



Namibia and Regional Destabilization in Southern Africa

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Namibia and Regional Destabilization in Southern Africa

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NAMIBIA AND REGIONAL DESTABILIZATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

—————
FEBRUARY 15, 1983
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs



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NAMIBIA AND REGIONAL DESTABILIZATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1983

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2:15 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard Wolpe (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. WOLPE. The subcommittee hearing will come to order. This afternoon the Subcommittee on Africa is meeting to hear testimony from Congressman William Gray, vice chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus, and from the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr. Chester Crocker, regarding our Namibian diplomacy and the matter of regional destabilization in southern Africa.

It is appropriate that the subcommittee's first hearing of the 98th Congress, with a subcommittee that is substantially reconstituted, with all but two of the members being new to the subcommittee, it is appropriate that that first hearing focus on the current status of U.S. involvement in resolving the issue of independence for Namibia because there is no African issue that has occupied more of the time or the resources of both the Carter and the Reagan administrations.

We now are entering our 6th year of American participation in what has been a multilateral effort, and still Namibia is not yet freed of the illegal occupation and administration of South Africa.

In addition, over the past 2 years we have witnessed an alarming increase in regional cross border violence, most of which has been a consequence of South African aggression against its neighbors, Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. Even the Seychelles was the target of a South African commando raid and attempted coup.

Just before Christmas, as we met in these same chambers to assess South Africa's role in regional instability, South African defense force commandos boldly attacked the capital of Lesotho, Maseru, and killed over 40 people.

Within South Africa itself the past 2 years have seen an intensification of government repression. Every day we read of new cases of arbitrary detentions, police torture, forced removal of urban blacks, and the banning of trade union leaders and other political activists.

All of these developments have profound consequences, both for the states of southern Africa and for American interests in the region. The intensification of South African repression at home and of South Africa's destabilizing campaign against its neighboring states is particularly worrisome because these developments have occurred against the backdrop of the American Government's new policy of so-called constructive engagement with South Africa.

What has happened, very bluntly, is that in the eyes of African leaders throughout the continent, the United States is now directly implicated in South African regional aggression and in South Africa's domestic repression.

We are seen as having encouraged the South Africans in the belief that they now have a free hand to do as they will within the region. Not only will the United States no longer engage in public condemnation of South African brutality, but we will, even in the face of such brutality, use our veto power within the United Nations to protect the South African regime from international censure and develop new American South African trade and military ties.

Repeatedly in hearings before this committee and in other forums in the past 2 years, the administration has argued that the various initiatives that have been taken toward South Africa under the label of constructive engagement were designed to enhance American leverage and influence with the South African regime with respect to both ongoing Namibian diplomacy and the question of internal change within South Africa itself.

What we want to focus on in this hearing today is whether or not there is any evidence that America's new approach has yielded any positive results on either front.

Is it not possible that the African critics of American policy are correct, that the principal consequence of constructive engagement has been to add to the regional instability by signaling to the South African regime that it will incur no cost whatsoever, at least as far as an American response is concerned, regardless of how much aggression it perpetrates against its neighbors and regardless of how much repression the regime sanctions in its domestic policies?

This may not have been what the administration has intended by its new relationship with the South African Government. I have indicated previously on a number of occasions that I deeply respect the intentions of Dr. Crocker in particular in fashioning the constructive engagement policy. But I think it is terribly important that we at least consider the possibility that the messages we have conveyed through constructive engagement may have been understood by the South African Government very differently than we may have intended.

If so, then constructive engagement will have had some very profoundly destructive consequences for both African and American interests.

What concerns me and those of my colleagues who have just returned from southern Africa is a growing sense that the Namibian negotiations are stalemated as long as the United States holds to its current diplomatic posture.

I hope today in your testimony, Dr. Crocker, that you will indicate whether you believe that South Africa now wants an internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia.

Why hasn't the United States advanced a specific timetable for putting an enabling resolution before the U.N. Security Council so that the UNTAG implementation can begin?

What concessions has South Africa made in the context of our constructive engagement policies to move the Namibian process forward? Since both the Front Line States and the Western Five Contact Group have disavowed the linkage of Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola to the question of Namibia's independence, why does the United States persist in maintaining the connection?

How is parallelism different from linkage, and does Namibia's independence take priority in our view over a bilateral arrangement between Angola and Cuba?

Again, has not our association with South Africa under constructive engagement encouraged South Africa to support aggressive activities against other states in the region and also to hide behind domestic constraints in order to block a Namibian settlement?

We eagerly await your response to these and other questions we wish to pose. This is an occasion for candor and critical self-examination of U.S. policy concerning a most serious and compelling matter, that of ultimate decolonization in southern Africa. The administration, therefore, has an opportunity to present an important assessment of its policies today.

In addition, we are delighted today to have before the subcommittee my distinguished colleague from Pennsylvania, Congressman Bill Gray. He and I cochaired the delegation that recently traveled to southern Africa and he has been a leader within the Congress on a whole range of issues related to South Africa and to southern African diplomacy. We look forward to hearing his testimony as well.

Before turning directly to the testimony, I would like to introduce both of you gentlemen to the new membership of the Africa Subcommittee.

I would ask my distinguished colleague from New York, Mr. Gerald Solomon, to make an opening remark.

Mr. SOLOMON. I thank the chairman, and I won't have any extensive remarks except to say that, Mr. Chairman, you know that I am the new ranking member on this subcommittee, as a matter of fact, new on the full committee, which puts me in the unenviable position of not having a great deal of knowledge on Africa.

However, as a Member of Congress, I have observed that the administration and the State Department in my opinion have done a most commendable job, and I will be most interested in hearing the Secretary's testimony.

Mr. WOLPE. I personally again want to welcome you, Mr. Solomon, and all of the new members to this subcommittee.

Congressman Crockett and I are the only standbys that continue from the previous committee.

I am delighted to have Mr. Reid, from Nevada joining us now, and also Mr. Ted Weiss, from New York. We hope to have other members of the subcommittee joining us as we move through the hearing.

At this point I would invite Congressman Bill Gray to present his testimony. We will encourage both of you, to summarize your remarks.

The full text of your testimony will be inserted in the committee record.

Congressman Gray.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM H. GRAY III, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. GRAY. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am grateful for the opportunity to participate in today's discussion of U.S. policy toward Namibia.

Although it was nearly 5 years ago that South Africa agreed to U.N. Resolution 435, which called for a cease-fire, elections, and independence in Namibia, that independence still is not a reality. Armed conflict is still a reality, and South Africa still occupies Namibia.

Pretoria spends nearly \$675 million a year on its illegal military occupation of that territory. An internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia, which the world community has sought and which America, the Western Contact Group, and frontline African states have worked for, has not yet occurred.

The nature and extent of the South African Government domination over Namibia was demonstrated last month, when Pretoria had to abandon even the fiction that Namibia is governed by a multiracial coalition of its own people. The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance resigned out of frustration over its own impotence, and the South African Administrator General resumed direct control over the Government.

Pretoria refused to permit the most moderate reforms in the racist laws which it has imposed on the territory that it has ruled since World War I. The DTA resigned because it was not allowed even to change the country's national holidays.

In 1981, the Reagan administration took the lead in negotiations and set as one of its major American-African policy goals a Namibian settlement.

The U.S. Congress has supported, generally, the efforts to find a political conclusion to the Namibia crisis. Although there has not always been agreement with the particular tactics of the executive branch in reaching a settlement, Congress has demonstrated its support for America taking a leadership role in the negotiations by legislating funds for implementation of an internationally acceptable settlement, before an agreement has been reached.

The administration strategy in dealing with the intransigence of South Africa has been to enter a so-called constructive engagement, designed to end the isolation and win the friendship of South Africa, and thus increase American influence with South Africa on Namibia and reform at home.

South African officials would perceive that an early Namibia settlement was in their interest, it was argued, because the friendly administration would take into account the concerns of Namibia's white minority, and would offer Pretoria the most favorable terms possible.

Inherent in this approach was a risk. What if South Africa took all the benefits of this new embrace but failed to work "constructively" for a settlement? There were assurances that progress was being made on Namibia—even predictions that by the beginning of 1983 a settlement would be reached.

But a funny thing happened on the way to a settlement. Another policy goal of the United States became linked to Namibia: The removal of Cuban troops from Angola. Now a Namibian settlement is in jeopardy as a result of linkage to Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. It is jeopardized because linkage allows South Africa to delay indefinitely by insisting that Cubans leave Angola before it agrees to a settlement.

It is jeopardized because the Angolans may remain intransigent on the Cuban troop issue because of Angola's own security needs, especially in light of continued South African attacks.

It is jeopardized because the Contact Group and the Front Line African States have rejected this linkage and may withdraw from negotiations to seek other means for a settlement, including sanctions and renewed military pressures.

It is jeopardized because linkage will complicate, confuse, and prolong negotiations, thus creating new opportunities for Soviet and Cuban military involvement in southern Africa creating the exact opposite effect that was intended by U.S. policy.

Now, there are press reports that South Africa has made a linkage offer, one that envisions staged withdrawals of Cuban and South African troops from southern Angola before final complete Cuban troop withdrawal and a Namibia settlement. However, this offer must be understood in context.

South African troops in 1975 marched to the outskirts of Luanda, with the intention of overthrowing the Angolan Government. Cuban troops were brought in, in large measure to counter this incursion and to deter similar invasions in the future.

In the last 2 years South Africa has intensified its open invasions and covert destabilizing actions in Angola and other neighboring countries. The South African military has launched several massive attacks on Angola, as well as on the capitals of Mozambique and Lesotho. Pretoria has provided substantial assistance to armed antigovernment factions in Angola, Mozambique, and Lesotho and has supported sabotage against Zimbabwe.

Now South Africa is proposing that its troops in southern Angola jointly monitor a cease-fire there with Angolan troops. South Africa is proposing that the Namibian nationalist forces of SWAPO withdraw at least 250 miles from Namibia, while its own troops remain in the territory. And South Africa is demanding that all Cuban troops return to Cuba as a precondition for a Namibia settlement, while its own highly mobile forces retire over the border and await the results of an election.

As one African leader has commented, this is like Argentina proposing a temporary cease-fire in the Falklands, during which Argentina's troops would return to Argentina, and Britain's troops would return to Britain.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, during the African/American Conference that you and I and members of your subcommittee recently attended, and in our subsequent travels, we

met with leaders from many African countries, including all the frontline states and other key nations such as Nigeria, Sudan, and Egypt.

These leaders unanimously opposed linkage of the Namibian negotiations to Cuban troop withdrawals from Angola. They made their opposition to this strategy clear both publicly and privately.

In the Africans' view, all such linkage is counterproductive, whether in stages, as with the most recent South African proposal, or indirect, as with the administration's pronouncements about "parallelism," or direct, with all the obfuscation removed.

Thus, new pragmatic options must be put forth. There must be a constructive disengagement from South Africa on this issue and an honest broker role must be resumed by the United States.

An internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia should be our sole objective. Questions concerning Cuban troops in Angola must be dealt with in separate bilateral negotiations. These new options must have as a vital component a point in the negotiation process when we will change the course rather than stay the course with continued South African intransigence and inaction.

The question must be asked, after all of the carrots of constructive engagement, What has really been accomplished? We in the Congress are told that there is a public and private posture with regard to this issue: Those who criticize our public policy privately admit that there has been progress. Yet, I find no such evidence.

When will we move to a point where pressure will be used to accomplish a settlement? As Senator Nancy Kassebaum said, at the African-American Conference:

Constructive engagement can only be effective when it is a two-way street. It is clear to many of us that it has not been a "two way street." A missing ingredient has been the recognition that pressure "sticks" as well as "carrots" may be needed to make South Africa reach a settlement in accord with U.N. Resolution 435.

One noted American who specializes in African policy wrote 2 years ago, and I quote:

Pressure can communicate to various audiences United States recognition of the unacceptability of current policies to the majority of South Africans, and it can also disassociate us from odious behavior. Provided there is some relationship between the specific means applied and the ends sought, pressure in the arm twisting sense can also offer Washington some influence, and that influence is likely to increase with the adoption of a more actively constructive policy.

That scholar was the distinguished Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker. And now that a more constructive policy toward South Africa is in place, and has been for nearly 2 years, I believe it is time to alter course rather than stay the course.

The United States must call for an immediate Namibian settlement based on U.N. Resolution 435. The United States, together with the other Western negotiators, must be prepared to use pressure. The United States must oppose vigorously South African aggression and apartheid.

Prof. L. K. H. Goma, Minister of Foreign Affairs for Zambia, asked in a recent speech:

We wonder why the United States and its allies are not taking as strong a stand against South Africa as they have done against Poland, for example. Can it be because the majority of the oppressed people in South Africa are black?

We in the Congressional Black Caucus believe that America must pursue a policy that will light a candle not only for those oppressed in Poland but those in Namibia as well.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you, Mr. Gray, for appearing and presenting eloquent testimony.

There is one point I would like to expand upon, with reference to discussions that our delegation had just a few weeks ago in Africa. It relates to the issue of the Cuban troops in Angola.

The position that was articulated to us, as I understood it, for example from President Nyerere of Tanzania, president of the Front Line group, and by other African leaders, is not that they had a different point of view with respect to the ultimate disposition of Cuban troops in Angola—in fact, it was stated very forcefully to us by a number of people, a number of leaders with whom we spoke—but they wanted to see an end to the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. They wanted to see an end to any external intervention by foreign powers within the continent.

The point that was being made, however, was that they saw the issue of Cuban troops in Angola as a distinct question, distinct from the Namibian diplomacy, and one that needed to be addressed on the basis of bilateral diplomacy with a sovereign state, the state of Angola, and that the linkage of these two questions in the view of the leaders with whom we spoke was one that was only going to undermine the objective of a Namibian settlement.

Was that your understanding as well of the conversations?

Mr. GRAY. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We had extensive conversations with the leadership from Front Line states as well as throughout the continent on the question, and it was very, very clear that they were saying basically two things: One, that it is good for America to play a significant role and be involved in negotiations in a leadership way, but their support for America's leadership in the negotiations did not mean that they support a linkage or a parallelism between Namibian independence and the removal of Cuban troops from Angola.

Each one of them said they would like to see the Cuban troops removed, but it was very clear that they did not see that as an issue that should be handled with regard to a Namibian settlement, and there should be no precondition for bringing about the independence of Namibia as a result of South Africa's violation of 435.

Mr. WOLPE. I recall with particular clarity the statement made that the African states themselves would be putting pressure on Angola to remove Cuban troops once the Namibia question was settled and Angolan security problems were addressed in terms of the South African presence.

I think that is just as important in terms of the message that was conveyed to us in our discussions in Africa recently.

Let me invite the gentleman from New York.

Mr. SOLOMON. I just have one question for my colleague. Back on July 27, 1982, Fidel Castro was reported to have stated that Cuban troops will not be removed from Angola until all of his conditions have been met.

APPENDIX I

RESOLUTION 385 (1976)
ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 1880TH MEETING ON 30 JANUARY 1976

The Security Council,

*Having heard the statement of the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia,*²⁸

*Having considered the statement by Mr. Moses M. Garoeb, Administrative Secretary of the South West Africa People's Organization,*²⁹

Recalling General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, by which the Assembly terminated South Africa's Mandate over the Territory of Namibia, and resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967, by which it established a United Nations Council for Namibia, as well as all other subsequent resolutions on Namibia, in particular resolution 3295 (XXIX) of 13 December 1974 and resolution 3399 (XXX) of 26 November 1975,

Recalling its resolutions 245 (1968) of 25 January and 246 (1968) of 14 March 1968, 264 (1969) of 20 March and 269 (1969) of 12 August 1969, 276 (1970) of 30 January, 282 (1970) of 23 July, 283 (1970) and 284 (1970) of 29 July 1970, 300 (1971) of 12 October and 301 (1971) of 20 October 1971, 310 (1972) of 4 February 1972 and 366 (1974) of 17 December 1974,

Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971²⁹ that South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its presence from the Territory,

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia,

Concerned at South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia and its persistent refusal to comply with the resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice,

Gravely concerned at South Africa's brutal repression of the Namibian people and its persistent violation of their human rights, as well as its efforts to destroy the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia, and its aggressive military build-up in the area,

Strongly deploring the militarization of Namibia by the illegal occupation regime of South Africa,

1. *Condemns the continued illegal occupation of the Territory of Namibia by South Africa;*

2. *Condemns the illegal and arbitrary application by South Africa of racially discriminatory and repressive laws and practices in Namibia;*

3. *Condemns the South African military build-up in Namibia and any utilization of the Territory as a base for attacks on neighbouring countries;*

4. *Demands that South Africa put an end forthwith to its policy of bantustans and the so-called homelands aimed at violating the national unity and the territorial integrity of Namibia;*

5. *Further condemns South Africa's failure to comply with the terms of Security Council resolution 366 (1974);*

6. *Further condemns all attempts by South Africa*

calculated to evade the clear demand of the United Nations for the holding of free elections under United Nations supervision and control in Namibia;

7. *Declares that, in order that the people of Namibia may be enabled freely to determine their own future, it is imperative that free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations be held for the whole of Namibia as one political entity;*

8. *Further declares that, in determining the date, timetable and modalities for the elections in accordance with paragraph 7 above, there shall be adequate time, to be decided upon by the Security Council, for the purpose of enabling the United Nations to establish the necessary machinery within Namibia to supervise and control such elections, as well as to enable the people of Namibia to organize politically for the purpose of such elections;*

9. *Demands that South Africa urgently make a solemn declaration accepting the foregoing provisions for the holding of free elections in Namibia under United Nations supervision and control, undertaking to comply with the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations and with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 in regard to Namibia, and recognizing the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia as a nation;*

10. *Reiterates its demand that South Africa take the necessary steps to effect the withdrawal, in accordance with Security Council resolutions 264 (1969), 269 (1969) and 366 (1974), of its illegal administration maintained in Namibia and to transfer power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations;*

11. *Demands again that South Africa, pending the transfer of power provided for in paragraph 10 above:*

(a) *Comply fully in spirit and in practice with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;*

(b) *Release all Namibian political prisoners, including all those imprisoned or detained in connexion with offences under so-called internal security laws, whether such Namibians have been charged or tried or are held without charge and whether held in Namibia or South Africa;*

(c) *Abolish the application in Namibia of all racially discriminatory and politically repressive laws and practices, particularly bantustans and homelands;*

(d) *Accord unconditionally to all Namibians currently in exile for political reasons full facilities for return to their country without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment;*

12. *Decides to remain seized of the matter and to meet on or before 31 August 1976 for the purpose of reviewing South Africa's compliance with the terms of the present resolution and, in the event of non-compliance by South Africa, for the purpose of considering the appropriate measures to be taken under the Charter of the United Nations.*

APPENDIX II

LETTER DATED 10 APRIL 1978 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF CANADA, FRANCE, GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

On instructions from our Governments we have the honour to transmit to you a proposal for the settlement of the Namibian situation and to request that it be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

The objective of our proposal is the independence of Namibia in accordance with resolution 385 (1976), adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 30 January 1976. We are continuing to work towards the implementation of the proposal.

(signed)

WILLIAM H. BARTON
*Permanent Representative of Canada to the
United Nations*

M. JACQUES LEPRETTE
*Permanent Representative of France to the
United Nations*

RUDIGER VON WECHMAR
*Permanent Representative of the Federal
Republic of Germany to the United Nations*

JAMES MURRAY
*Deputy Permanent Representative of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland to the United Nations,
Charge d'Affairs, a.i.*

ANDREW YOUNG
*Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations*

Proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation

I. Introduction

1. Bearing in mind their responsibilities as members of the Security Council of the United Nations, the Governments of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States have consulted with the various parties involved with the Namibian situation with a view to encouraging agreement on the transfer of authority in Namibia to an independent government in accordance with resolution 385 (1976), adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 30 January 1976.

2. To this end, our Governments have drawn up a proposal for the settlement of the Namibian question designed to bring about a transition to independence during 1978 within a framework acceptable to the people of Namibia and thus to the international community. While the proposal addresses itself to all elements of resolution 385 (1976), the key to an internationally acceptable transition to independence is free elections for the whole of Namibia as one political entity with an appropriate United Nations role in accordance with resolution 385 (1976). A resolution will be required in the Security Council requesting the Secretary-General to appoint a United Nations Special Representative whose central task will be to make sure that conditions are established which will allow free and fair elections and an impartial electoral process. The Special Representative will be assisted by a United Nations Transition Assistance Group.

3. The purpose of the electoral process is to elect representatives to a Namibian Constituent Assembly which will draw up and adopt the Constitution for an independent and sovereign Namibia. Authority would then be assumed during 1978 by the Government of Namibia.

4. A more detailed description of the proposal is contained below. Our Governments believe that this proposal provides an effective basis for implementing resolution 385 (1976) while taking adequate account of the interests of all parties involved. In carrying out his responsibilities the Special Representative will work together with the official appointed by South Africa (the Administrator

General) to ensure the orderly transition to independence. This working arrangement shall in no way constitute recognition of the legality of the South African presence in and administration of Namibia.

II. The electoral process

5. In accordance with Security Council resolution 385 (1976), free elections will be held, for the whole of Namibia as one political entity, to enable the people of Namibia to freely and fairly determine their own future. The elections will be under the supervision and control of the United Nations in that, as a condition to the conduct of the electoral process, the elections themselves, and the certification of their results, the United Nations Special Representative will have to satisfy himself at each stage as to the fairness and appropriateness of all measures affecting the political process at all levels of administration before such measures take effect. Moreover the Special Representative may himself make proposals in regard to any aspect of the political process. He will have at his disposal a substantial civilian section of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group, sufficient to carry out his duties satisfactorily. He will report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, keeping him informed and making such recommendations as he considers necessary with respect to the discharge of his responsibilities. The Secretary-General, in accordance with the mandate entrusted to him by the Security Council, will keep the Council informed.

6. Elections will be held to select a Constituent Assembly which will adopt a Constitution for an independent Namibia. The Constitution will determine the organization and powers of all levels of government. Every adult Namibian will be eligible, without discrimination or fear of intimidation from any source, to vote, campaign and stand for election to the Constituent Assembly. Voting will be by secret ballot, with provisions made for those who cannot read or write. The date for the beginning of the electoral campaign, the date of elections, the electoral system, the preparation of voters rolls, and other aspects of electoral procedures will be promptly decided upon so as to give all political parties and interested persons, without regard to the political views, a full and fair

opportunity to organise and participate in the electoral process. Full freedom of speech, assembly, movement and press shall be guaranteed. The official electoral campaign shall commence only after the United Nations Special Representative has satisfied himself as to the fairness and appropriateness of the electoral procedures. The implementation of the electoral process, including the proper registration of voters and the proper and timely tabulation and publication of voting results will also have to be conducted to the satisfaction of the Special Representative.

7. The following requirements will be fulfilled to the satisfaction of the United Nations Special Representative in order to meet the objective of free and fair elections:

- a. Prior to the beginning of the electoral campaign, the Administrator General will repeal all remaining discriminatory or restrictive laws, regulations, or administrative measures which might abridge or inhibit that objective.
- b. The Administrator General shall make arrangements for the release, prior to the beginning of the electoral campaign, of all Namibian political prisoners or political detainees held by the South African authorities so that they can participate fully and freely in that process, without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment. Any disputes concerning the release of political prisoners or political detainees shall be resolved to the satisfaction of the Special Representative acting on the independent advice of a jurist of international standing who shall be designated by the Secretary-General to be legal adviser to the Special Representative.
- c. All Namibian refugees or Namibians detained or otherwise outside the territory of Namibia will be permitted to return peacefully and participate fully and freely in the electoral process without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment. Suitable entry points will be designated for these purposes.
- d. The Special Representative with the assistance of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other appropriate international bodies will ensure that Namibians remaining outside of Namibia are given a free and voluntary choice whether to return. Provision will be made to attest to the voluntary nature of decisions made by Namibians who elect not to return to Namibia.

8. A comprehensive cessation of all hostile acts shall be observed by all parties in order to ensure that the electoral process will be free from interference and intimidation. The annex describes provisions for the implementation of the cessation of all hostile acts, military arrangements concerning the United Nations Transition

Assistance Group, the withdrawal of South African forces, and arrangements with respect to other organized forces in Namibia, and with respect to the forces of SWAPO. These provisions call for:

- a. A cessation of all hostile acts by all parties and the restriction of South African and SWAPO armed forces to base.
- b. Thereafter a phased withdrawal from Namibia of all but 1,500 South African troops within 12 weeks and prior to the official start of the political campaign. The remaining South African force would be restricted to Grootfontein or Oshavello or both and would be withdrawn after the certification of the election.
- c. The demobilization of the citizen forces, commandos, and ethnic forces, and the dismantling of their command structures.
- d. Provision will be made for SWAPO personnel outside of the territory to return peacefully to Namibia through designated entry points to participate freely in the political process.
- e. A military section of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group to make sure that the provisions of the agreed solution will be observed by all parties. In establishing the military section of UNTAG, the Secretary-General will keep in mind functional and logistical requirements. The Five Governments, as members of the Security Council, will support the Secretary-General's judgment in his discharge of this responsibility. The Secretary-General will, in the normal manner, include in his consultations all those concerned with the implementation of the agreement. The Special Representative will be required to satisfy himself as to the implementation of all these arrangements and will keep the Security-General informed of developments in this regard.

9. Primary responsibility for maintaining law and order in Namibia during the transition period shall rest with the existing police forces. The Administrator General to the satisfaction of the United Nations Special Representative shall ensure the good conduct of the police forces and shall take the necessary action to ensure their suitability for continued employment during the transition period. The Special Representative shall make arrangements when appropriate for United Nations personnel to accompany the police forces in the discharge of their duties. The police forces would be limited to the carrying of small arms in the normal performance of their duties.

10. The United Nations Special Representative will take steps to guarantee against the possibility of intimidation or interference with the electoral process from whatever quarter.

APPENDIX III

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 2 OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 431 (1978) CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN NAMIBIA

Introduction

1. At its 2082nd meeting on 27 July 1978, the Security Council adopted resolution 431 (1978). By that resolution, the Council, recalling its resolution 385 (1976) and taking note of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation contained in document S/12636 of 10 April 1978, requested me to appoint a Special Representative

for Namibia in order to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations. The full text of resolution 431 (1978) reads as follows:

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 385 (1976) of 30 January 1976, taking note of the proposal for a settlement of the

Namibian situation contained in document S/12636 of 10 April 1978.

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative for Namibia in order to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations.
 2. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to submit at the earliest possible date a report containing his recommendations for the implementation of the proposal in accordance with Security Council resolution 385 (1976);
 3. *Urges* all concerned to exert their best efforts towards the achievement of independence by Namibia at the earliest possible date.
2. Immediately following the decision of the Security Council, I appointed Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, as my Special Representative for the purposes of the resolution.
 3. Mindful of the Council's further request contained in paragraph 2, I requested my Special Representative to undertake, at the earliest possible date, a survey mission to Namibia for the purpose of gathering for me all the information necessary for the preparation of the present report. To assist him in this task, I placed at his disposal a team of United Nations officials and military advisers.
 4. This report, which is based on the survey of my Special Representative, is submitted to the Security Council in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 431 (1978), in which the Council requested the Secretary-General "to submit at the earliest possible date a report containing recommendations for the implementation of the proposal in accordance with Security Council resolution 385 (1976)".

