, and I understand there is renewed consideration of it now, such things as a sugar quota or use of Ex-Im Bank facilities or anything of that nature which involves the U.S. Government.

Third, we ought to indicate to the substantial American investment which is in South Africa that they are on their own. They cannot and should not look to the U.S. Government for support now in helping them carry out their business, or support later if they get into trouble because of the changed political situation in South Africa.

The second major point with regard to policies that stands with regard to violence which Professor Thompson cited.

It seems to me that in the last several years, particularly in the last 6 years, almost every statement of the U.S. Government on the issue of change in South Africa and Southern Africa has preached against violence. I do not myself advocate violence, but it does seem to me that the United States, if it has no other recommendations as to how the people of South Africa can be relieved of the oppressive situation in which they live—if the United States has itself no other positive recommendations, we ought at least to refrain from telling people what they ought to do to relieve themselves of the oppression from which they suffer.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. McHenry's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DONALD F. MCHENRY

I appreciate the invitation of the Committee to appear during the Subcommittee's series of hearings on the situation in southern Africa. The situation and problems of that part of the world, indeed of Africa as a whole, deserve more attention than Americans, including members of the Congress, have given it heretofore. It will be clear from my statement that I believe it necessary to correct a number of aspects of policy which the United States has followed in southern Africa, particularly in recent years. An essential prerequisite for the correction of policy is knowledge and understanding of developments there.

It has been my experience, particularly while in government, that when knowledge and interest were limited on a particular issue concerning southern Africa, policy decisions tended to reflect narrow and short term interests rather than the broader and long term interests of the United States. These hearings and others like them could go a long way toward assuring that there is sufficiently wide and open discussion to give overall United States interests greater consideration.

I have been asked to express my views on current developments in South Africa and Namibia and particularly on what, if anything, the United States can or should do to encourage a process of peaceful change within these two countries. In addition, I have been asked to comment on South Africa's attitudes and likely policies toward its neighbors.

Your committee has already explored the momentous changes set into motion by the coup in Portugal. South Africa, which was protected by a buffer of white-ruled states to the north became exposed directly for the first time to the independence movement which has swept the continent since World War II. The so-called white redoubt was dealt a crucial, but not fatal, blow. By the end of 1975 black majority-ruled governments are expected to hold power in every country in Africa except: Southern Rhodesia, where approximately a quarter of a million whites unilaterally declared independence of the United Kingdom and have continued to rule five million blacks despite mandatory economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations; Namibia, where with an equally lop-sided proportion of white/black population South Africa continues to maintain control, despite a determination buttressed by decisions of the World Court that South Africa's League of Nations' mandate was terminated and its continued rule judged illegal, and, of course; South Africa, where four million whites maintain control over more than twenty million blacks.

One view of the South African government is that it is stubborn and seemingly unresponsive to the changes which have taken place in the world since World War II and especially unresponsive to changes in Africa to the north. But the South African government is also pragmatic as events of the last year will attest. The government immediately recognized the implications of Mozambique independence for South Africa. The South Africans also recognized that the new government in Mozambique and Angola, no matter how committed to majority rule in South Africa, would be faced immediately with pressing political and economic problems.

As far as relations with its northern neighbor are concerned, South African support of the white government in Southern Rhodesia was an insurance policy to be retained and supported as long as the premiums remained low. The maintenance of a white government in Southern Rhodesia is not and never has been essential to the continuation of white minority rule in South Africa.

At least in the economic sphere, those problems were intimately connected with South Africa. South African commerce contributes heavily to Mozambique's port income; South Africa will be the major customer for power from the Cahora Bassa dam; and employment of Mozambique citizens in South African mines is a major source of Mozambique's foreign exchange. South Africa knew, as Zambia has discovered, that these economic relationships could not be altered immediately. South Africa also calculated that it might use the time during which the new governments were being established to emphasize, indeed to further, economic interdependence in the area and to establish working, albeit not warm, relations with its neighbors on the basis of non-interference in each other's internal affairs. In short, South Africa found itself in a peculiar coincidence of interest with its black neighbors. It was in South Africa's interest to distance itself from Southern Rhodesia and, if I may say so, to take some of the credit for promoting peaceful change in Southern Rhodesia.

I should also add that the Smith regime does not see its interests as the same as South Africa's and therefore has resisted South African pressure for accommodation to Rhodesia's black majority.

Mr. Chairman, I have examined what I believe are South Africa's motivations with regard to change in Southern Rhodesia in order to provide some indication of South Africa's approach to its neighbors. In brief, South Africa seeks to promote non-interference in internal relations while promoting an economic interdependence which, while assisting neighboring countries, would also make them pause before initiating or allowing hostile actions toward South Africa from their territory. Clearly South Africa is capable of, and prepared to, resist hostile actions by force, if necessary.

It is important to recognize, however, that South Africa has drawn a sharp distinction between change outside its borders and change within South Africa itself and between its willingness to discuss relations between states and its willingness to discuss what it looks upon as its internal affairs. There is a tendency by outsiders to look upon South Africa's recent external policies as an indication of change within South Africa and to conclude that, however slowly, South Africa is also deliberately moving toward what I would call structural change in South Africa and Namibia.

There are definite signs that South Africa has moved, or is moving, away from such absurd aspects of racial discrimination as separate park benches, water fountains, elevators, theaters, and the denial of the right of Africans to own land in so-called white South Africa. South Africa has devised a rationale for permitting inter-racial contact in sports and recently made changes in hotel accommodations. These changes should be recognized and welcomed. But, it should also be recognized unmistakably that neither in Namibia nor in South Africa has there been any change in the principle of apartheid. The South African government continues to pursue a policy of political and economic domination of the black majority by the white minority without the participation of the majority in the decision-making process. The means of implementing that domination have changed from outright racism to the more sophisticated concept of "homelands" and promises to move to "independent" black states. But the concept remains the same. Moreover, there is no indication that the South African government has moved away from its determination to enforce apartheid through passage and implementation of some of the most repugnant laws in existence. The pass laws, banning laws, the terrorism act, discriminatory labor laws, among others remain in effect. African political leaders remain banned, exiled, and jailed. Within the last year, the government has moved to weaken and perhaps ultimately silence some of the organizations, both black and white, which have spoken out against apartheid.

In Namibia, South Africa continues to rule almost ten years after the United Nations General Assembly terminated the mandate and declared continued South African rule illegal. South Africa claims that it is in the process of allowing the right of "self-determination", but not surprisingly it is a definition of self-determination which starts from the division of the country along tribal lines. Even if the theoretical possibility of a single government materializes, it promises to be so devised as to ensure white domination.

During the last year, some of our government's classified papers regarding United States policies toward South Africa have become public. I refer specifically to the National Security Council papers on southern Africa, National Security Study Memorandum 39, a study which technically covered southern Africa but which was largely devoted to South Africa. Not very persuasively Department of State officials deny that the recommendations in that document ever became, or constitute, present policy. I say not very persuasively because we have seen a coincidence between the recommendations contained in that study and United States actions. Given the changes which have taken place in southern Africa during the last eighteen months, it is time to take another look at United States policy. At this point, I would like to analyze the approach in NSSM 39 and make some suggestions of changes.

In the study, the statement is made that "None of the [U.S.] interests are vital to our security, but they have political and material importance. Some of these interests are concrete and evident in the region itself, while others relate to our position in black Africa and the world."

There follows a seemingly standard list of what are called United States interests. These include:

Political.—Insuring that United States policy is not considered so pro-white as to endanger United States relationships elsewhere in Africa on a variety of mat-

ters, including United States defense installations, overflight, investment, and trade; avoiding identification of United States racial policies at home with those of South Africa; and avoiding an outbreak of violence which would make it difficult for the United States to find a middle ground between insurgent violence and counter-violence "without sacrificing interests."

Economic.—A highly profitable direct investment of about one billion dollars; a growing trade which at the time showed a favorable balance of payments of about \$200 million; maintenance of a stable economic relationship between an important United States ally, the United Kingdom, and its major trading partner, South Africa; and the orderly marketing of South Africa's gold production which was seen as "important to the successful operation of the two-tier gold price system."

Defense.—Protection of the Cape route; potential access to ports and repair facilities in South Africa and overflight rights; and use of a Department of Defense missile tracking station in South Africa.

Scientific.—Use of a NASA station in South Africa to support unmanned spacecraft; and the orderly marketing of South African uranium for peaceful purposes and maintenance of influence aimed at channeling South Africa's atomic energy program toward peaceful purposes.

Perhaps in an effort to appear "hard-nosed," NSSM 39 contained no discussion, except perhaps by implication, of a United States interest in the attainment of majority rule or in the observance of international law and fundamental human rights. On the contrary, NSSM 39 holds that the racial policies are a major issue in United States foreign policy, not because the United States feels strongly about racial discrimination but "because other countries have made it so." For its part, the United States would be willing "to accept political arrangements short of guaranteed progress toward majority rule," albeit provided there was some assurance of "broadened political participation in some form by the whole population."

The United States political interest in the race issue arose largely from such negative considerations as minimizing Communist influence and propaganda; protecting "tangible interests" from any retaliation which might result from a policy sympathetic or accommodating to the white governments; and ensuring that racial issues in the United Nations remain "manageable." Further, there is the implication that United States interests in southern Africa might change, depending on whether violence was inevitable; whether the United States could exert influence for peaceful change; and whether African states could take any significant retaliatory action against the United States if we ignored our "political interests" and pursued our "tangible interests." Most important, there was the implication that definition of United States interests was greatly influenced by a judgment that the whites were sufficiently strong to hold out indefinitely. Presumably, an estimate that the blacks of the area might shortly attain power would have meant a re-definition of United States interests. The definition of United States interests was extremely flexible and short-ranged.

Based on this analysis of the United States interests, the Nixon Administration developed a policy of "communication" which, by "selective relaxation" of United States policies toward the white states and five million dollars in aid for the enclave states, was to "encourage some modification" of policies of the whites, "help to draw the two groups together and exert some influence on both for peaceful change." Consistent with Mr. Kissinger's recommendations of January 2, 1970, President Nixon ordered, and the United States began, an effort to "straddle" the black-white issues. However, whereas for the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to "straddle" meant to err on the side of distance from and coolness toward the white regimes, for Nixon "straddle" means "partial relaxation." Thus, the United States arms embargo was not changed but re-interpreted and more so-called grey area items were allowed export and military contracts increased; full EX-IM facilities were made available to South Africa; and the United States switched from a posture of pained abstention on United Nations resolutions to opposition.

More important than specific actions was the changed tone of United States relations and the signal transmitted to blacks and whites alike. South African officials were warmly received in the White House and at the Department of Defense, sometimes without the knowledge of, and usually over the objection of, the Department of State. The American Ambassador in South Africa entertained on a discriminatory basis and, only after heavy criticism, was stopped by Washington from participating in a public event at which discrimination was planned.

If today the same approach is used to assess United States interests in South Africa as was used in 1969, there would be some significant changes. On the one hand, having given moral and material support, however modest, to the nationalists in their struggle, the Soviet Union and China now occupy a stronger position in Mozambique than does the United States. It might be argued that Chinese and Soviet (communist) influence in Mozambique is a potential threat to United States interests. The argument could thus be made that South Africa's importance has increased, not lessened. This point of view is encouraged further by the fluid situation in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. While formerly the closure of the Suez Canal was a key factor, now the argument is being made that the opening of the Canal together with the potential denial of ports in Angola and Mozambique make the Cape route even more important: first, because the Soviets will have easier access to the Indian Ocean, thus putting them in a position to threaten crucial Western oil supplies; second, because, in any event, super tankers will have to continue to use the Cape route; and finally because use of the Suez Canal is uncertain for cargo destined to and from Israel.

South Africa has already begun to promote this line of reasoning in advertisements in American newspapers and magazines. It should not be long before there are renewed efforts to permit sales to South Africa for defense purposes, especially for submarine tracking and observation.

In the economic sphere, United States investments in South Africa have greatly increased (\$1.2 billion in 1974); United States exports to South Africa climbed to \$1.2 billion in 1974, up 80% over 1973, and constituted a substantial favorable balance (\$700 million) at a time of historically high United States trade deficits. The prospects are for increased South African purchases over the next decade. South Africa, riding the crest of greatly increased gold revenues and impressed by the changed political situation in the area, has already increased its military budget by a third and has accelerated its effort to become self-sufficient. Moreover, South Africa is the source of increasingly scarce natural resources, including much of the platinum used in pollution control equipment for United States automobiles.

A current 1969-type analysis would note the sharp increase in United States investments in Botswana and the more favorable prospects of that country as a source of raw materials. Finally, it would have to note that United States economic interests in other parts of Africa, particularly in Nigeria and the Congo have also grown substantially. Nigeria, particularly, is important because of its oil supply and its large market potential.

The problem with using a NSSM 39-type approach to determining United States policy toward South Africa is several fold: It quickly becomes a Christmas tree-type listing of specific relations with the area in which so-called "tangible interests" appear more important than "intangible interests," even though these "tangible interests" are not "essential" and are relatively minor in terms of overall United States relations: it focuses more on short term "tangible interests" than on long term "tangible interests"; and it inevitably favors "stability," or evolutionary change, even though justice and stability itself may demand revolutionary change.

In NSSM 39, the United States found a number of ways to rationalize continued pursuit of its "tangible interests." It was argued that economic and political necessity will force an accommodation between blacks and whites in South Africa; that economic and political realities will mitigate potential anti-United States views of black governments; that economic necessities and acknowledged South African military superiority will serve to postpone and/or moderate the potential for violence in the area; that no significant immediate threat is posed to South Africa which would place "important" United States interests in jeopardy; and finally, that blacks elsewhere in Africa and in the United States are too preoccupied with their own problems to object strenuously.

However, the situation in Portugal provides a graphic picture of the dangers inherent in a short term approach which emphasizes current "tangible interests." While the United States policy toward Portugal gave the United States access to the Azores, African ports and Angolan oil for an additional five years, the policy worked against both the United States and against Portugal. Portugal postponed and made more inevitable the agony of coming to grips with its economic, social, and political problems at home. While it did so, the very forces which Portugal suppressed organized to pursue sharply different and, comparatively, more progressive policies. The emerging government has already restricted United States use of the Azores. The new black governments in Africa owe no debt to the United States. They may ultimately conclude that their economic and

political interests require the equal access sought by American officials, but their present attitude is distinctly cool.

A more useful approach to assess United States interests and policies in South Africa must begin with precisely the issue which MSSM 39 obviously avoided. In the first place, the United States must recognize that the one-sided scale which existed previously in the weighing of "tangible interests" is no longer accurate. The United States increasingly needs the resources and even the good will of black Africa. But, second, the list of United States economic and military interests cannot be considered outside the context of ethical values and without including the maintenance of such values as an equally important United States interest.

To act on such values does not mean that the United States must, as Henry Kissinger once put it, "make the domestic policies of countries around the world a direct objective of American foreign policy." It certainly does not mean military involvement—although the willingness of the United States to resort to force on ideological grounds has not gone unnoticed. Nor does it mean taking on the responsibility for change in South Africa. That is something that only South Africans of all races need to accomplish—and I believe ultimately will. Rather, acknowledgement of human rights as a pervasive issue in United States relations with South Africa and the translation of that position into policy means giving greater weight to such issues in the process of resolving conflicting interests and a willingness to go to greater lengths to uphold human rights.

In the case of the carrier *Franklin Roosevelt* there was no question that South African ports were useful and convenient, even exciting, but the principle of equal treatment (and avoidance of domestic criticism) outweighed the cost of avoiding South African ports. With the FDR, it came down to a question of values; it will also no doubt be a question of values, not security, when questions such as the Cape route arise in a new evaluation of United States policy in South Africa.

Senator CLARK. I want to thank the witnesses very much for their statements.

Unfortunately, under the schedule we have, we must end this hearing at 12 o'clock, and it's 12 o'clock.

We have something in the area of 100 questions, many of which you have answered in your statements, some very specific questions. I want to go into the question with regard to our policy in the U.N. and many others. If I may, I will submit those to you in written form. Any that you feel were not covered by your statements perhaps you could answer in writing for us. I think we can keep the record open for inclusion for about 2 weeks. These will be prepared and mailed to you at once. If you will be kind enough to answer those, we would be most appreciative.

Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned.

[Questions and answers follows:]

MR. McHENRY'S ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CLARK

Question 1. Who in the United States are the advocates of the policy to apply greater U.S. pressure on South Africa to change its internal policies? Who are the major advocates for relaxing that pressure. Has U.S. public opinion had much impact on Administration policy toward South Africa? Has African opinion had any? Has Third World opinion had any?

Answer. It is important to note that the number of persons knowledgeable about South Africa and about American policy toward that country is extremely small. Generally, American concern about South Africa is not nearly as great as one concludes from reading South African newspapers. This absence, or seeming absence, is mostly due to an absence of knowledge and concern about Africa and southern Africa.

It seems to me that the groups most concerned can be found among America's young, particularly college students, among church organizations, and among blacks. In addition, there are such groups as the American Committee on Africa, the African-American Institute, the African Studies Association, black newspapers, and non-governmental organizations which take an active interest in foreign policy questions.

Opposed to these groups, which advocate increased pressure on South Africa in order to promote constructive change in policy, are a number of other groups which in many instances are more highly organized, more dedicated to a single cause, and more financially solvent. This latter group advocates relaxing American policy. That group includes conservative, so-called anti-Communists, and American corporations, particularly those which have large investments in South Africa, or who depend upon the importation of raw materials from South Africa, or who see South Africa as a large market for the export of sophisticated American goods. In addition, there are important elements within the American military establishment. The most vocal of these are those elements in the Pentagon, particularly in the Navy, who see some importance in protecting the Cape Route or counteracting Soviet naval build-up in the Indian Ocean and are inclined to subordinate political and humanitarian considerations to what I believe are ill-conceived and short-sighted security considerations.

Each of the groups has a counterpart within the United States government. For example, within the State Department there is a group, mainly in the Bureau of African Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, and the Legal Advisor's Office which continues to advocate pressure on the South African government and at least retention of those measures which the United States adopted between 1960 and 1969.

In addition, of course, there is the committee which was headed by Congressman Biggs, which has spent a great deal of time looking into the whole question of American policy toward South Africa.

On the other hand, South Africa has tacit supporters within the government and outside the military. Under the organization of foreign policy and decision-making introduced by President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger, these groups exert a significant measure of influence on American policy. Such agencies as the Commerce Department; the Treasury Department; the Bureau of Economic and Commercial Affairs and the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the State Department; the CIA—all tend to support a relaxation of American policy towards South Africa.

In general, I would say that the lesson of the last ten years is that those elements which support relaxation tend to prevail when there is no sharp public debate and when policy issues are decided in private or under the secrecy stamp of the National Security Council. When the Navy made an effort to take the carrier *FDR* into Capetown, that effort was opposed as an outrageous example of American cooperation with South Africa. As a result, the Pentagon backed down and, since the *FDR* incident, no American military vessel has made a scheduled call at South African ports. On the other hand, when the Nixon administration changed American policy towards South Africa in 1969, there was an elaborate effort to keep the change secret from the American public and as a result the changes went unnoticed by the public at large. Those persons who follow South African questions closely were unable to cite an example such as the *FDR* as a change in policy and therefore unable to marshal general American support towards the whole series of policy changes introduced by the Nixon administration.

In general, I would say that African opinion has had very little effect on American policy over the last six years or so. There was a tendency to rationalize—or rather—dismiss African views in a rather cynical way. Simply put, there was a belief that the Africans were not in a position to retaliate against the United States and therefore could be ignored. Even more cynical was the belief that Africans needed the United States and its assistance as much as, if not more than, the United States needed Africans, and therefore, again their opinion could be ignored. Perhaps the most cynical example of an evaluation of African views can be found in the feeling of the Nixon administration that a \$5 million increase in American assistance to the enclave states of southern Africa would offset closer relationships between the United States and the white countries of southern Africa. In general, I would say that the attitude which the United States exhibits towards African opinion is similar to the attitude which the United States exhibits towards the opinion of Third World countries. In short, it is the feeling that they are not important.

It is not clear whether the United States will change these feelings now that African countries, such as Nigeria, have taken on increased commercial importance to the United States; and, in fact, have become major sources of oil for the United States.

Question 2. Those who favor normal relations with China and Cuba and the Soviet Union and believe that all nations should be represented in the U.N. have

a difficult time accepting the recommendations that South Africa be expelled from that world forum.

How do those who advocate isolation of South Africa reconcile this with their general position that the U.S. should have relations with all countries?

Answer. I find it difficult to understand why those persons who advocate expulsion of South Africa from the UN should be expected to be any more consistent than the United States was when it supported continued South African membership in the United Nations at the same time that it opposed the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations. For my own part, I would not favor the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations. On the other hand, it does seem to me that the warmth of our relations with South Africa and the warmth with which South Africa is treated in the United Nations should be adjusted according to South Africa's willingness to move toward a more humane racial policy. It seems to me perfectly consistent with the maintenance of normal diplomatic relations and the maintenance of the channel of communication to say that while we can be on speaking terms with South Africa and allow private contracts with South Africa, we as a government do not have to extend to that country the kind of friendly relations which we would extend to countries with which we have common goals, aims and ideals.

Question 3. Whenever Rhodesian or South African issues are raised in Congress opponents of increasing pressure on these countries argue that human rights are being similarly violated in the communist countries and in many African states. Why single out South Africa and Rhodesia for censure? How do you respond to these arguments?

Answer. This is a red herring-type question. Of course, there are other countries where there are violations of human rights. But there is no other country where the violation is a matter of official policy. One might add that in other areas where the United States has found it difficult to countenance the policy of a particular country, the United States adjusted its relationship accordingly. That is why there are trade restrictions with regard to Eastern European countries, the Soviet Union, China, Cuba. Now, I do not wish to say that the United States should repeat in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia what I believe are errors in our relations with China, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and Cuba. But I *do* believe that as we have adjusted our relationships with those countries, it is necessary and essential that the United States adjust its relationships with South Africa and with Southern Rhodesia. If I may use a somewhat strained analogy, there are some people who are invited to dine at the White House on formal occasions. Only a few are invited to dine upstairs with the President and his family. Those who are not invited upstairs are not considered the President's enemies, but generally speaking those who are invited upstairs are considered the President's friends (or objects of persuasion). Similarly, in relations between states there are numerous occasions where relations can be adjusted so that there can be no doubt of our attitudes. If South Africa wishes to be a part of the so-called western, anti-communist world, let her adjust her attitudes and actions accordingly.

Question 4. What impact have policies of ostracism had on South Africa, such as exclusion from General Assembly, arms embargo, exclusion from international sports?

Answer. It is popular to believe that policies of ostracism on South Africa have had no impact on that country's policies, and some even suggest that the impact has had a reverse effect; that is, that South Africa in a state of siege may have even strengthened the policies to which outsiders object. I would argue that there *has* been an impact on South Africa already. From the mid-sixties to the present South Africa has been forced to avoid some of the extremes of the fifties and early sixties. There has been no Sharpeville, even though some of the conditions which were present at Sharpeville have been present in other recent instances (e.g., the Ovambo and Durban strikes). South Africa has been more reluctant to jail newly rising political leaders and has been forced to give new political leadership (who, after all, use South Africa's own creation as a platform) far greater latitude than South Africa wishes. South Africa has had to make changes in its sports policy and has had to allow selected foreigners greater access. It seems to me also that the South Africa has shown a greater sensitivity to criticism and at a minimum has been forced to attempt to put its policy forward in the best light. In some instances, the impossibility of presenting a policy in an acceptable manner has led to changes in that policy (e.g., sports, urban housing, labor grievances).

Now, with regard to the arms embargo, it is clear that South Africa has not been denied the kinds of conventional small arms and military equipment which it wanted. It is now capable of producing those materials on its own. In addition, there was always a very large hole in the arms embargo, largely because France refused to observe the arms embargo and French African countries were reluctant to criticize France lest they lose the French economic support upon which they were dependent. Nevertheless, the arms embargo has placed some significant difficulties in South Africa's path. The embargo forced South Africa to spend larger sums of money for French military goods. The embargo forced South Africa to divert some of its resources to the manufacture of arms. I think the embargo has kept South Africa from getting some of the most sophisticated weapons which it would have liked. Most important, the embargo kept them from identifying their policies and their protection with Western military establishments. We should be very careful not to underestimate the importance of that identification to South Africans. They wish to be identified with the West and that identification is very important to them, particularly in the business and military areas. I should note here that South Africa believes that both the businessman and the military are willing to subordinate their immediate objectives to any long-term or humanitarian considerations. That is the reason, for example, behind newspaper advertisements which ask whether South Africa alone should defend the Cape Route, an action which South Africa believes is sufficiently important to NATO to receive NATO support.

Question 5. A basic premise of the current policy of "communication" rests on the assumption that opportunities for communication between the major ethnic groups in South Africa exist, that there is some flexibility of position between them and the government and that there are outlets for black political development. Would you comment on that?

Answer. The question is not clear to me. Communications as such is like motherhood (was). Communications as used in American policy up to 1969 was basically to maintain a dialogue between South Africa and the outside world. The feeling was that a channel of communication needs to remain open. No action was taken to close that channel. On the other hand, it is clear that the so-called policy of communications outlined by the Nixon administration—and, I presume, in the Ford administration—was simply a rationalization for relaxation of American policy and pursuit of so-called tangible and immediate interests. Communication as a means of exchanging ideas was clearly secondary. While South Africa had unrestricted access to the United States to state its views, Americans were subjected to continued and increased restrictions in South Africa. USIA libraries continued to omit from their shelves harmless but classic American works of art simply because of South Africa's racially motivated censorship laws. South Africa restricts visas which it issues for Americans who wish to visit South Africa, and it restricts the passports which it issues for South Africans who wish to visit the United States. No restrictions are placed on South Africans who travel in the United States. South African citizens and diplomats are free to visit any public place without notice or permit. But even American diplomats must give notice and obtain a permit before visiting SOWETO.

But communications *within* South Africa are far more important than communication with outside individuals and countries. After all, in the final analysis, it is South Africans of all races and persuasions who will have to resolve their own problems. One of the ironies of South African policy was that while the South African government was seeking to establish a dialogue with other African countries and to maintain communications with the United States, it had established no communications with blacks *within* South Africa itself, with a majority of its own citizens. Only after that irony was pointed out by "homeland" leaders and by other African countries did South Africa consent to hold talks with the leaders of the homelands. Even now I am not sure that those talks have resulted in communications. I am not sure there is a dialogue. There probably is more a monologue. South Africa, so far, has not shown that it has gotten the essential parts of the messages which the homeland leaders have presented. Perhaps they do have that message and their decision is simply to ignore it.

Question 6. Another common assumption put forth with regard to change in South Africa is that "natural forces" such as economic development and industrialization would necessarily work on behalf of the gradual improvement of the political as well as the material well-being of the blacks. Is this an adequate or accurate basis for U.S. policy?

Answer. The assumption is that "natural" forces such as economic development and industrialization will naturally undermine apartheid. I'm afraid that that assumption is one of those seemingly plausible doctrines but elaborate rationalizations for continuing business as usual. There is nothing in the history of mankind which would lead us to believe that that assumption is correct. In the United States, industrialization and economic development did not lead to any change in the relative positions between whites and blacks in either the economic or political sphere. Only when the force of the federal government and federal and local laws intervened was there any sharp, or even significant, difference. Proof that the industrialization argument is fallacious can be found in South Africa itself. South Africa is one of the most developed countries in the world. Yet, the gap between South African blacks and whites has steadily increased, and Africans today have fewer political rights than they had twenty years ago. I would suggest two extended studies on this point. The first is Guy Davis' *Industrialization and Race Relations*, which covers not only the United States but South Africa and other countries of the world where there are race problems. The second study is Heribert Adams' book, *Modernizing Racial Domination*, which is entirely on South Africa. Both of these studies suggest that there is absolutely nothing inconsistent between economic development and industrialization on the one hand, and continued political and economic suppression of the victims of discrimination, whether in Capetown, London, or New York.

Question 7. It has been argued that "cultural exchanges" with South Africa (bringing South African citizens here and sending Americans there) help to expose Americans to South Africa's problems and South Africans to American values. Do these exchanges in any way serve to encourage change within South Africa? How could they be improved?

Answer. There are, of course, benefits to be derived from cultural exchanges. South Africans need to get out and see what the rest of the world is like; Americans and others need to go to South Africa and see for themselves the very genuine problems which exist in that country. But the exchanges must be free and open, and they must indeed be *exchanges*. Communication is not possible so long as the South Africans continue to restrict the Americans who go to South Africa—restrict those who get there and restrict what they do once they are there—and so long as the South Africans continue to restrict South Africans coming to the United States. It does no good for the South Africans to invite to South Africa only those persons who are among conservative elements in the United States and to exclude such distinguished American scholars as Professor Gwendolyn Carter, Professor Tom Kuris, and a number of others. There can be no useful exchange if an American musical organization going to South Africa finds that it cannot get visas for members of the group, only to discover once that when the black drummer is omitted from the group, visas for the remainder of the group suddenly and not so mysteriously come through. In sum, I support the idea of exchanges, of open communication and of unrestricted travel between the United States and South Africa. I would not like to see formal exchanges such as exist with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, should South Africa continue to subject visitors to that country to political scrutiny, then a formal exchange agreement would more appropriately reflect the state of U.S.-South African relations.

Question 8. Americans learn about South Africa mostly through the English language publications of that country, but the National Party is predominantly Afrikaner. Can you identify the basic differences between the British and the Afrikaner and the basic differences between the British and Afrikaner elements in the government?

Answer. Of course, there are differences in the publications of the English language press and the Afrikaans language press. I would say the most knowledgeable people on South Africa, however, get their information from media published in both languages. Or, they get their material from official government publications such as South Africa's *Hansard* or South Africa's *Gazette*. (Some of the most damning information about South Africa can be found in official publications.) In addition, organizations such as the South Africa Institute of Race Relations maintain excellent translation services and publish objective information on South African developments. I think it would be a mistake to identify or to depend solely upon English language sources and ignore the Afrikaner publications; however, I do not believe that the English press significantly distorts Afrikaner views.

I am not sure but that there isn't a fiction which exists in the West with regard to differences of approach between Afrikaner and the English-speaking South Africans toward black South Africans. The Nationalist Party continues to gain a tremendous plurality in elections, and it is a plurality which, though based on the overwhelming support of Afrikaners, also has the support of much of the English-speaking population and recent immigrants. I regret to say that many of the differences between the predominantly English-speaking United Party and the Afrikaner-speaking National Party, are distinctions without a difference. As a matter of fact, one of the real problems which the United Party has as the major opposition party is the task of presenting a real alternative to the Nationalist Party. It is not clear how different in practical terms United Party policies would be from the policies of the Nationalists. United Party policies might be less harsh, more humane, but the relative position between the white South African and the black South African does not seem to me as if it would be changed very much. You can see this every time a United Party spokesman is asked the ultimate question. And, in South Africa, the ultimate question is a long way from what was (and perhaps continues to be) the acid test in the United States: "How would you like your daughter . . ."

Question 9. Evaluate the internal political stability in South Africa with respect to the following points:

(a) What kind of limits on his maneuverability does Vorster face from the right wing of the party?

(b) How much political support can Vorster win for even cosmetic changes in apartheid policies from the National Party, the *Broderbond* and other Nationalist or Afrikaner elite groups?

(c) What kinds of pressures is Vorster feeling from the anti-apartheid white parties?

(d) Does Vorster need pressure from the United States and other powers to keep his right wing in line?

Answer. Given the conservative nature of South African society, there are undoubtedly very real limits on Mr. Vorster's maneuverability with regard to his right wing. On the other hand, there is every indication that Mr. Vorster is now at the height of his power. He has received considerable support for his efforts to resolve the Rhodesian question. He weathered the initial attack from his extreme right wing several years ago and, within the last year, Mr. Vorster was able to attain virtually complete control over the *Broderbond*, the so-called secret Afrikaner society which runs South Africa. It seems to me, therefore, that Mr. Vorster is certainly capable of making "cosmetic changes" in apartheid policy, and I would suggest that he is capable of moving South African policy considerably beyond cosmetic changes. South Africans tend to be people who follow their leaders, and Mr. Vorster is right now the unquestioned leader of South Africa.

I doubt seriously that Mr. Vorster is under great pressure from anti-apartheid white parties in South Africa. The United Party, which is supposedly the principal opposition—at least, it has the largest number of opposition members in Parliament—is weaker today than it has ever been before. One can argue that the small Progressive Party is stronger than it has ever been before, particularly now that it has been joined by United Party defectors. On the other hand, many of the Progressive Party gains came out of the hide of the very much weakened United Party. I am not sure whether Mr. Vorster needs pressure from the United States and other powers to keep his right wing in line. On the other hand, it helps. Mr. Vorster's six-month declaration on Namibia, the South African's ambassador's declaration with regard to racial discrimination before the UN Security Council last year, and the active role played by South Africa on Southern Rhodesia were all reactions in part to pressure from outside. There probably is a point, however, where outside pressure can be too great, particularly if it is blind pressure and takes no account of the practical political and social problems of South Africa. Fortunately, most responsible critics of South Africa are cognizant of these problems and do not advocate instant and simplistic solutions to South Africa's racial problems, only that South Africans of all races join in cooperative efforts toward resolving their problems. Certainly, that is the approach of the Lusaka Manifesto and the 1964 United Nations Committee of Experts.

Question 10. The South African government constantly speaks of the tribal or ethnic differences of the "peoples" of that country. Are they so different that they could not form a united front politically? Is one apt to emerge superior in leadership to others?

Answer. There are, of course, tribal and ethnic differences in South Africa, but it seems to me that South Africa uses those differences to rationalize continued white domination. The South African government certainly has gone out of its way to promote differences within groups. At one time, there were no tribal colleges. Fort Hare was a college which attracted people from all backgrounds (and several South African universities were open to all races). The government enforced tribal distinctions in higher education, as it had done in education generally. Even SOWETO, where there live thousands of people who have never been to the Homelands and whose tribal identification is almost non-existent, the government has enforced tribal identification. The advisory council in SOWETO was once organized along non-tribal lines. The government insisted that the group be destroyed and that members of a new body be elected on a basis of tribal representation. While recognizing tribal differences, I do not believe that differences are such that no politically united front can emerge. As a matter of fact, if there is a leader who commands attention from diverse elements in South Africa among the blacks, it is Chief Buthelezi, who is Zulu but whose appearances in SOWETO indicates that he is extremely popular across tribal lines.

Question 11. As of September, 1974, South Africa had diplomatic relations with only 26 nations (versus 17 in 1963), but conducts trade and investment relationships with many more, including many Black African nations. Please comment on South Africa's apparent success in this field as opposed to its diplomatic forays.

Answer. I do not find it surprising that South Africa would maintain trade and investment relations with a far greater number of countries than it maintains diplomatic relations. It simply indicates that the two are different. Trade is largely a private matter, whereas diplomatic relations are a public matter. Diplomatic relations frequently are an indicator of the warmth of relations between governments. Much of South Africa's trade with black Africa results simply from the earlier history of colonialism. By that I mean that in colonial Africa, trade and commercial lines were oriented toward the white south: Southern Rhodesia through Mozambique; the Congo through Angola; Zambia through Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, and Angola. South Africa benefitted from advanced development and, were it not for political factors, would be a natural hub of industrialization. South Africa has capital.

Some of South Africa's trade results from hypocrisy rather than necessity. There is an element in man which allows him to say one thing and do another. For example, it is clear that China has long traded with South Africa through Hong Kong and other places. At one time in the sixties, there were indications that eastern European countries were also trading with South Africa, while all the time maintaining that they had an embargo. Of course, the most outstanding examples of hypocrisy are those black African countries to the north whose trade had not been oriented to the south and who would suffer no great hardship—only inconvenience—under a total embargo. Those countries continue to trade with South Africa, and the amount of trade may be building. One thing is sure, we don't know what the extent of that trade is because, since about 1964, South Africa has not published a breakdown of its trade with African countries. They have not published this breakdown simply because secrecy allows African countries to continue to trade while saying they were doing otherwise.

Question 12. Prime Minister Vorster said in 1972: "Because we understand Africa and its people better than anybody else, we are prepared to lend technical and other aid to Africa insofar as we are able." Comment on why Black African states have been so reluctant to accept South African aid but are willing to trade with it.

Answer. I would not agree with Mr. Vorster's statement that South Africa and South Africans understand Africa and its peoples better than anybody else does. If anything, I would say that South Africa's self-imposed isolation from the rest of Africa have resulted in South Africa's tremendous ignorance of Africa and the continent. What South Africa knows is that which South African government propaganda gets a kick out of reciting—the unattractive things which occur in Africa's history and which occur in the history of any developing area. South Africans know of the military coups and of corruption; South Africans know of the problems—economic, social and political—which face much of northern Africa. But, as I say, these are negative things and I do not think they give South Africa any particular expertise and hardly rationalize, for example, the continued level of abject poverty in the richest country on the

continent, just as the United States can find no consolation in the fact that any group elsewhere is worse off than groups in the United States.

African reluctance to accept South African aid but acceptance of trade is partially explained in my earlier comment. It is not clear to me how much trade is going on, but we know that re-orientation of trade is a major priority of African countries. It is clear that Africans feel extremely strongly about the racial policies of South Africa. None of them wishes to see South Africa able to do in the rest of Africa what it has been able to do, or what was done, under the colonial administration in Southern Africa. None of them wish to see continue South African economic (and with it, political) hegemony over the area.

Question 13. Since 1959 South Africa has waged a successful and aggressive campaign to woo foreign investments and trade ties. Does the presence of foreign investors in South Africa weaken or strengthen South Africa's internal security?

Answer. I doubt that the presence or absence of foreign investment has anything to do with South Africa's present internal security. The question is, is South Africa strengthened by the presence or absence of foreign investors, and my answer would be that it is strengthened by the presence of foreign investors. Any tie which South Africa is able to maintain with the outside gives South Africa a certain amount of psychological strength. They are able to tell themselves that they are not the lepers of the world when it counts. Secondly, foreign investment becomes captive. It becomes a way of influencing policy. It becomes a consideration and perhaps a restraint on the United States if the United States should wish to act against South Africa. The captive—that is, the company—also becomes an effective lobby, a key lobby against any increase in pressure on South Africa. Foreign investment gives South Africa additional capital. South Africa can raise its own capital, but nevertheless, foreign investment gives South Africa additional capital. More important, foreign investment gives South Africa technology. The technology which is present in the rest of the world and the value of that technology cannot be underestimated.

Question 14 A. What should U.S. policy be concerning the Bantustans?

B. What should U.S. policy be on American investment in the border industries or within the Bantustans? How could your recommendations be implemented?

C. Has the South African government been successful in encouraging industries to establish plants on the borders of the Bantustans, so fewer African workers will come into the "White Areas"? What are the changes that the South African government will be successful in this policy and force a larger percentage of the African population to live in the "homelands"?

D. What is your opinion of the viability of the homelands policy? Can it work?

Answer. The Bantustan present something of a problem to the United States and for concerned individuals both in and out of South Africa. One does not wish to be harsh and unfeeling towards those people who by any standard need some kind of economic assistance and could use the political autonomy which might ultimately result if South Africa followed its Bantustan policy to its logical conclusion. On the other hand, one has to recognize that the Bantustans are indeed an implementation of the policy of apartheid, of racial discrimination, of taking a political entity and dividing it into smaller pieces without any say in that decision on the part of the people who are being divided, and who, after all, constitute a majority of the population. It is "divide and rule." More important than that, it is what Gwendolyn Carter in her book on the Transkei called "the politics of domestic colonialism." It allows South African whites to continue to maintain their dominant position while appearing to the outside world to be allowing self determination and political autonomy.

It seems to me that American policy towards the Bantustans must be based on our own independent judgement. In making that judgement we must hold in mind first the views of blacks within South Africa. It is very clear that blacks within South Africa do not buy the Bantustan concept. The people of SOWATO find it hard to believe that they ought to be shipped off to remote rural areas which they have not seen and which their forefathers have not seen. In general, I think current American policy toward the Bantustans is correct. The United States has sought to maintain contacts with the Bantustan leaders. This is appropriate. They are persons of great dignity, great importance and stature in South Africa, and many of them would be leaders even if there was no formal

Bantustan policy. At the same time, there should be no question of the United States maintaining or establishing any kind of formal relations with the Bantustans as if we look upon them as any present or future government. Certainly, the Bantustans cannot expect recognition from independent African countries.

I would take the same attitude toward American investment in border industries and with the Bantustans as I take toward investment in general in South Africa. Given the strictness under which business must operate, I do not believe it advisable for any new American investment to go into South Africa, nor do I believe it advisable for current American investors in South Africa to significantly expand their operations. I should make it quite clear that this has nothing to do with current investment in South Africa. They are there. They went at a different time. Pulling out, for most, would be impractical. They must be pressed to operate their businesses as fairly as the law permits, and when that limit is reached they must be pressed to seek changes in the law.

In general, investment in underdeveloped areas of any country is desirable, and investment in so-called border areas could be a desirable undertaking; however, here, too, one has to recognize that investment in South Africa's Bantustans is the government's way of implementing its policy of apartheid. Even the question of decentralization of industry, which should be the concept behind the border industries program and a perfectly normal, acceptable economic development concept throughout the world, has been tainted in South Africa by that country's definition of (industrial) expansion and location of a plant. Expansion in South Africa is defined not in terms of how many new employees would be employed; not in terms of what new resources there are; not in terms of whether there is adequate water or power or transportation or communication; but expansion is defined in terms of how many black African employees are to be used.

By coercion (refusal to issue permits) and financial incentives, South Africa has succeeded in encouraging growth in some of the border areas. It is worth noting, however, that some of the so-called border areas were always centers of urban living or established commercial areas which South Africa wishes to enlarge.

Basically, South Africa's efforts to keep Africans in the homelands face startling odds. Even government agencies have warned that industrial investment will have to "accelerate considerably" to achieve the minimum 20,000 jobs (which would hopefully lead to an additional 40,000 jobs) needed simply to keep pace with the growth in population. According to one source, only 720 jobs were created through investment in 1971, and fewer than 9,000 in 1974. Without massive assistance, Africans in the homelands are doomed to unemployment and an effort to scratch out an existence on the over-crowded, over-grazed, and inhospitable soil of homeland areas.

Question 15. Should the United States recognize the Transkei when it becomes independent next year? What other nations might recognize it?

Answer. No, the United States should not recognize an "independent" Transkei. I doubt that any African country will do so. As a matter of fact, I doubt that any country will do so except South Africa.

Question 16. How will the Transkei differ from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland?

Answer. The comparison with the enclave states is false, though it is a comparison which South Africans are fond of making. The homelands are a gerrymandered "fulfillment" of the 1936 Land Act. The gerrymandering is to protect white South African economic and political interests, not to fulfill African just political aspirations, or even to accord them a reasonable chance of economic success. The Africans will end up with less than 14% of South Africa's poorest land. Ten homelands will consist of 24 areas and only two homelands, Basotho Qwaqwa and South Ndebele, will be single entities. KwaZulu will be divided into 10 pieces.

Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland are single entities. But the major difference can be seen in the origin of South Africa's land decisions. As the *Johannesburg Star* (January 31, 1975) put it:

"Even a massive injection of loans and aid from the Central Government will not and cannot create States out of the inadequate land which the 1936 undertaking provided for. When that undertaking was given, the situation was totally different from today's. Then the land was for Native Reserves, the kraals to which migrant workers would return after their stint in the white economy. They were not to be States for free and independent people—just inalienable plots within the country as a whole for those who lived in the kraal life. The 1936

undertaking preceded equal and separate development . . . and the controversial land issue must be updated if the Government is sincere in its policy to create independent viable states for those Africans who do not live and work in the cities."

Question 17. A. Are any American or non-American companies in South Africa pursuing desirable employment policies?

B. Do you have any recent information on how American companies in South Africa compare with others in their labor policies?

C. What do you believe should be the policies of U.S. companies or their South African subsidiaries with regard to: Hiring; wages; promotion; training; educational and health benefits; and labor unions.

D. How can the U.S. government most effectively encourage U.S. corporations with investments in South Africa to adopt more enlightened employment practices?

E. How would you evaluate the recommendations that the U.S. government require corporations with investments in South Africa to make full, annual, public disclosure of the details of their employment practices there?

Answer. In general, the major American companies, with the exception of the tire companies, have made significant improvements in their employment policies. Much of this was in the elimination of blatant discrimination in fringe benefits, which in South Africa are even more important to black employees than they are to whites. Some improvement has also been made in wages and training.

However, South African formal and informal government restrictions place a limit on how far companies can proceed. Those limits—in the type of job which blacks can hold and the level of jobs (Government policy prevents blacks from supervising whites) also limit their wages. Some of these limitations can and should be pressed at least to the point where the government is forced to direct discrimination instead of simply implying that it would do so. In the area of worker representation, the companies could encourage and, if need be, assist in the formation of independent unions with black membership. Nothing prohibits such union organization and nothing prohibits the negotiations of contracts with such unions, albeit they could not participate in the industrial conciliation process.

The United States government must recognize that American investors are perceived to be representative of United States policy and that this perception will continue no matter how much we speak of free business enterprise and the American practice of not controlling business. As a matter of fact, the United States government is known to control business when it wishes to do so (e.g., balance of payments restrictions; East-West trade; trade with Cuba, China, etc.). In addition, the United States does provide informational assistance to American investors and representational and retaliatory assistance in the event American investors are unfairly treated. So the separation explanation is a myth.

It follows, therefore, that the Government should play an active role in promoting minimum standards. This need not be interference. The Congress, for example, would perform a significant service if it followed the precedent of the British and *subpoenaed* information from American firms on the grounds that their operations do affect the representation of the United States abroad. Similarly, the Executive might broaden and strengthen its efforts to persuade American investors to improve their ways.

Question 18. A. What are the prospects of African labor unions bringing about radical change in South Africa's political and economic structures?

B. What are the major barriers to labor unions being a major force for change? What are the conditions that could make them more powerful?

Answer. Black labor unions could bring about significant political and economic change in South Africa. As a matter of fact, it is because of the potential power of black labor unions that South Africa has opposed their full and equal participation in collective bargaining. South Africa is fully aware that changes in the economic structure must follow or accompany changes in the political structure. For example, the decision to include African blacks in skilled and supervisory positions, and thus open a higher economic level to blacks, is inconsistent with the concept of apartheid, and separate administration, and Bantustans.

I doubt that South Africa in the near future will change its laws and permit registered African unions. Their unwillingness to do so underscores the need for employers to take the only other route currently available. They should encourage the formation of nonracial unions and then negotiate with them.

[Whereupon, at 12 noon, the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA

South Africa and Namibia

THURSDAY, JULY 24, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:15 a.m. in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Dick Clark (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senator Clark.

Senator CLARK. The subcommittee will please come to order.

I want to apologize at the outset for the delay from 10:30. We are about 40 minutes late in getting started.

The Foreign Relations Committee is meeting with regard to the question of arms sales to Jordan, and we have had a vote. We apologize.

WITNESSES

We have about an hour for the hearing and have five witnesses. I am going to ask the witnesses to try to summarize their statements.

We will be hearing first from administration witnesses Secretary Davis and Secretary Buffum. Please come forward to the table.

OPENING STATEMENT

I have a very brief statement to make. I simply want to say at the outset, after having heard the public witnesses yesterday, that many Americans and representatives of the black African states are deeply concerned about what they perceive to be a U.S. policy of supporting the status quo in South Africa.

South Africa's system of apartheid violates the principle of human rights which this country regards as the essential foundation of good government. Many of the world's nations still look to the United States as the leading defender of human rights.

South Africa's policies of racial domination are particularly offensive to all who have fought against racism in this country and against colonialism in much of the world.

Many observers regard U.S. South Africa policy as a test of this country's support for human rights and racial equality throughout the world. They often wonder whether these commitments are genuine or are simply used when it is convenient for other purposes. After all, it was claimed that U.S. involvement in Vietnam and Korea and its

attempts to isolate Cuba and China were based on the defense of human rights. If the United States was willing to go against much of world opinion for these causes, it should certainly be willing to join the international community in efforts to defend human rights in South Africa.

As United States votes in the United Nations on South African issues, its trade and investment relations with South Africa and its seeming reluctance to pressure the South African Government in any way have called into question its commitment to human rights.

Yesterday's witnesses dealt extensively with the question of U.S. interests. They pointed out that this country has a growing interest in maintaining good relations with the nations of Africa. They asserted that these relations have been seriously jeopardized by U.S. Africa policy. They stated that the United States has a political interest in not supporting oppressive regimes, like the former Portugese government, because the resentment that builds up among the oppressed becomes resentment against the United States as well. Finally, they stated that the United States does have ethical and moral interests. Its foreign policy must be based not only on expanding and maintaining its power, but also on furthering and defending the principles that are at the core of its national identity.

At times, furthering such basic and long-term interests coincides with short-term economic, strategic, and political interests. Yesterday's witnesses felt that, while a correct South Africa policy is indeed consistent with many of this country's short-term interests, this administration has chosen to give higher priority to those short-term interests that conflict with support for human rights and racial equality in South Africa. That was the allegation. They called for an open, honest debate by Congress, the administration, and the concerned public on what this country's interests in South Africa are and which of them should be given the highest priority. Hopefully, the administration witnesses today, and the public witnesses who will follow them, will contribute to this necessary debate about the complex and controversial issues involving United States-South Africa policy.

Secretary Davis, would you like to proceed?

STATEMENT OF HON. NATHANIEL DAVIS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY DAVID P. N. CHRISTENSEN, ECONOMIC OFFICER, OFFICE OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, sir.

I think you asked me to summarize my statement, and I think that I have provided. I hope, copies of my full statement for the record.

Senator CLARK. They will be included in the record.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA

Mr. DAVIS. The United States strongly disapproves of the South African policy of apartheid or separate development and seeks to encourage the South African Government to end it and establish the basis for a just society and government. Our policy derives from our own heritage of a multiracial society, our interests elsewhere in Africa.

and our efforts to promote respect for human dignity throughout the world.

The United States has adopted a policy toward South Africa of imposing restraints in our bilateral relations and communicating with its government and people, making clear our nonacceptance of apartheid. Other restraints in our relations concern U.S. investment and trade. We neither encourage nor discourage private American investment. We engage in systematic contacts with all elements of South Africa's population. We carry on an active cultural and educational exchange-of-persons program, and we encourage American firms located in South Africa to adopt enlightened employment practices for all of their employees.

I might say also, the large majority of those people who come in our exchange program are not whites.

Certain aspects of what is called petty apartheid are being abolished, but we do not see substantial evidence that the South African Government has changed or intends to change the fundamentals of apartheid. Prime Minister Vorster has declared that the whites will continue to rule South Africa and that "separate development" will remain the bedrock of his government's racial policy.

Since South African leaders intend to maintain their basic policies, it is our view that the possibility of future racial conflict in southern Africa remains real.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD NAMIBIA

Turning to Namibia, U.S. policy toward that international territory is based on our belief that the people of Namibia should be allowed to exercise freely their right to self-determination. Given our support for U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2145 of October 27, 1966, which terminated South Africa's League of Nations mandate over Namibia, and for the conclusions of the 1971 International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion regarding Namibia, which upheld the legality of the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2145, we take the view that South Africa is illegally administering Namibia and should withdraw from the territory, which is properly the responsibility of the United Nations.

We have repeatedly made clear to the South African Government our deep concern over violations of human rights in the territory. For example, last month we sought to persuade the South African Government to revoke or stay the expulsion from Namibia of the Anglican Suffragan Bishop of Damaraland, Richard J. Wood, and his U.S.-citizen wife. We also expressed our displeasure to the South African Government when Mrs. Wood was evicted from the territory when she refused to obey the expulsion order.

Because of South Africa's illegal administration of Namibia and South Africa's refusal to acknowledge U.N. responsibility for this international territory, the U.S. Government has since May 1970, officially discouraged private American investment in the territory and has denied Export-Import Bank guarantees and other facilities for trade with Namibia. Since May 1970, we have also warned potential U.S. investors that we would withhold U.S. Government protection of U.S. investments, made on the basis of rights acquired through the

South African Government after the 1966 termination of the mandate, against the claims of a future lawful government in Namibia. We have encouraged the few American firms with investments in Namibia to conform their employment practices to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

South African leaders have repeatedly asserted that South African Government policy in Namibia is aimed at preparing the people of the territory to exercise their right to self-determination. However, the South African Government has not stated when and under what conditions the exercise of self-determination will take place. There are indications that the constitutional talks may begin within a few months. Political party leaders who are not also ethnic and tribal group leaders, however, will, as we understand it, not be permitted to take part in the talks. Therefore, political parties, including the South West African People Organization—SWAPO—recognized by the OAU and the U.N. as the legitimate representative of the Namibian people, will be excluded from the talks.

SWAPO leaders and other more militant black nationalists favor the immediate establishment of a majority rule unitary state and reject participation in the constitutional talks unless a number of conditions—such as the release of Namibian political prisoners—are met. Some leaders of minority ethnic and tribal groups are concerned at the possibility of domination of an independent Namibia by the numerically superior Ovambo tribe from which SWAPO draws its support.

Regarding the future of Namibia, we hold the following views. All Namibians should within a short time be given the opportunity to express their views freely and under U.N. supervision on the political future and constitutional structure of the territory. All Namibian political groups should be allowed to campaign for their views and to participate without hinderance in peaceful political activities in the course of self-determination. The territory should not be fragmented in accordance with apartheid policy contrary to the wishes of its people. And the future of Namibia should be determined by the freely expressed choice of its inhabitants.

We have expressed these views to the South African Government, and we are now considering what further actions we might usefully take to persuade the South Africans that it is in their own best interest to move rapidly to resolve in a satisfactory manner the Namibian issue.

Assistant Secretary Buffum will discuss the U.N. aspects of the South African and Namibian issues.

Thank you.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much, and we will go on to Professor Buffum's paper.

[Secretary Davis' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NATHANIEL DAVIS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: I am pleased to join with Assistant Secretary Buffum in representing the Department of State before the Subcommittee which today is considering U.S. policy toward South Africa and Namibia. We consider that South Africa and Namibia are separate although related issues, and therefore I propose to discuss first South Africa and then Namibia.

The United States strongly disapproves of the South African Government's policy of apartheid or separate development and seeks to encourage the South Africa Government to end it and establish the basis for a just society and government. Our policy derives from our heritage as a multiracial society, our interests elsewhere in Africa, and our efforts to promote respect for human dignity throughout the world. The United States has adopted a policy toward South Africa of imposing restraints in our bilateral relations and communicating with its government and people, making clear our non-acceptance of apartheid.

Foremost among the restraints has been our careful adherence over the past 12 years to a comprehensive arms embargo, encompassing all military equipment. In addition, since 1967 we have banned visits by U.S. Navy ships to South African ports except in cases of emergency.

Other restraints in our relations concern U.S. investment and trade: we neither encourage nor discourage private American investment. We seek to ensure that prospective U.S. investors are fully aware of the political, economic, and social problems relating to investment in South Africa. We do not engage in the full range of trade promotion activities in South Africa that we undertake in other countries. Only limited Export-Import Bank facilities are available for trade with South Africa and direct loans are specifically prohibited.

In implementation of our policy of communication without acceptance, we maintain our diplomatic mission in South Africa; we engage in systematic contacts with all elements of South Africa's population; we carry on an active cultural and educational exchange-of-persons programs; and we encourage American firms located in South Africa to adopt enlightened employment practices for all of their employees.

Within South Africa there is at present much talk of significant changes taking place in the apartheid system. The recent opening of the Nico Malan Theater in Cape Town to all races, government plans to permit certain blacks to buy their own homes, but not land, in the black townships near urban centers, and the participation of blacks in some international sporting events are cited as example of change. Certain aspects of what is called petty apartheid are being abolished, but we do not see substantial evidence that the South African Government has changed or intends to change the fundamentals of apartheid. Prime Minister Vorster has declared that the whites will continue to rule South Africa and that "separate development" (apartheid) will remain the bedrock of his government's racial policy. Since South African leaders intend to maintain their basic policies, it is our view that the possibility of future racial conflict in southern Africa remains real. We therefore believe that our present policy of restraints and communication without acceptance of apartheid should be maintained, and that it offers the most effective means at our disposal to approach the problems of southern Africa.

Turning to Namibia, U.S. policy toward the international territory is based upon our belief that the people of Namibia should be allowed to exercise freely their right of self-determination. Given our support for UN General Assembly Resolution 2145 of October 27, 1966, which terminated South Africa's League of Nations Mandate over Namibia, and for the conclusions of the 1971 International Court of Justice advisory opinion regarding Namibia, which upheld the legality of UN General Assembly Resolution 2145, we take the view that South Africa is illegally administering Namibia and should withdraw from the territory which is properly the responsibility of the United Nations.

We have repeatedly made clear to the South African Government our deep concern over violations of human rights in the territory. For example, last month we sought to persuade the South African Government to revoke or stay the expulsion from Namibia of the Anglican Suffragan Bishop of Damaraland, Richard J. Wood and his U.S. citizen wife. We also expressed our displeasure to the South African Government when Mrs. Wood was evicted from the territory when she refused to obey the expulsion order.

Because of South Africa's illegal administration of Namibia and South Africa's refusal to acknowledge UN responsibility for this international territory, the U.S. Government has since May 1970 officially discouraged private American investment in the territory and has denied Export-Import Bank guarantees and other facilities for trade with Namibia. Since May 1970, we have also warned potential U.S. investors that we would withhold U.S. Government protection of U.S. investments, made on the basis of rights acquired through the South African Government after the 1966 termination of the mandate, against the claims of a future lawful government in Namibia. We have encouraged the few American firms with investments in Namibia to conform their employment practices to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Since the Portuguese coup in April 1974, there appears to have been some movement away from political deadlock in Namibia. South African leaders have repeatedly asserted that South African Government policy in Namibia is aimed at preparing the people of the territory to exercise their right to self-determination. However, the South African Government has not stated when and under what conditions the exercise of self-determination will take place. It maintains that the people of Namibia, and not South Africa nor the United Nations, must determine their own future and all options, including unitary independence, will be open to them. The South African Government, acting through the ruling white National Party of South West Africa, called in September 1974 for the leaders of the various ethnic and tribal groups to meet together to discuss the future of Namibia. These constitutional talks have not yet been held, as efforts to persuade all the various groups to take part have apparently not been successful so far. There are indications that the constitutional talks may begin within a few months. Political party leaders who are not also ethnic and tribal group leaders, however, will, as we understand it, not be permitted to take part in the talks. Therefore, political parties, including the South West Africa People Organization—SWAPO—recognized by the OAU and the UN as the legitimate representative of the Namibian people, will be excluded from the talks.

At present black opposition to South African rule in Namibia is somewhat divided on some issues. SWAPO leaders and other more militant black nationalists favor the immediate establishment of a majority rule unitary state and reject participation in the constitutional talks unless a number of conditions such as the release of Namibian political prisoners are met. Some leaders of minority ethnic and tribal groups are concerned at the possibility of domination of an independent Namibia by the numerically superior Ovambo tribe from which SWAPO draws its support.

Regarding the future of Namibia, we hold the following views: all Namibians should within a short time be given the opportunity to express their views freely and under UN supervision on the political future and constitutional structure of the territory; all Namibian political groups should be allowed to campaign for their views and to participate without hindrance in peaceful political activities in the course of self-determination; the territory should not be fragmented in accordance with apartheid policy contrary to the wishes of its people, and the future of Namibia should be determined by the freely expressed choice of its inhabitants.

We have expressed these views to the South African Government, and we are now considering what further actions we might usefully take to persuade the South Africans that it is in their own best interest to move rapidly to resolve in a satisfactory manner the Namibian issue.

Assistant Secretary Buffum will discuss the UN aspects of the South African and Namibian issues.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM B. BUFFUM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. BUFFUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have also submitted a statement for the committee's record, outlining the relationship between our policy in the United Nations and South Africa's policy as it relates to apartheid currently and as it applies to Namibia.

U.N. ASPECTS OF SOUTH AFRICAN, NAMIBIAN ISSUES

I shall not take the committee's time to go over the specifics of this paper except perhaps to direct your attention to a few of the implications of our vote in the United Nations, since I gather this is a point that was raised in public testimony yesterday, implications which go beyond, really, our attitude either toward South Africa itself or its policies, since it has been our vote and certainly has been the subject

of some controversy. Most recently, this related to our veto in the Security Council, along with the United Kingdom and France, of a resolution which called for the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations.

We did not think this was, Mr. Chairman, because we believe that it is important—it is a serious problem of compliance with charter requirements by the United States to have that member exposed to the full opinion in that body itself.

We were equally and very fundamentally opposed to a decision by the General Assembly last fall to suspend South Africa from participation in its 29th session, since we consider that participation in meetings of the General Assembly is one of the fundamental rights of membership. That this question touches on the basic purposes and principles of participation in the organization and is implicitly a suspension or expulsion and that such measures against a member would require the action of the Security Council.

We viewed this as a matter of principle, Mr. Chairman, and not because it reflects any dimension of our concern for disapprobation of apartheid, but because it has universal application and because we think that the question of suspension and expulsion should not be dealt with lightly. Never in the history of the United Nations has a member been expelled. We think the consequences should be weighed very, very seriously before supporting such a policy.

I might advise the committee that the U.S. Government itself seriously considered the possibility of a suspension or expulsion move against Hungary in 1956, after the Soviet invasion, when the subsequent puppet regime accommodated itself to Soviet rule. We also contemplated the possibility of recommending disapproval of Hungarian credentials.

I attended a meeting at that time with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who was a prominent lawyer, and after very careful review of the provisions of the U.N. Charter, we concluded, and we have maintained the position ever since, that credentials are a technical matter which really just certify the authenticity of the delegates attending the session. That the question of suspension and expulsion is clearly the prerogative of the Security Council. It was quite clear to us that under those circumstances the Soviet Union would have vetoed such a measure, and therefore, we desisted, and that has been our policy ever since.

As you are quite familiar, Mr. Chairman, with the discussion in the press of the move against South Africa last year, it is already being taken by some members as a possible springboard for action against additional members this fall, and I think it is extremely important that we maintain a very clear and unequivocal stand and the fundamental principles involved in the rights and privileges of membership.

With regard to the Security Council move to declare the situation in South Africa and Namibia a threat to peace, let me just say very briefly, Mr. Chairman, that we do not feel in good conscience that we can declare it as such. We see no imminent threat of attack on Namibia, nor do we see that the situation at the moment threatens international peace in the sense that chapter 7 would require before a determination is made that there is in fact a threat to peace or a breach of the peace which would justify the imposition of mandatory sanctions.

I think the rest of the history of our participation is outlined in some detail, Mr. Chairman. I have described those items which I think are particularly significant and which have perhaps implications that the committee may wish to consider, going beyond the South African problem itself.

Thank you, sir.

[Ambassador Buffum's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR WILLIAM B. BUFFUM, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I am William Buffum, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs. I should like to review briefly for this committee events in the United Nations regarding South Africa and Namibia and the United States position with respect to those events.

Two policies pursued by the government of South Africa have involved that nation in a series of confrontations with the United Nations. The first of these policies is, of course, apartheid which has been mentioned by Ambassador Davis at some length. The other is the South African administration of the mandated territory of Namibia, which has also been mentioned. While the United Nations has had a consistent position of condemning the South African Government for these policies, over a long period, the tempo of United Nations considerations has been accelerated in recent years by the active interest of the new African members. The failure of the South African Government to heed numerous United Nations resolutions and the opinions of the International Court of Justice led to a sense of frustration among many of the members and eventually to the rejection of the South African delegation's credentials at the 29th General Assembly. Rejection of those credentials in effect deprived South Africa of a fundamental right and privilege of membership, namely participation in the General Assembly, and was effected in a manner which we consider violates the United Nations Charter and General Assembly Rules of Procedures. I believe it worthwhile to provide the committee with some of the background.

Each year from 1970 to 1973 the United Nations General Assembly has voted to amend the report of its Credentials Committee in order to reject the South African Delegation credentials. In each instance, the Assembly President ruled that the vote constituted a severe condemnation of and warning to South Africa, but that the South African delegation could continue to participate in the General Assembly since their credentials were technically in order.

In 1974 the Credentials Committee itself rejected the South African credentials. The 29th General Assembly President, Bouteflika, of Algeria, departed from the past rulings and instead ruled that the rejection required the exclusion of South Africa's participation from the remainder of the General Assembly session. The United States opposed this decision because we thought it not in accordance with the Assembly's Rules of Procedures, which provide only that the credentials must be signed by the head of state or government or the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In our view, the credentials review process is a technical one, designed to verify that persons claiming to represent a government have been authorized by that government.

In addition, the United Nation's Charter provides that the Security Council must recommend suspension or expulsion before the Assembly may act. Suspension of membership rights through the rejection of credentials is clearly contrary to the Charter provisions. On September 30, 1974, the General Assembly approved the Credentials Committee report recommending the rejection of South African credentials and called on the Security Council to "review the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa". In carrying out the instructions of the General Assembly the Security Council met and reviewed a resolution calling for the expulsion of South Africa. On October 30, 1974, that resolution was rejected when France, the United Kingdom and the United States joined in the first triple veto in the history of the United Nations. On November 12 the General Assembly upheld Mr. Bouteflika's ruling to suspend South Africa.

The reasoning behind these efforts to exclude South Africa appears to rest on the objection to two basic South African policies. The first is clearly the policy of racial segregation known as apartheid in which the majority of South Africa's population remains unrepresented in South Africa delegations. The United Nations has established a special committee which reviews the question

of apartheid and reports findings and recommendations to the General Assembly. The General Assembly with significant United States support has adopted resolutions condemning the policy of apartheid. The second is the South African policy of continued illegal occupation of and extension of the policy of apartheid to the former German colony of Southwest Africa, now known as Namibia.

As you probably know, the League of Nations in 1920 granted South Africa a mandate over the territory of Southwest Africa.

The provisions of the mandate were aimed at respecting the separate international status of the territory of Southwest Africa while authorizing South Africa to administer the internal arrangements of the territory. Such administrative arrangements were intended under the mandate system to be a means to political, economic and social development of the territory to facilitate ultimate self-determination. The United Nations General Assembly, as the League's successor, holds the authority to review conditions in the territory of Namibia and its progress toward self-determination.

From its earliest days as administrator, South Africa came under attack for its exploitation of Namibia and its treatment of its non-white population. South Africa's racial policy of apartheid had been severely criticized by the League of Nations. The League's successor, the United Nations, has also criticized repeatedly and severely South Africa's administration of Namibia and policy of apartheid. In October, 1966, the United Nations General Assembly, with United States support, decided that South Africa had violated its mandate. The General Assembly in Resolution 2145 declared the mandate terminated and stated that henceforth Namibia was to be the direct responsibility of the United Nations.

On June 21, 1971 the International Court of Justice gave an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of South Africa's continued presence in the territory, and ruled in effect that the South African mandate was legally terminated by the United Nations. However, United Nations efforts to exercise its responsibility have been of little avail because of South Africa's refusal to cooperate.

On December 17, 1974, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 366 which demanded that South Africa make a statement that it will comply with United Nations resolutions on Namibia, to withdraw from its territory, and to transfer power to the people of the territory. That resolution was entirely consistent with the established United States view that South Africa's presence in the territory has been illegal since the General Assembly Resolution (2145) in 1966 revoked South Africa's mandate.

In Resolution 366 the Security Council also decided to meet before May 30, 1975 to review South Africa's compliance with the resolution's provisions. On May 27, Prime Minister Vorster delineated South Africa's position:

(1) South Africa could not accept United Nations supervision with respect to Namibia.

(2) South Africa was prepared to negotiate with a mutually acceptable representative of the United Nations Secretary General.

(3) The South African Government was prepared to welcome African leaders who may wish to visit Namibia.

(4) The South African Government was open to meet with the African chairman of the United Nations Council for Namibia and Organization of African Unity to aid true leaders of the territory to meet with them as well.

In execution of Resolution 366, the Security Council met the first week in June of this year to review the question of South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia. The resolution before the Security Council determined that the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa constituted a threat to international peace and security, and therefore called for the institution of a mandatory arms embargo as provided for under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter. France, the United Kingdom, and the United States joined to veto the resolution. This marked the seventh time the United States had exercised its veto in the Security Council.

The United States believes that mandatory sanctions provided for under Chapter 7 of the Charter are not required by the existing situation in Namibia. Deplorable and illegal though South Africa's occupation of Namibia may be, we do not believe that the situation justifies a call for obligatory action by United Nations member states. There appears to be no danger of imminent attack by Namibia on any of its neighbors, nor does an attack by South Africa or its neighbors on Namibia appear imminent.

The United States Government has unilaterally refused to allow shipments of American arms and military equipment to South Africa for the last twelve years.

We have taken this action to make clear our strong disapproval of apartheid and to assist in a peaceful resolution of the serious racial situation in Southern Africa. We invite other countries to join us in our voluntary arms embargo policy. We do not, however, believe that the current situation justifies making that embargo a mandatory one or calling for other sanctions which under the Charter are designed to deal with threats to peace.

As a further commitment to Southern Africans under minority rule, the United States Government has participated in voluntary humanitarian and education United Nations programs. In 1974 the United States contributed \$50,000 to the United Nations Fund for Namibia and in 1975 \$50,000 to the United Nations Educational and Training Program for Southern Africa. Our contributions are contingent upon voluntary contributions of other countries. The goal of these programs is to provide assistance for education and vocational training to students from the minority ruled territories of Africa denied educational opportunities in their own countries. All training is conducted outside of the minority ruled countries.

In providing this brief review of recent events in the United Nations regarding South Africa and Namibia some questions may have occurred to you. I should be happy to try and answer them now or submit recent reports later.

U.S. VETOES ON SOUTHERN AFRICA ISSUES

Senator CLARK. I certainly want to say, Ambassador Buffum, that I agree with you with regard to the issue of expulsion. One witness did recommend that yesterday. I think that that is the wrong way to go, not only because of the Charter, but in general the concept of the United Nations, that includes all nations. If we start making moral judgments on the membership, I am not sure how many people we are going to have in the United Nations.

I think that the United States could have well adopted a more universal attitude in this respect—and not on the question of expulsion, but on the question of recognizing governments or not recognizing other governments, such as the People's Republic of China. We could have accepted on the same theory, at any rate, the inclusion of that nation and some others, perhaps, as well.

Let me ask you, Ambassador Buffum, we have talked about the United Nations and your statement goes in some detail about the U.S. veto of the imposition of mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, which, I think, is a different question. You mentioned that the U.S. veto of the arms embargo was the seventh that we have cast. How many of these vetoes have been on southern Africa issues? South Africa or Rhodesia, let us say.

Mr. BUFFUM. Mr. Chairman, I would really have to research the record to give you a precise number, and I will be happy to supply that.

Senator CLARK. Fine. I think that would be helpful.

[The information referred to follows:]

U.S. NEGATIVE VOTES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL REGARDING SOUTHERN AFRICA

[Supplied by Department of State]

1. In March 1970, Burundi, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Syria, and Zambia introduced a resolution to the Security Council which, *inter alia*, called for the expansion of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia to include transportation, postal service, and all forms of communications. The United States exercised its veto for the first time on the grounds that the effectiveness of such action was doubtful, and that even where relations are strained, the United States would view most seriously the prospect of having US citizens anywhere in the world without the means to travel and communicate. The United States and the United Kingdom voted negatively on the resolution.

2. On May 22, 1973, the United States and the United Kingdom vetoed a resolution which would have imposed, *inter alia*, a blockade on Lourenco Marques, Mozambique, and limited all purchases from South Africa, Mozambique, and Angola to 1965 levels. In explanation of the negative vote Ambassador Scali stated, "We consider it unrealistic to call for broader sanctions until the full membership of the United Nations has demonstrated its willingness to take more seriously the sanctions already in force. In our view, to pass a resolution which is clearly unenforceable would seriously damage the reputation and credibility of the United Nations and further erode public confidence in the United Nations ability to act in a meaningful way."

3. On October 4, 1974, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France joined in the first triple veto in the Security Council's history. This vote was in response to a resolution sponsored by Kenya, Mauritania, Cameroon, and Iraq which called for the expulsion of South Africa. In explaining the US vote, Ambassador Scali stated:

"The United Nations was not founded to be simply a league of the just. Rather, in our view it is a unique international forum for the exchange of ideas, where those practicing obnoxious doctrines and policies may be made to feel the full weight of world opinion . . . South Africa should continue to be exposed, over and over again, to the blunt expressions of the abhorrence of mankind for apartheid . . . Even if this would help thwart the ugly crime of apartheid, expulsion would set a shattering precedent which could gravely damage the United Nations structure."

4. On June 6, 1975, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States again joined in a negative vote on a resolution which determined that the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa constituted a threat to international peace and security, and therefore called for the institution of a mandatory arms embargo, as provided for under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter. In explanation of the vote, Ambassador Scali stated:

"My Government believes that the situation in Namibia, however illegal, however unacceptable to the international community does not constitute a threat to international peace and security." We believe that mandatory sanctions under the provisions of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter should be reserved for the most acute and critical threats to or breaches of the peace. Although we fundamentally disagree with certain actions by South Africa, we do not consider that the situation has reached such a critical state."

U.S. VETO OF MANDATORY ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA

Senator CLARK. Would you explain to us why the United States vetoed the imposition of the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa?