1. The survey mission

5. As stated above, my Special Representative, accompanied by a staff of United Nations officials and military advisers, visited Namibia from 6 to 22 August for the purpose of carrying out a survey of all matters relative to the implementation of resolution 431 (1978).

6. In addition to meetings with the Administrator-General of the Territory and his staff, as well as with the South African military and police commanders and local authorities, the Special Representative had the opportunity to consult extensively with representatives of political parties, churches, the business community and individuals. His consultations in this regard covered a wide spectrum of public opinion within the Territory. In this connexion, the Special Representative and his staff, by travelling extensively within the Territory, were able to familiarize themselves with local conditions which would have relevance to the effective organisation and operation of a United Nations Transition Assistance Group entrusted with the tasks set out in the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation contained in document S/12636.

7. In the course of his meetings and consultations, the Special Representative was able to obtain the view of not only the Administrator-General and his staff but the representatives of the Namibian people on a broad range of important topics relating to the necessary conditions for the holding of free and fair elections and to the role of the United Nations. Among the principal subjects discussed were the repeal of all the remaining discriminatory or restrictive laws, regulations or administrative measures which might abridge or inhibit the objective of free and fair elections; arrangements for ensuring the release of

political prisoners and detainees, as well as the voluntary return of Namibians; the arrangements and dispositions required to ensure the cessation of all hostile acts; the electoral process; the composition and work of the Constituent Assembly; and the time-table for the accomplishment of the above stages. The military aspects of the operation, with special reference to the introduction and functioning of the military component of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group, were also fully discussed. In addition, the Special Representative also discussed with the Administrator-General the manner of ensuring the good conduct of the police and the arrangements necessary to assure the free and unrestricted discharge by the United Nations staff of the tasks assigned to them.

II. General guidelines

8. The implementation of the proposal in paragraph 2 of resolution 431 (1978) will require the establishment of a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in the Territory, consisting of a civilian component and a military component. Because of the unique character of the operation and the need for close co-operation between them, both components will be under the over-all direction of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

9. The Special Representative will report to me, keeping me informed and making such recommendations as he considers necessary with respect to the discharge of his responsibilities. The Secretary-General, in accordance with the mandate entrusted to him by the Security Council, will keep the Council fully informed of developments relating to the implementation of the proposal and to the functioning of UNTAG. All matters which might affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of UNTAG will be referred to the Council for its decision.

10. The deployment of both components of UNTAG must take into account the specific geographic, demographic, economic and social conditions prevailing in Namibia. These include, in particular, the vast distances and varied nature of topography and vegetation; the broad ranges of climatic conditions; the scarcity of water; the population distribution and existing communication network; the distribution and concentration of ethnic groups; and the lack of an adequate infrastructure in the north, such as roads and other communications and facilities. All these factors, when analysed, make it evident that sizeable resources, both military and civilian, will be required to provide the close monitoring called for in document S/12636.

11. In performing its functions, UNTAG will act with complete impartiality. In order that the proposal may be effectively implemented, it is expected that the Administrator-General and all other officials from within the Territory will exhibit the same impartiality.

12. For UNTAG to carry out all its tasks effectively, three essential conditions must be met. First, it must, at all times, have the full support and backing of the Security Council. Second, it must operate with the full co-operation of all the parties concerned, particularly with regard to the comprehensive cessation of all hostile acts. Third, it must be able to operate as a combined United Nations operation, of which the military component will constitute an integrated, efficient formation within the wider framework of UNTAG.

13. To monitor the cessation of hostilities effectively, to maintain surveillance of the Territory's vast borders

and to monitor the restriction to base of the armed forces of the parties concerned, the co-operation and support of the neighbouring countries will be necessary. Such co-operation will be most important, particularly during the early stages.

14. Implementation of the proposal, and thus the work of UNTAG, will have to proceed in successive stages. These stages, which are detailed in the annex to document S/12636, can be grouped as follows:

- a. Cessation of all hostile acts by all parties and the withdrawal, restriction or demobilization of the various armed forces;
- b. Conduct of free and fair elections to the Constituent Assembly, for which the pre-conditions include the repeal of discriminatory or restrictive laws, regulations or administrative measures, the release of political prisoners and detainees and voluntary return of exiles, the establishment of effective monitoring by the United Nations and an adequate period for electoral campaigning;
- c. The formulation and adoption of a constitution for Namibia by the Constituent Assembly;
- d. The entry into force of the constitution and the consequent achievement of independence of Namibia.

15. The length of time required for these stages is directly related to the complexity of the tasks to be performed and to the overriding consideration that certain steps are necessary before it can be said that elections have been held under free and fair conditions. It will be recalled that the proposal envisaged a series of successive stages, spaced so as to provide a sufficient lapse of time before the holding of the elections. This should permit, among other things, the release of political prisoners and detainees, the return and registration of all Namibians outside the Territory who may wish to participate in the electoral process, the deployment of United Nations military and civilian personnel and electoral campaigning by all parties in an atmosphere of tranquility. The time-table set out in the proposal called for the lapse of approximately seven months from the date of the approval of the present report by the Security Council to the holding of the elections.

16. In his discussions with the Special Representative, the Administrator-General said that the South African authorities, having previously established 31 December 1978 as the date of independence, felt that they were committed thereto and that, consequently, the elections should take place as scheduled, regardless of the fact that it would necessitate substantially reducing the time-table necessary for completion of the preparatory plans. A majority of the political parties was of the opinion, however, that it was essential to maintain the orderly phasing of the preparatory stages and to allow sufficient time for electoral campaigning in order to ensure free and fair elections. Further, it was pointed out that the actual date of independence would fall within the competence of the Constituent Assembly.

17. It will be recalled, however, that at the time the proposal was first formulated, the date of 31 December 1978 was consistent with completion of these steps. The delay in reaching agreement among the parties now makes completion by this date impossible. It is therefore recommended that the transitional period begin on the date of approval of the present report by the Security Council and proceed in accordance with the steps outlined in document S/12636. Using the same time-table that earlier provided the 31 December 1978 date, an appropriate date for elections would be approximately seven months from the date of the approval of the present report.

18. Estimates of the periods of time required for completion of stages (a) and (b) of paragraph 14 above are included in the annex to document S/12636. In view of the fact that the periods required for stages (c) and (d) of paragraph 14 would be determined by the Constituent Assembly, it is expected that the duration of UNTAG would be one year, depending on the date of independence to be decided by the Constituent Assembly.

19. UNTAG will have to enjoy the freedom of movement and communication and other facilities that are necessary for the performance of its tasks. For this purpose UNTAG and its personnel must necessarily have all the relevant privileges and immunities provided by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, as well as those especially required for the proposed operation.

20. The military component of UNTAG will not use force except in self-defence. Self-defence will include resistance to attempts to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council. UNTAG will proceed on the assumption that all the parties concerned will co-operate with it and take all the necessary steps for compliance with the decisions of the Security Council.

III. Establishment of UNTAG

A. Military component

21. The functions which will be performed by the military component of UNTAG are set out in paragraph 8 of document S/12636 and in the annex thereto. These include, in particular:

- a. Monitoring the cessation of hostile acts by all parties, the restriction of South African and SWAPO armed forces to base, the phased withdrawal of all except the specified number of South African forces and the restriction of the remainder to specified locations;
- b. Prevention of infiltration as well as surveillance of the borders of the Territory;
- c. Monitoring the demobilization of citizen forces, commandos and ethnic forces, and the dismantling of their command structure.

22. The military component will assist and support the civilian component of UNTAG in the discharge of its tasks.

23. The military component of UNTAG will be under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General, under the Authority of the Security Council. The command in the field will be exercised by a Commander appointed by the Secretary-General with the consent of the Security Council. The Commander will report through the Special Representative to the Secretary-General on all matters concerning the functioning of the military component of UNTAG.

24. The military component will be comprised of a number of contingents to be provided by member countries upon the request of the Secretary-General. The contingents will be selected in consultation with the Security Council and with the parties concerned, bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographical representation. In addition, a body of selected officers to act as monitors will form an integral part of the military component.

25. The military component, including the monitors, will be provided with weapons of a defensive character consistent with the guidelines set out in paragraph 20 above.

26. In order that the military component might fulfil

its responsibilities, it is considered that it should have a strength of the order of seven infantry battalions, totalling approximately 5,000, plus 200 monitors and in addition, command, communications, engineer, logistic and air support elements totalling approximately 2,300. The infantry battalions should be fully self-sufficient.

27. It will be essential to establish an adequate logistic and command system at the very outset of the operation. It will therefore be necessary to obtain urgently from Governments the elements of such a system. In this connexion, it may well be necessary to use also the services of civilian contractors for some logistic functions, as appropriate. In the nature of the physical circumstances pertaining to this operation, UNTAG may have to rely to a considerable extent on existing military facilities and installations in Namibia.

B. Civilian component

28. The civilian component will consist of two elements. One of these elements will be the civil police, whose function will be to assist the Special Representative in implementing the tasks set out in paragraphs 9 and 10 of document S/12636.

29. The duties of the civil police element of UNTAG will include taking measures against any intimidation or interference with the electoral process from whatever quarter, accompanying the existing police forces, when appropriate, in the discharge of their duties and assisting in the realization of the function to be discharged by the Administrator-General to the satisfaction of the Special Representative of ensuring the good conduct of the existing police forces.

30. In order that the UNTAG police may fulfill their responsibilities, as described above, it is considered, as a preliminary estimate, that approximately 360 experienced police officers will be required. It is hoped that police officers will be made available by Governments on a secondment basis, bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographical representation, as well as the language and other requirements of the assignment.

31. The non-police element of the civilian component of UNTAG will have the function of assisting the Special Representative in implementing paragraphs 5 to 7 of document S/12636 and the relevant sections of the annex thereto. These tasks will consist, in particular, of the following:

- a. Supervising and controlling all aspects of the electoral process, considering the fairness and appropriateness of the electoral procedures, monitoring the balloting and the counting of votes, in order to ensure that all procedures are strictly complied with, and receiving and investigating complaints of fraud or challenges relating to the electoral process;
- b. Advising the Special Representatives as to the repeal of discriminatory or restrictive laws, regulations of administrative measures which may abridge or inhibit the objective of free and fair elections;
- c. Ensuring the absence of, or investigating complaints of, intimidation, coercion or restrictions on freedom of speech, movement or peaceful political assembly which may impede the objective of free and fair elections;
- d. Assisting in the arrangements for the release of all Namibian political prisoners or detainees and for the peaceful, voluntary return of Namibian refugees or Namibians detained or otherwise outside the Territory;
- e. Assisting in any arrangements which may be proposed by the Special Representative to the Administrator-General and implemented by the Administrator-General

eral to the Special Representative's satisfaction intended to inform and instruct the electorate as to the significance of the election and the procedures for voting.

32. Bearing in mind the vast size of the Territory, the dispersal of the population and the lack of adequate communications, it is considered, as a preliminary estimate, that approximately 300 Professional officers, as well as the necessary supporting staff, will be required initially until the cessation of hostile acts has been achieved. Thereafter about 1,000 Professional and 200 field service and General Service staff will be required during the electoral campaign and the period of balloting in order to cover all the polling stations. The staff will, among other duties, be required for 24 regional centres and more than 400 polling stations.

33. It is anticipated that some of these officials will be provided from among existing United Nations staff and that some will be persons appointed especially for this operation. In addition, it is my hope that a significant number of officials can be seconded or loaned by Governments. All such seconded or loaned personnel will be required to assume the responsibilities incumbent on United Nations officials.

34. It is also my intention to conduct consultations concerning the designation of a jurist of international standing whose appointment as legal adviser to the Special Representative is provided for in paragraph 7B of document S/12636.

IV. Proposed plan of action

35. Subject to the approval of the present report by the Security Council, it is my intention to initiate the operation as quickly as possible.

36. It is my intention to appoint as Commander of the military component of UNTAG Major-General Hannes Philipp, who has extensive experience of United Nations peace-keeping operations and is already familiar with the situation in Namibia.

37. Immediately following such a decision by the Security Council, the Special Representative, accompanied by the Commander of the military component, the key elements of their staffs together with essential command and logistic elements, will proceed to Namibia in order to establish the headquarters of UNTAG and begin operations as quickly as possible.

38. A number of Governments have already expressed their interest in providing military contingents for UNTAG. Immediately upon the approval of the present report by the Security Council, it is my intention to consult the Council and the parties concerned on the composition of the military component, bearing in mind the principle of equitable geographical representation, on the one hand, and the necessity of obtaining self-sufficient units, on the other. Every effort will be made to begin the deployment of the military component within 3 weeks and to bring it to its full strength within 12 weeks. For this to be achieved, it will be necessary to determine the composition of the military component at the earliest possible time.

39. It is also my intention to approach Governments to provide military personnel to serve as monitors. In the initial stages, given the urgency of deploying at least some of the monitors, it may be possible to draw upon officers already serving with other existing United Nations operations. This may also apply to key staff positions.

40. As regards civilian personnel, it is likewise my intention, as stated in paragraphs 30 and 33 above, to ap-

proach Governments to make available on secondment or loan experienced police officers to serve as police monitors and other experienced officials to serve in the civilian component of UNTAG. In recruiting civilian staff for UNTAG, I shall bear in mind both the accepted principle of equitable geographical representation and the urgent need to deploy a large number of experienced staff within the shortest possible time.

V. Financial implications

41. At present there are too many unknown factors to permit an accurate assessment of the cost of UNTAG. Based on the numbers of personnel specified in this report and the envisaged duration of 12 months, and taking into account the magnitudes and elements of the financial requirements experienced in other peace-keeping opera-

tions, the indications are that the financial requirements for UNTAG could be as high as \$300 million. Of this, approximately \$33 million will be required to finance the return of refugees and exiles. In view of the nature of the operation, due regard should be given to the fact that some elements of the operation might be phased out before the end of the mandate and that alternative arrangements might be possible which could result in lower costs.

42. The costs of UNTAG shall be considered expenses of the Organization to be borne by the Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter.

United Nations Security Council S/12827. 29 August 1978.

APPENDIX IV

RESOLUTION 435 (1978)

ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 2037TH MEETING ON 29 SEPTEMBER 1978

The Security Council

Recalling its resolutions 385 (1976) and 431 (1978), and 432 (1978),

Having considered the report submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 431 (1978) (S/12827) and his explanatory statement made in the Security Council on 29 September 1978 (S/12869),

Taking note of the relevant communications from the Government of South Africa addressed to the Secretary-General,

Taking note also of the letter dated 8 September 1978 from the President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) addressed to the Secretary-General (S/12841),

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia,

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General (S/12827) for the implementation of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation (S/12636) and his explanatory statement (S/12869);

2. Reiterates that its objective is the withdrawal of South Africa's illegal administration of Namibia and the transfer of power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations in accordance with resolution 385 (1976);

3. Decides to establish under its authority a United Na-

tions Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in accordance with the above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General for a period of up to 12 months in order to assist his Special Representative to carry out the mandate conferred upon him by paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 431 (1978), namely, to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations;

4. Welcomes SWAPO's preparedness to co-operate in the implementation of the Secretary-General's report, including its expressed readiness to sign and observe the cease-fire provisions as manifested in the letter from the President of SWAPO dated 8 September 1978 (S/12841);

5. Calls on South Africa forthwith to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution;

6. Declares that all unilateral measures taken by the illegal administration in Namibia in relation to the electoral process, including unilateral registration of voters, or transfer of power, in contravention of Security Council resolutions 385 (1976), 431 (1978) and this resolution are null and void;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council no later than 23 October 1978 on the implementation of this resolution.

APPENDIX V

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 435 (1978) AND 439 (1978) ON THE QUESTION OF NAMIBIA

1. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 439 (1978) concerning the situation in Namibia, I held meetings in New York with the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of South Africa and the Foreign Minister of South Africa from 23 to 24 November (S/12938) and from 27 to 29 November (S/12950). The meetings focused on paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), by which the Security Council called on South Africa forthwith to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the implementation of that resolution; as well as on paragraphs

4 and 5 of Security Council resolution 439 (1978) by which the Security Council called upon South Africa immediately to cancel the elections it had planned in Namibia in December 1978; and demanded once again that South Africa co-operate with the Security Council and the Secretary-General in the implementation of its resolutions 385 (1976), 431 (1978) and 435 (1978).

2. In a letter dated 22 December 1978 (S/12983, Annex I), the Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa in-

formed me that the Government of South Africa had decided to co-operate in the expeditious implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), and invited me to arrange for my Special Representative to "proceed to South Africa and South West Africa" as soon as possible for the purpose of completing consultations on outstanding issues. By letter dated 1 January 1979 (S/13002), I informed the Foreign Minister of South Africa that, following his Government's decision to co-operate in the expeditious implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), I intended to request Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, my Special Representative, to visit South Africa and Namibia in January to complete consultations on operational requirements for the deployment of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG).

3. My Special Representative, accompanied by the Commander of the Military Component of UNTAG and a staff of United Nations officials, visited South Africa and Namibia from 13-22 January for the purpose of completing consultations on the transitional arrangements called for in the Proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation (S/12636) and the operational requirements for the deployment of UNTAG.

4. At a subsequent stage, after reporting to me in New York, my Special Representative visited Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana and Angola from 28 January to 10 February to consult with them on the current situation relating to Namibia. At the invitation of the Government of Nigeria, he also had talks in Lagos from 11-12 February.

5. My Special Representative held consultations with Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO, at Luanda on 9 and 10 February. Their discussions covered the implementation of the settlement Proposal and practical arrangements to be made for the transitional period.

6. My Special Representative has now reported to me on his discussions with the South African authorities, SWAPO and the Governments mentioned above. He informed me of the willingness of both South Africa and SWAPO to co-operate in the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). However, during the meetings between my Special Representative and the representatives of South Africa and SWAPO, it became apparent that the two parties concerned had differing interpretations and perceptions regarding the implementation of certain provisions of the settlement Proposal. With a view to resolving these differences, I considered it necessary to consult further with the five Western Powers, which had worked out the Proposal with South Africa and SWAPO, as well as with the Front Line States.

7. In the light of all the information I have been able to obtain, and after hearing the views of the parties directly concerned, I have concluded that, in the circumstances and as a practical matter, the outstanding issues referred to in the paragraphs below should be resolved among the following lines.

A. Return of Namibians

8. The settlement Proposal (S/12636), in paragraph 7 (c), states that "all Namibian refugees or Namibians detained or otherwise outside the Territory of Namibia will be permitted to return peacefully and participate fully and freely in the electoral process without risk of arrest, detention,

intimidation or imprisonment. Suitable entry points will be designated for these purposes." The South African Government has confirmed to my Special Representative its acceptance of this provision in its entirety and I shall take all measures to ensure that it is scrupulously observed.

9. In order to facilitate the peaceful return of Namibians to the Territory, provisions have been made by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for the establishment of entry points and facilities to assist these returning Namibians. In accordance with normal UNHCR practice, reception centres will provide transit facilities for those returning Namibians who want them. These centres will be operated under the close supervision of the UNHCR to ensure that all returning Namibians will be free to locate where they wish; any other arrangements would be contrary to the guarantee of full freedom of movement in paragraph 6 of the settlement Proposal.

10. The provision made in paragraph 8 (d) of the settlement Proposal for SWAPO personnel outside of the Territory to return peacefully to Namibia through designated entry points to participate fully in the political process means that such return should take place without arms or other military equipment. Should any personnel seek to return bearing arms or equipment, such items would be placed under United Nations control.

B. Restriction to base

11. According to the settlement Proposal, coincidental with a cessation of all hostile acts the South African Defence Forces (SADF) and SWAPO armed forces will be restricted to base. This would involve the restriction to base of all SADF forces within Namibia and their subsequent phased withdrawal as outlined in the Proposal. Any SWAPO armed forces in Namibia at the time of the cease-fire will likewise be restricted to base at designated locations inside Namibia to be specified by the Special Representative after necessary consultation. The monitored move of these SWAPO armed forces to base cannot be considered as a tactical move in terms of the cease-fire.

12. All SWAPO armed forces in neighbouring countries will, on the commencement of the cease-fire, be restricted to base in these countries. While the Proposal makes no specific provision for the monitoring by UNTAG of SWAPO bases in neighbouring countries, nevertheless, paragraph 12 of the Proposal states that: "Neighbouring countries shall be requested to ensure to the best of their abilities that the provisions of the transitional arrangements, and the outcome of the election, are respected. They shall also be requested to afford the necessary facilities to the United Nations Special Representative and all United Nations personnel to carry out their assigned functions and to facilitate such measures as may be desirable for ensuring tranquility in the border areas."

13. I attach special importance to the repeated assurances which I have received from the neighbouring States to the effect that they will ensure to the best of their abilities that the provisions of the settlement are adhered to. In this connexion, in order to facilitate further this co-operation, I have sought the agreement of the Governments of Angola, Botswana and Zambia for the establishment of UNTAG offices in their countries to co-operate

with them in the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Proposal.

C. Cease-fire arrangements

14. The settlement Proposal calls for "a comprehensive cessation of all hostile acts". As previously indicated by me (see S/12869 and S/12938) it is my intention to propose a procedure for the commencement of the cease-fire. Thereafter, the various steps indicated in the Proposal for a settlement, as reflected in resolution 435 (1978), would take place. I intend to send identical letters to South Africa and SWAPO proposing a specific hour and date for the cease-fire to begin. In that letter I would also request both parties to inform me in writing of their agreement to abide by the terms of the cease-fire. I would require that they advise me of their agreement by a specific date which would be ten days before the beginning of the cease-fire. This period is necessary for both parties to have adequate time to inform their troops of the exact date and time for the commencement of the cease-fire and for UNTAG to deploy. The text of the proposed letter is attached as an annex to this report.

D. Composition of the military component

15. Aside from the outstanding issues concerning the implementation of the settlement Proposal mentioned above, the question of the composition of the military component of UNTAG remains to be finalized. In the course of my consultations with the parties, I have communicated to them a list of possible troop-contributing countries which, in the circumstances, I consider can best meet the requirements of UNTAG. Before the commencement of the United Nations operation in Namibia, I shall submit to the Security Council, in accordance with established practice, the proposed composition of the military component. In drawing up the list of contributing countries, I shall take into due account the views of the parties while seeking to balance those factors I consider essential in the case, such as the principle of equitable geographical representation, the willingness of the troop-contributing countries to participate and, in the case of logistics, the capacity to perform the required tasks.

E. Agreement on the status of UNTAG

16. A draft agreement on the status of UNTAG was first presented to the South African authorities in August 1978. Agreement has now been reached with those authorities in respect of most of its provisions. As stated in my report of 29 August 1978 (S/12827) UNTAG and its personnel must necessarily have all the relevant privileges and immunities provided for by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, as well as those especially required for the proposed operation.

Concluding remarks

17. The settlement Proposal requires that all its provisions be completed to the satisfaction of the Special

Representative. In agreeing to the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), the parties have agreed to abide by those provisions. The United Nations has the responsibility of assessing the implementation of the various military provisions of the Proposal. Similarly, the Special Representative is to be satisfied about the various provisions regarding the creation of conditions for and the conduct of elections. There is no basis for unilateral determinations or for unilateral actions by any party. At the same time it is recognized that the effective implementation of the Proposal is dependent upon the continued co-operation of the parties. Should the implementation of the Proposal be jeopardized as a result of failure of any party to carry out its provisions, I would bring the matter immediately to the attention of the Security Council.

18. I have already communicated to the Government of South Africa and SWAPO the basic elements of the proposals contained in this report. In the light of the above proposals, and if the co-operation of the parties concerned is forthcoming, I intend to designate the date of 15 March 1979 for the commencement of the emplacement of UNTAG and the entry into force of the cease-fire. The letter on the cease-fire will be transmitted accordingly. In the interim, I appeal to all parties to exercise restraint and to refrain from actions which might jeopardize the settlement.

19. I should like to draw attention to paragraph 18 of my report of 29 August 1978 (S/12827) in which I stated that "it is expected that the duration of UNTAG would be for one year, depending on the date of independence to be decided by the Constituent Assembly".

ANNEX

Cease-fire letter to be sent by the Secretary-General to both the South African Government and SWAPO

"In accordance with the Proposal for a Settlement of the Namibian situation as approved by Security Council resolution 435 (1978), I propose that a cease-fire take place beginning at 0000 hours on 15 March 1979. At that time comprehensive cessation of all hostile acts is to take effect.

"I request you to assure me in writing no later than 5 March 1979 that you have accepted the terms of the cease-fire and that you have taken all necessary measures to cease all warlike acts and operations. These include tactical moves, cross-border movements and all acts of violence and intimidation in, or having effect in Namibia."

APPENDIX VI

JOINT STATEMENT OF THE MINISTERS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA AND THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA ON THE 21ST ANNIVERSARY OF THE HEROIC 4TH OF FEBRUARY MARKING THE LAUNCHING OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE THAT IN 1975 BROUGHT INDEPENDENCE TO ANGOLA.

LUANDA, 4TH FEBRUARY 1982

As we commemorate the 21st Anniversary of the heroic 4th of February marking the launching of the armed struggle that in 1975 brought Independence to Angola, the Foreign Ministers of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba, in Luanda, on behalf of and representing their respective Governments wish to make the following

STATEMENT

The presence of Cuban Forces in Angola has been the target of slanderous and ill-intentioned imperialist propaganda, particularly by the U.S., which has shamelessly made every effort to link this presence to the process of Namibia's Independence, as a means of preventing implementation of the resolutions previously adopted by the United Nations.

In response to this situation, the Governments of Angola and Cuba consider it their duty fully to clarify international public opinion upon the reasons for the Cuban forces continuing presence in Angola.

We recall that the reason for the Cuban Forces' arrival in Angola, at the request of President Agostinho Neto, and the reason for their continuing presence at the request of Angolan Government, is in order to cooperate with the Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola, FAPLA, in their training, and in the defence of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the People's Republic of Angola, threatened and under aggression from the South African racists, imperialism, its mercenaries and puppets.

On October 14th 1975, the Government of the U.S.A. launched the South African Defence Force against Angola, in order to implement its plan of wiping out the Angolan revolutionary movement, and taking advantage of the fact that the South African racists were illegally occupying the territory of Namibia, as they continue to do, today.

In less than 20 days, the South African troops advanced over 700 kms into Angolan territory. Meanwhile, in the North, regular foreign troops and mercenaries were approaching and threatening the capital. It was then that President Agostinho Neto called on Cuba for military assistance.

The heroic resistance of the Angolan People, supported by the friendly internationalist forces, made it possible not only to contain the advance of the racist South African troops some 200 kms from Luanda, but also created conditions forcing them to abandon Angolan soil in March 1976.

The occupation by South Africa of Angola would have constituted a grave danger to States in the region, and in fact to the whole of Independent Africa.

Cuba's internationalist aid to the Angolan people in their resistance against the South African invaders is therefore a valiant contribution to the struggle of the African peoples against colonialism, racism and apartheid.

Because these events constituted an application of the principles and objectives of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the Fifth Summit held in Sri Lanka in August

1976 "congratulated the Government and the People of Angola for their heroic and victorious struggle against racist South African invaders and their allies, and hailed the Republic of Cuba and other states which came to the assistance of the Angolan People and frustrated the expansionist and colonialist strategy of the South African regime and its allies".

Accordingly, the Governments of Angola and Cuba declare:

1—The presence and the withdrawal of the Cuban Forces stationed in Angola constitute a bilateral question between two sovereign states, the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2—The Governments of Angola and Cuba, only one month after the expulsion of the racist South African troops, agreed on a programme of progressive reduction of these forces on April 22nd 1976. In less than one year the Cuban military contingent was reduced by more than a third, however the process was interrupted due to fresh external threats against Angola.