Mr. BUFFUM. I think that there are really two major facets to be answered.

First of all, the U.S. Government does impose a very strict, good faith, voluntary arms embargo on South Africa. We have done this over a period of years. We did this voluntarily because we felt originally that there might be a serious question as to whether or not arms provided by the U.S. Government might be used by the Government of South Africa, in implementation of apartheid policy and, in some ways, repression of the racial majority of the country. However, this was done as a voluntary measure, and I make a very sharp distinction between this and what would be called for under chapter 7.

This touches, Mr. Chairman, on the basic finding which I alluded to a moment ago in determining that the situation is a threat to peace and security, because it is only if the Security Council makes such a formal determination under chapter 7, which requires a specific finding that there is a threat to peace or a breach of the peace that the Council can then impose a mandatory arms embargo or mandatory sanctions of any kind.

RHODESIAN SANCTIONS' POLICY

Senator CLARK. Was that done in the case of Rhodesia?

Mr. BUFFUM. Yes, sir, it was done in the case of Rhodesia, and if I might point out the distinction between the two, in the case of Rhodesia, the Security Council was asked by the sovereign authority for Rhodesia—namely, the United Kingdom—to declare the situation a threat to peace. This happened at a time when the illegal Rhodesian regime was declaring its independence of Great Britain and when it was seeking to get external support both in terms of arms and, in the immediate instance, very critical petroleum supplies. The United Kingdom asked for a finding by the Security Council that under those circumstances at that time, permitting additional assistance to flow to the illegal regime constituted a threat to peace, as they, the sovereign administering authority, saw the situation. We, therefore, felt that since the Council itself was in receipt of a specific request by the sovereign authority concerned to declare a situation under its control a threat to peace—

OTHER REQUESTS FOR MANDATORY ARMS EMBARGOES

Senator CLARK. I understand that distinction, but I assume that other countries, and perhaps not the same circumstances, obviously not in the same circumstances that you have described with regard to Great Britain, but certainly that claim was made in this case as well, was it not?

Mr. BUFFUM. It has been made, yes, Mr. Chairman. There have been a number of resolutions introduced over the years which would have made such a finding, but the precise difference is that they were never, of course, introduced by the sovereign authority in the case of South Africa.

In addition, I think that we must also take account of practical differences which attend the situation in Southern Rhodesia as opposed to South Africa.

Senator CLARK. Just before you do that—and I think that would be valuable for us to go into, because there are always distinctions—on this question of the sovereign authority, I assume that our Government is not going to argue that we have a precedent here and we are only going to vote for those U.N. resolutions in this regard where the request has come from the so-called sovereign authority. We still have latitude to make that independent judgment on each of these resolutions, do we not?

Mr. BUFFUM. Yes, we do, indeed, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CLARK. Go ahead.

Mr. BUFFUM. I would not by any means require a request for the sovereign authority to determine a threat to peace if, in our best objective judgment, there were in fact an immediate threat to peace or breach of the peace in any part of the world. However, I should add that the Security Council has used its ultimate authority which it possesses in applying mandatory sanctions only sparingly. In fact, Southern Rhodesia is the only instance in the 30-year history of the United Nations where mandatory sanctions have been applied. Because this is, of course, the one area where the sovereign member states have

surrendered, in fact, a substantial amount of their sovereignty to the international institution by undertaking to apply measures as a legal obligation which had been invoked by the Security Council after having made a chapter 7 finding.

EFFECT OF U.S. VOLUNTARY EMBARGO

Senator CLARK. I agree that—it is not something that you take on lightly. It is an action that is one one should only take after the carefullest kind of consideration, but it seems to me that perhaps a voluntary embargo would have made it in a way much easier for us to support. I assume that as a result of having taken that action, the real effect of our Government's action would not have changed one iota.

Mr. BUFFUM. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. I think that the program that we have now pursued, our voluntary arms embargo, is undoubtedly the same program that we would have expected to pursue had the Security Council made a chapter 7 finding and imposed a mandatory embargo.

U.S. SUPPORT, EXPRESSING RESERVATIONS ALTERNATIVE TO VETOING ENTIRE U.N. RESOLUTION

Senator CLARK. The other question I have is that often we tend to be on the minor side of these issues, with a group of six or seven, or whatever, on the grounds that we have expressed reservations about certain details in the resolution. It seems to me that in the United Nations—and again, I am not sure that it applies in this case—that we would often support resolutions in principle, and at the same time, express reservations about details that we find not acceptable, rather than vote against the entire resolution. Is that not a practical alternative to so often being on the side of only two, three, or four nations in the world?

Mr. BUFFUM. Mr. Chairman, that is indeed practical and frankly, that is the course that we frequently follow in the General Assembly, where the net impact of our abstention, let us say, as opposed to making a vote, is quite different from what it is in the Security Council, most particularly, when it involves a question of being able to apply the full weight of the United Nations in terms of requiring member states to follow a specific program; namely, mandatory sanctions. There, of course, an abstention on the part of ourselves and the United Kingdom and France would have permitted the adoption of mandatory sanctions, which we really had—circumstances in the area did not warrant. And again, which we think would not be wise because, as a practical matter, we did not consider the consequences of the sort of total mandatory sanction that we feel confident would be invoked by the Council, if we were merely to abstain would have the effect, a significant effect on the situation in South Africa, since it has tremendous resources of its own. It possesses great internal strength, in stark contradistinction to the situation in Southern Rhodesia, which, in effect, is the practical point that I was alluding to a moment ago. It relates to the efficacy of sanctions, in addition to our basic legal reservation about the legitimacy of a finding that a threat to peace really does exist there.

U.S. RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING NAMIBIA INDEPENDENCE FROM SOUTH AFRICA

Senator CLARK. We are talking a great deal these days—I think wisely so—about positive approaches to the next session of the United Nations. Certainly that has been under discussion in this subcommittee, and in the committee as a whole.

Secretary Kissinger addressed himself to it at Milwaukee. In this regard, what, really, has the United States proposed as a positive alternative to the mandatory arms embargo, to strengthen international pressure on South Africa to grant independence to Namibia? Do we have any positive proposals to make, other than the fact that we have exercised our veto?

Mr. BUFFUM. Yes, indeed, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Davis has referred to a number of specific policy points which we have advanced to the South African Government. If you care to pursue that, I really think that that would relate to our relationship with the South African Government.

Senator CLARK. Anything beyond what you listed in your statement?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, if I follow you, sir, what you are particularly interested in is the question of Namibia, and the situation that we find ourselves in.

Senator CLARK. With particular reference to our positive recommendations to the United Nations in this regard.

Mr. DAVIS. Well, what I would say in this regard is that following the so-called triple veto, the triple negative vote of Great Britain, France, and the United States, on the question of the resolution regarding Namibia, and the debate on the first day of June of this year, we have entered into discussions with the British and French, because I think there is a concern shared by all three Governments at the outcome of the debate in New York, and we do presently have under consideration what our next possible courses of action might be with respect to this question, and such ways in which we can exert some constructive influence on the South African Government with respect to that question.

Senator CLARK. It seems to me that you are saying then that we have not made any positive proposals as yet. We are only talking with the other two veto powers.

Mr. DAVIS. Essentially we are at that stage in our consideration of what might next be usefully done.

Senator CLARK. But it would be your hope that the three of you together, or a part of that three, would have positive proposals to make on the occasion of the next session; is that accurate?

Mr. DAVIS. It certainly would be our hope that some positive action could result, whether in the bilateral context or in the context of the United Nations.

Senator CLARK. By way of positive proposals?

Mr. DAVIS. By way of some effort to exert a positive influence.

Senator CLARK. I think that is all the questions I have for Ambassador Buffum, although please feel free to pitch in at any point, if you have any comments.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA FOLLOWING NSSM 39

Ambassador Davis, two of yesterday's witnesses, Mrs. Butcher and Mr. McHenry, stated that there was a shift in U.S. policy toward South Africa following the NSSM 39, which is much discussed, reducing U.S. pressure on South Africa to change its internal policy. Mr. McHenry stated: "Consistent with Mr. Kissinger's recommendations of January 2, 1970, President Nixon ordered, and the United States began, an effort to 'straddle' the black-white issues. However, whereas with the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to 'straddle' meant to err on the side of distance from and coolness toward the white regimes, for Nixon 'straddle' meant 'partial relaxation'."

Or again, Mrs. Butcher said: "* * * Since 1969, U.S. policy, whatever the verbal pronouncements or abhorrence of apartheid and support of majority rule may have been, U.S. policy has been supportive of the status quo."

My question is this: Based on those allegations, what precisely has been U.S. policy toward South Africa since the famous NSSM 39?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, I do understand that there have been a number of recent press articles which charge the U.S. Government in 1970 did—and it has been variously described as "tilt"—toward the white regimes of southern Africa, or whatever these descriptions might be, and that these charges are related to what was a preliminary draft of a 1969 National Security Study Memorandum, a so-called NSSM, that was leaked to the press in 1972.

And at the beginning of the Nixon administration in 1969, the National Security Council did request a review of our policy toward southern Africa. This resulted in NSSM 39, whose six options ranged from the extremes of conducting normal relations with the white regimes to their isolation and increased measures of coercion. Each option was self-contained, opening with the statement of a premise, followed by the general policy posture, illustrated by some specific operational examples which would flow from that general policy posture; and ended with a listing of the pros and cons of adopting the option under discussion.

The authors of the articles alleging a tilt all assumed that Option 2 was adopted as our policy. What in fact occurred was not that. None of the six options were adopted, and in fact, there was a rather limited number of decisions that did ensue from that study and that exercise. And these decisions did preserve what was our basic policy toward South Africa and preserved it intact.

Now, there was a conception that was articulated which could perhaps be described as communication without acceptance, and as a result of that idea of communication without acceptance, for example, our exchange programs with South Africa were increased, and in this case, as I mentioned earlier in my statement, these exchange programs do principally relate to bringing people who are not whites to the United States, although it is also part of the policy of communication to influence people who will have an important voice in the direction in which things go in South Africa.

And the efforts of this kind do not imply acquiescence in regard to racial policies. Our policy does mean departing from the arms em-

bargo, from refusal to admit to apartheid in any of its forms, or from our continued expression of abhorrence for that system. It means pursuing policies designed to induce receptivity to change, respect for human rights, and we do hope that the result will not be violent.

REINTERPRETATION OF ARMS EMBARGO, CERTAIN EXPORTS SINCE NSSM 39

Senator CLARK. Let's look at some of the specifics. We have been given, I think, a valuable administration reaction to a number of allegations about NSSM 39, and it is valuable to have that for the record. Let us look more specifically now at what the witnesses talked about in terms of the implementation of NSSM 39, and have you respond to some of those.

One is that the arms embargo was reinterpreted, so that more of the so-called grey area items were allowed to export. What would you respond to that? Was there a slight lessening of the arms embargo and certain things exported?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, I do not know whether the word would be that misery enjoys company, but in the fairly recent time that I have been concerned with these questions, as Assistant Secretary, I might say that the concerns expressed by the South African side tend to be exactly the opposite. They reproach us for what they feel has been a rather rigid interpretation of the arms embargo.

Senator CLARK. Has anything slipped through in the process, small aircraft or anything of that kind?

Mr. DAVIS. To try to address this question, as I am sure you are aware—this controversy basically relates to actions and decisions that were taken for whatever it was, several years ago, in any event, and what I would say, in general, insofar as I have had contact with the administration of the arms embargo, I think that the arms embargo has been carefully preserved by the U.S. Government, and certainly, as I say, in recent times, since I have been associated with it.

Senator CLARK. Insofar as your knowledge is concerned, it has been a very, very tight embargo, and nothing has been slipping through on the basis of the interpretation in the grey areas?

Mr. DAVIS. I would not try to claim that nothing has ever—in which interpretations could be ambiguous, or grey areas, that nothing has ever been exported, because I think that I cannot say. There are always, of course, ambiguities, and that is why these are defined as grey areas.

U.S. POLICY CONCERNING EXPORT-IMPORT FACILITIES AVAILABILITY
TO SOUTH AFRICA

Senator CLARK. Let's run through the list here and check off some more for your reaction.

Full export-import facilities were made available to South Africa, including recently a decision to help finance and construct a nuclear reactor in South Africa by an American company.

Mr. DAVIS. So far as the Export-Import Bank is concerned, our current policy—toward South Africa—is that the policy permits insurance and guaranteed coverage on commercial sales. It normally limits the term of such coverages to 5 years, but extends it to a maxi-

num of 10 years if necessary, in order to be in keeping with current international commercial practices, or to meet foreign government support competition.

Pricing policy generally permits discount loans of less than \$2 million. Direct loans and all other Export-Import Bank facilities are not available for transactions with South Africa. No direct Export-Import Bank loans have been accorded to South Africa since before 1964.

FINANCING OF NUCLEAR REACTOR CONSTRUCTION AND PRESENT U.S.
POLICY

Senator CLARK. So we are not helping to finance construction of a nuclear reactor in South Africa?

Mr. DAVIS. So far as I know, there has been no Export-Import Bank financing to a nuclear reactor. Now, perhaps I had better check with my colleagues to be sure that that is right.

Senator CLARK. I think that it may have been a guaranteed loan that I am referring to.

Identify yourself.

Mr. CHRISTENSEN. The Export-Import Bank has issued—in fact, GE and several U.S. companies were competing for this contract, along with some foreign companies, French, German, et cetera, and the Export-Import Bank has issued a preliminary commitment to GE simply saying that the Ex-Im Bank will consider the possibility of issuing a guarantee to cover a Private Export Funding Corp. to the U.S. group that is bidding on this, if they were to receive the contract. The contract has not been awarded.

Senator CLARK. If that were done, Ambassador Davis, would you consider that consistent with U.S. avowed policy?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, if I understand the present situation and policy, what is being talked about, is not a direct loan.

Senator CLARK. A guaranteed loan.

Mr. DAVIS. And is consonant with the terms of reference of what the Export-Import bank policies have been for a number of years.

Senator CLARK. So that if the decision were made for a guaranteed loan, you feel that this could be consistent with American policy toward South Africa?

Mr. DAVIS. Certainly, as I understand it, it would not be a departure from current policy guidelines.

Senator CLARK. I wonder if you could provide for the record any past illustrations of where that may have been done.

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK. Consistent with our policy. In other words, let's build a record of the history of having done that, so that we are not establishing another new practice here, of an attitude toward South Africa.

[The information referred to follows:]

EXPORT-IMPORT BANK GUARANTEE LOAN PROGRAM

[Supplied by Department of State]

From the inception of the guarantee program over forty years ago through Fiscal Year 1974, the U.S. Export-Import Bank has extended a total of \$226 million in various forms of guarantees for transactions involving the export of

U.S. goods and services to the Republic of South Africa. Included in this total are the following examples of such guarantees:

General Motors/Continental Bank, \$48.6 million for the sale of diesel electric locomotives to the South African Railways, authorized on December 23, 1971; United Engineering and Foundry Company/Pittsburg National Bank, \$5.04 million for the sale of a cold reduction mill to the South African Iron and Steel Company, on May 17, 1971; and United Engineering and Foundry Company, \$6.3 million for steel foundry equipment to the South African Iron and Steel Company, authorized March 4, 1971.

MR. DAVIS. Could I just add one other word, in connection with question of nuclear matters, because I think, as you may remember in the past several months that the question, I think, that the question of providing nuclear material to South Africa came up and was subject to a rather wide misinterpretation. And so, I think that, as we are on the subject, it would perhaps be useful to clarify that question, which was, incidentally, clarified, I think, very effectively and clearly by Members of the Congress concerned with international atomic energy cooperation matters. In fact, they did read into the Congressional Record, I think, a very good clarification of what had been a very long-standing arrangement with the four peaceful nuclear activity.

Senator CLARK. In that regard, simply because we are so short of time, Mr. Secretary, and have other witnesses, I wonder if you would be willing to give us some prepared information on that?

MR. DAVIS. Yes, sir. The only thing I would want to make clear, however, is that such fissionable material that has been provided has been provided under an agreement of many years' standing and under full IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards, in terms of insuring that these materials not be converted.

Senator CLARK. If you have a longer statement, we would like to have that in the record, at this point, as well, because it would be good to have it. Does that include the question that the United States sold enriched uranium to South Africa?

MR. DAVIS. That was the question that I was trying to address.

Senator CLARK. You are saying that that sale is consistent with long-established policy of this Government and consistent with—

MR. DAVIS. And under full international safeguards. The agreement was entered into in 1957.

[The information referred to follows:]

AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION IN PROVIDING NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO SOUTH AFRICA

[Supplied by Department of State]

An agreement for cooperation permitting the export of nuclear materials, including enriched uranium to South Africa, has been in force since 1957, and we have been supplying enriched uranium for its research reactor since 1965. It is one of 29 such agreements the U.S. has entered into with various countries for the supply of nuclear fuel. Under its terms, the South African Government undertook to place all supplied materials under safeguards and not to use them in the manufacture of weapons. In 1974 the South African Government requested that the Agreement be amended to permit the acquisition from the United States of additional supplies of low enriched uranium to meet anticipated fuel requirements for two power reactors they planned to construct. The United States agreed to this amendment, which also extended the life of the agreement to 2007, only after assuring itself that the acquisition of this material would not contribute to that country's military capability. At the same time, we obtained the important understanding through an exchange of notes with South Africa that South Africa interpreted the terms of the Agreement for cooperation to preclude use of sup-

plied materials for any explosive device. This understanding eliminated the possibility that South Africa might have interpreted the Agreement to permit the use of supplied materials for "peaceful nuclear explosives."

U.S. SALES OF ENRICHED URANIUM TO SOUTH AFRICA

Senator CLARK. Have we been selling enriched uranium to South Africa, or is this new?

Mr. DAVIS. There is also some confusion in the original publication in which the total amount of uranium that had been furnished under this arrangement over a rather extended period of time was misconstrued as one very recent shipment, and there was a confusion in terms of the amounts involved. And the program is a program that is long in standing, and we have been supplying South Africa with enriched uranium for its research reactor since 1965 continuously.

U.S. POLICY CONSISTENCY CONCERNING CCC LOANS TO SOUTH AFRICA

Senator CLARK. One other point, and then I have some questions that I would like to have you answer for the record, in order that we can hear the other witnesses. One of the witnesses yesterday mentioned that the CCC—that would be the Commodity Credit Corporation—of the Department of Agriculture has extended a \$1 million credit to South Africa for the purchase of beef and breeding stock. Are you aware of that, and can you address yourself to that? Is that consistent with our goals in South Africa, in your view?

Mr. DAVIS. The Department of Agriculture informs us that CCC credits have been regularly provided to South Africa purchasers of U.S. agricultural commodities for the past, at least several years, as far back as records held in the Department of Agriculture, which go back, I believe, to 1969.

Senator CLARK. I wonder if you might ask the Department to provide for us that information for the record, the total amounts involved. As a member of the Agriculture Committee, that comes as somewhat of a surprise to me. I am not quite sure why we are extending credits to South Africa for beef and breeding stock. It may well have some purpose, but I think it would be good to have that in the record, at this point.

Mr. DAVIS. I understand the total is about \$11 million worth of such credit has been extended since 1969, generally in sums of about \$1 million per transaction, and then we will try to supplement this for the record, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

CCC CREDIT SALES TO SOUTH AFRICA

[Supplied by Department of State]

According to the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), U.S. Department of Agriculture, the total amount of CCC credit sales to the Republic of South Africa from Fiscal Year 1969 through Fiscal Year 1975 totaled \$47,098,000 to cover sales of rice (\$46,809,000) and tallow (\$489,000). The FAS notes that credits made available by CCC credit lines may be used only by individuals or firms in South Africa making purchases from U.S. suppliers; such credits are not extended to the Government of South Africa, and no approbation of the policies pursued by that government is either intended or implied. According to the FAS,

buyers in many African countries, including Senegal, Ghana, Liberia and Zaire, have participated in the CCC program.

Senator CLARK. Good. I would like to have that. It just seems to me—and I hate to make a statement without the evidence—but there are many companies in Africa with very low per capita incomes and very low life expectancy, to whom we give none or almost no assistance. And to extend \$11 million in credits to South Africa does not seem to me to be consistent. But I would like to look at it before making that judgment.

I wonder, Mr. Secretary—we have several other questions that I would like to give you. I think I may just hand them to you, at this point, and ask you if you would be kind enough to supply the answers for the record.

We thank you for coming. Thank you very much.

[Questions and answers follow:]

MR. DAVIS' ANSWER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CLARK

Question 1. What are the economic, strategic and political interests of the United States in South Africa?

Answer.

Economic.—Direct U.S. investment there at the end of 1973 was \$1.24 billion. We had a favorable balance of trade in 1974 amounting to over \$550 million. South Africa is a promising market and the source of a variety of essential minerals such as antimony, manganese, vanadium, chromite, uranium, platinum and gold. Balanced against this economic interest in South Africa is an increasing U.S. economic stake in the rest of Africa where U.S. investment is three times larger than in South Africa. U.S. trade with the remainder of Africa in 1974 was twice that with South Africa. Furthermore, trade and investment with black Africa is growing at a more rapid rate than with South Africa.

Strategic.—South Africa has an obvious strategic significance because of its geographic proximity to the lines of communication between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. While it would be convenient for U.S. naval ships to use South African facilities from time to time, these facilities are not vital to our defense needs. We have near Johannesburg the terminal tracking station of the Air Force's South Atlantic Missile Test Range, although this station is relatively inactive at present.

Political.—Our major political interests are:

To persuade the South African Government to abolish apartheid and thereby reduce the possibility of a bloody race war.

To encourage South Africa to pursue its efforts to promote peaceful movement toward majority rule in Rhodesia.

To convince South Africa that it should grant independence to Namibia on terms acceptable to the international community.

South Africa's racial policies clash directly with our own principles of racial justice and the right of the governed to a voice in their government. To be true to these principles, to maintain our traditional support for their universality, and to fulfill our international obligations in this regard, we consider it important to pay attention to the questions of human rights and human dignity in South Africa.

The South African Government's racial policies complicate our relations with the remainder of Africa and, at times, with other non-aligned states, both at the UN and in other international forums. They also prevent full pursuit of other interests in South Africa and the realization of the potential benefits of closer bilateral relationships with that country.

Communist countries with few economic interests at stake in the area are able to capitalize on the problem of racism in South Africa and to use this entree to enhance their own positions, often to our detriment, in Africa.

In the longer term, the continuation of South Africa's present policies increases the prospects for violence in the region and this could well invite foreign involvement.

Question 2. How is current U.S. policy toward South Africa perceived by the government there? By African political leaders in that country? By other African heads of state?

Answer. There is little question that South African Government leaders are acutely aware of the United States Government's opposition to apartheid and the policies that spring from it. Considerable attention and resources are devoted by government organizations such as the South African Information Service, as well as non-governmental organizations such as the South Africa Foundation, to persuading influential segments of American opinion to accept at face value the South African Government's claims of meaningful changes in race relations. The reiteration of the United States position on apartheid no doubt serves to increase the feeling of isolation among South African whites who would like to have the closest possible ties with the U.S. More practical manifestations of U.S. opposition, particularly our arms embargo, are a serious concern to South African leaders who are continually seeking ways to break it. It is possible that perceptions among leading South Africans about the depth of U.S. opposition to apartheid may differ. Some appear to believe that a few "low to medium level bureaucrats in the State Department" are primarily responsible for American positions that they dislike. Others may have a better appreciation of the relationship between our concern with our own problem of racial discrimination, the importance of our relations with the rest of Africa, and our South African policies.

Black African leaders in South Africa differ greatly in their overall political perspectives, and consequently in their views about American policy toward South Africa. While most would agree that foreign opposition to apartheid has had a constructive influence, they would disagree on such questions as the relative benefits and disadvantages of American and other foreign investment in South Africa.

The views of the leaders of other African states outside Africa are also divergent. However, their positions in the United Nations suggest that they would like to see a policy which takes a stronger position against South Africa. Some would appear to believe that we could promote much greater change in South Africa were we to use leverage they believe we have on the South African Government, e.g. trade and investment. A number appear to share our view that a policy of communication and of exposing South Africa to the broader influences of world opinion has a greater potential of encouraging progress there than a policy of hostility and isolation.

Question 3. Would you evaluate the internal political stability in South Africa with respect to the following points?

(a) What kind of limits on his maneuverability does Vorster face from the right wing of the party?

(b) Will his options decrease as elections in South Africa approach?

(c) What kinds of pressures is Vorster feeling from the anti-apartheid white parties?

Answer. The Prime Minister's standing appears to be high with all elements of his party and his policies have strong support among a solid majority of the white population. By-elections earlier this year did show some increase in the support for the arch conservative "Reconstituted National Party", and there has also been some criticism from the National Party right-wing supporters of his approach to the Rhodesian issue. However, we have seen few commentators who suggested that there was any serious challenge to the Prime Minister's supremacy within his party.

The last general elections were held in 1974. Although the English parliamentary tradition which permits the Government to dissolve the Assembly and call for elections at any time of its own choosing is applicable in South Africa, elections are only required every five years and we are unaware of any plans to call them in the near future.

The parliamentary opposition—the United Party and the Progressive-Reform Party—constitute no serious challenge to the National Party supremacy. Although they often serve to assure that significant government policy decisions are subject to debate and criticism, and that injustices perpetrated under the apartheid system are subject to some limited form of scrutiny in the parliamentary process, they are unable to exert any significant pressure, as political parties, on the Vorster Government.

Question 4. What are the functions of the Economic/Commercial officers assigned to the Embassy in South Africa? Are they following the stated policy that we neither encourage nor discourage investment in South Africa?

Answer. The U.S. policy governing commercial activities in South Africa, in order to give concrete expression to our displeasure with apartheid and to avoid giving an appearance of closeness to the South African Government, limits U.S.

Government sponsorship of export expansion activities while at the same time pursuing legitimate U.S. national interests in maintaining a favorable balance of payments position and in creating jobs through exports. The U.S. commercial officers operating within the framework of this policy perform the following services:

- (a) Report on significant economic developments in South Africa;
- (b) Brief U.S. businessmen on the South African political, economic and social factors;
- (c) Identify major South African projects which have significant export potential for American firms;
- (d) Assist U.S. businessmen, upon request, in making appointments with potential South African customers;
- (e) Maintain commercial libraries in each of the posts;
- (f) Investigate trade complaints;
- (g) Make representations on behalf of the U.S. Government or American companies with South African officials or businessmen.

U.S. commercial officers in South Africa strictly adhere to our policy of neither encouraging nor discouraging U.S. investment in South Africa and do not report on investment opportunities in that country. When speaking with potential U.S. investors, these officers explain our policy on investment in South Africa and the reasons for it. They also advise the potential investors that if any investments are made, company officials should seek to follow enlightened employment practices with all of their workers in South Africa regardless of race.

Question 5. How would you respond to the argument that South Africa is such an important supplier of raw materials that the U.S. should encourage closer economic relations?

Answer. South Africa is indeed an important source for the United States of a number of important raw materials: chromite, vanadium, platinum, manganese, gem diamonds and other products. However, there are alternate sources for each of these items. Canada, Australia and the Soviet Union provide the United States with many of the same raw materials that South Africa does. Moreover, the South African Government has never made political or economic support of its policies a factor in the marketing of its mineral resources.

Question 6. Dr. Pieter Koornhof, Minister of Mines, announced South Africa is in a position to embark upon a full scale uranium enrichment plant in Pelindaba, Transvaal. (It would produce 5,000 tons a year and could earn as much as \$375 million a year.) He added the private sector and foreign interests should take part.

Are any U.S. investors interested in this project? What would the U.S. Government's attitude be towards their so doing? Should the U.S. offer this? Are other nations apt to do so if we do not?

Answer. We are not aware of any interest at all by U.S. investors in participating in this project. American participation in such a venture would in any case be subject to the restrictions enumerated in the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 810, a copy of which is attached) which states in section 810.6:

"... it shall be unlawful for any person to engage directly or indirectly in the production of special nuclear materials outside the U.S. except (a) under an agreement for cooperation made with a foreign national pursuant to section 123 of the Act or (b) upon authorization by the Administrator [of the Energy Research and Development Administration] that such activities will not be inimical to the interest of the United States."

We see no reason why the U.S. Government should encourage American investment in this or any other indigenous national uranium enrichment undertaking. We are, however, encouraging the South African Government to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in order to bring all of its nuclear facilities, including the planned enrichment plant, under tight, internationally accepted safeguards.

There have been press reports that Iran was interested in a possible investment in the South African enrichment facility, but the Iranian atomic energy agency has publicly denied such an interest.

Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations

CHAPTER III—UNITED STATES ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
ADMINISTRATION

PART 810—UNCLASSIFIED ACTIVITIES IN FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAMS

Recodification of Regulations Governing Unclassified Activities in Foreign
Atomic Energy Programs

The U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration hereby announces nonsubstantive revisions to its regulations governing unclassified activities in foreign atomic energy programs. By Federal Register Notice of January 20, 1975 (40 F.R. 3242), the regulations of the Atomic Energy Commission applicable to the functions exercised by the Energy Research and Development Administration under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, were affirmed by the Administration. By Federal Register Notice of March 3, 1975, these regulations were redesignated as Chapter III of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 700 through 870. Pursuant to this redesignation, 10 CFR, Part 110, was redesignated as 10 CFR, Part 810. The present Notice is intended to recodify the current provisions of 10 CFR, Part 810, in order to remove all references to the Atomic Energy Commission and substitute therefor the Energy Research and Development Administration, or the Administrator, as appropriate.

Pursuant to section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 553), the Energy Research and Development Administration has found that good cause exists for making this action effective without the customary 30-day waiting period. Accordingly, pursuant to the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and sections 552 and 553 of Title 5 of the United States Code, the following amendments to Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations are published as a document subject to codification to be effective on the date of publication in the Federal Register:

1. Part 810 of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, is deleted.
2. A new Part 810 of Chapter III, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations is adopted as follows:

| | |
|--------|---|
| Sec. | |
| §10.1 | Purpose. |
| §10.2 | Scope. |
| §10.3 | Definitions. |
| §10.4 | Communications. |
| §10.5 | Interpretations. |
| §10.6 | Authorization requirement. |
| §10.7 | Generally authorized activities. |
| §10.8 | Grant and revocation of specific authorization. |
| §10.9 | Contents of application. |
| §10.10 | Reports. |
| §10.11 | Additional information. |
| §10.12 | Violations. |
| §10.13 | Effective date. |

AUTHORITY: Secs. 57, 161, 68 Stat. 932, 948, as amended; 42 U.S.C. 2077, 2201; sec. 104, Pub. L. 93-438 (October 11, 1974), sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended; 42 U.S.C. 2275, §§ 810.10 and 810.11 issued under sec. 161c, 68 Stat. 950, as amended; 42 U.S.C. 2201(c).

§810.1 Purpose.

The regulations in this part incorporate a general authorization made by the Administrator under section 57.b.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (78 Stat. 605); establish reporting requirements applicable to persons who engage in certain unclassified activities in foreign atomic energy programs; and establish procedures governing applications for specific authorizations to engage directly or indirectly in the production of special nuclear material outside the United States.

§810.2 Scope.

The regulations in this part apply to all persons within or under the jurisdiction of the United States.

§ 810.3 Definitions.

As used in this part:

(a) "Act" means the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 919) including any amendments thereto.

(b) "Agreement for cooperation" means an agreement for cooperation with any nation or regional defense organization pursuant to section 123 of the Act.

(c) "Atomic weapon" means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting or propelling the device (where such means is a separate and divisible part of the device), the principal purpose of which is for use as, or for development of, a weapon, or weapon prototype or a weapon test device.

(d) "Administration" means the United States Energy Research and Development Administration.

(e) "Administrator" means the Administrator of the United States Energy Research and Development Administration.

(f) "Defense information" means any information in any category determined by any Government agency authorized to classify information, as being information respecting relating to, or affecting the national defense.

(g) "Nuclear reactor" means an apparatus, other than an atomic weapon, designed or used to sustain nuclear fission in a self-supporting chain reaction.

(h) "Person" means (1) any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, association, trust, estate, public or private institution, group, Government agency other than the Administration, any State or any political subdivision of, or any political entity within a State; and (2) any legal successor, representative, agent or agency of the foregoing.

(i) "Research and development" means (1) theoretical analysis, exploration, or experimentation; or (2) the extension of investigative facilities and theories of a scientific or technical nature into practical application for experimental and demonstration purposes, including the experimental production and testing of motors, devices, equipment, materials, and processes.

(j) "Restricted Data" means all data concerning (1) design, manufacturing or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy, but shall not include any data declassified or removed from the Restricted Data category pursuant to section 142 of the Act.

(k) "Source material" means source material as defined in the regulations contained in 10 CFR, Part 40.

(l) "Special nuclear material" means special nuclear material as defined in the regulations contained in 10 CFR, Part 70.

(m) "United States", when used in a geographical sense, includes all territories and possessions of the United States, the Canal Zone and Puerto Rico.

§ 810.4 Communications.

All communications concerning the regulations in this part should be addressed to the Administrator, Energy Research and Development Administration, Washington, D.C. 20545. Attention: Division of International Security Affairs. Communications and reports may be delivered in person at the Administration's main offices in Washington, D.C. or Germantown, Maryland.

§ 810.5 Interpretations.

Except as specifically authorized by the Administrator in writing, no interpretation of the meaning of the regulations in this part by any officer or employee of the Administration other than a written interpretation by the General Counsel will be recognized to be binding upon the Administration.

§ 810.6 Authorization requirement.

Section 57b.(2) of the Act, as implemented by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, provides that it shall be unlawful for any person to engage directly or indirectly in the production of any special nuclear material outside of the United States except (a) under an agreement for cooperation made pursuant to section 123 of the Act, or (b) upon authorization by the Administrator after a determination that such activity will not be inimical to the interest of the United States.

§ 810.7 Generally authorized activities.

(a) Pursuant to section 57b.(2) of the Act, the Administrator has determined that any activity which constitutes directly or indirectly engaging in the pro-

duction of any special nuclear material outside of the United States will not be inimical to the interest of the United States and is authorized by the Administrator, provided that it:

(1) Does not constitute directly or indirectly engaging in any such activity in any of the following countries or areas:

Albania ;
 Bulgaria ;
 China, including Manchuria (and excluding Taiwan (Formosa)) (includes Inner Mongolia ; the provinces of Tsinghai and Sikang ; Sinkiang ; Tibet ; the former Kwantung Leased Territory, the present Port Arthur Naval Base Area and Liaoning province) ;
 Viet-Nam ;
 Cuba ;
 Czechoslovakia ;
 East Germany (Soviet zone of Germany and the Soviet Sector of Berlin) ;
 Estonia ;
 Hungary ;
 Latvia ;
 Lithuania ;
 North Korea ;
 Outer Mongolia ;
 Poland ;
 Rumania ;
 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ; and

(2) Does not constitute directly or indirectly engaging in any of the following activities outside of the United States:

(i) Designing or assisting in the design of facilities for the chemical processing of irradiated special nuclear material, facilities for the production of heavy water, facilities for the separation of isotopes of uranium, or equipment or components especially designed for any of the foregoing ; or

(ii) Constructing, fabricating, or operating such facilities ; or

(iii) Constructing, fabricating, or furnishing equipment or components especially designed for use in such facilities ; or

(iv) Training foreign personnel in the design, construction, fabrication, or operation of such facilities or equipment or components especially designed therefore ; or

(v) Furnishing information not available to the public in published form¹ for use in the design, construction, fabrication or operation of such facilities or equipment or components especially designed therefore ; and

(3) Does not involve the communication of Restricted Data or other classified defense information ; and

(4) Is not in violation of other provisions of law.

(b) Pursuant to section 57.b.(2) of the Act, the Administrator has determined that any activity not generally authorized pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section, which constitutes directly or indirectly engaging in the production of any special nuclear material outside of the United States, will not be inimical to the interest of the United States, and is authorized by the Administrator, provided that it:

(1) Does not involve the communication of Restricted Data or other classified defense information ; and

(2) Is not in violation of other provisions of law ; and either.

(3) Is limited to participation in (i) meetings of or conferences sponsored by educational institutions, laboratories, scientific or technical organizations ; (ii) international conferences held under the auspices of a nation or group of nations ; or (iii) exchange programs approved by the Department of State ; or

(4) Is limited to the furnishing of information which is available to the public in published form² or which will be made available to the public in published form within 60 days after the furnishing thereof.

§ 810.8 Grant and Renovation of Specific Authorization.

(a) Any person who proposes to engage directly or indirectly in the production of special nuclear material outside of the United States may apply, unless such proposed activity is authorized pursuant to an agreement for cooperation or is authorized by § 810.7, for a specific authorization to the Energy Research and Development Administration, Washington, D.C. 20545, attention: Division of International Security Affairs.

¹ For purposes of this section, "information which is available to the public in published form" shall include, but not be limited to any information contained in an application filed in accordance with the regulations of the U.S. Patent Office and eligible for foreign filing under 35 U.S.C. 184. In addition, information which is available from the Administration pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552 shall, for purposes of this section, be deemed to be information available to the public in published form.

² Ibid.

(b) The Administrator will approve an application for a specific authorization to engage directly or indirectly in the production of special nuclear material outside of the United States by conducting any of the activities enumerated in § 810.7(a) if, after taking into account following factors, he determines that such activity will not be inimical to the interest of the United States:

(1) Whether the United States has an agreement for cooperation with the country in which the proposed activity will be conducted;

(2) Whether the country in which the proposed activity will be conducted is a party to the treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and, pursuant thereto, has entered into an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the application of safeguards to its peaceful nuclear activities;

(3) Whether the country in which the proposed activity will be conducted, if not a party to the NPT, will accept IAEA safeguards with respect to the project;

(4) The relative significance of the proposed activity and availability of comparable assistance from other sources; and

(5) Any other fact which may bear upon the political, economic, or security interests of the United States.

(c) An authorization pursuant to this § 810.8 may be revoked, suspended, or modified, in whole or in part:

(1) For any material false statement in the application for an authorization or in any additional information submitted pursuant to § 810.11, or

(2) If the Administrator finds that the conduct of any or all of the authorized activities would be inimical to the interest of the United States.

§ 810.9 Contents of Application.

(a) Each application shall contain the following information:

(1) The full name, address and citizenship of the applicant. If the applicant is a corporation or other entity, it shall indicate the State where it was incorporated or organized, the location of the principal office, and shall furnish information known to the applicant concerning the control or ownership, if any, exercised over the applicant by any alien, foreign corporation or foreign Government. Each application shall contain complete and accurate disclosure with respect to the real party or parties in interest.

(2) A complete statement of the activity for which Administration authorization is requested, including designation of the country or countries involved and a detailed description of the specific project to which such activity relates.

(b) If the application contains restricted data or other defense information, it shall be prepared in such manner that all restricted data and other defense information are separated from the unclassified information.

(c) Information contained in applications, statements or reports otherwise filed by the applicant with the Administration may be incorporated by reference, provided that each such reference is clear and specific.

§ 810.10 Reports.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, each person who engages in an activity specified in paragraph (b) of this section shall within 30 days from the commencement of such activity submit a report to the Energy Research and Development Administration, Washington, D.C. 20545, Attention: Division of International Security Affairs. Each such report shall contain the following information:

(1) The name, address and citizenship of the person submitting the report;

(2) The name, address and citizenship of the person or persons for whom such activities are performed;

(3) A description of the activity, including its locations.

(b) Activities to be reported:

(1) The design, construction, or operation, outside the United States, of:

(i) A nuclear reactor; or

(ii) A facility for the separation of isotopes of plutonium; or

(iii) A facility for the chemical, physical or metallurgical processing or fabrication or alloying of special nuclear material; or

(iv) A facility for the production of zirconium (hafnium-free or low-hafnium), reactor-grade graphite, or beryllium; or

(2) The design or fabrication outside the United States, of any component part especially designed or fabricated for a nuclear reactor or other facility specified in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph; or

(3) The furnishing of designs, drawings, or other technical data for use outside the United States in the construction or operation of a facility specified in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph or in the fabrication of a component part specified in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph; or

(4) The separation, outside of the United States, of isotopes of uranium or plutonium, or

(5) The production, outside of the United States, of heavy water, zirconium (hafnium-free or low-hafnium), reactor-grade graphite, or beryllium; or

(6) The chemical, physical or metallurgical processing or fabricating or alloying, outside the United States, of special nuclear material.

(c) The reporting requirements of this section shall not apply to:

(1) Any activity consisting only of (i) the communication of information generally available to the public in published form; or (ii) financial assistance; or (iii) the transmittal of information relating only to conceptual design or performance characteristics of nuclear reactors or facilities; or (iv) the comparative evaluation of types of reactors or facilities; or (v) any combination of the foregoing.

(2) Any person to the extent that such person engages in activity authorized by § 810.7 as the employee of a person required to submit a report pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section.

(3) Any activity specifically authorized by the Administrator.

§ 810.11 Additional information.

The Administration may at any time require any person who engages in activity specified in § 810.10 to submit additional information with respect to such activity.

§ 810.12 Violations.

An injunction or other court order may be obtained prohibiting any violation of any provision of the act or any regulation or order issued thereunder. Any person who willfully violates any provision of the act or any regulation or order issued thereunder may be guilty of a crime and, upon conviction, may be punished by fine or imprisonment or both, as provided by law.

§ 810.13 Effective date.

The regulations in this part are effective September 30, 1975.

NOTE.—The reporting requirements contained herein have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget in accordance with the Federal Reports Act of 1942.

Dated at Washington, D.C., this 23rd day of September, 1975.

For the Energy Research and Development Administration.

EDWARD B. GILLS,

Acting Assistant Administrator for National Security.

[FR Doc. 75-26044 Filed 9-29-75; 8:45 am]

Question 7. How influential can the action of U.S. firms be in South Africa? Are we overestimating their impact in South Africa?

Answer. Since U.S. firms account for only about 17 percent of the total foreign investment in South Africa and only 3 percent of the total investment in that country from both domestic and foreign sources, it is obvious that the impact of the policies and practices of our companies is somewhat limited. However, progressive U.S. employers can provide an important example to other firms operating in South Africa of the effectiveness of enlightened employment practices and can demonstrate the U.S. employer's world-wide commitment to the principles of social justice. It is important also to note that U.N. firms are not alone in seeking to improve the conditions of their black employees in South Africa. Many British, Swedish, Canadian and domestic South African firms are also taking innovative actions in this field. The actions of one group of companies serves to encourage and reinforce the commitments of other groups toward fair employment practices. In addition, improved employment practices by U.S. firms alone can directly and favorably affect the lives of thousands of black workers employed by these firms in South Africa, which in itself is a very worthy goal.

Question 8. How do American companies in South Africa compare with native corporations in their labor policies and practices?

Answer. Many American companies operating in South Africa, including most of the larger ones, have announced steps which they have taken to improve

their employment practices with regard to their black workers, including more equitable wage scales, improved pensions and medical benefits, training facilities, employee housing and similar measures. However, U.S. and other foreign companies are not unique in providing these and other benefits to their black workers. A number of South African firms have traditionally been strong supporters of just employment practices for all workers regardless of race. In fact several major South African companies are in the forefront of the business community in South Africa in providing fair salaries and decent working conditions for black workers and in improving communications between the management and the black labor force. Unfortunately, many South African firms do not appear to have, as yet, followed the lead of these companies. We do not have sufficient material available on individual South African firms to permit a more detailed analysis of their respective employment policies and practices; however, judging from the rash of strikes in South Africa in 1973 and 1974 and from published aggregate data on wages and salaries, many South African firms (and probably a number of foreign firms as well) continue to pay their black workers at subsistence levels and have not established any realistic form of communication which would permit these workers to seek to redress their grievances.

Question 9. Should the Congress write legislation making it compulsory for U.S. corporations to follow the labor practices recommended by the Department?

Answer. In a response (copy attached) to a similar inquiry from Congressman Jack Brooks, Chairman of the Committee on Government Operations in the House of Representatives, the Department stated that while we sympathize with the intent of legislation to foster the expansion of improved employment practices by American firms in South Africa, we believe that such legislation could pose the risk for U.S. companies of irreconcilable conflicts with South African laws and administrative powers enforceable by law which can be, and have been, used in many instances to bar equal employment training and promotion opportunities for blacks. Therefore, we maintain that continuing to encourage voluntary efforts, building on the initial progress already made in this field, is a better approach.

OCTOBER 17, 1975.

Hon. JACK BROOKS,

*Chairman, Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I refer to your letter of April 28 and my interim reply of May 2 regarding H.J. Resolution 410 intended to make fair employment practices in the South African enterprises of U.S. firms a criterion for eligibility for U.S. Government contracts.

The Department of State has sought actively to encourage a peaceful evolution in South Africa from doctrinaire racial concepts to policies which will provide for the attainment of basic human rights by all of that country's citizens, regardless of race. In partial pursuit of this objective, it has been the Department's policy for the last few years to encourage and support the efforts of private American firms operating in South Africa to adopt enlightened employment practices. The Department has urged U.S. firms to persist in availing themselves of every reasonable and legally permissible means to ensure that all of their employees and the families of these employees have what they need to pursue decent and productive lives. Recommended practices include the following:

To pay the "rate for the job" or "equal pay for equal work";

To provide adequate pension, insurance and medical benefits;

To provide supplementary educational facilities for employees and their children;

To assist employees and their families to obtain adequate housing;

To provide skills training on a regular basis aimed at higher productivity;

To provide opportunities for advancement based solely on merit.

We are convinced that the racial problems of South Africa cannot be solved through violence or withdrawal, but rather through a policy of constructive engagement. The proviso "legally permissible" is, I believe, germane to the proposed joint resolution. As drafted, H.J. Res. 410 could pose the risk for U.S. companies of irreconcilable conflicts with South African laws and administrative powers enforceable by law which can be, and have been, used in many instances to bar equal employment training and promotion opportunities for blacks. Accordingly, adoption of the joint resolution might compel an American company with operations in South Africa to choose between remaining eligible for U.S. Government contracts and continuing operations in South Africa.

Thus, while we sympathize with the intent of this legislation to foster the expansion of improved employment practices by American firms in South Africa, we believe that continuing to encourage voluntary efforts, building on the initial progress already made in this field is a better approach. Many American companies with interests in South Africa have become increasingly concerned about the situation of black workers there. A number of U.S. firms have made public the steps they are taking to improve their employment practices in South Africa, while other firms have preferred to introduce significant improvements without publicity.

In an effort to focus increased attention on the topic of enlightened employment practices, the U.S. Department of State in February 1973 issued a booklet entitled "Employment Practices of U.S. Firms in South Africa", which provided an illustrative list of goals as well as specific examples of actions taken by U.S. companies to improve working conditions in that country for all employees regardless of race. Subsequently, in a statement dated September 1974, the Department reiterated these employment practices goals and urged that in view of the changes now taking place in the industrial relations picture in South Africa, American firms operating there should give special consideration to improving relations between employers and employees by using all available channels of communications. This would encompass being prepared to engage in collective bargaining with representatives of black workers including representatives of unregistered trade unions. The statement noted in this connection that, while unregistered unions are not specifically provided for in South Africa's industrial relations legislation, they are not illegal.

The results of these efforts are reflected in an article which appeared in the South African newspaper "Johannesburg Star" on October 5, 1974, which stated in part: "The State Department is anxious that American companies in South Africa should be seen to be at the forefront of the move to improve the conditions of Black workers."

"In the last five years many companies, under both public and private pressure, have greatly improved both the wages and conditions of their workers. Conditions in some American plants, notably those of General Motors in Port Elizabeth, are outstanding."

The steps taken by American firms in the field of employment practices complement similar efforts on the part of numerous responsible and progressive groups in South Africa which realize that the future welfare of their society may well depend on how soon existing inequities are removed. Additionally, public and private pressures in Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany and other countries which are being exerted upon firms with interests in South Africa have resulted in the adoption of improved employment conditions.

We are encouraged by these developments. In our view, public and private efforts which succeed in encouraging American companies in introducing voluntary improvements in their labor practices in South Africa are more likely to influence favorably South African and third country employers than would the proposed legislation.

I hope that you will call upon me if you believe that we can be of further assistance in this matter.

The Office of Management and Budget advised that from the standpoint of the Administration's program there is no objection to the submission of this report.

Sincerely,

ROBERT J. McCLOSKEY,
*Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations.*

Question 10. Britain has a large investment in South Africa. Are the practices of its corporations any different from American companies? What has been the impact of British public pressure on those corporations?

Answer. Private direct investments in South Africa from the Sterling Area (almost all British) totalled \$2.9 billion at the end of 1971, about 66 percent of all foreign direct investment in South Africa at that time. Total profits from these British direct investments averaged about \$180 million annually during the 1966-1971 period.

According to a detailed study done by the Expenditure Committee of the British House of Commons in 1973-1974, the performance of British firms in South Africa in the field of employment practices appears to be generally on par with the performance of other firms, both foreign and domestic, operating in that country. In an effort to encourage British firms to improve their employment

practices, the Expenditure Committee made a series of recommendations and published a set of guidelines (Code of Practice) for British firms operating in South Africa (copy attached).

Several individual British firms have made commendable initiatives recently in the field of improved labor conditions for their respective black labor forces in South Africa (better wages and fringe benefits and improved employer-employee communications). Two British firms have announced that they will negotiate directly with unregistered black trade unions representing their workers. Public pressures in the United Kingdom are likely to have considerable influence in encouraging other British firms to follow the initiatives of their more progressive colleagues.

FIFTH REPORT FROM THE EXPENDITURE COMMITTEE, SESSION 1973-74, WAGES AND CONDITIONS OF AFRICAN WORKERS EMPLOYED BY BRITISH FIRMS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Chapter 13

RECOMMENDATIONS

188. At various places in this Report we have given our opinion as to what constitutes good practice on the part of companies in South Africa with regard to wages and conditions of employment. These views are gathered together and produced as a set of Guidelines in the Code of Practice printed as an Appendix to this Chapter. We recommend that the Appendix be regarded as the draft for a new set of Guidelines to British companies with business interests in the Republic, replacing the advice currently given by the D.T.I. We recommend that the Guidelines be published by the D.T.I. and that a copy be sent by the D.T.I. to every British company known to have, or to be contemplating the establishment of, business interests in South Africa.

189. Although we were told by the D.T.I. that advice on employment practices in South Africa is given to companies both by the commercial staff posted to the British Embassy in South Africa and by D.T.I. in London, we received the impression that both the Embassy and D.T.I. played a fairly passive role, possibly waiting for companies to request advice and assistance. We recommended that the staff in the Embassy and the D.T.I. play an active role of seeking out companies in order to encourage and advise them on improvements in employment practices. This function requires an up-to-date knowledge of, for instance, the law, South African Government policy and company practice. Staff would be assisted in keeping up-to-date on current practices if they received voluntary reports on the progress of firms. Information in these reports could be incorporated in the Guidelines as a lead for other firms. We recommend that a review be undertaken of the staff in South Africa and the D.T.I. whose function it is to provide information, assistance and advice to companies, in order that the purposes we envisage are adequately met. We recommend that companies be invited to submit reports on their practices and on progress concerning African wages and conditions. We recommend that the Guidelines be regularly revised.

190. Is it important that companies should expect future publicity. In this inquiry we have been concerned to understand the situation in some detail and to document the employment practices of British-affiliated companies, both good and bad. Future investigations could concentrate on those companies which do not pursue good employment practices; and, if the policies which we have recommended appear to have failed in their objectives, tougher measures could then be considered. We anticipate that the subject will continue to command the interest and vigilance of the House.

191. Some companies said that they were reluctant to exercise control over or issue directives to subsidiaries in South Africa because the subsidiaries might thereby be rendered liable to United Kingdom corporation tax (see paragraph 53). The two memoranda submitted by the Inland Revenue do not indicate that the issue of policy directives on wages and conditions of employment alone has this result. Nevertheless it is important that there should be no doubt about the matter, and that companies should not be deterred from exercising due control through any misapprehension. We recommend that the Inland Revenue should issue public guidance on this subject, and that if necessary there should be legislative change.

CODE OF PRACTICE

GUIDELINES FOR UNITED KINGDOM COMPANIES WITH INTERESTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

1. Government policy is summarised in a statement of the Prime Minister made in March 1973: "I hope that British companies in South Africa would recognise their own interests in establishing a name as good employers, in particular by keeping abreast of the best current practices and opportunities for advancement". These Guidelines are intended to assist companies in achieving and maintaining good employment practices.

2. In general, companies should ensure as a minimum that as far as possible the management attitudes and practices adopted by their affiliates in South Africa, in relation to their employees are consistent with and can bear examination against the attitudes and practices adopted towards their employees in the United Kingdom.

3. British companies having business interests in South Africa or contemplating operations there should ensure that they have a thorough knowledge and understanding of the position of their African workers, and of the economic, social and political forces which govern their lives. There is an abundance of unskilled labour available in the Republic, so that the operation of market forces cannot be relied upon to ensure adequate wages for the unskilled. Because Africans lack the normal trade union rights and there are very few African trade unions, there can be no certainty that collective bargaining will ensure that African wages are adequate. Considerable differences exist in the average earnings from employment of Africans and Whites in all sectors of the economy. Government laws and regulations on the movement, residence and employment of Africans place great power in the hands of employers over their African employees: dismissal may entail the loss of rights to urban residence and employment. The migrant labour system, which has been subject to criticism not only for its economic but also its social consequences, is in many cases legally imposed on companies and their African employees. Various legal, institutional and customary obstacles to equality of opportunity and to the advancement of Africans into better and higher-paying jobs are encountered. The setting in which their subsidiaries and associates operate should be well understood by British companies. It is because of this setting that the present Guidelines have been produced.

4. The impression that employers are effectively prevented from improving the wages or conditions of service of African employees is mistaken. The South African Government has expressed itself in favour of increases in wages for Africans, and it is not opposed to the training and advancement of Africans provided that White workers do not object. It has spoken against the resistance of White trade unions to African advancement. Many South African employers have set progressive goals, as evidenced by statements of an employers' association in favour of trade union rights for Africans, and the minimum wage objectives of various associations. Progressive views have been attributed to some White trade unions. The great shortage of skilled and educated manpower which prevails in South Africa is generally acknowledged to have produced a greater incentive to, and possibility of, African advancement than existed in the past.

5. It is right for British companies to accept a responsibility in relation to the wages and conditions of African employees in their business interests in South Africa, in so far as the companies have the power to control or influence these wages and conditions. The wages and conditions of African employees are an important issue, on which the parent company is advised to formulate certain broad policies. The Main Board director responsible for industrial relations should be no less concerned with industrial relations in South African affiliates than the financial director is with their financial policies.

6. To increase their impact in South African subsidiaries and associates, it is important for parent companies to develop good relationships with them. These can be fostered through periodic visits to the Republic by the Chairman and others in the parent company. Personal visits also enable the parent company to acquire knowledge of wages and conditions in the affiliate. Main Board representation on the South African board is to be recommended. To monitor and assess an affiliate's policies, information should be required regularly on wages and conditions expressed in relation to the policy objectives of the British board.

Industrial Relations

7. In the absence of African membership of trade unions it is advisable to establish, or continue with, effective works committees of African employees as a means of consultation, communication, and training in industrial relations. To be effective, works committees should be democratically elected, should meet regularly and frequently, and should be able to discuss wages and conditions of employment. Practices which hinder the development of African unions should be avoided. African trade unions are not unlawful, and, although they possess none of the normal trade union rights, there is nothing to prevent a company from recognising and negotiating with a trade union representing African workers. The lawful development of collective bargaining with African employees should be encouraged.

The Poverty Datum Line

8. Poverty Datum Line (P.D.L.) and Minimum Effective Level (M.E.L.) estimates can provide a helpful guide to the minimum wages which employers should pay in the Republic. Companies should ensure that there is available an up-to-date P.D.L. and M.E.L. measure appropriate to their lowest-paid workers and their dependents, in each location of operation. Where P.D.L. and M.E.L. estimates are not available, a company should commission experts to undertake such studies, or it should join with other companies—either through an area employers' association or an industry employers' association or an association of British companies (e.g. U.K.S.A.T.A.) or through sponsorship of a national survey—to produce appropriate estimates.

9. The estimators of the P.D.L. regard it as a measure of the barest minimum required to support a family in African living conditions, assuming the wisest allocation of expenditure. A wage equal to the P.D.L. cannot therefore be thought of as a fair one. Companies are urged to accept the M.E.L. as the target for minimum wages, and to establish a timetable for achieving it.

Fringe Benefits

10. There is a case for companies to provide benefits in kind for employees if the benefits would otherwise be provided inadequately or not at all. Where companies provide board and lodging for migrant workers, much can be done to raise the quality of life of these employees. Companies should be familiar with the living conditions of their migrant workers and ensure that high standards of provision are achieved and maintained; but they should also be mindful of the living conditions and needs of their migrant employees' dependants.

11. Assistance with family housing is impeded by laws relating to freehold and residence, but in the case of employees commuting from nearby Bantu homelands there is a possibility of a company helping Africans to acquire their own homes. Much can be done to further education of African employees, their children and the African community generally: assistance can range from literacy programmes to bursaries for university education. The high demand for redaction among many Africans makes this a particularly valuable form of assistance. Companies are in position to ease the problems and insecurity of Africans resulting from restrictions on their movement, residence and employment, by providing advice and legal assistance when problems arise. Firms should determine whether African employees and their dependents have need of medical services in addition to those provided by the State; and if so, to meet the need. Companies should ensure that African employees are covered by a pension scheme which is comparable in benefits to that of White employees but suited to the needs of Africans, e.g. migrant employees should not be disadvantaged by broken service. By providing free or subsidised meals, companies can ensure that low-paid employees are nutritionally fed.

12. In the provision of fringe benefits, companies should attempt to redress the disadvantages encountered by Africans in the availability of social amenities and services. Many of the benefits in kind recommended above would be helpful not only to employees but also to employers, by strengthening employee loyalty and reducing labour turnover. There are many institutions and organisations concerned with the welfare of Non-Whites to which companies could make financial contributions.

Migrant Labour

13. Companies should adopt a policy towards migrant labour based not only on the consequences for the company of the migrant system but also on an understanding of the consequences for Africans.

14. There is much that companies can do to see that their employees have a legal right to reside with their families within commuting distance of their work. For instance, there is reason to believe that Government enforcement of migrant employment in some industries is not entirely inflexible. A consideration of importance in choosing a location for a new plant is that some locations permit more use of stable, family-based labour than others. Advice and legal assistance can be given to African employees in relation to the "pass laws".

Wage Structure

15. A company's wage structure should be determined irrespective of race, according to principles of job evaluation. "Equal pay for equal work" will be meaningless so long as Whites and Africans are not employed in the same jobs or grades. Payment of the rate for the job irrespective of race can accelerate the pace of African advancement in times of shortage of skilled labour, because it can give White workers and unions a sense of security against the undercutting of their wages.

16. It should be an objective of company policy to reduce the differential, often large, between the average pay of White and African workers. This can be achieved not only by a narrowing of the wage structure but also by a change in the racial structure of employment.

17. Controlled prices or competitors' practices may hinder British-affiliated companies in their improvement of wages and conditions. It is possible to reduce or overcome these difficulties, as is shown by those companies which have exerted their influence on their competitors (for example, in employers' associations) to raise wages throughout an industry, or on the authorities to introduce or raise statutory minimum wages or to raise controlled prices.

African Advancement

18. Companies are urged to press hard for the advancement of Africans into more qualified and better-paid jobs. Adherence to the *mores*, custom and practice of South African society may mean that opportunities for African advancement are overlooked. It is important that racial discrimination be avoided not only by those at the top of the company but also right down the managerial line. There may be need for a programme to change the attitudes of White supervisors of African employees.

19. There is reason to believe that where legal job reservation exists, it can be avoided by obtaining exemptions, and by careful and diplomatic handling of White workers and trade unions. There is no law preventing a Non-White from being in authority over a White, but a company would have to negotiate with the Government, whose general policy is to prohibit such appointments, and possibly with White workers or unions. In order to ensure equality of opportunity among the races, companies should be prepared to meet the costs involved in duplicating facilities where separate facilities are required by law.

20. Companies which complain of a lack of aptitude or ambition on the part of African workers may find that the problem lies with their own management. Where lack of education prevents African skill-acquisition or promotion, the remedy lies partly in a company's own hands. Moreover, an individual company can raise the educational quality of its labour force by offering attractive pay and conditions.

21. It is important to see African workers as individuals with potential for skill-acquisition and career-development. Wherever the scale of operations permits, companies should establish training departments to provide training for African workers, and to develop their full potential. Where training cannot be provided within the firm, the use of external training courses should be explored. Companies can attempt to overcome the problem that Africans cannot be apprenticed to White artisans, either by means of a training school for artisans or through training on-the-job.

22. Companies should recognize that to recruit skilled workers from Britain and other countries for employment in South Africa can retard the pace of African advancement. Where that is the case, companies are urged not to use White immigrant labour but to endeavour to recruit from the Non-White potential within South Africa and to develop that potential by means of training.

General Advice

23. Companies may feel that to follow some of these Guidelines would be damaging to their profitability. But there are profit advantages in being a good employer, and it is in a company's wider interest to maintain a good reputation. The

ability to pay basic wages above the relevant P.D.L. now, at least to all adult male employees, should be regarded as one of the minimum conditions for maintaining or establishing a business interest in South Africa.

24. Given the particular circumstances of British companies operating in South Africa and the continuing interest in their performance, companies should conduct a regular review of these matters at Main Board level so that they may be in a position to satisfy shareholders seeking information. Companies should bear in mind that disclosure followed by scrutiny is an essential characteristic of a free society which no one should fear and from which much good may come.

25. The British Embassy in Pretoria, the British Consulates-General in Johannesburg and other centres, and the Department of Trade and Industry in London are able to give detailed information and advice on P.D.L. and M.E.L. estimates and on the organizations and individuals making these estimates; on the training and advancement of Africans; and on other aspects of wages and conditions. They can also give details of organizations in South Africa which provide information and assistance on these subjects, and on the laws relating to Africans. Companies will find further help in the Fifth Report of the Expenditure Committee of the House of Commons, 1973-74, and in the evidence given to the Trade and Industry Sub-Committee in 1973 (House of Commons papers 116 and 21-I to 21-IV of 1973-74).

Question 11. What American corporations are operating in Namibia? What is the profit/investment ratio? Are they contributing in taxes an inordinate amount to the South West African government? Does some tax income go to the South African government? Should their taxes to those governments be deductible in light of the International Court of Justice and United Nations' actions against South Africa?

Answer. At the present time we believe the following American owned companies have investments in Namibia: American Metal Climax, Inc.; Brilund Mines Ltd.; Caltex Corporation; Gallion Iron Works & Manufacturing Company; Gemstone Mines, Inc.; Interspace Corporation; Mobil Oil Corporation; Newmont Mining Corporation; Arthur G. McKee and Company; Texas Gulf, Inc.; and the Zapata Corporation. We have no information available on the profit/investment ratio for these companies. In 1972, according to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, two U.S. companies in Namibia paid the South African Government a total of \$2 million in taxes. Twelve other American companies operating in Namibia during that year claimed no tax credits. The tax credit issue was carefully reviewed at the time the Treasury Department made its determination in 1973 that current U.S. law provides for a credit in the event of any payment of taxes on income to a governing power without regard to the legality of that government. Therefore, we do not consider that the granting of tax credits implies any recognition by the U.S. Government of the legality of South Africa's taxing power in Namibia.

Question 12. Is the Department ready to prepare, in conjunction with Treasury and other affected Agencies, legislation forbidding such tax credits?

Answer. The Department of State is not contemplating any further action at this time on the tax credit issue. A decision by the Department on whether or not to support any new Congressional legislation aimed at denying U.S. tax credits to American firms doing business in Namibia for taxes paid to the South African Government on income earned by these firms on their respective Namibian operations could not be made until such time as we would have the opportunity to review the actual legislative proposals.

Question 13. Many American scholars cannot get visas to visit and do research in South Africa because they have been critical of South Africa's policies. Some have suggested that there should be a slow-down of U.S. approval of visas to South African businessmen and officials until these scholars are granted visas. What is the Department's view on this?

Answer. We have exerted strenuous efforts in past years to persuade the South African Government to grant visas to individual Americans and in a general effort to persuade that Government to adopt more liberal policies with regard to the issuance of visas. We will continue to pursue these objectives. However, we do not favor retaliatory action. For many years we have sought to promote a free flow of persons and ideas among nations. Moreover, we do not believe that an individual should be penalized for the actions of his Government. Finally, there is no legal authority vested in our consular officers under present legislation to deny or delay the issuance of a visa simply as a measure of retaliation.

Question 14. Have "cultural exchanges" with South Africa—bringing South African citizens here and sending Americans there—in any way served to encourage changes within South Africa? Could they be improved?

Answer. It is, of course, difficult to evaluate in concrete terms the contribution of programs such as our cultural exchanges to furthering the objective of constructive change in South Africa. However, the comments of foreign service inspectors over the years and of the participants in these programs do suggest that it is one of the most constructive and creative elements in our relations with South Africa. Our Embassy and the U.S. Information Service in South Africa devote considerable energy to the selection of participants in an effort to assure that they reflect the major elements of South African society, that they are representative of significant social, cultural and political elements and are individually capable of benefiting from the exchange experience and of disseminating these benefits to others.

The criteria for selection of participants in these programs are frequently reviewed and each U.S. visit by a South African is separately evaluated in an effort to improve the content of the visits.

Question 15. What role will the Bantustan leaders play in bringing about change in South Africa? What is their role now?

Answer. The significance of the "Bantustan" or "Homeland" leaders in the future of South Africa will depend upon a number of factors, including their individual perspectives as leaders, the differences among the various territories they lead, their relationship with other groups in South Africa, including Africans outside the Homelands, and, of course, the future actions of the South African Government in regard to the Homelands.

The development of the Homelands policy in recent years has provided opportunities for the exercise of leadership by Africans which have been largely absent since the suppression of the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress in 1960. Most Homelands leaders have used the platforms provided, albeit to differing degrees, to criticize the policies of the South African Government and to articulate grievances against the apartheid system which are universally shared by Africans in South Africa. The voice they give to these grievances is one of the most notable contributions of the Homelands leaders at the present time.

The extent to which these leaders will be able to influence the political consciousness of the African population at large, especially those living in "white" South Africa, and the extent to which they will be able to organize support on the national level will be major factors in determining South Africa's future.

When evaluating the possibilities inherent in the Homelands system, however, it is desirable as well to recall that the encouragement of ethnic or "tribal" distinctions among Africans is among the objectives of the South African Government in pursuing this policy. African critics of the Homelands leaders argue that even if some of them do aspire to national leadership in the broad sense, they will owe their positions in the first instance to ethnic and "tribal" constituencies. In light of experience in a variety of countries with the divisive effects of real or perceived cultural differences, such critics contend that there is a danger that in the final analysis Homelands leaders will be unable to resist centrifugal pressure inherent in the Homelands policy and will emerge as rulers of small, "independent", but impoverished client states.

Question 16. What is the overall U.S. policy concerning Bantustans?

Answer. It is our view that the African Homelands, as presently constituted, represent an unjust division of South Africa's territory, the effect of which will be to enhance divisions among the African population, prevent their political cooperation with other South Africans, and deprive them of the share of South Africa's natural and man-made wealth to which they are in justice entitled.

Question 17. What is U.S. policy on American investment in the border industries or within the Bantustans? How is that policy implemented?

Answer. Since the "Border Areas" and the Bantustans or Homelands are integral parts of South Africa, we would regard any American investment in these areas as being indistinguishable from U.S. private investment elsewhere in South Africa and would therefore neither encourage nor discourage it.

Questions 18 & 19. Will the U.S. recognize the independence of the Transkei? In what ways will the Transkei differ from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland?

Answer. Although the South African Government has declared its intention to grant independence to the Transkei on October 26, 1976, the issue has not been formally posed in terms of a request for recognition or an application for UN

membership. In the meantime, the United States is following relevant developments both in the Transkei itself and in terms of its implications for South Africa internationally. An evaluation of the similarities and differences between the Transkei and independent states, including Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, will be among a number of factors which will be taken into account when we make a decision on the question of recognition. Pending a decision on the matter, we are taking care to avoid any actions which would compromise our freedom to choose the course we judge the most appropriate.

Question 20. One of the major criticisms of the Homelands policy is that it involves too little land for such a large proportion of the people. Is there any likelihood of South Africa's making major concessions for more land and for coherent geographical entities?

Answer. We have seen no evidence that the Government would agree to alter the present allocation of land for the homelands. This was first established in the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936. Prime Minister Vorster told the Homeland leaders who met with him in Umtata in November 1973 that he would be unable to go beyond the provisions of that Act. Nevertheless, many of the Homeland leaders continue to press for the addition of more land to their Homelands arguing that they would not otherwise be viable.

Question 21. Does the OAU recognize the South African Government or any South African political or exiled party such as the African National Congress?

Answer. Every independent country on the African continent is a member of the OAU except South Africa. The OAU does not recognize that the Government of South Africa is the legitimate representative of its people and on this basis favors its exclusion from the United Nations and other international bodies. The most recent OAU Council meeting, which was held in Dar es Salaam in May 1975, voted to provide material support to the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress, both of which organizations are seeking the overthrow of the South African Government. It should be noted that neither of these movements is recognized by the OAU as having governmental status.

Question 22. Has repression in Namibia increased since the veto of the Security Council resolution of June 6, 1975?

Answer. South African police and army reinforcements were sent to Namibia, particularly Ovamboland, in the wake of the mid-August assassination by unknown persons of the Chief Minister of Ovamboland Filemon Elifas. Since mid-August an unknown number of Namibians, reportedly including several Lutheran pastors, have been detained ostensibly in connection with the assassination of Chief Elifas. A few of those detained were subsequently released uncharged. As of mid-October the American Embassy in Pretoria estimated that about 30 Namibians were being detained throughout the territory under the Terrorism Act and other repressive and illegal legislation. In early September our Embassy approached the South African Government expressing concern over reports of detentions and requesting particulars on these detentions. We are still awaiting a promised South African Government response to our request. We do not believe that this recent increase in repression in Namibia results directly from the veto of the Security Council draft resolution on June 6, 1975, but is related to other events described above.

Question 23. Has the U.S. veto of the mandatory arms embargo had an impact on the South African Government's policy toward Namibia?

Answer. There have been no new developments in the South African Government's policy toward Namibia since June 6, the day the veto was cast. (Almost one year after it was proposed, a South African Government-inspired Constitutional Conference to discuss the future of Namibia was convened in Windhock on September 1.)

Question 24. Is South Africa willing to allow international supervision of the elections of the delegates to the South West African Constitutional Conference?

If not, would the United Nations be likely to recognize anything which evolves from that Conference. What will be the U.S. positions on this in the UN and toward South Africa?

Answer. South Africa has not been willing to allow international supervision via the UN of developments in Namibia, including elections held within various tribal groups. In a May 27, 1975 letter to the UN Secretary General, South African Foreign Minister Muller stated that the South African Government was "unable" to accept UN supervision in respect to Namibia. No elections have been held in Namibia solely for the purpose of choosing delegates to the Constitutional Conference.

It seems highly unlikely that the United Nations will recognize decisions reached in the Constitutional Conference in its present form as representing the will of the Namibian people, given the facts that the Conference was initiated by the South African Government and that SWAPO, recognized by the UN as the sole authentic representative of the Namibian people, is not represented at the Conference.

The U.S. Government does not consider that the Constitutional Conference represents the views of all the Namibian people since several significant political groups, such as SWAPO and the Namibia National Convention, are not represented at the Conference.

Question 25. Why has the U.S. not joined the UN Council for Namibia?

Answer. The United States abstained on UN General Assembly Resolution 2248 of 1967 which established the Council for Namibia because we believed that the stated functions of the Council, such as travelling to Namibia to take over the administration of the territory, were unrealistic and beyond the available means of the United Nations to achieve. We therefore declined to serve on the Council and have maintained this position ever since, although we periodically review our position on the matter.

Question 26. Should the U.S. recognize SWAPO as the representative political party of the people of Namibia? Why?

Answer. The United States is not prepared to recognize SWAPO as the sole representative party of the Namibian people in the absence of an indication from the Namibian people that SWAPO holds such a position. SWAPO draws almost all its support and membership from the Ovambo tribe, and there are no indications that it enjoys broad support in other tribal and ethnic groups in Namibia.

Question 27. Claims are made that Namibia's natural resources are being exploited to the detriment of the territory. On the other hand many describe it as a treasure trove of natural resources. How do you evaluate the mining activities of U.S. corporations there? Do they aid or harm its economy? its labor force? its human rights?

Answer. Most U.S. corporations interested in mining operations in Namibia are presently in the mineral exploration phase. Newmont Mining Corporation and American Metal Climax, Inc. (AMAX), which together own 65% of the Tsumeb Corporation, a large producer of copper, lead and zinc, are the only U.S. corporations presently engaged in large-scale mining operations in Namibia. Most Namibians who have visited the Department of State over the past two years have asserted that U.S. and other foreign investment assists the development of the Namibian economy and provides needed employment. However, these Namibians believe that American and other companies should increase wages paid to black workers and adopt the rule of equal pay for equal work. The Department of State has urged U.S. firms doing business in Namibia to seek to conform their employment practices to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Question 28. What would the withdrawal of South Africa mean for Namibia? Would another Angolan situation ensue?

Answer. The sudden withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia would no doubt cause considerable administrative and economic dislocation. Because of the scarcity of trained Namibians, it would probably be necessary to bring in considerable numbers of foreign personnel to maintain the functioning of the government and the economy. At the present time it does not appear likely that the withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia would create an Angolan type situation as Namibia has only one armed liberation group, SWAPO.

Question 29. What assessment do you have of the January, 1975 elections in Ovamboland? How much government interference was there? How free was it? Why did SWAPO do so badly at that time?

Answer. In the January 1975 Ovamboland Legislative Council elections some 55% of the eligible voters reportedly went to the polls despite a call by SWAPO for a boycott of the elections. The large voter turnout was seemingly a political setback for SWAPO. It is impossible to estimate with authority the extent, if any, of government interference in these elections. There have been charges made by the International Commission of Jurists and other groups that the South African Administration utilized a variety of coercive measures to insure a large turnout. Our Embassy in South Africa has no information which would either confirm or refute these allegations. Lutheran Bishop Anala and the recently expelled Anglican Bishop Wood initiated an investigation of these

allegations, and a legal team has visited Ovamboland to study the allegations. No report has been issued by the legal team to our knowledge. The failure of the voters to obey the SWAPO call for an election boycott has been explained by supporters of SWAPO as due to the government's efforts to force the people to vote. Also the flight of some 3,000 mostly young Ovambos, primarily SWAPO supporters, to Zambia during the last six months of 1974 left a very much reduced contingent of SWAPO activists in Ovamboland.

Question 30. How representative is SWAPO of the Ovambos? Of the rest of Namibia? What is its political ideology?

Answer. We believe that SWAPO continues to be a significant political force within the Ovambo community. As far as we know SWAPO does not have a broad base of support in any of the other ethnic or tribal groups of Namibia. It does have non-Ovambo members, such as National Chairman David Merero, who recently fled Namibia. SWAPO professes to be socialist and non-aligned in its political orientation. It strongly opposes foreign investment in Namibia at this time because it believes such investment strengthens the hold of South Africa over the territory, and it favors a unitary independent Namibia on a one-man one-vote basis. SWAPO leaders within Namibia advocate independence by peaceful political means while the SWAPO leadership in exile favors a combination of military activity and political agitation to achieve independence.

Question 31. What other political parties exist in Namibia? How strong are they? What are their ideologies?

Answer. In addition to SWAPO there are probably at least 25 other political parties and groups in Namibia. Most of these are small in membership and apparently have little territorywide importance. The more significant political parties would include the Herero-based South West Africa National Union (SWANU) which is the leading element in the Namibia National Convention, an umbrella organization which also includes SWAPO (in country), the Ovambo-based Democratic Cooperative Development Party (DEMKOP), the Damara-based Namibian African Peoples Democratic Organization (NAPDO) and the Rehoboth Volksparty. The Namibia National Convention favors a unitary government and has a militantly nationalist outlook, refusing to enter into discussions with the South African Government or to participate in the Constitutional Conference now underway in Windhoek until a number of conditions such as the freeing of political prisoners and the free return of exiles, are met.

At the other end of the political spectrum are such parties as the National Unity Democratic Party (NUDO), headed by Paramount Herero Chief Clemens Kapuuo, which favors dialogue with the South African Government to achieve independence for the territory. The White opposition party, the Federal Party of South West Africa (formerly the United Party) advocates a free, independent, democratic Republic of South West Africa, possessing a Federal Constitution and maintaining close economic and security ties with South Africa and other southern African states. The ruling white National Party of South West Africa, a branch of the National Party of South Africa, appears to favor a decentralized, confederal type of government and a policy of removing the "discriminatory" aspects of apartheid without altering its basic principles.

Senator CLARK. We are going to hear next from three public witnesses: Jennifer Davis, Elizabeth Landis, and Jordan Ngubane.

Unfortunately, we have been listening to the buzzer that just went off. It means that we have a vote. I am going to try to see if we cannot go a little longer than I had originally intended. I wonder if perhaps the best way to proceed would not be for me to go over and vote right now, before you start. It will take me about 8 or 9 minutes, I am afraid. Then we will come back.

Perhaps each of you could take a look at how you might try to summarize your statements. The entire statements will be put in the record. If you could spend perhaps 5 minutes on each statement, then we will have time for questions. If you cannot do that, I will understand; but if you can, I would like to have each of you comment upon one another's statements, and have a little discussion.

Thank you.

We are in recess for about 10 minutes.

[A recess was taken.]

Senator CLARK. The hearing will resume. Here is Jennifer Davis, from the American Committee on Africa.

**STATEMENT OF MS. JENNIFER DAVIS, RESEARCH DIRECTOR,
AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON AFRICA**

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have done my best to summarize the statement. And I will submit my statement for the record.

Senator CLARK. Let me say, by the way, that we would welcome any comments that any of you may have with regard to testimony that has already been presented this morning and any reactions that you may have.

Ms. DAVIS. What I want to talk about is, in effect, a very small part of the total argument that I am making. But this relates to something that you asked Ambassador Davis about and that is the sale of our light aircraft.

THE NATURE OF CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA

But let me just put it in a little background. I begin my testimony with a look at the nature of change in South Africa, because I think that is a central question. And to me it seems important that we do not confuse self-interested military flexibility with real social change.

I think that it is blatantly clear that there is considerable flexibility in the politics of the South African system. And adjustments are being made, but these are designed to maintain and to protect what is essentially the extremely racially oppressive system.

South Africa is under constant pressure, extremely strong internal pressure which can only be expected to increase and of course, external pressure.

INCREASE IN MILITARY EXPENDITURE

And South Africa has responded in a number of ways, some of which I outline briefly. But the one I am most concerned with at this point is the very dramatic increase in military expenditure in South Africa.

South Africa has doubled its military budget in 2 successive years and is now spending over a billion dollars annually on military expenditure. It has a dual defense philosophy; with one focus internally, and then a second external focus. The internal focus is of course designed to cope with the problem of potential black insurgency, so that they are focussing very strongly on developing their counter insurgency, as they term it.

There has been considerable expenditure, also, though on very much more sophisticated equipment. Other witnesses have spoken in the last 2 days, I noticed in testimony, about the communications base at Silvermine, in the Cape, about the Simonstown base extensions and so on: I will not repeat their evidence. But, as I see it, that expenditure is designed to strengthen South Africa's desirability as an ally. In other words, that second expenditure is not so much related to South Africa's direct military needs, as it is to integrating South Africa into a whole Western defense complex.

And I think that this is very important, because it reflects the tremendous importance that South Africa places on its relationships with Western Europe and the countries of the North American Continent, particularly the United States.

South Africa really sees these alliances as critical for its survival. And it will work hard to build them. It understands, I think, very accurately, how to manipulate the coalescence of its interests with the interests of the western countries, as they are perceived by, for instance, the defense departments of those countries.

Hence, its great stress, for instance, on the critical position of the Cape, so they now term it the "new Gibraltar," gate to the Indian Ocean and the watchdog of the southern Atlantic.

The concern of the American Committee on Africa is that this unacknowledged coalescence of interest is in fact likely to lead to closer and closer links between South Africa and the United States and to a breaking of any arms embargo that still does exist. And, that we see as not in fact very far fetched.

Partly, in my testimony, I have run through a number of ways in which there seems to be clear indications of pressure from different American groups on the arms embargo. The other reason why, in fact, it seems to me, not unlikely that the embargo might be breached is that in fact, it has already been breached, and very consistently.

ARMS EMBARGO BREACH RELATIVE TO SALE OF LIGHT AIRCRAFT

And I would like to read, or summarize in more detail, just the last three pages of my testimony on the question of the way in which the embargo is being breached in relation to the sale of light aircraft.

In 1971, I testified before Congressman Diggs' Subcommittee on Africa on the question of the arms embargo. I pointed out at that time that one of the major items of trade between South Africa and the United States was an increasing number of light aircraft.

During that year, Secretary Newsom explained U.S. policy on aircraft, as follows:

There has been no change in the arms embargo which we have maintained since 1963 and which among other things precludes the sale of any aircraft to South Africa for military purposes, including military training and reconnaissance.

Normal trade with South Africa in civilian-type goods for nonmilitary purposes continues, and we are prepared to consider licensing for VIP transport purposes limited numbers of small unarmed executive civilian-type aircraft which will not strengthen South Africa's military or internal security capacity.

I argued at that time that sending civilian aircraft to South Africa was, in fact, potentially a breaking of the arms embargo because of the particular nature of the South African military structure.

South Africa has a system whereby it has the air commandoes. It has other commandoes as well—that is, land commandoes—but I am here concerned with what can best be described as a flying militia, made up of volunteers who use their own planes. They are not members of the regular military forces, but are paid by the Government when they fly in times of emergency or war. The establishment of 12 squadrons of such commandoes was authorized in 1964.

The commandoes attend an annual 2-week training camp, during which all of their expenses are paid by the Government. Their training entails radio cooperation with army and mobile police striking forces, reconnaissance, practice bombing, and general cooperation with the police and the army, in maintaining the internal security of both South Africa and what they term "Southwest Africa"; that is, Namibia. Many of these commandoes fly U.S. light planes such as Pipers and Cessnas. I might interject that the South African Defense Force has a journal called *Paratus*, which I believe the Library of Congress has copies of, and regularly, in *Paratus* there are reports of training exercises; that is, joint exercises involving these commandoes, the military, and the air force.

And these are primarily, of course, counterinsurgency exercises. There was a large one last year called Project Irene, which brought together the air commandoes, some land commandoes, and the regular military forces. So this is one of the ways in which supplying light aircraft, even for commercial use, because of the structure of the air commandoes, makes U.S. aircraft directly involved in the process of counterinsurgency. In other words, exactly what we say we do not want to do, we are doing when we allow these civilian aircraft to go to South Africa.

It is increasingly clear, too, that there have been other erosions in the formal arms embargo, and that light aircraft, such as Cessnas and heavy transport planes, such as the Lockheed "Hercules" C-130, have been provided directly to the South African Government for military use, long after the supposed embargo of 1963.

I have attached further information on this as appendixes; appendix I is an extract from the International Institute for Strategic Study's annual report, titled "The Military Balance," and is a study put out every year of the world's military strength.

In that, you will see listed for South Africa, as part of the regular military air force, C-130's and Cessna's. Cessna's, according to the military balance, are used in a squadron, assigned to the army, and both the reserve squadron and the air commando squadrons; that is, they are used by the air force.

Senator CLARK. I certainly appreciate having it. That entire report will be made a part of the record, following the text of your prepared statement.

Ms. DAVIS. To conclude, I think that the best way of assessing how those aircraft are used, is again to look at what the South African defense journal, *Paratus*, says about them in an article depicting the role of aircraft on the border. An article in 1974 *Paratus* refers to the usefulness of the C-130's and the invaluable role played by the Cessna's.

They say, that without these aircraft, the helicopter, Cessna, and Dakota, problems of supplies and communication would be insurmountable.

They go on to describe the tasks performed and specifically refer to reconnaissance, low-level, visual reconnaissance with a pilot and observer as being done by the Cessna because of its maneuverability and low fuel consumption. These small aircraft keep the 1,000-mile border under constant surveillance, and that is clearly a military task.

Finally, the article reports that Cessnas are used for aerial observation and can be used to control ground fire onto specific targets and to report subsequent enemy movement.

It seems to be clear that U.S. aircraft are being built into South Africa's system of military repression in the most direct way possible. It is these aircraft that will be in the forefront of the inevitably bloody suppression of any black attempt to oppose continued white, minority rule.

It is useful to point out here, that in South Africa you do not have to carry a gun to be regarded as a terrorist. The definition of "terrorism" is "seeking to embarrass the affairs of state." You can be demonstrating; you can be marching in the street and be a terrorist; even peaceful demonstrators or striking workers might find themselves the targets of these U.S.-built airplanes. And it is certain that in the development of a "liberation war," such as that just ended in Mozambique, American planes would be used to search out and destroy African freedom fighters.

I have not made a long list of recommendations. But I would strongly support the recommendations made by Mrs. Butcher. And the one issue we would like to raise very seriously is the need to reexamine the way in which the arms embargo is, in fact, implemented or not implemented, and to push very strongly for a serious implementation of such an embargo. Thank you.

[Ms. Davis' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JENNIFER DAVIS, RESEARCH DIRECTOR, AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON AFRICA

HUNTING REALITY

One of the major problems for anyone trying to understand United States-South Africa policy and relationships is the long established tradition of double talking. To find the truth it is necessary to penetrate behind the coded language and to recognize a series of myths which serve to cloak a far more unpleasant reality.

The primary myth perpetuated by South Africa is that it is changing. Critics who call for radical international responses to South African racial oppression and exploitation have for many years been met by the "But things are changing" argument. The initial myth-maker is of course South Africa... but the device is most useful because it is so eagerly seized upon by powerful forces such as the United States government, seeking to justify a policy of perpetual tolerance for what is in fact, for those who suffer under it, an intolerable situation. Secretary Newsom articulated such a view very precisely in a 1971 speech. He said:

"We believe change will come in southern Africa. Economic and demographic pressures make this inevitable. In South Africa itself there is a lessening of rigidity. Change is a central theme of discussion; there is psychological and intellectual ferment within the Afrikaner community; there have been isolated instances of acceptance of multi-racial activities; there is a growing realism among businessmen that Africans are important to them as skilled workers and as a market. They are beginning to focus on the need for improvement of working conditions for non-whites. We cannot expect change to come quickly or easily. Our hope is that it will come peacefully."

The system has shown itself capable of considerable flexibility in the past decade. Ten years ago Prime Minister Verwoerd was proud to think of himself as a man of granite. Today's pragmatic South African leaders recognize that building in rock does not meet the needs of a rapidly expanding industrial economy.

At issue is not whether changes are occurring both inside South Africa, and in that country's attitudes to Africa and the world. The argument revolves around the nature and purpose of those changes. It is at this core level that there seems to be dangerous confusion. Perhaps it is necessary to re-state, at this point, the basic situation that calls for change.

The "problem" in South Africa is that of the dispossession of a majority black population and the total usurpation of all economic, political and social power by a white minority. The "problem" is a system—the apartheid system—deliberately designed to use blacks for the creation of wealth and then guarantee the exclusive benefits of that wealth to the whites. The primary purpose of the whole network of South African law and administration is the protection of this system, which produces for the whites, who benefit from it, the highest average standard of living in the world and for the blacks, who suffer under it, a life of perpetual poverty, violence and humiliation.

The statistics which reflect this situation are well known—I quote only a few of them.

There are less than four million whites in South Africa, they provide only 20% of the country's economically active population—but take home over 76% of the wealth created every year; the blacks, who provide 8 out of every 10 workers, are left with only 23% of all the wealth they played a major role in producing.

White workers earn an average eight times as much as their black fellow workers.

White workers can work anywhere, at any job they please, move about freely, live with their families, organize trade unions, strike legally. Black workers are restricted by a cast iron system of controls. They cannot move freely, are regimented by the pass laws, prevented from living with their families, forbidden to strike, forced to work as migrant workers, always under the white supervision—at unequal jobs for unequal pay.

Current South African policy as laid out in what is mockingly called a "homelands" plan aims at ensuring that Africans be denied permanent residence in the "white areas" (which comprise 87% of total land area and include all major towns and cities). The design intends to make Africans in such area migrants—living without their families. By 1971 the proportion of economically active African men living in single accommodation (i.e. labor barracks) in the five main cities of South Africa was as follows: Cape Town, 85%; Durban, 55%; Johannesburg, 49%; Pretoria, 47%; Port Elizabeth, 20%.

The changes that are currently being made are not intended to alter this pyramidal structure in which blacks, the majority, stand always at the bottom, supporting the whole society on their backs. Even a cursory glance at the continuing black/white wage gap, increasing population regimentation, endless political repression and hollowness of Bantustan independence, should indicate the futility of any belief in current government-directed change. It is a mistake to confuse self-interested flexibility with racial social change.

White South Africa is currently dealing with a very complex situation. Already the most highly industrialized country in Africa, accounting for 22% of the whole continent's GDP and 40% of its industrial production it now has to adjust to internal pressures generated by continued economic expansion, and at the same time confront a rapidly changing situation just beyond its frontiers.

The increasing sophistication of the economy has for instance shifted the nature of the demand for labor—and so there are announcements that Black workers are to be upgraded—what this means is that the pool of unskilled black labor is no longer useful and is to be replaced by a pool of semi-skilled black labor. The landless, voteless, rightless non-person status of the Blacks remains unchanged. Changing labor demands may even bring in their wake some measure of unionisation and more permanent urbanisation—but the rate and direction of all such changes will be controlled by the whites—who will move cautiously to avoid generating dangerously irreversible trends. There are daily reminders of this truth in the South African press. The *Cape Times* of June 13th reports Deputy Minister of Bantu Education, Mr. T.N.H. Janson as saying "The Government would train the Blacks, but it would not train them to be destroyers of the way of life in South Africa . . . one thing that was sure was that nobody wanted a recurrence of an Angola or Mozambique in South Africa." The June 24th *Cape Times* carried an assurance from Minister of Labour Marais Viljoen that "so-called white job now being given to Blacks would revert to the Whites if the worst came to the worst and South Africa suffered a depression . . . "If it becomes necessary the Government will not hesitate to take the necessary steps to give the White workers the protection to which they are entitled", he said.

Internal economic development brought with it also a need for change in relationships to the world outside. South Africa now seeks external markets for its manufactured goods as well as for the vast stream of raw materials which still continue to flow to major industrial countries, making it a valuable member of the "Western world". The rational place to find such market is close by, in Africa.

This thrust coincides with a second important set of South African priorities which devolve on its politico/strategic requirements. For the last ten years South Africa has been carefully developing a 4 pronged external policy designed to consolidate and protect its stability.

While working hard to build powerful friendships in the world South Africa has also sought to achieve three ends in Africa: Firstly, the extension of almost complete control over the so-called captive states—e.g. Lesotho, Swaziland. Secondly, neutralization of the independent African States, using where possible, the economic inducements associated with what was once Dialogue and is now Detente. (Where neutralization could not be achieved in a 'friendly' manner South Africa was prepared to use the tougher techniques of economic strangulation and political subversion.) Thirdly, there was the attempt to construct a solid Southern Bloc, involving a close-knit alliance with Portugal and Rhodesia. In this way South Africa attempted to ring itself with a series of buffer states, hoping that the combination of a ruthlessly efficient internal security police and border buffers would prevent successful black organization or guerrilla incursion.

Now the buffer states are vanishing rapidly. Indeed Mozambique is not just a country with an independent black government, but one with a very directed political philosophy which will no doubt soon begin to be translated into a living model of an alternative society.

In the face of such far reaching upheavals South Africa has already shown signs of considerable re-thinking. It seems clear that the coming period will see attempts to win by political and economic activity what can not be won militarily. Hence the pressure on Rhodesia's Ian Smith to move towards some sort of "settlement"; hence the generally very 'correct' attitude towards the new Mozambique, with great restraint placed on those who might normally have been expected to fulminate about black savages, red perils and the need for intervention; hence also the tremendous drive towards Detente in Africa.

At the same time, looking realistically into the future South Africa has also embarked on a crash program to double and re-double its military strength, and to cement its international alliances.

In fact this dual response is more closely interconnected than might first appear. In attempting to project a new image of increasing reasonableness and flexibility, coupled with a constant emphasis on its potential role as a bulwark against communism, South Africa seeks to provide the major powers of Europe and America with greater incentives (and justification) for a continued policy of overt where possible, covert where necessary, alliances.

SOUTH AFRICA'S MILITARY BUILD-UP—WHO ARE THE ENEMIES?

South Africa has doubled the size of its direct military budget in two years, expenditure rising dramatically from R470m (\$658m) in 1973/4 to R700m (\$980m) in 74/75 and a planned R948m (\$1,327m) for 75/76. In fact a decision was made in 1974 to complete the ten-year plan in five years. This expenditure now represents something of the order of 18% of the entire budget, 3.7% of GNP and an estimated per capita expenditure of \$28, according to P.W. Botha, Minister of Defense.

Minister Botha's arithmetic seems alarmingly weak. Total South African population in 1974 was just under 25 million, this would mean a per capita expenditure of R37.90 (\$53.00). In fact, a far more realistic way of looking at this expenditure is in terms of white per capita expenditure, because this money is obviously being spent to defend a privileged white society against its black members. On that basis per capita expenditure reaches R237.00 (\$331.80)—a figure higher than that for the United States during the Vietnam years.

According to the Defense White Paper tabled in Parliament in March 1975, the main reasons for the increase in expenditure are the need to counter all forms of insurgency and to maintain "a credible and balanced conventional force". Land forces are to be re-organized into a counter-insurgency force and a conventional force, and the Air Force is to be similarly restructured. The budget reflects this pattern, indicating particularly big jumps in expenditure on arms for land defense.

South Africa is not only spending much more on its defense but is also pushing very hard to develop self-sufficiency in the production of weapons, aircraft and ships. Using much imported technology, via licensing arrangements and specialised personnel, as well as internal "know-how", the South Africans now claim to be practically self-sufficient in the production of ammunition and rifles. Aircraft, armoured personnel carriers and radio equipment are all being made internally, and Minister Botha recently announced that South Africa is to begin building tanks, and six corvettes for the navy. This self-sufficiency, which gives South

Africa considerable independence and a great tactical advantage, has been deliberately fostered via the ten year old Armaments Board, and the state-controlled Corporation—Armcor—which is responsible for over-seeing the production of all military equipment. South Africa has long sought to make itself relatively safe against the consequences of possible international actions such as an effective arms embargo, and has apparently succeeded to some extent.

SOUTH AFRICA'S DEFENSE PHILOSOPHY

It seems relevant to speculate at this juncture on the purpose of this continuing escalation of military might. As can be seen from the reference to Appendix 1, South Africa already has a military force vastly superior to the combined force of most of Sub-Saharan Africa.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's handbook for 1974, South Africa is the only country in Africa to have an indigenously designed missile system. The system is described as being air to air, with a solid propellant power plant and high explosive war-head. The design was begun in 1966 and production began in 1972. According to the same source, South Africa is also the only country in Africa which manufactures, under license, foreign designed major weapons, including both aircraft and armoured vehicles.

Under license from Italy, South Africa produces the MB-326 M (Impala) trainer, a light strike aircraft, jet powered, with a speed of 800 km/hr; production was begun in 1967, the craft is 70% indigenous manufacture and by 1973 South Africa had 200 of these planes. A second license obtained from Italy in 1973 will enable South Africa first to assemble and later produce the light strike, jet powered MB-326 K, with a speed of 890 km/hr; production is reported to have begun in 1974. Licenses have also been obtained from France for the assembly and subsequent manufacture of the jet powered Mirage F1 fighters, with initial plans for a run of 100, and the SA 330 Puma utility helicopter, of which 20 had been produced by 1973.

There are other significant areas in which South Africa is building a military capacity that seems either greatly in excess of any African threat, or totally irrelevant to countering such a threat. The increasing South African interest in nuclear development is one such area; other striking examples include the development of a complex communications center at Silvermine, in the Cape—designed to maintain surveillance of a vast area stretching from the Indian Ocean to the southern Atlantic—and finally the expansion of facilities and construction of a submarine base at Simonstown, decided on despite the recent cancellation of the U.K. agreement involving the use of that port.

South African military strategy is in fact aimed at two fronts—an internal and an external one. Internally and on its borders the South African government is facing an increasingly threatening situation. Thus much military expenditure is designed to enable greater internal control and South Africa is concentrating on developing counter-insurgency capabilities very rapidly. There are numerous reports of regular 'COIN' practice operations, and as has already been indicated there is growing expenditure on equipment suitable for such operations—armoured cars, light aircraft, helicopters, etc. Growing pressure from SWAMPO, the Namibian liberation movement has forced South Africa to replace the police that were defending the Caprivi strip with army units. A special volunteer corp is being established to take over the increasingly serious task of guarding the borders—and such border units will be paid special bonuses!

It seems likely that South Africa sees independent Africa as threatening primarily in this context—i.e. insofar as it provides a base for "internal disorder." It is also probably true that South Africa fears a peasant rebellion in Pondoland more than it does a Chinese or Russian invasion.

CAPETOWN—A NEW GIBRALTAR?

If it is not to be used for repelling an "All African Army of Liberation" or Russian invaders, what then is the purpose of the rest of South Africa's military capacity? It is at this point that we see the coalescence of South African and Western interests—and must pause for a moment to consider a second myth.

The official U.S. position has long been that it "abhors apartheid" and has no common military or other interests with the white minority regime. In fact of course the reality has been very different. The wide publication last year of the NSSM 39 document served only to confirm the observations of those who had warned that the United States was in fact closely linked economically, politically and strategically to the white racists and colonialists in Southern Africa.

The South Africans themselves have used their knowledge and understanding of Western strategy to push for alliances, and are now concentrating heavily on their potentially crucial role as defender of the gateway to the Indian Ocean, and watchdog of the Southern Atlantic.

They have been quick to recognize the implications of America's Vietnam experience, realizing that U.S. strategic planners will have to rely on building strong regional alliances for the maintenance of U.S. interests, rather than on direct intervention. In particular South Africa seems eager to capitalize on U.S. interest in the Indian Ocean, seeing the Pentagon eagerness to fortify Diego Garcia as a hopeful sign for future joint working arrangements.

It is in this context that ACOA wishes to express alarm at the current direction of U.S. policy, particularly as it relates to military linkages and the arms embargo.

NATO AND SOUTH AFRICA

In May 1975 the South African press reported the eruption of a storm in the NATO defense and planning committee over American Defense Secretary Schlesinger's proposal that a major monitoring installation be established in South Africa for NATO intelligence purposes. The proposal that such an installation be used to monitor all Soviet fleet movements in the Indian Ocean met with a violent reaction from the Dutch Defense Minister, who threatened to put Holland out of NATO if there was any cooperation with the South African Government.

Already in 1974 work done by Sean Gervasi and others had made it clear that the Defense Planning Committee of NATO had issued a secret instruction in June 1973 to the Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic (SACLANT) to undertake contingency planning for the defense of the southern African region and the Indian Ocean, although this was outside the NATO area. The justification for such a decision was the need to protect the southern entrance to the Persian Gulf, and the sea routes used by the oil tankers serving European and American ports. The secret plans reportedly concentrated on the development of air-naval task forces which would operate in the Indian Ocean and around the Cape and would stand ready to assist South Africa in case of need.

Most recently in June 1975, the British Anti-Apartheid Movement released information alleging that several NATO members including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Holland and Denmark had been engaged in the planning and development of Project Advokaat, a naval surveillance system established by South Africa at Silvermine, which allows South Africa to keep under surveillance an area stretching from South America to Bangladesh. According to the Anti-Apartheid Movement, Advokaat has permanent channels linking it in with the United Kingdom admiralty and the United States Navy. The Anti-Apartheid Movement released documents showing that orders for parts of the system had been placed with companies in all the above mentioned countries, including the United States. Apart from any implications relating to NATO's role in this matter, it seems to us that the provision of electronic equipment for such a military communications system is a clear violation of the arms embargo. Yet apparently at least ten United States firms have been allowed to supply highly specialised devices to this project. The names of some of the Corporations involved in supplying equipment for Advokaat from the United States are now known.

It is impossible in so short a time to give more than a shorthand reference to a few of the other many indications of a growing American network of sympathetic contacts and linkages with the minority power in South Africa. There have been high ranking South African military and Government leaders visiting Washington with increasing frequency. 1975 has seen both Democratic and Republican Congressmen, several perhaps co-incidentally on the House Armed Service Committee, visiting South Africa, its Simonstown naval base, Silvermine Communications Center and Atlas Aircraft Corporation. Melvyn Laird, former United States Secretary of Defense, also went to South Africa this year. One might even play with other, more sinister connections—such as the growing collaboration between the United States, Iran and South Africa.

Finally I would call this Committee's attention to what is probably the simplest—and perhaps also the most disturbing—evidence of the long range direction of United States policy in South Africa. Despite all assurances to the contrary the United States has allowed a situation to develop in which American aircraft, supplied to South Africa after the imposition of the 1963 embargo, are being used by the military for purposes that cannot, by any stretch of the most bureaucratic imagination, be described as non-military.

BREAKING THE ARMS EMBARGO—U.S. AIRPLANES IN SOUTH AFRICAN SKIES

In 1971 I testified before the House Committee on African on the question of the arms embargo. I pointed out at that time that one of the major items of trade between South Africa and the U.S. was an increasing number of light aircraft. Commenting on such sales in that year Secretary Newsom explained U.S. policy as follows:

"There has been no change in the arms embargo which we have maintained since 1963 on the sale of military equipment to South Africa . . . and which, among other things, precludes the sale of any aircraft to South Africa for military purposes, including military training and reconnaissance. However, normal trade with South Africa in civilian—type goods for non-military purposes continues, and we are prepared to consider licensing for VIP transport purposes limited numbers of small un-armed executive civilian—type aircraft which will not strengthen South Africa's military or internal security capacity."

I argued that such sales of "civilian" aircraft to South Africa showed the fallacy of the licensing system under which aircraft are sold for "non-military purposes". This is little more than a polite legal fiction; any aircraft can be easily converted for military use and in South Africa the existence of a para-military group such as the Air Commandos makes it possible for the military to use civilian air-craft while maintaining the legal fiction.

THE COMMANDOS

The all white Air Commandos, established in 1964, can best be described as a flying militia, made up of volunteers using their own planes. These men are not members of the regular military forces but are paid by the government when they fly in times of emergency or war. The establishment of 12 squadrons was authorized in 1964. The Commandos attend an annual two-week training camp, during which all their expenses are paid by the government. Their training entails radio co-operation with army and mobile police striking forces, reconnaissance, practice bombing and general cooperation in maintaining the internal security of both South Africa and South West Africa. Many of these Commando members fly U.S. light planes, such as Pipers and Cessnas.

Thus, even if the licensing procedures were adhered to technically in the sense that no planes were sold to the military, such planes would become available to the military, and, most important of all, form part of the "security planning" of the government.

Recent reports from various South African sources, including the military journal, Paratus, indicate that the South Africans are now concentrating very seriously on training their military forces to cope with what they term "anti-insurgent" operations so that the importance of the Commando role is increasing. One such recent operation, held in the Kwa Zulu Bantustan in 1974 went on for 8 days, involving the Army, Air Force, Navy and Police; The exercise covered the following aspects of counter-insurgency operations:

Integration of Citizen Force, Commando, SAAF, SA Navy and SA Police elements in operations. Intelligence processing at unit and group HQ level.

Co-operation with local authorities and other departments.

At unit level:

1. Employment of armored cars.
2. Employment of light fixed wing aircraft.
3. Road movement.
4. Search and destroy operations.
5. Patrolling, road blocks, ambushes, counter penetration operations along a coastline. Follow-up operations.

According to the Paratus report the air arm was provided by a squadron of Citizen Force volunteer pilots with their own aircraft. They were used for visual recce, contact recce, evacuation of casualties, communication flights and special operations.

It is now increasingly clear that there have been even more serious erosion in the formal arms embargo, and that both light aircraft such as Cessnas and heavy transport planes, such as the Lockheed Hercules C-130 have been provided directly to the South African Government for military use, long after the supposed imposition of an embargo in 1963.

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (see App. I) there are now at least 7 C-130's operating in transport squadrons of the South African Airforce. Cessnas are used in a squadron assigned to the army, and in both the Reserve squadrons and the Air Commando squadrons.

These aircraft play a direct military role in operations quite openly described by the South Africans in their publications. Thus, in an article depicting the role of *Aircraft on the Border* Paratus refers both to the usefulness of the C-130s and to the invaluable role played by the Cessna, commenting that: "Without these aircraft, the helicopter, Cessna and Dakota, Problems of supplies and communication would be insurmountable."

Among the tasks performed by these planes are :

"Reconnaissance: Low-level visual reconnaissance with a pilot and observer is done by the Cessna because of its manoeuvrability and low fuel consumption. These small aircraft keep the one thousand mile border under constant surveillance.

"Aerial observation post: Cessnas can be used to control ground fire onto specific targets and to report subsequent enemy movement." (see App. II)

Thus U.S. aircraft are being built into South Africa's system of military repression in the most direct way possible. It is these aircraft that will be in the forefront of the inevitably bloody suppression of any Black attempt to oppose continued white minority rule. It should be remembered that in South Africa a terrorist is defined, by law, as anyone who attempts to embarrass the affairs of state. Thus even peaceful demonstrators or striking workers might find themselves the targets of these U.S. built airplanes, and it is certain that in any development of a liberation war such as that just ended in Mozambique, American planes would be used to search out and destroy African freedom fighters.

| South Africa | Nigeria | Tanzania | Zaire Republic |
|---|--|---|---|
| <p>Population: 24,490,000 (4,000,000 white). Military service: 9-12 mo in citizen force. Total armed forces: 15,700 regular, 31,750 conscripts. Estimated GNP 1973: \$26,900,000,000. Defence expenditure: 1974-75: 500,000,000 rand (\$750,000,000). \$1 = 0.667 rand (1974), 0.672 rand (1973). Army: 7,000 regular, 27,500 conscripts. 3 inf bdes, each of 1 tk, 1 inf and 1 arty bn. 100 Centurion Mark 5, 20 Comet med tks; 1,000 AML-50 and AML-50 and 50 M-3 armed cars; 50 Ferret scout cars; 250 Saracen, about 100 V-150 Commando APC; 25 pdr gun/how, 155mm how, 35mm L-70/40 and 3.7 inch AA guns; 3 batteries of 18 Cactus (Crotale) SAM. Reserves: 60,000 citizen force, in 9 territorial commands. Reservists serve 9 days a year for 9 years. Navy: 3,200 regular, 1,250 conscripts. 3 submarines. 2 destroyers with Wasp ASW helicopters, 3 frigates (3 with Wasp ASW helicopters). 1 escort minesweeper (training ship). 10 coastal minesweepers. 5 seaward defence boats. 1 fleet replenishment tanker. 7 Wasp helicopters (10 more on order). Reserves: 9,000 trained reserves in Citizen Force (with 2 frigates and 7 minesweepers). Air Force: 5,500 regular, 3,000 conscripts; about 100 combat aircraft. 1 br sqn with 6 Canberra B(1) Mk 12, 3 T Mk 4, 1 F1 bomber sqn with 10 Buccaneer S Mk 50, 2 fighter sqns with 32 Mirage IIIEZ and 8 IIIIDZ, 1 fighter/rece sqn with 16 Mirage IIICZ, 4 IIIBZ and 4 IIIRZ. 2 MR sqns with 7 Shackleton MR3, 9 Piaggio P-166S Albatross (11 more P-166S on order), 4 tp1 sqns with 7 C-130B, 9 Transall C-190Z, 23 C-47, 5 C-54, 1 Viscount 781 and 4 HS-125 Mercurius. 4 hel sqns: 2 with 20 Alouette III each; 1 with 20 SA-330 Puma; 1 with 15 SA-321L Super Frelon (1 flight of 7 Wasp naval-assigned). (1 army-assigned tp1 sqn with Cessna 185 A/D and A185E to be replaced by AW-30C. Trainers incl Harvard, 160 MB-326M Impala (some armed in a COIN role): Vampire FB Mk 6, MK 9, T MK 55; TF-85; C-47 and Alouette II/III. (15 MB-326K on order). Reserves: 3,000 active citizen force, 8 sqns with 20 Impala; 100 Harvard II, III, T-65 (Texan); 20 Cessna 185A/D, A185E. 12 Air Commando sqns (private aircraft). Paramilitary Forces: 75,000 commandos organized and trained as a Home Guard.</p> | <p>Population: 60,960,000. Military service: voluntary. Total armed forces: 210,000. Estimated GNP 1973: \$7,500,000,000. Defence budget 1974-75: 336,000,000 naira (\$548,000,000). \$1 = 0.613 naira (1974), 0.658 naira (1973). Army: 200,000. 3 infantry divisions, 3 reconnaissance regiments, 3 artillery regiments, 3 engineer regiments, garrison troops, Saladin and 20 AML-60/90 arm'd cars; Ferret scout cars; Saracen APC; 25-pdr, 105mm and 122mm guns; 40mm AA guns. (Scorpion lt tks and Fox scout cars on order). Reserves: 10,000. Navy: 5,000. 1 ASW/AA frigate, 2 corvettes, 5 seaward defence boats, 4 patrol craft, 1 landing craft. Reserves: 2,000.</p> | <p>Population: 14,730,000. Military service: voluntary. Total armed forces: 14,600. Estimated GNP 1973: \$1,700,000,000. Defence expenditure 1974-75: 300,000,000 shillings (\$42,000,000). \$1 = 7.16 shillings (1974), 7.02 shillings (1973). Army: 13,000. 1 tank battalion, 4 infantry battalions, 20 chinese I-59 med, 14 T-62 lt tks, BTR-40 and 152 APC; 120mm chinese mor, 24 ex-soviet 76mm guns; 8 122mm how; 14.5mm AA guns.</p> | <p>Population: 24,680,000. Military service: voluntary. Total armed forces: 50,000. Estimated GNP 1973: \$3,100,000,000. Defence expenditure 1974: 52,000,000 zaires (\$104,000,000). \$1 = 0.50 zaires (1974), 0.50 zaires (1973). Army: 45,000. 1 armoured car regiment, 1 mechanized battalion, 14 infantry battalions, 7 parachute battalions, 7 'guard' battalions. The above, together with support units, form 1 parachute division and 7 brigade groups. 100 AML armed cars; M-3 and 30 Ferret scout cars (less than 1/2 operational). Coast, River and Lake Guard: 200. 1 river boat, 1 patrol boat, 6 patrol craft.</p> |
| <p>Air Force: 5,000; 42 combat aircraft. 1 bomber squadron with 6 II-28, 2 FGA squadrons with 15 L-29 Delfin, 2 med tp1 squadrons with 6 C-47, 6 F-27, 1 lt comms squadrons with Do-27, 1 SAR hel sqn with 3 WinWind and 4 Bo-105, 3 training/service sqns with 20 SA Bulldog 5 P-149D, up to 28 Do-27/28A/B and 4 Piper Navajo.</p> | <p>Air Force: 1,000; 24 combat aircraft. 1 fighter sqn with 12 MiG-19 and 12 MiG-17 (ex-chinese), 1 transport sqn with 10 DHC-4 and 1 AN-2, 2 AB-206A and 2 Bell 47G hel. 7 Piaggio P-149D trainers. Paramilitary Forces: A police marine unit.</p> | <p>Air Force: 800; 33 combat aircraft. 1 fighter wing with 17 MB-326GB, 6 AT-6G and 10 T-28 armed trainers. 1 tp1 wing with 9 C-47, 4 C-54 and 3 C-130. 1 training wing with 8 T-6 and 12 SF-260MC. 1 hel sqn with 20 Alouette II/III and 7 SA-330 Puma. (17 Mirage V, 3 C-130H on order.) Paramilitary Forces: 12,000; 8 National Guard and 6 Dendarmier battalions.</p> | |

¹ Some South African troops are operating in the Caprivi Strip in Namibia (South West Africa).

Source: "The Military Balance 1974-1975", The International Institute for Strategic Studies London, England.

APPENDIX II

AIRCRAFT ON THE BORDER

The prevailing topographical and climatic features on the northern borders of South Africa necessitate the use of a number of types of aircraft for various purposes. They undertake regular flights conveying supplies which could not be adequately transported by surface from Pretoria to bases serving the border areas.

This is of particular value during the rainy season when roads become impassible. Air-lifted supplies are off-loaded at the large central bases where they are stored and subsequently flown to smaller and more remote bases by helicopter, Dakota or Cessna.

Other than this basic freight work, for which they are designed (the C130 and C160's being famous for their ability to take off and land from extremely short runways), these aircraft do no other border work and are based and maintained at Pretoria.

The most practical aircraft used in the primitive bushveld found on the border is the helicopter. They are based at the two main camps with the necessary pilots and maintenance crews, all of whom are members of the Permanent Force or extended-service National Servicemen who have been trained for their various jobs. Pilots and crew serve stints of duty of two or three months, after which they rejoin their base units.

Helicopters are used in the following ways :

CASUALTY EVACUATION

Because of the size and ruggedness of the surrounding country, an otherwise minor casualty on the border can lead to serious complications. Often patrols are taken deep into the bush, and even in many of the camps themselves medical facilities, although adequate for everyday mishaps, cannot cope where surgery is required. Here the helicopter comes to the fore through its ability to land in small spaces, or even to winch up a casualty from the bush without landing. Inside the helicopter are attachments for stretchers and adequate room for a doctor and assistant to work while the patient is in transit.

TRANSPORTATION AND RESUPPLY OF TROOPS

To patrol the vast open spaces between border posts, troops need to travel great distances. Where roads are bad or nonexistent, this takes time. In these conditions the helicopter is used to ferry troops to various points in the bush, to return for them later. These troops are landed from the helicopter, or, if no open space is available in the bush, dropped by winch. At the end of the patrol, at a prearranged time and place, they are picked up in a similar manner. If need be, they can be re-supplied with water and food and ammunition during the course of their patrol.

RECONNAISSANCE

Although not normally used for reconnaissance, the helicopter is indispensable when used in conjunction with ground patrols, as it can reach the border in the immediate vicinity for signs of enemy movement and then give aerial support to the patrol if necessary. They have also been used successfully searching for lost troops.

MAINTENANCE

Each pilot has his own particular aircraft and, with his ground crew, looks after it with parental assiduity. Spares are scarce and help far away. Whatever goes wrong must be repaired on the spot with the equipment available. Facilities, however, are good and the aircraft are kept in excellent condition. A helicopter needs servicing every five flying hours, so pilots and crew are kept busy, sometimes working through the night and all week-end to prepare their aircraft for service.

The aircraft which matches the helicopter's versatility and indispensability on the border is the Cessna. Used first in 1966, their landing field was the main dirt road in front of the local police station. These pilots also serve stretches of two to three months at a time.

Cessnas are used in the following ways :

RECONNAISSANCE

Low-level visual reconnaissance with a pilot and observer is done with the Cessna because of its manoeuvrability and low fuel consumption. These small aircraft keep the one thousand mile border under constant surveillance.

LIGHT TRANSPORT

All border posts have some kind of airfield or runway, but the majority consist mainly of a strip cleared of bush and levelled. These dirt runways turn into veritable quagmires in the wet season and at times it takes all the pilot's skill to reach take-off speed on the water-logged field, and landing can give the aircraft a mudbath from tip to tail! Personnel, rations and equipment are flown wherever they are required, often to settlements and camps too small to be honoured with a name on the map. A book, listing conditions of each runway, has entries which often look like this :

| | |
|----------------------|---------|
| Markings ----- | NIL |
| Wind Indication----- | NIL |
| Clearways ----- | NIL |
| Taxi Tracks----- | NIL |
| Dispersal Area----- | NIL |
| Facilities ----- | NIL |
| Drainage ----- | Natural |

CASUALTY EVACUATION

Special fittings for stretchers, drip and other medical equipment are fitted into each Cessna. One pilot informed me that a woman had even given birth in his Cessna while she was being rushed to hospital.

AERIAL OBSERVATION POST

Cessnas can be used to control ground fire onto specific targets and to report subsequent enemy movement.

ROAD RECONNAISSANCE

The Cessna is used to check on the condition of roads before a convoy sets off. Also, when large convoys are in transit, the distance between the leading and trailing vehicles can be as much as ten miles. The Cessna flies above the convoy and reports all required information to the convoy leader by radio.

RADIO RELAY POSTS

Because of the flatness of the terrain radio aerials cannot be placed on natural outcrops to augment their height. Radio communication is therefore at times difficult. Use is made of the Cessna to relay important radio messages, its height overcoming the ubiquitous topographical problem. Again, as with the helicopter, each pilot has his own aircraft and close attachments are formed. Each aircraft is given a name, usually terms of endearment, such as "Baby Jumbo", "Bukes' Baby", etc., and with the dedicated work of the ground crew all aircraft are kept in excellent flying shape. No matter what time the Cessna comes in, it is always welcomed by its crew who check and secure it for the night, always looking after its affairs before their own.

When writing about aircraft on border duty, some mention must be made of that old work-horse the Dakota. Flying long hours and heavy freights, this

versatile aircraft is a great asset to any border camp. It lands and takes off on the same bad runways, does work that no other self-respecting aircraft would do, but always keeps its head high with a little coaxing from pilot and crew.

Without these aircraft, the helicopter, Cessna and Dakota, problems of supplies and communication would be insurmountable. It is through them that the continued presence of our troops is guaranteed and life on the border made a little easier.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much.

We are going to hear next from Elizabeth Landis. I sometimes wonder if we can finish this hearing. There is another vote on now, but I can wait until the second bell. At any rate, I may have to interrupt you.

**STATEMENT OF MS. ELIZABETH S. LANDIS, LEGAL CONSULTANT,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSIONER FOR NAMIBIA**

Ms. LANDIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to omit a great deal of what is background material in my statement and simply turn very quickly to a series of recommendations which I have to make with as little explanatory material as possible.

I must say, I am terribly concerned with Mr. Davis' admission that, in fact, the United States has no plans for positive action to help bring about the liberation of Namibia.

It is ridiculous. There are all kinds of things that the United States might be doing, and I would like to list a number of them, as quickly as possible.

Senator CLARK. I think his testimony indicated that they were only talking to the British and French at this point.

Ms. LANDIS. Well, talk is cheap. But planning is important.

For the sake of clarity, I have broken down these recommendations into five major groups:

**FULL COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL COURT'S 1971 ADVISORY OPINION
ON NAMIBIA**

The first one is full compliance with the International Court's 1971 advisory opinion on Namibia.

My first suggestion is that the United States should denounce the provisions in its double taxation and extradition treaties with South Africa which extend those treaties to Namibia.

Another suggestion is that the United States should refuse to apply GATT provisions to goods of Namibian origin, since Namibia is not a party to GATT. It should in addition, take the necessary steps to insure that goods of Namibian origin are not passed off as if they were of South African origin, in order to obtain the benefit of GATT provisions.

Another suggestion that has already been discussed enough, I think, is that the United States should extend its arms embargo against various things which are not now covered, and, in particular, it should

extend it to technical know-how, patents and machinery for producing armaments within South Africa, itself.

Similarly, it should refuse to supply South Africa with enriched uranium or with equipment, data, patents, or technical advice concerning uranium enrichments; and it should refuse to train South African nuclear scientists and technicians; and so on.

WITHDRAWAL OR DISCOURAGEMENT OF U.S. INVESTMENT IN NAMIBIA

My second category is withdrawal, or at least discouragement, of American investment in Namibia.

In this connection I know that the U.S. State Department has sent out a nice letter to American investors in Namibia saying, "Our policy is to discourage investment. But if you will invest anyway, please treat your workers humanely."

This is not my idea of discouragement. And it is quite clear that other government departments do not discourage investment even that much.

To effectively discourage investment, I would say that, first of all, the United States should deny tax credits to American investors who are paying taxes to the South African government on Namibia operations. And the legislation or ruling—whichever is involved—should make clear that if a tax credit is denied, a deduction of the taxes paid as a necessary business expense is also not to be allowed.

In addition, I think it is perfectly clear that all departments of the Government ought to be instructed to discourage American investment, to take various actions discussed in my written statement. In particular, the United States ought to refuse all consular services to American investors in Namibia.

TREATMENT OF REFUGEES FROM SOUTHERN AFRICA

I have a third category on the treatment of refugees from southern Africa. They ought to be treated as political refugees as much as escapees from Cuba. I will not go into any more detail on that.

SUPPORT FOR NAMIBIA IN UNITED NATIONS

I would like to spend a little more time on the fourth category—support for Namibia in the United Nations—because I feel that the representations that were made here earlier this morning were somewhat distorted.

First of all, the United States, I feel very strongly, should reverse its record on Namibian and South African issues in the United Nations. It has gotten to the point where this last year, in one case the United States was the only country in the entire General Assembly that voted with South Africa. This is a pretty sad state of affairs.

I have here, and I would like to submit for the record, if I may, analyses of U.S. voting records on southern African issues for 1972 and 1973.

Senator CLARK. That would be most useful.

Ms. LANDIS. I am sorry I do not have the one for 1974. I will send it around later, if I can get around to finishing it.

Senator CLARK. I wish you would. That would be very, very enlightening.

[The information referred to follows:]

SOUTHERN AFRICA PERSPECTIVES—SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE UNITED STATES RECORD
AT THE UNITED NATIONS, 1972

[Supplied by: Elizabeth S. Landis]

The UN continued during 1972 to devote considerable time and energy to the seemingly intractable problems of southern Africa. Indeed, 1972 may be noted by future historians as the year in which both the General Assembly and the Security Council reached out—erratically and sometimes contradictorily, even erroneously, towards new initiatives to achieve some action on Southern Africa.

1972 may also be noted as the year in which the US conclusively proved in the UN that, despite its fine rhetoric, it does not disapprove of apartheid and colonialism as much as it fears effective steps to end them. The American position was made explicit in the General Assembly as US representatives repeatedly broke with the majority of the Western European countries to vote with South Africa and Portugal on resolutions opposing apartheid and colonialism.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Despite the US—or perhaps because the Assembly felt it unprofitable to water down resolutions to try to win American acquiescence—the 1972 Assembly took two very significant new steps relating to southern Africa:

1. Following a recommendation of the 1971 Assembly, it admitted representatives of the Organization of African Unity—recognized liberation movements from Namibia, Zimbabwe, and the Portuguese colonies as observers to committee discussions of territory represented by the movement. While this limited status fell far short of the movements' desires, it clearly represented a vital first step in that direction. (Resolution 3051, Namibia; 2918, Portuguese Colonies; and 2915, Zimbabwe) A long second step, probably involving major conflict within the UN, may well be taken when the PAIGC issues its anticipated claim to be the rightful government of Guinea-Bissau in 1973.

2. In a series of resolutions the Assembly "affirmed" the legitimacy of the struggle against apartheid and colonialism "by all available means", thereby effectively giving its blessing to wars of national liberation. The United States, born in revolution, opposed these resolutions approving violence.

Important provisions of the most significant resolutions adopted by the Assembly are summarized below.

Anti-colonialism Resolutions

Resolution 2908 (XXVII) Implementation of Independence for Colonial Peoples

The key provision of this resolution reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of colonial peoples and recognizes their right to achieve self-determination and independence "by all the necessary means at their disposal . . ." (Par. 6) The resolution also condemns the imposition of non-representative regimes and arbitrary constitutions on colonial territories (par. 7) and requests that states withhold assistance of any kind from Portugal, South Africa, and the Smith regime in Rhodesia. (par. 9)

The US joined France, Portugal, South Africa, and the United Kingdom in voting against this resolution.

Resolution 2979 (XXVII) Activities of Foreign Economic Interests

This resolution reaffirms the rights of people in dependent territories to self-determination and independence and to the enjoyment of the natural resources of their territories (par. 1). It also reiterates that the activities of foreign economic and other interests operating in Rhodesia, Namibia, and the Portuguese colonies "constitute a major obstacle to political independence" (par. 2) and condemns

the policies of colonial and other powers which support such interests. (par. 5) In particular, paragraphs 6 and 7 condemn the Cabora Bassa project in Mozambique, the Cunene River project in Angola and all governments which have not prevented their nationals from participating in these projects. The resolution also requests states to end all assistance to regimes which repress the people of colonial territories (par. 9) and calls on the administering powers to abolish discriminatory and unjust wage systems in their dependent territories (par. 10).

The U.S., sensitive to any calls to restrict private enterprise, and calling the resolution unrealistic, joined Canada, France, Portugal, South Africa, and the United Kingdom in opposing the resolution.

Resolution 2980 (XXVII) Implementation of Independence for Colonial Peoples by U.N. Agencies

The U.S. also voted against Resolution 2980, which calls on specialized agencies and other international institutions associated with the U.N. to assist colonial persons in Africa struggling for their independence as well as persons in liberated areas; to discontinue all collaboration with South Africa, Portugal, and the Smith regime until they renounce racial discrimination and colonial oppression; and to ensure the representation of colonial territories in Africa by their national liberation movements "in an appropriate capacity" when dealing with territorial matters.

South Africa—apartheid resolutions

Resolution 2923E Situation in South Africa

This resolution inter alia, condemns South Africa for intensifying the implementation of apartheid and its "Bantustan" policy and for exporting apartheid to neighboring territories, especially Namibia; and it demands an end to repressive laws and persecution of opponents of apartheid (pars. 1-5). It calls on all states to fully implement the U.N. arms embargo against South Africa, reaffirms its belief that only sanctions can change the situation in South Africa, and requests the Security Council to consider adopting such measures under Chapter VII of the Charter (pars. 6, 7). It states its support of the internal opponents of South Africa (par. 9) and reaffirms the "legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa to eradicate apartheid and racial discrimination by all available means . . ." (par. 10)

The U.S., again declaring its adamant opposition to violence, including wars of national liberation, joined Portugal, South Africa, and the United Kingdom in voting against the resolution, while most of western Europe abstained.

The U.S. did support three resolutions on apartheid which required no substantial action; but it abstained on three other, almost equally innocuous resolutions relating to the work program of the Special Committee on Apartheid, the dissemination of information on apartheid, and on an International Conference of Trade Unions against Apartheid. (Resolutions 2923 C, D, and F)

Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) resolutions

Resolution 2945 (XXVII) Question of Southern Rhodesia

The preamble to this resolution "notes with satisfaction" the African rejection (as reported by the Pearce Commission) of the (Goodman Commission) "proposals for a settlement" between the United Kingdom and the Smith regime in Rhodesia. The first operative paragraph reaffirms the principle of no independence before majority rule in the territory and calls for full participation of popular leaders in any settlement and for approval by the people of the territory. Subsequent paragraphs condemn the presence and intervention of South African troops in Zimbabwe (par. 5); they call on the United Kingdom to refrain from treating the Smith regime as sovereign (par. 2), to convene a national constitutional convention of genuine popular representatives to work out an acceptable settlement, and to assure that any future constitutional arrangements should be determined by universal adult suffrage on the basis of one-man, one-vote.

The U.S. voted with Portugal, South Africa, and the United Kingdom against the resolution, claiming that it required too much of Britain.

Resolution 2946 (XXVII) Question of Southern Rhodesia (Sanctions)

This resolution deploras the refusal of the United Kingdom to take measures to end the illegal regime in Zimbabwe (par. 1); condemns South African and Portuguese collaboration with the Smith regime (par. 2); condemns generally

violations of mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia (par. 3), and, in particular, importation of Rhodesian nickel and chrome by the United States (following enactment of the "Byrd Amendment".) (par. 4)

The U.S. joined Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, South Africa, and the United Kingdom in opposition to this resolution. U.S. representatives bitterly attacked what they considered undue attention to American violation of sanctions under the Byrd amendment while others engaged in far more extensive sanction-busting.

Portuguese colonies resolutions

Resolution 2918 (XXVII) Territories under Portuguese Administration

This resolution was the only one directed specifically to the Portuguese territories although several anti-colonial resolutions were concerned primarily with the same areas. After condemning Portuguese colonial policy and the "continued collaboration" of South Africa and the Smith regime in Rhodesia (preamble) it affirms that the national liberation movements are the "authentic representatives of the true aspirations" of the people of the territories and calls on U.N. agencies and organizations, when dealing with matters affecting the territories, to ensure their representation by the liberation movements. (par. 2) Paragraph 3 calls on the Portuguese to end repression in the colonies and to treat captured freedom fighters in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The next paragraph requests material and moral assistance for the colonial people to help them continue their struggle for self-determination and independence, and paragraph 5 requests governments, particularly NATO members to withdraw all assistance to Portugal which enable it to continue colonial repression.

The U.S., maintaining its reactionary stand and unwilling to concede that NATO weapons which it supplies to Portugal were being used for colonial repression, joined Brazil, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, and the United Kingdom in opposing the resolution. Canada, the Scandinavian, and other western European states joined the majority of the Third World in supporting the resolution, while Belgium, France and Italy abstained on this vote.

Resolutions concerning Namibia

Resolution 3031 (XXVII) Question of Namibia

The first paragraph reaffirms the inalienable right of Namibians to self-determination and independence and the legitimacy of their struggle "by all means" against the illegal occupation of their territory. The next emphasizes the territorial integrity of Namibia. Paragraph 6 deplors support given South Africa by states and "interests" operating in Namibia, and paragraph 7 calls on states, inter alia, to refrain from all relations with South Africa where it purports to represent Namibia. The resolution also calls on states to refuse to grant recognition to any rights or interests acquired in Namibia under South African authority since the termination of the mandate.

Paragraph 9 reaffirms the authority of the Council for Namibia as the administering authority and specifies certain functions and responsibilities the Council should discharge. Paragraph 10 requests cooperation by states and U.N. agencies and institutions with the Council, and the next paragraph invites the Security Council to take effective measures to implement the resolution.

Paragraph 12 enlarges the membership of the Council, a proposal informally discussed for some years but not formally made until there was some certainty that new members would be forthcoming. The People's Republic of China immediately indicated its willingness to serve on the Council and this generated a quick revival of interest in membership. The U.S.S.R., reversing its previously cautious attitude to the Council, sought membership, as did Poland and Rumania. Burundi, Liberia, and Mexico completed the roster of new members, adding seven to the original roster of eleven (Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Zambia).

The United States abstained on this resolution.

SECURITY COUNCIL

While most of the initiatives relating to southern Africa originated in the Assembly in 1972, the Security Council and the Council for Namibia both took important steps as far as Namibia was concerned. It appears that countries sympathetic to South Africa played an important role in developing several of the Security Council moves.

Resolution 309 (1972) Secretary-General Contacts

At the Security Council meeting in Addis at the beginning of 1972, the Argentine representative urged another attempt at negotiations with Pretoria concerning Namibia. The French representative is reported to have generated support for this proposal by suggesting that, if South Africa remained adamant, the French government would change its position on Namibia. Paragraph 1 of resolution 309, accepted on this basis by the African members of the Security Council, "invited" the Secretary-General "to initiate . . . contacts with all parties concerned . . . to enable the people of Namibia . . . to exercise their right to self-determination and independence . . ." He was to report back by the end of July.

The American Committee on Africa, condemning the move to engage in dialogue with South Africa over Namibia pointed out that this was a step backward from the previous UN position which, by terminating the South African mandate, had ended completely all South African authority in the territory. "The fact that South Africa has expressed a willingness to allow a special representative to make occasional trips to Namibia may seem to some to indicate a new liberality in South Africa's policy. To us it indicates the meaninglessness of the proposal which South Africa can accept because it makes no demands for a change in policy. At the very time that this proposal is being worked out, the South African regime is tightening up its apparatus for control in Namibia."

The United States gave its full support to this more as a constructive and bloodless approach to the problem of Namibia.

Resolution 310 (1972) Illegal Occupation of Namibia

In order to gain broader acceptance for the proposals embodied in resolution 309, the Security Council also adopted at Addis a resolution reaffirming the right of Namibians to self-determination and independence with national unity and territorial integrity. The most significant provisions are found in paragraph 5, which calls on all states whose nationals operate in Namibia despite UN resolutions, to ensure that such nationals hire Namibian workers in conformity with the basic provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (This was particularly aimed at contract labor.)

The United States voted for this resolution. In so doing it seems to have tacitly accepted the legal proposition that the Declaration is part of the constitutional law of Namibia.

Resolution 319 (1972) Continued Contacts with South Africa

The South African government immediately invited the Secretary-General to visit Namibia, and he accepted the invitation. At the end of July he issued a very hopeful report, indicating progress and recommending continuation of his mission, with the appointment of a special representative to deputize for him. Although the Africans voiced fears that no concrete results would emerge from the Secretary-General's contacts and expressed some concern that further negotiation under the terms established by Pretoria might be construed as tacit recognition of some South African rights in Namibia, they bowed to Western pressure, appearing sensitive to the accusation that a failure to agree to the extension of the Secretary-General's authority would be cutting off fruitful possibilities for peaceful settlement. He was thus given until the end of November to continue his contacts, and the authority to appoint a representative to help him.

The US supported the Secretary-General on the basis that the talks appeared promising and voted for the resolution.

Resolution 323 (1972) Further Extension of Discussions

It is reported that the South African government vetoed several emissaries proposed by the Secretary-General before he finally named Ambassador Alfred Martin Escher of Switzerland to represent him in continuing discussions. Ambassador Escher also made a trip to Namibia and South Africa. On November 30 he submitted a report which in effect accepted the South African Bantustan policy which Vorster had rechristened "regionalism", and attempted to disguise with a proposal for a token Advisory Council for Namibia. The report was so bitterly attacked that it and its author were dropped. But the African states were still unwilling to accept the onus for ending the mission, which was continued once more till the end of April 1973.

The United States supported resolution 323, extending the Secretary-General's powers to continue contacts. (Since that time the Council for Namibia, which the Secretary-General had not treated as a "concerned party" and had not consulted, has recommended that the Secretary-General's authority be terminated;

it pointed out that while the discussions were going on, without tangible results, South Africa continued to expand its "homeland" program in Namibia and to victimize its opponents.)

COUNCIL FOR NAMIBIA

In its first years of existence, the Council for Namibia was able to accomplish very little. However, in 1972 it also began to take some new initiatives.

Southeast Atlantic Fisheries

Early in 1972 the Council learned that an organizing meeting of the Southeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission was to open shortly in Rome under the auspices of the Food and Agriculture Organization, which had initiated the international convention under which the Commission had been created. It was apparent that the Commission would deal primarily with fishing in and near Namibian territorial waters, which were claimed by South Africa, and that South Africa would in effect represent Namibia at the meeting. The Council asked the Commission to be allowed to represent Namibian interests. When the Commission turned down the Council's proposed intervention, the FAO withdrew its assistance to the Commission in a step which served to acknowledge the validity of the Council's claim to represent Namibia.

The U.S. was not a member of the Commission and apparently was not aware of any of the action, all of which took place in about a week.

Investigation of Working Conditions in Namibia

As the general strike of Namibian workers, which began in December 1971, stretched into the spring of 1972 and unverifiable reports of victimization of strikers filtered out of the Territory, the Council sought first-hand information on working conditions in the Territory. Consequently the Council requested the presidents of Newmont Mining Co. and American Metal Climax Corp., which manage and jointly dominate Tsumeb Mining Co., the largest copper mine in Namibia accounting for 80% of all the base mineral production in Namibia and is the largest single private employer of labor, to meet with the Council and discuss working conditions in the Territory. The corporate officers refused. The Council thereupon requested U.S. Ambassador Bush to assist it in obtaining the presence of the corporation presidents, pointing out that this was in line with the requirements of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 310 (see above) which the U.S. had supported only a few months before.

Ambassador Bush's refusal was phrased as if it had been drafted by the corporations: It denied the authority of the Council to take such action, pointing out that the U.S. had not supported Assembly resolution 2248 (S-V) (1967) establishing the Council. Further, the Ambassador attacked the Council for picking on the American companies when employers of other nationalities, with, he claimed, probably worse labor practices, had not been asked to meet with the Council. He did not acknowledge any duties on the part of the U.S. under resolution 310.

Thus the United States has continued to reiterate its verbal support for human rights and self-determination on Southern Africa at the United Nations in 1972. At the same time it consistently opposed all attempts by the majority of the world's nations to initiate actions which would accelerate the struggle for liberation. Defending its stance by a stated abhorrence of violence as a weapon of change, the U.S. chooses to ignore the violence constantly perpetrated against 30 million black people by the white colonial and minority rulers of Southern Africa.

SOUTHERN AFRICA PERSPECTIVES—SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE U.S. RECORD AT THE UNITED NATIONS, 1973

[Supplied by: Elizabeth S. Landis]

United Nations decisions and actions in relation to southern Africa during 1973 generally built upon steps taken in 1972. They took account, however, of two new developments in the area: Guinea-Bissau's declaration of independence; and the failure of the Secretary-General's "mission" to South Africa to arrange the transfer of the administration of Namibia to the UN.

The US reaction to these developments was, typically, negative: it refused to recognize the new state of Guinea-Bissau (and, by implication, threatened

to veto its anticipated application for UN membership). And it clung to the illusion that the Secretary-General's negotiations were making progress (undefined) and therefore argued that they should be continued despite strong African sentiment to the contrary.

During 1973 the US edged closer than ever before to the white minority regimes of southern Africa although it continued to criticize apartheid. Its voting record diverged noticeably from that of most conservative European countries, including even France, which tended to withdraw from an exposed hardline position on racism and colonialism resolutions and frequently abstained instead. On the one issue the United States stood alone with Portugal and South Africa while *all* other states voted against them or abstained.

Most of the significant issues concerning southern Africa were considered by the General Assembly. The Assembly followed the 1972 precedent—opposed both years by the U.S.—in admitting representatives of the concerned OAU—recognized liberation movement as observers during committee discussions of the territory represented by the movement. It also again affirmed—over US opposition—the legitimacy of the struggle against *apartheid* and colonialism by all “necessary” means (in effect by armed force).

Important provisions of the most significant resolutions (classified generally by subject) are summarized below and the US vote indicated as to each.

ANTI-COLONIALISM RESOLUTIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3163 (XXVIII)

IMPLEMENTATION OF INDEPENDENCE FOR COLONIAL PEOPLES

The key provision (Para. 5) of the 17 operative paragraphs reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of colonial peoples for self-determination and independence “by all the necessary means at their disposal” and notes with satisfaction the progress made by the national liberation movements of colonial territories. Paragraph 7 calls for moral and material assistance to struggling colonial peoples, and Paragraph 10 calls on UN agencies to ensure representation of colonial territories by national liberation movements when matters concerning the territories are considered.

The United States joined France, Portugal, South Africa, and the United Kingdom in voting AGAINST this resolution.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3118 (XXVIII)

IMPLEMENTATION OF INDEPENDENCE BY SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

This resolution also reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggles of colonial peoples and urges all moral and material assistance by UN specialized agencies to the peoples of colonial territories, “including especially the populations in the liberated areas . . . and their national liberation movements.”

The US, Portugal, South Africa, and the United Kingdom OPPOSED this resolution.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3117 (XXVIII)

ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC INTERESTS

Operative paragraph 2 reaffirms that foreign economic, financial, and other interests operating in Southern Rhodesia, Namibia, and the Portuguese territories “constitute a major obstacle to political independence and to the enjoyment of the natural resources of those Territories by the indigenous inhabitants. . . .” Paragraph 6 calls on all governments to prevent their nationals from participating in the Cabora Bassa and Cunene River basin projects (in Mozambique and Angola respectively). Paragraph 9 calls on all states, in the language of the World Court's 1971 Advisory Opinion, to refrain from relations with South Africa which may support the continued illegal occupation of Namibia or in which South Africa acts on behalf of Namibia.

Only Portugal, South Africa, and the US voted AGAINST this resolution. Twenty-three states abstained.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3103 (XXVIII)

LEGAL STATUS OF FREEDOM FIGHTERS

This relatively short but revolutionary resolution declares that national liberation wars are "legitimate and in full accordance with the principles of international law" (Paragraph 1) and that attempts to suppress such struggles are "incompatible" with the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, etc. (Paragraph 2) The following paragraphs declare that armed conflicts by subject people against colonial and racist regimes "are to be regarded as international armed conflicts in the sense of the 1949 Geneva Convention," which shall apply to the combatants; and captured freedom fighters are to be accorded the status of prisoners of war. Paragraph 5 declares that the use of mercenaries against freedom fighters is considered a criminal act, and mercenaries shall be punished as criminals.

The US was one of 13 countries—mostly European, but including Brazil, Uruguay, Israel, and South Africa—voting AGAINST the resolution. Nineteen states abstained.

SOUTH AFRICA—APARTHEID

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3151G (XXVIII)

SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

This is the last and most controversial of seven resolutions on South Africa grouped under one resolution number. The resolution condemns South Africa for "its repeated acts of inhumanity and aggression," as well as other states which continue to provide military equipment and supplies to the Republic. (Paragraphs 1, 4) Paragraph 5 condemns "in particular, the unholy alliance between Portuguese colonialism, South African racism, Zionism and Israeli imperialism. . . ." It calls on states to take certain specified actions as a first step to bring pressure on South Africa. (Paragraph 8) Paragraph 2 reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle against *apartheid* by all available means, and paragraph 11 declares the OAU-recognized liberation movements (ANC, PAC) as the "authentic representatives" of the overwhelming majority of the South African people. Finally the resolution condemns South Africa's Bantustan policy. (Paragraph 14)

The US, in company with Bolivia, Israel, Nicaragua, Portugal, South Africa, and the UK, OPPOSED the resolution.

The US ABSTAINED on five other parts of the resolution, but voted FOR Part F, a purely formal resolution calling for voluntary contributions to the UN Trust Fund for South Africa.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3055 (XXVIII)

POLITICAL PRISONERS IN SOUTH AFRICA

The US SUPPORTED a short resolution condemning South Africa for failing to comply with UN requests to release persons "imprisoned, interned, or otherwise restricted" for opposing *apartheid*.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3068 (XXVIII)

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON APARTHEID

The US OPPOSED adoption of a draft convention on *apartheid*, along with Portugal, South Africa, and the UK. The US justified its opposition on the basis of several controversial technical provisions in the convention as drafted—although those flaws may not, in fact, constitute the true basis for American opposition.

RHODESIA (ZIMBABWE)

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3115 (XXVIII)

QUESTION OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA (GENERAL)

This relatively innocuous resolution reaffirms the right of the people of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) to independence (Paragraph 1) as well as the principle of no independence before majority rule there (Paragraph 2). It calls on the UK to end

the illegal Rhodesian regime and to bring about conditions (expulsion of South African forces, release of political prisoners, repeal of discriminatory laws, etc.) necessary for the people "to exercise freely and fully their right to self-determination and independence. . . ." (Paragraphs 3-5).

The US joined Portugal, South Africa, and the UK in OPPOSING the resolution.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3116 (XXVIII)

QUESTION OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA (SANCTIONS)

This stronger and more pointed resolution condemns: the UK for failure to end the illegal Rhodesian regime (Paragraph 1); South African and Portugal for collaborating with the Rhodesian regime (Paragraph 2); the US for continued importation of Rhodesian chrome and nickel in violation of mandatory¹ sanctions (Paragraph 4); and other (unspecified) states for failing to enforce such sanctions (Paragraph 3). Paragraph 7 "invites" the Security Council to widen its sanctions by taking three specified steps. The following paragraphs call on the Security Council to consider imposing sanctions against Portugal and South Africa, to force them to adhere to Rhodesian sanctions; they also appeal to permanent Security Council members not to frustrate Security Council actions against Rhodesia by casting vetoes.

France, Portugal, South Africa, the UK, and the US OPPOSED this resolution.

PORTUGUESE COLONIES

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3061 (XXVIII)

ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF REPUBLIC OF GUINEA-BISSAU

This resolution welcomes the accession to independence of the peoples of Guinea-Bissau. It condemns Portugal for "perpetuating its illegal occupation of certain sectors of the Republic" (Paragraph 2) and demands that it desist from further violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Guinea-Bissau.

The US interpreted the resolution as constituting virtual recognition of Guinea-Bissau and therefore cited all the classic arguments against recognition (inadequate control of population and territory, foreign-based administration, etc.) in explaining its vote AGAINST the resolution. Brazil, Greece, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, and the UK joined in voting no. Thirty states—mostly European and Latin American—abstained.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3113 (XXVIII)

QUESTION OF TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION

This long resolution starts by reaffirming the legitimacy of the struggle for independence of the people of the territories "by all ways and means at their disposal" and recognizes the national liberation movements in territories as the "authentic representatives of the true aspirations" of the peoples. (Paragraphs 1, 2) it recommends that UN specialized agencies deal with the liberation movements when considering matters which affect the territories (Paragraph 2) and give assistance to the people in the liberated areas to help them continue their struggle. (Paragraph 6) It condemns Portugal's continued repression (Paragraphs 3-5) and appeals to NATO allies and others to withdraw assistance which enables Portugal to continue its colonial wars and to refrain from collaboration with Portugal. (Paragraphs 7-9)

The US joined Bolivia, Brazil, France, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, and the UK in OPPOSING this resolution.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3114 (XXVIII)

INQUIRY INTO REPORTED MASSACRES IN MOZAMBIQUE

This resolution established a 5-nation committee of the Assembly to look into alleged massacres of Africans in Mozambique by Portuguese troops, as reported by local missionaries and others.

The US joined Portugal, South Africa, and Spain in OPPOSING this resolution.

¹ i.e., voted by the Security Council and binding on all UN members.

NAMIBIA (SOUTHWEST AFRICA)

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3111 (XXVIII)

QUESTION OF NAMIBIA

This resolution opens by reaffirming the legitimacy of the Namibia's struggle for independence "by all means," recognizing SWAPO as the "authentic representative of the Namibian people" (paragraph 18 provides for defraying SWAPO expenses when accompanying certain UN missions), and condemning South African occupation and repression. (Pt. 1, Paragraphs 1-4) Paragraph 7 states that contacts between the Secretary-General and the South African government should be terminated "as being detrimental to the interests of the Namibian people. . . ." Paragraphs 11-17 call on states and UN agencies to comply with UN resolutions and the recent World Court Advisory Opinion on Namibia; to cooperate with the UN Council for Namibia and invite its participation in their affairs when Namibian interests are affected; and to assist Namibians so that they can continue their struggle for independence. Part II requests more concrete assistance from specialized agencies. Part III calls for more information and publicity about Namibia; its last provision decides to commemorate each August 26 as Namibia Day.