3—The extent and depth of South African aggression against Kassinga, in May 1978, and the threatening presence of paratroopers from NATO Member countries on the North East frontier constituted a serious danger to Angola and made the continuing presence of Cuban military forces essential, together with the necessary means to guarantee Angola's security and territorial integrity.

4—In mid-1979, the Governments of Angola and Cuba again agreed to embark upon a fresh programme of gradual reduction of Cuban forces. Almost immediately afterwards, in September of the same year, the South African carried out a series of widespread major attacks against the provinces of Cunene and Huila.

5—In August 1981, a major act of aggression was carried out with the invasion of Cunene province by contingents of regular South African troops supported by heavy weapons, artillery, armoured vehicles and dozens of warplanes, and which culminated in the occupation of the provincial capital and other localities for several weeks. In spite of condemnation by the international community of this criminal act of aggression, expressed furthermore in a United Nations Security Council Resolution, which was then vetoed by the U.S. administration, the South African troops continued to occupy considerable areas of the provinces of Cunene and Kuando Kubango.

6—It is thus clear that the carrying out of the programme of gradual reduction of Cuban forces in the People's Republic of Angola has been interrupted several times by the constant and criminal acts of aggression perpetrated against Angola.

7—Over the course of these years, the U.S.A. and South Africa have increased their utilisation, as an instrument of aggression against Angola, of bands of counter-revolutionaries with their Headquarters, training camps, arsenals of military equipment and communications centres in Namibia. At the same time, the present U.S. Administration is increasing its political, economic

From your observations do you believe that Castro will remove his troops from Angola if authorities request he do so, even if some of his demands are not met? That is a followup to the chairman's question.

Mr. GRAY. From all of the information that I have gathered from talking with African leaders on my most recent trip to Africa, as well as talking to them over the last year and a half, I think it has been very clear that they all want to see the Cuban troops removed.

What they do not see is the connection between independence for Namibia and the removal of those troops, because those troops are providing to some extent, from their viewpoint, security. Thus I think, in terms of Fidel Castro's statements, his statements will not be the determinative statements but the views of the Angolans themselves as well as the Front Line states would have a more important weight, Congressman, in terms of having them removed.

So I do not think Fidel Castro is going to call the shots on when those Cuban troops are going to be removed. I think what will determine that is, one, when there is an independent Namibia and the threat of further South African incursions into Angola is removed.

When that is removed, I think you will see pressure. Even if the Angolan Government does not want to move the Cuban troops out, I think you will see tremendous pressure from Front Line states asking that those troops be sent back to Cuba.

I think it is simply in the interest of the Front Line states to see that happen. It is not in their interest to see foreign troops stationed permanently in large numbers in a neighboring country. That leads to potential further instability. So I think they will be removed once Namibia becomes independent.

Mr. SOLOMON. You just outlined the demands that Castro is asking for. Therefore, I think you said that if all of those demands are not met, then those troops will not come out of there?

Mr. GRAY. No; I have not outlined Castro's demands. To me it is what demands Fidel Castro made in his speech of July 1982. I am only giving you the views I have ascertained from African leaders and from talking with people from Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, the OAU, as well as Angolans. I am not familiar with what Fidel Castro said in July of 1982 at all.

I guess what I am really saying, Congressman, is I do not think whatever he said in a vacuum is going to make a tremendous difference once there is an independent Namibia.

I think that the Angolans will send the Cuban troops home. They will do so because there will be tremendous pressure brought by other Front Line leaders and other African leaders, as well as it will not be in their interest to keep them.

Mr. SOLOMON. Just to conclude then, are you telling me that you think if the Angolan Government asks for them to be removed, then Castro will remove them?

Mr. GRAY. Absolutely.

Mr. SOLOMON. Upon request?

Mr. GRAY. Absolutely.

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Crockett.

and military aid to South Africa, its gendarme against the peoples of Southern Africa, in flagrant disregard for the resolutions of the U.N., the O.U.A., the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and of international public opinion. The danger to Angola and to the other Front-line countries is today greater than ever.

8—Faced with this hypocritical intention of making the question of Namibia's Independence conditional upon the withdrawal of Cuba's force, the Angolan and Cuban Governments reiterate that the presence of these forces, prompted by external aggression perpetrated by the racist and fascist South African troops, in close alliance with the United States of America, constitutes an absolute sovereign and legitimate act by both countries and consequently is no way linked to the problem of Namibia.

9—If the selfless struggle of SWAPO, the only legitimate representative of the Namibian people, and the demands of the international community, succeed in winning a true solution to the problem of Namibia, based on strict implementation of Resolution 435/78 of the

United Nations Security Council, and leading to a genuinely independent government and to the total withdrawal of South Africa's occupying troops to beyond the Orange River, which would considerably lessen the danger of aggression against Angola, then the Angolan and Cuban Governments would analyze renewal of execution of a programme of gradual withdrawals of the Cuban forces, over a period of time agreed upon by both Governments.

10—It follows that, as and when the Angolan and Cuban Governments may so intend, the withdrawal of the Cuban forces stationed in Angolan territory would be carried out by sovereign decision of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola, once each and every eventuality of acts of aggression or armed invasion cease to exist. The Government of Cuba, therefore, reiterates that it shall implement without hesitation any decision adopted by the sovereign Government of the People's Republic of Angola on the withdrawal of these same Forces.

Paulo T. Jorge Foreign Minister People's Republic of Angola	Isidoro Malmierca Foreign Minister Republic of Cuba
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APPENDIX VII

STATE DEPARTMENT MEMORANDUM ON PRETORIA MEETING MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: *South Africa:*
Foreign Minister Pik Botha
Defense Minister Magnus
Malan

U.S.
Assistant Secretary-designate
Chester Crocker
Alan Keyes, S/P

DATE & PLACE: April 15/16, 1981, Pretoria
SUBJECT: Discussions with SAG
COPIES TO: AF, IO-McElhaney, S/P-
Keyes, AF/S

US-Africa Relations:

Botha opened first day's discussion by expressing unhappiness over what SAG perceives as backsliding by Administration from view of South Africa taken during U.S. presidential campaign. Reagan campaign statements produced high expectations in South Africa. But, administration, in response to views of allies, such as UK and Germany, and to influence State Department professionals, has disappointed SAG expectations. USG handling of visit by military officers example of this. Botha raised issue of trust, referring to earlier "McHenry" duplicity on issue of SWAPO bases.

However, he affirmed that it means a great deal to SAG to have good relations with U.S. and that SAG understands U.S. problems in maintaining friendly relations with black African states. To begin second day's discussion, Crocker noted that, though he hadn't come to discuss South Africa's internal affairs, it was clear that positive movement domestically would make it easier for the U.S. to work with SAG. U.S. ability to develop full relations with SAG depends on success of Prime Minister Botha's program and extent to which it is seen as broadening SAG's domestic support. "Pik" Botha cautioned against making success of P.W. Botha's program a condition of U.S./South African relations. Crocker responded

with view that this is not a condition but reflects U.S. desire to support positive trends. In response Pik Botha went more fully into reasons for deep SAG distrust of U.S. Botha reiterated view that, as result of pressure from African states in UN, and influence of State Department, USG has backed away from initial recognition of importance of its interests in southern Africa (read South Africa). He doubted whether, given domestic pressures and views of such African states as Nigeria, U.S. could continue any policy favorable to South Africa, which would not provoke constant criticism.

In response, Crocker replied that present Administration would have more backbone in face of pressure than previous one. U.S. has many diverse interests and responsibilities, but will stand up for what we think right. Our objective is to increase SAG confidence.

Toward end of discussion, in context of Angola issue, Botha again came back to question of trust. He said he is suspicious of U.S. because of way U.S. dropped SAG in Angola in 1975. He argued that SAG went into Angola with USG support, then U.S. voted to condemn in UN. Cited many examples of past USG decisions that didn't inspire confidence—Vietnam, Iran, USG failure to support moderate governments in Africa, while aiding those with leftist rhetoric. Alluding to Chad, Botha asserted that

African leaders became so desperate for help against Qadafi that one even approached SAG privately, as last resort, to ask for help. Botha admitted that SAG can't yet pass judgement on present Administration. He pleaded for consistency, "When we say something, let's stick to it."

Crocker addressed trust issue, saying that new Administration is tired of double think and double talk. Despite rocky start in US/SAG relations, improvement is possible. Reagan election victory represents enormous change in US public opinion on foreign policy reversing trend of post-Vietnam years.

SAG View of Regional Situation:

During first day's session Botha discussed at length situation in southern Africa and Africa at large. He cited economic, food and population problems to support view that Africa is a dying continent because Africans have made a mess of their independence. Botha asserted belief that cause isn't race, but fact that new nations lack experience, cultural background, technical training.

Referring to South African past experience in helping and training blacks in neighbouring states, Botha discussed the need for peaceful co-existence between South Africa and its neighbors. Until they recognize they're making a mess of their independence, South Africa can't help them. South Africa is willing to help those who admit they need its help.

On this basis Botha presented vision of southern Africa's future, in context of "Constellation of States" concept. He appealed for USG support for South Africa's view of region's future, involving a confederation of states, each independent, but linked by a centralizing secretariat. SAG doesn't expect U.S. support for apartheid, but it hopes there will be no repeat of Mondale's "One man, One Vote" statement. SAG goal is survival of white values, not white privileges.

Botha argued that central issue in southern Africa is subversion. Noting that what ANC does, South Africa can do better, Botha stressed need for agreement on non-use of force. If regions starts to collapse, fire will spread, there will be no winners. This is not meant as threat, but simply stating facts. Botha emphasized view that if you kill the part of Africa containing people who can do things, you kill whole of Africa.

Asked about U.S. view of the importance of southern Africa, Crocker summarized U.S. regional interests in context of its global responsibilities. He emphasized U.S. desire to deal with destabilization threats worldwide by going to their sources, using means tailored to each source and region involved. Crocker made clear that in Africa we distinguish between countries where Soviets and Cubans have a combat presence, and those whose governments espousing Marxism for their own practical purposes. He stressed that top U.S. priority is to stop Soviet encroachment in Africa. U.S. wants to work with SAG, but ability to deal with Soviet presence severely impeded by Namibia. Crocker alluded to black African view that South Africa contributes to instability in region. Said he agrees with this view to extent SAG goes beyond reprisal. Putting fears in minds of inferior powers makes them irrational.

Namibia/Angola Issue

Malan raised topic of Angola during first session. He asked about a supposed U.S. plan for an all-African force to replace the Cubans in Angola. Crocker responded that he was aware of no such plan, except perhaps as a sym-

bolic gesture, views were exchanged on the character of the MPLA Government, with the South Africans firmly asserting its domination by Moscow, while Crocker suggested a more nuanced view, allowing for several factions within the MPLA varying in ideological commitment and character. Discussion touched briefly on the nature of SWAPO. Botha alluded to the view that Nujoma is a "Bloody Thug".

Malan flatly declared that the SAG can't accept prospects of a SWAPO victory which brings Soviet/Cuban forces to Walvis Bay. This would result from any election which left SWAPO in a dominant position. Therefore a SWAPO victory would be unacceptable in the context of a Westminster-type political system. Namibia needs a federal system. SAG does not rule out an internationally acceptable settlement, but could not live with a SWAPO victory that left SWAPO unchecked power. Botha asserted that Ovambo dominance after the election would lead to civil war.

Crocker addressed these concerns saying USG recognized need to build South African confidence and security. Malan interposed with the view that it is the local people in Namibia who need security, and SAG could accept SWAPO victory only if their security is provided for. SAG can't dictate to local parties. Crocker remarked upon need to negotiate with governments, which ultimately means that parties can't have veto power. In response Botha gave eloquent rendition of SAG's problem in dealing with the internal parties. These parties fear secret plot to install SWAPO government. SAG doesn't wish to entrench white privileges but some confidence-building measures needed. Discussion briefly explored constitutional issues. South Africans asked who would write a constitution. Crocker alluded to idea of expert panel.

SAG sees Savimbi in Angola as buffer for Namibia. SAG believes Savimbi wants southern Angola. Having supported him this far, it would damage SAG honor if Savimbi is harmed.

Second round of discussions went into greater detail on Namibia/Angola questions. Malan declared SAG view that Angola/Namibia situation is number one problem in southern Africa. Angola is one place where U.S. can roll back Soviet/Cuban presence in Africa. Need to get rid of Cubans, and support UNITA. UNITA is going from strength to strength, while SWAPO grows militarily weaker.

In his response Crocker agreed on relation of Angola to Namibia. USG believes it would be possible to improve US/South African relations if Namibia were no longer an issue. We seek a settlement, but one in our interest, based on democratic principles. Our view is that South Africa is under no early military pressure to leave Namibia. The decision belongs to SAG, and ways must be found to address its concerns. USG assumes Soviet/Cuban presence is one of those concerns, and we are exploring ways to remove it in context of Namibia settlement. We agree that UNITA is an important factor in the Angolan situation. We believe there can be no peace in Angola without reconciliation between UNITA and MPLA. We see no prospect of military victory for UNITA. Must achieve movement toward reconciliation by playing on divisions in MPLA. With regard to Namibia, USG assumes that constitution is an important issue, which must be resolved before elections. The constitution would include guarantees for minority rights and democratic processes. We have said we believe SCR 435 is a basis for transition to independence for Namibia, but not for a full settlement. We wish to meet SAG concerns, while taking account of views on other side. We cannot

scrap 435 without great difficulty. We wish to supplement rather than discard it.

Milan took up Namibian question, observing that internationalization of the issue posed greatest difficulty. He alluded to tremendous distrust of UN in South Africa. He questioned inclusion of South Africa and Front Line states in the quest for a settlement, asserting that SWAPO and the internal parties should conclude it. He agreed on the need for a constitution. But 435 can't work. The longer it takes to solve the Namibia question, the less South African presence will be required there. We will reach a stage where internal forces in Namibia can militarily defeat SWAPO.

Milan's remarks set stage for Botha to discuss SAG view of SWAPO. Botha noted that SAG thought it was important to U.S. to stop Soviet gains. But if you say SWAPO not Marxist, you move in same direction as previous administration. SWAPO's people are indoctrinated in Marxism every day. Savimbi considers SWAPO universally Marxist. SAG's bottom line is no Moscow flag in Windhoek. If U.S. disagrees, let sanctions go on, and get out of the situation. South Africa can survive sanctions. Eventually South Africa can get support of moderate black African states. Better to start US/SAG relations with lower expectations, than to disagree angrily later. At moment, U.S. doesn't believe SAG view of SWAPO; you're soft on SWAPO. SAG appreciates U.S. firmness against Soviets, Botha continued. Even Africans now see you assuming leadership. But SAG worried that USG is moving toward Namibia plan SAG cannot understand. As with Kissinger attempt on Rhodesia, it will be difficult to get consensus, especially with so many parties involved. SAG tried one-on-one approach with Angolans, but Geneva meetings sidetracked effort. SAG has tried Angolans several times. Each time there is progress, but then something intervenes. We're convinced Moscow controls present government in Angola. We're convinced SWAPO is Marxist. Nujoma will nationalize the whole place, and cause upheaval and civil war, involving countries as well. We are pleading for you to see the dangers of a wrong solution in Namibia. It would be better to have a low-level conflict there indefinitely, than to have a civil war escalating to a general conflagration. If Nujoma governs as an Ovambo, the Hereros will fight. Also, Nujoma made promises to the Soviets. Defectors from SWAPO have revealed their plan to SAG—first Namibia, then Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, followed by the final attack on South Africa. SAG can't ignore this reality. We wouldn't justify that to our people. South Africa is a democracy as far as white voters are concerned. Even black leaders can criticize the government. South Africa has freedom, and can have more, but survival is the prerequisite. The BLS leaders agree with us. Even some Front Line leaders see the danger. We have twice saved Kaunda's life.

The situation is not what you think. You think in global terms; we're not a global power. We must safeguard our interests here. Not just white interests. We see the necessity of avoiding black-white polarization. But we see it as an ideological struggle. Developed moderate blacks are not communists. They will engage with us in common effort against communism. When whites see blacks as allies, whites will move away from discrimination. With more distribution of economic goods, more blacks will join us. But if we all come under Moscow's domination, that's the end.

Crocker addressed Botha's expressed fears and concerns

by first accepting the premise that Soviet domination is the danger. But U.S. believes best way to avoid that danger is to get Namibia issue behind us. As long as issue subsists, we cannot reach a situation where U.S. can engage with South Africa in security, and include South Africa in our general security framework. If Namibia continues, it will open South/Central Africa to the Soviets. Simmering conflict in Namibia is not acceptable. The ideas U.S. has in mind don't include Soviets in Windhoek. We believe we can get the Soviets out of Angola, and provide a guarantee of security whether Nujoma wins or not.

Botha said this is the nitty-gritty. Without Soviet support, others won't accept Nujoma's rule. To satisfy others we need a political solution. Crocker agreed that a political solution is needed. Botha stressed the need to consult with leaders in Namibia. If U.S. can gain their confidence, and SWAPO's, and talk about minority rights, progress is possible. People in Namibia are concerned about property, an independent judiciary, freedom of religion, the preservation of their language and the quality of education under the present system, discrimination has been abolished by law, though it continues in practice. There is also the problem of the white ethnic Legislature vs. the black majority Council of Ministers.

Crocker said that U.S. understands concern with constitutional rights. U.S. has inherited a situation with many parties but we must build a consensus in Africa that we are serious and not just delaying. We believe a Lancaster type conference won't work. We see a panel of experts, consulting all parties, writing a constitution, and then selling it through the Contact Group. With SAG's help, we could sell it to the internal parties. Botha referred to reports of a French constitutional plan. He said that he's against multiple plans. Botha stressed need for U.S. leadership, and emphasized need for U.S. to consult with internal parties in Namibia. He discussed SAG relations with internal leaders, and need to avoid leaving them in lurch in order not to be discredited with other moderate leaders in Africa. He tied this to possibility of SAG cooperating with moderate African states to deal with economic development problems. Botha concluded by saying that SAG doesn't want to let Namibia go the wrong way; that's why South Africa is willing to pay the price of the war. We pray and hope for a government favorably disposed to us. The internal parties don't want us to let go until they have sufficient power to control the situation. We want an anti-Soviet black government.

Following the substantive discussion, Botha conveyed to Crocker written communications from the heads of Bophuthatswana and Venda. He explained that their ambassadors wanted to deliver the messages in person, but Botha decided to convey them to avoid appearance of trying to force U.S. hand. Then question of invitation to Botha to visit U.S. in May was discussed. Crocker stressed need for SAG to decide cooperation with U.S. was worth it before accepting invitation. Botha resisted setting any conditions for visit, and said he would prefer not to come if conditions are set. Crocker said there were no conditions, just a question of clarifying the spirit in which the visit would take place. Botha ended the discussion by noting that he would inform internal parties about discussion immediately. He said he would tell Prime Minister Botha that SAG should explore question of constitution before an election in Namibia. He noted that a referendum on the constitution rather than constituent assembly elections, would make matters easier.

APPENDIX VIII

STATEMENT BY SAM NUJOMA, PRESIDENT OF THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION (SWAPO) OF NAMIBIA, TO A MEETING OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP, AT BRUSSELS, 28TH SEPTEMBER 1982

Mr. Chairman,
Honourable Members of the European Parliament,
Distinguished Guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Allow me, first of all, to express, on behalf of SWAPO and the embattled Namibian people, deep gratitude for this unique opportunity which you Honourable members of the European Parliament have accorded me to be here today in order to brief you about the plight, the hopes and the aspirations of the oppressed Namibian people.

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to seize this opportunity to register, on behalf of SWAPO, sincere thanks to the EEC member countries for humanitarian and educational assistance rendered to the Namibian people, through our movement. Your governments and your peoples have bilaterally made considerable medical, food and clothing donations to our movement in order to enable us to alleviate the health, social and educational problems of thousands of Namibian refugees and exiles who have fled their country, Namibia, in order to escape the brutal and racist repression and colonial domination in our country.

Collectively also, your governments have made educational funds and other humanitarian assistance available to our displaced people through the EEC channels. Various educational projects for Namibian refugees are being implemented with contribution of funds by the EEC. In this connection, I would like to mention the EEC funding of the vocational training project in Denmark where several Namibian refugees are now undergoing training. The EEC has also contributed to the funding of the United Nations Institute for Namibia and to the Distance Education Programme for Namibia, both of which are located in Lusaka, the capital of the Republic of Zambia.

Humanitarian assistance to the Namibian refugees from your governments has also reached our refugee centres in the front-line countries through the various non-governmental organisations of your countries. For all this, SWAPO is truly grateful. And we believe that this valuable humanitarian and educational assistance represents a positive beginning of important links between the EEC and Namibia whose long-delayed independence is but a matter of time.

Mr. Chairman, while SWAPO is convinced that Namibia's independence cannot be delayed indefinitely, I consider it appropriate to point out the fact that I address you here today at a time when the prospects for an early implementation of the UN Plan for the decolonisation of Namibia are, once again, looking bleak. After five years of intensive and sustained diplomatic efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement of the problem of South African illegal and colonial occupation of our country, the Namibian people are still suffering under the yoke of apartheid oppression.

In utter disregard of the wishes of the Namibian people and resolutions of the international community, apartheid South Africa is bent on the imposition of its own Bantustan version of independence on our people.

The racist regime in Pretoria has, since 1978, been and continues to create one excuse after another in an attempt to block the implementation of the UN Plan for the independence of Namibia; and while pretending to negotiate in good faith, the regime is, in actual fact, doing every-

thing within its power to deny the Namibian people the right to elect a government of their choice. South Africa is doing all this because it is very much afraid that under free, fair and democratic elections, the Namibian people will definitely repudiate its Bantustan puppets whom it has created and sought to impose on us over the last seven years of the Turnhalle puppet show.

The fundamental contradiction in Namibia is, therefore, our people's demand for free and democratic elections under UN supervision, on one hand, and South Africa's attempt to deny the Namibian people that democratic choice, on the other. The apartheid regime has not yet given up its intention to impose on our people puppet leaders chosen by Pretoria to serve the interest of South Africa in Namibia.

The pattern has become very familiar that at every point when the negotiations on Namibia are about to reach the implementation stage of UN Security Council Resolution 435, South Africa would come up with one excuse behind which to hide and thus to avoid the implementation of the resolution.

It can, for instance, be recalled that after she had accepted that resolution in 1978, Pretoria refused to allow its implementation by claiming that the number of 7,500 UN military personnel proposed by the Secretary-General to monitor the transitional process in Namibia was too large.

By 1979, the excuse behind which Pretoria was hiding was the South African complaint about the provision in the UN Plan that SWAPO armed forces, who will be found inside Namibia at the time of the cease-fire, would be confined to assembly points or bases within the Namibian territory.

By 1980, South Africa had come up with something else, i.e., the so-called UN lack of impartiality. Today, the excuse is the presence of the Cubans in Angola. This endless fabrication of excuses testifies to our conviction that the apartheid state is not yet ready to allow the Namibian people to exercise their democratic and national right to independence and self-determination.

It is important to note, however, that in the present impasse it was not Pretoria but Washington which has invented the issue of a linkage between the independence of Namibia and the presence of the Cubans in Angola. South Africa has merely found the American insistence on this issue to be yet another convenient excuse behind which to hide further in order to avoid free, fair and democratic elections in Namibia.

It is, indeed, a sad and tragic development of international politics that a leading world power, which claims to be the citadel of democracy, should choose to use the sufferings and agony of our unfortunate and small nation as a bargaining card in pursuit of its own global objectives.

Because of the decision by the Reagan Administration to hold up Namibia's independence and to use our people's agony and sufferings as a bargain card, the process of bringing Namibia to independence through a negotiated settlement has now come to a virtual stand-still; and, in

the meantime, Pretoria is daily intensifying its cold-blooded murder of our people, torturing them, burning down their villages and destroying their property in an attempt to force them to accept its own puppet arrangements in Namibia.

The catalogue of cases of atrocities that are being perpetrated against our people by the South African troops in Namibia is becoming extremely long and horrifying. It was in this light that the British Council of Churches sent a fact-finding mission, led by the Bishop of Manchester, the Rt. Rev. Stanley Booth-Clibborn, and the Rt. Rev. John Johansen-Berg, to Namibia.

The delegation of the British Council of Churches visited Namibia from the 16th to 28th November, 1981, and it was able to confirm what our movement has been telling the world—that a very brutal reign of terror exists in Namibia today. At the conclusion of their mission, the British religious leaders had the following to say:

'We have . . . been deeply saddened by many of the things we have heard and seen of the grave hardships faced by so many people . . . Our delegation leaves Namibia conscious of the great sufferings, caused by the war, to many people, especially in the northern areas. We heard accounts of deaths, torture, beatings and seizure of property . . . through arbitrary actions of the (South African) security forces . . . We experienced at first hand the deep desire of the great majority of the people of Namibia for independence under a government elected fairly and freely . . . Only in this way can the terrible sufferings brought about by the war be ended.'

The delegation of the British church people was followed by another one from the South African Council of Churches, led by Bisho Desmond Tutu and the Reverend Peter Storey, who visited our country in February this year. Like their British counterparts, the South African spiritual leaders came back from Namibia fully convinced that the South African army of occupation in Namibia is actually engaged in brutal mass repression and cold-blooded murder, rape and destruction of peasant crops and livestock. At a press conference in Windhoek before their return to South Africa, Bishop Tutu and the Rev. Storey also called for the immediate implementation of the UN Plan for the decolonisation of Namibia in order to end the sufferings of the Namibian people at the hands of the South African army of occupation.

The accounts of widespread atrocities in our country have, furthermore, been documented in great detail by the delegation of the South African Conference of Catholic Bishops which visited Namibia during the early months of this year. This delegation, too, has confirmed that electric torture, beating up of people suspected of being sympathetic to SWAPO, shooting of people, breaking into their homes, stealing and killing of peasant cattle, pillaging of shops and raping of women are the commonly accepted procedures used by the South African soldiers in Namibia to force the people to give information about SWAPO and its activities.

The Council of Churches in Namibia, representing the Anglican, the African Methodist Episcopal, the Lutheran and the Catholic Churches in our country, has also added its voice to this general outcry against the South African oppression and inhuman brutality against the Namibian people. For example, on the 26th February 1982, representatives of the Namibian church community presented an open letter to the South African Premier, P.W. Botha. In that letter they said, among other things, the following:

With respect, Mr. Prime Minister, we would like to

state that when the proposals of the Western Five were presented in 1978, on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 385 of 1976, the churches in Namibia supported those proposals believing that they provided a solid ground for a peaceful solution to the problems of our country and its people. This position is still held by the churches, and we are convinced that this represents the will and the right of the majority of the people of this country today to determine their own future.

'When your government called for an election in this country in 1978, without the participation of the UN and other parties, the churches warned against such a procedure because we believed that such a development would prolong the bloodshed and suffering of the people of this country, nor would it have commanded international recognition.

'The people whom we represent had high hopes and expectations at the time of the Geneva negotiations in January 1981; but great disappointment came when your government stated that it was premature to sign a ceasefire agreement, thus delaying the implementation of the said resolution. And this made the failure of the negotiations even harder to understand. We would again, earnestly, and with respect, appeal to the South African Government, which still controls this country, to agree to the immediate signing of a cease-fire so that an atmosphere of trust and confidence may be created in the negotiations, that the ongoing suffering may cease, and that peace may return to this land.