Although the US has adopted a cautiously correct position on legal issues involving Namibia, it was unwilling to approve liberation by armed struggle, and it also disagreed with paragraph 7. It therefore **ABSTAINED** on the resolution.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3112 (XXVIII)

UN FUND FOR NAMIBIA

The two crucial provisions of this resolution allocate \$100,000 to the Fund from the UN's regular 1974 budget (Paragraph 2) and appoint the UN Council for Namibia as trustees of the Fund (Paragraph 6).

In spite of some question as to the advisability of making the Council trustees—since the *delegates* (not the states) sitting as the Council change from meeting to meeting—the US joined the entire UN membership (except Portugal and South Africa) in voting **FOR** the resolution. It appears that the UN may make a substantial contribution to the Fund.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 342 (1973)

DISCONTINUATION OF EFFORTS UNDER RESOLUTION 309 (1972)

In response to Assembly resolution 3111, paragraph 7 (see above) and the urgings of the OAU, the Council for Namibia, and SWAPO, the Security Council voted to discontinue the Secretary-General's contacts with South Africa, undertaken in accordance with its resolution 309 of early 1972.

The US, which had strongly supported the Secretary-General's negotiations as a central feature of its policy on Namibia and expressed a hope that events would allow a revival of the negotiations, nevertheless voted **FOR** the resolution.

MISCELLANEOUS

The US supported the appointment of Sean MacBride, former Irish Foreign Minister, Executive Secretary of the International Commission of Jurists, and Director of Amnesty International, as the new UN Commissioner for Namibia.

The US opposed an amendment to the report of the credentials committee (A/9179) rejecting the credentials of the representatives of South Africa to the General Assembly. Although the amendment succeeded, the chair ruled the amendment was hortatory only, and South Africa was not excluded from the Assembly.

Senator CLARK. I am sorry to say that I must interrupt you long enough for me to go vote. If I do not leave now, I miss the vote. I will be back again in about 7 or 8 minutes. I also have a 12:15 meeting, but I will see if I cannot continue.

[A recess was taken.]

Senator CLARK. Please continue.

Ms. LANDIS. If I may, before I continue, I have here a draft report on foreign investment in Namibia which I would like to submit.

Senator CLARK. It will be made a part of the record.

[The information referred to is in the committee files.]

Mr. LANDIS. And I have something here which I cannot give you. It is the only copy now in existence. But in a few days there will be copies of this study on Namibia Uranium Implications for the South African Occupation Regime. And if I might have the opportunity to send this in, when they come off the press.

Senator CLARK. We would like very much to have that.

[The information referred to is in the committee files.]

Mr. LANDIS. Thank you. Now, I will continue on our voting record, which I think is appalling. I think that, as you pointed out, it is frequently better to make compromises, as most legislators do, and to have some influence on the ultimate outcome of legislation than it is to simply be rigid and refuse to take any part that applies in the U.N. General Assembly.

Secondly, the United States should make annual contributions to the United States Fund for Namibia, through which the U.N. channels its assistance to Namibians outside the territory. The United States did contribute \$50,000 in 1975, but conditioned further contributions on removing the fund from the regular budget of the United Nations, thereby making it totally dependent on voluntary contributions.

The United States should also contribute to the Namibia Institute, which is designed to set up crash courses for the training of Namibians to administer their own country, when it gets its independence. Everybody remembers the problems in the Congo, because there were no people trained to take over. The Namibia Institute is an attempt to prevent that kind of a fiasco in a free and independent Namibia.

Fourth, the United States should declare its support for the decree for the protection of the natural resources of Namibia, which was issued by the United Nations Council on Namibia on the 27th of September, 1974. I have here a copy of that decree, which I would like to submit for the record.

Senator CLARK. Fine. It will be made a part of the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

[Text of the Decree adopted by the U.N. Council for Namibia at its 209th meeting on 27 September 1974 and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its 29th Session on 13 December 1974]

UNITED NATIONS NAMIBIA GAZETTE No. 1

DECREE No. 1—FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES OF NAMIBIA

Conscious of its responsibility to protect the natural resources of the people of Namibia and of ensuring that these natural resources are not exploited to the detriment of Namibia, its people or environmental assets, the United Nations Council for Namibia enacts the following decree:

DECREE

The United Nations Council for Namibia.

Recognizing that, in the terms of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 the Territory of Namibia (formerly South West Africa) is the direct responsibility of the United Nations,

Accepting that this responsibility includes the obligation to support the right of the people of Namibia to achieve self-government and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

Reaffirming that the Government of the Republic of South Africa is in illegal possession of the Territory of Namibia,

Furthering the decision of the General Assembly in resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 which declared the right of people and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources,

Noting that the Government of the Republic of South Africa has usurped and interfered with these rights,

Desirous of securing for the people of Namibia adequate protection of the natural wealth and resources of the Territory which is rightfully theirs.

Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971,¹

Acting in terms of the powers conferred on it by General Assembly resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967 and all other relevant resolutions and decisions regarding Namibia,

Decrees that

1. No person or entity, whether a body corporate or unincorporated, may search for, prospect for, explore for, take, extract, mine, process, refine, use, sell, export, or distribute any natural resource, whether animal or mineral, situated or found to be situated within the territorial limits of Namibia without the consent and permission of the United Nations Council for Namibia or any person authorized to act on its behalf for the purpose of giving such permission or such consent;

2. Any permission, concession or license for all or any of the purposes specified in paragraph 1 above whensoever granted by any person or entity, including any body purporting to act under the authority of the Government of the Republic of South Africa or the "Administration of South West Africa" or their predecessors, is null, void and of no force or effect;

3. No animal resource, mineral, or other natural resource produced in or emanating from the Territory of Namibia may be taken from the said Territory by any means whatsoever to any place whatsoever outside the territorial limits of Namibia by any person or body, whether corporate or unincorporated, without the consent and permission of the United Nations Council for Namibia or of any person authorized to act on behalf of the said Council;

4. Any animal, mineral or other natural resource produced in or emanating from the Territory of Namibia which shall be taken from the said Territory without the consent and written authority of the United Nations Council for Namibia or of any person authorized to act on behalf of said Council may be seized and shall be forfeited to the benefit of the said Council and held in trust by them for the benefit of the people of Namibia;

5. Any vehicle, ship or container found to be carrying animal, mineral or other natural resources produced in or emanating from the Territory of Namibia shall also be subject to seizure and forfeiture by or on behalf of the United Nations Council for Namibia or of any person authorized to act on behalf of the said Council and shall be forfeited to the benefit of the said Council and held in trust by them for the benefit of the people of Namibia;

6. Any person, entity or corporation which contravenes the present decree in respect of Namibia may be held liable in damages by the future Government of an independent Namibia;

7. For the purposes of the preceding paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 and in order to give effect to this decree, the United Nations Council for Namibia hereby authorizes the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, in accordance with resolution 2248 (S-V), to take the necessary steps after consultations with the President.

Ms. LANDIS. I have some comments on the decree, but I will leave them to be read in my written statement.

Now, I would like to touch briefly on another U.N. matter, to say that I think that the United States should call immediately and strongly for new Security Council meetings to follow up on Security Council Resolution 366.

¹ *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 267 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.*

As you remember, Mr. Davis referred to the fact that the United States exercised its second triple veto to prevent Security Council adoption of a mandatory arms embargo, which was sought because South Africa had failed to end its illegal occupation of Namibia.

Now the triple veto, which was followed by no other alternative whatsoever—Council members simply folded up their tents and silently slipped away—the triple veto was interpreted by both Namibians and South Africans as an invitation to settle the whole Namibian issue by force.

South Africa immediately started a new crackdown on its opponents. At the same time it sponsored so-called homeland elections, under its control, and it made preparations to call a constitutional conference, under its control, to be attended by these people who were elected.

Allegations by responsible people that the elections were a fraud have been rejected out of hand by the South African Government. At least one African investigating such charges has been arrested, imprisoned, and beaten.

Namibia watchers assume that by the end of this year there will be a so-called independent Namibia, created by that constitutional conference.

It is also assumed that the great majority of the Namibian people will not accept a so-called independent government led by puppet black leaders. So the Namibian situation will turn from what it is today into a bloody confrontation of black against black.

This is the result of our triple veto. And we seem to be unconcerned about any further action to be taken.

My recommendation is that, at the very least, the United States should call for territory-wide elections on a universal suffrage basis, under U.N. supervision and control, to elect representatives who should consider the future of Namibia. The resolution should declare in advance that any other elections which are not conducted under U.N. supervision and control would be automatically deemed invalid; and that any government established on the basis of such an invalid election would not be recognized by any U.N. member.

Senator CLARK. Your proposal would be our proposal to the United Nations Security Council in the form of a resolution?

Ms. LANDIS. That is right.

CLARIFICATION OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD NAMIBIA, SOUTH AFRICA

And finally, my last point is on the clarification of U.S. policy toward Namibia and South Africa.

I do not want to read out the whole of what I have written but I have gone into the statements of the State Department people over a period of years as I have read them, and I have compared them with the actions which have been taken. Without going into all of those, I do want to point out in particular that the United States, in its so-called leadership exchange program, in which it has brought over blacks from Southern Africa, has failed to bring over a single SWAPO leader, although SWAPO is the recognized authentic voice of the Namibian people, recognized by the OAU and the U.N. It has brought over, sometimes repeatedly, black leaders, many of whom are members of divisive organizations in the territory. And in spite of the fact that

Mr. Davis referred to SWAPO as recognized by the U.N. and the OAU, I must say that one reason given for the U.S. refusal to support the 1974 resolution on Namibia in the U.N. General Assembly was that the United States was unwilling to so recognize SWAPO.

U.S. ACTIONS CONSONANT WITH NSSM 39, OPTION 2

I will skip most of my other points to come to the very last page, in which I point out that in my opinion the actions of the United States are consonant not with our abhorrence of apartheid or with our desire to get South Africa out of Namibia; they are consonant with following option 2 of NSSM 39, to which we all return eventually.

Apart from the fact that NSSM 39 dismisses moral considerations, considerations of the international rule of law, and considerations of the right of black people to independence equal to the right of white people to independence—apart from that, we all have to face the fact that NSSM was based on the false premise that blacks in Southern Africa could not change their condition by force. The Portugese coup has proven the obvious fallacy of that premise and the inadequacy of the basic staff work which produced NSSM 39.

REAPPRAISAL OF SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Sometime last year, it seems clear, a reappraisal was made of the situation in southern Africa. Presumably, a new national security study memorandum, which according to our best information is No. 80-something of 1974, was produced to take account of the changed situation and the weaknesses in NSSM 39. I think, undoubtedly, that the policy that our Government will in the future follow vis-a-vis Namibia and South Africa—whatever State Department officials say publicly—will be found in new NSSM 80-whatever-it-is.

Therefore, my last recommendation for the subcommittee—and I urge it as strongly as I can—is that this subcommittee should insist on obtaining access to the new revised NSSM: that it should refuse to accept anything less than the actual document. It should not accept any gloss on the document. If it is really serious about its attempt to understand or influence American policy toward southern Africa, this is the only way it would know what the policy is that it is influencing.

Thank you.

[Ms. Landis' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH S. LANDIS

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee: I want to congratulate you for holding this series of hearings on southern Africa at a time when change is occurring fast and furiously in that part of the world and when it is vital for our government to respond knowledgeably and sympathetically. I also want to thank you for the opportunity to speak to you about Namibia, which has been of special concern to me for many years now.

For your record, I am a lawyer and an Africanist. I have done technical assistance work for the Government of Liberia, have taught African studies, have worked on southern African questions at the United Nations in various capacities for a number of years, and have written a number of articles and other publications on the public law of South Africa and Namibia. Currently I am legal consultant to the UN Commissioner for Namibia. I speak here in my personal capacity, of course, and my views do not necessarily reflect UN positions.

BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT NAMIBIA

This summary of information about Namibia may provide some background for my recommendations, which follow.

Namibia is one of the larger territories in Africa, some 320,000 square miles in area. It can be roughly superimposed on California and Nevada. It is bounded on the north by Angola, on the east by Botswana, and on the southeast and south by South Africa. At the northern border a long thin panhandle (the Caprivi Strip) stretches some 300 miles further east to a junction with Zambia, Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), and Botswana.

Its population is sparse, some 850,000 by official South African estimate (1974), slightly over 1,000,000 according to the Commissioner's Office. One hundred thousand Namibians are white, descendants of Germans who settled there before World War I and Afrikaners from South Africa who flocked to the Territory after the War.

The Blacks consist mostly of indigenous Africans although there are some persons of mixed descent ("Coloureds," Rehoboth "Easters"). South African ethnologists recognize some nine indigenous "peoples" or "nations." The government claims that these peoples are mutually antagonistic and unable to cooperate politically. It has been, and still is, South African policy to create and enlarge ethnic hostilities, mistrust, and jealousies by every possible means in order to prevent unified opposition.

The Territory is very rich although its primary wealth is in wasting mineral resources: diamonds, low-grade uranium, copper, and other base metals. There is exploration for oil and gas off the coast and some suggestion of finds in very deep water.

These minerals are exploited today almost entirely by foreign capital. The most important investments are South African, followed by American.

Because the land is largely desert or semi-desert, agriculture, except in the northernmost areas, is largely limited to stock-grazing (cattle, karakul sheep). Overgrazing is a continuing problem. Droughts are repeated, sometimes protracted, and the availability of water is the key to agricultural development.

Namibian coastal waters teem with fish, but overfishing by South Africans and other foreigners has caused a serious decrease in the annual catch in recent years. An attempt is now being made to regulate fishing by an international convention, to which South Africa is a party and under which it, in effect, claims to represent Namibia.

The current *legal* status of Namibia is that of an international territory under direct administration of the UN General Assembly, carried out by the UN Council for Namibia and its executive officer, the Commissioner for Namibia. South Africa unlawfully occupies the Territory by force and administers it in defiance of the International Community and of international law.

As members of the Subcommittee are no doubt aware, Namibia, then known as to South West Africa, became an Imperial German Protectorate in 1884-85, as a result of the Congress of Berlin, which established the ground rules for colonial division of Africa.

When Germany lost the First World War, all its colonial territories became mandated territories under the League of Nations. The League entrusted it to the then Union of South Africa, which had occupied it as enemy territory during the War. South Africa was bound by its mandate agreement to deal with the Territory so as to "promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory. . . ." (Art. II)

The South African Government demonstrated almost immediately through its administration of Namibia that it looked upon the mandate as a disguised form of annexation. After the Second World War it was the only mandatory power that refused either to free its mandated territory or to convert it into a UN trust territory.

As international standards for dealing with colonial peoples slowly improved after the War, South Africa's practices in Namibia deteriorated: It introduced its domestic *apartheid* system into the Territory, replacing existing informal racial segregation by rigorous laws. It applied its battery of repressive legislation—including those recent horrors, the Terrorism Act¹ and the "BOSS Act"²—to quash Namibian dissent. It began a process of integrating the Territory eco-

¹ Act No. 83 of 1967.

² Act No. 101 of 1969, sec. 29, as amended.

nomically into the Republic so that, whatever its outward political trappings, it would in fact be dependent economically on South Africa.

The most hated action was, however, the creation of "homelands" ("Bantustans") in Namibia. Applying its theory of irreconcilable ethnic differences among peoples, the South African government created uninational homelands for each "nation" in Namibia. It assigned approximately 40% of the Territory's land surface—or approximately 0.14 square miles per capita—for the Black homelands. The remaining 60% of the Territory, which contains the entire sea-coast, the urban centers, major known mineral deposits, most roads and railroads, and much of the best agricultural land, is the "white homeland"—an allocation of approximately 1.92 square miles per capita. Blacks, forced by the poverty in their own homelands to seek work in the white area, are rightless "aliens" there, though in their own country; they may be sent back to their homelands involuntarily at any time.

By providing substantial perquisites to the local chiefs who back the homelands policy and by promising ultimate "self-government" to each area the Republic has managed to create a class which opposes national unity and fears free and open elections in the Territory.

In October 1968 the UN General Assembly revoked South Africa's mandate over Namibia on account of its maladministration of the Territory. Since that time the South African government has occupied the Territory in clear and flagrant violation of international law. South Africa now has no right to administer the Territory, to represent Namibia or act for it, to grant concessions or collect taxes there, or to engage in any other activity there, except to arrange for the transfer of its administration to the United Nations pending Namibian independence.

This interpretation of international law was specifically upheld by the International Court of Justice in 1971³ when it advised that UN members were under international obligation: to recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the invalidity of its acts on behalf of Namibia; and to refrain from any acts implying recognition of the South African presence or giving support or assistance to its presence. The United States backed this Opinion.

The Republic has, nevertheless, continued its unlawful activities with the acquiescence or connivance of its main trading partners, including the United States. In particular, it has continued its policy of fragmenting Namibia into Bantustans despite UN calls for independence with territorial integrity.

In the last decade, and particularly since the World Court's 1971 Advisory Opinion on Namibia, Namibian opposition to South African rule has become more unified, more militant, and more sophisticated. Namibians are now engaged simultaneously in political opposition within the Territory, military opposition along the northern border, and political lobbying on the international scene. Many observers know of the general strike in late 1971-72, which shut down the Territory for months. But fewer realize that there is a small-scale war of national liberation going on in the north, where South African paramilitary police have been replaced or reinforced by army units.

SWAPO (South West Africa Peoples Organization), which is active in all areas, is the largest constituent of the national liberation movement. It is recognized by the OAU and the UN as the "authentic representative" of the Namibian people. There are, however, other legitimate political groups, most of which collaborate with SWAPO in the newly formed umbrella organization, the Namibian National Convention.

South Africa has reacted to the growing and increasingly effective opposition with a several-pronged counter-attack: It has advanced its homeland program and held out the possibility of an independent Namibia of federated homelands; at the same time it has redoubled its efforts to destroy national unity by harping on the danger of Ovambo (equated with SWAPO) domination of less populous Black groups. It has directed a campaign of ruthless ferocity against opponents, characterized by public floggings of both men and women; imposition of permanent martial law in Ovamboland; and detention without trial and torture, even killing, of untried prisoners. (In consequence thousands of Namibians have fled the country. Protesting churchmen, including this last month the American wife of the Suffragan Bishop of Damaraland, have been forcibly deported from the Territory.) To distract the world's attention, South Africa has laid stress on its importance to the West as the guardian of the Cape route.

³ Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16, at par. 133.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMERICAN ACTION

The following recommendations have been grouped for ease of presentation under five headings. Most of them are not new, although some respond to recent events. They represent what I consider to be a minimal program if the United States intends to pay more than lip service to the International Rule of Law and to prove that it deems the freedom of Blacks as precious as the liberty of whites.

Full compliance with the International Court's Advisory Opinion on Namibia

The United States should denounce the provisions in its double taxation and extradition treaties with South Africa which extend those treaties to Namibia.

The United States should refuse to apply GATT provisions to goods of Namibian origin, since Namibia is not a party to GATT. It should, in addition, take the necessary steps to ensure that goods of Namibian origin are not passed off as of South African origin in order to obtain the benefit of GATT provisions.

The United States has the technical expertise to prevent the mislabeling of Namibian goods based on techniques developed during the two decades it excluded goods from mainland China.

The United States should extend its arms embargo against South Africa to include spare parts, all equipment (such as helicopters and executive jets) convertible to military use, and, equally important, technical know-how, patents, and machinery for producing arms and armaments in South Africa.

Although the United States claims to enforce fully the UN-requested arms embargo against South Africa, there has been some easing of the embargo by means of redefining the goods subject to ban. More important, perhaps, is the transfer of technology, patents, licenses, etc. to the growing South African armaments industry.

The United States should refuse to supply South Africa with enriched uranium or any equipment, data, patent, or technical advice about nuclear devices (peaceful or otherwise). It should refuse to send American nuclear scientists or technicians to South Africa; to train South African scientists and technicians in nuclear technology; or to allow South African scientists or technicians access to American nuclear laboratories, libraries, or plants.

Beyond the support which nuclear cooperation of any sort gives South Africa in its continued occupation of Namibia, it is unthinkable that the United States should give such assistance to any state which has refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Withdrawal, or at least discouragement, of American investment in Namibia

In May 1970 the United States government issued a statement intended to discourage American investment in Namibia by denying post-mandate investors there certain benefits and by refusing to protect them against claims of a future independent Namibian government. This statement is unique among the countries with substantial commercial contacts with South Africa or Namibia.

Nevertheless, there are serious questions about its implementation. As far as I have been able to discover, "discouragement" in fact consists of a form letter sent by the State Department to known American investors setting out this policy and adding that, if they insist on investing, will they please treat their workers humanely. It would be interesting to learn if the State Department ever evaluated its policy to determine its effectiveness.

Furthermore, it appears that other Departments and agencies of government disregard or even oppose the discouragement policy. Thus the Commerce Department approved sending inspectors to Namibia to observe the slaughter of baby seals there for an American fur company. And the IRS, or the White House, refused (when the issue was raised by Congressman Diggs) to deny tax credits to American investors in Namibia for taxes paid to South Africa or their activities in the Territory.

The United States should deny such tax credits to American investors by legislation if it cannot be done by administrative action. The legislation or ruling should not allow, alternatively, a deduction of the taxes paid as a necessary business expense.

All Departments and agencies of government should be instructed to discourage American investment in Namibia by, inter alia, refusing to provide information to potential investors or to assist or furnish any services in connection with such investment. The United States should refuse all consular services to American investors in Namibia.

Recasting immigration policy as to refugees from southern Africa

Unlike refugees from Cuba, Hungary (1956), or Tibet, Blacks from southern Africa have never been treated as, presumptively, political refugees although most of them in fact are. Nearly all of them are hassled by INS officials, and many live under threat of impending deportation—which is tantamount to condemnation to prison or execution. Even white opponents of the South African government find that the INS is likely to accept at face value accusations of ideological impurity made against them by the Republic although the United States has repeatedly denounced the very South African policies they opposed.

The INS should treat Blacks from southern Africa as presumptively political refugees if they claim that status.

The INS should cease its mindless harassment of Black refugees from southern Africa, particularly of students and ex-students who cannot return to their homes safely.

The INS should consider presumptively invalid charges of "communism" and similar accusations levied by any white minority regime against its citizen refugees in the United States who can show that they opposed the regime by means considered legitimate in this country. In case of other charges of a political nature, the immigrant should be accorded basic due process by being informed of the charges made by the regime he opposed and by being granted an opportunity to rebut them in an administrative hearing.

Support for Namibia at the United Nations

The United States should reverse its voting record on Namibian and southern African questions in the United Nations.

The American record on southern African and colonial issues at the United Nations has been going from bad to worse recently. In the 1974 General Assembly session we were South Africa's strongest supporter—in one case the only state in the entire Assembly to vote with the Republic. American representatives condemn South Africa with words, but support it by votes, both in the Assembly and in the Security Council, where the United States participated in the first triple veto in history to prevent expulsion of South Africa from the World Organization. We didn't even vote for the annual resolution on Namibia in 1974.

The United States should recognize that UN resolutions, like domestic legislation, seldom please anyone completely. Our representatives would do better to accept some unpalatable provisions in helping to shape the overall thrust of UN resolutions than to be totally ignored, as they are now, due to their rigidity.

The United States should make annual contributions to the UN Fund for Namibia, through which the UN channels its assistance to Namibians outside the Territory.

The United States contributed \$50,000 in 1974 but conditioned further contributions on removing the Fund from the Organization's regular budget, thus making it wholly dependent on voluntary donations.

The United States should contribute to the Namibia Institute. The Institute, being formally established this week in Lusaka, Zambia, is designed to prepare Namibians, through intensive training, to administer an independent state. It will emphasize training for middle-level administrative personnel and do research on problems that will be faced by the government of an independent Namibia.

The United States should declare its support for the Decree for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia issued by the UN Council for Namibia on 27 September 1974 and approved by the General Assembly on 13 December 1974.

The Decree states that only the Council may authorize the exploitation or exportation of Namibian natural resources, and it provides for the seizure of Namibian resources exported illegally and for their forfeiture to the benefit of the Namibian people.

When Congressman Diggs asked the State Department representative last month about its position on the Decree, he replied that the question would be one for an American court to decide when the issue came before it. This was, unfortunately, an unsatisfactory response, inasmuch as a court faced with such a novel matter would undoubtedly ask the Department for guidance (although it would not be bound by the Department's advice).

The United States should call for new Security Council meetings to follow up on Security Council resolution 366 (1974). It should work, at the very least, for a resolution calling for Territory-wide, universal suffrage elections,

under UN supervision and control, to elect representatives to a Namibian constitutional convention. The resolution should declare in advance that any other elections would be invalid and a government established on the basis of such invalid elections would not be recognized by any UN member.

Resolution 366, adopted last December, gave South Africa until 30 May 1975 to declare that it would leave the Territory and to take some effective step towards that end. When it failed to meet these conditions, the Security Council met to consider what action it should take. It voted on a draft resolution calling for the imposition of sanctions (in the form of a mandatory arms embargo) against South Africa. The resolution received the necessary majority of votes, but it was vetoed by the United States, Britain, and France. This left resolution 366 in effect, but no further action was taken.

Both the Namibians and the South Africans interpreted the triple veto as an invitation to settle the Namibian issue by force. South Africa immediately started a new crack-down on opponents. At the same time it sponsored homeland elections, under its control, for representatives to attend a constitutional conference, under its control, to determine the Territory's political future. Allegations, by responsible churchmen and others, of force and fraud in some of the elections have been rejected out of hand; at least one African investigating such charge has been arrested, imprisoned, and beaten.

Namibia-watchers anticipate that the South Africa-sponsored conference will create a confederal Namibian state, which, by the beginning of 1976, will be given nominal independence under Black puppet leadership. If, as expected, the great mass of Namibians reject the new government, the Namibian situation will turn into one of bloody civil war: Black fighting Black (the one supported by the South African government and the other by?).

Clarification of United States policy towards Namibia and southern Africa

My last recommendation is directed, with all the fervor I can express, to this subcommittee, to urge it to compel the State Department to reveal the policy it is *in fact* following vis-a-vis Namibia and southern Africa.

As I have gone over earlier statements of State Department officials about the American position on Namibia, I find the following:

- (i) The United States is opposed to *apartheid*.
- (ii) It believes that South Africa should get out of Namibia.
- (iii) It believes that Namibians should not use force to drive the South Africans out of their country although it admits that that may be the only way to end the occupation.
- (iv) It supported, and presumably would again support, negotiations by the Secretary-General to try to bring about an end to South African occupation, but it does not believe in the application of sanctions for that purpose.
- (v) It discourages American investment in Namibia but does not advocate withdrawal: it is neutral on American investment in South Africa.
- (vi) It supported revocation of the mandate but opposed establishment of the UN Council for Namibia and refused membership on it because it felt the Council could not be effective.
- (vii) It has refused to support certain Council activities because the resolution which established the Council directed it to go to the Territory and carry out its functions there whereas the Council, due to the continuing South African occupation, has functioned from UN headquarters.

This rag-bag hardly adds up to a coherent policy, in my opinion.

Turning, then, to United States actions to supplement and enlarge on its statements, I find that:

- (i) The United States has failed to implement its obligations as set out in the Advisory Opinion of Namibia.
- (ii) It has in recent years almost consistently opposed (or, at best, abstained on) UN resolutions on southern Africa.
- (iii) It vetoed a Security Council resolution to expel South Africa and another to impose sanctions against South Africa to end its occupation of Namibia. It failed to propose any alternative to the second resolution which it vetoed.
- (iv) It has apparently failed to discourage much investment in Namibia. The only reported withdrawals, by American companies engaged in off-shore oil exploration, resulted from stockholder and IIN pressure.
- (v) It has consistently failed to invite to the United States (under leadership grants and similar programs) leaders of SWAPO, the preeminent liberation organization. Instead it has invited, sometimes more than once, Africans associated with divisive activities in Namibia.

(vi) It has failed to raise a public protest over a number of particularly outrageous actions by the South African government in Namibia, e.g., public floggings; imposition of martial law; maltreatment of prisoners; repression of opposition political parties; deportation of church leaders, including American citizens, etc.

(vii) It has eroded the arms embargo against South Africa and omitted technical assistance from its coverage.

(viii) It has supplied enriched uranium, from which nuclear weapons can be made, to South African and allowed Americans to assist South Africa in developing its own processes although South Africa has failed to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(ix) Behind the scenes it has supported NATO rapprochement with South Africa.

(x) It has unofficially welcomed Admiral Biermann, the South African Chief of Staff, and allowed him to consult with American Defense Department and other government officials in the guise of social gatherings.

(xi) It is rumored to have intervened in Angola, which adjoins Namibia, by granting subventions to the FLNA, one of the competing liberation movements, and probably in other ways.

(xii) It has voided UN-mandated sanctions against Rhodesia (the "Byrd amendment").

(xiii) It appears to have turned a blind eye as long as possible to the recruitment of mercenaries in the United States to fight for the Rhodesian government.

These actions seem hardly consonant, on the whole, with our professed abhorrence of apartheid and our desire to see South Africa out of Namibia. They do, however, seem generally in line with "Option 2" of National Security Study Memorandum 39 of 1969.

Despite denials, Option 2 of NSSM 39 appears to have determined actual American policy towards southern Africa since 1969. Unfortunately it was based on the false premise that Blacks in southern Africa could not change their condition by force. The Portuguese coup a year ago, which resulted from Portugal's inability to win its colonial wars in Africa, demonstrated the fallacy of the premise and the inadequacy of the basic staff work which produced NSSM 39.

Some time last year, it seems clear, a reappraisal was made of the situation in southern Africa. Presently a new National Security Study Memorandum was produced to take account of the changed situation and of weaknesses in NSSM 39. We may assume that the policy that our government will in fact follow vis-a-vis Namibia—whatever State Department officials say publicly—is found in the new NSSM.

Therefore my last recommendation is that this Subcommittee should insist on obtaining access to the new, revised NSSM, and that it should refuse to accept anything less, if it is serious in its attempt to understand or influence American policy towards southern Africa.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much. That is an excellent statement.

We are going to hear next from Mr. Ngubane. You may proceed in any way you think appropriate.

STATEMENT OF JORDAN NGUBANE, SOUTH AFRICAN WRITER

MR. NGUBANE. To start with I want to express gratitude to you for having organized the hearing of evidence on my country. I also want to express gratitude for the reiteration by the many Americans I have listened to this morning of their commitment to the extension of the area of freedom in southern Africa.

VIEW OF U.S. POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA

But I want to submit that it is not enough merely to say that the Americans want self determination for everybody in my part of the world. When the United States exercises its right to veto decisions that

extend the area of liberty I submit, sir, that it is not enough for America to speak of nonviolence when the United States sells uranium to my country. I submit, above all, sir, that it is not enough for the United States to oppose the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations when the United States does not assert leadership initiatives to move events to a negotiated settlement of the race problem.

These difficulties arise, as we see the position ourselves, from the fact that the United States' policy, in particular, is based on inadequate clarity on either our aspirations and what we want or the type of society we want to establish in South Africa. And if this is accepted, the situation will be seen to call for constructive leadership initiatives from the United States to push South Africa toward a settlement of the race question—I will come to this remark a little later.

COMPOSITE VIEW OF SOUTH AFRICAN SITUATION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED

Second, I would think that the situation calls for the realization that the African, the Afrikaner, and the English in South Africa are three different monoliths. Each has its own concept of nationhood, its own churches and universities, and so forth. And in South Africa it is most unfortunate for anybody, either in South Africa itself or outside South Africa to take the *Afrikaner* case as the South African case or the *English* case as the South African case and I submit that our own case is one of three different monoliths. It seems to me that this difference is not considered when South African policy is discussed. People have to take a composite view of the situation.

I am particularly concerned about, for instance, what is happening at the moment as a result of the fact that the developments on my side of the color line are ignored. Right now the South African Government is organizing, or rather, is enlisting Africans for armed service—which is a departure from past policy. At the moment about 48 African soldiers are being trained in Baviaanspoort prison. Also, according to the latest information from the Star, men from the Transkei who have signed up for military service will soon be going to Capetown for military training. My fear is that here we see a pattern unfold whereby the apartheid regime is going to arm those Africans who support it or who have a vested interest in the maintenance of its power against those who oppose apartheid. It would be helpful if the American people took cognizance of the situation that will arise later when the Bantustan states are established, namely that we are likely to have civil war in South Africa, precisely in the way that we have it in Angola.

U.S. POLICY FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA BASED ON IGNORANCE

I say that one of the biggest handicaps that we suffer from is that American policy for my part of the world tends to be based on ignorance. To summarize what I have said here, let me read three paragraphs from NSSM 39. I do not regard NSSM 39, and am not discussing it here, as indicating a tilt towards South Africa at all. The point I am establishing is that we have the fear that American policy is based on ignorance when it comes to our side of the story.

NSSM, "There are reasons to question the depth and the permanence of Black resolve (to overthrow White domination.) Recently there has been a decline in the level of insurgency in Southern Africa. Neighboring Black states vital to successful guerrilla activity will choose to preserve their own security in the face of inevitable punishing white retaliation at an early stage of any significant guerrilla warfare. Isolation of the White societies has only intensified the oppressive policies. Moreover, extended efforts to force change by pressure and coercion have unified the Whites and produced an obdurate counter-reaction. The Whites (in southern Africa) are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for Blacks to gain the political rights that they seek through violence which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the Communists. Our interests in the White states are clearly worth retaining at their present political cost because our continued good will and support for their cause, (that is the African states in general and Tanzania and Zambia, in particular) will be important and they know it."

These observations were made in a memorandum designed to inform the President of the United States on the situation in South Africa in 1969. I regard them as remarkable because they are based on a serious misreading of the situation in southern Africa. The war was on in Angola and Mozambique. Less than 10 years before the drafting of NSSM 39, the Africans had crushed the Central African Federation and brought into being the Black states of Malawi and Zambia.

U.S. POLICY TENDS TO IGNORE FUNDAMENTALS OF CONFLICT

Next, we feel that American policy tends to ignore the fundamentals of conflict in South Africa and concentrates on the operational aspects of apartheid. What I mean is that we hear a lot said about the pass laws, the need to abolish racial discrimination, the need for one man/one vote, and things of that kind. Now, as a result, we find that the tendency is to ignore, for instance, the crucial points of vulnerability in the apartheid power structure. For example, the South African Government informed the Security Council last year that it wants to move away from discrimination based on race or color. We think America is best placed to make it clear to South Africa that this movement away cannot produce the desired effects for all concerned and it cannot be acceptable to Africa if it is based solely on White definitions of the race problem and White initiatives.

We feel that for deracialization to have any meaning at all, the victims of apartheid must be involved fully in planning for and determining the nature of the final solution in South Africa.

Sir, I want to point out that we do not want to be involved in war with the White man. Race at this level has nothing to do with our attitudes. But South Africa is our country and we want to have the fullest say possible in its future and its destiny.

RELATIONS BETWEEN BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS AND U.S. PEOPLE

Now, point three, and this is of interest to us because it affects the Americans; a few months ago, Dr. A. Boraine, a progressive party

spokesman on labor quoted the following figures on strikes furnished by the government's labor department. In 1973 there were 246 strikes. In 1974 there were 374 strikes. This tells a story as I say to myself. South African law goes beyond making it a crime for Africans to go on strike. In given instances, it literally draws no distinction between a strike and an act of treason. For the black people to have organized 374 acts of treason in 1974 on their own has a threefold significance for the relations between black South Africans and the American people. They are a warning to the American investor that the day is now not far when South Africa will no longer be the attractive investment field that she is at the moment; that profits ranging between 15, 16, and 25 percent are being written into the past by these events.

The figures warn also that the black victims of apartheid are making up their minds to use the strike as a political weapon. During the second week of February 1975, about 20,000 Africans gathered in the Jabulani Theater near Johannesburg to hear Chief Gatsha Buthelezi report on the interview between the Prime Minister of South Africa and the chief executive officers of the territorial authorities. After hearing him, the 20,000 Africans asked him to tell the government in white South Africa that they, "would withdraw labor from industry and commerce if the government did not respond favorably to demands made by homeland leaders."

Above all, the figures warn that the time has come for the United States to consider who the Americans will be trading with in southern Africa 30 years from today and to adopt policies for South Africa which would place the United States on the right side of history.

TREATY FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC

To sum up, I do not want to take your time, sir, but to sum up what I have said. I will make a few recommendations to amplify what has been said in my memorandum which I am going to submit. As I pointed out earlier, we are not asking the United States to side with us against the white community. We merely ask the United States to be on the right side of history. We ask the United States to give valid meaning to its own policy, namely, its own commitments to self-determination for all in southern Africa. How does it do this? How does it stand on the right side of history? First, South Africa is working very hard either to arrive at a treaty for the defense of the South Atlantic, the cape sea route and parts of the Indian Ocean. Now, we see no reason why the United States should rush to make a decision, a treaty with South Africa at this moment in time. If, however, it is necessary for any treaty at all, we would ask the United States to balance the strategic importance of Cape Town with the strategic importance of the east coast of Africa, from Mozambique to the Horn of Africa.

DISCOURAGE IMMIGRATION OF U.S. CITIZENS INTO SOUTH AFRICA

Two, South Africa is reorganizing her plans for attracting larger and larger numbers of white immigrants from the West. We would ask the U.S. Government to go carefully into this policy and discourage the immigration of Americans into South Africa for reasons that I have stated in my memorandum.

U.S. CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS AGAINST APARTHEID

Third, we would like the Americans to give serious consideration to the alternatives that we have been proposing against apartheid in the 65 years from 1910. And in that regard, to encourage the convention of a Pan-African treaty conference where the black states of Africa, my own people and representatives of the white governments in southern Africa, will meet to negotiate a settlement of the race problem. Before that takes place, I would like to see Americans press the South African Government to state precisely what it means by independence. We hear a lot said about independence being extended to the Bantustans. Now, it seems to me, I am not an economist, but it seems difficult to understand how on the one hand South Africa can do without the labor of the African community in the reserves when in fact she is short of labor in the industrial areas which she wants to build up with foreign investments. That is one side of the story.

But if we see the story from the side of the rural reserves, it does not make much sense to me for South Africa to insist on giving independence to its states when first, they cannot be viable, and second, they cannot establish viable economies for themselves, as I have showed in my memorandum.

Thank you, sir.

[Mr. Ngubane's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JORDAN K. NGUBANE—SOUTH AFRICA: AN AFRICAN ALTERNATIVE TO APARTHEID

INTRODUCTION

By bringing the borders of Free Africa to the South African frontier the independence of Mozambique creates a new balance in the relations between Black and White in South Africa and changes the dispositions of power on the Cape sea route, the South Atlantic and the South-Western approaches to the Indian Ocean. These developments combine with the *alternative to apartheid* adopted by the African people in November 1973, at Umtata in the Transkei to define in clearer outlines the constructive role the United States can play as events move to the moment of decision in South Africa.

The South African government informed the Security Council last year that it wants to move away from discrimination based on race or colour. America is best-placed to make it clear to South Africa that this movement away cannot produce the desired effects for all concerned and cannot be acceptable to Africa if it is based solely on White definitions of the race problem and White initiatives. For "deracialisation" to have meaning at all the victims of apartheid must be involved fully in planning for and determining the nature of the change. The alternative is an armed confrontation, now that South Africa has contiguous borders with Mozambique.

South Africa values American understanding. For this reason the United States can demand its own price; it can insist that South Africa should take practical steps to demonstrate its determination to be a stabilising influence in Southern Africa. The factors which call for the demonstration are the subject of the present memorandum.

Pretoria continues to urge the United States to fill the vacuum created in her naval defences when the British decided to leave the Simonstown naval base. One of the arguments used is that Cape Town and Simonstown occupy a strategic position on the Cape sea route. The extension of the coastline under African control from the Horn of Africa to Mozambique requires that planning for the defences of the Cape sea route should balance the value of Cape Town with the importance of the coastline under African control.

These developments combine with the dual authority crisis emerging in the relations between the government and the territorial authorities on the one hand and, on the other, the African workers' increasing use of the strike as an instru-

ment of economic reform to create a situation of fluidity in the relations between Black and White which calls for attention from United States policy makers.

With the exception of the Transkei, which has a unique history of political evolution under the British, all the segregated territorial administrations or bantustans have rejected the independence offered by the Vorster government. The significance of the rejection lies, among other factors, in the growing use by the Black people of the strike as an instrument for improving their position in the economy.

During the 1974 budget debate on the Labour vote, Dr. Boraine, the Progressive Party spokesman on labour, quoted the following from figures on strikes furnished by the government's Labour Department:

| Year | Number of strikes | Workers involved |
|-----------|-------------------|------------------|
| 1973..... | 246 | 67, 338 |
| 1974..... | 374 | 57, 656 |

These figures tell an important story. South African law goes beyond making it a crime for the Africans to go on strike; in given instances it virtually draws no distinction between a strike and an act of treason. For the Black people to have organised 374 acts of "treason" in 1974 alone has a threefold significance for the relations between the Black South Africans and the American people. They are a warning to the American investor that the day is now not far when South Africa will no longer be the attractive investment field that she is at the moment; that profits ranging between 16% and 25% are being written into the past by events. The figures warn, also, that the Black victims of apartheid are making up their minds to use the strikes as a political weapon. During the second week of February, 1975, about 20,000 Africans gathered in the Jabulani Amphitheatre near Johannesburg to hear Chief Gatsha Buthelezi report on the interview between the prime minister of South Africa and the chief executive officers of the territorial authorities. After hearing him, the Africans asked him to tell the government and White South Africa that they "would withdraw their labour from industry and commerce if the Government did not respond favourably to demands made by homeland leaders." (Johannesburg *Star*, February 10, 1975).

The figures warn, above all, that the time has come for the United States to consider who the Americans will be trading with in Southern Africa, thirty years from to-day and to adopt policies for Southern African which will place her on the right side of history, at least in Africa.

THE PROBLEM

From the African side, the problem for the United States is that American policies for Southern Africa are based on ignorance of the forces which collide in South Africa's crisis of colour. One example of the ignorance will be given here. The widely publised National Security Study Memorandum 39 made these observations:

"... here are reasons to question the depth and permanence of Black resolve (to overthrow White domination). Recently there has been a decline in the level of insurgency. Neighbouring Black states—vital to successful guerrilla activity—will choose to preserve their own security in the face of inevitable punishing white retaliation at an early stage of any significant guerrilla warfare....

"Isolation of the White societies has only intensified repressive policies. Moreover, external efforts to force change by pressure and coercion have unified the Whites and produced an obdurate counter-reaction....

"The Whites (in Southern Africa) are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists....

"... our interests in the White states... are clearly worth retaining at their present political cost... because our continued goodwill and support of their (the African states in general and Tanzania and Zambia in particular) cause will be important and they know it."

These observations were made in a memorandum designed to inform the president of the United States on the situation in Southern Africa in 1969 and are remarkable because they are based on a serious misreading of the situation

in Southern Africa. The war was on in Angola and Mozambique; less than ten years before the drafting of NSSM 39 the Africans had crushed the Central African Federation and brought into being the Black states of Malawi and Zambia.

One of the factors behind the misreading of the situation in Southern Africa is that most American policy-makers see the race problem mainly through the eyes of English-speaking South Africans who speak their language and the dominant group in the newspaper and book publishing fields. The problem in this regard does not have much to do with race; the Afrikaner, who is White, is still largely through the eyes of the English in spite of the fact that he controls the government.

The main groups in South Africa, the Africans, the Afrikaners and the English, function as monoliths; each has its own culture, history, ideal of nationhood, church and universities. The British fought the Zulus (1879) and the Afrikaners (1899-1901) to pave the way for the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910. On the one hand the Union was a white united front based on African labour, the Afrikaner political potential and English financial power; on the other it was a *closed society* in which the White skin was the definitive qualification for citizenship. The hope was held out that economic factors might, in time, corrode the Afrikaner's commitment to race discrimination and pave the way for the acceptance of "civilised" Africans as the legal equals of the Whites.

The Afrikaners, as a group, were committed to a different ideal of nationhood; they resented being under British rule and longed to transform the Union into a republic. While they were as eager as the British to exploit African labour, they were uncompromisingly hostile to race equality and integration and insisted that the African should *develop along his own lines*.

The Afrikaner's attitude to the race issue must be seen in the context provided by history and the conflicting monoliths. The Dutch ancestors of the Afrikaners favoured marriage across the colour line when they came to South Africa in 1652. Jan van Riebeeck¹ the first commander of the Cape settlement, encouraged some of his men to marry women of colour. Simon van der Stel, one of the most famous governors the Dutch East India Company sent to the Cape and after whom Stellenbosch University is named, was a man of mixed blood. The university is the most important centre of learning for the Afrikaners. The Dutch Reformed Church solemnised the mixed marriages.

Attitudes changed when the Dutch settlers became farmers on their own and wanted more land and labour to work it. The resulting conflicts between Black and White were complicated by the policies pursued by the British after their occupation of the Cape in 1806. From then onward, the people who became the modern Afrikaners felt threatened by the African majority on the one hand and, on the other, the economic, military and cultural power of the English. The clashes with the two groups confronted the Afrikaner with what he regarded as threats of extermination; a *survival problem* developed which was to be the driving power behind apartheid.

In 1912, the representatives of the various Black communities of South Africa met in Bloemfontein to hammer out their own answer to Union, the White united front and the labour-political-financial balance. They rejected integration in the minority civilisation, abandoned the traditional loyalties which had divided them for centuries, formed themselves into a new people in history and committed themselves to an altogether different concept of nationhood.

They set out to establish an *open society* in which the person would be equipped and seen to face the challenge and realise the promise of being human regardless of race, colour, sex or creed. In this society no human being would be punished for being the child of his or her parents.

The clash between Black and White is, in the light of what has been written so far, a collision between conflicting concepts of nationhood: between the *closed society* agreed upon by the Whites in 1910 and the *open society* to which the Africans committed themselves in 1912. Race and colour are used as vehicles in what is essentially an ideological quarrel.

The above definition of the race problem focuses attention on another weakness in America's approach to the situation in South Africa. Stress is laid on the *operational aspects* of apartheid; on the attitudes, the usages, the laws and the institutions which translate apartheid into action and next to nothing is said

¹Eric A. Walker, "A History of Southern Africa," new impression with corrections, 1968. London, pp. 39-47.

about the African people's *alternative to apartheid*. The alternative is important as much because of its political and economic implications for the whole of Southern Africa as because of the balance of power it seeks to create on the Cape sea route, the South Atlantic and the south-western approaches to the Indian Ocean.

ROOTS OF CONFLICT

In 1967 the government of South Africa announced its intention to compel the various African communities in the rural reservations to establish territorial authorities. Up to then, policy had left each community free to accept or reject the authorities. The Zulu-speaking community, the largest on the African side, had consistently refused to establish a territorial authority. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, whose family had provided some of the ablest prime ministers to Zulu kings before conquest, had led the resistance to the establishment of territorial administrations.

The 1967 announcement meant that co-operative chiefs, who are, in effect, government employees, would be elected to the territorial authorities which they would use to endorse apartheid. Such endorsement would enable the government to go to the United Nations and tell all concerned that the African people had, through their territorial authorities, accepted apartheid. Some African communities decided that to boycott the apartheid institutions would create a political vacuum the government would fill with its stooges. They chose to fight apartheid in its own institutions and elected men who would make it difficult for the territorial authorities to endorse apartheid. Gatsha Buthelezi from Kwa Zulu, Dr. Cedric Phatudi (Lebowa) and Professor Hudson Ntsanwisi (Gazankulu) were the most outspoken critics of apartheid in the new administrations. The three constitute the nationalist bloc in the territorial administrations. Chiefs Mangope (Bophutha-Tswana), Mota (Basotho Qwa-Qwa, Mphephu (Vendaland) and Mr. Lennox Sebe (Ciskei) regard themselves as pragmatists while Chief Kaiser Matanzima (Transkei) stands in a class by himself.

Matanzima is the only chief executive officer who has accepted the independence offered by the Vorster regime; he has gone on record as saying that he will regard any armed attack on White South Africa as an attack on his own Transkei. In spite of his posturing, Matanzima is not an apartheid stooge; this does not mean that he is a nationalist. He reacts to a complicated set of pressures in the Transkei. On the one hand, he is an ambitious man whose attitude is influenced by the dynastic aspirations of his family. On the other, the poverty of the Transkei places him in a vulnerable position.

In 1960, only 32% of the land was arable; the rest had been eroded by water and "overstocking." The overload did not mean that the Transkeians had more cattle than they needed. There was not enough land even for the few they owned. At the time the territory had a population density of 82 per square mile. For 30 years up to 1968 the land had had an average annual maize yield of only 3 bags per morgan (1 morgan is about 1.9 acres).² This figure is crucial for the understanding of the peculiar relationship between the Transkei and South Africa. A comparison of agricultural production in the African reserves and in the White areas will shed light on the relationship:

These figures³ show how hunger is used as a weapon for forcing the Africans out of the reserves into the White areas where they sell their labour on terms dictated by the Whites.

The Transkei, which had a population well in excess of 5,000,000 in the early 1970s, is the largest of the Black reserves. Its inability to feed its population

| Product | 1947-48 | 1967-68 |
|----------------------------|---------|---------|
| Maize (million bags): | | |
| African areas..... | 3.8 | 3.7 |
| White areas..... | 30.4 | 105.2 |
| Sorghum (million bags): | | |
| African areas..... | 1.2 | 0.7 |
| White areas..... | 1.8 | 9.5 |
| Livestock (million units): | | |
| Africa areas..... | 3.6 | 4.0 |
| White areas..... | 8.8 | 7.5 |

² These figures have been compiled from the annual reports of the South African Institute of Race Relations for 1969, 1970, 1971, and 1972.

³ Brian Bunting, "The Rise of The South African Reich," Penguin Books, Baltimore, 1969.

forced it to send 155,329 (1968) people to the White areas in South Africa to seek employment. Of these, the migrant labourers, recruited largely by White South African organisations, brought in R23,500,000 as against earnings totalling a meagre R5,600,000 paid to non-vocational (unskilled) workers employed inside the Transkei.

The Transkei's inability to feed itself combines with Matanzima's dynastic ambitions and the British connection to make Pretoria's offer of independence to the Transkei particularly attractive to Matanzima.

The use of poverty, hunger, disease and other forms of deprivation is not confined to the Transkei only. The statistical outlines of the position in all the reserves which will be given in the pages which follow show how race discrimination is used not only to inflate White standards of living, but also to provide the high profits which make South Africa an attractive investment field. Above all, the figures explain why the Africans think, no longer in terms of reforms at the *operational level* but regard *majority rule* as the only answer to the tangled relations White domination has created among the peoples of South Africa.

Land and the distribution of other forms of wealth are the basic factors in the quarrel between Black and White in South Africa. According to the census figures for 1970, South Africa had 1.5 million economically active Whites. Of these, 100,000 were farmers and owned 90 million hectares of farming land. The Africans in the reserves now number more than 7 million and share only 15 million hectares among themselves.

This state of affairs must be seen in the light of the changes in the White population. In 1910 about half of the Whites lived on the farms. Today, 15 per cent of the White population is on the land. What we are seeing is a fall in the number of Whites on the farms precisely when numbers of Africans in the rural lands increase. The Vorster regime has announced that it will not give one more acre of land above the 13 per cent (15 million hectares) reserved for the African people in 1936.

The position of the government here responds to factors which the White minority can no longer control. Industrialisation makes the White minority increasingly dependent on African labour. In July-August of 1970 the Association of Chambers of Commerce announced that the distribution and allied services, which included the hotel industry, were short of labour by 35,000 persons, which amounted to 4.8 per cent of employed people. The government's own department of labour, in its *Manpower Survey No 8*, also issued in 1970, reported that up to April 30, 1969, South Africa had had a shortage of 70,000 workers.

In a speech in parliament on February 4, 1970, Dr. G. F. Jacobs, the United Party's expert on labour, stated that Job Reservation was defeating its own purpose. Determination No 8 of 1960 had reserved 25 per cent of given types of jobs for Whites in the clothing industry in the Transvaal. In spite of these precautions the number of Whites employed had fallen below the quota laid down for them by the law. In 1960 the Whites could provide only 19 per cent of employees. By 1970 this figure had shrunk to 9 per cent. In the same period the numbers of Africans employed in the same industry rose from 44 per cent to 60 per cent. Dr. Jacobs added that in a special category, reserved for Whites, the "choppers-out," Job Reservation had almost collapsed; the latest figures he had showed 350 Africans and 120 Coloureds had had to be employed because there were only 30 Whites available.

This brings us to land distribution in the rural reserves:

| Ethnic group | Population size | Province inhabited | Living space in Morgen | Number of reserves ¹ |
|-----------------|-----------------|--------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Zulu..... | 3,970,000 | Natal, Tvl, OFS..... | 3,585,212 | 29 |
| Xhosa..... | 3,907,000 | T'kei, Ciskei, Cape..... | 5,016,550 | 19 |
| Tswana..... | 1,702,000 | Tvl, OFS, Cape..... | 4,330,135 | 19 |
| Pedi..... | 1,596,000 | Transvaal..... | 1,947,277 | 3 |
| S. Sotho..... | 1,416,000 | Cape, OFS..... | 50,000 | 1 |
| Shangane..... | 731,000 | Transvaal..... | | 4 |
| Swazi..... | 487,000 | Transvaal..... | 519,000 | 33 |
| Venda..... | 360,000 | Transvaal..... | 935,800 | 3 |
| Tonga..... | | Transvaal..... | 890,716 | |
| S. Ndebele..... | 230,000 | Transvaal..... | | |
| N. Ndebele..... | 180,000 | Tvl, Rhodesia..... | | |
| Other..... | 314,000 | | | |

¹ See 2 above.

The 1972 report of the South African Institute of Race Relations stated that in 1970 the density of population per square mile in the reserves was as follows:

Homeland and density of population (actual)

| | |
|-----------------------|-----|
| Transkei | 122 |
| Ciskei | 148 |
| Kwa Zulu | 173 |
| Lebowa | 127 |
| Venda | 113 |
| Gazankulu | 104 |
| Bophutha-Tswana | 61 |
| Basotho Qwa-Qwa | 136 |
| Swazi | 144 |

In addition to overcrowding as one of the specialized pressures for forcing the Africans to leave the reserves to seek employment in the white areas, there is the prevalent neglect of the health of the people in the reserves. In its 1972 report again, the Institute of Race Relations quoted the Minister of National Education as the source for the following figures on medical doctors available to the various communities in South Africa:

- 1 African doctor for every 44,000 Africans.
- 1 Coloured doctor for every 6,200 Coloureds.
- 1 Indian doctor for every 900 Indians.
- 1 White doctor for every 400 Whites.

During the period under review, the Ministry of Bantu Administration and Development announced that the rural reserves together had 70 trained doctors in 1972. Of the 86 hospitals in these reserves, only two had been established by the government: the remaining 84 were founded by the missionaries. This left the homelands with one bed for every 343 Africans.

The results of the neglect were summed up, among others, by two authorities. The Southern Africa Tuberculosis Association's report for 1969 gave the following figures of cases in its books:

Group and number of cases

| | |
|-----------------|--------|
| Africans | 59,970 |
| Coloureds | 7,063 |
| Asians | 976 |
| Whites | 86 |

The 1969 report of the Institute quoted Professor John Reid, head of the department of physiology at the Durban Medical School, as having stated that "a survey conducted in 1966 had indicated that almost half of the children born in a typical African reserve in South Africa died before reaching the age of five years." A year later, the Institute reported this comment from Dr. Reid again: "... there is reason to believe ... that the endorsing out of Africans (from the White cities) to Reserve areas is exacerbating the malnutrition seen there, and undoubtedly the population increase is contributing to the problem."

The report added that in a press interview, Dr. Reid had indicated that the "death rate for African children in the Reserves was 25 times that of White children. Tuberculosis, which had a link with malnutrition, was ten times as common among Africans as Whites."

The statistics given above describe conditions mainly in the rural reserves where about 41.7 per cent of the African population lives. Roughly about 29.6 per cent are settled on White farms while 28.7 per cent live in the urban areas. In March, 1973, the influential White daily, the Johannesburg *Rand Daily Mail* (March 30, 1973) published the following comparison of the monthly wages earned by the different racial groups in South Africa:

| Occupation | Africans | Coloureds | Indians | Whites |
|------------------------------------|----------|-----------|---------|--------|
| Mining | R 21 | R 79 | R 98 | R 361 |
| Manufacturing | 60 | 88 | 94 | 352 |
| Construction | 60 | 127 | 161 | 69 |
| Electricity | 73 | 58 | ----- | 393 |
| Banks and building societies | 71 | 87 | 123 | 250 |

South Africa's annual wage bill at the time was R3,670,000,000. Of this, the Africans received only R610,000,000 or less than one-sixth of the total. The Whites, who were about one-fifth of the population, controlled about 70 per cent of the country's purchasing power while the Africans, who constitute more than 70 per cent of the population have buying power which amounts only to 23 per cent of the total. The African family usually spends about 45 per cent of its earnings on food while the White family spends 25 per cent.

The *Rand Daily Mail* survey covered Africans mainly in the urban areas. The table⁵ which follows summarises the living conditions in the Black and White communities:

| Item: | Africans | Whites |
|---|-----------|---------|
| Population (in 1970, in millions)----- | 14.9 | 3.8 |
| Percent of population----- | 69.0 | 18.8 |
| Percent of land reserved----- | 13.0 | 87.0 |
| Percent of income received----- | 18.8 | 74.0 |
| Average income (head/year)----- | \$188 | \$1,596 |
| Average annual wage in mining (cash only)----- | \$302 | \$5,275 |
| Average annual wage in manufacturing----- | \$828 | \$4,032 |
| Minimum cost of living for family of 5 in city----- | \$1,075 | \$1,075 |
| Life expectancy----- | 35-40 | 64-70 |
| Infant mortality per 1,000 births----- | 200-250 | 24 |
| Number of pass arrests per year----- | 7-900,000 | 0 |

In the view of most Africans (including Kaiser Matanzima) the state of affairs revealed in the statistics quoted so far cannot be corrected unilaterally by the Whites through their parliament. *Majority rule* alone will create the balance of power that will enable Black and White to agree on a safer route to a better future for all South Africans.

AN AFRICAN ALTERNATIVE TO APARTHEID

At the Bloemfontein Conference of 1912, Dr. Pixley ka Isaka Seme, the driving force behind the gathering, had argued⁶ that the integration of the African in the White minority's civilisation was not an answer to race discrimination. He had urged the Africans to confront the Whites with "a new civilization;" with an alternative to what is to-day known as apartheid. At the time, the alternative assumed the form of a new nation created out of the various language groups which together constituted the African community. Ethnic Grouping and the mandatory establishment of the territorial authorities were designed to destroy the Bloemfontein Commitment and to reduce the African peoples to the situation of fragmentation which made possible their conquest by the Whites last century.

In the years before the apartheid regime rose to power, the Africans had waged a resistance struggle in the bid to persuade the Whites to accept the 1912 concept of nationhood and establish an *open society*. The Sharpeville shootings in 1960 were the White minority's answer to peaceful demands for change. After that armed confrontation became the main option open to the Africans, Black leadership initiatives to fill the vacuum which had emerged in White thinking on the race question. The outlines of the vacuum were seen in Vorster's offer of a type of independence which would reduce the "free" Black states to permanent vassalage to the Whites. His insistence on the creation of Black states which would never be in the position to withdraw their labour from South Africa and which could never hope to establish viable economies created the conditions which made it impossible for the nationalists in the territorial authorities to accept "independence."

This is how Dr. Kobus Kruger, an Afrikaner thinker who lectures at the University of South Africa describes the vacuum:

"... at the moment the initiative as far as thinking about the future of South Africa is concerned, has been grasped by the new generation of black intel-

⁵ See 2 above and various statements issued by the Council for Christian Action of the United Church of Christ, the Social Criteria Committee of the Episcopal Church, the American Committee on Africa in 1972.

⁶ Tom Karls and Gwendolin Carter, "From Protest To Challenge: Documents of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964," Volume I, Hoover Institute Press, Stanford, Documents 20 and 21.

lectuals. The whites are called upon to react to their action, which is quite unique in our recent history . . . the first reaction of the white man who has really been confronted by the new black thinking, is a certain *embarrassment*. He contemplates this phenomenon from the outside, and feels himself excluded. . . . For a long time we have been excluding the black man. Now we experience something of this ourselves. . . . The stream of black consciousness will not be stopped. It has the power of a waterfall. . . ." (*Pro Veritate*, Johannesburg, January 15, 1973; author's italics).

The Sharpeville shootings transformed the African's fight for freedom from a resistance movement demanding reforms at the operational level into a struggle for power; for *majority rule*. Vorster's offer of "independence" in the reserves responded to this change. His offer was not acceptable to the African people. The nationalists in the territorial authorities persuaded Matanzima to host a meeting of the chief executive officers of the territorial administrations in Umтата during the first week of November, 1973. At this gathering Gatsha Buthelezi argued that the Africans should answer Vorster's offer of "independence" with a *geopolitical alternative* based on the Bloemfontein Commitment which would unify all the peoples of Southern Africa. Later, he explained:

"We no longer think we should be preoccupied with begging for more reforms . . . We dream now of . . . an alternative to what our White rulers have propounded so far. . . . This means a non-racial society in which every human being will have the right and opportunity to make the best possible use of his life. . . . Only through a Federal Union of the Autonomous States of Southern Africa can the Black man, the White man, the Brown man, each translate the great principles handed down to each one of them by their ancestors into satisfying social, economic and cultural action. The Federal Union of the Autonomous States of Southern Africa will guarantee the identity, and cultural autonomy of every racial, ethnic or cultural group. . . ."

Buthelezi was thinking in terms of a Federal Union which would ultimately include a South Africa ruled by the Black majority, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Other Free African states could accede to the Federal Union if they wanted to.

The Federal Union had several advantages; it confronted the White minority with an alternative to apartheid which did not depend on White support to be translated into political realities. All that it needed was acceptance by the Africans of Southern Africa.

The Federal Union would provide a geopolitical base for the unity which is always on the lips of most African statesmen. Stretching as it would from the Indian Ocean in the east to the South Atlantic in the West, it would create a balance of power on the Cape sea route which neither the United States nor the Western Europeans could afford to ignore.

Above all, the Federal Union's 60,000,000 people and its mineral and other resources would make it the wealthiest and most powerful Black state in the world. Buthelezi thought that support for this type of alternative would confront the United States, Britain and France with a clear choice in Southern Africa's crisis of colour.

The territorial leaders committed themselves to the ideal of establishing the Federal Union. Those Free African statesmen more deeply involved in the struggle against apartheid drew the distinction between the nationalists and the collaborators in the territorial authorities. President Nyerere of Tanzania was so impressed with the performance of the African nationalists in the territorial authorities, at the special OAU conference called to hammer out a new Free African strategy against apartheid, his government circulated a position paper briefing the OAU foreign ministers on the position in South Africa. Of the nationalists, the government paper said:

"The establishment of these Bantustans is now being given great emphasis by the South African government. It is through them that South Africa hopes to convince a hostile or suspicious world that Africans in South Africa are treated as human beings, and that apartheid is designed to achieve 'separate' but 'equal' development. It may even hope to convince the Africans of South Africa that the denial of rights to them in 87 per cent of their country is irrelevant to their welfare—but in this they will not succeed.

"The Africans have no choice in the establishment of these Bantustans. The institutions of 'separate development' were forced on them, and the only choice for an individual who opposes apartheid is to boycott them or try to use them

as a platform and a means of showing the hollow pretensions of the 'separate development' policy. Some of the present leaders of the 'Homelands' are clearly trying to do that, and even to use their authorised position to reach outside their own tribe and counter the divisive tactics of the government. All except one of them have also rejected the South African talk of 'independence' for their fragmented areas in future, pointing out that this is an attempt by the South African Whites to deny to the African people their rights as citizens to the resources and wealth of South Africa."⁷

How the nationalists propose to move to their goal of a Federal Union based on *majority rule* can be summed up briefly as follows:

(i) The rejection of the "independence" offered by the apartheid regime in favour of a Federal Union of the Autonomous States of Southern Africa;

(ii) The use of the united front of the territorial authorities to create a dual authority crisis;

(iii) The use of the strike as a political weapon to be complemented by the dual authority crisis;

(iv) Persuading Free Africa and the OAU to press for a Pan-African treaty conference in which the Black and White peoples of South Africa would sit together with the representatives of Free Africa to hammer out a negotiated solution to the apartheid problem;

(v) The development of the African monolith's economic power for the purpose of cracking the White united front and using the African's purchasing power as an additional weapon against apartheid;

(vi) The use of foreign investments as a political weapon against apartheid;

(vii) The establishment of OAU machinery to co-ordinate internal and Free African strategies against apartheid;

(viii) Launching an informed campaign directed at the mind of the Afrikaner to create polarisations in the White community which will accelerate movement toward a negotiated settlement;

(ix) The convention of a conference of Southern African states which export labour to South Africa to lay down the conditions under which the Africans must work on the mines.

WHITE WEAKNESSES

The composite strategy outlined above responds to the Black concept of nationhood on the one hand and, on the other, the points of vulnerability in the White power-structure. The main areas of weakness include the police, the army and the economy.

In April, 1975, the Minister of Police released figures in parliament showing that South Africa had 54,000 police at the end of 1974. Of these, 68% were White and 27% were Black. The numbers of commissioned officers per race were:

| | | |
|-----------|-------|-------|
| Africans | ----- | 26 |
| Coloureds | ----- | 13 |
| Indians | ----- | 3 |
| Whites | ----- | 2,145 |

In terms of pay, the African police are treated as the inferiors of their Coloured, Indian and White colleagues. The different scales of pay for the rank of captain, which is the highest to which a Black policeman can rise, apply in police life as in every other sphere of employment:

| | | |
|-------------------|-------|-----------------------|
| Africans | ----- | R300-365 (per month). |
| Coloureds/Indians | ----- | R365-445 (per month). |
| Whites | ----- | R445-555 (per month). |

These figures tell a somewhat unexpected story. According to them, South Africa is surprisingly under-policed on the Black side when it is remembered that in its treatment of the Africans, the republic is a police state. At first glance, 14,580 Black police are a little too few for the purpose of upholding apartheid laws in a Black community of about 19 million. The weakness is cancelled by the fact that the South African police force is organised along army lines and armed accordingly.

The second surprise is that 36,720 Whites are tied down to unproductive police work in a country with the industrial colour bar. This wasteful use of White

⁷"African Strategy In Southern Africa," a position paper issued by the Tanzanian government for restricted circulation during the Dar-es-Salaam special conference of the OAU in April, 1975; pp. 9-10.

manpower is dictated by the commitment to apartheid. The police are not the guardians of the law that they are in England, for example; they are the protectors of the political ideology. This combines with their differential pay to give the Africans a sense of grievance. In a general strike designed to paralyse the apartheid power-structure and which was backed by dual authority initiatives, the government has little reason to believe that the Black police would be overwhelmingly loyal. This would particularly be the case where the police were controlled by the territorial authorities.

The ideological factor creates weaknesses also in the army. The international edition of the *Johannesburg Star* (December 28, 1974) attributed to Major-General Neil Webster, the highest ranking English officer in the Citizen Force, the following description of the Afrikaner-English percentage ratios in the then all-White army:

[In percent]

| Army section | Afrikaners | English |
|----------------------------|------------|---------|
| Air force..... | 75 | 25 |
| Navy..... | 50 | 50 |
| Generals and admirals..... | 70 | 30 |
| Permanent force staff..... | 85 | 15 |

As in the police force, the majority in the army are the Afrikaners. In situations which strain the narrowly Afrikaans or English loyalties some of the military foundations of the White power-structure begin to crack. The persecution of the English-oriented protestant churches drove the leaders of these denominations to take the decision, at their Hammanskraal conference in the Southern winter of 1974, that they would not advise their members to enlist for service in the army to fight the African guerrillas.

At the time, this crack in the foundations of White power was more symbolic than decisive. It became significant when the Afrikaner government reacted to it and, in doing this, exposed its real weakness in this area. Pretoria amended the Defence Act to deracialise the Army. By December, 1974, the government had 48 African soldiers accommodated in Baviaanspoort Prison near Pretoria where they were trained under the command of Major André Pretorius.

In the budget debate on the Defence Vote in the South African parliament this year, the Minister of Defence said it was essential that when the territorial authorities became independent, their defence systems should "find their place within the military milieu of South Africa and not outside." He added that there were territorial leaders who wanted to involve their people in guarding the borders.

The *Star* (July 12, 1975) reported from Umtata in the Transkei that the first batch of recruits for the Transkeian army would commence training under the South African Defence Force in Cape Town early in August. The paper said its source was Brigadier P. Pretorius, the military adviser to the Transkeian government.

Against the background provided by the strikes which have become endemic in South Africa and the Hammanskraal decision, the enlistment of Africans as soldiers is an admission by the apartheid regime that the White minority, by itself, can no longer defend South Africa. The admission assumes particular significance in the context of reports given wide publicity in the South African press that Tanzania is training an army of guerrillas to fight the Whites in Rhodesia. According to some reports, this army can be expanded to have 20,000 soldiers. The apartheid regime is concerned about the psychological effects of an armed African invasion in Rhodesia on the 19,000,000 victims of apartheid. If the conflict did not spark off an armed revolt inside South Africa, it would be an almost irresistible argument for a dual authority crisis and a general strike to paralyse the apartheid economy.

THE ECONOMIC FACTOR

The apartheid regime is most vulnerable on the economic plane. The mines, which earn foreign exchange reserves and reinforce the country's ability to pay inflated dividends to foreign investors have one fatal weakness: they depend for their normal production on labour imported from outside South Africa while the

non-mining industries cannot operate without the labour of the location Africans who have staged most of the strikes in the last three years. The figures which follow illustrate the above :

| Employment field | Foreign Africans | Local Africans |
|---------------------------|------------------|----------------|
| Mining and quarrying..... | 416, 745 | 222, 225 |
| Manufacturing..... | 11, 923 | 674, 926 |
| Agriculture..... | 24, 500 | 445, 760 |
| Construction..... | 19, 150 | 341, 855 |
| Wholesale..... | 3, 385 | 294, 390 |
| Government services..... | 10, 358 | 413, 246 |
| Domestic..... | 9, 208 | 567, 716 |
| Miscellaneous..... | 5, 526 | 312, 266 |

These figures were given to parliament this year by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development. The foreign miners come mainly from Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique and Swaziland. By emphasising the language and cultural differences which divide them, apartheid has created tensions and produced the violence behind the following fatalities on the mines⁸ :

| Date | Mine | Africans killed |
|---------|---------------------------------------|-----------------|
| 1974 | | |
| Aug. 8 | Rustenburg Platinum Mine..... | 3 |
| 31 | Western Holdings..... | 3 |
| Oct. 13 | East Rand Pty Mines..... | 1 |
| 22 | Hartebeesfontein, Stilfontein..... | 2 |
| Nov. 20 | Western Deep Levels..... | 1 |
| Dec. 16 | Bafokeng South (Impala Platinum)..... | 3 |
| 29 | Prieska Copper Mines..... | 3 |
| 1975 | | |
| Jan. 6 | Vaal Reefs..... | 4 |

The strikes and the violence continued after January 6. By March 15, not less than 106 Africans had died in the disturbances on the mines. Large numbers of foreign Africans returned to their countries. By the end of 1974 the South African press was reporting that the mines had only 73 per cent of their full labour complement.

Mozambique is going to play an increasingly important role in the use of the economic weapon against apartheid both because she is one of the largest exporters of labour and her openly Marxist bias. The Mozambicans do the most dangerous jobs in the mines. According to one estimate⁹ "more than eighty thousand (Mozambican) African recruits died while working the South African mines" in the fifty years from 1902.

Apartheid's use of tribalism creates conflicts which affect production of the mines. The reaction of the governments of Malawi and Lesotho to the disturbances raise the prospect that one of these days the OAU might call for co-ordinated action to protect Free African miners in South Africa. The Free Africans might withdraw their citizens when alternative sources of employment become available; on the other hand, they might enact legislation creating trade unions for their citizens in South Africa's mines and might insist that these unions keep an eye on how South Africa treats their citizens.

VACUUM AGAIN

Nowhere is the vacuum in White thinking on the future of South Africa drawn in sharper outlines than in planning for a better life for the Black people.

The latest annual report of the Bantu Investment Corporation says South Africa will need R50,000,000 to create 20,000 new jobs in the homelands in the next few years. This must be seen against past efforts to persuade investors to

⁸ Compiled from figures published by the international edition of the Johannesburg Star from the beginning of August 1974 to the end of January, 1975.

⁹ "Southern Africa in Perspective"; editors Christian P. Pothom and Richard Dale, The Free Press, New York, 1972, p. 187.

sink their money in the Black areas. Private investment in these areas in 1971 was about R2,500,000. This figure rose to R23,500,000 in 1974. The statistics for the factories and the jobs provided in the same period show the immensity of the task the apartheid regime faces :

| Year | Number of factories | Number of jobs |
|-----------|---------------------|----------------|
| 1971..... | 14 | 720 |
| 1974..... | 106 | 8,900 |

The Task would be immense even if these figures told the story of development in any one of the largest reserves. When one remembers that there are no less than 8 reserves with millions of people, the thought that the apartheid regime has not faced the challenge of the reserves is almost inescapable. The question this raises is: Why bother about offering the Africans an "independence" which is devoid of all meaning?