'Mr. Prime Minister, since there are questions today of UN impartiality and other claims as to who truly represents the Namibian people, we believe that the time, now long overdue, has come for the Namibian people to be given the opportunity to decide through a democratic and free election, controlled and supervised by the UN. We plead with you, Sir, let the Namibian people now be the judge of these questions so that all counter-claims of representation may be settled.'

Mr. Chairman, I have cited but a few examples about the moral outcry and indignation by people of conscience and good will, from different parts of the world, who are very concerned about the repression and brutal atrocities to which the Namibian people are condemned.

I wish to point out here further examples of the nature and scope of the more recent crimes which the South African army of occupation has been perpetrating against our people.

On the 10th of March, 1982, at a traditional homestead (kraal) near the Oshikuku Roman Catholic Mission, ten innocent Namibian men, women and children were cold-bloodedly massacred by soldiers belonging to the so-called Ovambo Home-guard, which forms part of the South African army of repression and colonial occupation in Namibia. The soldiers came to the afore-mentioned homestead, brandishing automatic weapons with fixed bayonets. They then ordered all twelve members of the extended family to line up. Minutes thereafter, they started spraying their victims with bullets. Only two of the twelve members of that family survived by feinting to be also dead.

The two survivors of the massacre have unmistakably identified the soldiers. They recognised a certain Nakale whom they described as an infamous and brutal commander of a task force of the South African army known as "Koevoet".

Horrifying photos of that unspeakable atrocity are available in this building for the Honourable members of the European Parliament to see for themselves what the Namibian people are experiencing at the hands of the

apartheid army of occupation in our country.

I have earlier cited the position of the religious community in Namibia regarding the continued and brutal South African occupation of Namibia. I would like to mention here that the church community in Namibia as well as its property have also become the favourite targets of the South African reign of terror in our country.

For instance, a printshop of the Lutheran Church at Oniipa, in the northern part of Namibia, had been blown up twice by the South African Army. First, it was destroyed on the 12th of May 1973, and for the second time on the 19th November 1980, after it had been rebuilt with the financial assistance of the World Council of Churches. On the 22nd of August this year, it was, again, fired at by South African soldiers with a 40mm shell fitted with a high explosive device. The shell smashed through a part of the roof of the printshop building, but failed to hit its intended target, i.e., the printshop.

The reason for this repeated attempt to strike at the heart of the spiritual foundation of the Lutheran Church in Namibia is that the religious newspaper of this church, "Omukwetu", has courageously dared to publicize cases of atrocities committed by the South African army in our country.

In a continuous campaign of harassment and intimidation of the Namibian church community, a South African military plane dropped explosives on hospital buildings belonging to another Lutheran missionary station at Elim, about 45 km northwest of Oniipa. The fire gutted one of the two buildings to the ground, a building which contained medical supplies and equipment, valued at 28,000 rands, for the hospital; all these were completely destroyed. The second building was saved from being gutted down by the missionary students and local people who rushed to the scene and helped to put out the fire.

The following day, Commandant T.A. Nell and Captain D. Atkinson of the South African army went to Elim to admit and apologize that their military plane dropped the fire on the hospital buildings by "mistake".

Such incidents have, however, become too numerous to be accidental. It is a well known fact that nowadays the South African troops in Namibia take pleasure in desecrating church property and religious congregations as a way of intimidating the population.

For instance, on May 16th this year, South African soldiers interrupted, at the same time, two Sunday worship services at Elombe parish, 48 km east of Ondangwa and at Onayena parish, approximately 15 km west of Elombe. At both places, the racist soldiers got into the church and stopped the worship service under the pretext of looking for SWAPO activists. They turned the two church services into total confusion as they surrounded the two churches and ordered all the people to leave the two church buildings. They also threatened to shoot anyone refusing to leave the church or trying to run away. All the men were assembled, interrogated and some beaten up.

One can go on endlessly listing cases of mass brutality and terrorism to which our people are daily subjected.

It is against this background, Mr. Chairman, that the Namibian people and SWAPO are extremely outraged by the position of the Reagan Administration that the agony and sufferings of our people must continue in order to serve as a trump card for Washington to achieve its own imperialist interest in Southern Africa.

We reject with indignation and strongly denounce as callous and, indeed, inhuman the American efforts to prolong the agony of our people on account of the Cubans in Angola.

Namibia is surely not Angola. The question of Namibia is a question of pure and simple colonial and illegal occupation by South Africa. The presence of Cubans in Angola is an entirely separate issue. It is an arrangement between two independent and sovereign states—Cuba and Angola. It does not have anything to do with the decolonization of Namibia.

Furthermore, when the USA, Britain, France, Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany asked for UN mandate to mediate between SWAPO and apartheid South Africa concerning Namibia's independence, they did not ask that such mandate should include the Cuban troops in Angola. It is, therefore, outrageous in the extreme that the Reagan administration should try to force a linkage between these two entirely separate issues.

The American gang-up with the murderous and oppressive racists of Pretoria does not give the Namibian people a positive impression of the moral strength of American democracy. Washington's holding-up of our country's independence on the grounds of the presence of Cubans in Angola has, moreover, the effect of not only giving comfort to the racist regime of Pretoria, but also of conferring legitimacy upon South Africa's illegal occupation of our country.

The American attempt to link these two separate issues is as unjust as its demand that the EEC countries should not build a pipeline in order to obtain the supply of gas, which they need, from the Soviet Union. We know from the mass media that many of your countries are opposed to this unjust and imperialistic dictate. The people of Namibia, like those of your countries, recognize the fact that the United States of America is a leading world power. But we do not agree that the United States has the right to bully smaller nations in such a crude way as the Reagan administration is trying to do regarding the decolonization of Namibia.

The cardinal problem in Southern Africa is, in actual fact, not the presence of the Cuban troops in Angola but the racist policy of apartheid pursued by the regime in Pretoria. It is the policies of this regime which pose a threat to the security of the people and nations of Southern Africa; and it is, let the truth be told, the aggressive policy of this regime which has occasioned the presence of the Cuban troops in Angola.

Mr. Chairman, with open support and encouragement of the Reagan administration, the South African government is blocking even the conclusion of the negotiations on Namibia. The July talks in New York failed to bring the negotiations to a conclusion because South Africa refused with contempt to take part in them. Therefore, the three outstanding issues, namely, the choice of the electoral system, the composition of the UNTAG military component and the modalities and date of the ceasefire agreement could not be agreed upon. Pretoria has up to now refused to announce its choice of the electoral system to be used in Namibia. SWAPO, as Honourable members of the European Parliament are aware, has stated that we prefer proportional representation. Our preference for this system is governed by the fact that the time given to the UN to implement Resolution 435 is very limited. We have also said that we can accept single-member constituency system, provided that all the requirements concerning the application of this electoral procedure are met.

SWAPO strongly believes that if there are going to be UN supervised elections the people of Namibia must know the method of election which will be followed. There is no justification whatsoever for Pretoria to hide from the Namibian people the method of election to be used. The parties which will participate in the UN supervised elec-

tions must know what procedure is to be followed so that they can prepare themselves better.

Mr. Chairman, on its part, SWAPO is ready to participate in free, fair and democratic elections under UN supervision and control. In other words, we are ready to submit ourselves to the verdict of the Namibian people. We are confident that the Namibian people know that it is SWAPO alone which has championed their cause over the last two decades; and, as such, we believe that the Namibian people will choose a SWAPO leadership to form a national government in our country.

A SWAPO government will jealously pursue a policy of true democracy. It will promote and respect human rights and fundamental freedom for all those who live in Namibia. We will, however, not support any idea of having privileged minority sections of the Namibian population to the detriment of the majority of our people. Therefore, for us, human rights and fundamental freedom would entail an emphasis on socio-economic justice and fundamental narrowing of the gap between those who have enjoyed privileges and those who have been dispossessed.

With regard to foreign policy, a SWAPO government will follow a policy of non-alignment and will seek to develop friendly relations with other peace-loving states, irrespective of their social and political systems.

Mr. Chairman, Namibia's economy is essentially based on the production of primary products, mainly minerals, which it does not consume. Therefore, independent Namibia, under a SWAPO government, will give priority to the development of close relationship in economic, commercial and industrial fields with the EEC countries

since your countries are among those whose industries need our primary products.

SWAPO is very well aware that no country on this planet can do without commercial links with other countries. Even the biggest countries, such as the USSR and the USA, do need to conduct foreign trade. Our little Namibia could not be an exception to this rule. Therefore, our country will, under a SWAPO government, develop diplomatic and commercial relations with all those countries that are friendly to her, including the EEC countries.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and Honourable members of the European Parliament, I wish to appeal to you to use the good offices of all your governments, your political parties and popular organisations in your countries to actively dissuade the Reagan administration from outrageous and unjust position towards the oppressed Namibian people.

We earnestly ask your governments to publicly reject the American linkage of Namibia's independence to the presence of the Cuban forces in Angola.

Once again, I wish to thank you most sincerely for this unique opportunity you have accorded me in order for me to state before you, Honourable members of the European Parliament, the plight, hopes and aspirations of the Namibian people.

I must also state here, Mr. Chairman, the Namibian people, led by SWAPO, will not, I repeat, will not accept the imposition of a South African puppet regime in our country. They will resist to the last drop of their blood Pretoria's genocidal attempt to compel our people, by force of arms, to accept puppet leaders.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

APPENDIX 3

STATEMENT OF HON. LARRY P. McDONALD, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF GEORGIA

As a member of the Armed Services Committee of the U. S. House of Representatives, I have become increasingly concerned with the developing risk to our vital U. S. national defense interest as a result of increasing acts of terrorism and violence by Soviet-backed local "liberation" movements in southern Africa such as the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO). It is time to quit deluding ourselves about the purpose of Soviet empire expansionism in southern Africa. For at least a decade the U.S.S.R. has been intensifying the so-called "mineral resource war". Namibia, with a small population of one million persons in an area twice the size of California, and flat terrain, is an ideal gateway for Soviet military and political control of the rest of southern Africa.

For more than a decade political leaders in the U.S.S.R. have made it clear that from the Soviet point of view there is a "crisis crescent" which extends from Pakistan through the Middle East clear to Cape Town at the southern tip of the African continent.

Soviet Major General A. N. Lagovskiy, in a book entitled "Strategy and Economics", termed America's dependency on certain strategic materials from abroad as "the weak link in American military capability." Lagovskiy argued in favor of a Soviet effort to control such strategic materials a means of exerting influence on the American economy. Efforts to debilitate the Western world's industrial economies through raw materials imports deprivation are now firmly implanted in Soviet doctrine.

Not long ago Frank R. Barnett, President, National Strategic Information Center New York, made the following statement:

"At present the U.S. defense industry's operations and the economic viability of the United States rest on the importation of some two dozen non-fuel minerals. The country is more than 90% dependent on 13 of them (chrome, cobalt, manganese, tantalum, platinum group metals, corundum, industrial diamonds, columbium mica, strontium, graphite, bauxite-alumina and fluorspar) and more than 50% dependent on another 13.

"Without access to reliable foreign supplies of raw materials, the United States cannot make tanks, bombers, missiles, jet engines, machine tools, computers, television equipment, crankshafts, gears or drilling bits -- just to begin the list. Consumer interest would be crippled just as surely as defense production."

Recent U. S. studies have indicated America's vulnerability to a foreign cut off of key minerals arising from an unstable or hostile situation, as well as how such a development would affect U. S. consumer, industrial and national defense production.

A July 1980 report prepared by the Subcommittee of Mines and Mining of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the U. S. House of Representatives noted American dependence on mineral resources from the southern part of Africa.

South West Africa/Namibia, which has major mineral reserves of vanadium, uranium, diamonds, tin, copper, lead, tungsten, and zinc, has become a primary target in the U.S.S.R.'s mineral resource war. Not only does it have the largest uranium mine in the world and 1/6 of all the Western world's uranium reserves, but strategically

Namibia is the logical pathway to further U.S.S.R. military control of the vital transportation route around the Cape of Good Hope at the southern end of Africa. Each year some 28,000 ships pass around the Cape of Good Hope, carrying 90% of Western Europe's oil, 70% of its strategic minerals, 20% of U. S. oil imports, and 25% of Western Europe's food.

The Soviet campaign to take over Namibia is being carried on by the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO), a terrorist group operating from bases in the southern part of Marxist Angola, a country which was taken over in 1975 by another Soviet-backed puppet. We now know that Russian naval units operate out of Luanda, Angola on the west coast of Africa and Maputo, the main port of Russian controlled Mozambique on the east coast of Africa. If a Soviet puppet can be installed in Windhoek, Namibia, then Russia's nuclear powered submarines can operate from ports on the southwest coast of Africa, in a strengthened position to bisect the oil and mineral lifeline from the Mid East and southern Africa.

In its January 1982 edition, the naval-oriented strategic magazine, Sea Power summarized the findings of a 100-page report published by the New York-based National Strategy Information Center. Relevant extracts are:

" . . . defense analysts know all too well but the American press, public and Congress are only belatedly starting to realize: that the United States faces a

Mr. CROCKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join the chairman in appreciation to our colleague, Mr. Gray, for his excellent presentation.

I really have no questions as such. I do have an observation on which I would like to have you comment. You will recall that at the AAI conference in Harare recently, I referred to that very perceptive speech given by Robert McNamara in South Africa a few months ago.

In that speech, he mentioned that time was running out as far as the conflict in South Africa itself was concerned, and he expressed the view that the question of apartheid just might be solved in a violent rather than a peaceful manner.

He indicated that South Africa seems to be counting on the United States to furnish some military assistance to South Africa in the event that should occur. He expressed the view that that would pose very serious questions for the United States, particularly with respect to the black population in the United States.

I would like to have your considered judgment on the question of whether or not blacks generally in the United States are prepared to go to war in defense of South Africa and apartheid. That is the first part.

The second part is: Would it make a material difference, with respect to South Africa's point of view in connection with the Namibian situation, if our negotiators made clear to South Africa that the Yanks are not coming in the event they get in that kind of trouble?

Mr. GRAY. Congressman Crockett, I remember those remarks that you made, and you quoted Robert McNamara's presentation. I totally concur with what Mr. McNamara said.

It is my view that black America would not support U.S. military involvement in the maintenance or the prolonging of the life of apartheid. I think that is a very important issue, particularly in light of the number of blacks and other minorities that serve in the armed services of this country.

I think it would be absolutely an absurdity for the United States to find itself militarily supporting apartheid. It would be almost tantamount to the United States providing military support in the late thirties and the early forties to Nazi Germany. I don't believe that any American would support such action, particularly if they understood the real truth and the meaning of apartheid.

That, of course, is a separate issue, but it is a major issue because I think many Americans and many people here in the U.S. Congress are led to believe that apartheid is some kind of mild or perhaps a little more severe form of segregation, similar to what we had in the United States, and that with the passage of time everything will be worked out. It is not the case whatsoever, and those comparisons cannot be made.

I think it is important that our negotiators and our policy clearly state to the South Africans that we will not provide military support; and second, I think we need to even go beyond that before we even come to that point and say to South Africa now, in 1983, that it has been almost 5 years, there is not a Namibian settlement, it doesn't appear to be even close at this point and there is a certain timetable that we are going to apply, which you must comply with if we are to continue our present relationships with you.

potential mineral crisis which could grind American industry to a screeching halt and create worldwide economic chaos.

" . . . the Soviet Union, having achieved military parity with the United States virtually across the board -- and military superiority in a number of areas -- now may be attempting to gain monopolistic control of a number of key strategic metals and minerals without which the United States and its free world allies would be militarily helpless."

The role of minerals and metals in a modern economy is taken largely for granted. However, the picture changes dramatically if metals and minerals are put into an every day context. Recently an official of Boeing Aircraft outlined the aircraft industry's reliance on strategic minerals. He noted that chromium and manganese are two of the essential specialty alloys used in the production of aircraft, missiles and hydrofoil ships. A typical aircraft jet engine could not be produced in the United States in the event of a foreign cut off of mineral supplies. For example, the Pratt and Whitney F100 jet contains, among other metals, 670 pounds of aluminum, 1485 pounds of chromium, 885 pounds of cobalt, 145 pounds of columbium, 23 pounds of manganese, 4504 pounds of nickel, three pounds of tantalum, and 5440 pounds of titanium. The U. S. is currently 77-100% dependent on foreign sources for the above minerals.

If the Soviet Union could control the mineral resources of Namibia and southern Africa together with their own resources, the U.S.S.R. would have available 80% of the world gold production, 76% of its chrome production, 90% of its production of metals of the platinum group, 75% of the production of manganese, 80% of the production of vanadium, and between 40-50% of the production of uranium.

David Kroft in The Geopolitics of Non-Energy Minerals, identified three reasons behind the U.S.S.R.'s minerals doctrine: The Soviets hope to bring about an economic crisis in the West which will ultimately lead to the collapse of the capitalist system through the restriction or denial of international mineral resources; the U.S.S.R. has not developed sufficient mineral production capacity to supply its own industrial and defense needs; and by controlling the source of strategic minerals in southern Africa, the U.S.S.R. could earn hard currency to purchase Western technology and other goods. This can be achieved most easily through the resale to the West of minerals bought at low prices from countries like Namibia and other areas of southern Africa, once these areas are under the control of Soviet puppets or sympathetic Marxist regimes.

In the light of these circumstances, U. S. policy respecting South West Africa/Namibia should not be determined by the United Nations, the U.S.S.R., or by the terrorist leaders of SWAPO. Settlement of the problem of independence for Namibia cannot be the primary goal of U. S. policy. Our policy with respect to Namibia as well as Cuba, the Mid East and elsewhere, must always be the military and economic security of the United States. We must recognize that the Soviet goal in Namibia is not independence, or to establish a democratic process, or to further the cause of self-determination for the people of Namibia. It is Russian control of Namibia.

Before there can be any settlement in Namibia, the U. S. must insist that all Cuban soldiers be removed from Africa and that the Soviet-backed terrorists of SWAPO close their bases in Angola and Zambia and

return to Namibia and participate in a fair, free and peaceful election. Our policy should demand an election in Angola, where the Soviets, with the aid of 20,000 Cuban soldiers placed its MPLA puppet in power in 1975 with the promise of elections in two years. There have been no Angolan elections, and the people of Angola are being denied their right of self-determination. There can be no peace or independence for Namibia as long as a Soviet puppet controls Angola even though the Cuban soldiers may be removed and the SWAPO bases closed.

Soviet policy in the "crescent of crisis" is no pipe dream, it is a grim and incontrovertible reality. The Houston Post noted in its March 1, 1982 edition that

"Growing evidence indicates that the Soviet Union's chief motive for invading Afghanistan was to gain access to natural resources, including strategic metals . . . Since 1964 the Soviets have done most of the surveying and prospecting for mineral deposits in Afghanistan."

Soviet efforts to gain control in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and North Yemen are a part of the "resource war" problem. South Yemen, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Angola are already in the iron grip of Soviet control. Zimbabwe, where Marxist terrorist Robert Mugabe came to power with Soviet support, has now declared a one party state, and is busy killing or driving out all opposition. Zambia harbors the Institute for Namibia, a SWAPO controlled training school for terrorists.

We know that the SWAPO terrorist guerrillas are trained, equipped and financed by the Soviets. As in Afghanistan, Cuba and Central America, the U.S.S.R.'s chief motive in Namibia is access to and control of natural resources and strategic military locations. These are the facts. We are entitled to our own opinions, but not our own facts. It is time to face reality on the Namibian question.

APPENDIX 4

REPORT OF A CONGRESSIONAL STUDY MISSION TO ZIMBABWE,
MOZAMBIQUE, TANZANIA, AND EGYPT, JANUARY 8-21, 1983¹

INTRODUCTION

During our 14 day trip to southern and North Africa, our delegation had an opportunity to discuss current U.S. policy on southern African matters with an important cross-section of African leadership and to understand how that policy was directly affecting vital American interests in the region.

We first visited Zimbabwe where we attended the thirteenth bi-annual African-American Institute Conference in Harare, Zimbabwe's capital. The African-American Institute Conference (AAI) is intended to bring together prominent American and African legislators, government officials, and business leaders for a week of free and frank discussions on a broad range of political and economic issues of mutual concern to Africa and the United States. In the past, these conferences had proven invaluable in helping to strengthen relations between the U.S. and Africa and in acquainting Members of Congress with the problems and issues of greatest concern to Africans. Hosted by Prime Minister Mugabe, the 1983 AAI conference proved once again to be an exceptional forum in which to hear African perspectives on America's southern African policies of the past two years. Many African delegates were highly critical of American intentions stemming from our "Constructive Engagement" posture toward South Africa. Many more delegates openly decried our linking Namibia's independence negotiations to a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. A number of these points were covered as well in our meeting with Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, although we also took this occasion to discuss our bilateral relations, especially on economic matters.

We briefly visited Mozambique, the first Congressional Delegation to do so in some years. Our relations with the Mozambican government are currently moving toward greater normalization following several years of hostility and a visible downgrading of our presence in Maputo, the capital. There has been no American Ambassador in residence since late 1980. The Mozambicans welcomed our visit as a further demonstration of American interest in restoring cordial relations and afforded us an opportunity to meet with a wide-range of high-level Mozambican officials within a twenty-four hour period. While pleased to voice their concerns about southern African issues in general, our talks with the Mozambicans generally focused on Mozambique's severe economic crisis, partly drought-induced, their emergency food requirements and their struggle to overcome the South African-backed insurgency of the MNR (Mozambican National Resistance Movement). We came away from Mozambique with a firm impression of the general state of decay that country has undergone since the advent of independence in 1975 and of the government's determination to renew certain ties to the West in order to change that circumstance. We also became more acutely aware of the dependency of its land-locked neighbors on Mozambique's deteriorating transportation system and the need to address that sector's immediate reconstruction.

In Tanzania, we had a one-and-a-half hour meeting with President Julius Nyerere that ranged broadly over southern African issues and Tanzania's current economic crisis. Nyerere had not met with any American legislators in some time and appeared to enjoy the give-and-take of our free-wheeling discussion. As president of the African Front-Line Group, he expressed his deep dismay over the linkage of the removal of Cuban troops from Angola with the issue of Namibian independence, and the manner in which "constructive engagement" has encouraged South African intransigence in the Namibia negotiations. Nyerere asserted that the Africans themselves would press Angola to remove the Cuban troops and has communicated this to the administration several times.

We asked a number of questions about Tanzania's intentions regarding its coming to terms with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Nyerere stressed the importance his government attaches to reaching agreement with the IMF. Although he objected to the stringent conditions that IMF negotiators have offered in earlier dis-

¹ Representatives Howard Wolpe, William H. Gray III, Ted Weiss, Geo. W. Crockett, and Mervyn M. Dymally participated in the study mission. The report was prepared by Anne F. Holloway, staff director, Subcommittee on Africa. The views expressed are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the Committee on Foreign Affairs or any of its members.

cussions, he indicated that Tanzania would continue to hold talks in hope of reaching the necessary agreement and welcomed U.S. assistance on Tanzania's behalf.

Tanzania has continued to be a moderating influence within the Front-line states as well as in Third World and other international groupings. It has maintained flexibility in working to resolve, in the past, the Rhodesia conflict, and now, the Namibia diplomatic negotiations. It has supported U.S.A.-led initiatives on southern African issues, working closely with us over the past five years to achieve political settlements to a number of protracted problems.

Our visit to Egypt was in response to an official government invitation to Members of the Congressional Black Caucus. We had an eventful meeting with President Mubarak on the eve of his departure for a visit to the U.S. We briefly discussed Egypt's support for American diplomatic efforts in southern Africa but surmised that the President's chief intent was to outline his country's post-Lebanon views on the Middle East situation. Egypt has generally supported OAU statements concerning southern Africa, thus Mubarak's views on Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola, the Western Sahara conflict, and Ethiopia were somewhat at variance with perceived official Egyptian policy. A series of meetings with the Foreign and Defense Ministry officials did give appropriate clarification to the President's views. His comments concerning the special relationship that continues to exist between Egypt and the U.S. since the time of the Camp David Accords were especially welcome.

During a brief stop in Paris, we met with French Foreign Ministry Africa Director Jean Ausseil to discuss southern African issues. Ausseil unexpectedly proffered his government's support for "constructive engagement" as a means of obtaining South Africa's movement on Namibia, although he upheld France's noninvolvement with the linkage issue within the Western Contact Group. He further noted that ways should be found to take care of Angola's security concerns, to give Cuba a face-saving way out of Angola, and to protect the MPLA government's interests. Regarding nuclear sales to South Africa, France would most likely oppose South African request for a second nuclear power plant or requests to enrich nuclear fuel in the future. However, France would not move to support even limited sanctions against South Africa according to Ausseil, because they would be ineffective in application. We came away with the perception that there was no longer a coordinated African policy focus in the Mitterand government, particularly in light of French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson's publicly stated dissent regarding our administration's insistence on "linkage."

What follows are brief reports on perspectives encountered by our delegation during the study mission. Due to the brevity of the trip, we offer a short list of recommendations that mainly take into account our policies in southern Africa as it concerns U.S. involvement in the Namibia diplomatic negotiations. We offer these recommendations in the hope that they will help advance a swifter pace toward independence for Namibia under U.N. Security Council Resolution 435 and will encourage our Government to carefully evaluate the possible consequences of current policy initiatives in the southern Africa region whose human welfare and material resources are of vital importance to U.S. national interests.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING NAMIBIA

1. The United States, in consultation with other parties, should immediately establish a specific timetable for initiating Namibia's transition to independence under United Nations Security Council Resolution 435.

2. The United States should eliminate "linkage" as a policy tool.

This question has prolonged rapid resolution of the Namibian conflict and has reduced the ability of all the parties to the diplomatic negotiations to work together harmoniously. Diplomacy concerning the proposed removal of Cuban troops from Angola should continue but should not deter swift movement on a political settlement of the Namibian situation.

3. If South Africa does not agree to a proposed timetable for a Namibian settlement, the United States should initiate steps to distance itself from the South African Government by reducing its diplomatic presence in South Africa, by withdrawing the measures of association and cooperation introduced during the period of "constructive engagement", and by passing sanctions-related legislation against the South African Government.

4. Absent a timely Namibia settlement, the United States should support South African-related sanctions as they arise in multilateral organizations such as the United Nations Security Council.

ZIMBABWE

The purpose of the delegation's visit was to attend the biannual African-American Institute conference in Harare from January 10 through 14, 1983, and to ascertain the views of the Government of Zimbabwe on U.S. policy in southern Africa. We also briefly discussed Zimbabwe's internal political problem of dissidence in Matebeland and South Africa's destabilization of Zimbabwe's economic infrastructure in a forty minute audience with Prime Minister Robert Mugabe. During the duration of the conference, the delegation had many occasions to meet and speak with a wide array of Zimbabwe Government officials and to renew close ties that arose during increased congressional involvement in the negotiations for independence.

UNITED STATES-ZIMBABWEAN RELATIONS

U.S.-Zimbabwean relations have continued to be both cordial and mutually beneficial since Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. Zimbabwe remains the largest recipient of American economic support funding (\$75 million) in southern Africa and has a steadily growing U.S. aid and private sector profile. The ESF Commodity Import Program has been cited by the administration as the most effective one operating on the African continent. Under AID auspices, U.S. companies participated in a highly successful event, "Rural Development Technology '82," which displayed American appropriate technology goods and resulted in sales of \$4-6 million for those companies involved. H.J. Heinz Company also signed a major agreement with the Zimbabwean Government to establish a new plant which will further diversify Zimbabwe's manufacturing sector.