But the future is written in trouble even when it comes to planning for White South Africa. The Minister for Planning has just made public his schemes for economic development up to 1979. The plan envisages an economic growth rate of from 5.75 to 6 per cent per annum and will need more than a million new African workers in 1979. The following table compares the labour demand expected in 1979 with the position in 1973 :

| Labour group | 1973 total | 1979 estimates |
|------------------------|------------|----------------|
| Africans..... | 6,153,000 | 7,466,000 |
| Whites..... | 1,624,000 | 1,882,000 |
| Coloureds/Indians..... | 991,000 | 1,200,000 |

According to these figures, South Africa will need about 1,313,000 additional workers in 1979. But, as has been shown, South Africa is having a shortage of labour which threatens to reach crisis proportions in the foreseeable future. The mine owners have started quarreling with the farmers whom they accuse either of hoarding Black labour or of using it wastefully. It is said in South Africa that each White worker creates about 3 jobs for the Africans. This wasteful use of human resources by all sections of the White community is what apartheid is about; no White government can now solve the complicated problems the colour bar has been creating in the sixty-five years from Union.

The White minority does not have the numbers to provide jobs for 1,313,000 Africans in 1979. To have the requisite number of Whites, South Africa has embarked on a policy of attracting increasing numbers of immigrants. The Department of Planning reckons that these are coming in at the rate of about 22,000 per annum at the moment, but concedes that even if this number were to rise to 30,000, South Africa would still be short of White workers by no less than 32,000 workers. Some authorities place the latter figure at 68,000.

To this must be added the fact that the flow of immigrants is likely to be affected by factors over which South Africa has no control. The estimates are based on the assumption that nothing will happen on the international plane to discourage immigration as happened after the Sharpeville shootings in 1960. No allowance is made for the effects on immigration of a race war in Rhodesia or of the possible expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations. No allowance is made even for the possibility that the OAU might one day persuade the countries which export labour to South Africa to withdraw it to reinforce the use by the Black South Africans of the strike weapon and the dual authority crisis to paralyse apartheid.

These points of vulnerability reveal the points of weakness in apartheid and White domination. The nationalists in the African community are mobilising their forces on the homefront and abroad to strike at these points because, they believe, this is where apartheid can be hurt most. The nationalists are concerned not only with the overthrow of White domination but also with plans to fill the *multiple vacuum* which will emerge after the collapse of apartheid. The *Geopolitical Alternative* is designed to fill this vacuum; this is what *majority rule* is all about.

AMERICA'S ROLE

The definition of the race problem made in the present memorandum inevitably limits the role the United States can play in the crisis of colour. Events have developed a momentum of their own which is not likely to respond much to American initiatives.

Having said this, I must point out, however, that the United States can play a constructive role at two levels. History created a very complicated relationship between the United States and Africa. This relationship, in turn, creates difficulties for America in both the global quarrel on resources and in the crisis of colour in Southern Africa. At one point or another Africa views her conduct in the quarrel and the crisis in the context provided by the peculiar relationship; the misreading of the situation in Southern Africa, to which reference was made early in this presentation, is linked with the peculiar relationship. Few Americans will insist that this does no harm to their country's policy in Black Africa.

One way out at this level is the establishment of a Centre for the Study of Race Relations in situations of contact and conflict between Black and White not only in the English-speaking section of the human race but also in the relations between the Black and the White nations. In a world of proliferating trading blocs and where America was becoming increasingly dependent on mineral and other resources controlled by peoples of colour, the United States interest would require clarity on the evaluations of the person and the ideals which motivate policies and action at least in the Black nations of the Third World. The study of the peculiar and complicated relations which develop in situations of contact between Black and White would enlighten the Americans even on their own colour problem.

The second option before the United States is to be on the right side of history in Southern Africa. This can be done by supporting Black South African pleas for a Pan-African treaty conference where the states of Free Africa, the representatives of the African communities in Southern Africa and of the Whites in South Africa and Rhodesia would negotiate a settlement of the race problem. There is reason to believe that the time has come for calling such a conference. Speaking through its representative in the United Nations in the Security Council debate on the expulsion of South Africa, the apartheid regime asked Free Africa to be willing to discuss with the government in Pretoria the problems which complicate the relations between Black and White.

The prime minister of South Africa has set a precedent for the treaty conference suggested by pressing the Smith government to negotiate a settlement with the Africans.

At their April meeting in Dar-es-Salaam, the foreign ministers of the OAU made it clear that they are prepared to consider meaningful proposals for the resolution of conflict in Southern Africa.

The alternative to the Pan-African treaty conference is a race war, as the armaments programme undertaken in Southern Africa and the preparations for guerrilla warfare in Free Africa show.

JORDAN K. NGUBANE.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much.

We are very appreciative to all of you for coming today. I only wish that we had more time. I notice that there is a vote on again. I wish we had time for some questions. You have presented very complete statements and have been able to expand upon those with a number of documents for the record. I hope that you will feel free individually to contact me at any time you have additional comments or thoughts with regard to this question.

Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA

Overview

MONDAY, JULY 28, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:14 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Dick Clark (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senator Clark.

Senator CLARK. The hearing will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

Over the past several weeks, this subcommittee has been exploring the rapidly changing situation in southern Africa, the foundations of the U.S. policy there and what future policy should be. Administration and public witnesses have provided some extremely valuable analysis and policy recommendations. But this evaluation of U.S. policy in southern Africa would not be complete without an examination of the impact of that policy on broader U.S. interests. It is to this question that today's public witnesses and tomorrow's administration witnesses will address themselves.

It is important to recognize that the U.S. policy toward southern Africa will have a profound impact on this country's relations with all of the African nations. The independent African states are particularly concerned about the continuation of white supremacy in Rhodesia, Namibia and the Republic of South Africa. They are committed to the goals of freedom and majority rule for all of the people of their continent. The continuation of racial domination in southern Africa is a barrier not only to the realization of these goals but also to the true Pan-African cooperation in economic and political development.

In the United Nations, the African states have called upon the international community to help further the principles of human rights and self-determination in Southern Africa. The U.S. response to these appeals will be regarded as a key indicator of whether this country is genuinely concerned about African interests and committed to the cooperative relations with the African states.

The U.S. response to the independence of Angola and Mozambique will also have an important impact on our relations with the rest of

Africa. This country's lack of support for the struggle against colonialism in these countries was a mistake that cost much in terms of our relations with their future leaders as well as with the rest of Africa. But the United States can still show that it is committed to independence and genuine self-determination for Angola and Mozambique. It can assist in the economic development that is so essential to real independence. It can demonstrate a willingness to work with whatever government emerges in Angola and a respect for the rights of the people of that country to resolve their internal problems without outside interference. Such actions would make it clear to the rest of Africa that this country respects the sovereignty of all African nations and is anxious to work with them in building their strength as unified states rather than exploiting their internal divisions.

This country's southern Africa policy also has a profound impact on our position in the United Nations. The U.S. violation of international sanctions against Rhodesia has seriously undermined the credibility of our commitment to the United Nations and to strengthening its role in the peaceful resolution of world problems. On the eve of the Seventh Special Session, the United States must make a special effort to build cooperative relations between the developing nations and the industrialized states in the United Nations. One clear indicator of this country's commitment to improving such cooperation is our stand on the southern African issues that are important to so many of the developing countries. Rather than simply voting "no" or abstaining on the resolutions that are introduced on Rhodesia, South Africa, and Namibia, the United States must be willing to take the lead in proposing constructive actions the international community can take to further human rights and self-determination in that part of the world.

The U.S. policy in southern Africa will have a significant impact on the credibility of this country's commitment to human rights and self-determination throughout the world. The United States claims to base many of its foreign policy actions on its commitment to freedom and human rights. Yet these commitments will appear shallow indeed if this country opposes rather than supports the efforts of the African states or the international community to further these principles in southern Africa.

Finally, the U.S. southern Africa policy will have an impact on this country's strategic interests. The African nations are rich in the natural resources for which the United States is becoming increasingly dependent on outside sources. The African nations control numerous ports on the Indian Ocean, in which this country has expressed a growing interest. These countries' willingness to cooperate with the United States in furthering these interests will be greatly affected by our willingness to cooperate with them in resolving the problems that they are most concerned about—the problems of southern Africa.

We welcome the witnesses this morning who will be followed, as I indicated earlier, by three witnesses from the administration tomorrow which will end this series of hearings on southern Africa. Members of this subcommittee will be traveling to southern Africa to the countries that have been discussed in these hearings throughout much of the last half of August.

We are going to hear first from Edwin Munger, professor of geography, California Institute of Technology in Pasadena. We will hear each of the statements, and save the rest of the morning for discussion. [Mr. Munger's biography follows:]

A BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF EDWIN S. MUNGER

Professor of Geography, California Institute of Technology, since 1961. Previously with American Universities Field Staff (1951-60), and simultaneously on the faculty of the University of Chicago, where he received his Ph. D. in 1951. Knows Sub-Saharan Africa from repeated visits to every country and major island, and residence in all regions in the course of 32 long and short visits.

Author of seven books, primarily political, and over 230 articles on Africa.

Author, *Afrikaner and African Nationalism* (Oxford) 1967.

Co-author, *United States and Southern Africa* (Columbia) 1968, etc.

President, L. S. B. Leakey Foundation for the Study of Man since 1970.

Member, State Department Advisory Council on Africa (1968-1972) and Leader of Mission to South Africa (1971).

Editor, Munger Africana Library Notes, now in fifth year of publication.

Fellow, Royal Society of Arts, Fulbright Fellow (1949).

Trustee, U.S.-South African Leader Exchange Program, American Friends of America.

Member, Africa Committee of the National Academy of Sciences, Council on Foreign Relations (New York), and many professional societies in Africa and U.S.

Active in Pugwash Conferences (1966 Ethiopia, 1967 Sweden, 1970 Oxford, 1974 Austria).

Occasional field evaluator for Peace Corps (Uganda 1966, Botswana 1967).

Former President, Pasadena Playhouse, Pasadena Cultural Foundation, Altadena-Pasadena Committee on Human Relations, Formerly Executive Director of African and American Universities Faculty Exchange, trustee of African Studies of U.S. and African American Institute.

Clubs: Athenaeum (Pasadena), Cosmos (Washington, D.C.), Explorers (New York).

Dr. Munger's research in Africa has been underwritten by the Rockefeller Foundation, Rockefeller Brothers Foundation, Carnegie Corporation, Ford Foundation, Institute of Current World Affairs, American Universities Field Staff, Fulbright Program, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Professor Munger was born in 1921, is a native of La Grange, Illinois, and received his B.Sc., M.Sc., and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Chicago. His address is California Institute of Technology, 1201 East California, Pasadena, California 91125. Telephone: 795-6811, extension 1468.

STATEMENT OF EDWIN S. MUNGER, PROFESSOR OF GEOGRAPHY, CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, PASADENA, CALIF.

MR. MUNGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am grateful for the invitation to appear before this subcommittee. It is an honor which I appreciate.

My remarks will be relatively brief because I agree with a great deal of what my distinguished academic colleagues have already said. I do, however, take a different position with respect to American policy toward South Africa and I have some other ideas concerning our nuclear policy in Africa.

This is not the place to provide copious facts and footnotes to judgments I wish to offer—judgments based upon, if you will excuse me, some 30 visits to Africa since 1947, continual study, and residence in west, east, central, and southern Africa totaling more than 12 years. One could provide facts ad infinitum and, no doubt, ad nauseam. Among close observers of the African scene both academic and non-

academic, the facts are less in dispute than conclusion drawn from them.

My brief remarks fall into four categories: humanitarian; political; nuclear policy; and the special problem of South Africa.

U.S. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA

Our country has long been characterized, although not always appreciated, by its concern for individuals and nations who have suffered from natural disasters and for those who, often through force of circumstances, have not had the wherewithal to lift themselves to a decent standard of living.

Foremost among humanitarian concerns must be the question of starvation of all and the malnutrition of the young. In my judgment we can be reasonably proud of American efforts in the Sahel and in Ethiopia, although problems of transportation and distribution have been seriously underestimated, particularly in regard to the landlocked nations in the interior of west Africa. We could have done more and, if there is a comparable threat to human life, we should do more. But more important, I would hope that we will expand our efforts to provide the wherewithal for people in the Sahel to better prepare themselves for natural disasters. The Ivory Coast has a remarkable record in raising its GNP in the last decade; we might have helped Upper Volta and its neighbors more by improvements to the Ivorien transport infrastructure before the crisis than by expensive ad hoc transport during the crisis.

U.S. POLITICAL POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA

Politically, Mr. Chairman, our views are maturing, and the cold warriors of the 1950's are, fortunately, less listened to in the formation of American policy. I am suggesting it is not our role to tell the peoples of Africa under what system of government they should live. But it is a special opportunity for us to assist those who wish to live under a democratic system of government while not denying aid to those who opt for other systems. Our policy should support those who not only profess to assist the common man but are visibly seen to do so.

I think our policies have evolved, and should continue to evolve, beyond the simple question of whether a government is pro-Soviet or pro-Chinese or pro-American. My experience, Mr. Chairman, with the leaders of African states and with the peoples, reassures me that they, not the United States, are the best guarantors against neo-colonialism, from any quarter, whether it be political, military, or economic.

NUCLEAR FREE ZONE CONCEPT FOR AFRICA

Mr. Chairman, on my third point, I would urge that this subcommittee look favorably on sincere efforts to make Africa—or Africa south of the Sahara, because by doing that I exclude Egypt and the problems of Israel and the Arab states—a nuclear free zone. I have spent a considerable time over the last decade at conferences where a truly nuclear free zone has been discussed by African scientists, and I find a widespread support for this concept. Last September, I was

cochairman with a distinguished Soviet colleague, Ambassador Fredrenko, former ambassador to the United Nations, of a Pugwash Commission which met in Austria and discussed this problem at great length.

Progress has been painfully slow. But the new spirit of détente between South Africa and many members of the Organization of African States inspires me to believe that realistic progress can be made. If all of the states in sub-Saharan Africa favored a nuclear free zone, I personally would strongly support a joint Soviet-American agreement to reinforce such a position and to give reassurance to all parties. From some discussions I had in Moscow last week with leading Soviet scientists, but not necessarily with the formal approval of the Soviet Government, I believe that such an agreement is feasible. These Soviet scientists do not necessarily reflect the official view of the Soviet Government but I think there are some excellent possibilities. It is also my personal opinion, from long study of the South African political scene and from many interviews with key political figures, that such an agreement can be achieved. The technical monitoring of any nuclear free zone in sub-Saharan Africa is beyond the present technical capacity of the black African nations concerned and beyond the political capacity of the Republic of South Africa. Thus, the need for Soviet and American cooperation. You will note, Mr. Chairman, that I have not mentioned the People's Republic of China or France or Germany or the United Kingdom or India or other nations with nuclear capabilities. My purpose at this hearing this morning is to urge, insofar as it is within the power of the U.S. Congress, that any initiatives from Africa for a nuclear free zone be encouraged, and in the first stage Soviet and American cooperation is of prime importance.

The seriousness of horizontal proliferation is so great with respect to all the world, and, more and more, with respect to Africa, that no time can be lost in minimizing the chances of sub-Saharan Africa being involved in the process. I therefore enthusiastically welcome the contemporary emphasis in Soviet foreign policy toward Africa that non-governmental organizations must not have any access to nuclear weapons or, equally important, to such devastating radioactive materials as plutonium. There are, of course, many different voices to be heard in the Soviet Union, and I am not unaware of an arms buildup in Angola, but I think that on balance the Soviet Union now believes that the problems of southern Africa can be settled justly without resort to war. This is a change in Soviet policy over the last 5 years. I am not suggesting that the ultimate goals of liberation groups supported by the Soviet Union have been abandoned, but rather that it is possible that in an atmosphere of détente necessary changes can be made peacefully.

Limitation on the shipment of conventional arms to Africa and the establishment of bases in Africa are other topics on which Soviet and American cooperation could be fruitful.

SPECIAL PROBLEM OF SOUTH AFRICA

In this context, Mr. Chairman, I move on to my final comment, which concerns South Africa.

The current efforts of President Nyerere of Tanzania and of President Kaunda of Zambia, and not forgetting the courageous and lonely pioneering done, for which he was often mocked, by President Banda of Malawi, are all deserving of strong encouragement and support by our Government.

I say this because I never have and do not now share the widespread views expressed before this and other committees on the Hill that the future of South Africa is inevitably a sanguinary one. By comparison I would say I see the future as relatively sanguine. It will not be without stress, turmoil, and loss of life, granted, but I cannot subscribe to the volcano thesis. This thesis that next year it will blow up has been put forward every year since 1921, and it has a rather poor record for predictability. The black and brown peoples of South Africa want justice, and some want retribution, but I believe with Alan Paton, the former president of the Liberal Party, that under Prime Minister Vorster there is a chance to achieve a just society without widespread violence, and that the process of evolution in South Africa is clearly underway.

The South African Government's lack of support for reactionary and racist white elements in Mozambique is only one example of official policy supporting my views.

But the crux of the South African problem is not, as the more sapient African heads of state have pointed out, one of détente between South Africa and black Africa, but détente between the white oligarchy in South Africa and the black majority, not forgetting the colored and Asian populations.

U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO HOME LANDS GOVERNMENTS

You may ask, Mr. Chairman, how the United States can assist in this process which is fundamentally a domestic concern of the Republic of South Africa, the Transkei, and other incipient states?

The answer was suggested 3 years ago in a report of a mission by the then Advisory Committee on Africa of the Department of State, consisting of two black and two white Americans, which I was privileged to lead in South Africa. We spoke then, and I have done so repeatedly in the intervening years, with a wide cross-section of all the peoples of South Africa about American policy. We recommended then, and I hold the same views even more strongly this morning, that the United States respond to the wishes of the home land governments for economic assistance.

It is my privilege to have been friends, in some instances for more than 20 years, with such leaders of the home lands as Buthelezi, Mangope, Nsantwisi, Phatudi, and Matanzima. These men are sometimes cruelly and inaccurately attacked as stooges of the Pretoria government. A man like Gatsha Buthelezi has every bit as deep a sensitivity to the discrimination against his people and as strong a desire to change the situation as the late Martin Luther King had, himself often denounced in this country for his nonviolent approach. These home land leaders do not substitute rhetoric for reason. They know the depth of the grievances in South Africa. They also know the price that civil war would exact from all people whose blood runs red.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to see legislation in this Congress supporting American encouragement to the home lands and financial assistance of such projects as a technical high school in Kwa Zulu for any of the citizens of Kwa Zulu, because that country and those racial home lands are not going to be racially exclusive states. Already, Chief Buthelezi has said that Indians, coloured people and, whites can live and settle in this area; an apparent contradiction to the South Africa.

I would support scholarships for the best qualified students to study in the United States where there are not adequate opportunities in South Africa, and for other education aids, such as libraries and outreach programs to the least educated and least favored citizens in South Africa. As a trustee of two different foundations, I am involved in sending American librarians, both black and white, to South Africa to pass on the latest in American outreach programs and to provide graduate training to Africans who wish to interpret their own history and prehistory.

Economic assistance to the home lands is equally important, and I would urge support where feasible of the new African bank, encouragement of American investments in the home lands, and the assistance of the Import-Export Bank. There is not time now to discuss policy toward Rhodesia and Namibia, where our country has opportunities for constructive leadership, but they are related to our South African policy.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

To summarize, Mr. Chairman, I urge the Congress to continue and to expand humanitarian concerns for Africa; to assist governments, preferably democratic, that truly serve the people; to take a bold and new initiative to discourage the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons in sub-Saharan Africa; and, finally, to undertake a dramatic change in policy in supporting the education and training of black Africans in the South African home lands, and to encourage American investment in these areas.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to state my views.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much. We appreciate your very concise and straightforward statement. I might just say that before going on we try to maintain a rather strict 20-minute limit. You spoke, I believe, for 13 minutes and I would like to say to the other witnesses that if they would like to summarize below 20 minutes, that would give us more time for discussion.

But, I will leave that to you. Before we have questions, let us go ahead and hear the other two witnesses.

Next, we are going to hear from Jean Herskovits, who I believe is at City University of New York.

Ms. HERSKOVITS, State University of New York.

Senator CLARK. State University of New York. You may proceed.

[Professor Herskovits' biography follows:]

CURRICULUM VITAE—JEAN HERSKOVITS

Born: May 20, 1935, Evanston, Illinois.

DEGREES

B.A., Swarthmore College, 1956; honors major in history.

D.Phil., University of Oxford, 1960; in African history—Thesis: "Liberated Africans and the History of Lagos Colony to 1886."

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Brown University, Dept. of Political Science—Lecturer, 1961-2.

Swarthmore College, Dept. of History—Lecturer, fall, 1961-2; Instructor, 1962-5; and, Assistant Professor, 1965-67.

The City College, City University of New York, Dept. of History—Assistant Professor, 1967-71.

State University of New York, College at Purchase, Division of Humanities—Associate Professor, 1971- ; Coordinator of History Faculty, 1972- .

OTHER RELEVANT EXPERIENCE

Lecturer, Institute of African History, University of Rhode Island, summer 1961.

Lecturer, Peace Corps Training Programs for Nigeria—U.C.L.A., 1961, 1962; Educational Services, Inc., Boston, 1966.

Director of Nigerian Studies, Peace Corps Training Program, Morehouse College, summer 1966.

External Examiner in History, honors program, Swarthmore College, 1973, 1974.

ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL HONORS

B. A. with high honors, 1956.

Phi Beta Kappa, 1956.

Lucretia Mott Fellowship (awarded by Swarthmore College for graduate study), 1956-1957.

Bursary, Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research, 1958.

Ford Foundation Foreign Area Training Fellowship, 1959-60.

Social Science Research Council summer research grant (with Igor Kopytoff), 1964.

Emergency Faculty Research Award, Research Foundation of the City University of New York, August 1970.

Faculty Research Award, Research Foundation of C.U.N.Y., 1971-72 (declined).

Social Science Research Council-American Council of Learned Societies, Joint Committee on Africa, research award for 1971-72.

National Endowment for Humanities, Senior Fellowship, 1972.

RESEARCH IN AFRICA

1958: Nigeria, with supplementary archival work in Ghana and Sierra Leone.

1964: (summer) Ivory Coast and Nigeria.

1970: (summer) Nigeria.

1972: Nigeria.

1973: (summer) Nigeria.

OTHER RELEVANT TRAVEL

1970 (Oct.-Nov.): to nine universities in Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, Zambia, Tanzania to explore African interest in student and faculty exchange programs on behalf of the City University of New York.

PUBLICATIONS

A Preface to Modern Nigeria: The "Sierra Leonians" in Yoruba, 1830-1890, University of Wisconsin Press, 1965 (published under the name Jean Herskovits Kopytoff).

In *Man's Unfinished Journey: A World History*, Houghton Mifflin, 1971, four chapters on African History and cultures.

"The Sierra Leonians of Yorubaland", in P. D. Curtin (ed.), *Africa and the West: Intellectual Responses to European Culture*, University of Wisconsin Press, 1972.

"One Nigeria", in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 51, no. 2 (Jan. 1973).

Editor, volume, V, *Subsaharan Africa*, in *The Dynamics of World Power: Documentary History of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1945-1973*, Chelsea House-McGraw Hill, 1973.

"The Ibo in Nigeria: A Time of Reconciliation", *Outlook, The Washington Post*, Feb. 25, 1973, reprinted in *Congressional Record*, Feb. 26, 1973.

"Nigeria: Africa's Emerging New Power." *Saturday Review/World*, February 9, 1974, reprinted in *Congressional Record*, March 5, 1974.

"Nigeria: Africa's New Power," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 53, no. 2. (January 1975).

Review and review articles in *Journal of Modern History*, *American Historical Review*, *African Historical Studies*, *The Annals*, *American Anthropologist*, *Africa Today*, *Political Science Quarterly*, *Journal of International Affairs*.

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Board of Directors, African Studies Association, 1973-

Joint Committee on African Studies of the Social Science Research Council and American Council of Learned Societies, 1973-

Robert Livingston Schuyler Prize Committee, American Historical Association, 1971-

Member: African Studies Association; American Historical Association; Historical Society of Nigeria.

STATEMENT OF JEAN HERSKOVITS, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Ms. HERSKOVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also am very grateful for the chance to be able to address these hearings on today's subject which I think is a particularly important one.

We do not often look at our policy in southern Africa in the context of its impact on our relations with countries in the rest of Africa. We usually look at it as a problem geographically located south of Zambezi. Sometimes we look at it in a very much broader context—a global one that connects interests in other places with the geographical location of southern Africa. I do think it is important that the southern Africa questions not be detached from the questions of what in short hand we may call black African questions. I think that it is not only essential, in an intellectual sense, it is also in our interest to make such a connection.

The British certainly make it. I think the Russians and the Chinese make it. It has been very clear in his recent diplomatic efforts that Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa makes that connection. And we ought not to be behind him in making it as well.

What I would like to do is summarize some of the points I make in my prepared statement which considers our policy in southern Africa in the context of our own interests and the rest of Africa. In doing so I want to look at our economic, scientific, and strategic interests in Africa.

NIGERIA OF PARTICULAR ECONOMIC CONCERN TO UNITED STATES

I would like to mention right at the start that there is another country in sub-Saharan Africa which is of particular economic concern to us. That is Nigeria, which is, by the latest figures, appended to my full statement, our largest supplier of crude oil, as it has been throughout this year. Indeed, in the past 18 months the percentage of our total imports supplied by Nigeria has varied between 17 percent and 25.6 percent.

Nigeria is also a country of nearly 80 million people, some four times the size of South Africa; with current economic changes it seems to me it provides a potential market that is not negligible. We have interests in a number of other countries, but I mention Nigeria partly because I know it best and partly because it is the most salient example.

Senator CLARK. As a matter of fact, as I look at your chart, it is significantly higher than any other importer that we have, is it not?

Ms. HERSKOVITS. That is right, and I am continually surprised that Americans in general do not seem to be aware of that fact.

HOW BLACK AFRICA SEES U.S. POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

I think that, to assess our interests in other parts of Africa as they are affected by our relations with the policy in southern Africa, it would be well to look first at how black Africa sees our policy in southern Africa and how it sees the southern African situation generally.

Clearly, the countries of black Africa look at the situation in white-dominated southern Africa as a moral outrage. I do not think any more need be said on that point. But Africans are not naive about injustice. They do not think it exists only in southern Africa, although for their own historical reasons and because of their contemporary experience, they feel particularly strongly about the kind of oppression that involves white over black.

They naturally, therefore, see anyone who gives comfort that becomes aid to those white minority regimes as people who are not fundamentally working for ends they value. Any country that gives support to those white regimes, however indirect, they perceive as purposefully eroding good will in black Africa. But because Africans are not naive about injustice or other realities of life, they are really not unreasonable, I think, in what they are asking of us in southern Africa.

Some Africans seem to substitute rhetoric for reason. But leaders in many countries, including our own, do that sometimes. I think we often mistake the rhetoric for the substance of what Africans think we ought to be doing. They themselves support, as we do, peaceful change to majority rule in southern Africa. They have made that clear in the Lusaka manifesto of 1969. They made it very clear again in the statement that came out of Dar-es-Salaam in April. I think there are some who would say—and indeed there are some Africans who do say—that the patience of African leaders in black African countries, given the slowness of change in southern Africa, is remarkable. But they do express a willingness to work for peaceful change and to take the kind of measures that Mr. Munger was talking about and that, I agree, we should certainly support.

Nonetheless, many leaders in black African countries insist that the status quo in southern Africa will not go on forever. I think the Portuguese coup and what has happened in the months since then has made that very clear. I think that the effects to find a peaceful solution in Rhodesia have drawn sizable support from black African countries, and they will continue to support those efforts. But they will not support them as the only way to exert pressure on the Rhodesian regime, and they will not support them forever. Whatever our

own position, I think we have to recognize that that position is being taken by a number of black African states.

If change is going to come, it seems to me, it is unrealistic for us to keep on believing that we can befriend equally white minority governments and black African governments. It has been possible for us to act in the belief that we can do so, but I think it is going to become less and less easy for us to continue. African countries are not saying to us, "You must choose today or tomorrow." But they are increasingly dubious about our interest in our relations with them, the black-ruled states, because we persist in certain actions, of which, of course, continuing with the Byrd amendment, is the most striking.

Now, because we persist in such policies, cooperating in effect with the white-dominated regimes in southern Africa, Africans regard us, (and a matter of fact, they did even before the substance of NSSM 39 became well-known) as not being truly neutral. They regard us as neutral against African interests.

I think in some respects Africans would settle for our being truly neutral. If we took a few steps—the repeal of the Byrd amendment as the most striking—to correct the more obvious things we do that look neutral against them, I think we would see a substantial positive reception.

I think Mozambique made the clearest statement about how Africans feel—not, however, in the speeches at independence. Those speeches, printed in our newspapers, contained a great deal of rhetoric and expressed certain ideological thoughts that we sometimes respond, or over-react, to. I am not generally convinced about ideological threats in Africa. I believe Africans to be cautious about taking on other people's ideologies. I do not think the leaders of Mozambique were making their statement about African feelings toward us in their speeches, but quite simply by not inviting our government to be present at their independence.

I think the leaders of the countries of black Africa, whether they are neighbors of South Africa or farther away, believe that we must take some small steps to make it clear that we come down on the side of freedom in southern Africa. And we simply have not been doing that, they say as they look over, not only the Byrd amendment, but the sale to South Africa of equipment with potential military uses, the continued existence of the NASA space tracking station. Lately our sale to South Africa of enriched uranium certainly has not contributed to making Africa a nuclear free zone. Africans do not see us taking the steps that would make us, at least, neutral on their side.

CONSEQUENCES OF PRESENT U.S. POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, U.N.

The consequences our present policy, interestingly, are just what the study in response to NSSM 39, written in 1969, said that they would be. In my prepared statement, I quote some of those consequences, clearly indicating, I believe, a recognition, even then, that to pursue the kind of policy that it seems we have been pursuing, is to give the white governments a sense that we support them, in whatever measure. Today to continue with that is to damage our relations with black states. I cannot improve on the incisiveness with which the damage to our relations with black states was predicted in NSSM 39.

There is also damage being done, of course, to the United Nations because of our violation of sanctions against Rhodesia. We take that step on the one hand and then lecture the African and other third world states about how they weaken the U.N. That does not sit very well with Africans either.

I have said that I want to talk about it as being in our self-interest to adopt different policies in respect to southern Africa. That is because I think that our greater self-interest lies north of the Zambezi. And I just want to mention—

Senator CLARK. You said because our greater self-interest lies?

Ms. HERSKOVITS. North of the Zambezi in the present political situation, with some changes south of the Zambezi, too, of course. I do not mean at all to suggest that we will never have an interest there.

Senator CLARK. Yes; I understand.

ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH SOUTHERN AFRICA

Ms. HERSKOVITS. Now, on the economic side, I just want to mention again Nigeria's oil and not only Nigeria has oil. Gold and chromite, and a lot of other minerals in southern Africa are important. But what we keep hearing about is an energy crisis. It seems to me impossible not to look at the supply of oil and the role that Nigeria, in particular plays, and that others may come to play, in the context of what we decide to do apropos chromite and gold. Nigeria is developing a capacity to direct the flow of her own oil. She now has between 55 and 60 percent control over the oil interests in the country itself. There is work on refineries and on distribution. It will take a little while to complete this work. But I would like to suggest that we misread the leadership in Nigeria and other African countries if we think that they will never redirect their economic resources to make a statement about southern Africa.

U.S. INVESTMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

As for trade, we have a greater volume of trade with black Africa than we do with white-ruled Africa, and it is growing at a faster rate. I have also appended those figures to my prepared statement. Investment figures are extremely elusive. The best estimates I can get put our investment in South Africa at \$1.2 billion in 1974. In Nigeria, an estimate then was at about \$900 million. The rate of growth was said to be four times as fast in Nigeria since 1971 as in South Africa, and American capital put recently into a liquified natural gas project in Nigeria has probably pushed our investment there above what it is in South Africa.

Security of investment is always of interest to investors, and I would just like to raise one question. Given the political changes in southern Africa in the last 15 months, does Southern Africa look as secure a place for investment as it once did. I would also like to suggest that American businessmen do not see all African governments as unreliable. One afternoon last month I spent an hour and a half at the Department of Commerce Office in Chicago looking at some information. During that time there were three calls from Chicago businessmen, all leaving for Nigeria within a few weeks. It is a small incident,

but it is one that shows that some businessmen think there might be possibilities for investment there.

I have put together, after a certain amount of digging, a list of firms with investments both in South Africa and in Nigeria. I have reached a number—27—which I do not suppose is accurate. I suspect that by now there are considerably more, but in any case, many of them are small. General Motors, IBM, Mobil Oil, Chase Manhattan Bank, and the like. One day, possibly, those companies, as perhaps the U.S. Government, may have to make some hard choices about where they prefer to have their interest in Africa.

SPACE TRACKING AND MONITORING NAVAL TRAFFIC

I want to pass very quickly over the scientific questions. That has to do mainly with space tracking and monitoring naval traffic. I am not a scientist, but it is my understanding that there is not only one point where you can locate such facilities. I would like to ask whether there is not a possibility of relocating in a country with an African government—perhaps Botswana—so that a majority government could benefit from all of the technological knowledge and whatever other benefits our presence provides.

Strategically, I would like to raise two questions. One of them actually, Mr. Chairman, is a point that you touched on in your opening remarks. I have noticed, as you have, that there are other ports on the Indian Ocean as well as those in South Africa. I find it puzzling that we seem uninterested in taking steps to make the countries that control those ports—Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya—more favorably disposed toward us.

We have missed many opportunities with those Governments before. It may be too late, but I wonder what would happen if we asked African leaders about possible alternatives, were we to remove facilities from South Africa—I wonder if they might not respond.

The other strategic point I want to raise is whether we really want, even in the prevailing climate of détente, to encourage the Soviet Union's presence in black Africa.

I have heard any number of Africans from various countries say, look, if there is any American military presence, or anything that supports the South African military, then for reasons of our own security, we have little choice but to seek help from people I am not sure you want to encourage us to seek help from. These Africans have also said that there is an inclination among many people who run black African countries to be friendly, even turn to the United States for such help. But there is no possibility of their doing so if we are, however indirectly, giving military aid to their enemies.

This is a problem we create for African leaders who are favorably disposed to us. If I may just mention Nigeria again. Nigeria has a vocal press and a loud public opinion. In such circumstances, it is hard for leaders favorably inclined toward many things about the United States to maintain a favorable stance.

LESSENING OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR SOUTHERN AFRICAN MINORITY REGIMES

I think that Africans would respond positively to almost any measures we took to lessen what they see as our support for southern

African minority regimes. I list in my statement a number of suggestions, but I would only like to mention a few here. The first and most obvious is the repeal of the Byrd amendment, which I understand has created more bad feeling toward us in black Africa than any other single thing we have done. In South Africa, I would suggest that we return to a strict enforcement of the arms embargo, and end all forms of military contact. I do not want here to get into the whole question of what the business practices of U.S. firms might be, or the issue of disinvestment. I should think, though, that a change from our statement that we neither encourage nor discourage American investment in South Africa—a change that was more discouraging—would be a gesture that would also produce quite a positive response.

I think we must establish diplomatic relations with Mozambique. The urgency of that seems self-evident. But in connection with Mozambique, I would like to make another suggestion that is not new here; that is, that we state in principle our willingness to contribute to the multilateral fund already planned to compensate Mozambique for its financial losses when its Government cuts off Rhodesian access to its ports to end the sanctions violating trade. The toll there is going to be enormous, and as you know, Britain and the Commonwealth have already committed themselves to helping. I see no reason why we could not commit ourselves to helping, even before there is a mechanism for doing so.

Along similar, if somewhat more far-reaching, lines, I would like to make two more suggestions. One has to do with—well, both of them really have to do with the economic situation in southern Africa as a region. Arrangements were made between colonial governments of now independent countries and the South African Government for, in their view, a rational economic system whereby South Africa could industrialize and mine its minerals by using African labor from outside its borders.

It seems to me that one of the things that is going to happen—and it may not happen in a day or two, but it will happen sometime—is that those independent African states will, whatever the cost (and in Zambia it has been a considerable cost, but the Zambians have done it), cut off the supply of labor to South Africa. It seems to me that an imaginative and positive thing we might do is to explore multilateral efforts to give those countries supplying that labor alternatives within their own countries. We could investigate possible multilateral efforts to guarantee investment in labor-intensive projects of various sorts, so that—well, the positive consequences for the countries involved are obvious.

SOUTHERN AFRICAN POWER GRID QUESTION

I would also like to raise the question of the power grid in southern Africa. The Cabora Bassa Dam was designed with the idea that power would be supplied to South Africa. If Mozambique cuts that off, it is

going to be at a considerable cost to Mozambique as well as to South Africa. Would it not be possible for the United States to join in an effort simply to examine in scientific terms the orientation of hydroelectric power in southern Africa? Once the Kariba Dam is completely in African hands, the question becomes more complex. But could the grid not be redesigned so that power could be sold to the north instead of to the south? We could make a great technical contribution to such an effort and other kinds of contributions as well.

MORE U.S. CONTACT WITH AFRICANS SUGGESTED

Finally, I would also like to stress that we need more contacts with Africans of a range of views, inside the countries concerned, and also outside those countries. I do think that range must include the leaders of liberation movements. We have had ample evidence that we should have communication with them. That Cabral are heads of independent states, makes the point. When Joshua Nkomo was here a couple of months ago, he was not just talking when he said, "Today's rebels are tomorrow's government." It is not always true. But if there is a chance that it may be true, it is not in our interest to have no communication with such people.

What, then, prevents the kind of changes that I am suggesting here? It seems to me very little. It seems to me we can make those changes at very little cost. NSSM 39 stated that our interests in southern Africa are "important but not vital." I think important interests are often sacrificed for other important interests, and certainly for vital ones. I am not saying that we have other vital ones in Africa, but I think we have others that are important.

Our investment in South Africa is no more than 1 percent of our total overseas foreign investment. Indeed, for the firms with investments in South Africa, many of them have only a very small percentage of their investment in South Africa. I know nobody likes losing investments. But perhaps they might have other opportunities in other countries that would compensate.

It seems to me that in our own domestic politics, there is really nothing standing in the way of our taking the steps I have mentioned. I am not sure whether it is a good thing or a bad thing, but I have not heard great public outcries on African issues one way or the other. Certainly not when we have taken what steps we have that were positive from an African vantage point. There are also people in this country who would politically support such changes. NASA and the Department of Defense might be inconvenienced by some of the ones I have mentioned, but I am sure that they have resources that would permit them to find alternatives.

All of my suggestions are in the context of encouraging peaceful change. African countries want to encourage peaceful change. We are certainly not going against their wishes in doing so too. And it seems to me that we need to plan for a situation—certainly more likely to exist than we could have predicted 1½ years ago—that may put some of the very things we now seem to value in African hands before many years have gone by. If we could help accomplish that peacefully and have good relations with majority governments in the countries of southern Africa, it would seem to me clearly optimal.

Finally, I can conclude no better than by quoting an experienced African diplomat at the U.N., one often deeply critical of U.S. policy in public, but who said to me very straightforwardly, "Look. Africans are not Communists. They are certainly not anti-American. America has only one serious problem with Africa; that is her policy in southern Africa."

[Ms. Herskovits prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JEAN HERSKOVITS

The perspective we are taking today on U.S. policy towards Southern Africa is, I believe, badly needed. It is both wrong and unrealistic to see southern Africa as detached from the rest of Africa. Africans in majority-ruled Africa know that. The British certainly know it. The Russians and the Chinese seem to know it. South Africa's John Vorster has made clear how well he knows it.

I do not minimize in this broader approach the views of the people who live south of the Zambezi. The problems of southern Africa are their first. Their voices matter most, especially those among them hardest to hear because, though belonging to the majority, they are officially silenced. But the problems of southern Africa and our policy towards it are usually considered only up to the Zambezi, or else they arise in a very broad context, the global one.

Other African voices that do matter for U.S. policy are scarcely listened to. But the United States has interests in Subsaharan Africa north of the Zambezi, interests in trade, investment, energy, even in strategic possibilities. Nigeria alone, with four times the population of South Africa and all of it black, is now our largest supplier of crude oil. In each of the last 18 months, between 17 percent and 25.6 percent of our crude oil imports have come from Nigeria.¹

How does black Africa look at minority-ruled southern Africa? Very simply as a moral outrage. Black Africans see anyone who gives comfort, let alone aid, to continuing oppression there as a partner in furthering injustice. This is an obvious point, and it is the basic one. Africans are not naive about injustice and cruelty. They know it exists in many places, in Africa as well as outside it. But racial injustice is the moral offense they feel most deeply. The historical reasons why they take that position are self-evident.

Historical reasons also explain why the members of the Organization of African Unity have strongly opposed interference in internal matters in African countries. They even prefer not to intervene in the southern African countries whose reality is abhorrent to them. The Lusaka Manifesto made that clear statement in 1969; the Dar-es-Salaam declaration of last April did too [and the Kampala O.A.U. summit confirmed it]. Africans would like nothing more than to see the minority regimes move themselves, from inside, to majority rule.

But no one who has studied the last century in South Africa can be optimistic about that happening there. And so, at Lusaka and Dar-es-Salaam, African leaders said, we will be patient and peaceful, but not forever. The United States needs to plan for that time.

Africans inside southern Africa and outside it are not setting up a two-pronged choice: the status quo or violent change. But for them there must be change, and they will do what they can to speed it—including putting newly possible pressure on countries supporting a southern Africa status quo.

Rhetoric and policy are not, of course, the same, in or out of Africa. African countries may, at the U.N. and elsewhere, demand that the United States and other Western countries engage in boycotts against South Africa as well as Rhodesia; that we arm liberation movements; that we force complete disinvestment. But they don't expect all that, because they are also realistic.

They would, I believe, be satisfied, even pleased, to see us be truly neutral. In the early 1960's people talked of Third World "neutralism." It was usually seen as "neutral for" or "neutral against"—and usually against the West. That is how Africans see our own policy in southern Africa now: we are neutral, we say, but they say we are neutral on the side of white minority rulers. Except possibly in Namibia, it is hard to see it otherwise.

In South Africa we "neither encourage nor discourage" American investment. Yet the Department of Commerce provides helpful information and services to investors, and investment there increases. We retain from the early 1960's an

¹ See Appendix I. The figures come from the Federal Energy Administration.

arms embargo. Yet, citing balance of payments exigencies, we sell South Africa equipment that has potential military uses.

Lately South African admirals and other military figures have been quietly appearing here, and have even met, however unofficially, with counterparts at the Pentagon. Our NASA space tracking station gives the South African government access to crucial technology. We sell South Africa enriched uranium—for peaceful uses, of course, as Canada did to India. We, however, have India's example.

In Rhodesia we cannot even maintain the language of neutrality. We continue with the Byrd Amendment, violating an international agreement we ourselves joined in making. We allow a Rhodesian Information Office to lobby in Washington and to encourage tourism that brings Rhodesia crucial foreign exchange. We even permit recruitment in our own country of American mercenaries to bolster white armed forces in Rhodesia. Africans cannot see all this and believe us neutral, however willingly the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa met Zimbabwean leaders when they were here in May.

The new leaders of Mozambique have made the clearest recent statement of how we look to Africans. It was not in their speeches. It was simply in their decision not to invite us to celebrate their independence. Even Britain, another ex-colonial power, was friend enough to be there. We, having virtually ignored them, were not.

It is true that Africans, in Africa and here, expect more understanding and sympathy for their aspirations from the United States than from most other countries. We have nourished their expectation with our own history and our own proclaimed ideals. When we give not more support than others but less, we reap disillusionment. It is not in our self-interest that we continue to do so.

The situation in southern Africa has changed drastically since the Portuguese coup d'etat of April 25, 1974. In 1969 the by-now-well-known premise of Option 2 of NSSM 39 stated, "The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them."²

That assumption of whites in unending control is now proven false for Mozambique and Angola. It is scarcely less false for Namibia's prospects. The change from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe is but a matter of time. All these changes bring others—in politics, in psychology. John Vorster's shifts in external policy and his internal maneuverings show he knows these things.

Only the United States, which persists in importing Rhodesian chromite and takes other measures remarkably in line with the "operational examples" of Option 2 of NSSM 39,³ seems not to have digested the change.

The arguments about Option 2 policy, based on the outdated assumption of a white-dominated status quo, could not be better put than in the National Security Council's Interdepartmental Group for Africa's "Study in Response to NSSM 39: Southern Africa" of August 15, 1969. I shall quote both sides here:

Pros

1. Encourages existing tendencies to broaden relations between black states and white and thus reduce tensions—South Africa's new outward policy, Zambia's trade and sub rosa political contacts with South Africa and Portugal.

2. Preserves U.S. economic, scientific and strategic interests in the white states and would expand opportunities for profitable trade and investment.

3. Relaxation of the U.S. attitude toward the whites could help lift their present siege mentality; and it would encourage elements among the white seeking to extend South African relationships with black Africa.

4. U.S. diplomatic support and economic aid offer the black states an alternative to the recognized risks of mounting communist influence.

5. Increased aid would also give us greater influence to caution the black states against violent confrontation and give them a tangible stake in accepting the prospects of gradual change.

6. Would reduce a major irritant in our relations with Portugal, and afford the Caetano government opportunity for liberalization.⁴

There is no comment in the "pros" about southern Africa's non-white peoples; they have already disappeared in the assumption. Those who know many Africans

² National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa, "Study in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 39: Southern Africa," AF/NSC-1G 69, August 15, 1969, p. 27. Hereafter cited as NSSM 39 Study.

³ NSSM 39 Study, pp. 2809.

⁴ NSSM Study, p. 30.

may also raise questions of reasoning in points 1, 4, and 5 (6 is of course now irrelevant). And they may ask whether South African history makes the first effect in point 3 likely, and why the second is desirable unless linked to internal change, as the Dar-es-Salaam statement in April insisted it must be.

The contrary case is well made in the study memorandum itself :

Cons

1. Relaxation of the U.S. stance towards white states could be taken by the whites as a vindication of their policies. Many black states, led by Zambia and Tanzania, probably would charge us with subordinating our professed ideals to material interests and tolerating white-regime politics.

2. There is a serious question whether pro-Western leaders of the black states could continue to justify their stance to their populations if the U.S. officially declared its opposition to current liberation efforts. Radical and communist states would be the beneficiaries.

3. Unilateral U.S. relaxation of sanctions against Rhodesia would be a highly visible violation of our international obligations and would be damaging both to the U.S. and to the U.N.

4. The current thrust of South African domestic policy does not involve any basic change in the racial segregation system, which is anathema to the black states. There is virtually no evidence that change might be forthcoming in these South African policies as a result of any approach on our part.

5. Requires extensive diplomatic and economic involvement in a situation in which the solution is extremely long-range and the outcome doubtful at best.

6. It is doubtful that the additional aid contemplated would be sufficiently great to influence the black states in the direction indicated.⁵

As we look back over the last five years or so that Option 2, or something very like it, has guided our policy, we can see that "cons" 1-4 and 6 have come, at least partially, to pass.

I should like to go further in examining the second and fourth arguments given in favor of continuing this policy. These arguments raise central issues of self-interest: economic, scientific, and strategic. I think it is a serious error of judgment to assess these interests only in terms of "the white states," and so I shall place them here in a broader African context.

ECONOMIC INTERESTS

It is no longer true that our only, or even our major, economic interests in Africa are in the Republic of South Africa (no one ever made such a case for Rhodesia). The most striking point bears repeating: Nigeria is now our largest supplier of crude oil. She did not join the OAUPEC boycott, she continues in first place despite cutting back her own production to conserve a wasting asset. Gold is important to us, and so is chromite, but the "crisis" we hear of continually is an "energy crisis." Nigeria's oil is sulphur free and therefore even more attractive because of our environmental concerns.

Most countries, say the realists as well as the cynics, do not change policies that reflect their self-interest for reasons of principle in a far-away land. African countries, like all others, have internal needs that take priority. But to think that no external issue can reach African leaders is to misread them. Southern Africa is an issue that reaches a country like Nigeria, as well as the countries whose borders touch their white-ruled neighbors. [From what we know of Nigeria's new leaders, their concern is as great as their predecessors'.]

It will take time for these countries to build economic and political strength that can give them leverage with non-African countries on southern African issues. But that strength is building.

The economic issues go beyond oil and other mineral resources (new finds are announced frequently these days). Let us look at trade figures. I am not setting these in the context of our world trade, for my interest here is in southern vs. what the Commerce Department (but no one else) has sometimes called "Middle Africa."⁶

⁵ NSSM 39 Study, no. 30-1.

⁶ "World Trade Outlook for Africa," Overseas Business Reports, U.S. Department of Commerce, OBR 75-16, March 1975, pp. 2-3.

"South Africa, Nigeria, and Zaïre will be the major markets for U.S. sales, with high world commodity prices playing an important role in expanding their foreign exchange earnings and import potential," says the same source, p. 2. It singles out for consideration in addition Angola, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Zambia. OBR 75-20 of April 1975 is on "Marketing in Cameroon," reflecting some interest there too.

If we take Nigeria and Zaire for a first comparison with South Africa, we find the following, using the most recent yearly figures available (1973; in millions of dollars) :

[In millions of dollars]

| | Imports from the United States | Exports to the United States | U.S. balance | Total volume |
|-------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------|--------------|
| Nigeria..... | 208 | 906 | -698 | 1,114 |
| Zaire..... | 115 | 70 | +45 | 185 |
| Total..... | 323 | 976 | | 1,299 |
| South Africa..... | 792 | 244 | +548 | 1,036 |

If we include U.S. trade with all black African countries on one side, add Rhodesia on the other, and use more recent figures which give comparisons between the first quarters of 1974 and 1975, we find the following (in millions of dollars) : (See Appendix II for detailed figures)

[In millions of dollars]

| | Imports from the United States | | Exports to the United States | |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------|
| | 1st quarter 1974 | 1st quarter 1975 | 1st quarter 1974 | 1st quarter 1975 |
| Black Africa..... | 215.6 | 392.4 | 856.8 | 1,364.5 |
| White-ruled Africa..... | 234.1 | 321.7 | 99.3 | 204.5 |
| Total volume: | | | | |
| Black Africa..... | 1,072.4 | | | 1,756.9 |
| White-ruled Africa..... | 333.4 | | | 526.2 |

Because oil has made our balance of trade unfavorable with Nigeria, the incentive to increase our exports there is all the greater. Nigeria is, of course, predominant in our African trade, as the following figures show : (in millions of dollars)

[In millions of dollars]

| | Imports from the United States | | Exports to the United States | | Total volume | |
|-------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|--------------|---------|
| | 1st quarter 1974 | 1st quarter 1975 | 1st quarter 1974 | 1st quarter 1975 | 1974 | 1975 |
| Nigeria..... | 39.2 | 116.1 | 510.1 | 947.9 | 549.3 | 1,064.8 |
| South Africa..... | 233.9 | 320.6 | 95.1 | 199.2 | 329.0 | 519.0 |

Noting that Nigeria's economy now has a real growth rate of 10 per cent, has mounting foreign exchange reserves, and has just launched a \$50 billion five-year development plan, the Department of Commerce concludes in understatement that, "there are abundant opportunities for U.S. business in Nigeria."⁷ This new development plan emphasizes capital-intensive projects, for which U.S. manufacturers could supply vast amounts of goods and equipment. [I do not see from early indications that Nigeria's change of government is likely to bring major revisions in the plan itself, or consequently, in what is needed to implement it.] Meanwhile the Commerce Department quotes "most observers" as believing that "South Africa's current upward cycle has peaked. The first three quarters of 1975 should be a period of more temperate growth, with an upward trend projected to begin in the fourth quarter. A real GDP growth of 3.4% is forecast."⁸

I should like to insert here an urgent recommendation, tangential to our policy in southern African, but central to our African policy. Congress must alter the

⁷ OBR 75-16, March 1975, p. 3.

⁸ OBR 75-16, March 1975, pp. 2-3.

provision in the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 502(b)(2) (Jan. 3, 1974), that denies all OPEC countries the status of "beneficiary developing country." Nigeria (and there are others, such as Venezuela) did not join the OAPEC boycott. The Nigerian Government is bewildered and offended by this reprisal against behavior that helped, not harmed, the United States.

Figures on U.S. investment in African countries are elusive. I have scarcely been able to improve on estimates I received some months ago from State Department sources: for 1974, \$1.2 billion invested in South Africa and over \$900 million in Nigeria, with a rate of increase in Nigeria since 1971 some four times that in South Africa.⁹

The latest Commerce Department statements I have found give only 1972 figures for South Africa (\$1.025 billion).¹⁰ On Nigeria they said in December, 1974: "Best estimates of total U.S. investment in Nigeria run as high as \$1 billion. . . . Probably 90% of U.S. and at least 80% of other foreign investment, mainly from U.K., Belgium, France, and Germany, is concentrated in Nigeria's oil sector. These estimates are rather fickle because there is no common denominator of criteria upon which the estimates are based. And, a single investment in the oil sector, such as the \$1 billion LNG facility, could very well double most careful estimates almost overnight." [American and European capital have since been committed to that very project.]¹¹

All of this is simply to suggest, since hard data are not available, that we have Nigeria alone as much of a commitment of U.S. capital as in the Republic of South Africa, and a commitment likely to increase. Security of investment is, of course, a major consideration for investors. The question of time enters: secure for how long? The new situation in southern Africa ought to raise questions about South Africa's stability that were unimaginable two years ago. Long-range security for U.S. investment throughout Africa may depend on our not counting on permanent white control there.

Available lists of *American Firms, Subsidiaries & Affiliates* operating abroad show that many more are involved in South Africa than in Nigeria. But they also show that at least 27 of the same companies, eight of them ranked among America's fifteen largest by *Fortune*, have investments in both places.¹² It may not always be possible for them, any more than for the U.S. Government, to be friendly on both sides of the southern African racial issue.

One NSSM-39 interpretation says that the political cost to us in black Africa of retaining our interests in the white-ruled states ". . . may be accompanied [by the black African countries] because (a) the great majority of non-white states in Africa and elsewhere will put their own immediate self-interest ahead of penalizing us for our interests in the white states, and (b) even the most directly involved black states (Zambia and Tanzania) will temper their reaction because our continued good will and support for their cause will be important, and they know it."¹³

Whether or not that was an accurate assesment in 1969, Zambia in particular has shown a willingness to act against economic self-interest. If others have not by 1975, they may by 1980—especially if they increasingly doubt "our good will and support for their cause."

SCIENTIFIC INTERESTS

These interests center on the NASA space tracking station located near Johannesburg. The scientific issues are complex ones, and some of their complexity has emerged through hearings held by the Africa Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs in March and April 1973.¹⁴ I wish only to raise one question here: is there no place in an African country with majority rule that would provide the same advantages? Botswana, for example, is less than 100 miles from the station and, though I am not a scientist, I have

⁹ Herskovits, Jean, "Nigeria: Africa's New Power." *Foreign Affairs*, January 1975, p. 314 n. 1.

¹⁰ "Market Factors in South Africa." OBR 74-57, p. 18.

¹¹ "Marketing in Nigeria." OBR 74-66, p. 22.

¹² See Appendix II. I am indebted to Professor Ann Seldman for the chance to benefit from reading her unpublished ms. dealing with U.S. corporate involvement in South Africa.

¹³ NSSM Study, p. 8.

¹⁴ *Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo (Against Portugal and South Africa), and Related Issues*. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, March 20, 22, April 6, 1973.

always thought that such decisions allowed a range of geographic choice. If there are other possible locations in African-run states, why do we give moral support, access to technology, the dollars American personnel bring, and other benefits to the Republic of South Africa? Why should those advantages not be offered to a black African state? Africans wonder.

STRATEGIC INTERESTS

I should like to consider first what I shall call narrow strategic interests: those that, although they have global implications, focus on the geographic importance of South Africa. The U.S. government is concerned about the Cape Route for a number of reasons (some of which are echoes from the 19th century). A salient one is the Russian naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

But not only South Africa is strategic for the Indian Ocean. Other African countries have ports on it, or have access to it, as Somalia has helped us notice. Between Somalia and South Africa along that Indian Ocean coast are Kenya, Tanzania, and Mozambique. We have missed many opportunities with these countries, stunningly with Mozambique. We have no guarantee that any of them would consider us welcome, as does the present South African government. Indeed, without a change in our southern African policies, we can be sure they would not. But with a change, it could be as an African official from one of those countries remarked, "Talking with friends is more productive than talking with those whose deep-felt interests you oppose."

Nor is it imaginable that a white South African government would offer its naval facilities to the Soviet Union, whose presence is our stated concern. The related question, however, of monitoring from South Africa the activities of the Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean also arises. An article in the July 1975 issue of *Africa*, published mainly by Africans in Paris, deals with South Africa's *Project Advocate*, "an advanced system of computers, radar scanners, and communications equipment buried beneath tons of concrete and lead in a shell safe from radio-active fallout,"³⁵ alleged to do just such monitoring for NATO.

The article goes on to reproduce and quote from photostats of correspondence indicating 23 pieces of U.S. equipment delivered to Pretoria—by what route is not clear—for the project. Whatever the substance of the charges, one is again forced to ask: Is there no alternative way for NATO in general and the U.S. in particular to gather necessary information? Whatever additional expense or inconvenience must be weighed against what we lose in black Africa by such arrangements. That loss is less measurable but, I think, not less great in the long strategic view.

I should like to turn to "broader" strategic interests on the African continent itself. These involve the major communist powers—Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China—though minority whites in southern Africa tend to use the term "communism" in a way that may mislead. The South African "Suppression of Communism Act" defies communism as all opposition to the present government of South Africa. It bears no resemblance to what we ordinarily associate with the term—nor does their use of the word "Terrorism."

Outsiders' misunderstanding of these South African usages often produces support, however misinformed, for South Africa. Our makers of policy, even without semantic confusion, worry everywhere about the role and influence of Russia, especially, and China. They worry about those influences in southern Africa for other strategic reasons connected to the Indian Ocean and, of course, the Middle East.

Yet they act as if they need not give any attention in black Africa to what worries them elsewhere—as if we needed no friends in a static southern Africa of Option 2. Only a few private Americans were invited to join the Mozambique independence celebrations, not the U.S. government. "It is not that Mozambique or an other African country can—or wants to—ignore the United States," an official from another East African country commented, "It's just that there was no basis for an invitation. Even though they knew independence was coming, Americans didn't make much effort with Mozambique's leaders—even when the Portuguese were feverishly decolonizing. Your former Assistant Secretary for Africa [Donald Easum] was trying, and suddenly he wasn't there any more and there was nothing."

³⁵ "NATO Arms South Africa," *Africa*, No. 47, July 1975, p. 34.

It is not in America's interest to repeat that experience. If we establish no official contacts with Africans from liberation movements, we do leave the field to the Russians and the Chinese. As an African official put it, "You can hardly contain the USSR by throwing Africans to her."

We leave that field in several ways: economic, strategic, even military. (I minimize the ideological impact because I have seen no evidence in the last 15 years that Africans rush to embrace ideological positions formulated outside Africa. They act in African interests and out of a fundamentally African cultural context.)

Economically, we express great concern in southern Africa's chromite, gold and other resources. We do not want to be dependent for them upon the Soviet Union, by nature's hand the other source.

The point is that, if we want access to chromite and, in years to come, to South Africa's gold and other resources, we will need to have relations with the governments that then prevail. These governments are likely to be a majority—that is, largely black African—governments. They will have markets other than the U.S. to which to turn. Nigeria can do so with oil once she develops her own capacity, now being planned, for refining and distribution. That time is not far off.

Strategically and militarily, we are also jeopardizing our interests in Africa itself. If we involve ourselves with South Africa's military—by visits of admirals, supply of technology, sale of enriched uranium, or whatever else—we may force neighboring countries to consider substantially increasing their own military capacity for reasons of their own security. Their arms may come from the Soviets or Chinese. They may have to turn to them even if they do not want to, and for many reasons, historical and contemporary, most of them do not. Western planes, used or merely ready, are likely to face Russian or Chinese SAM missiles, merely ready.

This is a problem we are creating for African states. It is not confined to the neighbors of South Africa and Rhodesia. A country like Nigeria, with a lively public opinion and a vocal press, faces a variant of it. Many of its leaders, military and civilian, are quite favorably disposed towards the United States. But they find it increasingly difficult to keep that disposition in light of our much-publicized Byrd Amendment, the widely-perceived view of our relations with South Africa, the unfortunate timing of shifts in State Department personnel that is now compounded by revelations of CIA activities.

"If trouble were to come in South Africa, and the United States did not support African freedom, where could Nigeria and others turn?" asked a senior Nigerian official. "Britain or France would hardly be an answer. Does the United States really want to force Nigerians and others to get more involved with the USSR than we want to?" The answer gains in importance when we notice Nigeria's relative strength in Africa, and her leaders' efforts to use that strength and potential towards developing a strong, stable, peaceful Subsaharan Africa (her role in creating the new Economic Community of West African States is an instance of those efforts).

The NSSM 39 study stated flatly, "Our interests in the region [southern Africa] are important but not vital."²⁹ What has changed since that 1969 conclusion? Our economic involvement is greater and growing faster north of the Zambezi than south of it. The momentum towards majority rule has gained dramatically. Portuguese decolonization has brought a new and fluid political situation. We must consider that foreign interests in southern Africa will sooner or later be regulated by African hands. Sooner in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and Namibia, later in South Africa—but not eternally later, as it could have seemed in 1969 or even early 1974.

In sum, I do not see that our present policy is in our self-interest; not now, and particularly not a very few years hence. A few years hence, however, our

²⁹ NSSM Study, p. 1. This statement comes under the heading of "I. SUMMARY. B. The Problem." It continues, "Our investments, primarily in South Africa, total about \$1 billion and our trade yields a highly favorable balance of payments advantage. This geographically important area has major ship repair and logistic facilities which can be useful to our defense forces. An important space tracking station is located in South Africa. Outside of the region our investments in Africa total about \$1.5 billion and profitable trade relations are expanding. Relationships involving these economic interests and a variety of other matters including U.S. defense installations elsewhere in Africa could become more difficult if our policies in southern Africa generate intense adverse reaction." (p. ii.)

opportunities for good relations with black Africa may well be fewer, as they are fewer now than they were in the mid-1960's.

What African countries would really like us to do in southern Africa is in fact quite modest. It is hard for them to understand why, in a place where our interests are relatively slight ("important but not vital"), we go against our broader interests as well as our principles.

African countries do not understand our illusion that we can befriend both them and their enemies. In Milwaukee on July 14th Secretary of State Kissinger said that the countries of the Third World were behaving irresponsibly at the United Nations and would bring its demise. African representatives read that statement with wonder: the United States imports Rhodesian chrome, violating U.N. sanctions. Africans say we have brought what we now deplore upon ourselves. We first undermined the U.N. when it suited our apparent interest, and now condemn others for acting in their own apparent interest. An African at the U.N. put it bluntly: "This administration has not bothered to be sensitive to Africans' problems, yet now they expect Africans to be sensitive to their own; worse, to come running at the snap of two fingers." Our southern African policy, then, reverberates through issues reaching beyond Africa.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES IN POLICY

These suggestions are in the context of the stated U.S. commitment to work for peaceful change in South Africa. I shall group them geographically.

Rhodesia

Put our total weight behind majority rule.

(1) Repeal the Byrd amendment. It has given greater offense to black Africans than any other single step we have taken in Africa.¹⁷

(2) End Rhodesian recruitment of mercenaries in this country.

(3) Close the Rhodesian Information Office¹⁸

Namibia

(1) Continue activity to discourage U.S. investment, denying guarantees under a future Namibian government but also under the present illegal South African one.

(2) Support legislation denying U.S. tax exemptions to firms operating in countries whose government the International Court of Justice has ruled illegal—that is, Namibia.

(3) Reconsider our use of the veto in the Security Council of an embargo against arms to be used against Africans in Namibia. Apart from whether or not to veto is right, is it necessary?

South Africa

(1) Return to strict enforcement of our voluntary arms embargo. A balance of payments deficit, now shifting, indeed, to a favorable balance, must be weighed against other deficits we create.

(2) Move the NASA installation, possibly to Botswana, if its government were willing to have it.

(3) End all forms of military contact and cooperation with the South African military; remove any U.S. military facilities.

(4) Discourage further U.S. investment, rather than neither encouraging nor discouraging it.¹⁹

(5) Support legislation linking U.S. firms' employment practices to South Africa to granting them government contracts here.

(6) Facilitate visits by as many non-white South Africans, Zimbabweans, and Namibians as possible to this country, with specific purposes for their travels.

¹⁷ Ambassador John Scall said in 1973. "It is the single most troublesome issue that I have at the United Nations." *Importation of Rhodesian Chrome*. Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, September 6, 1973. Washington 1973.

¹⁸ See "Washington Notes on Africa." Washington Office on Africa, July 1973, pp. 1-2.

(4) End American tourism in Rhodesia.

¹⁹ I shall not take up here the complex question of disinvestment and other variations on the theme of investment, except to stress the possibility that some firms may one day find their South African activities affecting opportunities they would like to pursue in black African countries.

We advocate communication with whites there (we suppose it may change their thinking), but we talk less often, for it is harder, to non-whites from these countries. It is essential to know what they are thinking. Too often we draw conclusions from what we assume Africans, or some Africans, think. The Study on NSSM 39, 70 pages long, given one paragraph to the views of Africans within South Africa.

(7) Resist lobbying by the government of South Africa (and that of Rhodesia), especially trips for Congressmen and Senators financed directly, or less obviously, by the South African government. Legislators especially can recognize that whites in Africa place a high priority on public relations and can afford to pay for them. Africans have other urgent needs—education, health, the standard of living—which demand their more meagre resources.

I have several suggestions pertaining to southern Africa as a region. As for Mozambique, we should do two things:

(1) Establish diplomatic relations, and

(2) Contribute as soon as it exists to a multilateral fund to compensate the Mozambique government for revenue lost in denying Rhodesia use of ports, railroads, and all other facilities essential to her sanctions-violating trade. Announce now a U.S. commitment in principle, as Britain and the Commonwealth countries did in May.

It is only a matter of time until Mozambique, despite the cost, takes the step of denying Rhodesia her facilities. It is only a matter of a bit more time until she and other majority-ruled neighbors take further economic steps. These countries—Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland—have inherited from colonial rule an economic situation designed to benefit South African industrialization and the treasuries of colonial or metropolitan governments. By agreement with Portugal and Britain years ago, South Africa would draw, and draw heavily, on African labor from beyond her borders.

Zambia has already put a stop to her nationals' working in South Africa. But given a pattern of decades, and the difficulties of alternative employment, it has been at considerable social and economic cost. Other independent African states, most immediately Mozambique, face the same problem. They want to deny South Africa the labor on which her economy heavily depends, but they know that doing so will have internal consequences—human, economic, political.

The United States wishes to encourage peaceful political and legal change in South Africa. We frequently argue that economic changes there will bring the others about. We should, then, support efforts to exert pressure to change conditions of labor in South Africa.

(1) Explore possible multilateral efforts to provide to such countries as Mozambique and Malawi the capital—government or private with government guarantees—to create whatever labor-intensive alternatives those governing in such countries may think desirable.

(2) Provide Botswana, which has substantial resources but lacks skilled African technicians, an alternative to the white South Africans now holding such jobs. Training programs for Africans from Botswana or neighboring countries are the main solution. In the interim American and other technical personnel might be offered through multilateral mechanisms.

Another economic pressure point is hydroelectric power. In the days when southern African whites believed they were all there to stay—and stay in control—Cabora Bassa Dam in northern Mozambique grew from the needs of South Africa as well as those of Mozambique itself. The present government of Mozambique now faces yet another dilemma resulting from colonial economic planning: Cabora Bassa's power is designed to supply South Africa, and to bring valuable foreign exchange in return. To end that arrangement is to compound economic difficulties in Mozambique. The United States ought to:

(3) Explore and join a multilateral effort to redesign the power grid in southern Africa (no less important once Kariba Dam is also under full African control), so that the power from Cabora Bassa could be sold to the north rather than to the south.²⁰

It is, finally, in our interest to follow whenever possible the lead of Africans in matters concerning Africans. We must at the very least learn about what Africans—inside and outside white-ruled countries—are thinking. We should act

²⁰ I am indebted to Philip A. Wellons, lawyer at the International Legal Center (New York, N.Y.) and consultant to the O.E.C.D., for clarifying my ideas about the first of these three suggestions and contributing his own on his last two.

multilaterally whenever we can. Treating African governments as mature, full-fledged, and as responsible as any others would not only be appropriate; it would further our economic and strategic interests north of the Zambezi. It would certainly improve a deteriorating situation at the United Nations.

Nor can we ignore the southern African liberation movements. Joshua Nkomo, of Zimbabwe's African National Council, stated the issue clearly at a meeting in New York in May. He said, "The United States needs to understand that today's 'rebels' are tomorrow's government." We do not need to take only his word for that: Machel and Cabral are immediate examples.

At a time when the long-range is coming closer than those most sympathetic to African aspirations could have imagined two years ago, it is in our own interest to stop treating freedom fighters as terrorists. That does not mean we must supply them with arms or even money for arms. It does mean moral support for their goals—goals in line with our own declared commitment to human dignity. It means at least quiet contacts with their leaders, and perhaps even diplomatic support. It means humanitarian support of the kind the Scandinavian countries and Holland have been giving. It could mean educational help as well.

To do nothing at all is, as Africans have told me so often, to invite the USSR and China to amass at least good will while we draw suspicion. To do nothing is in the eyes of all Africans to be "neutral" against them. Surely we do not want to repeat the Mozambique experience, in which we virtually destroyed what relations we had built up with FRELIMO in the mid-1960's, leaving us now to work all the harder if we want to salvage something.

What stands in the way of these changes in policy? Africans are asking us for little more than gestures. The cost of responding is small. What interests we have in the white-ruled states are acknowledged as "not vital." The \$1 billion invested in South Africa is no more than 1 per cent of the value of our private overseas investment.

In domestic politics the negative consequences of changing our southern African policy would, I think, be very minor. For better or worse, these are not issues that move the bulk of Americans. Black Americans would, of course, be pleased, as would a number of others. Those who want us to support white domination for racial reasons seem unlikely to organize politically around southern African issues.

NASA and the Department of Defense would be inconvenienced, but I doubt that, if pressed, they could find no alternatives to their South African arrangements. The American companies that lobby actively or quietly to support our present policies are mainly of a size to have their major interests elsewhere. I would guess (because I have been unable to find out) that the southern African investments of many individual companies are a small percentage of their foreign commitments. I would be interested to know in the connection what position companies other than Union Carbide and Foote Mineral take on repeal of the Byrd Amendment? One with a concern about chromite, the Ford Motor Company supports repeal. Do others? Or do they even not oppose it?

Events have made our stand in southern Africa an urgent matter. Our policy is to avoid bloodshed there. True, it may not work out that way finally. But promoting peaceful change means supporting African pressures on the white regimes. Sometimes that is very easy, as following the lead of the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969 or last April's Dar-es-Salaam declaration would be.

We need to recognize that it takes two sides to make a peaceful settlement. Experience has shown the Africans that the whites are very reluctant, at best, to allow erosion of their privileged position. But when they do change at all, it is only under pressure from Africans. For Africans there is no acceptable alternative to creating that pressure.

We have not affected Apartheid with our present policy, nor should we expect to. We ought to make very clear to the South African government, however quietly, that we will not support continuing oppression. We need to mean it, and they need to understand it. We must at the very least become truly neutral.

I think we can do more, however, and easily. We can support Africans in ways I have suggested. We have taken some steps in Namibia that show what we can do if we choose. Africans applaud those steps, and Americans scarcely notice them; certainly there have been no loud public protests.

I am convinced that if we took other steps—starting with repeal of the Byrd Amendment—we would gain great good will. And we would gain it at very little cost. Outside southern Africa, we would give the African governments friendly to the United States, and many are friendly, room for maneuver in their relations with us. New opportunities could follow.

An experienced African diplomat, often deeply critical in public of American policy, stated clearly what I myself wish to conclude: "Africans are not Com-

munists; they are certainly not anti-American. America has only one problem with Africa. It is her policy in southern Africa."

APPENDIX I
IMPORTS OF CRUDE OIL, BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
(Million barrels per day)

| Country | Imports | Imports as percent of U.S. imports | Total production by ¹ | Percent of production to United States |
|-----------------------|----------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--|
| Arab OPEC: | | | | |
| Algeria..... | 356.0 | 9.2 | 960 | 37.1 |
| Iraq..... | 6.9 | .2 | 2,360 | .3 |
| Kuwait..... | 25.8 | .7 | 1,930 | 1.3 |
| Libya..... | 221.0 | 5.7 | 1,160 | 19.1 |
| Qatar..... | | | 470 | |
| Saudi Arabia..... | 358.0 | 9.3 | 7,020 | 5.1 |
| U.A.E..... | 169.0 | 4.4 | 1,710 | 9.9 |
| Non-Arab OPEC: | | | | |
| Ecuador..... | 55.0 | 1.4 | 110 | 50.0 |
| Gabon..... | 50.0 | 1.3 | 210 | 23.8 |
| Indonesia..... | 332.0 | 8.6 | 1,164 | 28.5 |
| Iran..... | 281.0 | 7.3 | 5,090 | 5.5 |
| Nigeria..... | 728.0 | 18.9 | 1,560 | 46.7 |
| Venezuela..... | 494.0 | 12.8 | 2,420 | 20.4 |
| Other: | | | | |
| Canada..... | 398.0 | 10.3 | 1,500 | 26.5 |
| Mexico..... | 96.0 | 2.5 | 800 | 12.0 |
| Other..... | 288.3 | 7.5 | 25,316 | 1.1 |
| Total..... | 3,859.0 | 100.1 | 51,480 | 7.5 |
| Arab OPEC..... | 1,136.7 | 29.5 | 15,610 | 7.3 |
| Non-Arab OPEC..... | 1,940.0 | 50.3 | 10,554 | 18.3 |
| Other..... | 782.3 | 20.2 | 25,316 | 3.1 |
| Total..... | 3,859.0 | 100.0 | 51,480 | 7.5 |

¹ Estimated.

TRADE IN CRUDE OIL BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND OPEC-OAPEC COUNTRIES—NIGERIA
(Million barrels per day)

| Date | Total United States crude imports | Crude imports from Nigeria | Crude oil from Nigeria as a percent of United States crude imports | Total production by Nigeria | Percent of Nigerian production to United States |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|--|-----------------------------|---|
| September 1973 (precrisis)..... | 3,471 | 409 | 11.8 | 2,100 | 19.5 |
| Total 1973..... | 3,550 | 410 | 11.5 | 2,053 | 20.0 |
| 1st quarter 1974..... | 2,368 | 458 | 19.3 | 2,250 | 20.4 |
| 2d quarter 1974..... | 3,702 | 708 | 19.1 | 2,300 | 30.8 |
| 3d quarter 1974..... | 3,938 | 829 | 21.1 | 2,280 | 36.4 |
| 4th quarter 1974..... | 4,009 | 837 | 20.9 | 2,210 | 37.9 |
| Total 1974..... | 3,733 | 678 | 18.2 | 2,260 | 30.0 |
| October 1974..... | 3,810 | 704 | 18.5 | 2,330 | 30.2 |
| November 1974..... | 3,958 | 1,012 | 25.6 | 2,240 | 45.2 |
| December 1974..... | 4,261 | 796 | 18.7 | 2,060 | 38.6 |
| January 1975..... | 6,071 | 1,194 | 19.7 | 1,980 | 60.3 |
| February 1975..... | 3,827 | 692 | 18.0 | 1,800 | 38.4 |
| March 1975..... | 2,740 | 664 | 24.2 | 1,710 | 38.8 |
| 1st quarter..... | 4,213 | 850 | 20.2 | 1,830 | 46.4 |
| April 1975..... | 4,971 | 844 | 17.0 | 1,620 | 52.1 |
| May 1975..... | 3,859 | 728 | 18.9 | 1,560 | 46.7 |

¹ Preliminary.

Sources: IOD, PIW, Department of Commerce Publications IM145 and IM146. Compilation of data and calculations by E. K. Bauer.

APPENDIX II

Countries and figures used in text of statement [see below, page 29] are so marked (—).

ABLE E-3.—DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN MERCHANDISE—WORLD AREA AND COUNTRY OF DESTINATION (F.A.S. VALUE BASIS): 1975 AND 1974

In millions of dollars. See "Explanation of Statistics" for information on coverage, definition of f.a.s. export value, sampling procedures, and sources of error in the data. Special Category commodities, if any, are included in totals for individual countries and world areas. Developed countries include Canada, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the Republic of South Africa. Developing countries include the rest of the world excluding communist areas in Europe and Asia. The assignment of countries generally follows that made by the United Nations. X—Not applicable. Z—Less than one-half of rounded unit.

| World area and country of destination | 1975 | | | 1974 | |
|---|---------------|-------------|-----------------------------|---------------|-----------------------------|
| | Current month | Prior month | Cumulative, January to date | Current month | Cumulative, January to date |
| U.S. EXPORTS | | | | | |
| Africa..... | 470.7 | 368.4 | 1,235.6 | 284.9 | 772.1 |
| Morocco..... | 13.8 | 37.5 | 71.0 | 19.6 | 51.7 |
| Algeria..... | 54.9 | 37.2 | 124.6 | 20.5 | 85.1 |
| Tunisia..... | 7.9 | 7.9 | 28.9 | 9.8 | 24.6 |
| Libya..... | 33.8 | 26.2 | 74.2 | 7.0 | 21.4 |
| Egypt..... | 78.9 | 64.8 | 202.9 | 45.4 | 116.1 |
| Sudan..... | 6.5 | 5.2 | 18.5 | 1.0 | 6.4 |
| Canary Islands..... | 4.5 | 4.8 | 14.3 | 4.3 | 13.5 |
| Spanish Africa, n.e.c..... | (Z) | (Z) | (Z) | (Z) | .8 |
| Equatorial Guinea..... | (1) | (1) | (Z) | (Z) | (Z) |
| Mauritania..... | 1.1 | .8 | 1.7 | .3 | 2.1 |
| Federal Republic of Cameroon..... | 1.8 | 2.3 | 8.3 | 1.4 | 3.9 |
| Senegal..... | 1.8 | 2.2 | 6.1 | 2.5 | 6.0 |
| Mali..... | .5 | .2 | 1.0 | 2.5 | 5.6 |
| Guinea..... | 1.1 | 2.5 | 3.8 | .5 | 1.6 |
| Sierra Leone..... | .4 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 1.3 | 3.4 |
| Ivory Coast..... | 5.4 | 6.2 | 17.4 | 3.1 | 8.4 |
| Ghana..... | 7.4 | 4.7 | 17.6 | 6.6 | 16.0 |
| Gambia..... | .2 | .1 | .6 | .1 | .3 |
| Niger..... | 1.6 | .9 | 4.3 | 1.0 | 2.8 |
| Togo..... | 1.1 | .8 | 8.3 | .3 | 1.5 |
| Nigeria..... | 52.4 | 57.2 | 116.1 | 11.9 | 39.2 |
| Central African Republic..... | .1 | .1 | .4 | .1 | .2 |
| Gabon..... | 4.7 | 2.3 | 8.9 | 1.5 | 5.4 |
| Chad..... | .5 | .1 | .6 | 1.0 | 1.6 |
| British West Africa..... | (1) | (1) | (1) | (1) | (1) |
| Madeira Islands..... | (Z) | (Z) | .1 | (Z) | .1 |
| Upper Volta..... | .5 | .3 | 1.8 | .6 | 1.2 |
| Dahomey..... | .9 | .7 | 3.1 | .6 | 1.6 |
| Angola..... | 4.4 | 3.6 | 17.5 | 8.7 | 18.2 |
| Congo (Brazzaville)..... | 1.6 | .6 | 3.0 | .3 | 1.1 |
| Western Africa, n.e.c..... | .1 | .1 | .2 | .3 | 1.0 |
| Liberia..... | 7.3 | 7.1 | 22.3 | 5.4 | 14.5 |
| Zaire..... | 12.3 | 12.0 | 43.3 | 5.0 | 15.5 |
| Burundi..... | .1 | (Z) | .3 | .2 | .3 |
| Rwanda..... | .2 | .3 | .9 | .3 | .4 |
| Somalia..... | .8 | .5 | 1.7 | .1 | .6 |
| Ethiopia..... | 1.7 | 3.1 | 13.1 | 4.8 | 9.1 |
| Afars and Issas (French)..... | .3 | .5 | 1.0 | .2 | .5 |
| Uganda..... | .3 | .1 | .6 | 5.3 | 6.7 |
| Kenya..... | 4.7 | 2.8 | 9.7 | 5.6 | 11.7 |
| Seychelles and dependencies..... | (Z) | .1 | .1 | (Z) | (Z) |
| Tanzania..... | 13.7 | 1.9 | 24.1 | 4.0 | 5.9 |
| Mauritius and dependencies..... | .1 | .9 | 3.2 | 1.0 | 2.4 |
| Mozambique..... | 12.9 | 1.1 | 7.6 | 2.1 | 7.4 |
| Malagasy Republic..... | 1.2 | .5 | 2.3 | .2 | .9 |
| French Indian Ocean Areas..... | .2 | (Z) | .1 | .7 | .8 |
| Republic of South Africa..... | 126.9 | 92.9 | 320.6 | 92.1 | 233.9 |
| Southwest Africa (Namibia)..... | .3 | .4 | .8 | (X) | (X) |
| Botswana..... | .1 | .1 | .4 | .2 | .5 |
| Zambia..... | 10.3 | 3.9 | 24.0 | 4.9 | 12.5 |
| Swaziland..... | .1 | (Z) | .1 | .1 | .2 |
| Rhodesia ² | .1 | .1 | .3 | .1 | .2 |
| Malawi..... | .2 | .3 | .7 | .3 | .6 |
| Lesotho..... | (Z) | (Z) | .6 | (Z) | .7 |
| Unidentified countries ³ | 10.0 | .2 | 10.2 | .2 | .3 |

¹ Countries included in Africa—United States figures in text.

² Note U.S. exports to Rhodesia.

³ Reflects transshipments of certain grains and oilseeds through Canada.

TABLE 1-4A.—GENERAL IMPORTS AND IMPORTS FOR CONSUMPTION—WORLD AREA AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

[In millions of dollars. See "Explanation of Statistics" for information on coverage, definitions of Customs, f.a.s., and c.i.f. import values, sampling procedures, Australia, New Zealand, and the Republic of South Africa. Developing countries include the rest of the world excluding communist areas in Europe]

| World area and country of origin | General imports | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|-----------------------------|---------------|-----------------------------|
| | 1975 | | | 1974 | |
| | Current month | Prior month | Cumulative, January to date | Current month | Cumulative, January to date |
| U.S. IMPORTS | | | | | |
| Africa..... | 579.4 | 566.4 | 2,051.6 | 392.3 | 985.4 |
| Morocco..... | .7 | .6 | 2.7 | 1.5 | 3.5 |
| Algeria..... | 84.1 | 91.5 | 362.1 | 5.2 | 8.5 |
| Tunisia..... | 1.1 | 2.1 | 9.9 | 2.0 | 1.5 |
| Libya..... | 36.0 | 52.0 | 101.6 | .2 | .9 |
| Egypt..... | .2 | .5 | 1.0 | .5 | 4.3 |
| Sudan..... | .7 | .1 | 1.8 | 1.4 | 2.6 |
| Canary Islands..... | .5 | .6 | 1.9 | .4 | 1.5 |
| Spanish Africa, n.e.c..... | (1) | (1) | (Z) | (1) | (1) |
| Equatorial Guinea..... | (1) | (1) | (1) | (1) | (Z) |
| Mauritania..... | (Z) | (Z) | .1 | (Z) | (Z) |
| Federal Republic of Cameroon..... | 1.4 | .4 | 3.3 | 1.2 | 4.2 |
| Senegal..... | 3. | .1 | .8 | .1 | .4 |
| Mali..... | (Z) | (Z) | .1 | (Z) | .1 |
| Guinea..... | 2.1 | 1.4 | 6.1 | .8 | 1.4 |
| Sierra Leone..... | 1.8 | 5.1 | 9.0 | 9.4 | 16.5 |
| Ivory Coast..... | 15.0 | 28.1 | 54.2 | 13.6 | 34.5 |
| Ghana..... | 19.1 | 11.1 | 39.4 | 16.0 | 39.8 |
| Gambia..... | (Z) | (Z) | (Z) | (Z) | (Z) |
| Niger..... | (Z) | (Z) | (Z) | (Z) | (Z) |
| Togo..... | .1 | (Z) | .1 | 3.0 | 3.1 |
| Nigeria..... | 250.6 | 237.9 | 947.9 | 209.8 | 510.1 |
| Central African Republic..... | .5 | .1 | .6 | .7 | 1.8 |
| Gabon..... | 11.1 | 4.4 | 30.2 | 1.2 | 2.4 |
| Chad..... | 4.3 | (Z) | 4.3 | (1) | |
| British West Africa..... | (1) | (Z) | (Z) | (1) | 2.1 |
| Madeira Islands..... | .2 | .1 | .4 | .2 | .5 |
| Upper Volta..... | .1 | (Z) | .1 | (Z) | (Z) |
| Dahomey..... | (Z) | (Z) | (Z) | (Z) | .6 |
| Angola..... | 32.5 | 33.1 | 131.7 | 30.9 | 111.2 |
| Congo (Brazzaville)..... | .1 | 4.3 | 5.5 | .4 | .8 |
| Western Portuguese Africa, n.e.c..... | 3.9 | .5 | 4.6 | (1) | .9 |
| Liberia..... | 10.1 | 7.6 | 27.5 | 10.1 | 25.6 |
| Zaire..... | 2.3 | 3.0 | 9.3 | 4.2 | 14.5 |
| Burundi..... | 4.1 | .6 | 5.6 | 1.2 | 4.0 |
| Rwanda..... | 3.0 | 1.3 | 7.3 | 1.9 | 7.1 |
| Somalia..... | .1 | (Z) | .1 | (Z) | (Z) |
| Ethiopia..... | 5.5 | 3.1 | 11.1 | 6.3 | 11.7 |
| Afars and Issas (French)..... | (Z) | .1 | .1 | (Z) | (Z) |
| Uganda..... | 3.2 | 7.6 | 12.7 | 6.1 | 17.4 |
| Kenya..... | 2.0 | 4.4 | 9.3 | 1.7 | 8.1 |
| Seychelles and dependencies..... | .1 | .2 | .3 | .1 | .2 |
| Tanzania..... | 1.7 | 3.0 | 8.5 | 3.6 | 6.6 |
| Mauritius and dependencies..... | 1.2 | .6 | 2.2 | 1.5 | 2.4 |
| Mozambique..... | 3.0 | 2.2 | 8.8 | 4.7 | 12.2 |
| Malagasy Republic..... | 7.8 | 1.0 | 11.6 | 3.6 | 14.4 |
| French Indian Ocean Areas..... | .2 | (Z) | .2 | .3 | .7 |
| Republic of South Africa..... | 65.3 | 53.8 | 199.2 | 43.1 | 95.1 |
| South West Africa (Namibia)..... | (1) | (1) | (1) | (1) | (1) |
| Botswana..... | 2.0 | 2.5 | 7.1 | (Z) | .1 |
| Zambia..... | (Z) | (Z) | (Z) | 1.6 | 3.8 |
| Swaziland..... | (Z) | .5 | .5 | (Z) | .1 |
| Rhodesia..... | 1.4 | .8 | 5.3 | 3.0 | 4.2 |
| Malawi..... | .2 | .1 | 5.5 | .4 | 1.0 |
| Lesotho..... | (Z) | (1) | (Z) | (Z) | (Z) |
| Unidentified continents..... | 1.0 | 1.0 | 2.9 | 1.3 | 3.1 |
| Unidentified countries..... | 1.0 | 1.0 | 2.9 | 1.3 | 3.1 |

¹ Countries included in African-United States trade figures in text.

Source: "Highlights of U.S. Export and Import Trade" U.S. Department of Commerce; FT 990, March 1975, issued May 1975.

APPENDIX III

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES, AND AFFILIATES OPERATING IN NIGERIA AND IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Firms ranked by *Fortune* among the 15 largest industrial companies in the United States are marked with an asterisk (*): The Chase Manhattan Bank; Chesebrough Pond's, Inc.; *Chrysler Corp.; Ernst & Ernst; Exxon Corp.; Farrell Lines, Inc.; *Ford Motor Co.; *General Motors Corp.; *Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.; Gulf Oil Corp.; *IBM World Trade Corp.; Ingersoll-Rand Co.; International Harvester Co.; Johns-Manville International Corp.; Eli Lilly International Corp.; *Mobil Oil Corp.; The National Cash Register Co.; Otis Engineering Corp.; Pan American World Airways, Inc.; Charles Pfizer & Co., Inc.; Rexall Drug & Chemical Co.; The Singer Co., Inc.; Sterling Drug, Inc.; Symington Wayne Corp.; *Texaco, Inc.; Upjohn Co.; and Westinghouse Electric Co.

SOURCE: "American Firms, Subsidiaries & Affiliates Operating in Nigeria"; "American Firms, Subsidiaries & Affiliates Operating in Republic of South Africa," 8th edition, 1974; and World Trade Academy Press, Inc., New York.

From my own information I know that at least *International Telephone and Telegraph can now be added to this list, which could probably be much longer with up-to-date information.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much.

We have a live quorum on the floor. I am going to have to leave for about 7 or 8 minutes. We will then hear Professor Johnson's statement. We will stand in recess for about 15 minutes.

[A recess was taken.]

Senator CLARK. We are going to hear next from Dr. Willard Johnson, who is professor of political science at MIT. We are very pleased to have you, and up to the next 20 minutes are yours.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My verbal statement does condense somewhat the written version.

Senator CLARK. Let me just interrupt to say that all of your statements, of course, will be made part of the record as written.

[Professor Johnson's biography follows:]

BIOGRAPHY OF WILLARD R. JOHNSON

Johnson, Willard R., 44 Norwood Avenue, Newton Centre, Mass. 02159. Born: Nov. 22, 1935, St. Louis Mo.

M.I.T., Bldg. E53-Room 429, Cambridge Mass. 02139, (617) 253-2952. Married to Vivian R., Two Children.

Current Position: Full Professor of Political Science, M.I.T.

Educational Background: Ph.D. in Political Science, Harvard Univ. 1965; M.A. in African Studies, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, 1961; B.A. in International Relations, U.C.L.A. 1957.

Employment Background: Asst. Professor, M.I.T. 1964-69; Associate 1969-1974. President, The Circle Inc. (a community economic development corporation in Roxbury, Mass.) 1968-70. Visiting Associate Professor, Harvard Business School 1969. Visiting Lecturer, African Studies, Boston University, 1968. Adjunct Associate Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy 1970 to present.

Recent Important Published Works: *The Cameroon Federation: Political Intergration in Fragmentary Society*. Princeton Univ. Press 1970. "Should the Poor Buy 'No-Growth'" in *Daedalus*, Fall 1973. "U.S. Policy Toward Africa," in *Africa Today*, Winter 1973. Written as chairman of Task Force on Policy Toward Africa, Senator McGovern's Presidential Campaign.

Current Research Interests: International Business Involvement in Economic Development; Management Education for Economic Development Promotion; Community Economic Development Corporations in the American Black Com-

munity. Cameroon, Nigeria, Kenya and Tanzania—political and economic development.

Affiliations: African Heritage Studies Association, Board of Directors; National Convention of Black Political Scientists; Caucus of Black Economists; American Political Science Association; Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

STATEMENT OF WILLARD R. JOHNSON, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you.

My statement does not attempt to convey new information. Indeed, reading the record of these hearings and those in the past, I think, would give all the essential and relevant facts. Why is it, then, that we have ever been searching for but never coming to the truth? Why do we seem to listen but never hear, look but never see, manipulate but never truly feel? Perhaps we express the right facts but the wrong values.

The policies we have been pursuing are wrong, both morally and practically. They need to be changed. But what is more important, we must change the basis on which they were constructed, the assumptions that underlay them. Our problems in southern Africa are, in many ways, symptoms of a more general illness. The cleansing and basic reordering which Watergate revealed we need in our domestic political life is a necessary aspect of, perhaps even a prerequisite to, the changes we need to make in our approach to southern Africa.

We need an honest government that truly cares about the masses of the American people and dedicates itself to serving their interest, especially their long-term interest. It must reject the self-serving claims of greedy special interests, and end the illusory and deprived expressions of "manhood" we have often been wont to display in racism and cold warrior jingoism. No government that truly pursued the enlightened interest of the masses would have taken our approach to southern Africa, in my estimation.

U.S. APPROACH TO SOUTHERN AFRICA

What is the essence of the approach we have taken? It is to side with the ruling white minority regimes against an actively resisting black African majority. Why have we done this? From reviewing the few announcements about the National Security Council decision of 1970 that formalized our tilt toward white racial dictatorship and rampant economic exploitation of black labor, it would seem it was because we assumed that:

One, white power is superior to black power in the region, and therefore the white regimes are there to stay until they decide in their own way and time to change.

Two, that black memories will be short, and if and when blacks come to be able authoritatively to allocate the economic resources we need, we can adjust our stance without fear of damage from the historic legacy of our complicity with white domination.

And three, there will be no important domestic costs to us for pursuing such an approach.

This is a foundation such as an idiot might construct. But it is supposed to support interests that are real and that affect us all, despite their seeming invisibility. It should disturb us more, not less, that dis-

tinguished men with reputations for brilliance, and not idiots, are responsible for the bases of this stance. These assumptions are wrong; they accord with neither reality nor righteousness. Although these errors come easily out of traditional American attitudes about race, they are no less demonic for being demotic.

American policies will be captive of American traditions of racism and exploitation only so long as American policy making is the captive of racists and exploiters. To argue politics stops at the water's edge, or at least at the 200-mile limit, is nonsense and serves only to beguile those ill served.

EXAMINING U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA

I wish to examine those policies in several domains. Our general policy has pursued stability. Where the status quo involves some obviously repugnant features, we have publicly stressed peaceful change, with more emphasis on peace than change. But there has not been peace in southern Africa for some time. There has been a steady trend toward the achievement of power by the African majority. In the long run, therefore, by tilting toward the wrong side, we threaten ourselves with the worst kind of instability, where we will be upended along with our defeated allies. The boundaries of the white redoubt are shrinking fast, leaving behind liberated zones of black rulers with whom our only relations have been ones of hostility.

In 1970, the National Security Council concluded that white power was stably entrenched throughout southern Africa, but in 1974 the Portuguese military admitted not only their inability to win their colonial wars, but the relevance of the model and the message of the African liberation movements to the Portuguese masses. In 1975, this realization is opening over a thousand miles of borderland between free Africa and South Africa. South Africa has been quicker than the United States to realize how untenable this makes the old policies of the white redoubt. South Africa already has economic agreements with Mozambique. The United States was officially excluded from Mozambique's independence celebrations.

We have built up naval connections and space tracking stations in South Africa with an eye to Russian involvement in the Indian Ocean. But this may have cost us the potential alternatives of such relationships with five of the other eight states with coasts on the Indian Ocean or Red Sea. Somalia has already offered such facilities to the Soviets.

We have occasionally expressed our concern about the Cape of Good Hope shipping lanes. Such concern provides no rational explanation for the alliance, however. South Africa has no need, and little capability, to exclude our ships from those waters.

The really important military concern we have with South Africa is also one of our most important general economic interests—in certain critical mineral resources, large deposits of which are in South Africa. However, if access to these materials were truly vital to us, to take them over outright, even to bomb Johannesburg and Stellenbosch, Capetown and Kimberley, would involve no greater moral wrong than we have already committed for less tangible interests in our bombing of Cambodia, our secret war in Laos, and our indiscrimi-

nate massive bombing in Vietnam. Nor would it be any greater offense against humanity in its total weight of injury than our present alliance with the South African regime that slowly kills and maims many times the numbers of people that might be injured or killed in such a takeover.

I do not advocate the military conquest of South Africa; merely the withdrawal from an alliance, politically and economically—and indirectly militarily—with what is a murderous, oppressive, outrageous regime.

The most recent offense in this series of outrageous connections with South Africa is the sale of enriched uranium and nuclear technology that would be useful in creating nuclear weapons. South Africa has recently opened a uranium enrichment plant for which the pilot enriched nuclear material and some of the technology was procured from American firms. In addition to the full range of dangers that attends any proliferation of nuclear capability, there is the unique likelihood that South Africa's principal targets for nuclear weapons would be its own people. Moreover, South African officials boast of acquiring through this development "a bargaining position equal to that of an Arab country with a lot of oil."

Whose security interests are served by these developments? Surely not those of the general American public. Our basic conception of constraining nuclear warfare has been, prior to now, to pose countervailing nuclear capacity. From whom will come the nuclear counter to South Africa? Are we inviting the Soviet Union to place its nuclear mantle over the rest of black Africa?

As I stated 3 years ago before Senate hearings on Senate Resolution 214 concerning the Azores and Bahrain base agreements, if we insist on joining with the racists and colonialists in their wars of suppression in Africa, then ultimately we may have to fight some of the battles of those wars right here in America.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH SOUTHERN AFRICA

With respect to our economic relations, with its advanced industrial techniques, our society unquestionably needs many of the mineral resources in which South Africa is so unusually, perhaps even uniquely, endowed. We are well aware of the great reliance we have on chromium, copper, and manganese from South Africa. But for these, there are numerous alternative suppliers and even substitute materials. We may have greater difficulty, however, reducing or getting around our need for certain "vitamin minerals" from South Africa, such as antimony, beryllium, and vanadium.

Because most of these minerals are essential to the industrial processes on which a large part of our economy is based, our interest in them goes well beyond the tiny group of owners of the mining and importing enterprises. But, there are also vital minerals, occasionally even those that may substitute for some we get from South Africa, which come from other African countries, which now are, or very soon are likely to be under black African rule. Angola, Zimbabwe, even Namibia are bound to be free—I would guess all within the next 5 years. What if Nigeria, Mozambique, and Zaire were to shut off our supplies of columbium, which can be substituted sometimes for vana-

dium and tantalum? What if Sierre Leone did not like our South African policies enough to deny us titanium? When the blacks take over in Zimbabwe, which some call Rhodesia, are they likely to have any reason to want to shut off our petalite, corundum and chromium? What if Barundi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire say, OK, have it your way—get all your beryllium from South Africa, we will sell ours to the Soviet Union, Japan, Western Europe?

The very arguments one might use to demonstrate a dependency on South Africa can also be used to demonstrate a dependency, perhaps even to a greater degree, on the rest of black Africa. Policies of alliance with South Africa and policies of relying on the staying power of a handful of white Rhodesians against millions of able-bodied black Zimbabweans—this offers us no economic or military security at all.

More important to our general, truly national interest, as regards the scarcity of important mineral resources would be our policies regarding stockpiling, and the encouragement not only of new exploration, but of basic and applied research to develop substitutes. Why do we then leave it to the mining companies that want to extract as much profit as possible from their present concessions?

BUILDUP OF CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

What interests are served by the buildup of corporate investment in South Africa? Over 460 American enterprises have nearly \$1.25 billion assets there. For very few of these firms in the South African branch their major operation. IBM, Ford, General Electric or General Motors would do as well to look to the rest of Africa. South Africa will not offer a safe haven from which to manufacture and export to the rest of Africa. South Africa's ideological moorings are in racism and nationalism, its praxis is fascism. It can nationalize firms as readily as any other African state. The corporate assets that are tied up in Nigeria alone are worth more than those in South Africa, and are less liquid.

The important thing about our corporate connections with South Africa is not how big they are, but how small, and how few people gain anything from them. The controlling stockholders of all these firms together could fit in one high school gymnasium. And yet these petty circles of interested parties seem to be in a position to orient our national policies in such a fashion that the long-term interest of the vast majority of us are jeopardized. Labor has no positive stake in these investments—they tend to export the type of jobs most relevant to the working class. The American black population has no positive interest in these relationships: they lose not only the jobs, but suffer the anguish of knowing their kinfolk have to endure an essentially slave system for the meager crumbs they are allowed to acquire.

The general American public, even the average stockholder, with his lot or two of shares, has a stake in bringing the multinational corporations [MNC] under greater control. That is a general proposition that applies to South Africa. It is not only the sovereignty of the foreign host country, but that of our own Government that might be at bay. Popular sovereignty is already at bay in this country, largely due to the inordinate power MNC's have acquired through legal and

illegal political contributions, through Government and big business mutual infusion of personnel, through the hidden persuaders of advertising, corporate prestige, and mythmaking.

The people's resources in this context for control of government are perhaps inadequate. This seems to be the lesson of the Byrd amendment. Whose interests are served by the violation of U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia—the management and controlling interests of two or three enterprises, whose lobbyists are constantly active, and aided by close friends in the top echelons of the former, at least, administration. The general American society gets no benefit from it. The chrome is not scarce now, but future supplies of it may be as the black African government that is sure to take over Zimbabwe remembers our perfidy. That so ludicrous an action as the imposition of the Byrd amendment could not be reversed before now speaks volumes about the distortions of the lines of accountability on our Government.

I do not expect that our general policies toward Southern Africa will change suitably until these distorted lines of power are straightened out and reconnected with the people.

KEY FACTOR IN U.S. POLICY IS POLITICAL STANCE

In the political domain, the key and neglected factor in our policy stance is the political one. How long can the vested interests we have in South Africa exploitation count on racism and ignorance to becloud this potential battlefield? We can be sure that it is only racism and inordinate greed that supports the policies we have allowed to misguide us.

The price we pay for this delusion may be the highest of all. When I was first in graduate school, the Belgian Congo set about its troubled course of independence, and shortly thereafter its forceful and visionary young Premier, Patrice Lumumba, was assassinated. All my black friends, who studied the matter with great interest, and most of my fellow white students, had no difficulty in concluding the CIA had a hand in it. Discussing the case of Lumumba, when first he was imprisoned, and before his announced death, my professor, an ex-State Department official, posed the question in class whether assassination was a proper tool of foreign relations. He interpreted my emphatic rejection of the notion in terms of Boulay's admonition that some acts are even worse than crimes in being, also, blunders.

The real costs are even higher, I argued, for they are not just to the image, but to the self. At some point we will realize that we cannot violate America's character in our foreign actions without destroying that character itself. The succeeding 15 years produced a steady and unbroken line of march toward just such a disaster.

It is said that when Rhodesia first contemplated its unilateral declaration of independence, and consulted South African officials, the latter advised against it because, as realists, they appreciated the futility of 200,000 or so foreign white settlers trying to stem the tide of history. Even these unabashed racists did not puff up white men so far beyond the measure of black as to make them vulnerable to the prick of any pinpoint. South Africans, too, no doubt, expected more of the Portuguese, but, then, they always were dislaimful of mixed blood. When the Portuguese shield was bashed down, the South

Africans were among the first to realize that Rhodesia would give way, someday soon, to Zimbabwe, and they moved to facilitate the change while there was still time to realize a moderate inward-looking leadership there, characteristic more of the neocolonial 1960's than the liberation-minded 1970's.

It would seem that the United States has not yet appreciated the significance of the changed circumstances. The appointment of Assistant Secretary Davis looks back to simpler and illusory times.

Not even in South Africa is the future clearly beneficent to white domination. The white South Africans have deluded U.S. officials, along with themselves, into believing that the Bantustan or so-called Home Land policy will work and make for circumstances that are altogether different in South Africa. They count on pressing half the black Africans, and all of their political and social rights, into nine ostensibly independent states, thus removing them from any claim to membership in South African society and, therefore, any claim to political or other rights there.

Nearly 10 million people crowded onto only 13 percent of the South African land area with almost none of its mineral wealth, virtually none of its decent agricultural land, and very little of its coastline. Nine international basket cases, dependent still on the few "jobs" in the white slaveocracy. Many will fall for the illusion of political sovereignty, out of quest for the few privileges all oppressors know they must allow to some, in order to beguile the rest. Many will simply have no choice because, being all too human, they will cling to such life and the means to it, as is allowed them. But any sane person must wonder if it will not fail as an experiment in controlled and allocated misery. The remaining 10 million black workers with their families will still outnumber whites in the latter's own towns and cities, by more than two to one. Even in the miserable Bantustans there will be room to start movements. And outside the power of Botswana will be building, the power of Zimbabwe will be building, and the power of Mozambique, to say nothing of the troubled infant Angola, will be building. All these new black states will be growing and learning to flex such muscles as human beings are capable of giving to well endowed societies with a sense of grievance.

What a faint star on which to fix our hopes for a few more years of profit, and avoidance of ever paying the price of a just retribution.

Only one who fails to recognize any humanity in the black hordes of South Africa can count their determination and capacities so low as to pose no threat to our basic strategy of backing apartheid.

All the while, we can be sure that we will have to make our own separate peace on the periphery of the South African cesspool. No amount of cologne we might wear to our meetings with the Mozambiqueans, the Namibians, the Zibabweans and even the chief supplier now of our petroleum products, as my colleague has pointed out—the Nigerians—will smother the evidence of our other social engagements.

There will be myriad details of change and challenge for us to work out, but the fundamental task confronting us is relatively simple—at least to state: embrace democracy, eschew exploitation, believe in people, walk humbly but towards right.

We are currently doing just the opposite. Can anyone here argue otherwise? The real question is, why are we doing it? If it is because

the minerals of South Africa are vital to our physical being, then who is striving to reveal to the American people the peril they are in, not only because such dependency is not generally known, but because democracy and equity, humanitarianism and the honor of righteousness is equally vital to our moral and social, even our political well-being. If it is because there is some good in white South Africans, then are we to dismantle all our own institutions of criminal punishment, for there is some good in everybody. If it is because we believe so strongly in noninterference in the internal affairs of other States that we cannot move ourselves to act against their wishes, then let us remove ourselves entirely, collectively and individually. If it is because we believe so strongly in "free enterprise" that we cannot impose our public standards on our private selves, are we to make anarchy our social ideal? If it is because all these things are tangled together, are we never to start to untangle them?

[Dr. Johnson's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. WILLARD R. JOHNSON, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, M.I.T.

"WE NEED A FRESH START IN SOUTHERN AFRICA"

My statement will attempt to summarize the position we have come to occupy with regard to Southern Africa, and the need for and possibilities of a fresh start I think we confront. It is not an attempt to convey new information. Indeed, anyone reading simply the record of the hearings of this committee and that of the House of Representatives over the last few years would be exposed to all the essential and relevant facts. Why is it that we have been so constantly searching for but never coming to the truth? Why do we listen but never hear, look but never see, manipulate but never truly feel? Perhaps we express the right facts but the wrong values?

We do not know everything possible about the situation in Southern Africa, but we do know enough to know that the United States has been drawing the wrong conclusions. The policies we have been pursuing are wrong—both morally and practically. They need to be changed. But what is more important, we must change the basis on which they were constructed, the assumptions that underlay them. Our problems in Southern Africa are, in many ways, symptoms of a more general illness. The cleansing and basic reordering which Watergate revealed we need in our domestic political life is a necessary aspect of, perhaps even a prerequisite to the changes we need to make in our approach to Southern Africa.

We need an honest government that truly cares about the masses of the American people and dedicates itself to serve their interest, especially their long term interest. It must reject the self-serving claims of greedy special interests, and end the illusory and deprived expressions of "manhood" we have often been wont to display in racism and cold warrior jingoism. No Government that truly pursued the enlightened interest of the masses would also have taken our approach to Southern Africa.

What is the essence of the approach we have taken?—it is to side with the ruling white minority regimes against an actively resisting black African majority. Why have we done this? From reviewing the few announcements about the National Security Council decision of 1970 that formalized our tilt toward white racial dictatorship and rampant economic exploitation of black labor, it would seem it was because we assumed:

1. white power is superior to black power in the region, and therefore the white regimes are there to stay until they decide in their own way and time to change.

2. black memories will be short, and if and when blacks come to be able authoritatively to allocate the economic resources we need, we can adjust our stance without fear of damage from the historic legacy of our complicity with white domination.

3. there will be no important domestic costs to us for pursuing such an approach.

This is a foundation such as an idiot might construct. But it is supposed to support interests that are real and that affect us all despite their seeming invisibility. It should disturb us more, not less, that distinguished men with reputations for brilliance, and not idiots, are responsible for the bases of our stance. These assumptions are wrong; they accord with neither reality nor righteousness. These errors come easily out of traditional American attitudes about race. They are no less demonic for being demotic.

Because such approaches may tap popular attitudes does not mean they serve the interests of the populace. We have the potential to change this stance. American policies will be captive of American traditions of racism and exploitation only so long as American policy making is the captive of racists and exploiters. We are sometimes told that foreign policy pursues only the national interest, that we must unite behind it at any given time, because politics stops at the water's edge, or at least at the two hundred mile limit. This is nonsense and serves only to beguile those ill served.

In examining the present situation and the prospects for the future, in several domains of concern, we should also constantly consider whose interests might be served and whose injured by any particular policy approach. There is no consensus among the general American populace behind the policies we have pursued. I wish to examine those policies in several domains.

Military Security

Our general policy has pursued stability. Where the status quo involves some obviously repugnant features, we have publicly stressed peaceful change, with more emphasis on peace than change. But there has not been peace in Southern Africa for some time. There has been a steady trend toward the achievement of power by the African majorities. In the long run, therefore, by tilting toward the wrong side, we threaten ourselves with the worst kind of instability, where we will be up-ended along with our defeated allies. The boundaries of the white redoubt are shrinking fast, leaving behind liberated zones of black rulers with whom our only relations have been ones of hostility.

In 1970 the National Security Council concluded that white power was stably entrenched throughout Southern Africa. In 1974 the Portuguese military admitted not only their inability to win their colonial wars, but the relevance of the model and the message of the African liberation movements to the Portuguese masses. In 1975 this realization is opening over a thousand miles of borderland between free Africa and South Africa. South Africa has been quicker than the U.S. to realize how untenable this makes the old policies of the white redoubt. South Africa already has economic agreements with Mozambique. The U.S. was officially excluded from Mozambique's independence celebrations.

We have built up naval connections and space tracking stations in South Africa with an eye to Russian involvement in the Indian Ocean. But this may have cost us the potential alternatives of such relationships with five of the other eight states with coasts on the Indian Ocean or Red Sea. Somalia has already offered such facilities to the Soviets.

We have occasionally expressed our concern about the Cape of Good Hope shipping lanes. Such concern provides no rational explanation for the alliance, however. South Africa has no need, and little capability to exclude our ships from those waters.

The really important military concern we have with South Africa is also one of our most important general economic interests—in certain critical mineral resources, large deposits of which are in South Africa. We will return to this in our discussion of the economic domain of our interests. Suffice it to be said here that were access to these materials truly to be vital to us, to take them over outright, even to bomb Johannesburg and Stellenbosch, Capetown and Kimberley, would involve no greater moral wrong than we have already committed for less tangible interests in our bombing of Cambodia, our Secret War in Laos, and our indiscriminate massive bombing in Vietnam. Nor would it be any greater offense against humanity in its total weight of injury than our present alliance with the South African regime that slowly kills and maims many times the numbers of people that might be injured or killed in such a take over. I do not advocate the military conquest of South Africa, merely the withdrawal from an alliance, politically and economically, and (indirectly) militarily, with what is a murderous, oppressive, and outrageous regime. Such vital resources can be bought from South Africa without such an intricate network of connections as we have allowed to develop between our societies. And where are the emergency programs

to develop substitutes and alternative sources? To be the hostage of South African oppression in order to obtain these needed materials offers us no security.

The most recent offense in this series of outrageous connections with South Africa is the sale of enriched uranium and nuclear technology that would be useful in creating nuclear weapons. South Africa has recently opened a uranium enrichment plant for which the pilot enriched nuclear material and some of the technology was procured from American firms. In addition to the full range of dangers that attends any proliferation of nuclear capability, there is the unique likelihood that South Africa's principal targets for nuclear weapons would be its own people. Moreover, South African officials boast of acquiring through this development "a bargaining position equal to that of an Arab country with a lot of oil."

Whose security interests are served by such developments. Surely not those of the general American public! Our basic conception of constraining nuclear warfare has been to pose countervailing nuclear capacity. From whom will come the nuclear counter to South Africa? Are we inviting the Soviet Union to place its nuclear mantle over the rest of black Africa?

As I stated three years ago before Senate Hearings on SR214 concerning the Azores and Bahrain base agreements, if we insist on joining with the racist and colonialist in their wars of suppression in Africa, ultimately we may have to fight some of the battles of those wars right here in America.

Economic Relations

With its advanced industrial techniques, our society unquestionably needs many of the mineral resources in which South Africa is so unusually, perhaps even uniquely, endowed. We are well aware of the great reliance we have on chromium, copper and manganese imports from South Africa. But for these, there are numerous alternative suppliers and even substitutable materials. We may have greater difficulty reducing or getting around our need for certain "vitamin" minerals from South Africa, such as antimony, beryllium, and vanadium.

Because most of these minerals are essential to the industrial processes on which a large part of our economy is based, our interest in them goes well beyond the tiny group of owners of the mining and importing enterprises. But, there are other also vital materials, occasionally even those that may substitute for some we get from South Africa, which come from other African countries, which now are, or very soon are likely to be under black African rule. Angola, Zimbabwe, even Namibia are bound to be free—I would guess all within the next five years. What if Nigeria, Mozambique and Zaire were to shut off our supplies of columbium (which can be substituted sometimes for vanadium) and tantalum. What if Sierre Leone didn't like our South African policies enough to deny us titanium. When the blacks take over in Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia) are they likely to have any reason to want to shut off our petalite, corundum, and chromium. What if Burundi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire say, OK, have it your way—get all your beryllium from South Africa, we'll sell all of ours to the Soviet Union, Japan, Western Europe.

The very arguments one might use to demonstrate a dependency on South Africa can also be used to demonstrate a dependency, perhaps even to a greater degree, on the rest of Black Africa. Policies of alliance with South Africa and policies of relying on the staying power of a handful of white Rhodesians against millions of able bodied Black Zimbabweans—this offers us no economic or military security at all.

More important to our general, truly national interest, as regards the scarcity of important mineral resources, would be our policies regarding stockpiling, and the encouragement not only of new exploration, but of basic and applied research to develop substitutes. Why do we leave it to the mining companies that want to extract as much profit as possible from their present concessions?

What interests are served by the build up of corporate investment in South Africa? Over four hundred sixty (460) American enterprises have nearly one and a quarter billion dollars (\$1.25b) assets there. For very few of these firms is the South African branch their major operation. IBM, Ford, General Motors, General Electric would do as well to look to the rest of Africa. South Africa will not offer a safe haven from which to manufacture and export to the rest of Africa. There is not only the threat of external boycott and internal strikes there is also the threat of general turmoil as South African society approaches its explosive future. Such Africa's ideological moorings are in racism and nationalism, its praxis is fascism. It can nationalize firms as readily as any

other African state. One should not be overly pessimistic about the military interventions and coups elsewhere in Africa. So far they have not disrupted business. The corporate assets that are tied up in Nigeria alone are worth more than those in South Africa, and are less liquid.

The important thing about our corporate connections with South Africa is not how big they are, but how small, and how few people gain anything from them. The controlling stockholders of all these firms together could fit in one high school gymnasium. And yet those petty circles of interested parties seem to be in a position to orient our national policies in such a fashion that the long term interests of the vast majority of us are jeopardized. Labor has no positive stake in these investments—they tend to export the type of jobs most relevant to the working class. The American black population has no positive stake in these relationships, they lose not only the jobs, but suffer the anguish of knowing their kinfolk there have to endure an essentially slave system for the meagre crumbs they are allowed to acquire.

The general American public, even the average stockholder, with his lot or two of shares, has a stake in bringing the multinational (MNCs) corporations under great control. It is not only the sovereignty of the foreign host country, but that of our own government that might be at bay. Popular sovereignty is already at bay in this country, largely due to the inordinate power MNCs have acquired through legal and illegal political contributions, through Government's and Big Business's mutual infusion of personnel, through the hidden persuaders of advertising, corporate prestige and mythmaking.

The people's resources for control of government in this context are perhaps inadequate. This seems to be the lesson of the Byrd Amendment. Whose interests are served by the violation of UN sanctions against Rhodesia—the management and controlling interests of two or three enterprises, whose lobbyists are constantly active, and aided by close friends in the top echelons of the Administration, at least the previous one. The black community gets no benefit from it, the workers, especially those in ferrochrome operations shutdown here as a result—they get no benefit from it. The general American society gets no benefit from it—the chrome is not scarce now, but future supplies of it may be as the Black African government that is sure to take over in Zimbabwe remembers our perfidy. That so ludicrous an action as the imposition of the Byrd Amendment could not be reversed before now speaks volumes about the distortions of the lines of accountability on our Government.

I do not expect that our general policies toward Southern Africa will change suitably until these distorted lines of power are straightened out and reconnected with the people.

Political Relations

The key and neglected factor in our policy stance is the political one. How long can the vested interests we have in South African exploitation count on racism and ignorance to becloud this potential battlefield. We can be sure that it is only racism and inordinate greed that supports the policies we have allowed to misguide us.

The price we pay for this delusion may be the highest of all. When first I was in graduate school, the Belgian Congo set about its troubled course of independence, and shortly thereafter its forceful and visionary young Premier, Patrice Lumumba, was assassinated. All my black friends, who studied the matter with great interest, and most of my fellow white students, had no difficulty in concluding the CIA had a hand in it. Discussing the case of Lumumba, when first he was imprisoned, and before his announced death, my professor, an ex-State Department Official posed the question in class whether assassination was a proper tool of foreign relations. He interpreted my emphatic rejection of the notion in terms of a Boulayan admonition that some acts are even worse than a crime, in being, also, blunders. The real costs are even higher, I argued, for they are to the self. At some point we will realize that we cannot violate America's character in our foreign actions without destroying that character itself. The succeeding fifteen years produced a steady and unbroken line of march towards just such a disaster.

Moral Character

It is said that when Rhodesia first contemplated its unilateral declaration of independence, and consulted South African officials, the latter advised against it because, as realists, they appreciated the futility of two hundred thousand or so foreign white settlers stemming the tide of history. Even these unabashed

racists did not puff up white men so far beyond the measure of black as to make them vulnerable to the prick of any pinpoint. South Africans too, no doubt, expected more of the Portuguese, but then, they always were disdainful of mixed blood. When the Portuguese shield was bashed down, the South Africans were among the first to realize that Rhodesia would give way, someday soon, to Zimbabwe, and they moved to facilitate the change while there was still time to realize a moderate inward looking leadership there, characteristic more of the neo-colonial 1960s than the liberation minded 1970s.

It would seem that the U.S. has not yet appreciated the significance of these changed circumstances. The appointment of Assistant Secretary Davis looks back to simpler and illusory times.

Not even in South Africa is the future clearly beneficent to white domination. The white South Africans have deluded U.S. officials, along with themselves, into believing that the Bantustan policy will work and make for circumstances that are altogether different in South Africa. They count on pressing half the black Africans, and all of their political and social rights into nine ostensibly independent states, thus removing them from any claim to membership in South African society and therefore, any claim to political or other rights there. Nearly ten million people crowded onto only thirteen percent of the South African land area with none of its mineral wealth, virtually none of its decent agricultural land and very little of its coastline. Nine international basket cases, dependent still on the few "jobs" in the white slaveocracy. Many will fall for the illusion of political sovereignty, out of quest for the few privileges all oppressors know they must allow to some, in order to beguile the rest. Many will simply have no choice, because, being all too human, they will cling to such life and the means to it, as is allowed them. But any sane person must wonder if it won't fail as an experiment in controlled and allocated misery. The remaining ten million Black workers with their families will still outnumber whites in the latter's own towns and cities, by more than two to one. Even in the miserable Bantustans there will be room to start movements. And outside the power of Botswana will be building, the power of Zimbabwe will be building, and the power of Mozambique, to say nothing of the troubled infant Angola will be building. All these new black states will be growing and learning to flex such muscles as human beings are capable of giving to well endowed societies with a sense of grievance.

What a faint star on which to fix our hopes for a few more years of profit, and avoidance of ever paying the price of a just retribution.

Only one who fails to recognize any humanity in the black hordes of South Africa can count their determination and capacities so low as to pose no threat to our basic strategy of backing apartheid.

All the while we can be sure that we will have to make our own separate peace on the periphery of the South African cesspool. No amount of cologne we might wear to our meetings with the Mozambiqueans, the Namibians, the Zimbabweans and even the chief supplier now of our petroleum imports—the Nigerians—will smother the evidence of our other social engagements.

There will be myriad details of change and challenge for us to work out, but the fundamental task confronting us is relatively simple—at least to state: embrace democracy, eschew exploitation, believe in people, walk humbly but towards Right.

We are currently doing just the opposite. Can any one here argue otherwise. Why are we doing it? If it is because the minerals of South Africa are vital to our physical being—then who is striving to reveal to the American people the peril they are in, not only because such dependency is not generally known, but because democracy and equity, humanitarianism and the honor of righteousness is equally vital to our moral and social, even to our political well being. If it is because there is some good in white South Africans, then are we to dismantle all our own institutions of criminal punishment. If it is because we believe so strongly in noninterference in the internal affairs of other states that we cannot move ourselves or act against their wishes, then let us remove ourselves entirely, collectively and individually. If it is because we believe so strongly in "free enterprise" that we cannot impose our public standards on our private selves, are we to make anarchy our social ideal. If it is because all these things are tangled together, are we never to start to untangle them.

Senator CLARK. Very interesting and very well thought out statement.

TEST OF OUTSIDE COUNTRIES' INTEREST IN AFRICA

In the time that we have I think we can cover about four or five basic topics that this committee is particularly interested in. I just ask each of you, if you care to, to make some brief comments on each topic. This hearing, of course, and the hearings that we have had in this subcommittee for the last several weeks have dealt with southern Africa and the question really is: Are southern African issues the most important ones to African States, generally, in evaluating outside countries, particularly those countries' interests and concerns about Africa? In other words, as concerns—is this a test of outside countries' interest in that continent and, if so, why?

We have not heard from you for awhile, Mr. Munger. Would you care to try that? I am not sure that I really articulated the question that well. Do you understand what I mean?

Mr. MÜNGER. I think I do, Senator, thank you. Politically I think the most important issue to black African States, as Dr. Herskovits characterized it, is the question of South Africa. Now, there are obviously other questions, economic standards of living, education, and so on. These have a very high priority.

Where I differ with my two colleagues here, Mr. Chairman, is that I do not think the United States is taking as active an interest as it could take in regard to promoting change within southern Africa, to have South Africa become a just society. I have felt this for a long time. I have written about it for, perhaps, 15 years or more in Foreign Affairs and other places. I now find that we are behind people like President Kounda, of Zambia, President Nyerere, of Tanzania, who, in their own good judgment—I think it is excellent judgment—are interested in promoting change in southern Africa, and if they go in there with their eyes open, I think it is, to answer your question, politically the No. 1 question in sub-Saharan Africa. But economics are very often more important, and that is why many African countries have traded in various ways with South Africa. I think their own self-interest is what has dictated this, and I find no reproach to them in that regard.

Senator CLARK. Ms. Herskovits.

Ms. HERSKOVITS. Well, I certainly do think that for the countries of black Africa, the southern African issues are the central ones. They watch what we do down there very carefully, and not just in South Africa. Take the Byrd amendment. That is the one that comes up over and over again, and they regard it very much as a test. They see us in the impossible position of trying to support both sides of a conflict, and they are continually looking to see if we are altering that position at all. They have expected better things of us. They have not seen them. They keep hoping that something will change.

So, I think it is true that the southern African issue is central—and South Africa, of course, is the most long-range concern, the one over which they continually judge us. That they are assessing our position all the time is something we should know.

Most African leaders, like all other leaders, have domestic concerns that they must worry about, and ultimately most of their politics operate on that basis. But my experience is that the one international issue

on which they have to deal with some of their own constituents, the one issue on which African governments will move is this issue.

Nigeria, even if it wanted to, could not now control the distribution of its oil, because the oil companies do that. But the Nigerians are making plans, and they are not the only ones doing so. And I think that only at our own peril do we ignore the possibility that one day they are going to say to us, "We have been watching you very carefully; you are doing things that are abhorrent to us morally, but also not in our interest; we are going to take some steps in our interest that may not be in your interest."

SENATOR CLARK. Mr. Johnson, anything that you would like to add to that?

MR. JOHNSON. Yes; very briefly. I want to stress the importance of looking at the long-term side of it, that is to say, to appreciate that other African governments are not necessarily going to expect the situation in Southern Africa to turn around tomorrow. I think they expect it to be a rather long struggle. They expected the struggle in Mozambique and Angola to take longer than, in fact, it has, and there are still troubles ahead.

So, if there are not world headlines built around African accusations about our policies or any one else's in southern Africa, I think that should not beguile us into thinking there is no danger. And second, I think also the same thing is true for our domestic political situation. No one puts such issues above their own survival; this is as true for the American black community, for example, as for most of the black African states, they have a lot of development to do, but they are building their power, not only to serve themselves, but also to serve the ideas they believe in, and, clearly, South Africa is a test of that.

And, I think that if we fix our own attention on what that means for us in the long term, we can begin to build a network of proper connections with the rest of the continent that will hold up and carry us over some of the difficulties we will inevitably face as we try to adjust.

IMPORTANCE OF EVENHANDED U.S. POLICY

SENATOR CLARK. I observe that there is a vote on, which means that I have about 14 minutes, so we have about 7 or 8 more minutes. I particularly wanted to get the judgment of each of you, if you care to comment, on why it is important, or unimportant, that we be truly neutral in Africa. Let us take Angola as an example and the parties involved.

I think Professor Herskovits, you talked about this in particular, so maybe I will ask you to address yourself to it first. Why is it important in your judgment that we take a very evenhanded policy there? What are the consequences of not doing it, perhaps, is a way of saying it.

MS. HERSKOVITS. Well, I think it is truly important that we take an evenhanded policy there because that is what African states want us to do. I have talked with Africans from several countries about this very problem, and they are worried lest we choose a side and, being a very important and powerful country, have an effect that will not contribute to the solution of an extremely difficult problem.

It is not our business in some respects, and it is even less our business than we might have thought it in earlier times when there was not an organization of African countries (the OAU) that will try itself to take multilateral action. If that fails, then African states may make other requests. But it seems to me absolutely essential for our relations with African countries generally that we start treating them like grownup, fullfledged countries, who have a better sense of the kinds of problems they are dealing with than we are likely to have. One of the ways that we can make that point is by standing aside and following their lead on how best to bring about a reasonable and, one would hope, just and good solution to that thorny problem.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes; I would like to make a comment in that regard. I think, first of all, I asked the question, in what way might we likely take a side. I doubt whether we would, in fact, openly and publicly proclaim our support for one of the three liberation organizations. It is much more likely to be behind the scenes and subterranean. Indeed, I wonder if we are not dangerously close already to doing that with the National Front, which is closely associated with the regime in Zaire, with whom we have a close relationship. There is a great danger in that. Also in Cabinda, where at least each of the three national liberation organizations themselves have made accusations that we have supported secessionist movements in that tiny enclave, where all of the oil concessions are located.

CONSEQUENCES OF UNITED STATES SUPPORTING ONE OF THE LIBERATION ORGANIZATIONS

Senator CLARK. May I just interrupt long enough to ask Mr. Johnson, what would you see as the consequences of our supporting one or the other? What would be the adverse effects?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I think if we sided with any of the secessionist groups in Cabinda, I think you very quickly would get a move by at least one, if not two of the other neighboring states, to move in and displace us. I do not think that the U.S. relationships are so close to Zaire that Zaire would stand back and watch an engineered breakoff of Cabinda, by itself.

CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR FNLA OR MPLA

Senator CLARK. And how about in the case of the FNLA or the MPLA?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, quite frankly, I do not think there is any ideological threat to us by siding with any of those regimes. I have pursued a laymanly-like study of the leadership of those movements over the course of the years. I frankly am not impressed with their ideological acuity, and the firmness of their commitments to grand outside ideas. I think, rather, the danger is to promote an instability which the region can ill afford. What they need most is the chance to hold that country together, in relatively peaceful circumstances, and for us to side with any of them rather than to side with those forces that are working to hold them all together, I think, would be to

threaten the stability and security of the area generally, and to make it much more easily the prey, I think, of the machinations even of South Africa, and to move the whole southern African region toward a less calculated address of its problems.

Senator CLARK. Do you care to comment?

Mr. MUNGER. No; thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CLARK. All right, fine.

INCENTIVE FOR AFRICAN STATES UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. POSITIONS IN U.N.

I think we have a couple of minutes left before the second bell rings. Do you feel that if the United States were to play a more constructive role in the United Nations on southern African issues, is it likely that the African states would be more understanding of U.S. positions on other issues before the United Nations? There is frequent African opposition to the United States in the U.N. based more on kind of a third world solidarity than what Africans regard as U.S. insensitivity to southern African issues? If we were more sensitive to southern African issues, do you think they would be more sensitive to certain positions that the United States might take in the U.N., or do you think that is somewhat irrelevant?

Mr. Munger.

Mr. MUNGER. Mr. Chairman, I think there needs to be a major overhaul of the American positions in the United Nations in regard to South Africa particularly, and the adjacent states, because we have been in the position of giving lip service to much of the rhetoric which is recognized by even some African delegates who use it at the United Nations about South Africa. I think we need, as suggested by the report that Mr. Barton ably made to this subcommittee, we need to stand up and vote, and we need to take positions which, in my view, Mr. Chairman, are going to contribute to constructive and peaceful change in Africa.

Now, we tend to listen to the rhetoric and say little because we are afraid of being branded as a racist this or a racist that. Consequently, we have not been constructive. Now, we have a lot of détente going on with African leaders and South Africa. President Houphouët-Boigny who is likely to go to Johannesburg shortly is an example. We should support this kind of exchange. This is a very positive effort that I think we should undertake.

Senator CLARK. Ms. Herskovits.

Ms. HERSKOVITS. A quick comment, if I may?

Senator CLARK. Right.

Ms. HERSKOVITS. I have been talking to a number of Africans at the U.N. about this subject, and sometimes they talk very frankly; I am talking now about the ones who talk frankly.

I have to start by saying I really do not agree about efforts to support South Africa's view of its own détente, President Houphouët-Boigny to the contrary notwithstanding, because there are a large number of African countries—of which Nigeria is only one; I can name numbers of others, starting with Tanzania and Zambia—who do not

take that view. I would be very reluctant to see us follow a lead that encourages or fosters South Africa's particular version of dialog, even if some few African states go along with it. I know that South Africans are trying terribly hard to have countries like Nigeria join in such contacts; most African governments are refusing. For us to encourage them to do otherwise would not be to help anything.

To direct myself to your specific question, yes, I think if we played a more constructive role on these issues in the United Nations, we would receive a more sympathetic hearing on other issues. I have put that question directly to several African diplomats and each of them has had a similar reaction; we find it impossible to understand why we are getting lectures about our behavior, when your behavior—in the specific case of the Byrd amendment—has undermined the role of the United Nations. We would be pleased to consider revising various positions if we did not feel that we were being bullied, and bullied by people whose own actions violate international effectiveness—and law—as much as anything we are proposing.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much.

I have about six other areas that I wanted to go into. I wonder if I might submit those to each of the three of you, and if you care to respond to them for the record, sometime in the next 7 or 8 days, we would much appreciate having your views.

[Additional questions and answers follow:]

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO PROFESSOR MUNGER FROM SENATOR CLARK

Question 1. Are southern African issues the most important ones to African states in evaluating outside countries' interest in and concern about Africa? Why?

Question 2. Why is it important—in your judgments—that we be truly, really neutral in Africa—let us say—using Angola as an example?

Question 3. What sacrifices are the African countries themselves making to further human rights and racial equality in southern Africa?

Question 4. If the United States plays a more constructive role on southern African issues in the United Nations, is it likely that the African states will be more understanding of U.S. positions on other issues before the U.N.? Or is frequent African opposition to the U.S. in the U.N. based more on third world solidarity than on what the Africans regard as U.S. insensitivity to southern African issues?

Question 5. Is there any relation between the southern African issues and the Middle East issues as the African states perceive them?

Question 6A. Many previous witnesses have stated that the U.S. should be more responsive on the southern African issues because of the growing importance of Africa as a source of raw materials. They refer particularly to Nigeria as this country's largest supplier of crude oil, or Zambia's copper supply, or Zaire's cobalt.

Question 6B. What difference will it make in terms of U.S. access to Africa's raw materials if this country shows a greater interest in furthering human rights in southern Africa? What difference will it make if the U.S. continues its present southern Africa policies?

Question 7. The Soviet Union and China have provided military support for all the liberation movements. Has this significantly improved their relations with the African nations to the detriment of the United States. What can we do in southern Africa, in a peaceful way, to achieve credibility and friendship?

Question 8. What three or four specific actions would you recommend the United States take to improve its policy toward Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa?

PROFESSOR MUNGER'S ANSWERS TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR CLARK

CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,
Pasadena, Calif., August 4, 1975.

Senator RICHARD CLARK,
*Chairman, Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, Dirksen Senate Office
Building, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR SENATOR CLARK: Thank you again for the invitation to appear before your subcommittee on July 28th last. The questions you raised at the hearing and in notes given to me on U.S. policy issues in regard to Africa and South Africa, as well as a review of the testimony presented before the Subcommittee, lead me to answer your queries first in a broad sense and then with specific facts.

Senator Humphrey in his opening statement at the committee hearing on July 23, 1975, raised the question of principle as to whether it is "possible for the United States to have a foreign policy which is both pragmatic and moral."

My answer with respect to Africa is emphatically yes. But our point of departure needs a new orientation. American policy in relation to Africa and southern Africa must be based on American perceptions of the situation, on sensitivity to the views of others in Africa and elsewhere, and on American self interest.

Too much of our rhetoric has been directed to the appearance of being "non-racist" and to paying lip service to the analysis of southern Africa as presented in the United Nations by most African member states.

It is fallacious to assume that the majority of African states in West and East Africa have a detailed perception of the situation in South Africa, and it is even more fallacious to assume that those who advocate a peaceful solution have a thoughtful policy of how to accomplish change without massive loss of life.

What most of black Africa knows correctly is that South Africa is not a just society and that for generations Africans have suffered racial discrimination there.

But once that is recognized, it does not follow that their analysis of the current facts or prescriptions for the future are necessarily accurate or wise. Unfortunately, the same simplistic denunciations of South Africa and of policy recommendations flowing from them characterizes some of the testimony previously given before the subcommittee.

It is understandable that many African nations are not well informed on South Africa. Few of them send—or are allowed to send—competent people to investigate. Some black countries are sending officials sub-rosa, but in West Africa only the Ivory Coast has proposed a visit for a leading official. The American position at the United Nations cannot be constructive with respect to South Africa if it accepts the analysis of how to produce change in South Africa from countries that are so woefully ill informed.

My plea for more self-confidence in the analysis of South Africa as produced by official American sources is one often echoed by black South Africans who are not in exile. Africans from that Republic should be the first to complain about the way they are treated in their own country. They do state many grievances. But they are often amazed at the hyperbolic statements and sweepingly inaccurate generalizations about South Africa that they hear when they come abroad.

Let me illustrate how an understandable criticism of racial discrimination in South Africa, and one which I share, has often been followed by inaccurate statements. When I was before the subcommittee, I listened with some amazement to the description of the South African Home Lands by a distinguished American scholar who has done definitive work in West Africa as about "ten million people crowded into thirteen per cent of the South African land area with none of its mineral wealth, virtually none of its decent agricultural land. . . . Nine international basket cases. . . ."

First of all, no official in South Africa maintains that the Home Lands can absorb even half of the twenty million Africans. Second, there are extensive mining areas within the Home Lands and more are likely to be discovered. As a matter of fact, mining was the single largest employer in the Home Lands in 1974, involving some 78,000 Africans. The platinum deposits in BophuthaTswana are of particular interest to Americans.

Third, the Transkei has a substantial (for its size) percentage of the best agricultural land in South Africa. The expansion of profitable sugar estates in Kwa Zulu are another example of "decent" agricultural land.

Fourth, although the Home Lands have been characterized as too small and too poor to be successful, the facts are otherwise. Last year the budget of independent Lesotho was \$25,000,000. In comparison, the budget of Kwa Zulu was \$138,000,000, of the Transkei \$130,000,000, of Bophutha Tswana \$75,000,000, and so

on. The Transkei is larger than Israel, Holland, or Belgium. It has more people than a score of the members of the United Nations.

The issue, therefore, is not one of economics but one of politics. My statement before the subcommittee advocates consideration of American assistance to black education in Kwa Zulu and in other Home Lands and of encouraging American economic ties. But these territories will never provide in themselves the answer to the problem of racial justice in South Africa. I don't know a single responsible official Afrikaner who even begins to think so. Witnesses before this committee have been attacking paper tigers when they assume that responsible South Africans believe that the Home Lands are "the answer," when there have been repeated statements about the need to meet the legitimate political aspirations of the majority of Africans—those living in what is now designated as the "white area." Too many hortatory statements are made at the United Nations against the Home Lands without a real understanding of their political dynamics within the total southern Africa scene.

It is time that the United States gave the lead in forging a constructive policy of peacefully achieving racial justice in South Africa. There are men in the State Department and elsewhere in the government who have far greater knowledge and more accurate of southern Africa on which to base policies than have most of the orators at the United Nations. It is high time that the Senate consider legislation on the basis of American interpretation and leadership. You asked me before and might well again, why the United States does not face the issues at the U.N.? I believe this arises from a misguided effort to avoid any change of being accused of racism. In fact, it is racist to assume that a small country in West Africa must know more than multi-racial Americans about how to solve the complex problem of South Africa simply because of the skin color of its citizens.

Witnesses before the committee have advocated peaceful change as a goal. But I listened with further amazement to another distinguished scholar, perhaps the American best-informed on Nigeria, advocate peaceful change in one breath, but then call for actions that would be barriers to peaceful change. I refer to the recommendation that the Congress support a study of how the power of the Cabora Bassa Dam in Mozambique could be channeled elsewhere and thus hurt the South African economy. A look at the figures shows that the present generating capacity is 1200 megawatts, almost double the amount of electricity produced at the Kariba Dam, and in two years the capacity will be four times that amount. Mozambique needs to sell this power and a depressed South Africa would not be able to absorb it. No other possible user looms before 1980 plus.

But the idea of crippling South Africa economically while at the same time advocating peaceful change was further advanced before the committee by a call to study how the one million Africans from outside South Africa who now find gainful employment there might be employed elsewhere.

If there is one truism of the relation between economics and changes in racial discrimination in the United States, it is that more opportunities are available for minority groups in good times than in bad times. It is during periods of economic boom, not in periods of depression, that racial bigotry is overcome the most rapidly. The very burgeoning of the South African economy which has drawn tens of thousands of Africans into skilled positions, thousands more into the lower echelons of management has forced the abandonment of many forms of economic discrimination. The so-called Job Reservation Act applies to only 3% of workers in theory and only 1% in practice, in large part because of the economic growth. The problem of racial justice in South Africa cannot be solved simply by encouraging economic growth; conversely efforts to cripple South Africa economically can at the same time impede the long overdue economic opportunity for blacks which has come through growth.

In the short run such a policy may well engender greater criticism of the United States by some black African countries. But in the longer run it will bring praise because we will be accurately perceived as genuinely contributing to an improved status and equality for the black men and women who live in South Africa.

We have been too slow and too cautious in following the early lead of President Banda of Malawi, who has made a major contribution to better racial understanding between black and white in South Africa. We are still too cautious in supporting the efforts by President Kaunda and President Nyerere to promote genuine peace in Rhodesia. It is not politically easy for them to work with Prime Minister Vorster, just as it is politically difficult for him to work with them. The United States should be doing more to facilitate such efforts by black and white statesmen.

It is my hope that in their visits to Africa the distinguished Senators on your subcommittee will have an opportunity to see in depth the problems on which I have commented.

Cordially,

EDWIN S. MUNGER,
Professor of Political Geography.

MS. JEAN HERSKOVITS ANSWERS TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR CLARK

Question 1. Are southern African issues the most important ones to African states in evaluating outside countries' interest in and concern about Africa? Why?

Answer. In brief and in general, yes. (In particular an issue directly touching a country's own interest will take priority in that country's evaluations. Ethiopia probably looks first to an outsider's position on Eritrea, for example.) Southern Africa is the place on the African continent where issues are most clear cut, where siding with or against fundamental human rights is most readily measurable. I have dealt with this point in some detail in my statement.

Question 2. What sacrifices are the African countries themselves making to further human rights and racial equality in southern Africa?

Answer. The most striking examples come from the countries bordering the white-dominated states. Zambia and Tanzania in particular have shown a willingness to sacrifice substantial economic benefits. Zambia's border closing with Rhodesia is one example; both countries' shutting off their flow of labor to South Africa is another. It is too early for the new government of Mozambique to have taken similar actions, but their intention to take them is well known.

Obvious sacrifices also lie in support for the liberation movements. Tanzania and Zambia have been providing actual bases of operation—and paying a price in real and threatened retaliation by doing so. Botswana, risking even more, gives asylum to refugees and quietly harbors some freedom fighters. All those countries have given financial aid, directly and indirectly.

But so have other African countries, either through the Liberation Committee of the O.A.U., or by direct contributions to the movements themselves. From any developing country with huge internal demands on its resources, such measures constitute sacrifice. So does providing training for Africans from the white-ruled states; places they have in West and East African universities, for examples, could be filled several times over by qualified nations.

Question 3. If the United States plays a more constructive role on southern African issues in the United Nations, is it likely that the African states will be more understanding of U.S. positions on other issues before the U.N.? Or is frequent African opposition to the U.S. in the U.N. based more on Third World solidarity than on what the Africans regard as U.S. insensitivity to southern Africa issues?

Answer. I have dealt with this matter in my statement, but would like to repeat here that the *general* answer to the first part of the question is, I believe, yes; the second, no. I must qualify that, however, by saying that the first answer depends naturally on what the "other issues" are. The second answer is illuminated, I think, by the O.A.U. resolution on Israel's U.N. membership passed at the 12th annual summit meeting [July 28–August 1] of the O.A.U. in Kampala. There the majority did not support calling for Israel's expulsion or even suspension, but instead asked members "to reinforce the pressure exerted on Israel at the United Nation . . . including the possibility of eventually depriving it of its membership."

Question 4. Is there any relation between the southern African issues and the Middle East issues as the African states perceive them?

Answer. The answer to this very complex question is an equally complex yes and no. Africans recognize historical differences in the two situations, as well as differences at present. The Subsaharan African countries have never denied Israel's right to exist, for instance, while they do deny that right to the present minority government of South Africa.

But there are some links. Egypt is an African state; African states oppose and condemn occupation of any African state by force, and part of Egypt, as internationally defined, is occupied. Further, Egypt has long played an active role in supporting the liberation movements in southern Africa. "We have objections in principle to Egypt's being occupied," said an African diplomat, "but we also note that the fact of her being occupied limits her ability to aid those movements."

That African states do not equate the two situations is clear. Their votes at the 1974 General Assembly were to expel South Africa; their votes at this year's O.A.U. summit did not support expelling or even suspending Israel from the U.N. Nonetheless, African governments have not failed to notice recent allegations of increasing collaboration between Israel and South Africa. They find it hard to understand why, for example, Israel believes it now necessary to exchange ambassadors with South Africa when that was not thought necessary before.

In sum, I think an easy answer to the question is impossible. I would rather suggest that most Africans judge each issue on how they see its merits. But the issues will increasingly come together if the principals in the two situations bring them together for Africans in such ways as the one I have mentioned.

Question 5. a. Many previous witnesses have stated that the U.S. should be more responsive on the southern African issues because of the growing importance of Africa as a source of raw materials. They refer particularly to Nigeria as this country's largest supplier of crude oil, or Zambia's copper supply, or Zaire's cobalt.

Question 5. b. What difference will it make in terms of U.S. access to Africa's raw materials if this country shows a greater interest in furthering human rights in southern Africa? What difference will it make if the U.S. continues its present southern Africa policies?

Answer. It is hard to do much more than guess about the future, especially since the countries in question are only now coming to control production of their own resources. Gaining control over distribution of these resources is still ahead for them. As I have suggested in my statement, however, they are approaching a time when they will have such control. They do not lack other possible markets (especially in the case of Nigerian oil). They do judge non-African countries by southern African policies and actions. I should think, therefore, that we can only improve our chances of continuing access by making it concretely clear that we will no longer tolerate violations of human rights in southern Africa. Conversely, such access will be ever more threatened by our persisting in policies which, in Africans' views, support the white minorities while claiming to be "neutral."

Question 6. The Soviet Union and China have provided military support for all the liberation movements. Has this significantly improved their relations with the African nations to the detriment of the United States? What can we do in southern Africa, in a peaceful way, to achieve credibility and friendship?

Answer. It is a mistake to see Africans as choosing to place themselves in communist or non-communist camps; as I said in my statement, I do not see evidence that ideologies and international issues outside the African continent are compelling to most Africans. Nor do Africans want to become entangled in East-West competition and conflict; the former Congo-Kinshasa's experiences of the early 1960's are one obvious reason for their wariness. On the other hand, given the priority most African governments place on southern African issues, they do tend to assess non-African countries in terms of those issues. The support, moral and material, the liberation movements have received from the USSR and China can only dispose African leaders more favorably towards those countries, as ones showing understanding of African concerns (albeit in their own interests) and a willingness to help. As I say in my statement, present American policies only serve to encourage better relations between African countries and the USSR and China, while discouraging similar—or greater—improvement in our own relations with African states. The statement also contains the changes I would propose.

Question 7. What three or four specific actions would you recommend the United States take to improve its policy toward Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa?

Answer. (1) Repeal the Byrd Amendment.

(2) End all military and military-related contacts with the Republic of South Africa.

(3) Actively discourage further investment in South Africa.

(4) Establish diplomatic relations with Mozambique, and contribute to the already-announced multilateral fund to aid that country economically in enforcing Rhodesian sanctions.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much for coming.

This hearing is ended.

[Whereupon, at 11:56 a.m., the committee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.]

U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA

Overview

TUESDAY, JULY 29, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m. in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Dick Clark (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Clark and Pell.