Despite the growing success of U.S. economic and development interests in Zimbabwe, a significant rupture could occur in U.S.-Zimbabwe political relations as a consequence of developments in Matebeland. In 1982, the U.S. Senate passed a Resolution commending the Zimbabwe Government for its role in attempting to locate the two Americans and four other western tourists captured by dissident ZIPRA forces in the southwestern section of the country. A similar resolution is now pending before the House of Representatives. This good will could easily evaporate in light of the escalating violence and killing of innocent civilians by government armed forces such as occurred during the early months of 1983.

In our meeting with Prime Minister Mugabe, the delegation voiced its concern for political reconciliation in Matebeland between ZANU and ZAPU and later expressed the same sentiment in written communication to the Prime Minister upon our return to the United States. Continued support for Zimbabwe, especially in the U.S. Congress, could face difficulty should government-sanctioned violence not quickly end. It is our perception, however, that the Zimbabwe Government is exercising its constitutional responsibility to protect the human rights of all the people of Zimbabwe and has moved to assert proper control over its military presence in Matebeland. Nonetheless, the U.S. Government should cautiously monitor the situation in order to determine if there are gross violations of human rights aimed at destroying democratic political opposition.

NAMIBIA

Zimbabwe strongly opposes the Reagan administration initiative on linking the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola to negotiations on Namibia's independence under U.N. Res. 435. The government feels that the U.S. policy of "constructive engagement" and acquiescence in the face of repeated South African military actions in the region has only emboldened the South Africans to defer Namibia's freedom.

As a member of the Frontline States, Zimbabwe supports all negotiations that would commence the UNTAG implementation in Namibia and favors a strong U.S. role in pressuring the South Africans to come to terms. It accepts, too, the tactical position that Angola has the right to conduct bilateral talks with any parties it chooses in order to address its legitimate security concerns, including the withdrawal of foreign troops from its territory.

MOZAMBIQUE

Zimbabwe is in favor of the U.S. developing friendlier ties with its neighbor, Mozambique. It views Mozambique as essential to its own well-being because of its dependency on that nation's transport system and because of the material and other forms of assistance Mozambique extended to Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. U.S. aid is of critical importance to Mozambique if that nation is to rehabilitate its deteriorating railways, port facilities and telecommunications links which are required to service several landlocked states in the region. The U.S. should continue to talk

with the South Africans about ending their support to the MNR insurgents conducting cross-border strikes against Mozambique.

SOUTH AFRICA AND ZIMBABWE

Zimbabwean officials view South Africa as directly responsible for the escalation of attacks on Zimbabwe's economic infrastructure. The fuel crisis which plagued Zimbabwe at the time of the AAI Conference was caused by South Africa-backed MNR destruction of the oil pipeline and storage tanks in Mozambique that constitute the supply lines to Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe Government cites this and other examples as indicative of South Africa's strategy to sabotage Zimbabwe's economy. South Africa, according to this analysis, has embarked on this strategy because it fears a strong, stable and economically competitive Zimbabwe that could challenge its regional hegemony in the future. South Africa is not prepared to peacefully co-exist with its neighboring black-ruled states and does not respect the sovereignty of the surrounding independent nations. Further still, South Africa is anxious to break up the fledgling SADCC organization since it opposes the SADCC objective of reducing economic dependency on South Africa and wishes to implement its theory of a southern African constellation of dependent satellites.

The Government of Zimbabwe urges U.S. initiatives to pressure the South Africans into moving away from its destabilization efforts in Southern Africa. This pressure could include sanctions against South Africa if they were effectively applied and were multilateral in origin and support. Other actions would entail the U.S. opposing multilateral lending to South Africa and voting on behalf of U.N. resolutions critical of South Africa's military aggression against other southern African states.

MOZAMBIQUE

In an effort to assess the current status of U.S.-Mozambican relations and the import for future normalization with that government, the delegation made a twenty-four hour visit to Maputo on January 14-15. Our stay was quite productive even though we were not able to exhaustively examine the full complement of issues before us. The delegation while unable to meet with President Samora Machel or Foreign Minister Chissano, did hold talks with members of the Mozambican People's Assembly, the Municipal Executive Council, and several ministers of state. The Mozambicans appeared to welcome the delegation visit, the first in over three years, and to view it as building a momentum toward improved bilateral relations.

UNITED STATES-MOZAMBIKAN RELATIONS

Relations between the United States and the Government of Mozambique have been diplomatically correct but strained for a period of four years. Since the 1980 departure of the last American Ambassador, who was effectively recalled, our diplomatic presence has been downgraded, particularly in the absence of U.S. development activities.

Recently, the Reagan administration has responded favorably to Mozambican overtures to upgrade bilateral ties and to extend American assistance to Mozambique's drought-stricken, war-ridden agricultural sector. Several high-level State Department officials have held talks both in Maputo and Washington to fashion the terms of normalizing relations. U.S. officials have also spoken with the South African authorities concerning the worsening insurgency situation in a number of Mozambique's territorial provinces.

It is likely that our Government will decide to further normalize bilateral relations with Mozambique, to name a new Ambassador to Maputo, and to initiate an AID program that takes into account Mozambique's emphasis on rural agricultural development priorities. An important indication of this thawing of hostility is the \$8.3 million title II emergency food aid extended to the Mozambique Government in the first quarter of 1983. The Africa Subcommittee supports these initiatives and encourages the administration to pursue normalization with Mozambique and to establish a solid bilateral program that can in the long-term promote U.S. national interests in that country and the region.

NAMIBIA

Mozambique has been very active in the Frontline States and bilaterally in encouraging flexibility and moderation concerning the Namibia negotiations. It has used its considerable influence with its fellow Lusophone state, Angola, in order to

move the process along and has not acted against Angola's perceived need to hold bilateral discussions with the U.S. and South Africa regarding the Cuban troops issue.

At the same time Mozambique does not support "linkage" and continues to call for immediate resumption of the Namibia negotiations under U.N. Res. 435. It views South Africa's continued occupation of southern Angola as a major obstacle to implementation of UNTAG and gives limited materiel assistance to SWAPO in its armed struggle against South African Defense Forces. Like Zimbabwe, it favors U.S. pressure on South Africa to force South Africa to leave Namibia.

SOUTH AFRICA AND MOZAMBIQUE

In language strikingly similar to that of the Zimbabwe Government, Mozambique accuses South Africa of seeking to destabilize its government, both militarily and economically. South Africa has established a logistical support base for insurgents of the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR) in the northern Transvaal who make cross-border raids into Mozambique territory and in some cases control provinces inside the country. The leader of the MNR was recently found dead on a farm on the outskirts of Pretoria in suspicious circumstances. Despite South Africa's denials, insurgents caught inside Mozambique have confessed to that country's involvement.

On the economic front, aside from sabotage of Mozambique's infrastructure by MNR activity which emphasizes economic targets like the fuel storage tanks, South Africa has swiftly altered standing bilateral arrangements in order to place Mozambique at a disadvantage. The South Africans have suspended their technological assistance to port facilities, and at the cost of supplying cheap electricity to their own citizens, have from time to time cut back on their intake from the Cabora Bassa hydro-electric system.

Threatened by South African-led and backed incursions and facing a deteriorating internal security situation, Mozambique has looked to the U.S. to intervene on its behalf with the South Africans. While direct talks have occurred between the South Africans and Mozambicans about the security issue, the MNR dissidence has not diminished, although the Mozambique Government has had some success in regaining control of certain provinces. Mozambique is active in SADC and views its success as vital to lessening its own dependency on the South African economy.

TANZANIA

The delegation visited Tanzania from January 15-17 in order to ascertain Tanzanian Government views on current U.S. actions in southern Africa and to gain a better overview of Tanzania's economic crisis. The highlight of our visit was a ninety minute discussion with President Julius K. Nyerere and other Tanzanian officials that explored in depth a number of pertinent issues. As President of the Frontline states, it was our expectation that President Nyerere's perspective would afford us an accurate summation of that important group's thinking regarding U.S. policy in southern Africa.

UNITED STATES—TANZANIAN RELATIONS

Tanzanian attitudes toward U.S. policies in Africa have often been highly critical and, at times, have placed some stress on our bilateral relations. Tanzania has also tended to be quite influential in African and Third World circles in creating policy responses to Western initiatives; the U.S. has often felt the impact of that response in detrimental terms.

On the other hand, in the Ford, Carter and Reagan administrations, we have tended to rely upon the moderating and influential role of the Tanzanian Government in the person of Julius Nyerere in gaining a vitally needed African consensus for U.S. policy positions particularly on southern African issues. In seeking to use American power to encourage movement on the critical matters of decolonization and racial justice, Nyerere has given currency to U.S. diplomatic initiatives and has rallied other African leaders to accept them. The relations, therefore, between the U.S. and Tanzania have not always been easy, but they are enduring due to our mutual concern to advance national interests that converge on these important matters.

NAMIBIA

Tanzania, like other Frontline governments, strongly rejects "linkage" but goes further in its objection to stress that American policy, in emphasizing this focus,

will likely fail. Deeply concerned about the current stalemate in the Namibian negotiations, the Tanzanians urge a reassessment of American policy and point out that the linkage issue is playing into the hands of the South Africans who do not want to leave Namibia. It is the Tanzanian perception that the U.S. raised the linkage question first and that the South Africans bought into it as a convenient tactic for delaying indefinitely Namibia's independence. Tanzania stresses the separation of the two issues but has no quarrel with Angola's genuine attempt to secure its territory by holding bilateral talks with other parties over the Cuban troop issue. Nyerere has told the administration on several occasions that the Africans will press Angola to have the Cuban troops to leave.

The Tanzanian Government would like to see the U.S. resume the Namibia talks, preferably within the Contact Group modality, and to press ahead with implementation of U.N. Res. 435 by bringing an enabling resolution to the Security Council. Once adopted with U.S. support, UNTAG could begin with the South Africans forced to withdraw from southern Angola to barracks in Namibia. The Angolans would then be encouraged to work out a scheduled phase-down of Cuban troops in their territory since their southern borders would be guaranteed by the UNTAG peace-keeping force. In the short-term, the Tanzanians are not sanguine about the immediate prospects of the Namibia discussions.

SOUTH AFRICA

Tanzanian officials believe that the American policy of "constructive engagement" has had the effect of encouraging South Africa's intransigence on Namibia and its destabilization efforts throughout southern Africa. They admonish that the signals sent to South Africa under the label of "constructive engagement" have given it the overall message that it can operate at will in the region at no cost to its relationship with the U.S. They deplore the aggressive activities of South Africa against its black neighbor states and fear that the continuing political upheaval and instability that result will impede African progress and development for years to come. Tanzania would like to see the U.S. change change its current policy and distance itself from South Africa's apartheid government.

INTERNAL ECONOMIC CRISIS

Tanzania's economy has never fully recovered from the expenditure of about \$100 million in hard currency it used to help Ugandan insurgents overthrow Idi Amin and to maintain troops in Uganda until the new government assumed power. This factor, along with mismanaged stata policies and an undue reliance on foreign assistance over a twenty year period, has finally caught Tanzania in a liquidity squeeze of unprecedented proportions. Because of the global economic recession and the declining value of its agricultural-based exports, not to mention high fuel import costs, Tanzania faces a monumental balance-of-payments crisis.

Tanzania places the highest importance on reaching an agreement with the IMF in order to overcome its worsening economic situation and to attract foreign investment. It is currently negotiating a standby facility agreement with the IMF but is critical of the conditions attached since they are likely to make the economic situation more depressed before conditions restabilize.



I think if we did have a point set in the negotiations where we were prepared to break off and apply pressure, that would have some effect. But I think it is very, very clear that we ought to make it a matter of just absolute policy that the United States is not going to get into any military support with its troops or military equipment to support or prolong the life of apartheid. It would be counter to every principle that this country stands for, and it would be tantamount to our joining the Axis Powers in World War II.

Mr. CROCKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you.

Mr. Zshau.

Mr. ZSHAU. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman, but I do want to thank our colleague, Mr. Gray, for coming to share his views with us.

Mr. WOLPE. Welcome to the committee.

Mr. Reid.

Mr. REID. I have no questions.

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Weiss.

Mr. WEISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no questions, but I share your view that it was, in fact, perceptive and eloquent testimony. Thank you.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Gray.

Now we turn to the testimony of Dr. Crocker. I am very pleased to welcome you before the committee today. We spent a lot of time together in recent weeks in other forms and look forward to hearing your assessment of where we are now both with respect to the issue of Namibian diplomacy and destabilizing of southern Africa.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHESTER A. CROCKER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, Congressmen, it gives me great pleasure to be able to report to you today on developments in southern Africa at the midpoint in the first term of President Reagan's administration.

These hearings on progress toward independence for Namibia, and the broader subject of destabilization in southern Africa, are indeed important, for they address core issues in our southern African policy.

I would like to start, Mr. Chairman, by restating the administration's objectives, so it will be clear that they have not changed and that we are continuing to pursue them with vigor and purpose.

The United States seeks to help strengthen communication between the countries of southern Africa in order to ease tensions, bolster regional security, and encourage negotiated solutions and peaceful change.

Second, we are intent on using every diplomatic tool at our command in order to bring about conditions which will lead to Namibia's independence at the earliest possible date.

Third, believing that apartheid as a structure of legally entrenched racial separation is morally unacceptable to a democracy such as ours, we have sought to encourage those elements within South Africa seeking constructive change in order to see widened

the base of participation in government and the economy to include all the elements of South Africa's varied population.

Finally, we seek constructive engagement with all the states of the region who wish the same with us. We do not approach the region with the belief that our task is to choose sides.

On the contrary, it is the fact of our desire for strengthened relations with all the states of the region that enables us to work to play a role where such is welcome in working for regional security, development, and peaceful change.

The United States is on the side of peaceful change and negotiated solutions. This is where our interests lie and this is what makes us uniquely relevant to the region.

The recent history of southern Africa must serve as a cause of alarm to all of us. With the collapse of the Portuguese Empire in the mid-1970's, violence has escalated throughout the region to a point today where the fact or threat of violence is a major feature of the area. Cross border conflict risks becoming endemic.

The question the United States faces alone and with its allies is whether diplomacy can provide an alternative to violence or whether southern Africa is in the process of condemning itself to violence as a way of life.

We have seen this happen elsewhere in the world in the Middle East with still incalculable consequences for world peace and our national security. It is in our national interests to seek to avoid such a development.

Mr. Chairman, this administration did not invent violence in southern Africa. We did make it our purpose to do something about it. We have set out as a conscious objective of policy to provide an alternative to conflict, not only in Namibia, our most visible effort, but throughout the region. We have made it our purpose to work with the nations of the region to see if a framework of restraint and broad rules of conduct could be developed which could contain conflicts and provide the basis for solutions.

The Vice President summed up our policy in Nairobi on November 18, 1982, when he said: "We are determined to help turn the sad tide of growing conflict and tension in southern Africa."

From the outset of this administration, we sought to establish effective communication with all those nations and other political elements with whom communication was inadequate or had lapsed. It seemed self-evident that unilaterally isolating ourselves from those with whom we had differences, however strongly felt, served no purpose other than to cut us off from an ability to influence or affect their policies.

We began with a series of intensive discussions with all of the major actors in the region in order to identify their concerns, see how these fit in with our objectives, and determine how best we might proceed to advance American and Western interests.

The priorities which seemed apparent to us were the ones I have enumerated earlier: Regional security, independence for Namibia, the encouragement of elements favoring peaceful change within South Africa away from the system of apartheid, and constructive engagement with regional states in tackling the larger problems of economic and political development.

With respect to regional security, it seemed clear that one of the major problems was our own lack of a credible dialog with significant actors in the southern African region, not the least which were the Governments of South Africa and Angola.

Over the course of the past 2 years, we have worked assiduously to restore communication and get a dialog going. I believe we can point to a considerable record of success.

We have now had an extensive series of discussions at senior levels with the Angolan Government, exploring ways of improving our bilateral relationship with that country and seeking to bring about circumstances which will make possible agreement on Namibian independence.

After a period of difficulty in our relationship with Zambia, we have worked hard to reestablish a basis of confidence and improving communication, culminating in a highly successful visit that Vice President Bush paid to that country in November of last year. We hope to have President Kaunda visit the United States in the very near future.

We have continued to attach a high priority to assisting Zimbabwe, now in its third year of independence, as it seeks to meet pressures from the world economic downturn, a devastating drought sweeping across much of southern Africa, and the stresses and strains from political divisions within.

Zimbabwe has traveled a rough road over the past 2 years, but those who seek to judge its performance should have the humility to recall our own history at a similar stage in America's independence, as well as the daunting challenges facing Zimbabwe's leadership.

We intend to continue our efforts to assist this new country, convinced that it offers important prospects for becoming a keystone in the economic development and regional stability of southern Africa. Just as we seek to foster a regional climate of security and confidence that will encourage constructive change in South Africa, so too do we seek a regional climate conducive to Zimbabwe's success as an independent nation.

This administration took office just as U.S. relations with Mozambique reached a low water mark. Communication with the Mozambican Government was practically nonexistent; that country's policies seemed unalterably alined with those of the Soviet Union and its satrapies, its perceptions warped by hostile disinformation.

But the utter incapacity of Marxist economics to cope with the problems of a developing country, and the conspicuous inability of the Soviet Union to assist Mozambique with security and political problems stemming from its isolation, led to indications that the Mozambican Government wished to reestablish communication with the United States.

We responded by making clear that we, too, were interested in a positive relationship based upon respect for each other's interests and were willing to engage in building bridges between us based upon mutual respect.

Within the past 3 months, we have had two sets of discussions between senior American and Mozambican officials aimed at engaging the Mozambican Government in a constructive effort to improve regional stability and restore communication. We believe

that a solid basis now exists for a meaningful improvement in relations between us.

Similarly, in our contacts with South Africa we quickly moved beyond discussion of the Namibia issue and bilateral questions to the overarching question of regional security. We believe our extensive contacts with Pretoria have enabled us to more fully grasp the South African Government's concerns about the region's dynamics, while also making clear the terms on which we must operate if we are to be credible and effective there.

While much remains to be done, the conditions now exist for a candid, sensitive, and productive dialog on regional matters with that country.

I would like to turn now to another facet of our diplomacy in southern Africa, which is encouraging effective communication between South Africa and its neighbors.

We have not engaged in this effort as a search for glory or out of our own ambition. We have done so for the good and sufficient reason that it is obviously in our national interest.

Dialog alone, of course, will not necessarily solve the problems, but communication among countries that have serious disputes and basic political differences is an obvious first step.

Within the past 6 months, South Africa has had significant and positive discussions with Angola, with Mozambique and, in fact, with virtually all of its immediate neighbors.

It is difficult to overstate the significance of the developing dialog between South Africa and its neighbors, a dialog we have sought in unintrusive ways to further. We welcome the fact of these contacts, and hope that by a thorough airing of differences, a constructive effort can be made toward their resolution.

It is important, we believe, to recognize that as dialog itself is, by definition, a two-way street, so, too, is regional security. There is a compelling need for all the parties to recognize this. Although at any given moment, following some specific development or event, it might be possible to pronounce a moral or political judgment upon that event, it is not always useful, or even wise, to do so. For that matter, it is not always even possible to know precisely what has taken place, or why.

Public posturing and the passing of judgment, however gratifying to those who do it, is not usually the most helpful way to deal with the root causes of disputes. We seek results.

This administration is profoundly conscious of the fact that southern Africa is a highly charged, politically polarized environment. Some would say it is a minefield. There is ample public posturing by the regional actors themselves without adding our own rhetoric to the mix.

Regional security runs in both directions across international borders, and in southern Africa each side in every dispute claims grievances against the other. We have not chosen to condemn each transgression by one or another of the parties, but have, rather, chosen the perhaps less gratifying but certainly more important long-term task of trying to ease tensions.

In our view, our effectiveness depends on our ability to be a credible partner to all who wish our partnership and are prepared to engage in good faith efforts to solve problems.

Apart from Namibia, all states of the region are sovereign and recognize each other's sovereignty. That is a fact, and it carries with it certain obvious implications. Some states are not more sovereign than others. We recognize no state's right to harbor plotters or perpetrators of violence across borders and against other lands.

Mr. Chairman, I recognize that some observers are less than satisfied with the balance and discretion inherent in what I have just said. But we believe that those who would have us take sides among the parties in southern Africa would have us unlearn every important rule of diplomacy.

In South Africa, as in the Middle East, it is not by choosing sides that we shape events or resolve conflicts. Our nation should be proud to stand on the side of peace and diplomacy and be prepared to weigh the concerns and interests of the parties involved as we seek to build bridges and explore avenues for agreement.

Turning to Namibia, Mr. Chairman, when President Reagan took office in January of 1981, the Namibia negotiations had broken down, despite the substantial efforts and accomplishments of our predecessors.

There was an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and recrimination among the parties whose agreement was essential for Namibia to secure its freedom. The obstacles to agreement between the parties were so great that it would have been tempting for us to walk away from the problem, washing our hands of the negotiations, and leaving it to debate and doubtful resolution by others. Certainly there were other urgent priorities.

Instead, partly in response to what we were clearly told by our African friends and our key allies in NATO, and partly because of America's historic tradition of support for self-determination, we set out to find a way to move toward Namibian independence.

In preparation for this, we conducted extensive and exhaustive discussions with each of the major parties to the negotiation—the Front Line States, SWAPO, other states in Africa, the South Africans, the U.N. Secretariat, the internal parties inside Namibia, and our European allies.

We concluded that Namibia's independence could not be achieved in the absence of conditions which gave all participants reasonable confidence that their security interests would be protected. It was obvious to any observer that, irrespective of the reasons for their being there, the presence of Cuban combat forces in Angola was an integral part of the regional security problem.

I know and I have just heard that the members of this distinguished subcommittee are familiar with the charges and counter-charges from both Angola and South Africa about the fighting across the Namibian/Angolan frontier.

My point is a simple one: The Cuban troop issue is not an issue we made up; it is an objective reality at the core of the question of regional security.

The South Africans, whose concurrence and cooperation must be secured for any agreement leading to Namibian independence, have repeatedly made clear that they regard the Cuban troop issue as fundamental to their security concerns.

Quite apart from that, "the United States," as Vice President Bush said in Nairobi on November 19, 1982, "is not ashamed to

state its interest in seeing an end to the presence of Cuban forces in Angola," just as we seek internationally recognized independence for Namibia. Such an outcome would contribute to both regional security and a climate globally of restraint.

We have, for more than a year now, been engaged in intensive discussions with the Angolan Government in an effort to reach a broadly acceptable formula for parallel withdrawal of foreign forces from Namibia and Angola. These bilateral discussions have been held outside the framework of U.N. Security Council Resolution 435, and are not part of the Western Contact Group's mandate.

We are fully prepared to respond to Angola's security concerns as well as to deal forthrightly with the reality of South Africa's concerns. We believe that this is a viable means of achieving the goal of Namibian independence to which we are profoundly committed. We know of no other means.

We believe that Angola wishes to contribute to a Namibian independence agreement, so long as its own security interests are preserved. We have achieved real progress in our talks with the Angolans and will spare no effort in continuing our search for a comprehensive, peaceful settlement.

Your letter, Mr. Chairman, inviting me to participate in these hearings, asked what the "short and long run prospects" are for a Namibian settlement, as well as a number of specific questions about "when" South Africa and the United States made Cuban troop withdrawal a necessary accompaniment to Namibia's independence.

The answer to the first question is: "reasonably good." Certainly we intend to continue the effort. But this is a complicated and difficult negotiation, and it involves fundamental issues and choices for both sides. It has taken time and it may take more.

I believe the greatest mistake that we could make would be to yield to historic American impatience with the process of negotiations.

That carries with it the answer to your second question, about "when" the Cuban troop issue became a prerequisite for Namibian independence. Security, of which the Cuban troop issue is an integral part, has always been a prerequisite for agreement on Namibian independence.

As a practical diplomatic matter, it will not be possible to obtain a Namibian independence agreement without satisfactory regional security assurances.

Quite apart from the diplomatic problem, it would not be desirable to bring Namibia to independence in circumstances that held prospects for greater regional instability and turmoil. This administration would not be a party to it, and I would hope that no one in this room would wish to see that either.

This approach does not mean an indefinite delay for Namibia's transition to independence. Some in the media and elsewhere press for our forecasts on these negotiations.

In reply, I would say that we are neither optimistic nor pessimistic; instead, we have a realistic objective, and we are determined to move steadily toward it.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would emphasize that we have set ourselves goals worthy of the support of all Americans and developed a road map for reaching them. The parties in the region are well aware of our seriousness.

Not surprisingly, all of them can find fault with this or that aspect of our diplomacy. But our goals and methods are increasingly understood. Despite the inherent difficulties, the administration sees no reason to shift course and every reason to persevere.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Crocker's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHESTER A. CROCKER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS

The Search for Regional Security in Southern Africa

Mr. Chairman, Congressmen, it gives me great pleasure to be able to report to you on developments in southern Africa at the mid-point in the first term of President's Reagan's administration.

These hearings on progress toward independence for Namibia, and the broader subject of "destabilization" in southern Africa, are indeed important, for they address issues at the core of our southern Africa policy. Over the past twenty-five years, virtually all of formerly colonial Africa has gained independence from the European metropolitan powers. These newly-independent nations, with many of whom we have significant economic, commercial and political ties, have made clear the importance they attach to eliminating colonialism from their continent. Thus, even apart from the traditional American desire to help the spread of self-government and democracy, there are profound political reasons for engaging in the effort to bring independence to Namibia.

There are equally important reasons for our concern about tension and instability in the region. Clearly, our desire to strengthen our economic and commercial links with Africa are not served by local conflicts or arms races, or by efforts of outside powers to exploit them from unilateral advantage. On the contrary, our own national interests are

best served by an atmosphere of political stability and economic growth, which alone can nurture modern African economic and political institutions. It is obviously to our advantage to do whatever we can to ease tensions, and work toward the peaceful resolution of problems and disputes among the nations of the region. This is the fundamental principle behind our policy of constructive engagement in the search for a more stable, secure, prosperous and democratic southern Africa.

I would like to start, Mr. Chairman, by restating the Administration's objectives, so it will be clear that they have not changed, and that we are continuing to pursue them with vigor and purpose.

-- The United States seeks to help strengthen communication between the countries of southern Africa in order to ease tensions, bolster regional security, and encourage negotiated solutions and peaceful change.

-- We are intent upon using every diplomatic tool at our command in order to bring about conditions which will lead to Namibia's independence at the earliest possible date.

-- Believing that "apartheid", as a structure of legally-entrenched racial separation, is morally unacceptable to a democracy such as our own, we have sought to encourage those elements within South Africa seeking constructive change, in order to see widened the base of participation in government and the economy to include all the elements of South Africa's varied population.

-- Finally, we seek constructive engagement with all the states of the region who wish the same with us. We do not approach the region with the belief that our task is to choose sides; on the contrary, it is the fact of our desire for strengthened relations with all the states of the region that enables us to play a role -- where such is welcome -- in working for regional security, development, and peaceful change. The United States is on the side of peaceful change and negotiated solutions. This is where our interests lie and this is what makes us uniquely relevant to the region.

Regional Security

It has long been clear to all who were genuinely concerned about Africa's efforts to develop modern democratic institutions and processes -- social, economic, and political -- that tension and hostility were inimical to those efforts. Certainly a region threatened with the prospect of heightened violence and polarization would find it difficult, at best, to focus positive efforts on its own development.