Senator CLARK. The hearing will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

In this final hearing on U.S. policy toward southern Africa, we will want to examine with representatives of the administration the impact of that policy on broader U.S. interests. This country's strategic, economic, and political interests throughout Africa are profoundly affected by its position on the southern African issues. The U.S. role and the United Nations' is affected by its votes on the many resolutions pertaining to human rights, self-determination, and the peaceful solution of problems in southern Africa.

The credibility of the U.S. commitment to genuine independence for the African nations and of its respect for the sovereignty of developing countries is affected by its policy toward Angola and Mozambique.

Finally, U.S. strategic interests in ports on the Indian Ocean and access to Africa's critical raw materials are affected by our southern African policy.

The witnesses today will undoubtedly have much to say about all these aspects of U.S. interests in southern Africa, but at this time it is particularly important that they concentrate on two key questions.

First, what effect do our positions on southern African issues in the United Nations have on our efforts to build more cooperative relations with the developing countries on a variety of issues before the United Nations? And second, how does our southern African policy fit into the debate over the Indian Ocean?

On the eve of the Seventh Special Session, it is particularly important that the United States demonstrate a willingness to work cooperatively with the developing countries on the issues of greatest importance to them.

The atmosphere of confrontation between developing countries and the industrialized states must be replaced by one of conciliation and recognition of mutual interests. Too often, the United States has ended up opposing resolutions, resolutions that, in fact, it supports in principle, but fears are impractical and impossible to implement. This country must adopt a policy of going beyond vetoes and no votes on impractical resolutions to taking the lead in proposing constructive alternatives.

The developing countries have demonstrated the importance of the southern African issues to them by introducing numerous resolutions over the years on Rhodesia, South Africa, Namibia, and the Portuguese colonies. The United States should certainly be able and willing to work with the developing countries in formulating constructive and realistic proposals to further human rights and self-determination. But too often the United States has been in the position of abstaining or vetoing or voting no on these various issues and has been joined in its votes by only a few other countries.

According to the Library of Congress, four of our seven vetoes were on southern African issues.

Hopefully, the witnesses today will be able to tell us that we, the United States, have done following each of these vetoes to propose constructive alternatives and to further human rights and bilateral relations with the nations of southern Africa. One of yesterday's witnesses stated that the African nations will be willing to reevaluate their positions in the United Nations on many issues of importance to the United States, if the United States shows greater sensitivity to their interest in the southern African issues.

In light of this, we will want to know how the administration is planning to deal with the southern African issues that will undoubtedly be raised in the next session of the United Nations. Just yesterday, the Senate voted on the issue of expansion of the base at Diego Garcia; and during the debate, the U.S. relations with many African states which have Indian Ocean ports were cited as being extremely important. U.S. access to those ports could well be affected by this country's position on southern African issues.

The possibility of the U.S. use of military facilities at Simonstown, South Africa, and the devastating impact that could have on our relations with the rest of Africa, was also raised yesterday on the floor during the debate. It is important that we clarify at this hearing exactly how the Department of Defense views the possibility of using Simonstown and whether the tremendous political costs of such an action have been seriously considered.

Finally, previous witnesses have made numerous suggestions about what U.S. policy should be in the United Nations on southern Africa and about how our southern Africa policy could best further this country's strategic interests. The administration witnesses responsible for these areas should give the subcommittee their evaluation, their suggestions, and whether any of them will be adopted in the near future.

We are particularly happy to have Senator Claiborne Pell here this morning. Do you have an opening statement, Claiborne?

SENATOR PELL'S OPENING STATEMENT

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to be with you right through the morning, but ask you to forgive me if I move on to some other responsibilities.

I wanted to be here to congratulate the chairman on organizing these hearings which are giving lively attention to the problems of Africa, problems which have, in great part, been ignored on the legislative side and not given the focus they should in the executive branch. Thanks to the good work of the chairman of this subcommittee in focusing public attention on this developing, important, and strategic part of the world, great service is being rendered. I also believe that Assistant Secretary Davis will prove an outstanding Assistant Secretary and one that those who criticized when he was up for confirmation and the African nations which were a little bit skeptical of him will find that he is as good a friend as he could possibly be to them and will prove a fine Assistant Secretary for the next couple of years.

I look forward to reading the testimony of the witnesses, even if I can't hear it.

Thank you, sir.

WITNESSES

Senator CLARK. I appreciate your comments. We are going to hear first from Edward Mulcahy, who is Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Department of State; and then from Mr. Blake and Mr. Noyes. I understand Mr. Blake does not have a statement. Is that correct?

Mr. BLAKE. That is correct.

Senator CLARK. But you are here to answer questions. Thank you. First, Mr. Mulcahy.

STATEMENT OF EDWARD MULCAHY, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT O. BLAKE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. MULCAHY. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before the subcommittee as a representative of the State Department to discuss with you American policy toward southern Africa. Assistant Secretary Nathaniel Davis, who is absent from Washington, has asked me to express his regret that he is unable to be here for the final session of this useful series of hearings.

Perhaps the most significant attribute of the policies we adopt toward southern Africa is that they affect not only our relations with the countries of that area, but also our own identity as a nation and our interests throughout Africa. As you are aware, Mr. Chairman, the relevant issues in southern Africa are majority rule in Rhodesia, self-determination in Namibia, and the problem of apartheid in South Africa. Our stands on these issues determine to a significant degree our ability to pursue our interests elsewhere in the continent of Africa.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD RHODESIA

At earlier hearings in this series our policies in these three areas were discussed in detail, as well as our policy in Angola and in Mozambique. With respect to Rhodesia, we support fully the efforts of Rhodesia's neighbors, Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Botswana, and South Africa, to bring about a negotiated end to the constitutional crisis. This can only be done on a basis of majority rule, a goal we support. We are well aware of the danger of an escalation in the armed conflict in the absence of rapid progress toward meaningful negotiations and our policy is designed to do what we can to avoid conflict.

U.S. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO NAMIBIA

In Namibia, the United States believes that South Africa should permit the people of that territory to exercise freely and promptly their right to self-determination and independence. We support U.N. resolutions calling on South Africa to remove its illegal administration from Namibia and to recognize the authority of the United Nations over the territory. We follow events in Namibia closely and seek to promote and protect the human rights of the Namibian people. We discourage private American investment in the territory and we withhold Export-Import Bank facilities from trade with Namibia.

UNITED STATES SOUTH AFRICA POLICY

Regarding South Africa, we have for many years made clear our strong condemnation of South Africa's policy of apartheid or separate development. Because of apartheid, we have imposed certain constraints on bilateral relations with South Africa while seeking to communicate our desire for a peaceful resolution of its racial problems, without on our part implying acceptance of apartheid. These restraints include a 12-year-old comprehensive arms embargo, an 8-year-old ban on U.S. Navy ship visits to South African ports, neither encouraging nor discouraging private American investment in South Africa, and limiting Export-Import Bank facilities for trade there. Our position of communication without acceptance of apartheid is reflected in our maintenance of a diplomatic mission in South Africa, in our systematic contacts with all elements of South Africa's population, in our active cultural and educational exchange-of-persons program, and in our encouragement to American firms operating in South Africa to adopt enlightened employment practices.

U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD PORTUGUESE-SPEAKING TERRITORIES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

Our attitude toward the Portuguese-speaking territories of southern Africa was stated by President Ford at the White House dinner for President Kaunda, of Zambia, on April 19, when he said:

We have been following developments in southern Africa with great, great interest. For many years the United States has supported self-determination for the peoples of that area and we continue to do so today. We view the coming independence of Mozambique, Angola, and the island territories with great satisfaction—as we viewed the independence of Guinea-Bissau just last year—America stands ready to help the emerging countries, and to provide what assistance we can.

U.S. POLICY RESPECTING MOZAMBIQUE

In Mozambique, we have recognized the new government, and have conveyed to its leaders our desire to establish diplomatic relations. With funds already wisely appropriated by Congress, we have also offered to assist them in their economic development if they wish our help.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD ANGOLA

Finally, in Angola we continue to deplore the fighting there and regret that the three liberation movements in that promising country have not yet been able to achieve workable cooperation. It is our hope that we shall ultimately see progress toward independence in peace and stability.

**CONTINUATION OF PRESENT U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA
RECOMMENDED**

I recognize, as have assistant Secretary Davis and his predecessors, that there are some who believe we could do a great deal more to influence a settlement in southern Africa along the lines we believe to be conducive to peaceful progress in that area. There are others who hold we should take a contrary course. We continue to believe that our best interests are served by the policies we have described and discussed with you. The situation is not a static one. We will continue to make our views known on issues and problems as they arise. We will continue to keep constantly abreast of the fast-changing situation, and to study every possible step we might take to further peaceful progress toward self-determination and the end of minority rule based on racial oppression. But it is primarily up to the parties and peoples of southern Africa themselves to bring about a settlement. The role we can play and are playing is to encourage solutions through negotiations in order to avoid bloodshed that would threaten the peace and stability of Africa.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Before we have questions, we are going to hear from Mr. James Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs at the Department of Defense.

**STATEMENT OF JAMES H. NOYES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR NEAR EASTERN, AFRICAN, AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, IN-
TERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

Mr. NOYES. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I am pleased to join with Secretaries Mulcahy and Blake to comment on the defense aspects of this general overview of current and foreseen U.S. national security interests in the southern African area.

At the outset, I would like to emphasize that the role of the Department of Defense [DOD] is essentially supportive of the Department of State in the implementation of U.S. policy toward southern Africa. In contrast to the broad range of problems associated with U.S. support of the various United Nations Resolutions seeking to

encourage equal rights for the native peoples in the Republic of South Africa, Namibia, Rhodesia and the Portuguese Territories of Angola and Mozambique, the DOD's specific responsibilities are relatively limited.

U.S. STRATEGIC SECURITY INTERESTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Our strategic security interests in the area derive from the fact that the continental land mass of southern African littoral interdicts the vital sea lanes to the Indian Ocean and the underbelly of the Middle East. The ultimate and potential importance of these sea lanes was brought sharply into focus when the Suez Canal was closed in 1947 and remained closed until last month. While Suez is now open, we must remember that another closure always remains possible.

DOD SUPPORT OF PRESENT U.N. POLICIES CONCERNING SOUTHERN AFRICA

I would like to refer briefly to our support of current policies on the U.N. arms embargo on South Africa and that country's disputed presence in Namibia, the U.N. resolutions condemning Rhodesia's illegal secession from the United Kingdom without provision for the rights of its native population, and finally movement toward independence by the Portuguese African territories, including Angola and Mozambique.

DEFENSE ACTIVITIES IN REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

In the Republic of South Africa, defense activities are confined to an exchange of military, naval, and air attachés in Washington and Pretoria, and the now reduced operation of USAF [U.S. Air Force] missile and satellite tracking stations at Pretoria which is run by civilian contractors for recurring use when specific satellite programs are in process. This station is serviced by periodical deliveries of supplies by MAC [Military Airlift Command] aircraft and visits by technical personnel from the United States. The facility is the terminal station on the Air Force Eastern Test Range and played a key role in our missile and space program during the 1960s. The DOD has adhered strictly to the U.S. arms embargo policy which was established even before the U.N. resolutions of 1963. Since that time, we have excluded South Africa from DOD sales of U.S. military equipment, training, and even correspondence courses that might help South Africa to enforce its apartheid policy of racial discrimination. In addition, we have suspended normal U.S. ship visits to South African ports since 1967, making use of facilities elsewhere. I should emphasize that while South African ports and other facilities have highly significant capabilities when viewed in the sense of potential need in case of world conflict, we have found it possible to meet current requirements elsewhere.

RHODESIAN, NAMIBIAN DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

In the cases of Rhodesia and Namibia, the DOD has no current or anticipated security requirements. We maintain a complete hands-off policy with them and have no basis for any military exchange or re-

reciprocal arrangements. Until both countries become legally independent nations there would be no basis for seeking such cooperations. As you may be aware, the issue of the U.S. purchase of high quality Rhodesian chrome has been viewed by some as a breach of U.S. policy to support the U.N. resolutions against Rhodesia. In that connection, the Byrd amendment that made such U.S. purchases possible is still being considered for repeal by Congress. The DOD believes that Rhodesia's chrome is not required to meet anticipated defense requirements as these needs are a comparatively minor part of overall U.S. consumption of chrome.

DEFENSE INTERESTS IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE

Defense interests in the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique have posed considerable problems in the past. As liberation forces battled with Portuguese troops over the past 14 years the United States has carefully adhered to a position of assisting neither side. Our neutrality brought complaints by the liberation groups and their African and U.N. supporters that we opposed legitimate self-determination, as well as from the Portuguese with whom we have had arrangements for military cooperation and assistance in connection with their membership in NATO. We have also had mutually satisfactory arrangements with Portugal on U.S. base rights in the Azores. These interests obviously tended to conflict. As a result, neither the Portuguese nor the liberation groups in Angola and Mozambique were happy with our hands-off position.

Nevertheless, the Portuguese were responsive to U.S. requests for ship visits and bunkering arrangements for USN [U.S. Navy] ships transiting the Indian Ocean. This service made it possible to avoid stopping at South African ports enroute to and from the Persian Gulf and Vietnam at a time when the Suez Canal route was closed.

Now that Mozambique has obtained its independence and Angola will become independent of Portugal on November 11, 1975, we shall be dealing with the newly emerging governments. In light of their continuing criticism of U.S. policy during the insurgencies, the people who are coming to power may be reluctant, at least in the immediate future, to welcome U.S. ship visits. We are fortunate that the Suez Canal route has now reopened.

This concludes my remarks, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CLARK. Fine. Thank you very much.

I have two series of questions here, one on the defense aspect and the other with regard to questions that probably would be more closely related to the State Department, although I would like to have all of you feel free to comment at any time on any of these issues.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD USE OF MILITARY FACILITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA

As long as you have just spoken, Mr. Noyes, let's look at some of the defense aspects first.

I was particularly happy to hear you say that the Department of Defense believes that Rhodesian chrome is not required to meet anticipated defense requirements as these needs are a comparatively minor part of overall U.S. consumption of chrome.

I know the State Department at present has taken a strong position in favor of repeal of the Byrd amendment. It certainly is going to be one of the questions raised on the floor. We are happy to have your testimony on that.

Mr. Noyes, you have touched on this briefly, but I would like a little more explanation. What is the position of the United States concerning the use of military facilities in South Africa? How would you summarize that?

Mr. NOYES. Mr. Chairman, I might elaborate by saying that there is no initiative or proposal within the Department of Defense or going outward from the Department of Defense to the rest of Government with respect to a desire to use military facilities in South Africa.

Senator CLARK. So there is no consideration being given in the Government to possible use of any South African facilities, insofar as you are aware?

Mr. NOYES. That is correct, Mr. Chairman, except as a potential in time of substantial world emergency. One cannot rule out the importance of Simonstown and other possible facilities in South Africa, but there is no current requirement that is presently being considered.

U.S. POSITION CONCERNING NATO USE OF MILITARY FACILITIES

Senator CLARK. What is the position of the United States, as a member of NATO, concerning NATO use of military facilities in South Africa? Does that cast a different light on it if we look at it from the point of view of NATO or through NATO?

Mr. NOYES. My understanding is, Mr. Chairman, that NATO does not really consider matters south of the Tropic of Cancer and I do not believe there is any NATO consideration in a formal sense of a potential problem that would arise in respect to the sealanes in that area.

Senator CLARK. NATO consideration for that part of the world just does not exist.

Mr. NOYES. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

U.S. USE OF SOUTH AFRICAN NAVAL FACILITIES AT SIMONSTOWN

Senator CLARK. More specifically, since this has been discussed a good deal, would the United States consider using South African naval facilities at Simonstown for any reason that you are aware of? You are not giving any consideration to the use of Simonstown?

Mr. NOYES. There is no consideration, Mr. Chairman. We have had some emergency stops there where individuals who have been critically ill on U.S. warships have been taken off for treatment in South Africa, but other than that, we have made no stops and anticipate no requirements.

REPORTS OF MAJOR MONITORING INSTALLATION FOR NATO INTELLIGENCE

Senator CLARK. It has been reported, as you know, that Secretary Schlesinger proposed a major monitoring installation in South Africa for NATO intelligence at a meeting of the NATO Defense Planning Committee last spring. Is that then totally unfounded to your knowledge?

Mr. NOYES. It is absolutely unfounded, Mr. Chairman.

FUTURE U.S. USE OF SIMONSTOWN NAVAL FACILITIES

Senator CLARK. If, at sometime in the future, both the ports in Angola and Mozambique and the Suez Canal were closed to the United States Navy, would it be necessary to use Simonstown? Apparently, your testimony is even if Angola and Mozambique refuse to allow us to land there, and if the Suez Canal, for one reason or another might be closed, there has been no planning given under these circumstances to using Simonstown.

Mr. NOYES. There certainly has been no planning given. I would find it difficult to speculate on that particular set of circumstances, but I think alternative arrangements certainly could be made under normal conditions to use——

Senator CLARK. Use other facilities?

Mr. NOYES. Yes.

Senator CLARK. Did someone else answer?

Mr. NOYES. My colleague was just saying it would be possible to refuel at sea.

Senator CLARK. Yes, I see.

U.S. NAVY USE OF ANGOLAN, MOZAMBIQUE PORTS POST VIETNAM

How many times a year did the U.S. Navy use Angola and Mozambique ports after U.S. involvement in Vietnam ended?

Mr. NOYES. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I have these reports. I can provide that precisely for the record.

Senator CLARK. I wish you would. Maybe you could just for purposes of discussion give us a general idea, but we would like to have the specifics. Was it done regularly or just once or——

Mr. NOYES. This information has been forwarded to you, I think.

[See pp. 253-254]

Senator CLARK. Yes. I know we asked for it once before. I haven't actually seen it.

Mr. NOYES. We have in 19—let's see. You would be interested in the period 1974. I see about 10 calls, port calls in Luanda by U.S. destroyers and destroyer-escorts, and 2 in Mocamedes and in Mocamedes during 1975 I see 4 calls again by destroyers or destroyer-escorts. But that, of course, was prior to the opening of the canal.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR DEFENSE OF CAPE ROUTE, SOUTHERN AFRICA

Back again to the question of NATO. In June of 1973, the NATO Defense Planning Committee issued a secret instruction to the Supreme Allied Commander of the Atlantic [SACLANT], a contingency plan for the defense of the Cape route and the southern African region. At least this is what we have been advised. Can you throw any light on that? Do you have knowledge of that?

Mr. NOYES. I have no knowledge of that.

Senator CLARK. Is there anyone that is accompanying you that can speak to that question?

Mr. NOYES. In 1973, Mr. Chairman, the SACLANT was given permission to study the sea lanes going through that area at the Indian

Ocean, but there was no authority or inclination to study the actual land—potential land facilities or anything of that sort.

Senator CLARK. But, there was a NATO study done in effect below the Tropic of Cancer?

Mr. NOYES. It was related to NATO interest in the oil supply aspect.

SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT OVERTURES TO U.S. CONCERNING MILITARY FACILITIES

Senator CLARK. Has the South African Government made any overtures to the United States concerning the use of their military facilities?

Mr. NOYES. I am not aware of any.

Mr. MULCAHY. Mr. Chairman, I can say quite categorically there has been no approach made to the State Department recently. I could also add that in his meeting in April with the assembled African chiefs of mission in Washington, the Secretary told them that they could put their minds completely at rest, that there was no consideration being given anywhere in the U.S. Government to the United States entering any military relationship of any sort with South Africa.

Senator CLARK. My question went specifically to a question of whether the South African Government had approached our Government and you said not recently.

Mr. MULCAHY. Not recently at all, sir. We have had no approach from them.

Senator CLARK. Just for purposes of understanding that clearly, what do you mean by "recently"? In the last few days, weeks, months, or years?

Mr. MULCAHY. I can speak categorically for the past year that I have been serving in my present capacity and I am not aware of any before that. My colleagues confirm that, sir, going back several years, at least.

Senator CLARK. The South African Government has not initiated any discussion about establishing American military facilities in their country for several years.

Mr. MULCAHY. No, sir; despite the advertisements in American newspapers by the South African Ministry of Information advertising the delights of the now disused base at Simonstown.

Senator CLARK. All right. Thank you very much.

CONSTRUCTIVE U.S. PROPOSALS FOLLOWING U.N. VETOES CONCERNING SOUTHERN AFRICA

I would like to ask you some questions Mr. Secretary, about the U.S. vetoes in the United Nations and how they relate to some of the problems of southern Africa. As you know, the United States has vetoed four resolutions in the Security Council relating to southern Africa problems. The first two resolutions had to do with the expanding and strengthening of sanctions against Rhodesia. The second two had to do with applying international pressures on South Africa to end its illegal occupation of Namibia. The question is this. What constructive proposals did the United States make following each of those vetoes

for international acts to further self-determination in Rhodesia and Namibia?

In other words, what proposals were made for increasing the effectiveness of sanctions on Rhodesia or for increasing pressure on South Africa to grant independence to Namibia either bilaterally or through other organizations that would have said we have some positive ideas rather than simply vetoing the proposals at the U.N.?

Mr. BLAKE. Mr. Chairman, the most recent veto was cast along with the French and British.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Mr. BLAKE. On the basis of a request for mandatory sanctions on arms to South Africa. We had pointed out at that time that we already had a voluntary sanctions program, embargo on arms to South Africa. This came up, Mr. Chairman, as a matter of procedure after there had been some very urgent efforts made by the United States, the British, the French, and some of the other members of the Council to get a resolution through which would have been very positive in carrying pressure a bit further against the South African Government, putting us very squarely on the record. The politics of the Security Council were such that the pressures on the African members made it impossible in their view to accept anything other than the—what we considered the more extreme measures. In essence, what the problem was, these pressures were so strong that they frustrated some very real attempts to get a constructive outcome for which all members of the Council could have voted.

Now, that is a short history of that effort.

Senator CLARK. Let's hear that in a little greater detail. As I understood you, you said that the United States, Great Britain, and France had a positive proposal—

Mr. BLAKE. That is right.

Senator CLARK [continuing]. To introduce at the Security Council—

Mr. BLAKE. Right.

Senator CLARK [continuing]. And that you were prepared to make this proposal and it was just not acceptable. Can you tell us something about the nature of that proposal?

Mr. BLAKE. Well, it touched on the various elements. I don't have that with me, Mr. Chairman, right now, but—

Senator CLARK. Would you provide it for the record?

Mr. BLAKE. That was—it never saw the light of day in essence because it was—in a negotiating stage before we got to the resolution which was vetoed. You have a constant problem in the Security Council for the African members to decide whether they will take action which will get a large majority of votes or even unanimous support as against something which goes as far as, let us say, some of the more hard-line Africans ask.

I would say in addition to that, though, Mr. Chairman, that we believe that while the resolutions are very important, it is also important before and after and between the sessions to continue to make our views very strongly known.

On the Namibia question, you may be aware that before this meeting of the Council, we had made with the French and the British a tripartite demarche to the South African Government on the ques-

tion of Namibia, urging them to move forward rapidly, to do it with U.N. supervision, to be sure that all parties inside the country had a chance to make their contribution to this campaign.

Senator CLARK. But, this was simply a reiteration of former American policy.

Mr. BLAKE. No. I don't think—

Senator CLARK. It was not a new initiative.

Mr. BLAKE. That is not completely new.

Senator CLARK. What is new about it?

Mr. BLAKE. It is in details moving further along the lines of what we were specifically asking the South Africans to do.

Senator CLARK. You have suggested this proposal. I think that is exactly the kind of thing that we would like to have on the record, what we have done of a positive nature. You have identified this British-French-American proposal as being a positive new initiative. Could you describe for us what some of those positive new initiatives were, even in a general way?

Mr. BLAKE. I think I have, Mr. Chairman. I think probably the best way to characterize them would be the statement that Ambassador Scali gave in the Security Council. I would be glad to furnish that for the record if you wish.

[The information referred to follows:]

UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHN SCALI, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, ON NAMIBIA, JUNE 3, 1975

Mr. President: May I add my good wishes to those of my colleagues upon your accession to the Presidency of the Security Council. I assure you of the full cooperation of the United States Delegation. I also would like to congratulate our distinguished colleagues from Guyana upon the manner in which they so ably presided over the Council during the month of May.

Last December the United States supported Security Council Resolution 366. We voted "yes" in the belief that the text, though imperfect in some ways, adequately reflected our view that South Africa should act quickly and decisively to end its illegal occupation of Namibia. We believe, moreover, that the Security Council rightly placed its views and recommendations before the South African Government and urged it to move promptly along the path indicated.

During the last six months, there has been some forward movement in the Namibian situation, but not enough. It is clear, however, that regardless of how disappointed we are at the pace of steps toward genuine self-determination we must move carefully lest we worsen rather than improve the outlook for justice and freedom.

In this connection we hear calls for an arms embargo. The record of the United States Government in this respect is one of which the American people can be proud. For twelve years the United States Government has voluntarily refused to allow shipments of American arms and military equipment to South Africa. Our Government has done this as a matter of principle. We do so out of conviction and not because we are required to do so by an international forum. If others wish, they can join us in such a voluntary policy, and we earnestly invite them to do so.

As the Security Council considers what constructive steps it can take for the future of Namibia, there are four fundamental questions as we see them:

Whether there is a commitment by South Africa to a course of self-determination for all the people of Namibia, and to respect for their rights;

The timing of steps toward self-determination once that principle is accepted by South Africa;

The question whether all Namibians, of whatever color, political affiliation, or social origin, would have their voices heard in determining the future of the territory; and

The United Nations' role in the process of self-determination of all the people of Namibia.

The South African Government made public its position on Namibia in a letter from Foreign Minister Muller to Secretary General Waldheim on May 27. In this letter, the South African Foreign Minister restated many positions already put forward by his Government.

My Delegation believes we should explore South Africa's offer to resume a dialogue with a representative of the United Nations Secretary General and to enter into discussions with African leaders with the Chairman of the United Nations Council for Namibia and with the Special Committee of the Organization of African Unity. We fully recognize the past difficulties in such dialogues and note the restrictive terms of South Africa's present offer. Nonetheless, in our view, it is important that new efforts be made to determine whether, in fact, a genuine discussion can now be initiated in these channels.

We also note that the letter of May 27, in discussing the future of the territory, states that all options are open, including "independence as one state." We have also noted that this letter reiterates South Africa's recognition of the international status of the territory and states that it is the South African Government's wish that a constitutional conference take place in as short a time as possible.

Mr. Muller's words go somewhat beyond the assurances he gave the Secretary General in April 1973. They may reflect a more realistic appraisal of the situation in southern Africa. Ambiguities remain, and South Africa should provide clarification of its intent. We wish to know more precisely when and in what manner the planned constitutional convention will be conducted and who exactly will participate.

During the Council's debate on December 17, 1974 I called unequivocally for precision and detail in South African planning for Namibia's future. Coupled with positive action, such clarity is called for to ensure a peaceful and realistic settlement of the territory's future. Mr. Muller's most recent statements may offer hope that South Africa will allow a truly fair exercise of self-determination in Namibia. South Africa must now move from general statements of purpose to specific implementing action. Can South Africa be in any doubt that the international community wants these steps to define Namibia's separate status, and the timetable for carrying them out, and these to be stated in unambiguous terms?

At its meeting in Dar es Salaam in April, the OAU Council of Ministers reviewed the situation in Namibia and adopted a comprehensive declaration on the territory aimed at overcoming South Africa's recalcitrance. Members of the Security Council, including the United States, have also been active in seeking to encourage South Africa to move forward decisively in Namibia to allow the Namibian people to express their views freely on the political future and the constitutional structure of the territory.

The United Nations, and this Council especially, have a unique and grave responsibility for Namibia and its future. South Africa has now given us some reason to expect that it acknowledges the interest of the international community in Namibia even though it still has not accepted United Nations participation in the process of self-determination for Namibia. Once again we declare to South Africa that it is our considered view that without a role for the United Nations in the self-determination process, the international community cannot judge progress objectively and therefore cannot be satisfied that the people of Namibia will be able to exercise a democratic choice as to their future.

The United States for its part remains committed to the view (a) that all the people of Namibia should within a short time be given the opportunity to express their views freely and under United Nations supervision on the political future and constitutional structure of the territory; (b) that all Namibian political groups should be allowed to campaign for their views and to participate without hindrance in peaceful political activities in the course of the process of self-determination; (c) that the territory should not be split up in accordance with the policy of apartheid; and (d) that the future of Namibia should be determined by the freely expressed choice of its inhabitants.

As we continue to press for these goals, the United States will sustain its present policies with regard to the territory. We will continue to discourage United States investment in Namibia and to deny Export-Import Bank guarantees and other facilities for trade with Namibia. We will continue to withhold United States Government protection of United States investments, made

on the basis of rights acquired through the South African Government after 1966, against the claims of a future lawful Government of Namibia. This policy reflects our strongly held belief that South Africa should act in the immediate future to end its illegal occupation of Namibia.

Mr. President, the obligation of this Council is to foster a peaceful and just settlement. Our agreed goal is the exercise by the people of Namibia or their right to self-determination. As a responsible deliberative body, it is our duty to encourage all the parties concerned and to explore every possible opportunity for launching the process of timely self-determination.

In view of the facts of the Namibian situation, it is difficult to find that a threat to international peace and security exists within the meaning of the Charter. The party seen by some as causing the threat has agreed on some of the objectives desired by the international community and has offered to exchange views on the means of achieving them. This clearly does not add up to a crisis, peace-and-war situation at this time. Thus, in our view, it would not be appropriate to invoke mandatory sanctions which specifically are reserved for threats to the peace. We believe the Council, in collaboration with other African states, should insist that South Africa give concrete effect to its words, give firm assurances about the issues on which it has not yet declared its position, and move forward with dispatch toward a new environment of freedom in Southern Africa.

Senator CLARK. We would like to have that. Can you tell us orally roughly what the thrust of that was?

Mr. BLAKE. All right. Just a minute. I will see if I have that statement.

I believe that Mr. Buffum, when he spoke, gave the major elements of that. I have a quick characterization of this here, Mr. Chairman, and as I said, I will provide you the rest. I might add that we have not made the text of our demarche public for reasons of diplomatic privacy, but we have made all of the major elements that we have spoken of—the major elements that we have spoken of have been reflected in speeches, and so forth.

Senator CLARK. You are speaking of the major elements of this proposal that we were prepared to put before the Security Council?

Mr. BLAKE. No, sir. The major elements of what we urged the South Africans to do. It was reflected to quite a degree. But in any negotiating stage, it is like a piece of legislation, that any—at any given stage, it has a lot of different elements in it and—

Senator CLARK. I guess it is the elements we are interested in.

Mr. BLAKE. Right.

All Namibians should, within a short time, be given the opportunity to express their views freely and under United Nations supervision on the political future and the constitutional structure of the territory. All Namibian political groups should be allowed to campaign for their views and to participate without hindrance in peaceful political activities in the course of self-determination. The territory should not be fragmented in accordance with apartheid policy contrary to the wishes of its people. And the future of Namibia should be determined by the freely expressed choice of its inhabitants.

Those are the major elements there.

Senator CLARK. What is the date of that?

Mr. BLAKE. I will have to furnish that for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

April 22, 1975.

Senator CLARK. It is fairly recent?

Mr. BLAKE. Yes.

Mr. MULCAHY. About mid-May.

Mr. BLAKE. About mid-May.

Senator CLARK. I thought the elements you have just described had been our policy for some time. Are these new policies?

Mr. BLAKE. This is a further elaboration. We have increasingly been outspoken and specific in what we ask and suggested to the South Africans.

Senator CLARK. Senator Pell, feel free to come in at any time you have questions.

Let's go back now to the original question that I asked, because you addressed yourself to only one part of it. What specific proposals have we made as a result of or following each of these vetoes of a positive nature? You said in the case of the most recent one that we had a proposal made that was never made public and apparently never was completely drafted, but which was in the discussion stage which you have just addressed yourself to.

Have we made any other initiatives?

Mr. BLAKE. Immediately preceding that the veto was on the question of expulsion of South Africa. I am not quite sure how that is subject to the same kind of considerations.

Senator CLARK. I don't think it is. I agree with you. What about the other two?

Mr. BLAKE. I am unaware of any such proposals, although since this was before my time, there may have been.

U.S. POSITIVE PROPOSALS CONCERNING NAMIBIA

Senator CLARK. What about the period since the last veto? What have we done of a positive nature with regard to the Namibian proposal?

Mr. BLAKE. Mr. Chairman, there is a thing we do have under consideration now. The timing has not been that long, but we do intend to seek further means of bringing home in an effective way to the South African Government our feeling that it is important that they move ahead and move ahead quickly to bring Namibia toward self-determination.

Senator CLARK. We hope that it will be more than just words, because you can only say the words so many ways so many times. We would hope that you could find a way in the United Nations to assist other countries who always seem to be in the majority on this issue, to push them in that direction. I don't necessarily subscribe to the idea that you have to believe in every word of a resolution to vote for it. It seems to me we could exercise our vote and give our qualifications, but we went over that with Secretary Buffum here last week in some detail.

Mr. BLAKE. Right. Generally speaking, Mr. Chairman, in the General Assembly it is different from the Security Council. We do tend to support the resolutions which the African countries put up on this subject, except to the—

Senator CLARK. Speaking of the General Assembly?

Mr. BLAKE. In the General Assembly, except to the extent that there are recommendations for mandatory sanctions at various times which often do pose particular problems because it is us they are asking to impose the sanctions.

Senator CLARK. Yesterday's witnesses argued that the African nations would be much more responsive to U.S. interests in the United

Nations if the United States were more responsive to their interests in the South African issues. Obviously, this is a subjective decision on anyone's part, but the witnesses yesterday felt that would be the case.

KEY ISSUES FOR AFRICAN SUPPORT IN U.N.

Let me ask you on what key issues do we really need African support in the United Nations, in your judgment?

Mr. BLAKE. This year, coming up, it might be interesting to point out two issues which will be of importance to us. One is an issue, the question of Korea. On this question in the past, we have enjoyed the support, the positive votes of a number of African countries and a certain number have abstained and a certain number have voted against us. In that case, it seems to be related, as much as anything, to their status within the nonaligned movement and in a general way whether they are considered the more radical states or the more moderate states. These are slogans which don't necessarily hold up on too close examination, but we have enjoyed substantial support from them.

Now, the other issue is a new one, and one which is difficult. The suggestion made in some nonaligned circumstances that Israel might be expelled from the United Nations. This is a matter of important principle and it will be important. Of course, this is not our issue. This is a broader issue involving the whole world, but one on which we feel strongly and certainly we will seek the support of African countries. The question in principle is an important political question.

SHOULD THE UNITED STATES BRING ANGOLA QUESTION BEFORE THE U.N.?

Senator CLARK. Let me switch to a different subject. We are all aware of the difficulties in Angola now and the problems of the civil war that is occurring there. In your judgment, should the United States raise in the United Nations the problem of the conflict in Angola, particularly from the point of view of the conflict being fueled by outside supply of arms? Does that justify our bringing this question to the United Nations, or do you think that is not the right forum for it?

Mr. BLAKE. I think right now, Mr. Chairman, the major effective and the most promising line of effective action is through the Africans acting amongst themselves. I think we would be inclined to be responsive to and sensitive to their leadership, how they felt this thing could be handled best. At this stage, I have heard of no real proposal to have United Nations peacekeeping forces. It could happen, but I have seen nothing to suggest that at this time.

OUR ACTION ON ANGOLA QUESTION

Senator CLARK. Have you seen any suggestion that the Organization of African Unity, now meeting in Uganda, is prepared to take any action?

Mr. MULCAHY. Mr. Chairman, we have had some indications from individual African leaders that they find the situation in Angola so deplorable that something ought to be done about it and they invited

all three of the leaders of the nationalist factions in Angola to be present. I believe that only Gen. Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, is attending. It is possible the other two movements may send representatives. I dare say that there will be a great deal of talk at the Uganda summit at the moment about it, but we have yet to find any major critical issue in Africa on which the Organization of African Unity will intervene except at the explicit request of the country involved without being invited to do so.

The Organization of African Unity did send, a few months back, a small group of observers to Angola and perhaps the only issue involving their foreign relations on which the three factions agreed was that they would have no dealings whatsoever with this mission that was sent. There was also a United Nations mission there of some nature. I have forgotten exactly what their business was, but they were also boycotted by all three factions, because they had come unbidden to Angola.

The charter of the United Nations itself, Mr. Chairman, as you know, encourages the settlement of disputes by regional organizations. They would, for example, in the case of a dispute between members of the Organization of American States expect the OAS to take the lead first. The United Nations would probably be reluctant, without OAU support and without an OAU initiative, to take cognizance officially of the Angolan situation.

It is a great problem. We certainly hope that statesmanship is going to triumph and that African leaders, whether they do so within the framework of the OAU or whether in the context of a "wise men" body, or a group of negotiators, would lend a hand to settle this bleeding problem.

TAX CREDITS TO CORPORATIONS INVESTING IN NAMIBIA

Senator CLARK. It has been argued by some of the witnesses here that the United States should not grant tax credits to corporations investing in Namibia and paying taxes to the South African Government. In fact, if my memory serves me correctly, Senator Mondale introduced a bill to that effect last year. What is the administration's position on that?

Mr. MULCAHY. I don't recall, Mr. Chairman, that the issue has arisen since its consideration in the Congress. I am told, Mr. Chairman, that the tax credit issue presents basically an issue of statutory interpretation. While we regard South Africa as illegally occupying the territory and we consider its official actions in the territory to be invalid, the Treasury Department has determined that the factors are not relevant to determining whether payments are creditable under section 901 of the Internal Revenue Code. In the Treasury view, which seems to be controlling as far as the administrative branch is concerned, the current law provides for a credit in the event of any payment of taxes upon income to a governing power without regard to its legality. We do not consider the grant of a tax credit to imply any recognition by the U.S. Government of the legality of the taxing power of, in this case, the South African Government. I think that is the—

ADMINISTRATION SUPPORT FOR TAX CREDITS BILL

Senator CLARK. I am asking a slightly different question. I am asking whether you would support legislation to prevent that from happening. In other words, you have interpreted the IRS's view of this under present law, but my question is if we were to introduce a bill, as I think Senator Mondale did in the last session, which we are contemplating doing in this session, would the administration support it?

Mr. MULCAHY. I think about the most I can say to that, Mr. Chairman, at the moment, is that we would be very happy to study it, study the wording of the legislation. It does offer some very good possibilities of advancing our position with respect to the——

Senator CLARK. Good. We would like to have your judgment on that.

DESCRIPTION, U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO NAMIBIA INSTITUTE

Could you describe the Namibia Institute that the Council on Namibia is seeking to set up in Usakos. Should the United States contribute to that?

Mr. MULCAHY. I believe, Mr. Chairman, if my memory serves me correctly, that we have made a contribution of a few thousand dollars. I am subject to minor correction, Mr. Chairman. We have, in principle, agreed to support the Institute. We are at the present awaiting budgetary information that we have requested on it before actually committing the funds.

Senator CLARK. You are sympathetic toward that institute?

Mr. MULCAHY. We are, sir.

COMMERCE DEPARTMENT HEARINGS: HARVESTING FUR SEALS OFF SOUTH AFRICA

Senator CLARK. Another question of a somewhat minor nature, but one in which we are interested. I understand on September 18 the Department of Commerce will be holding hearings on harvesting of fur seals off South Africa. If so, is it your understanding that the Department of Commerce expects South Africa to represent Namibia or will it ask the U.N. Commission on Namibia to testify?

Mr. MULCAHY. I believe, sir, that we would have to deal with the South African Government as being the de facto controlling power on the scene.

Senator CLARK. Why so?

Mr. MULCAHY. In that access to Namibia is not possible today without the approval of and in fact the issuance of a visa by the South African Government. To the extent that the American business interests are engaged in the sealing industry and along the coast of South Africa and Southwest Africa, it is necessary for them to deal with the South African Government.

U.S. POLICY INCONSISTENCY

Senator CLARK. Is there anything inconsistent in our position and attitude toward South Africa and Namibia on the one hand in the U.N. that we talk about and on the other hand in these hearings? Don't you see some inconsistency in that?

Mr. MULCAHY. It is inconsistent, sir, insofar as it is a very anomalous situation. We have the greatest sympathy for the Council on Namibia. We have not yet become members of it. We may, indeed, some day. But the body, as constituted at the present time in practice is unable to exercise its mandate within the territory.

Senator CLARK. Did we deal with South Africa on all issues related to Namibia in similar fashion? With regard to these hearings we see South Africa as the de facto government in Namibia and deal with it accordingly?

Mr. MULCAHY. Yes; and usually with a reservation made in each case that our dealings with the South African Government do not constitute a recognition of the legality of its rule in Namibia.

U.S. MEMBERSHIP ON U.N. NAMIBIA COMMISSION

Senator CLARK. Why have we not become a member of the Namibia Commission? How does one become a member?

Mr. BLAKE. Mr. Chairman, this is by appointment of the president of the General Assembly, if my memory serves me. I don't think we have been asked to be members of the Commission. That is a theoretical possibility, but in fact, it may well be that the Council, as things develop and as the process unfolds, will not have the same central role that some people now seek for it. It probably will be a more pragmatic type of development. Certainly, the South African Government hasn't been ready to recognize the Council, although they have indicated in some way that they will deal with the United Nations.

Now, this is one of these areas where developments are under consideration and it is hard to say what role the Council will, in the end, have.

Senator CLARK. Have we initiated any action or shown any interest in becoming a member of the Council to your knowledge?

Mr. MULCAHY. No; Mr. Chairman, we haven't.

Senator CLARK. Gentleman, we thank you very much for coming up. We appreciate it.

Senator CLARK. We are going to hear now from Mr. George Houser, executive director, American Committee on Africa, New York. Please come up to the table.

Mr. Houser, we have a 20-minute rule. Consistent with that, proceed in any way you think appropriate.

STATEMENT OF GEORGE M. HOUSER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON AFRICA, NEW YORK, N.Y.

Mr. HOUSER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; 20 minutes?

Senator CLARK. Twenty minutes.

Mr. HOUSER. I had been told it was about five minutes.

Senator CLARK. That is what we tell people in the hope that they will stay within 20. So you proceed. You may summarize your statement or present it in anyway you think appropriate. Certainly, your entire statement will be made a part of the record.

Mr. HOUSER. Thank you. I might observe, Mr. Chairman, that in looking over the statement as it was rather hurriedly stenciled and mimeographed yesterday, there are a number of typos which I will inform whoever needs to be informed about.

Senator CLARK. Fine. We appreciate that.

Mr. HOUSER. I had not thought, due to the strictures on time, that I would read any portion of the statement—

Senator CLARK. Fine.

Mr. HOUSER [continuing.] But would simply make some comments about the general thrust of what I am trying to say in it. Since this is a section of the hearings dealing with overview, I haven't tried, of course, to dwell upon any one area of southern Africa, but tried to take a look at what I interpret U.S. policy as a whole to be, and I have given a kind of title to my statement which is "Observations on the Relevance of U.S. Policy to Southern Africa."

The key word there, of course, would be relevance.

That raises a question about what the nature and what the essence, both of the southern African situation is and what the essence of U.S. policy is in relation to southern Africa.

I have not had the opportunity, unfortunately, to read all or maybe even most of the statements which have been made during the course of these hearings. I will be interested to do this. However, I am sure that there is plenty of factual information which has been submitted, most of which I imagine I would accept, on what exists in the various countries, what the problems, the facts, are of the conditions and the situation in most of the countries which make up southern Africa.

RACIAL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION OF BLACKS BY WHITE MINORITY

I have just two points that I would make on the first part of my case, having to do with what the essence of the situation in southern Africa is. The first, and I shall not try to document this because I believe it would be documented in other statements, the first is that the essence of the situation is that it is characterized by racial, political and economic exploitation of the great mass of people, the majority of the people, the Africans in this area of the continent by a white minority. One might interpret this that certainly it would have been prior to the coup in Portugal as also colonial domination and it is not necessary for me to dwell upon this because I am sure that in the testimony which has been given on South Africa, on Namibia, and on Rhodesia, it has been very well documented that in South Africa there is about 19 percent of the population that controls practically all of the land, all of the resources, the white minority living very happily and satisfactorily, nevertheless with fear, as to what their future is, but in control of the politics and of the economy of the country to the detriment of the vast majority of people, the Africans and the non-whites, the black population that live there.

This is true in not just South Africa, which, however, is the most important power because it is the largest in population. It is the richest. It is the most powerful, and therefore it dominates the situation. In Namibia, where about 13 percent of the population are European and have the same rights and privileges and power that their counterparts, the white South Africans have in the Republic of South Africa. This is also repeated in the Rhodesian situation where a bare 5 percent of the population are European, again with even greater fears because the possibility of drastic change is much more imminent seemingly in

Rhodesia than even in Namibia. And certainly, in South Africa. Therefore, there is a great deal of fear on the part of the white minority in Rhodesia that they may be losing out.

At any rate, the first point what I would make is that the situation in southern Africa in essence is characterized as one of racial, political, economic exploitation of the great mass of people by the minority who are in power.

ONGOING STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM BY AFRICAN PEOPLE

Now, the second aspect of what I think is the essence of the situation to which policy must be related if it is relevant is that it is a situation of struggle and conflict. Now, of course, ever since, virtually since the end of the Second World War, certainly getting up into the mid-1950's, there has been a struggle on the part of African people all over the continent for freedom, self-determination, and independence. I think it is remarkable that with few exceptions, this struggle has been a nonviolent struggle. That is, on the whole it had proceeded along peaceful lines with the exception of the war for liberation and freedom in Algeria, and with the exception of the period of the Mau Mau in the changing situation in Kenya, east Africa. By and large, the changes have been brought about by nonviolent rather than by wholesale violent methods.

Now, one of the reasons why we pay attention and why I think hearings such as this are held is because the southern African situation is unique in the African context in this respect, because here the methods of change have been violent. Beginning with the Angolan situation in 1961 and then in the Guinea-Bissau situation which, although not geographically part of southern Africa, is in spirit the same kind of situation. or was, violence again there, guerrilla warfare, arms struggle, in January 1963 and in September 1964 in Mozambique, in the spring or April of 1965 armed struggle began in Zimbabwe, and in Namibia in August of 1966, so that all of the areas with the exception of South Africa have an intentional armed struggle as part of at least the struggle for liberation.

In South Africa it has not developed to that stage yet, because of the power of the South African Government in terms of military and economic might and also because up to this point South Africa has been protected by buffer zones.

Now, one of the things which has changed the situation in southern Africa is, of course, the independence of Mozambique and to a little lesser extent the coming independence of Angola because this brought in a new objective situation in which a buffer protecting South Africa was removed, and South Africa has therefore pursued or attempted to pursue a different international policy to relate to these objective changes which have taken place since the coup in Portugal and since it was obvious that Mozambique was going to be independent.

The policy of détente came into existence last year. I think it is important to observe that the African approach to détente led by those countries that have taken the leadership in this—Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, and now Mozambique—is in contrast to the approach that South Africa takes to the question of détente. South Africa is essen-

tially taking protective action and pursuing a changed tactical international policy to try to win friendship with the African states, whereas the objective of the African states is a much more limited one. It is not based on the supposition that there is to be a change in the South African situation internally, but rather that it is possible for South Africa to be removed as a factor from the Rhodesian and the Namibian situations.

This was clearly outlined in the statement which Tanzania introduced to the special session of the Organization of African Unity held in Dar es Salaam, I believe, in April of this year, where the subject for debate really was the OAU approach to the South African situation and the détente was the essence of the discussion.

I think it is—in other testimony, I am sure there has been a great deal of attention given to the question as to whether change is taking place within South Africa itself, and by and large, I believe it is recognized now increasingly, although I am sorry not far enough, that change is not—basic change is not, essential change is not taking place in South Africa. All of the strictures of apartheid, the laws which keep Africans from any participation in the political life of the country—one could list all these laws, as I have in my testimony, and it has been in other testimony—are still in existence, so apartheid still exists and the situation internally is not changing except in very peripheral fashions.

I mention this only because it is important to bolster up my case again, which is that exploitation exists on the one hand in southern Africa and struggle and conflict, confrontation between the majority, the Africans and the white minority in control, is incontestably involved in the situation and characterizes what the situation actually is.

Now, my only point is if policy is not related to this reality, then it is not too relevant.

U.S. POLICY AIMED AT AVOIDING DISTURBING PROFITMAKING ENTERPRISES

Now, my analysis of U.S. policy is that it is not strictly related to the reality, this essential conflict and struggle in South Africa. I would, in summary, point to three aspects of U.S. policy which seem to me descriptive of what U.S. policy essentially aimed at. The first thing I would point to is aimed at avoiding disturbing profitmaking enterprises in South Africa particularly, which is the most important area, of course, of southern Africa, because business investment is more important in the relations of the United States to South Africa than any other aspect of policy. With something between 300 and 400 American corporations making a 19-percent-or-so profit on investment, it is obviously lucrative. The argument is made that by changing labor practices in industry in South Africa, possibly change can be brought about in the South African situation, but I think it is important to observe in this connection that the reason why American corporations or other foreign corporations are in South Africa is not to bring change about. It is to make profits. And I think when one is talking about essence, this is the important part of it.

U.S. POLICY OF GOOD RELATIONS WITH WHITE MINORITY GOVERNMENT

The second point I would make is that the U.S. policy has essentially maintained a good working situation with the white minority governments rather than with the mass of people. I think that a policy over the years in relation to Portuguese territories is instructive at this point, because I don't think it is essentially changed, not toward the Portuguese territories, but toward what makes up the essence of the conflict and the struggle. The United States never developed any working relationship or an understanding with the liberation movements in southern Africa. It has never taken them seriously.

I recall only a short time ago, since it was a short time ago, that the PAIGC [African Party for the Independence of Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde Islands] was engaged in its liberation struggle in Guinea-Bissau and it proclaimed the existence of its state, that there was some pressure upon the U.S. Government to recognize the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, which the PAIGC had declared prior to the coup in Portugal, and the position of the State Department was to me an embarrassing one, not them—was then, but even more so when one thinks in retrospect on it. The United States took the position that the PAIGC had only about 10 percent of the people giving it loyalty, and that the Portuguese controlled two-thirds to three-quarters of the country.

It is not surprising that the United States was not invited as a guest to Mozambique's independence celebrations on June 25 because as Frelimo said at that time "this is an occasion for the friends of us, those who supported us in our struggle for independence to join together." The United States could hardly be ranked among them. The United States has had policies such as NASA tracking stations in South Africa, has cooperated with the Atomic Board of South Africa, and as my colleague, Jennifer Davis, pointed out the other day, in trade has sent many small planes to South Africa which undoubtedly are being used for military purposes.

One thinks also of the \$436 million loan to the Portuguese Government prior to the coup in Portugal as a means of assuring the continuation of the Azores as a base for the United States.

[Mr. Houser's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED TESTIMONY OF GEORGE M. HOUSER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
OF THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON AFRICA

OBSERVATIONS ON THE RELEVANCE OF U.S. POLICY TO SOUTHERN AFRICA

These hearings under the sponsorship of the Senate Subcommittee on Africa and chaired by Senator Richard Clark, have been helpful in focussing attention on the southern African complex of problems. All too little attention had been given to this area of the world in the Senate of the United States recently. I am appreciative of the opportunity to present a concern about the direction of U.S. policy. For more than 20 years, the American Committee on Africa has been working in the field of U.S.-African relations. We hope that we can offer some helpful perspective on U.S. policy towards southern Africa coming out of our experience.

The section of these hearings in which I appear is titled "Overview." In line with this my purpose is not to focus on any one country of southern Africa, but rather to try to look at U.S. policy in the perspective of the whole southern African situation. My major contention is that U.S. policy is not dynamically related to the actual circumstances existing in southern Africa.

Southern Africa, like practically all of the continent, has been the victim of conquest and exploitation covering a very long period. The fact which distinguishes southern Africa, and is undoubtedly the reason for a current concentrated attention on that area of the world, and also is the rationale for these hearings, is that this conquest and exploitation persists today. This is true even though the change in Portugal brought about by the coup of April, 1974, has raised new hope for a resolution to the problems of exploitation in southern Africa.

In my statement, I do intend to dwell at length on facts and statistics which have been documented in other sections of these hearings dealing with particular areas of southern Africa. It is inevitable that reference to South Africa should figure prominently because South Africa is the largest, the richest, and the most powerful of all the countries in the area. Also, it is not irrelevant to refer to the period of Portuguese domination in Angola and Mozambique because the changes there are so recent that the struggle for independence is fresh in memory.

The situation in southern Africa can be described under two principal headings. First, southern Africa is an area of racial, political, and economic exploitation.

In Rhodesia, with only 5% of the population white, 50 out of the 66 seats in the Parliament are held by white members. Under the 1969 Constitution, presently in force, African representation could never surpass that of whites in Parliament, even if there were dramatic changes in the educational and financial circumstances of blacks. This Constitution was adopted with only 6,645 Africans qualified to vote. Under the Unlawful Organization Act and the Preventive Detention Act a succession of African political organizations have been banned. The Law and Order Maintenance Act gives the police extensive power to arrest nationalists and to ban meetings simply by arresting the speakers. The Land Apportionment Act and the Native Land Husbandry Act puts the best land in the hands of whites. Six thousand four hundred white farmers have nearly all the best land. On an average the European worker in Rhodesia is paid ten times more than the African. The industrial Conciliation Act so limits trade union rights for Africans that they are virtually powerless to change their working conditions and their relations with either the white workers or their employers.

In Namibia, approximately 13% of the population is white. No Africans are represented in the Legislature. Sixty-five percent of the country is in the hands of whites. All African land is held by an agency called "The Bantu Trust." Under the law, electoral politics for Africans are irrelevant because there are no elected positions for Africans as a whole in the government of the country. The South African government, which has controlled Namibia ever since the end of the second World War, has done everything it could to encourage a division of the country among ethnic groups. This was an attempt at a divide and rule policy the purpose of which is to maintain European control over the country for an indefinite period.

In South Africa 19% of the population is white. By law no African may be elected to Parliament. Africans have no vote. The major African political organizations, which have existed primarily to protest injustices and to preserve as far as possible the rights of the majority of the people, have been banned, their leaders imprisoned, hounded by the police, or forced into exile. Under the apartheid system the majority of the people, the Africans, have only the privilege, not the right, of leaving the reserve areas, or Bantustans, which occupy only 13% of the land surface of the country. And yet, the economy of South Africa rests upon the labor of the Africans. A system of migratory labor has been imposed upon the Africans, they have been obliged to accept this in order to sustain themselves in the small areas of the country where they are supposed to have their homes. About 47% of the African population live in the Bantustans. But only 15% of the income of the people in the Transkei and 9% of the income of the people in Kwazulu (the two largest Bantustans) are earned within these areas. Over half of the blacks live below the \$120 monthly income estimated as the poverty datum line for a family of five.

Second, *southern Africa is an area of struggle and conflict*. It is primarily because of this confrontation between the African majority people and the white minority that the rest of the world has given unusual attention to the area. Most of the African countries achieved their independence through a

struggle that remained remarkably non-violent. Algeria's war for independence and the Mau Mau in Kenya, were the exceptions. Liberation movements of southern Africa were driven to violence because they saw no other way to end exploitation and colonial domination. Guerrilla warfare was finally successful in the three major Portuguese colonial areas of Africa—Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique. Not only did the liberation movements in these countries succeed in freeing themselves from the Portuguese, but they were the catalytic agents which brought about a fundamental change in Portugal itself.

In South Africa, for literally decades, the African National Congress attempted to bring change about within the institutions which the Europeans had created. The banning of the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress following the Sharpeville massacre of 1960 brought an abrupt end to the African strategy of non-violence.

The armed struggle for the liberation of southern Africa began first in Angola in 1961, in Guinea-Bissau in 1963, and in Mozambique in 1964. Zimbabweans date the beginning of the armed struggle in Rhodesia from 1965, and in Namibia guerrilla tactics began in 1966.

In South Africa sabotage and sporadic incidents of violence have occurred over the last decade, but the liberation struggle has not yet erupted into full-scale violence. The reason for this has been twofold. First, South Africa has been protected by buffer areas on its borders—the ocean on two sides, Mozambique under Portuguese domination, Botswana which has been economically dependent upon South Africa, and Namibia, a captive state. Second, the government of South Africa has protected itself by the creation of a militarized police state. Within the last three years military expenditures in South Africa have more than doubled now amounting to a billion dollars a year. The Republic now produces about 80% of its lighter weapons. More than 100 kinds of ammunition, rifles, explosives and armoured cars are produced annually in the defense production of South Africa. In her testimony a few days ago before this subcommittee, my colleague, Jennifer Davis, outlined the military buildup in South Africa. The purpose of this military strength, of course, is to protect white South Africa from threats to its way of life either internal or external. Any opposition to the system of white domination is dealt with immediately and leaders of active protest are put under ban or imprisoned. Half a million or more Africans are arrested annually under the pass laws in order to maintain the separation of black and white peoples from one another even while the labor of the African is exploited to keep white prosperity alive.

That a dramatic change has taken place in southern Africa within the last year and a half is incontestable. The policy of the new government in Portugal was a victory for the liberation movements of Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique. The independence particularly of Angola and Mozambique, because of their strategic location in southern Africa, has had a tremendous effect on the objective situation facing South Africa and Rhodesia. Part of the buffer that South Africa has always relied upon, has been removed. The white minority government of Rhodesia faces new pressures of isolation. South Africa has reacted to this new development not with a change of internal policy, but with a change of international tactics. A "correct" policy has been adopted towards Mozambique. At least limited pressure has been applied to the government of Ian Smith to come to terms with the African nationalist movement there. A policy of detente between South Africa and black African states to the north is being attempted.

The approaches of the black independent states, led by Zambia and Tanzania, and of South Africa to detente are in contrast. The objective of Prime Minister Vorster is to try to stave off any external attack against his country's security while tightening up internal machinery to preserve control. Efforts towards communication with African leaders such as Kaunda, the attempt to normalize relations with Mozambique, speeches for external consumption about changes due to come inside South Africa, talk about removing South African troops from Rhodesia, speeches designed to make South African policy on Namibia sound reasonable—all of this has the purpose of deceiving the international community into thinking a basic change is taking place in South Africa.

The approach of the independent African states to detente has a limited objective. It is designed not to lessen pressure on change within South Africa, but to try to remove South African economic and military power from Rhodesia and Namibia. This is quite clear from the statement which Tanzania submitted to a recent Organization of African Unity session in Dar es Salaam dealing with the question of detente. The statement read: "The willingness to talk to Vorster and

his government about the transfer of power in Rhodesia and Namibia is quite a different thing from co-operating with him as he attempts to make friends in Africa in order to weaken the struggle for human rights and dignity within South Africa. All talking must be confined to matters of direct relevance to the transfer of power in those two countries, and in full co-operation with the appropriate nationalist movements."

If South African power can be removed from Rhodesia and Namibia, the change to majority rule may come about soon and largely through peaceful methods. It is unthinkable that the Smith regime can last in Rhodesia without the presence of South African troops, and without the cooperation of Mozambique and South Africa through access to their seaports.

The more fundamental question is whether change is taking place within South Africa itself. In explaining the new international tactical approach of South Africa, Prime Minister Vorster said to his own constituents "I have made no promises of change in domestic policy." To a recent student conference, the Prime Minister said "I have spoken recently to many who have intergrationist tendencies. They are people who have already thrown in the towel . . . do not advocate a course which would lead to a sharing of power over your own people and over other people." The fundamentals of apartheid have not changed. The pass laws effectively limiting the right of the majority of the people of South Africa to travel around their own country, still exist. The Unlawful Organizations Act, the Public Safety Act, the Suppression of Communism Act, the Sabotage Act, the Terrorism Act, the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, the Group Areas Act, the Bantu Education Act, the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, the Bantu Administration Act, and a multitude of others still exist. The legal right of black trade unions to strike and even to engage in effective collective bargaining, is still denied. Africans still cannot participate in government and their political organizations are banned. South Africa justifies its "separate development" and "homelands" policy by contending that South Africa is made up of many nations. It still spreads the fiction that each African "nation" can be independent when it is obvious to any observer that the homelands policy is simply a means of maintaining control over a divided black populace.

The recent changes in southern Africa with the independence of Mozambique and the forthcoming independence of Angola, far from removing the bases for struggle, intensify them. The white minority of South Africa is powerful. This minority has given no indication of a desire for fundamental change towards the establishment of a multi-racial society. The black majority in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia are inspired by the independence which they have seen in Mozambique. Their expectations of change in the near future have risen tremendously. This increases the pressure for confrontation. These pressures will not be lessened by minor increases in wage levels nor by removing signs "for Europeans only" from park benches. The majority of the people want to run their own affairs. As long as the white minority looks upon this as a threat, struggle, conflict, and confrontation are inevitable. This is as it should be. This is the way change takes place in history. There is always hope when a repressed majority are unwilling any longer to accept the inferior status which has been forced on them.

The policy of the United States has never come to terms seriously with the southern African reality. This is not new. It only becomes necessary for the United States to have a policy toward Africa as a whole after the mid and late 1950's when newly independent African states were emerging. Up to that time Africa was considered an extension of Europe. In spite of the fact that the United States has always given verbal support to the principle of self-determination, it is rather ironic that one of the last acts of the Eisenhower administration was to abstain on the decolonization resolution passed by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1960. For a very brief period, towards the beginning of the Kennedy administration, there was some indication that the United States Government might begin to accept a new reality in Africa. The United States voted to censure Portugal for its policy in Angola just after the armed struggle began in 1961. The United States took some steps to challenge the continuation of French colonial domination in Algeria. The United States voted for an arms embargo against South Africa. But with a few exceptions the United States has lagged shamefully on colonial questions, taking no effective initiatives and giving the conflict in southern Africa low priority on the agenda of issues with which it was concerned.

As suggested in the title I have given my statement, I raise the question about the relevance of U.S. policy to the dynamics of the southern Africa struggle.

A policy which is irrelevant to an objective situation is useless, or bankrupt, or deceitful. Any irrelevant policy is wasted motion because it does not meet the need to which it is supposed to relate. Or it may be deceitful in that it is in reality related to an entirely different set of interests and circumstances.

If it is true that the southern African situation is characterized primarily by the struggle of the majority of the people against exploitation, then the contention that United States policy is irrelevant has substance. One important aspect of United States policy towards southern Africa, and particularly South Africa, has been to avoid disturbing a profit-making enterprise. Economic ties dominate the relations between the United States and South Africa. The official policy of the U.S. government is to neither encourage nor discourage investment and trade with South Africa. Over 300 American firms have investments in South Africa and the average rate of return has been 19%. An article in *Fortune* magazine remarked "The Republic of South Africa has always been regarded by foreign investors as a gold mine, one of those rare and refreshing places where profits are great and problems small. Capital is not threatened by political instability or nationalization. Labor is cheap, the market booming, the currency hard and convertible". (John Blashill, "The Proper Role of U.S. Corporations in South Africa," *Fortune*—July, 1972.) With business conditions in the white community so profitable, investment could not be discouraged unless it was a matter of national policy.

It is clear that American business is in South Africa for profit, not to bring change about in the internal situation. In fact various surveys and studies made of the attitude of the average American businessman in South Africa reveal that they are quite content with the status quo. If change were to come about, it is by no means clear to them that they could continue to profit so highly from their business enterprise. Over the last several years there has been controversy as to whether foreign investment in South Africa tends to strengthen the status quo, or weaken it. The controversy usually ends when it is observed that the debate is irrelevant because business is not going to withdraw from South Africa as long as substantial profits are being made. Therefore many who are seemingly ready to accept the argument that American investment tends to bolster up the regime say "Let us make the best of a bad situation. What pressures can American business enterprises in South Africa bring to bear to help change the internal situation?" The U.S. government rationale is that "improvements in labor practices can be a catalyst for change in the South African situation." If there is any virtue in this position it is certainly not by design. The design of the policy of "business as usual" is to try to make a virtue out of profit-making by claiming that American firms working within the law to make slight improvements in wages and working conditions will bring new pressures for change upon the South African government. This is deceitful. It is illustrative of what a policy of irrelevance is all about. It says nothing about the fundamental injustices of the system which denies citizenship rights to the majority of the people living within the borders of the Republic.

A second aspect of U.S. policy towards southern Africa is that it is designed to maintain a good working relationship with those in power, the white minority. The assumption of policy is that if changes are to take place, the initiative will come from those in power. The role of the liberation movement has never been taken seriously. During the long years of the struggle against Portuguese colonialism, the policy of the State Department was never to receive representatives of movements from Guinea-Bissau, Angola, or Mozambique in the State Department building itself. It was thought that the Portuguese government would look with suspicion on any such meetings. American ambassadors to sensitive areas in Africa had to be very careful in their contacts with the liberation movements from the Portuguese territories. The American ambassador in Conakry, the capital of the Republic of Guinea, where the PAIGC had its headquarters during the long years of struggle, told me that he had virtually no contact with the PAIGC leadership. The representatives of the liberation movements reciprocated by not wishing to have any contact with the official American representatives.

In the case of liberation movements from other parts of southern Africa, their representatives could visit the State Department if they so desired. However this was done on the whole infrequently and without enthusiasm.

In the case of Guinea-Bissau, there was considerable pressure put upon the U.S. government to recognize the government after it proclaimed the existence of its state in September 1973. This was several months before the coup in Portugal. It is almost embarrassing now to look at the official U.S. response,

which refused recognition because it contended, the PAIGC had the allegiance of only about 10% of the population of the country while Portugal was still in control of between two-thirds and three-fourths of the country. It should not have come as a surprise to the government that there was no official representative from the United States invited to the independence celebration in Mozambique. A Mozambique representative explained that the celebration was for those who were supporters of their struggle against the Portuguese. The United States government could hardly qualify on this basis.

In both Dar es Salaam and Lusaka, which have, in recent years, been the principal listening posts for information about southern African liberation movement activities because most movements had headquarters there, the U.S. representative appointed to keep in contact with the movements found themselves increasingly isolated.

The United States followed a policy of placating the pre-coup government of Portugal for military and strategic reasons. Even while claiming to follow a policy of support for self-determination and independence, the United States remained neutral in Portugal-African wars. In December 1971 a great deal of attention was given to the agreement between the United States and Portugal for the use of the Azores. In exchange for continued use of this base the United States agreed to a 436 million dollar economic aid package to Portugal in loans and grants.

In the case of South Africa, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration established three tracking stations in South Africa. A cooperative arrangement was worked out between the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and South Africa's Atomic Energy Board. With U.S. cooperation South Africa's first nuclear reactor was inaugurated in 1965.

Relations with the Rhodesian government had not been so cordial because the United States did close its consulate in Salisbury and supported the United Nations boycott against South African goods. The effect of this policy was dulled considerably by the passage of the Byrd Amendment and the rather lackadaisical attitude the White House took towards defeating the amendment when it first came up for reconsideration.

In the case of Namibia, the United States has supported the termination of South Africa's mandate, but has not gone much further to implement this policy.

Jennifer Davis pointed out in her testimony several days ago before this Subcommittee that the United States was permitting violations of the embargo on military goods to South Africa, particularly through the sale of planes. The continued sale of planes, helicopters, diesel locomotives, trucks, spare parts can by no stretch of the imagination be interpreted as implementation of the policy to support the liberation struggle. These are policies designed to strengthen the status quo. As such they are relevant to the southern African situation only as they strengthen the power which perpetuates the injustices.

Third, U.S. policy supports the thesis that change can take place without confrontation and struggle. The assumption on which the policy of dialogue and communication is based is that the governments in southern Africa would respond to friendly persuasion. The U.S. government has encouraged American black athletes to visit South Africa in line with this policy of communication. The United States has welcomed leaders of South Africa in the United States presumably on the assumption that this would help to change policy there. The U.S. strongly supported the initiative of Kurt Waldheim, Secretary General of the United Nations, when he proposed entering into dialogue with South Africa on the Namibian question. The representative of the United States said in the Security Council "The U.S. continues to believe that such discussions are also the most realistic way of gaining self-determination for the people of Namibia. . . ." The United States works on the thesis that economic and demographic pressures will naturally bring about the change without the necessity of the sort of struggle which took place in the Portuguese territories for over a decade. Thus U.S. policy is not related to the real situation in southern Africa. It rests on the assumption that the white minority will bring change about through their own efforts and on their own terms. It operates on the assumption that American investments can continue, that profits can be made, and that this in itself will somehow contribute towards change. It operates on the thesis that the liberation movements have an insignificant role to perform and that they should be looked upon with suspicion because the source of their international support is suspect.

In spite of unemployment and inflation, and attendant economic problems on the home front, is the United States too satisfied with its level of education,

health, and general standard of living to relate to the dynamics of change in southern Africa? The people of southern Africa clearly are not satisfied. Their struggle for selfhood and independence has begun, and will continue until basic change has been brought about. This change need not be brought about through wholesale violence, although it would be foolish to think that violence will not play a role. When in history have a preferred minority willingly given up the position, power, and supposed security they have? The change in southern Africa cannot take place easily or without struggle or with no inconvenience to the rest of the world. This struggle can easily spread particularly because of the racial implications of a black majority struggling against a white minority. This struggle will be compounded by the fact that great powers in the world have investments in opposing sides. The United States, Britain, and France among Western powers, and Japan in the Far East have an economic stake in the status quo. Some African states, Russia, China, among other powers in the world support those who intend to overthrow the system which perpetuates white minority rule.

The irrelevancy of the United States policy to the dynamics for change in southern Africa assumes a relevancy to the forces attempting to maintain the status quo. If United States policy is to be relevant to the struggle in southern Africa it must reverse its direction. Instead of supporting in any way the white minority regimes, it should encourage those struggling to eliminate them. Instead of permitting trade in materials which might benefit the white minority regimes, it must put a stop to such transactions. Instead of in any way encouraging a continued business investment in South Africa, the policy must unmistakably urge withdrawal.

Senator CLARK. I wonder if I might interrupt you to take your last 5 minutes. I wanted to particularly have your judgment on a couple of questions, one of which you are addressing yourself to now, but I would like to try to sharpen that a little.

SUGGESTIONS REQUESTED CONCERNING FUTURE U.S. POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

What one or two, perhaps three, specific policy changes would you recommend to our Government with regard to southern Africa? I then have another question I want to ask you about Angola, because I understand you have familiarity with the leaders there, and so forth.

Mr. HOUSER. Yes.

Senator CLARK. What one, two or three things do you think our Government ought to be doing that it is not doing, that it could do?

BAN ON FUTURE INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA RECOMMENDED

Mr. HOUSER. Well, when you limit it by saying what it could do, that is a problem, because I am not very optimistic about what our Government is in a position to do, or would do, given the circumstances. I would like to see the United States have a definite policy of discouraging, really positively, effectively discouraging, limiting American investment in South Africa. This ties us to the regime there.

Senator CLARK. Excluding or limiting?

Mr. HOUSER. I would like to see it excluded.

Senator CLARK. In other words, a ban on further investment—

Mr. HOUSER. Right.

Senator CLARK [continuing]. In South Africa.

Mr. HOUSER. I think it could be programed over a period of time. It is a simple thing to say exclude. I don't think that a law could be passed, probably couldn't get through, could be passed today and have it go into effect tomorrow, but I believe if there—if this was the direc-

tion in which policy was going, there would be some hope for thinking that the United States could become relevant to the real struggle rather than just relating to the powers that be.

Senator CLARK. All right. That is one proposal, and a rather interesting one, I think. What would be another?

U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO U.N. TRUST FUND FOR SOUTH AFRICA

Mr. HOUSER. All right. I would like to see the United States contribute to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa which, I believe, also is—can be expanded through other funds to include southern Africa. Now, the United States has given in very small amounts, like \$25,000, to some funds in the United Nations related to southern Africa, but not directly to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, because that fund is used for legal defense purposes, it is used to aid the families of those who have been arrested in South Africa because of their part in the struggle. I would like to see the United States take a vigorous policy in support of a fund such as this, that it does not look upon with, you know, a lackadaisical attitude.

Senator CLARK. All right. That is two. Can you think of another one or two?

Mr. HOUSER. Well, I can undoubtedly mention very many. I think that the question of tax credits that you brought up earlier is exceedingly important. I was going to mention a couple of very specific things which—

Senator CLARK. Good. Go ahead.

U.S. ARMORED VEHICLES USED BY FNLA CITED

Mr. HOUSER. Which are very current right now. It is a matter of immediate investigation. It is not a long-term policy in one sense, but there has been an item within the press within the last couple of days that American armored vehicles are being used by the FNLA in the Angolan situation, given to it by the Zaire Government, and I think that this question ought to be looked into. The United States—

Senator CLARK. I must say I raised that question yesterday with the State Department and I was advised that they were, in fact, not American, that they were Belgian. Obviously, I haven't seen them. I don't have independent confirmation of that, but when I saw that in the paper yesterday, I was very concerned about it.

Mr. HOUSER. I think it is an area for research here. A newspaper writer, it is true, could just, by the stroke of a pen, say American-made vehicles, but the fact there has been U.S. military assistance to Zaire, the fact that Zaire has supported the FNLA gives it some credibility.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Mr. HOUSER. Furthermore, I am informed that one item which shows in the books as an armored vehicle that has been given to Zaire is the M-3 halftrack, and that might very well be the kind of armored vehicle that the FNLA could be using in this present strife over in the town of Caxito, not too far north of Luanda in Angola. So, I think there is something to look into now. As I say—

Senator CLARK. We have asked the State Department to do that. I spoke to Under Secretary Robert Ingersoll yesterday about it.