The recent history of southern Africa must serve as a cause of alarm to us. With the collapse of the Portuguese Empire in the mid 1970's, violence has escalated throughout the region to a point today where the fact or threat of violence is a major feature of the area. Cross border conflict risks becoming endemic. The question the United States

faces - alone and with its allies - is whether diplomacy can provide an alternative to violence or whether southern Africa is in the process of condemning itself to violence as a way of life. We have seen this happen elsewhere in the world - in the Middle East - with still incalculable consequences for world peace and our national security. It is in our national interests to seek to avoid such a development.

Mr. Chairman, this administration did not invent violence in southern Africa. We did make it our purpose to do something about it. We have set out as a conscious objective of policy to provide an alternative to conflict - not only in Namibia, our most visible effort, but throughout the region. We have made it our purpose to work with the nations of the region to see if a framework of restraint and broad rules of conduct could be developed which could contain conflicts and provide this basis for solutions. The Vice President summed up our policy in Nairobi on November 18, 1982 when he said:

"We are determined to help turn the sad tide of growing conflict and tension in southern Africa."

From the outset of this administration, we sought to establish effective communication with all those nations and other political elements with whom communication was inadequate or had lapsed. It seemed self-evident that unilaterally isolating ourselves from those with whom we

had differences, however strongly felt, served no purpose other than to cut us off from an ability to influence or affect their policies.

We began with a series of intensive discussions with all of the major actors in the region in order to identify their concerns, see how these fit in with our objectives, and determine how best we might proceed to advance American and Western interests. The priorities which seemed apparent to us were the ones enumerated earlier: regional security, independence for Namibia, the encouragement of elements favoring peaceful change within South Africa away from the system of apartheid, and constructive engagement with regional states in tackling the larger problems of economic and political development.

With respect to regional security, it seemed clear that one of the major barriers -- if not the principal stumbling block -- was the inability or unwillingness of parties on either side of South Africa's borders to speak to each other. Instability, coupled with a self-imposed reluctance on the part of the United States to act in concert with potential parties on behalf of our interests, had led to openings which were being exploited by our adversaries. Another major problem was our own lack of a credible dialogue with significant

actors in the southern African region -- not the least of which were the governments of South Africa and Angola.

Over the course of the past two years, we have worked assiduously to restore communication and get a dialogue going again. I believe we can point to a considerable record of success:

-- We have now had an extensive series of discussions at senior levels with the Angolan Government, exploring ways of improving our bilateral relationship with that country and seeking to bring about circumstances which will make possible agreement on Namibian independence.

-- After a period of difficulty in our relationship with Zambia, we have worked hard to re-establish a basis of confidence and improving communication, culminating in a highly-successful visit that Vice President Bush paid to that country in November of last year. We hope to have President Kaunda visit the United States in the near future.

-- We have continued to attach a high priority to assisting Zimbabwe, now in its third year of independence, as it seeks to meet pressures from the world economic downturn, a devastating drought sweeping across much of southern Africa, and the stresses and strains from political divisions within. Zimbabwe has travelled a rough road over the past two years but those who seek to judge its performance should have the

humility to recall our own history at a similar stage in America's independence, as well as the daunting challenges facing Zimbabwe's leadership. We intend to continue our efforts to assist this new country, convinced that it offers important prospects for becoming a keystone in the economic development and regional stability of southern Africa. Just as we seek to foster a regional climate of security and confidence that will encourage constructive change in South Africa, so too do we seek a regional climate conducive to Zimbabwe's success as an independent nation.

-- This administration took office just as the United States' relations with Mozambique reached a low-water mark. Communication with the Mozambican government was practically non-existent, that country's policies seemed unalterably aligned with those of the Soviet Union and its satrapies, its perceptions warped by hostile disinformation. But the utter incapacity of Marxist economics to cope with the problems of a developing country, and the conspicuous inability of the Soviet Union to assist Mozambique with security and political problems stemming from its isolation, led to indications that

the Mozambican government wished to re-establish communication with the United States. We responded by making clear that we were interested in a positive relationship based upon respect for each other's interests and were willing to engage in building bridges between us based upon mutual respect. Within just the past three months, we have had two sets of discussions between senior American and Mozambican officials aimed at engaging the Mozambican government in a constructive effort to improve regional stability and restore communications between us. We believe that a solid basis now exists for a meaningful improvement in relations between us.

Similarly, in our contacts with South Africa we quickly moved beyond discussion of the Namibia issue and bilateral questions to the over-arching question of regional security. We believe our extensive contacts with Pretoria have enabled us to more fully grasp the South African government's concerns about the region's dynamics while also making clear the terms on which we must operate if we are to be credible and effective there. While much remains to be done, the conditions now exist for a candid, sensitive and productive dialogue on regional matters with that country.

I would like to turn now to another facet of our diplomacy in southern Africa--encouraging effective communication between South Africa and its neighbors. We have not engaged in this effort as a search for glory or out of our own ambition. We have done so for the good and sufficient reason that it is

obviously in our national interest. The cycle of violence that threatens southern Africa is antithetical to everything this country stands for. Militarized conflict and the recourse to violent means can only advance the interests of our adversaries.

Dialogue alone, of course, will not necessarily solve the problems, but communication among countries that have serious disputes and basic political differences is an obvious first step. Within the past six months, South Africa has had significant and positive discussions with Angola, with Mozambique, and, in fact, with virtually all of its immediate neighbors. It is difficult to over-state the significance of the developing dialogue between South Africa and its neighbors, a dialogue we have sought--in unintrusive ways--to further. We welcome the fact of these contacts, and hope that by a thorough airing of differences, a constructive effort can be made toward their resolution.

It is important, we believe, to recognize that as dialogue itself is, by definition, a two-way street, so, too, is regional security. There is a compelling need for all the parties to recognize this. Although at any given moment, following some specific development or event, it might be possible to pronounce a moral or political judgment upon that event, it is not always useful, or even wise, to do so. For that matter, it is not always even possible to know precisely what has taken place, or why. Public posturing and the passing

of judgment, however gratifying to those who do it, is not usually the most helpful way to deal with the root causes of disputes. We seek results. This Administration is profoundly conscious of the fact that southern Africa is a highly-charged, politically polarized environment. Some would say it is a minefield. There is ample public posturing by the regional actors themselves without adding our own rhetoric to the mix.

Regional security runs in both directions across international borders, and in southern Africa each side in every dispute claims grievances against the other. We have not chosen to condemn each transgression by one or another of the parties, but have, rather, chosen the perhaps less gratifying but certainly more important long-term task of trying to ease tensions. In our view, our effectiveness depends on our ability to be a credible partner of all who wish our partnership and are prepared to engage in good-faith efforts to solve problems. Apart from Namibia, all states of the region are sovereign and recognize each other's sovereignty. That is a fact, and it carries with it certain obvious implications. Some states are not more sovereign than others. We recognize no state's right to harbor plotters or perpetrators of violence across borders and against other lands.

Mr. Chairman, I recognize that some observers are less than satisfied with the balance and discretion inherent in what I have just said. But we believe that those who would have us take sides among the parties in southern Africa would

have us un-learn every important role of diplomacy. In southern Africa as in the Middle East, it is not by choosing sides that we shape events or resolve conflicts. Our nation should be proud to stand on the side of peace and diplomacy and be prepared to weigh the concerns and interests of the parties involved as we seek to build bridges and explore avenues for agreement.

Namibia

When President Reagan took office in January of 1981, the Namibia negotiations had broken down, despite the substantial efforts and accomplishments of our predecessors. There was an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and recrimination among the parties whose agreement was essential for Namibia to secure its freedom. The obstacles to agreement between the parties were so great that it would have been tempting for us to walk away from the problem, washing our hands of the negotiations, and leaving it to debate and doubtful resolution by others. Certainly there were other urgent priorities.

Instead, partly in response to what we were clearly told by our African friends and our key allies in NATO, and partly because of America's historic tradition of support for self-determination, we set out to find a way to move toward Namibian independence. In preparation for this, we conducted extensive and exhaustive discussions with each of the major parties to the negotiation--the Front Line States, SWAPO, other states in

Africa, the South Africans and the internal parties inside Namibia, and our European allies.

We concluded that Namibia's independence could not be achieved in the absence of conditions which gave all participants reasonable confidence that their security interests would be protected. It was obvious to any observer that--irrespective of the reasons for their being there--the presence of Cuban combat forces in Angola was an integral part of the regional security problem.

I know that the members of this distinguished subcommittee are familiar with the charges and counter-charges from both Angola and South Africa about the fighting across the Namibian-Angolan frontier. My point is a simple one: the Cuban troop issue is not an issue we made up; it is an objective reality at the core of the question of regional security. The South Africans, whose concurrence and cooperation must be secured for any agreement leading to Namibian independence, have repeatedly made clear that they regard the Cuban troop issue as fundamental to their security concerns. Quite apart from that, the United States, as Vice President Bush said in Nairobi on November 19, 1982, "is not ashamed to state its interest in seeing an end to the presence of Cuban forces in Angola," just as we seek internationally recognized independence for Namibia. Such an outcome would contribute to both regional security and a global climate of restraint.

We have, for more than a year now, been engaged in intensive discussions with the Angolan government in an effort

to reach a broadly acceptable formula for parallel withdrawal of foreign forces from Namibia and Angola. These bilateral discussions have been held outside the framework of (UN) Security Council Resolution 435, and are not part of the Western Contact Group's mandate. We are fully prepared to respond to Angola's security concerns as well as to deal forthrightly with the reality of South Africa's concerns. We believe that this is a viable means of achieving the goal of Namibian independence to which we are profoundly committed. We know of no other means.

We believe that Angola wishes to contribute to a Namibian independence agreement, so long as its own security interests are preserved. We have achieved real progress in our talks with the Angolans and will spare no effort in continuing our search for a comprehensive, peaceful settlement.

Your letter, Mr. Chairman, inviting me to participate in these hearings, asked what the "short and long-run prospects" are for a Namibian settlement, as well as a number of specific questions about "when" South Africa and the United States made Cuban troop withdrawal a necessary accompaniment to Namibia's independence.

The answer to the first question is: "reasonably good." Certainly we intend to continue the effort. But this is a complicated and difficult negotiation, and it involves fundamental issues and choices for both sides. It has taken time and it may take more. I believe the greatest mistake that we

could make would be to yield to the historic American impatience with the progress of negotiations.

That carries with it the answer to your second question, about "when" the Cuban troop issue became a prerequisite for Namibian independence. Security, of which the Cuban troop issue is an integral part, has always been a prerequisite for agreement on Namibian independence. As a practical diplomatic matter, it will not be possible to obtain a Namibian independence agreement without satisfactory regional security assurances. Quite apart from the diplomatic problem, it would not be desirable to bring Namibia to independence in circumstances that held the prospects for greater regional instability and turmoil. This Administration would not be a party to it, and I would hope that no one in this room would wish to see that either.

This approach does not mean an indefinite delay for Namibia's transition to independence. Some in the media and elsewhere press for our forecasts on these negotiations. In reply, I would say that we are neither optimistic nor pessimistic; instead, we have a realistic objective, and we are determined to move steadily toward it.

In conclusion, I would emphasize that we have set ourselves goals worthy of the support of all Americans and developed a road map for reaching them. The parties in the region are well aware of our seriousness. Not surprisingly, all of them can find fault with this or that aspect of our diplomacy. But our goals and methods are increasingly understood. Despite the inherent difficulties, the Administration sees no reason to shift course and every reason to persevere.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be glad to answer your questions.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you, Mr. Crocker, for your testimony. The document that was published in the Washington Post in early 1981 you reportedly wrote and I quote:

We cannot consent to act as a smokescreen for actions which excite the fear of other states in the region and encourage impractical emotional responses to regional problems. South African government intemperance in vital adventures will expand Soviet opportunities and reduce western leverage in Africa.

How would you assess the present state of South African initiatives in the region? Is not, in effect, South African Government intemperance of vital adventures acting to destabilize the region in a way that indeed enhances the possibilities for Soviet-Cuban adventurism in the area?

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, as I think my opening statement indicates, we believe that the roots of regional turmoil in southern Africa are deeply rooted in the history of the region. There are many factors that explain the rise in regional violence.

There is no question that no matter who the party is, whether it be South Africa or anybody else that is responsible for a given incident or a given escalation of conflict, such a development does indeed open the door for possible manipulation or exploitation of those circumstances by our global adversary.

There is no question as to—

Mr. WOLPE. Is there any other instance in southern Africa in which the national troops of a country have moved into South Africa either from Angola, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, or any of the Front Line states?

Mr. CROCKER. Any instance in which the troops of a neighbor—

Mr. WOLPE. The national troops of a neighboring state under control of that state have moved into South Africa?

Mr. CROCKER. There probably have been random crossings by error or intentionally in the border region. I do not know. I do not have the facts for you, but I am not aware of any invasion of South Africa by regular troops of any southern African country; no.

Mr. WOLPE. Is it not an accurate statement that the only aggression that has occurred has been government supported and sanctioned, in fact, has come from South Africa moving into the other countries?

Mr. CROCKER. I think one has to watch that terminology pretty carefully. There have, of course, been incidents on borders in several cases, and there have been charges and countercharges about who was on whose territory on several occasions.

When it comes to the use of conventional forces by South Africa's neighbors against South Africa, I am not aware of any instances of that. If I am wrong, my colleagues will be sure to tell me.

Mr. WOLPE. Has there been anything comparable to South Africa's continued occupation of Angola or the South African raid on Lesotho that has been directed at South Africa by any of the Front Line states?

Mr. CROCKER. There is a pretty systematic campaign directed against South Africa from neighboring states; yes. The question is: Who is doing it and which party is it?

Mr. WOLPE. Are you saying that the governments of these other states are doing it?

Mr. CROCKER. What I am simply saying is the fact that there are guerrilla efforts that are launched across South African borders.

Mr. WOLPE. Supported and sanctioned by the other government?

Mr. CROCKER. One assumes the other governments in many cases would be in a position to know about it; yes.

Mr. WOLPE. Are you saying that that violence is comparable and equivalent and not in any sense differentiated in either its international significance, in terms of international law or in terms of its fundamental content from the South Africa activity?

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, the position of the administration is that violence is violence. I think my statement made clear that we do not believe that there is any right to use violence in southern Africa, be it by organized groups seeking to overthrow the Government of South Africa or by South Africa itself.

Mr. WOLPE. I want to, for a second, turn to the assessment of Namibian independence. Throughout 1981 and during much of 1982 the administration has provided consistently optimistic scenarios for rapid movement toward an independence agreement.

Last June U.S. officials said if things went according to the timetable we have in mind, it is foreseeable in the next several months the parties could agree on implementation of Resolution 435 and could begin with elections by March or April of 1983.

What is your current outlook? Is it not time there be established some kind of specific time frame for the signing on of the Namibian agreement?

Mr. CROCKER. If it were possible, Mr. Chairman, we would be the first to leap at the possibility, but I think the way to put your question in perspective is to indicate that we set last year a desirable objective or target of 1982 as the year in which we would hope to begin the implementation of the U.N. plan for Namibia.

Things have moved a little slower than we hoped, but we, as I indicated in my statement, believe that the effort is certainly worth persevering in and offers prospects for success. I do not believe that we can look at the issue of deadlines as a very constructive possibility at this point, and one would have to ask the basic question, "Who are we going to threaten with the deadline?"

At the current point we have pulled virtually all of the pieces of the Namibia negotiation concerning Resolution 435 together. Most of those issues are resolved, so who is going to be recipient of a deadline?

At this point we are waiting for comparable movement on the Angolan issues, which are separate, and are being negotiated bilaterally.

So do we threaten the Angolan Government with the deadline? Is that what you wish us to do or who?

Mr. WOLPE. You are the people who made the linkage. We have talked about this in public session on a variety of occasions. So we can begin to clarify that record; it was the United States, was it not, that raised the Cuban troop issue as a matter of formal linkage to the question of the Namibian independence settlement?

It was not South Africa that raised this question. It had not arisen in the earlier diplomacy prior to the new effort that was undertaken; is that not accurate?

Mr. CROCKER. No; that is not accurate, Mr. Chairman. The issue of Cuban troops had been referred to and had been raised in previous periods of negotiation, going back several years before we entered office.

What we sought to do in coming in to examine the situation was to identify what it would take to get a go-ahead from the key parties.

We knew, as far as the African parties were concerned—that is, the Front Line states and SWAPO—that what it would take to get an agreement was the consolidation and the confirmation of U.N. Resolution 435.

Mr. WOLPE. If I may interrupt you, it is very important that we use the same words—not use different words that are intended to convey one meaning when you have something else in mind.

I have had conversations personally with ambassadors representing the Front Line states and with Presidents and heads of state. I have had similar discussions with members of the Western Contact Group, the French, Canadian, British, and Germans.

In no instance has anyone suggested that anything but the Cuban troop linkage question was newly advanced as part of the diplomatic thrust of the new administration. Simply they claim it had never arisen as part of the formal negotiating process previously.

Are you saying that is all in error? I want to understand precisely what your position is on that.

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, I share your interest completely in clarifying this point. The point I made is that this is not, since we came into office, the first time that the Cuban troop issue has been discussed in the negotiations.

What we sought to do was to restructure for success the negotiation that we inherited. The negotiation we inherited had a substantial accomplishment in it; namely, all the agreements surrounding U.N. Resolution 435.

There is one minor problem, Mr. Chairman. South Africa was not of a mood to implement it.

Mr. WOLPE. Did you or did you not make these formally linked propositions in a way that had not happened previously?

Mr. CROCKER. Our effort to relate Namibia to Angola was our effort. I am not denying that. What I am saying is that—

Mr. WOLPE. That is all I was trying to establish.

Mr. CROCKER. That was not the question you asked, Mr. Chairman. You asked if this was the first time Cubans have been an issue in the negotiation. They have been an issue in this problem since 1975, when they arrived there.

Mr. WOLPE. They were never linked as part of the formal diplomacy. Of course, we have been talking about Cuban troops in Congress as well. I think it is important not to obscure what is at least a common perception that is shared by all of the Contact Group, the Front Line states and, in fact, I submit, the world.

We have raised a new issue that was not part of the formal set of questions related to Namibian diplomacy.

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, we have developed a new approach to a negotiation which had bogged down.

Mr. WOLPE. That is fine. This leads me to my next proposition, because I am not here to quarrel with the genuineness of your motivation in raising that issue.

You have said before this committee in previous testimony that this was, in fact, a new proposal that you felt would assist the South Africans in selling the Namibian settlement to their constituency.

However, I think it is important that we all here understand precisely the history by which this linkage concept as part of diplomacy was initiated. The South Africans did not put this on the table. We did it in an effort to try to secure an agreement.

I do not quarrel with what motivated that initiative, but it does lead me to the broader question that I do want to pose with you.

In your testimony you spent some time in justifying the diplomatic approach that the administration has taken by, first of all, affirming the goals of the diplomacy in terms of a Namibian settlement and elimination of apartheid and regional security.

Again, I have no quarrel whatsoever with the directions and goals that you have enunciated in that discussion.

You then go on to assert that the administration is essentially interested in results and that your diplomacy and approach that has been taken is one you believe is more realistic.

I think you talked about rhetoric not achieving anything. I want to submit to you, Dr. Crocker, hoping we can dispose of this issue today and not come back to it months down the road, that the suggestion that the critics of the policy are operating from a kind of rhetorical posture or are more interested in emotional catharsis or in the advocacy of a moral point of view is simply a misstatement of what the criticism and critique has been all about.

I am not, for one, particularly interested in whether we feel good in what we do. When you submit that is what is motivating the criticism of the policy, I think you are doing a real disservice, very frankly.

I am arguing, what other critics of policy have argued, that the policy being pursued is politically ineffective. It is counterproductive to the goals you have established for yourself. It is counterproductive, I submit, because the messages that we have sent out have been very confusing messages.

We say we condemn apartheid at the same time that we expand our relationships with the regime in terms of trade and economic activity.

We say we condemn regional violence at the same time we will use our veto in the United Nations on the question of condemnation of the South African invasion of Angola.

I guess what I would simply put to you: Is it not reasonable that the message that the South Africans have heard is that they can engage in regional aggression; they can engage in the continuation of the system of apartheid and at no point will this administration or the American Government be prepared to adopt any kind of response that would mean some cost to the South Africans?

If that is not a reasonable perception and conclusion that is the conclusion that I have reached. It is not clear to me as an American that this administration is prepared to use any sticks as part of its diplomatic packet of carrots and sticks.

I think it is a policy that is based exclusively upon carrots. It is not clear to me that we are prepared to make clear what we really mean or what we say we mean.

Why should it be any clearer to the South Africans?

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of clarifying the record on the issue we were previously discussing, I wonder if I could add one word on that question of the Cubans, and then I will come to the second point you made.

I think you said that we were looking for a way to restructure the negotiations and we sort of sidled up to the South Africans and said, "Hey, how about some Cuban troop withdrawal?" That wasn't the way it went. I want to make this very clear for the record.

We sought to ask the South Africans for a definitive list of their concerns which, if addressed, would lead to an agreement to implement U.N. Resolution 435.

They were very quick to indicate what that would be, not surprisingly. This is an issue, as I said, that has been on their minds since 1975.

This question of linkage gets tossed around in many ways. For years we have heard from the Angolan Government a notion of linkage which is that once Namibia is independent, sometime thereafter Cuban troops will go home. We do not think that kind of linkage is terribly productive any more than we would have accepted South Africa's insistence that Cuba should go first and then, after the Cubans have left, we would be prepared to decolonize Namibia.

We have rejected both kinds of linkage which say "you go first," and we have sought a relationship of parallel movement here which would have both sides, in effect, making compromises.

I think it should be very clear for the record, since we are trying to establish a record here, that our approach is fundamentally balanced on that point.

Mr. Chairman, in relation to your—

Mr. WOLPE. Can I clarify that point before you move on to the question? Are you saying, in effect, that the American Government took South Africa's list of what was important to it and agreed to make that part of our diplomatic package because it was on South Africa's list?

Mr. CROCKER. We asked all the parties what was on their list. We did not accept everything on everybody's lists either.

Mr. WOLPE. Why this?

Mr. CROCKER. It was obviously the most important issue. As we said, what we are seeking to do is to build a climate in southern Africa which has foreign troops going home, South African foreign troops going home and Cuban foreign troops going home.

Mr. WOLPE. I do not want to prolong this unduly. I am more interested in moving on to the second question. I want to say that in our conversations with Prime Minister Botha of South Africa he asserted to us that it was the United States that really raised this question, not the South Africans.

Please proceed.

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, we are obviously as interested in results as you are. I do not think it is my purpose to cast aspersions on anyone's motivations.

I do think there is a tendency in our body politic—which is one that, as any American, I can understand, which is why I addressed it in my opening remarks—to seek to have kind of immediate, instant gratification by sounding off about political problems one doesn't like. We do not like them either, but we are trying to get something done. It was in that spirit I made the observations that I made.

We are of the view that there can be no doubt whatsoever in the minds of the South African Government leaders or, for that matter, the other Government leaders in the region that we are seeking a balanced approach to the region and that we stand for a balanced approach to the region.

We have never given any government *carte blanche* to do what it might wish to do in an ideal world. We have never given the South Africans to believe that we would turn a blind eye or permit this and that and not react to it.

Most recently our position has been very clear on the issue of the Lesotho raid, which you referred to. But there have been many other occasions.

I regret we cannot have tape recorders every time we have discussions with our counterparts in the South African Government. I can assure you they do not have the impression or have not drawn the conclusion that our policy toward the region constitutes a blank check for South Africa.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you.

Mr. Solomon.

Mr. SOLOMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, Mr. Crocker, I want to commend you on your testimony. I guess as a new member of this committee, I am sitting here somewhat in a daze. I have heard all of the condemnation on regional violence and a line of questions on that subject thus far.

I would also think that some of the questions might concern what I really think is our biggest problem in the world: International communism and the spread of it.

But I am surprised we have not had questions asked like, how many troops are there in Angola today? How many SWAPO terrorists are there in Angola? Does the U.S. position contemplate closure of SWAPO's bases? When will there be an election in Angola? Is it fair to say Angola is not independent or sovereign but is governed as a Soviet puppet state? Those are the kinds of answers I would really like.

Mr. CROCKETT. Would the gentlemen yield?

Mr. SOLOMON. Not at this point. I will when I am finished.

Mr. Crocker, would you say that southern Africa today is more stabilized than it was 1, 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 years ago?

Mr. CROCKER. Congressman, I would say it has taken us several years to establish and to get on the road our objectives. I think in many respects that the stability and security of southern Africa is on the road to being reinforced.

I cannot say in all candor that it is more stabilized than it was. In fact, there is still much too much violence. Violent incidents do continue, and there have been upsurges of violence in recent years that concern us very much.

But the roots and history of these problems go back a long, long way. We think it is important to get on the record the complexity of the issues, the limits on our influence, and the good faith effort we are making to try to address the problem.

Mr. SOLOMON. How much destabilization is there today? How much is due to international causes and how much is due to the various internal national problems that are being experienced by these countries in that region?

Mr. CROCKER. That, of course, is the key question. We have made it our purpose to try and address not only the local and regional causes but also the global ones as well.

It is our view that there is, as I said, a history here. If we look back at the events of 1975, a time in which our Nation was doubting virtually everything about our basic principles in foreign affairs, we found a Soviet Government prepared to take what seemed to us to be big risks but, in fact, were not big risks for them, given our national mood, to engage in a distant across-water adventure, to place a substantial Cuban force in Angola, an expeditionary force, which, in effect, created the current Angolan Government.

Obviously, this event has had a fundamental effect. Even more important was the decision or the events a year earlier in Lisbon which led to the Portuguese coup d'etat and revolution, which led to one of the messiest, if I can use that term, decolonization processes that we have ever seen in Africa, in both Angola and Mozambique, as well as in other ex-Portuguese territories, creating, in effect, an instant power scramble in many areas which encouraged outsiders to intervene to manipulate for their own advantage.

As a result of that, in turn, we have seen a significant inflow of arms from outside sources, overwhelmingly from the East, into these various arenas of conflict, whether it is in the ex-Portuguese territories or in Zimbabwe, formerly Rhodesia.

It is a heavily internationalized region now, Congressman, and that is one of our problems.

Mr. SOLOMON. Getting back to the chairman's question on linkage under the Carter administration, there was no linkage on the question of getting those Cuban troops out of Angola; no effort was made, just a lot of rhetoric?

Mr. CROCKER. There was, under the Carter administration, no formal policy of linking Namibia to Angola. There was an effort, which we have continued, to make clear that until such time as there is movement in that direction, it will be very difficult for us to have a normal relationship with Angola, but that is a bilateral matter.

There was not under the Carter administration a formal parallel relationship between Namibia and Angola.

Mr. SOLOMON. Thank God there is linkage now.

Mr. WOLPE. I think the point that Dr. Crocker made is important to reemphasize. The issue that I and others have raised in recent months does not go to the question of whether or not Cuban troops should be removed from Angola.

What is being argued is that indeed the approach that we have taken has actually increased the reliance of the Angolans upon the Cuban troops and made more difficult at the same time the settlement of the Namibian conflict.

So the issue we are raising here is not one of goal but how do you achieve those objectives.

Mr. SOLOMON. I appreciate the chairman's comments too, but you know, I look at Israel's intrusion into Lebanon as being one of self preservation. Perhaps the same situation exists in Namibia.

When our guerrilla and terrorist activities cross the border and the existing government does nothing about it, sometimes we have to do things to preserve ourselves.

Let me get on with another question. Mr. Secretary, you talked about constructive engagement. Before constructive engagement it appears there was no U.S. policy in southern Africa and that the South Africans had a free hand in the region along with the Soviets. Now both the Soviets and the South Africans must deal with the fact of U.S. involvement in the region.

So my question is: With the United States now actively involved with Mozambique, and Angola, and Zimbabwe and a growing security relationship with Botswana, how has this affected South Africa's freedom of action?

Mr. CROCKER. Congressman, I think it is fair to say that our efforts at present in southern Africa have gotten the most serious attention from South African decisionmakers, black African decisionmakers and Soviet decisionmakers.

There is no doubt whatsoever in our minds that we have grabbed the attention of all the other actors in the region, even our allies I would add to that list.

There are those who think, as I said earlier, that what we have been doing is writing a blank check. There may have been those in South African society and government who hoped that that is what this administration would bring. But that has not been what we brought.

We brought a balanced, careful diplomatic approach to the region. We are seeking to build peace in a region of importance to us. In that sense, to answer your question, all the parties are on notice that we are serious, that we intend to take people at their word, that we are not going to have others choose our friends for us and that if we fail, it is they who live there who will be the biggest sufferers.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Secretary, aside from the issue of linkage, what are the other significant issues that remain to be resolved by the parties to the Namibian negotiations?

Mr. CROCKER. There are no significant obstacles to a rapid implementation of U.N. Resolution 435 apart from this question of parallel movement on the Angolan/Cuban issue.

There are several what I would call minor or technical issues that are not yet fully pinned down. One of them concerns the final composition of the U.N. force to be stationed in Namibia during the transition. Most of that is agreed. I think there is one element that is not yet agreed. The other concerns the choice of an electoral system to be used during that transition process.

It is our judgment that both of those issues could fall into place rapidly and without serious political difficulty for any of the parties if we can get the other issues resolved.

Mr. SOLOMON. So you are saying that there is progress being made on the issue of the presence of Cuban combat troops in Angola?

Mr. CROCKER. As far as the Angolan/Cuban issue is concerned, as I said in my opening remarks, we believe that important progress has been made. There is a good ways to go still.

We have every reason to think the Angolan Government wishes this effort to succeed. It has said nothing to us indicating that it has given up hope or that it wishes us to stop trying.

So, as long as that is the case, we intend to persevere. We have made progress.

Mr. SOLOMON. One last question. The Wall Street Journal reported on January 28, following your recent visit to Moscow, the U.S. officials believe Russia will not oppose a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. Is that accurate?

Mr. CROCKER. It will take, I think, events themselves, Congressman, to indicate what the Russians will or will not do about permitting an agreement on Cuban troop withdrawal to go forward.

They, of course, are not parties directly to the negotiation on that issue, which is bilateral between us and the Angolans. Their influence, one assumes, is indirect or behind the scenes. They have not said anything to us which would indicate that they would block such an agreement.

Mr. SOLOMON. I thank you, Mr. Secretary, for bearing with me.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you, Mr. Solomon.

Mr. Crockett.

Mr. CROCKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Crocker, I am still getting mail blaming me for what you are doing as Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. [Laughter.]

You really have a difficult role because you have to conduct diplomacy secretly and still you are required to report back to Congress on what is going on and on the progress that is being made.

For 2 years now we have been having these hearings, and, frankly, I am no better informed with respect to our negotiations on the Namibian situation than I was 2 years ago, yet you have been here repeatedly and given these formal statements and so forth very diplomatically saying absolutely nothing. You do have some help today.

On your previous occasions we have had a subcommittee that was more or less united at least for that anticommunism line that has trotted out so frequently. We stuck to the basic issues. That was true on both sides of the aisle.

I suppose now we are in for a very interesting 2-year session.

Mr. SOLOMON. You can count on that.

Mr. CROCKETT. You spent quite a bit of time in your statement, Mr. Crocker, talking about the desire of the State Department to create "communication with respect particularly to the Front Line nations."

Yet I think you will agree that communications with respect to Mozambique were broken off by us and that Mozambique has always been willing to resume relations with the United States, and the United States has been the one that has been refusing to do so.

You spoke about renewing communications or encouraging communications with Angola. There, again, American business, particularly the petroleum industry, has no difficulty communicating with Angola. I do not think you have had any. I think you admit that you have had several meetings.

This subcommittee visited Angola in August, I think, 2 years ago. We met at that time with the President. He told us of his desire to establish normal relations with the United States.

We had hearings here with representatives from Mobil Oil and Gulf Oil, and they expressed the desire that normal relations be established between the United States and Angola.

It seems to me that all that is required is for us to stop this charade about not recognizing the Government. Even though we do business with them, even though you, as the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, sit down and talk with them, we still say we will not "recognize them" and exchange Ambassadors.

When do you anticipate we will recognize Angola and resume diplomatic relations with Mozambique?

Mr. CROCKER. Congressman, I think you have posed two questions really concerning our relations with two different states in Southern Africa. I would like to respond, if I could, to each.

We, of course, never broke off relations with Mozambique. The new administration, when it came into office, was on the verge of confirming a previous administration decision to go forward with a regional project that would have benefits for Mozambique when, through an unfortunate series of events, it became apparent there was going to be a sharp deterioration in our relations, which was not one which we sought. Half of our diplomatic mission was chucked out of Mozambique by the Mozambique Government amid accusations that our Embassy was a nest of spies and plotters and what have you with the South Africans, a litany of East bloc-inspired disinformation which we rejected for what it was.

At the same time we found it increasingly difficult for our people in Mozambique to have normal access to our diplomatic contacts. Our U.S. Information Service representatives were unable to function.

We saw a growing pattern in Mozambique's international position on issues of importance to us. It sounded as though they could have been written in East Berlin. There was a clear deterioration. We did not seek it. We would have no incentive to seek it.

More recently, there has been a very different atmosphere in our relations with Mozambique. We are the first ones to want to do better with them and are very eager to have this new tone in our relationship prevail. I think that that desire is mutual.

I know you are aware, Congressman, that in relations between governments there are often issues of face. Each side will point to the other and say, "Well, the ball is in your court. It is your fault. If you want better relations, you do something." There was a bit of that between us and Mozambique, to be perfectly candid, but we are now on the right road and I think we are doing a lot better.

We never broke off relations. We always had an embassy there. We are soon to be choosing an ambassador to be assigned there.

Mr. CROCKER. I think I misspoke myself. You withdrew ambassadors, is that right?

Mr. CROCKER. No; there was an ambassador there earlier who was transferred before we came into office, and there was a replacement slated to go out and had been slated to go out for some months, chosen before we came into office, and it was in the light of the expulsion of members of our diplomatic mission that we did not, in fact, replace the previous Ambassador. But this administration did not in fact, withdraw an ambassador from Mozambique.

Concerning Angola, you are quite correct, Congressman, we have had plenty of contacts. In fact, there are those who ask why we would ever have to have diplomatic relations with Angola since we have so much contact without diplomatic relations.

To turn your question around, we are not seeking to extract any specific pound of flesh from anyone in order to have a normal relationship with Angola.

I would point out that the policy started by President Gerald Ford and continued by President Jimmy Carter has been also continued by President Ronald Reagan in this respect. So it is not something we invented.

We do feel that in the context of an overall settlement there will be normalized relations with Angola, and we hope to get that context established as soon as possible.

Mr. CROCKETT. The recent disturbance in Lesotho by South Africa has never been protested by our State Department, has it?

Mr. CROCKER. Yes, it has, Congressman, both in noon press briefings and in terms of the guidance sent to our mission in New York, the U.S. mission to the United Nations, where we voted with the international community in a unanimous vote of condemnation of South Africa's raid on Lesotho.

Mr. CROCKETT. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you, Mr. Crockett.

Mr. Reid.

Mr. REID. Mr. Secretary, not understanding a lot of the political intrigue that we have talked about here today, the question I have is more basic, I think.

It would seem that this country, Namibia, which I am learning to say, is really caught between a rock and a hard place.

It seems to me the longer we talk about this, the less chance they have of making it on their own whenever this thing comes to an end.

As I understand it, they have a limited amount of resources there anyway, and while we are talking here today, South Africa's Government is tearing out of the ground there the few resources they have left in the way of minerals.

My question is: When this is all over and done with, Is Namibia going to survive anyway? Because I read something recently that in South Africa they are projecting that their mineral wealth would be gone some time in the eighties anyway.

My next question, if you could respond to two of these they are both in different areas. Dr. Crocker, I learned quickly that we get in the habit of asking questions this way because most of the time we are limited in the time we have to ask questions.

Mr. WOLPE. I hope you appreciate the lenience of the chairman.

Mr. REID. I do not want to get in a bad habit.

Mr. WOLPE. I was trying to protect my own ability to go beyond the normal time.

Mr. REID. My next question is: Do we have any information of Cuban troops being in any way involved in anything in Namibia? Would you respond to those two questions?

Mr. CROCKER. Congressman, I am not in a position to give you a detailed answer on the first question, as to what Namibia's development prospects are. It is our general judgment that it is a resource-rich territory in terms of mineral raw materials and that, given the slender population of Namibia, this does provide a base for economic development.

It certainly is by no means exploited to the point where there is nothing left. In fact, things are still being discovered. Were there to be a climate of confidence and political certainty about the future, I think we would see a lot more foreign investment coming in from various sources, from the international community, which would lead to an expansion of exploration and further development of those resources.

Mr. REID. Could you at a later time give me an estimate from your offices as to what natural resources are available in that country?

Mr. CROCKER. I would be happy to do so. There is a farming community, a sheep industry, which is an important export. There is a fishing industry which has been in difficulty but still exists. So there are various things. We will provide you more data on that.

I fully share your view that there is an awful lot of attention focused on the problem of bringing Namibia into being. In fact, the transition process for Namibia could well wind up costing the international community in excess of \$500 million, a good chunk of which you can expect we will be asking the Congress in its wisdom to support.

We are very grateful for the vote of confidence we already have received for an initial approval of those funds to support the U.N. force (UNTAG) for Namibia and hope that that response will be similar when the time comes that we have a settlement in hand.

The answer to your second question is that I am not aware of any Cuban troops having gone into Namibia. There are, obviously, Cubans in Angola in very substantial numbers who are closely involved with both the Angolan forces and have relationships as well with the SWAPO forces that have sanctuary, that have bases in Namibia.

Mr. REID. Then I guess my question is——

Mr. CROCKER. Bases in Angola, I am sorry.

Mr. REID. I understood that. Is it this linkage problem, is it a fear that the Cuban troops will come from Angola down to Namibia and into South Africa? Tell me why there is a linkage, which I am having trouble comprehending.

Mr. CROCKER. Congressman, I think there are basically two issues involved. One is a concrete security concern on the part of some in Namibia and certainly on the part of the South African Government and its domestic supporters, which is that in an environment of a new nation getting on its feet with young institutions, fragile institutions, heavily dependent on the outside world for economic support and experts and so on, the looming presence across

that frontier of a very substantial Cuban expeditionary force would decisively affect the political atmosphere, the political environment, inside Namibia and could, of course, trigger reinterventions into Namibia, whether by South Africans, by Cubans, whatever. It would be obviously a messy situation. That is one concern.

The other is the simple fact of political life inside South Africa. South Africans are being asked, under our diplomacy, to remove themselves from a place they have been in control of for many, many years. Inevitably, this is a difficult decision for any South African Government to take.

As a matter of practical politics, it seems to us that what we are hearing from them is essentially this: What is in it for us? You are asking us to take a step which will look like political surrender. Is there anything in this deal for us? So I think there are two aspects, both security and politics.

Mr. REID. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you, Mr. Reid.

Mr. WEISS.

Mr. WEISS. Dr. Crocker, as you were describing the situation of a new, young nation, insecure in its capacity to govern and protect itself from outside forces, until you said Namibia, I thought you were talking about Angola.

If we go back to how the Cubans got to where they are, wouldn't your description projecting to Namibia apply to Angola?

Mr. CROCKER. Congressman, we have every sympathy and empathy with the circumstances that have faced the Angolan people since their independence. It is a tragic history. It is a rich country with a talented people that could presumably one day be one of the really strong nations of Africa. It has suffered as a nation far more than most and far more than anyone has any reason to impose upon the people of Angola.

The tragedy, however, is I think a bit more complex than is sometimes stated in our history. The tragedy is that a minority in Angola was installed in power with the aid of foreign troops, and the issues that are involved in creating a reconciled Angolan society have not yet been fully addressed. That is one of the reasons why these wars that face Angola continue and are so damaging and destructive.

Mr. WEISS. You are not suggesting that we are not recognizing the Angolan Government because we think that the people in power do not really deserve to be in power?

Mr. CROCKER. That is not what I said, Congressman.

Mr. WEISS. I wish you had.

Mr. CROCKER. The people in power in Angola obviously were put there with the assistance not only of their own fighters but with a substantial foreign intervention involved.

Mr. WEISS. I had not really intended to go into this line of questioning. Have you had discussions with the Angolans and/or the South Africans as to what kind of security provisions or arrangements were made for Angola, assuming Namibian independence, assuming Cuban withdrawal, assuming South African withdrawal?

In your statement you made some general comments about how the United States wants to see a secure Angola. What specifically

have the discussions pointed to as far as those arrangements are concerned?

Mr. CROCKER. I am glad you asked the question, Congressman. I wish I could give you the full details. Obviously, you can appreciate there are proposals on the table which are still in the diplomatic channels. So there are limits on what I can say.

But we have indeed put forward quite specific ideas and we have also encouraged in every way our Angolan interlocutors to raise questions, to make counterproposals, to indicate what it is that is of greatest concern to them in terms of their security. We have also made clear to them and to many of their closest friends that we are more than willing to address those issues once we have a feel for them or a handle on what they are.

So there are, of course, many possibilities. There is one that is often bruited about that I want to make our position clear on. It has never been suggested by us or by them that some substitute foreign forces are the answer. They have not raised it and we have not raised it.

They have said to us that they wish to be masters in their own house. We assume they mean it.

There are many possibilities. We are talking about parallel movement within what we term in the negotiation "phase 3." Phase 3 begins on the date that the U.N. Security Council passes a resolution of implementation of the U.N. plan. It would not end until the independent flag of Namibia is raised on a flagpole. That period of time could be up to a year, perhaps even more than a year.

We are seeking to get parallel movement on two issues of troop withdrawal within that broad context of time. We have never dictated or sought to dictate precisely what that means. That is for negotiation between us and the Angolans and the South Africans.

Mr. WEISS. I hope that when considered appropriate you will, in fact, take us into your confidence. I assume by that time the world will know as well, but it will be nice to know as you are moving forward.

Let me ask very briefly a question in the area that I had intended to address. I think that your administration, the administration under your leadership with regard to Africa has, in fact, done some positive things, which I saw.

Having just come back from the conference with the delegation from southern Africa, I am impressed by the commitment that has been made by the administration and continues to be made to the survival and strengthening of Zimbabwe. I do not believe they could be at the point where they are without that support.

It is within that context that I find perplexing, I guess is the word, the attitude of the administration and perhaps your attitude as well in discounting or disregarding what is, in essence, a state of war being waged by the South African Government in various forms against Zimbabwe, against Mozambique, against Angola, against all of the states surrounding them.

You mentioned in your comment, your opening statement, that there seemed to be negotiations and discussions between South Africa and some of those countries. You know that many of those discussions have come under duress, that indeed the Government

of South Africa is attempting to dictate who from those countries, what level of government they will enter the discussions with, that, in fact, South Africa is attempting to bring those countries to their economic knees and, in some instances, since they are at their economic knees already, into a totally prostrate position, all of this at the same time that we are, in fact, expending American taxpayers' funds by the hundreds of millions of dollars to give some of those countries a chance to survive.

I do not understand the laxity with which South Africa's destabilization efforts are viewed by our Government. Will you comment on that?

Mr. CROCKER. Congressman, you have asked a very central question. I think I sought to answer at least part of it in my opening comments, in which I indicated that we cannot condone and do not condone violence in southern Africa. In fact, we make very clear our feelings about violence from whatever quarter across borders in southern Africa. We have not sought to cover up anything in this regard. We make it very clear to the South Africans, as we do to others.

Mr. WEISS. You are not equating the sporadic guerrilla crossing of borders from some other countries, not directed by those countries, into South Africa or Namibia with the controlled, acknowledged governmental efforts to destabilize the country of South Africa by the Government of South Africa. Are you equating those two things?

Mr. CROCKER. I think we have to be careful which cases we are talking about. You mentioned, Congressman, the case of Zimbabwe. We have, as you said, put a lot of chips on the table to try to back Zimbabwe's success as a new nation.

We have on repeated occasions become involved in Zimbabwe's relationship with South Africa to seek to build bridges, to open avenues, with the willingness of both sides that we do so.

We have passed messages and so on and so forth. We continue to do that. There can be no doubt whatsoever in our minds that South Africa, the Government of South Africa, is fully aware that we favor peaceful coexistence in that relationship. We believe a politically and economically strong Zimbabwe is, in fact, in South Africa's best interests. The only people who will gain if there is a pattern of destabilization in Zimbabwe is our global adversary, which we assume that South Africa does not want to see either. There is not any ambiguity on this point.

I have to say it, even though it may sound gratuitous, that we are sitting here looking at a certain pattern of history with events that disturb us—and they do—but we are assuming that if we had been doing nothing at all, things would be better, if you see my point.

In other words, we read about the bridges that get blown up. We do not read about the bridges that do not get blown up. We are actively engaged in this region.

Mr. WEISS. Just to close it out, just I guess within a week or 10 days before we arrived in Harare, the oil depots as well as the pipeline between Mozambique and Zimbabwe were blown up, not for the first time, nor for the last, in all probability, clearly to the advantage of South Africa having more economic control and in over-

whelming likelihood at the instigation, direction, and control of South Africa.

I know that we are not happy about Zimbabwe being put into that kind of economic bind, and yet I don't know. Have we made representations to South Africa saying, knock it off, that is our money that you are destroying?

Mr. CROCKER. Congressman, in the case of individual incidents, your question puts us in a most difficult position, as I am sure you will appreciate. We are not in a position to know precisely the causation of every event that happens in the region.

I am certain that if we were to pose this question, if you were to pose this question, to the South African Government, they would deny any such involvement in the act of blowing up storage tanks at Beira or the pipeline that supplies Zimbabwe. So I do not think one can presume too much knowledge on the causation of these differing events.

We have certainly made as clear as we know how that we have a stake in the success in Zimbabwe. We have made it abundantly clear that we do not think it will be a victory for the Western World if we manage to get Cuban troops out of Angola and wind up seeing them somewhere else as a result of internal activity in Mozambique.

Mr. WEISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLPE. I thank you, Mr. Weiss.

I would like to pursue what I think is a terribly important line of inquiry that Mr. Weiss has developed. I also want to begin with the same affirmation. I think there are elements of administration policy in southern Africa that I think have been very enlightened and I think have been very constructive.

The recognition of the importance of Zimbabwe and the willingness of this administration to essentially run across rhetorical predispositions in the campaign to recognize this Marxist Government or, for that matter, the Governments of Mozambique and Angola that use the label of Marxism are in many respects very pragmatic governments and that support for these efforts for national independence and development serve American interests I think is a very important initiative on the part of the administration.

One of the problems as we deal with all of these foreign policy matters, especially in third world countries, is Americans tend to react to a set of labels. The labels frequently do not have the content in the African context particularly that the Americans think they have. It takes some courage to break out of those stereotypes and try to respond to the realities of the field.

Having said that, what is particularly distressing to those of us who recently were in Zimbabwe was to see a very important and correct, I think, American policy toward Zimbabwe being effectively undermined by South African aggression.

I think it is important for us to understand the extent to what is happening to American tax dollars which are being wasted. They are being eroded as a consequence, not from Zimbabwe's Government activities, but as a consequence of South African activities.

This really leads me to return to the question I was putting to you at the very outset. My quarrel in many instances is not with

the direction of policy as much as it is with the means by which we are trying to achieve our ends.

You indicated in response to Mr. Weiss that there can be no ambivalence or no misunderstanding whatsoever on the South African end with how we view the destabilizing activities directed toward Zimbabwe.

Very frankly, I am not sure that is not an accurate statement. I do not doubt that you have told the South Africans that we regard this as an unfortunate activity.

My question to you is: Why should the South Africans believe at this point, given all of the various concrete initiatives we have taken to improve relationships, such as to increase the number of military attachés, to train South African coast guards, to allow the shipment of new nuclear material to South Africa and to loosen our restrictions on export, why should they think that we intend to respond any way that will be costly to them if they continue in attacking American interests?

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, I think I should start with where you started. It would be erroneous for us to leave the impression that Zimbabwe's difficulties today are primarily the result of any decisions taken in South Africa.

Mr. WOLPE. That is not what I said.

Mr. CROCKER. There was the implication, I think, in what Congressman Weiss said, as well as in your own question, that South Africa is destroying our investments there.

Mr. WOLPE. I think that is correct.

Mr. CROCKER. Zimbabwe faces a number of problems. In fact, our aid program there has been remarkably successful. It is not being impeded by what we hope are short-term difficulties, for example, in having security in oil imports.

Zimbabwe has a relatively efficient administrative structure. It absorbs aid quickly and rapidly, and our program has been quite effective there. I would not want to leave any implication that the American taxpayer's dollar is going down the drain in Zimbabwe either in general or because of South Africa.

Mr. WOLPE. Dr. Crocker, perhaps there is a communications difficulty or I did not pose the question very succinctly or clearly.

I fully support the American policy toward Zimbabwe, which is directed at trying to allow the Zimbabweans to develop a self-sustaining economy and move ahead with their economic development tasks. It makes all sorts of sense for the United States to be associated with that, with the effort to develop greater stability within that country.

What I am suggesting, however, is that the American investment that is being made is under challenge by South African destabilizing activities in Zimbabwe. For example, if we, on the one hand, put money which is directed at trying to assist in an agricultural development project, we are engaged in some of that activity; on the other hand, Zimbabwe has to now take resources that it was intending to utilize for agricultural development and instead use that to address an emergency energy crisis created by the sabotaging of fuel lines, then our basic objective, the reason we are in Zimbabwe, is being undermined.

All I am saying is that, from my point of view, South Africa in its policies directed to Zimbabwe is running in direct conflict with American taxpayer interests and with American national interests.

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, I think where we may differ is that I do not think there is the pattern of South African activity which your analysis would suggest.

Mr. WOLPE. I am glad you said that because I think that is the nub. I think that if I were sitting there as a South Africa decision-maker and hear you, Assistant Secretary for Africa, saying in public session that you really do not think the pattern of destabilizing activity is as great as has been suggested by me or others on the committee, what I would hear and interpret is that indeed the United States has no real problems about what South Africa is doing, and I would understand that to be a license to do as you wish.

Is there something that is incorrect about that conclusion from a South African standpoint?

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, I think we have to be precise about what we are defining here. I do not believe that the principal domestic problems that Zimbabwe faces today, and they do face problems, are problems that one can attribute to South African decisionmakers. That is the point I am trying to make.

There are internal disturbances. There are problems in certain parts of the countryside. It is not our analysis that those problems are caused by South Africa.

Mr. WOLPE. Again, that is not what I am asking. I would accept that.

Mr. CROCKER. It seems to me that what you are saying is that Zimbabwe's problems can be laid at the doorstep of South African decisionmakers.

Mr. WOLPE. No. I am simply saying that South African destabilizing efforts directed to Zimbabwe are running in direct conflict with what we are attempting to achieve in Zimbabwe and are, therefore, undermining the effectiveness of the investment we are making in Zimbabwe.

Mr. CROCKER. I believe our policy has been very clear. We have sought to put everybody on notice that we want to see Zimbabwe succeed.

Our very decision to triple the aid level that was inherited in the budget when it came in should have had a demonstration effect throughout the region. I think it has.

Mr. WOLPE. What will be the cost to South Africa if South Africa persists with a destabilizing campaign in southern Africa?

Are we prepared in any respect to alter or pull back from the various initiatives that have fallen under the label of constructive engagement?

Are we prepared to tighten up on our liberalized trade activity? Are we prepared to withdraw the upgrading military attachés? Are we prepared to do anything whatsoever?

If not, why should South Africa take heed to whatever our verbal posturing might be on those issues privately or publicly?

Mr. CROCKER. Congressman, I think you are asking me to put virtually every one of our cards on the table in putting a question like that. There are two points that have to be made here.

One is that we do not view every initiative we have taken in our bilateral relations with South Africa as a carrot for South Africa. A lot of things we have done have been in the spirit and substance of building a more constructive relationship in our interest.

We have not been setting up Christmas trees with presents around them. It is in our interest to have military attachés in South Africa.

Mr. WOLPE. I know you really believe that that policy is advancing American interest. What I am trying to suggest is that the messages that are conveyed by those initiatives have been understood very differently than you intended, Dr. Crocker.

In a way the African criticism of American policy that we have intentionally or not is not important that we have actually encouraged South African aggression because of a new sense that America will no longer respond in any meaningful fashion may well be valid.

Mr. CROCKER. I think we may have to disagree on this, Mr. Chairman. I do not believe there is much in the record that our friends among the Front Line States can point to which would constitute support for the argument that we want to see South Africa destabilize the region.

There is, on the contrary, a long, long record of our making clear that if people wish us to be engaged in promoting discussion and solving problems, we will do so. That is precisely what we are about.

Mr. WOLPE. We visited Mozambique shortly after you met with President Machel, about a day or two afterward. On the Mozambican side there was genuine enthusiasm at the progress that occurred in your discussions with President Machel and in the state of the growing resumption in relationships with Mozambique.

Again, I think that is a very important initiative on the part of the administration, and I applaud you for undertaking that effort.

I was surprised, however, as we reviewed the aid package, to find that, at least as of this moment, there is no request for Mozambique within the aid package. My understanding was that we were contemplating immediate food assistance to Mozambique, which is facing a major food shortage and drought problem, and that we were also contemplating two AID projects directed at saving the regional economic development entity that would assist in the development of the communications and transportation infrastructure in which Mozambique would participate in a very central way.

Could you indicate the status of that?

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, there is indeed urgent review being given to the question of emergency food assistance. There is a severe problem, a humanitarian problem, already in Mozambique. We will be responding to it.

We have had a mission out there which is just now in the process of developing its recommendations for a U.S. Government response to the food crisis.

Second, there is indeed provision through the southern African regional ESF account for regional projects in southern Africa of which Mozambique could be a beneficiary. We pose no obstacle to that. We need the projects. SADCC is a new organization. Project

development takes time. We pose no obstacle to the use of it for that purpose.

As far as bilateral aid is concerned, as you know, there is a problem, legislation.

Mr. WOLPE. Which could be corrected within the authorization this year. That is why I am raising the question now. My impression was the administration and the Mozambicans did want to move on these matters rather quickly, and we will be moving to the foreign aid authorization bill very shortly. I am trying to find out if there would be some interest in pursuing that. I hope so.

Mr. CROCKER. We are moving in this effort to build a better relationship with Mozambique in a deliberate step-by-step way. We are certainly not holding back. We hope the relationship would warrant such a move. We have every reason to want that to be the case. We are moving in a deliberate way. There is no point in a bum's rush. The Mozambicans do not want that, we do not either.