SECURITY GUARD FORCE FOR RHODESIAN EUROPEAN FARMS BEING RECRUITED

Mr. HOUSER. OK. And I was going to mention one other specific thing that is very current which takes some investigation. I hope it is going to take some legal action. That is this announcement that some place in Pennsylvania there is a recruiting effort to recruit young Americans, supposedly veterans, as the person who is leading it is a Vietnam veteran, to go to Rhodesia as a kind of security guard for European farms. Now, this is slightly different than the effort that has received a little attention out in Nevada, Colorado, the Phoenix Organization.

Senator CLARK. I have been advised by the staff that the Justice Department does have that under investigation.

Mr. HOUSER. Good. Well, I think we ought to push the Justice Department as much as we can on this point, both from a private organization point of view and, of course, from the Congress.

JUDGMENT AS TO U.S. POLICY IN ANGOLAN SITUATION

Senator CLARK. Let me ask you very briefly, because our time has gone, what, in your judgment, is going to happen in Angola? It is my understanding that you know or have visited with Mr. Neto and Mr. Savimbi and Mr. Roberto. You followed that situation.

Mr. HOUSER. Yes.

Senator CLARK. What is your judgment on what is going to happen, and tied to that, what do you think our policy ought to be with regard to these—

Mr. HOUSER. I have known the leaders of the movements for many years, and I was in Angola for some days toward the end of March and had occasion to see some of the men at that time. It doesn't pay for me to look into a crystal ball on this one. I can only express my hopes—

Senator CLARK. All right.

Mr. HOUSER. Which are easier to do, because if one was speculating, you see, you can speculate in so many directions. You can speculate that the country is going to be partitioned with the various movements in control in areas where they have the preponderant force. You can speculate that it is going to—that a full scale civil war is going to develop. Now, if you want to be pessimistic, you can take this kind of a route, but you can speculate more optimistically as well, which I would hope—I would like to do. Who knows what is going to happen? I would like to speculate that they will make some adjustment to one another. There is not too much that backs that up at this point, to be sure, and I have followed the differences that have existed among these movements for all the years virtually that they have been in existence, and those differences are quite deep. They are not as deep ideologically, I think, as they are made out to be, but with the present leadership there I think it is going to be very difficult to see this solved without a great deal of strife, and yet the necessity is upon the movements and upon the people of the country to try, I think, to make an arrangement with one another which will lead to a peaceful solution.

I doubt if there are going to be elections in October.

Senator CLARK. What should we be doing in your judgment, if anything?

Mr. HOUSER. First, the United States should stay out of it and, who knows what the United States may be doing in various ways? I don't know. Traditionally, there has been a relationship with the FNLA for a variety of reasons which would take some historical discussion. I hope that this is not the case at this point. I would like to see the United States privately take an initiative to discuss this question with the Soviet Union. I think it would have to be done on that kind of a basis.

Other things could be done, perhaps, through the Organization of African Unity. I doubt that it is a question that should be on the agenda of the United Nations at this point. I don't think it would get anyplace. The OAU can do things and they can do things privately. Their resolutions, I am sure at this session right now, will be for the movements to get together, but they will undoubtedly set up a Commission of several of the Presidents of various countries to serve as a reconciling factor.

Now, they have done this before and they have had agreements before. I would like to see that kind of a road taken through the OAU. The United States—I would like to see an initiative taken bilaterally with certainly the Soviet Union and, perhaps, with China, because there are elements in the conflict in Angola which could lead to a much wider conflict than just what is happening in Angola.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Houser, I wonder if, for the record, because of your familiarity with the parties in Angola, sometime in the next week if you can provide for the record your understanding of the distinctions between these three movements.

Mr. HOUSER. It is going to be difficult to do unless it is something that is already written, because I am about to leave on a trip for 4 weeks.

Senator CLARK. That is fine. I just thought if you had an opportunity.

Mr. HOUSER. I might say that I have some of the testimony from Gerald Bender and John Marcum and I think they have done a pretty good job of laying this out.

Senator CLARK. Fine.

Mr. HOUSER. However, I might be able to come up with a couple of pieces that could be sent to you.

Senator CLARK. If you could, we would be glad to have them. We want to identify as thoroughly as we can the distinctions and the ways in which they may find some unity between them. We thank you very much for coming today.

Senator CLARK. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the hearing was adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

SOUTHERN AFRICA—SELF RULE OR SELF DESTRUCTION

A TRIP REPORT—APRIL 12—MAY 5, 1975

(By Robert Barton, Professional Staff Associate, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee)



The powder keg is in place. The fuse is primed, and the time is urgent.

The independence of Mozambique on June 25 seems to me¹ after a three week visit to five southern African countries to be the key to a series of volatile developments all of which are explosive in nature.

The scene was set a year ago when the "Unholy Alliance"² of Portugal,

¹ South Africa, Mozambique, Rhodesia, Zambia, Namibia in that order; a visit to Angola was scratched due to the outbreak of fighting there. A map of the area and a short description of each is attached as an appendix.

² So described by Alfred Nzo, Secretary General of ANC-South Africa.

Rhodesia and South Africa fell apart. The overthrow of Portugal's authoritarian Caetano government on April 25, 1974 by military officers tired of the African colonial wars suddenly meant the end of buffer-state protection for South Africa and threatened the very existence of Rhodesia.

Mozambique's small cadre of Frelimo revolutionaries³ owes much to the OAU⁴ and to Tanzania; to the first for its generous supply of Russian and Chinese arms, to the second for providing guerrilla bases for over a decade of "freedom fighting." In my mind there is no doubt that they will cash in their IOUs by demanding Mozambique to shut down Rhodesia's access to the sea either by closing its ports of Beria and Lourenco Marques or by preventing the further falsification of shipping documents. These two measures, long permitted by the Portuguese, have allowed Rhodesia to maintain a steady growth of its GNP for the last decade and would appear to be a primary weapon to be used against Rhodesia if Prime Minister Ian Smith fails to make political concessions of major magnitude to the ANC-Rhodesia.⁵

Ian Smith combines certain political craftiness with sheer maladroitness as seen by his arrest of the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, leader of the extremist ZANU⁶ organization, just weeks before Smith was to meet with the ANC leaders at a round table conference to discuss greater black participation in the Rhodesian government. Sithole's detention and subsequent trial in March for plotting revolution gave the ANC leaders good reason for delaying the meeting while waiting for (and perhaps persuading) Mozambique to make up its mind.

Smith's Nationalist Party has no opposition in the National Assembly except for 16 blacks,⁷ but the party's hardcore of obdurate diehards is unlikely to approve of any conciliatory or appeasement motions. Rhodesia's ministers and senior civil service officials with whom I talked speak of turning over the government to "majority rule" but only when the black is "ready." Neither the need for a prompt political settlement nor a realization of how much racial discrimination they might have to erase to satisfy the blacks appear present in their thinking.

In any event, I predict nothing substantive will take place at roundtable conference before Mozambique becomes independent next month. Bishop Muzorewa and Rev. Sithole attended the Jamaican commonwealth leaders conference in late April (just after I saw them⁸ in Rhodesia and Zambia) where the Rhodesian question was much discussed and the ANC position heartily supported. OAU support was earlier forthcoming at a meeting of African foreign ministers in Dar es Salaam in early April although the OAU declaration was more temperate than some African nations wished.

Unless Smith can convince South African Prime Minister Vorster that it is not his intransigence, but ANC's, that prevents further talks, South African will pull its 600 counter-insurgency police force out of Rhodesia's northeast battle zone in order to shorten his own battle lines. More important to Rhodesia is whether he will leave South African equipment behind: without the 35 helicopters, various troop carriers and a steady supply of ammunition, Rhodesia will face a critical guerrilla war with minimal firepower.

Ostrich-like, South Africa and Rhodesia believe Mozambique will not close its ports because so much of its economy depends on Rhodesian traffic, trade and tourism. My brief stay in Lourenco Marques convinces me to the contrary. The OAU Conference in Dar es Salaam resolved to find a peaceful solution in Rhodesia if possible, but otherwise to resume confrontation and the armed struggle led by the ANC. At the Commonwealth Conference the consensus appeared to favor granting Mozambique economic support in return for her closing ports to Rhodesia, for mobilizing international support for the UN economic boycott (especially with regards to Japan and the United States (Byrd

³ Frelimo—Mozambique Liberation Front. The Portuguese estimated they numbered 3,000 troops; Rhodesian intelligence sources said half as many.

⁴ OAU—Organization of African Unity.

⁵ ANC-Rhodesia—African National Council, a coalition of three liberation movements, headed by Bishop Abel Muzorewa; not to be confused with ANC—South Africa—African National Congress, a 30-year-old movement banned by the Republic of South Africa and led by Albert John Mvubi Luthuli in exile.

⁶ ZANU—Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union, one of the three freedom fighting groups in the ANC. The other important one is the ANC itself. Less important for now is ZAPI—Zimbabwe African People's Union, led by Joshua Nkomo.

⁷ Eight are appointed by tribal movementmen who are under the paternalistic domination of the white District Commissioners, and 8 are elected. None can exercise any real opposition in the National Assembly due to being solidly blocked by the 50 white MPs.

⁸ For a list of all persons interviewed, see Appendix III.

Amendment), preventing the seating of Rhodesian delegates at international conferences and the travel of its citizens to other nations, and, finally, a program to dissuade emigration to Rhodesia.

Presently, ZANU insurgency is strongest in the northeast, an area where the Rhodesians have adopted Sir Robert Thompson's Malaysia defense scheme of protected villages." I flew over several of these and am satisfied they work in areas of relative population density, but not in rugged, hilly terrain where people are far scattered and agricultural and pastoral lands are scarce. Since the ANC demands black majority rule immediately and Smith will not grant it in less than two or three years, I fear fighting will break out with greater vengeance in the northwest on the border with Zambia. President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia has been the leading spirit in the "detente" movement presently underway with South Africa and has preached moderation with Rhodesia, even having gone so far as saying, although he subsequently denied the quotation, that "immediate black majority rule could come in two years." Nevertheless, it has also been said that if Smith, who he describes as a "slippery character" does not make concessions, Kaunda will allow Rhodesians a chance to train in Zambia, provided they will do so under the ANC banner rather than continue their rivalry with each other. This rivalry led to the assassination of a ZANU co-chairman named Herbert Chitepo in Lusaka shortly before my arrival and the execution by firing squad of 155 other ZANU henchmen who wanted to unite with ANC. Kaunda is determined to stamp out this lawlessness and substitute for it an effective and united guerrilla force trained to fight an escalated war against Rhodesia.

But the honest, blunt President of Zambia, who was being entertained in the White House while I was visiting Rhodesia, is determined to win majority rule in South Africa. He said just shortly before departing for the Jamaica Commonwealth Conference. "In this great African endeavor to liberate the rest of Africa, there is no struggle which has been as expensive for Zambia as that currently waged in Zambabwe," and he is perfectly willing to continue with that sacrifice. He differs from the extremist nations only that we would prefer to win without war if possible. If not, so be it. Let war come.

In Lusaka, Zambia's capital, I met the exiled leaders of three white controlled nations who still dream of independence and their return to their countries as saviors.

Those from Angola worry whether that former Portuguese colony's interim government can ever coalesce sufficiently to allow independence and self-government to emerge November 11th, as scheduled. Fighting between the Marxist MPLA⁹ and the FNLA¹⁰ broke out two days before I was scheduled to arrive in Luanda, forcing me to cancel my visit. Five hundred were reportedly carried to the morgue and untold hundreds more were buried in the rubble of the city. Such rivalry can only benefit UNITA,¹¹ whose leader Jonas Savimbi is scheduled to visit the United States in June, according to George Sangumba, Secretary for External Affairs for UNITA, with whom I met in Lusaka.

According to Sangumba, the issue between all three parties is what kind of government independence from Portugal will bring to Angola. Neto's MPLA will bring such strong Soviet influence into southern Africa as to upset the balance of power there he claims. Fortunately for UNITA, the Portuguese elections of April 25th did not bring the Communists into power in Lisbon. Such a victory would have meant the strong backing of MPLA by Portugal and the end of the coalition government.

Roberto's FNLA, accused in late March of machine-gunning to death 55 young MPLA recruits, has no appeal to UNITA because of its dependence of Zaire which seems to Sangumba the ideological fountainhead for most of Roberto's political thinking. UNITA predicts Roberto will become a one-man dictator if allowed a free hand, and classified him as one of Angola's three greatest enemies, the other two being Zaire's Mobutu and the USSR.

⁹ MPLA—Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. Leader Agostinho Neto has the support of 25% of the population, most socialist minded intellectuals and young people in Luanda, the capital. Although it has a well defined platform it appears out of touch with the grassroots.

¹⁰ FNLA—National Front for the Liberation of Angola. Leader Holden Roberto is related by marriage to Zaire's President Mobutu who has given him so much support many Angolans fear Angola will become its junior partner. It draws about 20% popular support, mostly from one ethnic tribe.

¹¹ UNITA—National Union for Angola's Total Independence. Leader Jonas Savimbi is compared to his friend Che Guevara as a dynamic political figure. His party has 45% of the population behind him and owes no foreign allegiance.

To counter the influence of these two strong forces already at work within Angola,¹² Savimbi will visit the United States in order to locate outside support to finance the pre-independence election campaign. Its imminence has been largely responsible for the intensification of party rivalry with consequent shoot-outs which endangers the country to the point that no one can speak with assurance that an election will ever be held. Fortunately, the new Portuguese High Commissioner Silvo Cardoza appears to be neutral in his dealings with all three parties and may be able to use the 24,000 Portuguese troops to maintain order now that the Portuguese Communist Party lost in Lisbon.

Angolan independence will affect South West Africa, renamed Namibia by the United Nations. This scantily vegetated and inhabited mandated territory¹³ contains many of the virtues and vices of South Africa, its de factor administrator. Its elaborate economic and social infrastructure could never have developed without South African assistance on a vast order. South Africa's relations with the 12 African peoples living in Namibia have not been all bad by a long shot, some of the worst offenses having been committed while the territory was still Germany's, but the disease of *apartheid*¹⁴ flourishes in Namibia and will eventually destroy it in its present form.

Prime Minister Vorster has announced that South Africa is prepared to give up Namibia as soon as the territory can decide how it can become self-governing. The SWA all-white National Assembly has accepted motions to (1) decide which discriminatory racial laws can be abolished immediately and (2) hold a round table conference with the 12 tribal peoples to discuss independence and self-government.

If this sounds familiar by now, let it be said that the Namibian situation also resembles Rhodesia's in the sense that the white administrators here hold the same views about the blacks that the Rhodesians do, that is they consider themselves the "guardians" of primitive peoples unable to support economically a complex government or even to manage it. In addition, they see the blacks putting up artificial obstacles to free discussion, not realizing that the blacks no longer trust the whites and would just as soon fight as negotiate.

The white's gravest opponent is SWAPO¹⁵ which says it represents all of the Namibians but which gets almost all of its support from the Ovambos. This energetic tribe accounts for almost half of the black Africans in SWA,¹⁶ but are crowded into a northern "homeland" along the Angolan border. Many Ovambos live also on the other side of the border which accounts for the threat to Namibia posed by Angolan independence. Vorster has made clear his antipathy to dealing with SWAPO, which he claims does not represent in any way the entire tribal composition of the territory.

Meeting with Sam Nujom, SWAPO's President-in-exile in Lusaka, I was told categorically the party does represent all the peoples, but my own impression is that far from doing so, it is actually feared by many of the lesser tribes such as the Hereros and Damaras. The South West African whites can probably arrange for Ovambo representation at the round table constitutional talks, although of course not SWAPO party leaders, but presently are faced with certain obstinancy from the Hereros, a fiercely independent tribe which was displaced by Germans generations ago and are still displeased to be living on a semi-desert in the northwest of the country, much like American Indians who were forced from their lands into South Dakota.

The white administrators I talked with in Windhoek, the capital, reminded me again of the Rhodesian ministers who recognized the inevitable but wanted to procrastinate as long as possible. When reminded that the time bomb was ticking away, that Rhodesia's inevitable downfall would mean the subsequent concentration of all African forces on Namibia, they simply wailed that they were going forward with self-governing plans at all possible speed. I was not convinced. Their talks with various tribal representatives seemed to me more on the lines of convincing them the whites knew best what should be done for Namibia than eliciting their own views (which however are probably extremely

¹² Sangumba says there has been a huge increase of USSR technicians, "tourists" and fishing boats, etc. in the vicinity recently.

¹³ Approximately one person to square kilometer or 750,000 people for 318,261 sq. miles.

¹⁴ *Apartheid* literally means "separateness" and by extension includes South Africa's program of "separate and equal development," which few believe to be either equal or possible.

¹⁵ SWAPO—South West Africa People's Organization.

¹⁶ About 350,000 out of 650,000 Africans, the remaining 100,000 being either Europeans or "coloureds."

ill-defined), and in any case are not progressing with the urgency which the situation demands.

I predict that Nujoma will receive substantial aid from Zambia if progress is not made and that the U.N. General Assembly will make a major issue out of Namibia in September when it next convenes. Meanwhile, on May 31st the UN Council on Namibia will invoke its boycott on all products exported from SWA which will place the United States and many other nations in another embarrassing situation. The US-controlled Tsumeb Corporation¹⁷ accounts for most of the copper, lead and zinc exports of the country and contributes a substantial share of the total revenue of the territory. (Diamonds are in first place, bringing in a little more than half of the value of mineral exports.) Presumably in order to avoid the UN Council's boycott Namibia's exports will travel the long route to South Africa's ports at considerable increase of costs, but this will only serve to intensify OAU campaigns against South Africa itself.

In Lusaka I met also with the leaders of ANC-South Africa, an old but feeble opposition party-in-exile which was banned by South Africa in 1960, ten years after the Communist Party was banned there. "Banning" was described to me in Johannesburg¹⁸ as "The single most powerful weapon the South Africa Republic has at its command against black organizations." While I met with many black leaders in South Africa ranging from a homeland Chief Minister to university intellectuals, I was as much impressed with the ANC-South Africa's proposals for a new, black equality rule for the Republic as I was with any of theirs. On the other hand, the African National Congress appears to have little strength within the Republic, due I think to the age of its leaders, its existence in exile and to the "intellectualism" of its program as opposed to the more populist appeal of other movements still permitted in the Republic.

Assistant Secretary Mennen W. ("Soapy") William's reply to a question of whether he would write a book about South Africa after being there a week was quoted to me. He said, "No, I've been here too long!" The same applies to any visitor who tries to expand on what he had learned about South Africa from extensive readings prior to going there and then digs into the issues once in the Republic. First of all, they are too numerous, too complex, too intermingled to be sorted out easily or even fairly. I tried to keep an open mind as I talked with government ministers. I tried to maintain my objectivity as I heard the impassioned resentment of whites working for the Bantu's cause,¹⁹ or the rather resigned tales of woe of the several Africans I met. After interviewing over 60 well-placed individuals representing both sides of the question, I have the material for a book, but for this summary analysis let it suffice to say that Vorster, like Belshazzar, has seen the ominous handwriting on the wall. The question is will he heed it and if so, will he do so quickly enough.

The message reads, "We blacks will no longer tolerate economic peonage based on racism." It has taken a few years to scratch out the warning clearly enough for Vorster to perceive it clearly. Two years ago illegal strikes in Durban made him realize how completely dependent South Africa is on black labor. The booming economy, based only in part on rising gold prices, has forced the country into training blacks for skilled positions previously reserved for whites. A better educated and more assertive black middle class has become impatient to win political rights. The partial realization that the bantustan²⁰ policy cannot work effectively in an integrated economy. The external pressures exercised by overt enemies such as the OAU and a substantial majority of the UN as well as by friends such as the US and UK. And finally and most importantly, by the events of the last year in Portugal and their repercussions in Mozambique, Angola and Rhodesia. So we have come full circle, a Catch-22 situation both in southern Africa and South Africa, with a set of dates each drawing the circle tighter until it may become South Africa's noose: May 31, Namibia; June 25, Mozambique; September, the United Nations General Assembly; November 11, Angolan independence.

¹⁷ Tsumeb is a subsidiary of American Metal Climax Corp.

¹⁸ Jane Phakati of the Christian Institute. This injunction requires no evidence, no court proceedings and no legal appeals are permitted. Banning might also be described as "censorship" although the government avoids that word. For example, the sale of "Ebony" is banned while the magazine itself is not "censored."

¹⁹ Bantu, African and Black are used indiscriminately to describe 70% of the 24 million South Africans. Ten percent are either "Coloureds" or Asians, meaning Indians primarily, and the remaining 20% are of Afrikaner (Dutch) or British stock.

²⁰ Bantustan—homeland, the government policy of placing each African tribe in its own territory where it will have self-government within the confines of its fenced-in area.

To meet this challenge, let it be said John Vorster exactly six months ago asked his critics to give South Africa a chance to change its tune. The 180-day period ended on the day of my return from Windhoek, and chalking up the concessions one by one, they appear impressive not so much to an American who would hardly wish to recall how many U.S. blacks suffered similar indignities a generation ago in this country) but certainly to white Africans.

Sustained talks with Bantustan leaders on how to govern and develop their homelands.

Sitting at the same banquet table with them, flanked on either side by their wives and toasting them as equals.

The removal of "Whites Only" signs from parks, bus stop benches and public lavatories.

The opening of Cape Town's Nico Malan theater and the promise to do the same in other cities.

The promise to ease the color ban in hotels and restaurants.

The admission of blacks into the diplomatic corps and the armed forces and the promise that some day (when?) white soldiers will be saluting black officers.

The mixing of the races in sports events.

Such relaxation of "petty apartheid" fails to satisfy the more demanding black and arouses grumbles among the more conservative white, but I feel the change in atmosphere permits some dialogue between the races within the Republic and just as importantly on the African continent itself.

Vorster has been seen now joking with black leaders in Liberia, has met with President Kuanda on the Rhodesian crisis, and has promised independence and self-government to South West Africa. These are not inconsequential events and although his "detente" policy still remains to be tested and the lower half of Africa looks apprehensively at Rhodesia and skeptically at Namibia, they may dampen the fuse on the powder keg.

Extinguishing it would require the complete abandonment of all of the obnoxious forms of racial discrimination rampant in all three remaining white controlled countries: the Pass Laws, the "influx control"²¹ regulations, racial classification, economic discrimination in the form of wages, job opportunities, training, and more importantly tenancy and ownership of one's own land and house. On the eve of my departure (which coincided with the end of the 6-month race period Vorster had requested), he announced that the government would present a bill repealing the 8-year ban on black ownership of homes in the townships²² and would allow more black entrepreneurs to operate businesses in them. Like an earlier bill, which coincided with my arrival, which would permit blacks into the diplomatic service, it still remains to be enacted by the National Assembly.

The truth of the matter is that "grand apartheid" remains Holy Writ for the Nationalist Party. Separateness is held dear: separate racial identity, separate national development in separate portions of the Republic. That 70% of the population can live on 13% of the land staggers the imagination. Overpopulated, non-arable, without natural resources to exploit, these bantustans can only be considered as corrals for work forces to be drawn upon as South Africa requires migrant labor. The test will come next year when the first of them, the Transkei becomes independent as is Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.

Remaining unresolved are what to do with the 8 million urban blacks in the townships, who have lost any tribal allegiance they may have had and in no way could be forced to "return" to a land they never knew. A further question, but similar, is what to do with the "coloureds" and the Asians, also discriminated against legally although less hardly.

The challenges are many and many want them met. There is but one topic of conversation in South Africa. An Embassy official told me he was happy to be leaving Africa having heard nothing else for two years either in the office or socially except the problems of apartheid, whether he was with Americans or South Africans of any race. As for me, I regretted leaving the beautiful climate and scenery of southern Africa with its extraordinary economic vitality, its immaculate and slumless cities, its efficient governmental services, its charming people of all sorts. I left realizing how much the human hates and dreads change and how long it takes to alter dogma and attitudes. For such a conservative people as the Afrikaner the torture of change must be excruciating. How much

²¹ Influx control keeps blacks in the bantustans unless they are needed for the labor force.

²² Townships are like the bantustans but are black suburbs fenced off from the city.

better it would be to get it over with quickly—and peacefully; not by having the powder keg explode.

WHAT THIS MEANS TO THE UNITED STATES

South Africa and Namibia

One of Vorster's chief accomplishments is the universal acceptance, even by Africa's most militant liberation leaders, that the whites in southern Africa are not considered as temporary colonists, that they have a right to stay and to work together with other races in the development of each country. They can remain but not as masters. The United States itself has only recently accepted racial equality (and in the case of the Indians still has steps to take), but it can now show it works and can persuade, through its recognized private and public good offices, that a pluralistic society can live harmoniously and prosperously together.

South Africa is a highly civilized and enormously rich land. It has much to offer the world at large and the United States in particular and there exists a natural affinity to America on the part of both blacks and whites. Option II of the famous NSSM-39, despite the frankness of its wording, remains the best policy for the future although it could be beefed up with harder hitting persuasion.

French, British, German and Japanese trade missions are covering South Africa offering credit terms which American salesmen cannot match. In exchange for a relaxation of restrictions on the Export Import Bank credits and guarantees, greater concessions may be forthcoming from Vorster's government than otherwise will be the case. If Vorster's detente with African nations proceeds, should the United States also relax its present restrictions on its Ex-Im Bank?

In considering our policy towards South Africa the United States must realize that this is the main event in the arena, Rhodesia and Namibia being simply preliminary bouts before the heavy-weight match. To some our policy has appeared to be so much empty rhetoric through which we express abhorrence to apartheid but in fact do little about it. Any real assessment of what should be done should include three criteria: what can we do which will be meaningful to the blacks? What can we do that the white South Africans will accept? How can we be helpful to the blacks? One shining example of this has been the "Polaroid Experiment" where this U.S. corporation's enlightened employment practices for blacks has pioneered new labor relations and improved benefits at all levels. If South Africa could be convinced to put more of its national budget into improving living conditions for the blacks, instead of \$1.5 billion (this year) into defense preparations, much tension would be relieved and a black middle class could emerge which would be as solidly behind South Africa as any Afrikaner.

South Africa's dependence on black labor gives them a strong handle with which to wrench greater employment benefits and civil rights. The time is ripe to be offering embryonic labor unions training courses on labor management practices and union organization. Otherwise disjointed strikes and repressed resentment will open the field to communist agitators or other extremists. Both white and black South Africans would welcome U.S. experts in this field I am told.

The United States has a particularly difficult role to play in the United Nations, but abstaining on crucial votes appeases no one. The hypocrisy of other major nations who vote for sanctions and then allow their violation by their businessmen seems to be more tolerable to many Africans than our own moral posturing. Rather than abstaining we should either vote up and down on southern African issues, explaining clearly why we are doing so, or absent ourselves diplomatically when the issue comes to a vote.

If the Namibian question is not settled by September (and I do not see how it can be), strong pressure will be exerted in the United Nations to expel South Africa from that body and isolate it economically by boycotts and sanctions. The United States has a \$1.25 billion investment there in the form of 435 American business firms operating in one form or another, uses many of its rich mineral resources, and may require its strategic geography at some future date. The State Department must prepare itself carefully for this vote and develop contingency plans for future relationships with South Africa if a U.N. boycott is passed by the General Assembly.

The May 31st deadline for the UN Council on Namibia to review South Africa's handling of the territory will be the first of an embarrassing series for the United States. If Sean McBride's Council determines to invoke an export embargo, the United States will probably ignore it (unless, which is highly unlikely, it has a mandate to do so from the Congress). This can only put us in further disgrace with the black African nations. One solution would be to exert enough pressure on South Africa and McBride so that he could visit the territory and see for himself the dilemmas the government faces. More tolerance on McBride's part would not be treason nor betray the black man.

The U.S. abstained on the vote to set up the Council of Namibia on the grounds that it was "unrealistic." Since its establishment the PRC and USSR have joined it. It may be even more "unrealistic" for us to continue to remain outside. We should reexamine the issue so as to protect our main interest—which is to find a *peaceful* solution.

Despite having withdrawn consular and diplomatic representation from Namibia, our Capetown officials have excellent contacts with both the government and liberation movement leaders there. These should be maintained and strengthened so that we can press for a peaceful settlement in that territory as well.

South Africa should be encouraged to concede its Walvis Bay enclave to Namibia at the time it becomes independent. Without it Namibia has no port facilities and the 400 square mile enclave will be a bone of contention for years to come.

One of the most powerful allies of the South West African whites has unwittingly been Sean McBride's backing of SWAPO. SWAPO is not a national party and not only does not represent the other major ethnic African groups but is actually feared by many of them. They see SWAPO's insistence on "one man-one vote rule" as a way to put it into the driver's seat. McBride's idea of setting up a UN training center for SWAPO civil administration is looked at askance by every other black tribal leader in Namibia. As the situation now stands it will be difficult to get the various peoples around the constitutional conference roundtable. To get an agreement will take a miracle.

More U.S. Senators and Congressmen should visit South and South West Africa in order to understand more precisely its problems, to recommend solutions, and to guide State Department's policies. One advantage of meeting with the liberation front leaders is to size up their abilities to take over the reins of office. The rivalry between groups must be taken into consideration as well as their intolerance of one another. A further reason is to estimate the extent of damage which will be done to the balances of power if communist directed power groups take over a land as rich in resources and economic strength as is South Africa or even South West Africa.

Mozambique

Mozambique presents an enigma. It has a caretaker government in Lourenco Marques with real power resting with Machel in Dar es Salaam. Assistant Secretary Basum's visit last November seemed to have brought an easing of anti-Americanism resulting from what the Africans consider to have been a pro-Portuguese attitude on our part during the long struggle for independence. His offer of food for peace and an economic survey team has been held in abeyance, perhaps because of his abrupt replacement by Nathaniel Davis, perhaps because FRELIMO leaders believe they can get more from the USSR or PRC. Still, the FRELIMO got badly stung on a wheat deal with Romania and may be a bit chary about future negotiations with the Communist bloc countries. No FRELIMO official made himself available to me which may or may not be an intentional slight to the United States. In either case, my recommendation is to be hospitable to any overtures FRELIMO might make, but not to appear too anxious to ingratiate ourselves at this point.

One aspect of this will be whether the Consulate General should be raised to Embassy status. The Portuguese High Commissioner, who did see me, believed Mozambique after independence would not automatically recognize all consulates which had had relations with the Portuguese, but would probably replace some while establishing diplomatic recognition of Russia and China instead. While it appears inconceivable that Mozambique would not recognize the United States sooner or later (although perhaps with a dual US-UN mission due to the financial burden of maintaining two embassies here), that might happen if the Byrd Amendment is not repealed.

If the new government invites United States representation to its independence day ceremonies June 25th, it would provide Foreign Relations Committee Members with an excellent opportunity to visit that and other southern African countries.

By the end of 1975 Mozambique will be facing a severe food crisis due to war disruption and the exodus of Portuguese farm managers. A request for US PL-480 foods will probably not come until the last moment, but the US should anticipate the request and provide contingency plans for it.

The exodus of Portuguese harbor masters, etc., has severely strained port facilities at both Beira and Lourenco Marques. Ships are tied up from 45 days to two months which poses a hardship on U.S. firms dependent on Rhodesian ferrochrome and mineral ores from either Rhodesia or South Africa. In addition to domestic dislocations, harbor delays and stoppages may have repercussions in South Africa with men being laid off until excess stock is disposed of. This could of course exacerbate labor conditions in South Africa where everything takes on racial overtones which could lead to violence.

Another contingency to take into consideration is whether Mozambique will allow the U.S. the use of its ports for our naval vessels or even for hauling ores. Like diplomatic recognition denial seems unlikely, but the final decision will depend on Congressional action on the Byrd Amendment repeal and on the influence Vice President Marcelino de Santos will have in foreign policy. A devoted Communist, he abhors the United States and could push for hardline policies towards the entire Western bloc.

Despite this attitude, Mozambique is less likely—right now—to take strong measures against South Africa. The new Caborra Bassa Dam, which I flew over, is almost full and goes into operation this month. Its energy will be sold to South Africa, who paid for it anyway, and that income is needed to retire that debt and to supply funds in recompensation for decreased agricultural production. Likewise, South Africa will probably be allowed the continued use of Lourenco Marques, at least until September when the Namibian issue will again come before the General Assembly.

Another reason for a conciliatory attitude towards South Africa has been that nation's policy of selling its gold to the new Mozambique government at the low official price of \$42 an ounce for mine workers' remittances of salary which Mozambique then resells at the free market price of about \$165 an ounce. This provides the Government with sufficient funds to offset some of its other losses and cements a relationship with South Africa which Mozambique would find expensive to break.

Mozambique's press outdoes the Frelimo in invective against the West. USIA is to be complemented on getting an excellent USIS press officer into Lourenco Marques early. He has already made many excellent contacts and although his work has not ameliorated the situation up to now, his presence should be felt—and reflected in press statements—within time.

RHODESIA

Despite the general impression, copper is Rhodesia's major product, not chrome which actually is third behind copper and asbestos. All require heavy transport equipment and ports. If Mozambique closes its ports Rhodesia's economy will teeter on the brink of disaster, not just for fault of foreign exchange but also because massive unemployed black labor could lead to internal strikes, resentment and disruption.

The Rhodesian government fully understands the pressures on the United States to repeal the Byrd amendment. Although it rues the need to do so, its generally favorable attitude towards the United States will not be altered appreciably by our so doing. Besides, it's a sellers' market for chrome these days, if they can get it out.

Although officials refused to divulge from whence Rhodesia was getting its petroleum or where it was sending its exports, it was not hard to see from merchandise in stores that France, Germany, Italy and Japan were major suppliers. Automobiles from all four are assembled in Rhodesia and ply the streets in quantity despite fuel rationing. Many US firms operate in Rhodesia also, but presumably are subsidiaries of US-South African firms. To name just a few, Hertz and Avis, Pepsi and Coca-Cola, F. W. Woolworth and of course all of Rhodesia's commercial airfleet is Boeing.

It is too easy to blame Ian Smith for blind obstinacy with regards to a settlement with the ANC. Neither side has observed the pre-conference conditions settled on in Lusaka. ZANU elements are still conducting terrorist attacks in

the northeast, placing Russian and Chinese landmines along roads and killing people indiscriminately—with many more Africans dying than whites. Five died this way while I was in Rhodesia as well as two freedom fighters. In retaliation Rhodesia stopped releasing political prisoners. Although the explanation given me was that they were being held as ransom for stopping the border incursions, I felt that some were probably captured terrorists whose release would simply amount to additions to the guerrilla forces.

Rev. Sithole, the leader of the ZANU element of ANC arrived in Lusaka from Dar es Salaam while I was in Zambia and surprised me by his generally moderate tone. He tempered his usual declaration of "black majority rule now" with an indication that "now" could mean two years or so if guarantees were forthcoming. The joint attendance of Sithole and Bishop Muzorowa in Jamaica may find these two preeminent black leaders coming closer together on goals and policies for the constitutional roundtable talks. In my opinion, Sithole is by far the stronger politician of the two and will emerge as leader although at present his judicial standing appears to be that of a refugee parole breaker having been released by the government from detention to attend the OAU meeting in Dar es Salaam and then refusing to return. Only when that status is cleared up can the talks possibly begin. Other questions remaining are whether the British will be asked to moderate the conference and where it will be held. Muzorewa and Sithole prefer it to be outside of Rhodesia where they will not be at a disadvantage; the government prefers Salisbury. No agenda has been fixed as yet and this may be another stumbling block. If it looks like the conference will get under way, proper diplomatic statements by the Secretary of State expressing hope of success might be appropriate and helpful.

If the conference is not held or if it breaks down, Rhodesia can expect guerrilla attacks along all its borders except that with South Africa. A long and bloody war will ensue which the whites will eventually lose unless South Africa assists in a massive way; even so, victory cannot be achieved. If the ZANU and ZAPU forces emerge triumphant over the whites and within the ANC, Rhodesia, with all its wealth and resources, will ally with the USSR and PRC in the future. Every effort should be made by the UK and USA to prevent a conflict which can only end disastrously for us and Africa. Taking a neutral stance or telling the British, "It's your problem, you handle it" is not enough. To paraphrase John Donne, the bell tolls for the free world as much as for Rhodesia.

On the other hand, it is a mistake to confuse black nationalism with international communism. It is important to separate them so as to get black nationalist leaders together to speak constructively to the issues facing the country. This is what Kuanda, Nyerere and Machel have been doing and their efforts should be applauded and encouraged.

Both whites and blacks showed keen interest in patterning a new Rhodesia constitution on lines similar to ours. If the conference gets that far, the United States might offer to send some first rate constitutional lawyers or political scientists to Salisbury to help the conferees draft it and a bill of rights satisfactory to all parties.

Racism is not the same burning issue that it is in South Africa and for the most part appears less evident, but Rhodesians, both white and black, told me that apartheid exists in a subtle way just as much as in South Africa. Its elimination could mean the development of a black middle class, described to me by a white Anglican bishop, as "the most stabilizing force we could have here." So many people there believe that "economics is the key to African politics nowadays" the US should prepare plans to help Rhodesia's economic development for its blacks once this time of trial passes.

Zambia

Zambia, formerly Northern Rhodesia, serves as proof that the "Zebra policy" (meaning blacks and whites living together harmoniously) can work. A white exodus and especially of civil servants occurred in 1964 when it became independent, but many whites have returned to the farms and to commerce so that the white population almost equals what it was then. Government efficiency falls far below South African and Rhodesian standards, but the Africans are proud to run their own country and want no outside interference. U.S. AID assistance in the amount of \$5 million has gone unused because of the inability of the government to develop satisfactory project plans, or perhaps because the Zambians have found it easier to deal with the Chinese. While I do not

recommend international competition in the granting of development assistance, I feel we should continue to repeat our willingness to be of help if and when called upon, provided that the Zambians plan worthy projects on their own.

Export Import Bank loans have amounted to about \$45 million since 1966, mostly for locomotives and heavy equipment for the copper mines such as drag lines and mechanical shovels. Zambia's huge copper reserves require this type of modern equipment and I hope Ex-Im Bank loans can continue.

China's technical assistance, especially that involving the new Zam-Tan railroad line to Dar es Salaam, has mortgaged the Zambians' future for years to come. Its markets are flooded with shoddy Chinese products but it cannot consume enough to satisfy the Chinese. Despite new, large and elaborate embassies neither the Chinese nor Russian personnel are much in evidence. I found it difficult to evaluate their influence, but the government follows the African socialist line and if Kaunda undertakes the training of Rhodesian and Namibian guerrillas he will draw on communist weapons with which to arm them.

Kaunda's attitude towards the United States was plainly announced while he was at the White House, namely that he is disappointed over the lack of support and assistance black Africa has received from the United States in its fight to liberate southern Africa. His deputy foreign minister, however, told me that they have been encouraged by what U.S. corporations and churchmen have been doing in the area and suggested that we use the VOA to promote anti-apartheidism.

Kaunda left the United States for Cuba where he signed a joint communique and technical assistance agreement. The latter calls for Cuban help for improving Zambia's sugar industry, to eradicate illiteracy and to improve technology and health. The former condemned the U.S. for its intervention in Latin America, congratulated the peoples of Indochina for their liberation from imperialism, called on Israel to evacuate occupied lands, and expressed the support for the peoples of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) and Azania (South Africa). The most curious arrangement agreed upon was for closer relations between the two countries' political parties, including the sending of a Zambian delegation to Havana to study Cuban party organization and mass mobilization. If nothing else, this should keep Kaunda's standing high in African circles, although it would appear that his frank talk at the White House would have sufficed for this purpose.

Kaunda has jeopardized his leadership position in Africa somewhat by his advocacy of modernization towards Ian Smith, especially with his temporizing over how long it might take for "black majority rule" to come into force. Trying to analyze his reasons for this, I conclude that (1) he is unhappy about a large foreign army running around loose in his country, (2) he resented the assassination of ZANU Chitepo and over 100 of his followers and seeks to abolish such lawlessness, (3) he wants the European farmer back in Zambia to resurrect the defunct agricultural sector, and (4) world copper prices have fallen which hurts his economy. A settlement in Rhodesia would save him \$25 million in transportation expenses now skyhigh as ore must go much further either to Dar es Salaam in Tanzania or Lobito in Angola. Kaunda's moderation parallels the U.S. policies with regard to white southern Africa and should be given our full support.

Zambia's economic prospects for 1975 appear grim with copper exports scarcely sufficient to cover imports already restricted to absolute essentials. A negative impact on the employment situation is expected and this, combined with government inefficiency and corruption could lead to internal dissension. However Zambia appears confident it can weather it out by foreign borrowing. Zambia's credit rating is excellent and U.S. and European banks provided \$150 million in credits less than two years ago. Now they are negotiating to loan another \$200 million to the mining industry. With this and domestic belt tightening, Zambia can see 1975 through without extreme sacrifice provided that: the world economic picture lightens up and brings with it an increased demand for copper; and that southern Africa remains relatively peaceful. It is even more in Zambia's interest than ours that peaceful change comes to southern Africa and his efforts as a "marriage broker" between the contending factions should be encouraged.

Zambia looks forwards to the day when Africa itself will be united by common political goals and economic policies. While realizing this will take decades to accomplish, since rival blocs have already taken shape, regional groups might pave the way. One ideal is to develop a South African Economic Cooperative, another idea deserving American support.

Angola

As previously stated Angola's present is perilous and its future tenuous. With fighting continuously erupting between the leftist MPLA and the Zaire-backed FLNA, it looks as if only the centralist UNITA can emerge as the final survivor. American policy has been to maintain a neutral position towards all three parties, but in a crunch UNITA looks now to be the best bet to back. Elections are slated for Oct. 31; independence for Nov. 11. UNITA's leader, Dr. Jonas Savimbi, has been touring the world (Romania for example in early April) seeking financial support and moral encouragement. I was told he would visit the United States in June and I would hope that he might meet with Congressional leaders and top level State Department officials while in Washington.

Besides asking for support of himself and his party, he may request help for Angola once it has independence. Despite its potential wealth, bloodshed and uncertainty have destroyed its economy. Employment declined 12.5 percent over the past 12 months but wages soared to over 50%. Production has dropped from 35-50% and sales have fallen as much as 90%. Supplies within the country are critically short as shipping companies refuse to send their vessels to Angola due to the 80-day waiting period to unload in either Luanda or Lobito.

A problem of a somewhat different nature is Cabinda, the oil rich enclave which historically belongs to Angola but which is geographically separated from it by Zaire. A separate political party called FLEC²² has emerged there which demands Cabinda's independence from Angola, something no Angolan would permit. FLEC's leader has received support over the past decade from President Mobutu of Zaire whose goals are somewhat unclear but which could range from a desire to annex it to simply ensuring Zaire's access to the sea. Mobutu has also been a strong supporter of MPLA. Should MPLA fail to win the election, which appears likely as UNITA and FLNA might unite against their common enemy, Mobutu might then throw more weight behind FLEC.

Cabinda Gulf Oil Company, which could pay Angola \$400 million in royalties this year if peace emerges, could be a prime target for either FLEC, which has threatened to blow up its wells if it pays Angola's provisional government any more royalties or for MPLA which would nationalize it if it came to power. Gulf officials, however, remain optimistic over the future believing that the contractual arrangements made with Angola, based on those made with Nigeria, benefit both sides and the enlightened labor policies outlined by the State Department create a favorable climate for the company within the enclave and company. Should either FLEC or MPLA extremists damage Gulf, the consequences for Angola's future economic development could be overwhelming.

The potential for a good life in Angola is tremendous. Natural resources abound; diamonds, iron, copper, coffee, timber, cane, beef and agricultural produce of all kinds as well as oil. To develop the potential, first and foremost, political stability is needed. Assuming that it can be achieved, the second requirement will be to narrow the gap between the haves and have-nots, particularly by massive slum clearance and wage adjustment programs. Some 400,000 people, mainly Africans, live in *mucques*, cane shanties sprawled out without streets or sanitary arrangements. Although Angola will remain within the escudero market, Portugal is too poor to extend the credits or grants to help in this type of project. A small amount of U.S. assistance could reap untold benefits both for the Angolan slum dwellers as well as for the United States which would be amply repaid as the development of Angola's rich resources takes place.

SIGNIFICANT STATEMENTS OR MEMORABLE REMARKS

The following quotations are supplied to give a feeling for the attitudes of various people toward the political situation in each country.

South Africa

"We can see that fragmenting South Africa into many parts will present major problems, but the alternative is still worse." (Secretary of Information official.)

²² FLEC—Cabinda Enclave Liberation Front. Its leader, Ranque Franque, has asked Portugal, not Angola, for its separate independence.

"If we don't quickly make more radical changes, the situation in this country will explode." (A professor at the University of South Africa.)

"For a long time we will have nothing to sell but our labor." (A Bantustan chief minister.)

"You hear them say, 'We know our blacks. But they don't, they simply don't!'" (An American working to improve race relations.)

"The trouble is they don't want to share power. They're too rich and too comfortable and they can't even contemplate sharing it. We're all going to suffer the consequences of the white man's stubbornness." (A black feminist leader working in community relations.)

"I'm going to speak to you as a black man. Even though we listen to your Ambassador we are not going to swallow everything. We take it with a pinch of salt. There is an aura of suspicion we hold over him." (A black church leader.)

"Those changes in Angola and Mozambique, they make the black man stop and think. That might be the only way to change things here." (Ibid.)

"The trouble with apartheid is it's uneconomical. It's almost grotesquely uneconomical!" (A U.S. diplomat.)

"We've got to lean much harder on South Africa. Our expressions are sincere but we don't back up our rhetoric with any punch." (Ibid.)

"All American visitors are firebrands, rabble rousers or hippies." (A journalist.)

"Before you chaps started (to work against apartheid) there weren't these changes. The U.S. can't opt out of its responsibilities towards this part of the world—or any part of the world." (A former Johannesburg government official.)

"South Africa can never be changed until its Dutch Reformed Church becomes Christian." (Ibid.)

"Apartheid can never be reformed! Only abolished! That's our position." (An African National Congress leader.)

"The U.S. people are lovers of justice. That's one side of the equation. Our view is that the U.S. administration is committed to South Africa. That's the other!" (Ibid.)

Namibia (South West Africa)

"Sure, we're prepared to talk with Vorster, if he'll talk with us. And if not, we're prepared to fight . . . for the next 20 years if necessary." (A SWAPO leader.)

"Now I want to make clear SWAPO does not want to push the whites out or to victimize them. Those who live there we consider to be Namibians, but not masters." (Ibid.)

"Action must come from the outside. There's no black political force here that could be converted into action, not even discontent and antagonism towards the whites." (A foreign diplomat.)

"People outside think there are blacks here represented by SWAPO. Altogether false. The blacks are absolutely incapable of forming a political party—or even to get rid of their tribal groups and form a common liberation front." (Ibid.)

"I'm quite sure that the black representatives already elected could come to terms with what the whites are willing to negotiate. Now, if we can only get the Hereros to select somebody, we can sit around the table and talk. We're in a hurry to find a peaceful solution." (A South African administrator in Namibia.)

"The National Assembly will concede what they think is necessary. Sure, they're sincere as far as they go, but they're so apt to repudiate their promises. Look at SWAPO. They promised full and free participation of all political parties but SWAPO is still harrassed." (An opposition party leader.)

"SWAPO? It's absurd to say they're the only spokesmen for the blacks, much less for the coloureds, but it's equally absurd to say they are not influential. They are: both here and internationally." (Ibid.)

"The Nationalist Party? It'll continue with this boloney as long as the UK and the U.S. and France continue their present foreign policies. That's the

tragedy. The blacks, the browns, the coloureds, hell, they don't believe in the West!" (Ibid.)

"The kind of freedom outsiders want for the Africans will only change things around. We're the masters now; they will be then." (A leader of the National Party.)

Rhodesia

"We're not going to give away our country overnight to an incompetent group. If we have to go to the barricades, we'll go." (Rhodesian Foreign Affairs officer.)

"We're not sitting on top of these people, keeping them down. But damnit, they've got to prove their merit." (A senior Foreign Affairs official.)

"It looks to me as if the ball were back in the Africans' court. They're in a strong position, no matter what." (A leader of the opposition party.)

"The crisis presents me with one of life's basic issues, the dilemma between compassion and justice on the one hand, and the exercise of power and responsibility on the other." (An administrator at the University of Rhodesia.)

"We trust that the Rhodesian Front's plans for provincialization—euphemistically called "political separation with economic integration"—will now be buried." (Leader of another opposition party.)

"For evil to triumph, all it needs is for good men to be silent." Edmund Blake (A poster in Bishop Muzorewa's office.)

"The only agenda (for the round table conference) can be how to transfer power from the whites to the blacks. Protection of the whites? That just means the protection of their privileges." (An African National Council leader.)

"Do you have any idea how much the Byrd Amendment and supporting a losing horse hurts you? You can get that chrome someplace else. You're preventing our freedom!" (Ibid.)

"Why should a black defend capitalism. He's never even had a chance to be a capitalist. We have nothing." (Another ANC leader.)

"If the West would supply arms to our men and tell American corporations here to pay our people a living wage, then we might consider being friends of the West." (A third ANC leader.)

"Zimbabwe should set up communalism (based on tribal chief rule) as a bridge between communism and capitalism." (An African Member of Parliament.)

"The other day we killed that (tribal) chief . . . a chief puppet. We hated him more than we do Smith. A terrible traitor." (A ZANI freedom fighter.)

"How many have been killed? Since 11 December 1974 (reading from an intelligence report) when the Lusaka agreement was announced we count 202 separate incidents, 27 murders and 42 landmines. They're Russian or Chinese, not homemade mind you." (An intelligence official.)

"White Rhodesians have never grown beyond the Battle for Britain." (A churchman.)

"I can assure you that not the ANC, the ZANI or the ZAPU believe in the ideology of the communists, only in their tactics." Communism has no place in Zimbabwe—or anyplace in Africa." (The ZANU freedom fighter.)

"Freedom fighters are in no mood to lay down their arms because the causes for which they took up arms have not been removed." (Rev. Sithole to the Press in Zambia.)

"The principle of majority rule is not negotiable." (Ibid.)

"We're terrified. We don't know what to do. Tell our government they've got to do something quick!" (A shopgirl.)

Zambia

"In this great African endeavor to liberate the rest of Africa, there is no struggle which has been as expensive for Zambia as that currently waged in Zimbabwe." (President Kuanda.)

"What is the role of Zambia in southern Africa? It's to fight for total liberation." (A senior government official.)

"Black Consciousness" is what it's called. And its goes right down from the

university students to the most conservative rural preached and it takes a very uncompromising stand." (An American foreign correspondent in Lusaka.)

Angola

"The problem is we have differences on how to fight for the independence of Angola and then we have even greater differences on what kind of a society we want for Angola." (A UNITA leader.)

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (RSA)


Capital: Administrative, Pretoria; Legislative, Capetown.

President: Jacobus J. Fouché. Prime Minister: B. Johannes Vorster, Minister Foreign Affairs: Hilgard Müller.

Population: 23M (19% European, 10% "Colored" or mixed, 3% Asians, 68% Africans).

Area: 471,455 m² (twice the size of Texas).

GNP: \$26.8B (per cap. \$1,170) 1 Rand equals \$1.49.



Colonized by the Dutch in the 1600s, rivalry with the British began upon their arrival towards the end of the 18th century. In 1936 the Boers, as the Afrikaner farmers were known, made their "Great Trek" north rather than subject themselves to British rule in Cape Province. Isolated in two new states carved out of old African tribal lands, they became extremely conservative towards racism. With the discovery of diamonds in Kimberley in 1870 and gold near Johannesburg in 1886, more Europeans rushed into the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. Dissatisfied with the Afrikaners inefficient government, the new settlers instigated the Boer War in 1889. When it ended two years later the Afrikaner territory was incorporated into the Union of South Africa.

The Union lasted until 1961 when the South Africans renamed itself the Republic of South Africa and withdrew from the Commonwealth rather than accept criticism for its stand on racism. It could not escape criticism of its racial policies or administration of South West Africa so simply; both the UN Security Council and General Assembly passed resolutions almost annually from 1961 on, calling for it to end apartheid and terminate its administration of South West Africa. Despite imposing an arms embargo as an indication of UN indignation, South Africa proceeded with apartheid. The Odendall Commission in 1964 recommended that "bantustans" or homelands be established for the major African tribes found in the Republic. Using the new (1966) nations of Lesotho and Swaziland as examples, South Africa said the bantustans would have their own tribal governments and local autonomy within the Republic. Africans would be free to move about and even own property in them, neither of which is now permitted. Still, the plan calls for only 13% of the Republic's area to be turned over to the homelands whereas 70% of the population would be compelled to reside within them. The Transkei was established in 1971 for Zulus and is to become "independent" next year. Since the areas set aside for Africans have little housing or other amenities and can hardly be considered economically viable or even adequate for subsistence agriculture, the whole concept invites considerable criticism.

While the Vorster government claims apartheid is a purely internal matter, most UN members, including the U.S. believe it endangers the peace and stability of the region and violates the human rights articles (55 & 56) of the UN Charter. Despite consistent statements against apartheid, U.S. ambivalence of action has been attacked on all sides. The South Africans, for example, steadily bypass the Department of State when dealing with this government by calling on Congressmen, other Departments' officials, and businessmen in an effort to have the arms embargo lifted, new trade benefits granted, or new capital investments made. Black African nations criticize the US because it has allowed the sale of limited "dual purpose" weapons or has abstained on key UN Resolutions calling for more drastic measures than the US is willing to back. Even within the US government, some agencies favor opening contacts with the RSA police and military establishments so as to protect the vital seaway around the Cape.

Further ambivalence occurs in our limitations on trade promotion and our neutral stand on US investments in Southern Africa. The US wants to keep its share of the RSA market by allowing commerce between the two states, but limits trade promotion to "low profile facilitative services." The Department supports a RSA sugar quota arguing that it benefits blacks as much as whites and might even lead to better treatment of plantation workers. It uses the same arguments towards US investments, saying they help blacks in many ways while strangling the RSA economy with an embargo would undoubtedly harm them. Opponents of apartheid demand the withdrawal of US corporations but the Department considers it more salutary to urge US firms to establish better work conditions, such as wage equality regardless of race, health benefits, etc., than to have them withdraw. Since some 350 are located in the RSA and have over \$1B invested, such a move would be next to impossible without Congressional approval. The Department also encourages US firms to look at Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland as alternative locations for their

plants, but obviously such neutrality appeases no one. The Commerce Department wants more trade promotion and various firms would like more government facilities to encourage investments. Critics, both within the US and in Africa, see US investments as economically and psychologically supportive of RSA apartheid and demand restrictions or even a complete embargo on trade.

These considerations have led to charges that the US is "tilting" towards South Africa.

The imputation of tilting first appeared in a 1972 *New York Times* story which quoted from a secret National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM-39) written early in 1969, the first year of the Nixon administration. It offered various options for southern Africa ranging from maintaining normal diplomatic relations to increased coercion short of armed conflict. The Department of State now says no option was accepted *in toto* but rather a series of options emerged from NSSM-39. Number Two (here listed last) is the one presently being followed out of four in the spectrum:

(1) *Acceptance* of the status quo and maintenance of normal relations; rejected as repugnant to our moral position, damaging to our relations with other African nations, and opening the door to Communist initiatives.

(2) *Liberation*, by supporting insurgent movements against the status quo; rejected because it involves violence without much guarantee of success given RSA's strong military preparedness.

(3) *Isolation*, by breaking off diplomatic relations and ending investments and trade; rejected as it would turn South Africa inward and would hurt RSA's African population.

(4) *Communication*, by which is meant maintaining strictly formal relations while urging changes within southern Africa through diplomatic channels and multinational organizations. It means adherence to the 1963 UN arms embargo and no loans or grant assistance. While trade and investments are allowed, they are not encouraged and US firms are urged to follow liberal labor practices.

In pursuit of communications without acceptance of apartheid the U.S. has:

Maintained the strictest arms embargo against RSA and Portugal's African colonies of any major trading nation.

Limited Ex-Import Bank and trade promotion activities in South Africa and Portuguese territories.

Limited contacts with the RSA military.

Continued an embargo on US naval visits to RSA.

Encouraged US corporations (about 350) to improve work opportunities, pay and fringe benefits for blacks and to engage in collective bargaining in South Africa.

Accepted the International Court of Justice decision of 1971 on the illegality of RSA's hold on Namibia.

Officially discouraged US investments and commerce with Namibia, despite the trade benefits which might have accrued.

In a no-win position the U.S. is encouraged by recent public signals that RSA has made some concessions on petty apartheid and Namibia in 1975, but since Vorster can hardly afford to arouse the opposition of the more conservative members of his party, real progress appears far distant and the US posture more teetering than tilting.

NAMIBIA (SOUTH WEST AFRICA)


Administrator: Berend Johannes Van der Walt.

Capital: Windhoek (pop. 65,000).

Population: 746,000 (88% Black; 12% White).

Area: Size of Texas & Louisiana (318,000 m²).

GNP: \$680M (1976); per capital \$5,525 for whites; \$325 for blacks.



Germany's South West Africa colony was proclaimed a mandated territory of the League of Nations after the defeat of Germany in World War I, and was placed under the administration of the Union of South Africa in 1920. After the Second World War all mandated territories were placed under UN Trusteeship but the Union refused to turn it over. Since 1946 the UN and its agencies have passed over 80 resolutions denouncing South Africa's annexation of the territory and proclaiming the right to self-determination and independence. In the process the UN renamed the territory in 1969 after the Namib Desert. South Africa persists in the illegal occupation and, furthermore, has extended its apartheid policies to the area.

The U.S. recognizes the authority of the UN over Namibia and believes RSA should promptly comply with the UN resolutions that it withdraw and adhere to the 1971 Court of International Justice decision which found illegal RSA's administration of the territory. The US believes that self-determination for Namibia must come from peaceful persuasion and not through force or violence. The US discourages US investments in Namibia and grants no Ex-Import Bank facilities for trade. US firms doing business there are encouraged to conform with fair employment practices and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The US has no government offices in Namibia and has provided no economic assistance to it except for \$50,000 in 1974 to the UN Fund for Namibia.

South Africa has recently appeared willing to give up its de facto administration of Namibia and the Territory's National Assembly is reviewing apartheidism. Earlier, South Africa had set aside 11 homelands for eventual independence. They will cover over half of the land area and one, twice the size of Holland, has already been given a representative legislative council. Here, in Ovamboland, six Ovambo Tribes share control with white South African officials, but political rallies in the spring of 1974 led to such repression that 3,000 Ovambo's fled to Zambia. Without their leadership, 55% of the Ovamboland voters turned out for a general election in January 1975, which the leading party, SWAPO (South West Africa's Peoples' Organization) had urged them to boycott. This defeat for SWAPO had come on the heels of earlier victories in December. At that time the UN had voted to allow SWAPO to seat observers in certain UN sessions and the UN Security Council voted a resolution demanding South Africa's withdrawal

by May 30, 1975. A special subcommittee, formed by UN Security Resolution 276 of 1970 and called the UN Council for Namibia, decreed in September, 1974 that any natural resources exported from Namibia without its approval would be subject to seizure. Various US oil corporations announced in February that they would stop explorations there due to pressure from US religious organizations as well as the State Department's opposition to new investments in Namibia.

This action may diminish the criticism that the US is not doing enough but the charge is certain to arise again if the US persists in leaving to the UN the prime responsibility for settling the issue while at the same time opposing more forceful measures to bring about changes.

RHODESIA

President: Clifford Dupont (since 1970), Prime Minister Ian D. Smith (since 1964).


Capital: Salisbury (pop. 463,000, 75% blacks).

Population: 5.6M (1972 est.) (250,000 whites).

Area: 150,820 square miles (size of Montana) (subtropical).

GNP: \$1.44B (\$266 per capita) Rhodesian dollar—\$1.40.

From the National Geographic.



Southern Rhodesia was to all intents and purposes founded by Cecil Rhodes's British South African Company which administered it for its own self-interest until 1923 when agricultural settlers decided to make it a self-governing colony rather than be annexed to the Union of South Africa. Even then, the UK felt it had a special responsibility towards the Africans and in 1961, when Southern Rhodesia won autonomy under a new constitution, Africans were given limited franchise. Four years later Ian Smith's Rhodesia Front Party won all 50 seats reserved for whites (out of 65) in the Legislative Assembly, soundly beating Prime Minister Winston Field on the basis of his being too moderate. Stalemated with the British on the issue of majority representation, Smith issued on November 11, 1965, a Unilateral Declaration of Independence which was declared illegal the following day by both the UK and UN because it did not offer blacks adequate protection of their civil liberties. The UK imposed economic sanctions and the next year the UN asked its members to do likewise. The US complied and closed all of its offices except the consulate, whose closing was delayed until 1970. Poorly enforced, even by neighboring black nations and especially by Portugal's Mozambique, the sanctions have hurt but not defeated the Smith Government. The US supports the UN sanctions in general but by accepting the Byrd Amendment in 1971, nullified them in fact.

In 1972 the Pearce Commission from Britain outlined a UK-Rhodesian agreement which, in exchange for UK recognition of Rhodesia's independence would move the country gradually (and slowly) towards African majority rule. Meanwhile it promised them stronger constitutional protection of individual liberties and British economic aid. Rhodesian whites accepted the terms but the Africans were negative. They formed soon afterwards the African National Council (ANC) made up of church and other black leaders and three rival groups, the most important of which is the Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union. ZANU stepped up insurgent operations in 1972 using Dar-es-Salaam as headquarters and both Tanzania and Zambia for operational bases. Others are trained in USSR, PRC, Algeria, Egypt and Cuba and those taken prisoner have been found carrying either Russian or Chinese weapons.

In December, 1974, ANC, ZANU, ZAPU, & FROLIZI agreed to unite under the leadership of ANC's Bishop Muzorewa. Through the joint efforts of Zambia's Kuanda and South Africa's Prime Minister Voster, Ian Smith agreed to meet the Bishop and other black leaders to discuss a new constitution. Voster's interest evolves from Mozambique's promised independence. He feels the need to neutralize the hostility of black nations on his north and fears them as a threat to his own Republic as long as they condone insurgency against Rhodesia.

On the condition that Smith would release political prisoners, many of whom are captured insurgents, ANC promised a ceasefire. Thereafter a constitutional conference would take place. Under the present constitution, approved by a nearly all-white electorate in 1969, the control of the government rests firmly in the hands of the House of Assembly. It has 66 members, 50 of whom are elected by constituents made up of whites, Asians and coloreds. Eight of the 16 seats reserved for blacks are elected by Africans; 8 by Tribal Councils. Their proportion is to increase as the African population earns a larger share of the nation's economy and pays a larger proportion of personal income taxes, but this process would require decades. The issue of immediate majority rule is the most critical to be discussed at the Constitutional Conference.

Ian Smith runs the government, yet is prevented by his white constituents from moving too fast. They fear the concept of majority rule as much as the militancy of the black insurgents.

The ceasefire agreement has not been well observed, due in part to Smith's renegeing on his promise to free all political prisoners. The blacks claim 500 remain in jail. Added to this was the arrest of Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, the leader of ZANU, on charges that he was plotting to assassinate AFC leaders. Bishop Muzorewa, allegedly the intended victim, has said Sithole's arrest sabotages black unity and has postponed the proposed constitutional conference. Sithole was released to attend the Dar es Salaam OAU conference and violated his parole to attend the Jamaica Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference but vows to return to Salisbury to continue the fight for majority rule.

Meanwhile, Rhodesia is trying to find some way to appease the 5M blacks. Mozambique's independence, Vorster's insistence on a compromise and his threat to withdraw his counter-insurgency policy may have more effect than the repeal of the Byrd Amendment or the various UN resolutions. The longer Smith waits the more Rhodesia's economy suffers and the worse becomes the psychological climate for whites fearful of a bloodbath.

ANGOLA

Portuguese High Commissioner: General Antonio Silva Cardoso: Johnny Eduardo (FNLA), Lopo do Nascimento (MPLA), and Jose Ndele (UNITA) are rival liberation leaders on the 3-man Presidential Council.


Capital Launda (pop. 475,000).

Population 6M (mostly Bantu); 400,000 Portuguese, 40,000 mixed.

Area: 481,351 sq. miles (14 times Portugal or twice size of Texas). Includes Portuguese enclave of Cabinda on Congo River between Zaire and Congo Republic.

GNP: \$1.2B; per capita, \$220.

Economy: Mineral extraction (oil, diamonds, iron), cotton and coffee, and subsistence agriculture.



MOZAMBIQUE

Premier: Joaquim A. Chissano (since September 30, 1974) Portuguese High Commissioner: Admiral Victor Crespo.


Capital: Lourenco Marques (pop. 250,000).

Area: 303,000 sq. miles (twice California).

Population: 8.5M (1972 est.); 97% African, 200,000 Asians and 40,000 Afro-Europeans.

GNP: \$2.5B; per capita, \$320.

Economy: Agriculture, exports cashews, sugar, sisal and imports machinery.



ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE

Portuguese claims to both Angola and Mozambique go back historically to the 16th century when colonies were settled. Portugal won its border claims to Angola, including the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda at the Congress of Berlin on West Africa in 1885. After the defeat of Germany in World War II, Portugal added German East Africa to its territory of Mozambique. During the following decades Portugal administered both without concern for the native Africans. In fact, the Portuguese Inspector of Colonies described in 1947 the work and living conditions of the Bantus in Angola as "worse than slavery." Due in part

to his report and in part to world opinion, Portugal amended its constitution in 1951 to make its colonies "Overseas Provinces" with limited local autonomy. Angola sent seven delegates to the 130-man Portuguese National Assembly in Lisbon; Mozambique sent three.

In the UN General Assembly of 1960, Khrushchev condemned Portugal for "Tyrannical rule." Soon thereafter the UN adopted a resolution calling for Portugal to report on its territories. Portugal objected to "interference in its national affairs" and said "brotherly feelings" prevail in Mozambique.

As if to prove they did not, rebellion broke out that same year in Luanda and freedom movements in both colonies became active in 1951. Holden Roberto, leader of what is now named the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), began to lobby at the UN for independence. Other independence organizations subsequently were formed; guerrilla fighting ensued. Portugal sent in more and more troops. The UN took successively stronger action, such as expelling Portugal from ECOSOC, and Portugal tried to win time by making various concessions.

The most important of these occurred in 1972 when Portugal passed its Organic Law for Overseas Territories which provided for elective territorial governments beginning January 1, 1973. In Angola, Roberto's FNLA and Agostinho Neto's Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) agreed to cooperate during the elections. UNITA, the most moderate group, was not included. During the elections 24 blacks won seats versus 29 whites. In Mozambique, however, only 112,000 voters participated as only one slate of candidates was put up. The FRELIMO continued its guerrilla warfare from Tanzania.

The fall of the Caetano government in Lisbon on April 25, 1974, abruptly brought prospects of peace and independence to all of Portugal's African colonies. General Spínola's 7-man junta suspended military operations in both Angola and Mozambique in order to negotiate a final settlement and promised almost immediate independence to Guinea-Bissau on the Northwestern "bulge" of Africa. In Angola, the centralist UNITA movement agreed to drop its differences with MPLA and FNLA to present a united front during negotiations. Shortly thereafter, in Portugal the three rival groups signed an agreement with the junta to co-govern until independence could take place on November 11, 1975. As a result, a Portuguese High Commissioner shares the executive power with a 3-man presidential council and a 12-member cabinet representative of the three liberation movements. The Portuguese 24,000 man army was slated to leave the Angola April 30, but renewed clashes between the MPLA and FNLA armies in Luanda have delayed their departure.

In Mozambique, the Portuguese arranged with the FRELIMO for a cease-fire, freedom of 1,000 political prisoners and independence on June 25, 1975. There the interim government was formed with FRELIMO leader Joaquim A. Chissano as Premier and the Portuguese High Commissioner, Victor Crespo, as co-executor.

Due largely to Portugal's importance to NATO and to the agreement on the use of the Azores as an air base for the Middle East, the U.S. has never stressed as energetically as other UN nations its support for the black Africans in the Portuguese Territories. The U.S. has enforced an embargo on all arms shipments to Portuguese Africa and obtained assurances, which it believes were lived up to, that weapons supplied as part of our military assistance and sales programs to Portugal would be confined to NATO related use only. Many critics of U.S. policy in Africa claimed that Portugal violated these agreements either directly or by using non-U.S. arms, freed up by redundancy, for fighting in Africa. Members of Congress and the general public called for severing the military assistance programs, but their efforts were offset by Portuguese assistance during the Yom Kippur War. With the subsequent changes of government in Lisbon, making U.S.-Portuguese negotiations or renewing the Azores base agreement still more sensitive, the abatement of criticism of Portugal regarding its African Territories can only be considered fortunate by the United States.

During the long struggle for freedom and self-government, the US carried on normal trade relations with the African possessions. It neither encouraged nor discouraged U.S. investment although Ex-Im Bank financing was made available. The Department, however, warned U.S. investors of the problems they would face such as possible sabotage prior to independence and nationalization afterwards. U.S. firms were encouraged to apply enlightened employment practices to offset both domestic and international criticism and to make the US presence less obnoxious to the Africans. This unsatisfactory arrangement resulted partly from State and Commerce disagreement over whether trade policies

in Portuguese Africa should be encouraged or restricted. With independence that issue should subside, but investors are likely to assume a wait-and-see attitude before making any large scale commitment.

During the struggles, the US had no USIA, AID or Peace Corps programs in Portuguese Africa. A USIA officer has now been assigned to Mozambique. The US has consulates in Launda and Lourenco Marques which can be elevated to small embassies upon independence.

In Mozambique independence will bring in a one-party, Maoist-oriented, authoritarian government headed by President Samorro Moises Machel and Vice President Marcellino dos Santos. Chissano will become Prime Minister. Mozambique's relations with South Africa may be moderated by economic considerations but he promises to honor the UN embargo on Rhodesia despite the economic hardships Mozambique will incur thereby.

In Angola, independence appears more perilous. The rivalry of the three Angolan independence groups causes day-by-day tensions and outbreaks of violence as each strives for political advantages before the fall elections. Furthermore, in Cabinda a new secessionist movement called FLEC (Cabinda Enclave Liberation Front) is calling for separate independence negotiations with Portugal. Although it is highly unlikely that Portugal would accede to FLEC's demand, the Angolans can be counted on to resist the partitioning away of Angola's richest area, the Cabinda oil fields. Finally, the question of a relatively complex, white dominated economy remains unresolved. With 350,000-450,000 Portuguese settlers in Angola, the most after South Africa on the continent, Angola would suffer severe economic setbacks if it should force them into exile or to take over too abruptly their business concerns.

REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA

President: Kenneth David Kaunda.


Capital: Lusaka (pop. 381,000).

Population: 4.5 million, 99% Bantu.

Area: 290,000 square miles (size of Texas).

GNP: \$1.8 billion; per capita, \$415.

Economy: Copper.



Bantus began arriving in the 15th Century with the greatest influx in the late 17th and early 19th. The mid-19th found Western explorers, such as David Livingstone, missionaries and traders entering. In 1888 Cecil Rhodes obtained mineral rights from tribal chiefs and placed Northern and Southern Rhodesia in the British Empire. The two separated in 1923 but rejoined in 1953 to form the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (now Malawi). Insistent African demands for greater participation in government, particularly from Northern Rhodesia, contributed to the dissolution of the three-nation Federation in 1963. Independence was granted by Britain in 1964, and the nation took its present name.

The Republic of Zaire's 1964 constitution was abrogated in 1973 with a new one creating "one-party participatory democracy." This provides for a strong President and a unicameral National Assembly dominated by a 25-member Central Committee which formulates national policy. The President and cabinet execute it.

President Kaunda has wide popular support and has successfully bridged the rivalries of the nation's ethnic groups and regions. His "Humanism", a loosely structured African socialism based on cooperation of the peoples but not at the expense of the individual, appeals to Africans brought up in a tribal society, but he now faces antipathy to bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption, high unemployment and growing inflation.

A major objective has been to use the mineral wealth (copper) to advance economic and social welfare. Falling copper prices have faced Zambia with the problem of coping for the payment of these welfare programs. Copper contributes 35-50% of the government's revenues, depending on world market prices. It forms 96% of all exports and 50% of the GNP. To increase its share Zambia took over 51% of the predominantly U.S.-owned copper mines in 1970 and more recently has assumed the management of them.

Zambia follows a policy of non-alignment and has been a leading power in the OAU and Third World politics. Its major foreign policy concern is to promote majority rule in southern Africa, an idea which has been fought for at considerable economic sacrifice.

Zambia accepts aid from both East and West, the largest project having been underwritten at the cost of \$400 million by the Chinese. This involved building a 1,000 mile railroad from Kapiri Mposhi in the copper belt to Dar es Salaam. It was finished this year. The U.S. provided \$21 million from 1964-71 and in 1973 offered \$5 million more, most of which has not been drawn down. It also is still helping pave the Lusaka-Dar es Salaam road.

U.S.-Zambian relations can be considered to be good although Kaunda has frankly told President Ford in the White House that he is disappointed with America's policy towards Africa. He criticizes particularly the belief that change in southern Africa can be brought about through persuasion rather than revolution, but has himself become in 1975 a strong leader in the movement to bring about reconciliation between blacks and whites in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa through meetings and conferences.