Mr. WOLPE. Would it be constructive at this point, though, to move to at least remove the legal prohibition so at an appropriate point the aid can be generated and the involvement can—

Mr. CROCKER. We would be happy to keep in touch with you, Congressman, about that. I do not think I would be in a position to make a judgment right here today.

Mr. WOLPE. Angola, an important issue, as was discussed earlier with Mr. Weiss, about Angola in considering withdrawal of Cubans, the extent to which you can trust American assurances regarding South African behavior in the future.

In this context did the United States have any prior knowledge of South African military planning for the invasion of southern Angola in July and August 1982, and if we did, did the United States attempt to dissuade the South Africans from this course of action?

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, the period that you are referring to was preceded by a substantial period of restraint on both sides. This is a war in which there are several sides, as we keep pointing out, although people raise doubts about it.

Toward the end of that period of restraint we began to get indications through our various sources of information that there was indeed a pattern of reescalation developing.

As to what is chicken and what is egg in a situation of a cross-border conflict that involves guerilla raids and retaliatory raids, it is not easy to say, but once we began to be aware of a clear picture of escalation emerging, we made our views known.

Mr. WOLPE. This was a major invasion I am describing here. The question is: Did you have advance knowledge of the planning for it and, if so, did you inform the Angolans?

Mr. CROCKER. We did not have advance word of planning. We were aware once it began that it was going on, and it continued over a period of some months, this activity, which, as I say, had two sides to it. We made it clear to both South Africa and Angola that we were prepared to pass messages, to serve as in good faith, not only as a message passer, but also to make suggestions for deescalation, which indeed we did.

Mr. WOLPE. There were reports that General Walters had led the Angolans to believe there would not be a South Africa invasion, is that inaccurate?

Mr. CROCKER. I would have to check the record on that, Mr. Chairman. I am not certain if there was such a statement made by General Walters.

Mr. WOLPE. You are aware of administration contacts with the Angolans that alerted them of what was in process?

Mr. CROCKER. The Angolans told us about what was going on. I come back to the point, which seems to be of remarkably little interest to the subcommittee, that this is a two-way street. There is a guerrilla war going on, launched from Angolan territory against the people and property of Namibia, and as long as that continues, South Africa will go after them, I expect.

Mr. WOLPE. Perhaps I misunderstand the legal situation involved here. When you talk about a two-way street, my understanding is the South African continued administration occupation of Namibia is, in the eyes of the national court of the United Nations and international law, illegal.

My understanding, moreover, is that the United States has adopted that position. Are you saying no longer do we regard that as illegal, therefore, actions designed to remove an illegal occupation are viewed as equivalent to the illegal occupation itself?

Mr. CROCKER. We are not trying to win a court case, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLPE. I am only responding to your criticism that we talk about this as a one-way street. I am trying to understand what you mean by that.

Mr. CROCKER. There is a political situation we are trying to address. It is, of course, a legal situation. Our legal position is as it always has been.

Mr. WOLPE. As I described it?

Mr. CROCKER. Yes.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you.

Mr. Solomon.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, we have spent considerable time discussing to what extent South Africa has contributed to destabilization in the region, if any.

We have not talked at all about to what extent the Soviets or the Cubans have contributed to destabilization in the area.

I am not going to take the time of the committee today, but, Mr. Chairman, I would like to pursue this subject again in the near future.

Mr. WOLPE. Let me close with just a few additional questions related to the Angolan piece of what is happening.

First of all, what is the American position at this point with respect to UNITA? Do we take the position in our diplomacy that there must be some kind of arrangement with UNITA that is also a part of the overall ability to put together a settlement of the Namibian conflict and of the issue surrounding Cuban troop withdrawal?

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, we take the position that we have all along, that UNITA is an important and legitimate nationalist movement inside Angola.

It is based inside Angola. It operates primarily from the base of support of people inside Angola and from captured equipment.

We also take the position that the resolution of that political question is not for us. It is a matter for Angola. It is an internal Angolan matter. It is not a preconditioned or a linked aspect of the negotiations that we have been talking about today.

Whether the Angolan Government and others will conclude that in order for these other issues to be resolved, there will need to be some kind of an agreement on the issue of UNITA, that is for them to say. We have no conditions on that issue.

Mr. WOLPE. First of all, what is the American Government's understanding at the moment as to where UNITA receives its external assistance? Where does it come from? What does it consist of?

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, I think I would prefer to get you a written answer to that question. UNITA does, as I indicated, get the bulk of its ability to operate from within, in our judgment.

It does trade as well as purchase supplies that are military related across the Namibian border, but it is not our impression that it depends primarily on South Africa for its equipment.

There have been historically other sources of external support, but I would prefer to get you a written answer to that question.¹

Mr. WOLPE. Is Morocco providing military training for UNITA cadres and have American officials or military personnel observed or participated in such training?

Mr. CROCKER. The answer to the second question is, no, I am not aware of any activity at the present time that would meet your description on the first question. But, again, I would be glad to get you a written answer.¹

Mr. WOLPE. If the United States were to ask Morocco to help UNITA or assist Morocco in subsequent training, would you consider that a violation of the Clark amendment prohibiting U.S. direct or indirect military aid in Angola?

I am not saying that a request has been made. I am saying if such a request were to be made.

Mr. CROCKER. I am not a lawyer, but I would expect it would certainly be a question that one should put to a lawyer, because there is a Clark amendment and we have made every effort to respect the law in the conduct of our African policies, as in our other policies.

We have also said repeatedly that we have no plan or intention to provide material support to UNITA.

Mr. WOLPE. Has Zaire given assistance to UNITA in recent months and, if so, have we expressed any opposition to this to the Zairian Government?

Mr. CROCKER. What do you mean by assistance, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. WOLPE. I would prefer that you tell me. What kind of assistance has been extended by the Zairian Government?

Mr. CROCKER. When you permit someone to fly through your city on occasion, I do not consider that to be assistance of the sort that you would mean. We would be glad to get you an answer to that question, too.¹

¹ Material was not submitted.

Mr. WOLPE. There have been, as you know, recent UNITA attacks near the Zairian border in the north, and that is sort of part of what is prompting the question I am raising right now.

Is Zaire aiding another Angola rebel group, Comera, which re-groups the former followers of Roberto, and have we expressed some concern about this development to President Mobutu?

Mr. CROCKER. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, Zaire and Angola both continue to respect the accords negotiated before this administration came into office concerning peaceful coexistence and good neighborly relations. I have no evidence to indicate any such activity on the part of Zaire.

Mr. WOLPE. I, finally want to turn to the question that was raised by my colleague from New York, Mr. Solomon, with respect to Cuban troops. He asked a question, and I will again, that we kind of passed over.

What is our estimate of the number of Cuban troops that are presently in Angola?

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, we estimate there are from 20,000 to 25,000 Cuban military forces in Angola, Cuban military forces.

We further estimate there may be from 5,000 to 8,000 Cuban nonmilitary personnel in Angola.

Mr. WOLPE. What was that number for the nonmilitary personnel?

Mr. CROCKER. From 5,000 to 8,000 Cuban nonmilitary personnel in Angola.

Mr. WOLPE. Are all of the military forces that you are describing engaging in military related tasks or are some of the military forces engaged in civilian type engineering and other tasks?

Mr. CROCKER. It is our impression that the figure that I cited as Cuban military are indeed engaged in military related tasks. It is, of course, not easy to have complete detail on the functions of everybody, but that is our general impression.

Mr. WOLPE. How does the number of 20,000 to 25,000, which is the current administration estimate, compare with the situation 2 years ago when the administration came into office?

Mr. CROCKER. We estimate there may have been a marginal increase in Cuban presence over the past year to 18 months, perhaps in the range of 1,000 to 2,000, something like that.

Mr. WOLPE. This goes to a question Mr. Solomon asked, the question, "What would be the Cuban response?"

A year ago Angola and Cuba issued a joint statement saying that if the SWAPO struggled and U.N. Resolution 435's implementation produced "a genuinely independent government" in Namibia and the withdrawal of South African troops to South Africa, then Angola and Cuban, and I will quote, "would analyze renewal of execution of a program of gradual withdrawals of Cuban forces over a period of time agreed upon by both governments."

Angola alone would decide upon the withdrawal of Cuban forces "once each and every eventuality of acts of aggression or armed invasion ceased to exist."

Cuba agreed to "implement without hesitation" such a program. Furthermore, Angola and Cuba stated within the context of this joint statement, that from April of 1976 to early 1977 a third of the Cuban troops were withdrawn but that the process was interrupted

due to "fresh external threats," and that South African aggression in 1978, the Lesotho raid, and in 1979, the attacks near Angola, prevented further withdrawals.

Again, during the recent Harare Conference, the Angola representative essentially reaffirmed that statement.

Do you have any reason to doubt Angola's intention and capacity to make substantial troop withdrawals as the South African military threat recedes and do you quarrel with their chronology of past withdrawals of Cuban troops and the reasons why the program of withdrawal was interrupted?

Mr. CROCKER. I do not have any comment on the past record before I took this job. I can check into it and try to get you an answer, if you wish, for the record, but I am not familiar with it.¹

I think the point we would make, as I tried to indicate earlier, we do not accept either a South African dictated relationship between the two issues or an Angolan dictated relationship between the two issues.

We are seeking to get something which would involve both sides in making concessions and both sides leading toward an overall regional settlement.

What you are quoting from, Mr. Chairman, is a published document of Angolan diplomacy, a clear affirmation of Angola as a sovereign government, a sovereign country, stating that it will do in its house what it wants to. Well and good, we do not debate that.

What we insist upon is the necessity of getting an agreement, and that agreement is going to require not that you go first and I will go second, but that we go together.

Mr. WOLPE. On that point, South Africa's Foreign Minister recently said that the proposed cease-fire that has emerged as a topic of discussion in the Angolan-South African discussions that took place a short time ago, is now an essential precondition of a Namibian agreement in addition to withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

Is it an essential precondition or a needed parallel track for us as well? If so, should we add the separate agreement, with its potential for encouraging further delays in the Namibian accord, to the existing requirement for a cease-fire under U.N. Resolution 435 by Namibia?

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, the discussions that are taking place between South Africa and Angola, of course, we are not privy to since we are not in the room when they occur, but it is our impression from talking to both parties that these discussions concerning the deescalation of violence and a cease-fire are wholly consistent with our own proposals on a cease-fire.

As long as that is the case, we will encourage that process. Our own proposals for a cease-fire are designed to put substance in what are at present simply words in the U.N. plan.

¹ Representatives Howard Wolpe, William H. Gray III, Ted Weiss, Geo. W. Crockett, I and Mervyn M. Dynally participated in the study mission. The report was prepared by Anne J. Holloway, staff director, Subcommittee on Africa. The views expressed are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the Committee on Foreign Affairs or any of its members.

The U.N. plan says that on day x there will be a cease-fire. It does not address the issue of how or all of the complex aspects of building a cease-fire.

We believe the issue of cease-fire is very important as a matter of practice in any negotiation, to get an end to a war. We believe that the discussions taking place can contribute to and lead into the U.N. cease-fire, which is the capstone of the whole process.

It is not an additional condition or source for delay, to answer your question.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you.

I have no further questions at this point. I would like to make a couple of closing observations. There is no one on this committee that does not share the goal of a settlement of the Namibian conflict or independence for Namibia. I understand that has been the objective toward which the administration has been working.

I understand that you really believe in the normalization of aspects of our relationship with the South African Government. The removal of their quiet status, is the phrase that was used very early on, was one means of enhancing American influence and leverage on that situation, also with respect to the question of internal changes.

I must say that those of us, however, who have had the opportunity to participate in the African-American meetings in Zimbabwe and met with Mozambican leaders; we spent time with Prime Minister Mugabe and with President Nyerere and have come to the conclusion, very sadly, that the policies that we are pursuing are having some very counterproductive consequences, both in terms of the goals of our diplomacy in terms of Namibia and in terms of American interests within the region.

I want to draw your attention to an article that appeared in today's Washington Post written by my counterpart in the Senate, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa, Senator Nancy Kassebaum, under the heading "South Africa, It's Time We Acted."

She proceeds in the course of this article to describe the evolution of her own thinking on the meaning and significance of constructive engagement. She indicates in the article that she herself had fully supported the application of quiet diplomacy out of belief that public posturing had not yielded sufficient results and that it was time to take a different approach.

She has publicly, as you know, affirmed her belief in the concept of constructive engagement as has been pursued on previous occasions.

She then goes on to say, "But many Africans, I learned during my visit" to South Africa and also to Harare, where she spoke:

Now believe that the pendulum has swung too far in the other direction. We now hear so little from the United States that increasingly they see constructive engagement as a *carte blanche* for Pretoria to pursue racial separation.

Later on in the same article she writes,

It also may be time to concede that quiet diplomacy alone has not achieved sufficient results in South Africa and needs to be supplemented with a stronger and more public stance.

The United States should be willing to remind Pretoria that it, too, has responsibilities under constructive engagement. It is essential at times to be openly critical

of present racial policies. South Africa wants and needs American criticism of policies they know are unjust and dangerous.

Let me submit that public diplomacy is not simply an exercise in political rhetoric. Frequently, as we well know in diplomacy with respect to almost any other country in the world which we know and in which we have relationships and are engaged in diplomatic negotiations there are times when public statements are the only way of enhancing and making clear the credibility of private initiatives.

More to the point, and this is the central issue, there is nothing that you have said today that has frankly furthered my understanding of how it is that South Africa should take us seriously when, in the face of all of the intensification of aggression in the region, in the face of growing repression within South Africa itself, we continue to expand our trade relationships, to remove restrictions upon our relationship what had previously been in place.

If I were South Africa, particularly a member of the present South African Government, I would think the message is quite different from that which I think you are intending to convey.

I think it is that confusion and ambiguity in the message that underlies some of the diplomatic difficulty we are facing in our relationship with South Africa, and it certainly underlies the growing sense of abandonment and betrayal by the rest of the African Continent. I think that is a very dangerous development for American interests.

Mr. SOLOMON. I would like to comment on the article in the Post, Mr. Chairman, that you read. I might just make an offhanded observation that Senator Kassebaum does not have a reputation for staying the course, in my opinion, therefore, this article is understandable.

Mr. WOLPE. Without objection, I would like to include the full article in the committee record at this point along with the gentleman's observation.

[The article referred to follows:]

[From the Washington Post]

SOUTH AFRICA: IT'S TIME WE ACTED

(By Nancy Kassebaum)

Finding the right mix of "quiet" diplomacy and public pressure to apply to white-ruled South Africa has never been easy for any U.S. administration. After spending a week there, I'm convinced we need to reconsider both the ingredients and the blend of our current South African policy.

The daily indignities of black life inherent in apartheid—the restrictions on movement, the "banning" of public figures, the separation of families—are repugnant to Americans and call for unequivocal U.S. opposition. Yet the United States has less leverage than is commonly believed, since we provide no foreign aid or arms to South Africa. Often we cannot even be certain of Pretoria's intentions, since dissimulation and charade are frequent instruments of its domestic and foreign policy.

Political dialogue in the country seemed to me refreshingly honest and even civil, but it is also freighted with sensitive code words and hidden associations Americans often misunderstand or misuse. There is little unanimity even within racial groups about the path to equal rights. Some blacks, for example, encourage outsiders to "disinvest"—pull back their investments—from South Africa. Other blacks counter that disinvestment would only cause soaring unemployment that would hurt blacks more than whites.

How should the U.S. government approach the puzzle of South Africa? The Carter administration was harshly critical, and may have provoked greater South African recalcitrance. Blacks believe it failed to prod the South African government toward visible reform but at least showed America was on the side of human rights. The Reagan administration has instituted a policy of "constructive engagement." I have supported this application of quiet diplomacy, which seeks to produce results without either embracing or abandoning the Pretoria government. In the past, Americans have alienated South Africans, both black and white, by lecturing them on their own problems.

But many Africans, I learned during my visit, now believe that the pendulum has swung too far in the other direction. They now hear so little from the United States that increasingly they see constructive engagement as a *carte blanche* for Pretoria to pursue racial separatism. Part of the problem, I believe, is that U.S. policy in the region has focused almost exclusively on the complex negotiations, involving 13 countries plus the United Nations over independence for Namibia, the neighboring territory that South Africa administers. We had expected results from these negotiations by the end of last year, but after two years of intensive activity, a successful outcome is still not assured. At times, we seem to be treading water.

Certainly it is my hope and belief that the Namibian question can be resolved soon. The time has come, however, to broaden the scope of our South African policy and revitalize our efforts toward other policy goals. There are other important issues that also demand priority attention, such as South Africa's deteriorating relations with its neighbors and the uncertain path of political reform in the segregated republic.

It also may be time to concede that quiet diplomacy alone has not achieved sufficient results in South Africa and needs to be supplemented with a stronger and more public stance. The United States should be willing to remind Pretoria that it, too, has responsibilities under constructive engagement. It is essential that at times we be openly critical of present racial policies. Those who seek reforms in South Africa want and need American criticism of policies they know are unjust and dangerous.

What form could such a revitalized diplomacy take? The United States could carefully focus attention on certain human rights issues. Many South Africans are calling for a bill of rights to be included in the new constitution now under consideration. The constitution would include coloreds (people of mixed race) and Indians, but it would exclude the black African majority. Although we cannot endorse such an exclusion, the enactment of a bill of rights covering all races should be a major U.S. policy goal.

The State Department's human rights funds could be expanded to aid directly selected social projects that address the needs of South African blacks. At one cramped medical clinic I visited, a single physician ministered to the thousands of black children who lived in a squatters' camp. Helping programs like this would be a small but concrete example of American concern.

The problems of race in South Africa are so complex that one almost despairs of solving them, and diplomacy in the face of hair-trigger South African sensitivities becomes almost hazardous duty. But we ought to spread our nets wide for opportunities to play a positive role.

While I was in South Africa, I frequently heard the complaint from whites that "the United States doesn't understand," and from blacks that "the United States doesn't care." We need a South African policy that strives to do both, and do them visibly.

Mr. WOLPE. I again want to thank you for your testimony today and look forward to pursuing some of the specific questions with respect to the assistance package that will be coming before the committee in the days ahead.

[Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX 1

RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO THE BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS BY HON. GERALD B. H. SOLOMON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK, CONCERNING THE SOVIET BLOC IN AFRICA

Question. What is the approximate level of troop strength for SWAPO?

Answer. We estimate that SWAPO currently has approximately 6,000 troops.

Question. How many SWAPO troops are currently based in Angola?

Answer. We believe that most of the 6,000 troops are based in Angola.

Question. What were the circumstances that led to the introduction of Soviet bloc advisors and/or troops into Angola?

Answer. The introduction of Soviet bloc advisors and Cuban troops into Angola came about essentially as a result of the breakdown of a peaceful process towards Angolan independence following the Portuguese revolution of April, 1974. In January, 1975 the three movements fighting for independence—the Marxist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the Western-oriented movements of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)—agreed in the Alvor Accord to peaceful transition towards independence through free elections to be held in November, 1975. Shortly after the signing of the Alvor Accord, however, fighting erupted among the three groups, and the peaceful transition process broke down. The MPLA requested increased Soviet support in the form of military supplies and Soviet and Cuban advisors. In the fall of 1975 Cuban combat units entered Angola at the request of the MPLA at approximately the same time that a South African force entered Angola from the south. The South African force withdrew early in 1976. By this time the MPLA has succeeded in consolidating power in Luanda as a result of Cuban and Soviet assistance. Soviet advisors and Cuban combat forces have remained in Angola since that time.

Question. How many Soviet bloc advisors and/or military personnel are presently in Angola?

Answer. We estimate that there are approximately 1,600 Soviet and other Eastern European advisors in Angola. There are approximately 20,000 to 25,000 Cuban troops and 5,000 to 8,000 Cuban civilians in Angola.

Question. How is Angola assisting the activities of SWAPO?

Answer. Angola permits SWAPO to maintain bases on Angolan territory and to receive military equipment from the Soviet bloc. Some SWAPO camps are located near the bases of Angolan and Cuban forces. SWAPO carries out military operations inside Namibia on its own. Although SWAPO would clearly have difficulty operating in Angola without the consent of the Angolan Government, it is equally clear that Angola would have difficulty controlling SWAPO cross-border activities if it tried to do so in the face of SWAPO resistance.

Question. Are foreign troops engaged in the protection of the Gulf Oil facilities in the Cabinda province of Angola? If so, how many and where are they based?

Answer. We have no evidence to indicate that foreign troops are guarding Gulf facilities in Cabinda. We do, however, have evidence that Cuban forces are stationed in Cabinda, where the separatist Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEX) is operating.

ETHIOPIA—ARMED FORCES

Question. What is the relative level of strength and size of the Ethiopian armed forces compared to the forces in the neighboring countries of Sudan, Somalia, and Kenya?

Answer. Ethiopia's armed forces number somewhat over 200,000, while those of Somalia number around 35,000, those of Kenya, 16,500, and those of Sudan, around

60,000. The Ethiopian armed forces are also much better equipped than those of their neighbors, and have overwhelming superiority in armor and aircraft.

ETHIOPIA—SOVIET BLOC/CUBA

Question. What were the circumstances that led to the introduction of Soviet bloc advisors and/or troops into Ethiopia?

Answer. Unclassified: Ethiopia signed an agreement with the USSR in December, 1976 for the provisions of military equipment, and abrogated its military supply agreements with the U.S. four months later. By the summer of 1977, Ethiopia had cut its links with one arms supplier (the U.S.) but was not fully resupplied with new weapons. Ethiopia was also heavily engaged in fighting in Eritrea. At this point Somalia attacked Ethiopia, and pushed the Ethiopian forces back until they managed to stabilize a defensive line at Dire Dawa. Ethiopia then asked for and began receiving Cuban combat troops, who were instrumental in staging a counterattack and pushing the Somalis back to their borders. Ethiopia was also helped by the introduction of Soviet military advisors, and a massive air and sea lift of Soviet material.

ETHIOPIA—NUMBER OF SOVIET BLOC/CUBAN ADVISORS

Question. How many Soviet bloc advisors and/or military personnel are presently in Ethiopia?

Answer. Unclassified: Perhaps 12,000 Cuban troops still remain in Ethiopia; this is some 5,000 fewer than there were in 1978. Soviet advisors number between 1000 and 2000. East German advisors are thought to number in the low hundreds.

APPENDIX 2

A STUDY ENTITLED, "NAMIBIA: THE CRISIS IN U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA," PRODUCED BY SEVERAL NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Namibia:

The Crisis in United States Policy Toward Southern Africa

Produced By:

Africa Committee, National Council of
Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.
African Heritage Studies Association
American Committee on Africa
Americans for Democratic Action
American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO
Black American Political Association of
California
Coalition of Black Trade Unionists
Congressional Black Caucus
Congress of National Black Churches
Delta Sigma Theta Sorority, Inc.
International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers
International United Automobile, Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America, UAW
Lutheran World Ministries
National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People
National Bar Association
National Black Caucus of Local Elected
Officials
National Council of Negro Women
National Urban League
Phelps-Stokes Fund
Southern Africa Support Project
Southern Christian Leadership Conference
TransAfrica
United Church of Christ, Commission for
Racial Justice
Washington Office On Africa



Foreword and Recommendations

The Ambassador to the United Nations from the People's Republic of Angola, Elisio de Figueiredo, recently stated that the story of Namibia is the story of Africa, the history of Namibia is the history of Africa, and the tragedy of Namibia is the tragedy of Africa. We, the co-producers of this report on Namibia and the negotiations on United Nations Security Council Resolution 435, believe that the story of Namibia is also a tragedy for people of conscience around the world. It is a story of a proud and energetic people who have been subdued by force. It is a story of institutionalized racism and the export of the barbarous system of apartheid to a country whose independence is long overdue. Most critically, it is a story of a failed effort on the part of five western nations to compel South Africa to live up to norms of international law and conduct. South Africa's continued intransigence, despite the good-faith negotiations of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), its principal opponent in Namibia and the leader of the Namibian people's struggle for independence and freedom, has made a final settlement in Namibia ever more illusive.

The co-producers of this report believe it necessary to bring to the public's attention, once again, the magnitude of suffering that South Africa's rule has brought to the Namibian people. The transplanted system of apartheid not only represses the legitimate rights of the people to political participation, freedom from detention without trial and summary execution, and the right to participate fully in the economic life of the country, but it also creates economic and social disparities that make the indigenous people of Namibia among the poorest on earth. The story of Namibia, therefore, must focus on the legitimate rights of its people; it is not simply the story of diplomatic maneuverings and protracted negotiations.

As Americans, we also believe it important to provide a concise history of America's involvement with Namibia, and its involvement in international efforts to seek a peaceful solution to the Namibian crisis that will result in full independence for that nation.

Since South Africa's control over Namibia was made illegal officially in 1966, the territory's future has presented a relatively straightforward question of self-determination for the 1.5 million people who live there. Unfortunately, this rather clear objective has become tangled in a web of false solutions and extraneous issues. It is useful to examine the policies pursued by American administrations toward Namibia in the context of overall American interests and objectives in the southern Africa region.

Officially, the United States has opposed South African rule in Namibia since the UN revoked Pretoria's mandate in 1966. However, tempered by its economic, political, and strategic interests in the region, and by an often shortsighted perception of how best to protect those interests, the U.S. has failed to move South Africa.

U.S. economic interests in sub-Saharan Africa are heavily concentrated in the southern third of the continent. Nearly \$3 billion of direct investment, or about 60 percent of the sub-Saharan total, is located there. US-southern Africa trade totals more than \$6 billion. The area contains immense deposits of many strategic minerals that

are vital to industrial economies such as that of the United States, including the platinum group, manganese, vanadium, chromium and cobalt as well as a dominant share of the world's gold and diamond output and an internationally significant output of coal, uranium, copper and other minerals. With regional stability, the nations of the area could prosper and serve as a dynamic center for African economic progress. However, during the current regional turmoil the economic potential of the region is unrealized.

The U.S. has an interest in maintaining positive diplomatic and political relations with all of Africa, especially in international organizations. The support of these countries is largely influenced by their perception of U.S. policy toward apartheid in South Africa and Pretoria's illegal rule in Namibia. In South Africa and Namibia, the U.S. often has stated its support of political freedom and civil liberties for all the people of these countries and for an end to the illegal Pretoria control over Namibia. The denial of democratic majority rule in South Africa and Namibia risks an escalation of violence in the region that could destroy chances for economic development for years to come. It also risks triggering bitter controversy in the U.S. that could erode the consensus favoring progress on race relations here.

Finally, the U.S. has stated a goal of protecting its military and strategic interests in the region, and of minimizing Soviet influence in southern Africa. The Cape sea route is of strategic importance to the United States because much of the oil destined for the West is shipped along that route. Many of the minerals from several states in the region are also considered strategic for their use in U.S. production of military hardware.

For many years, American administrations believed that the best way to protect most of these interests was simply to maintain an unofficial alliance with the apartheid regime of South Africa. They theorized that economic and strategic interests mattered most, and that political interests were not immediately threatened because of the presence of the Portuguese colonial empire in southern Africa and independent Africa's dire need for economic aid from the U.S. Domestically, it was thought that a rhetorical condemnation of apartheid and a low profile on the questions of Namibia by the American government could forestall any large-scale criticism of U.S. policies toward the region.

There is a new reality in southern Africa. Moreover, the view outlined above has now lost credibility because of the failures it produced in the mid-1970s. U.S. economic interests are increasingly endangered by the possibility of the region's war escalating to the point of threatening U.S. "business as usual." As a result of South Africa's intransigence and its aggression in the region, the Soviet Union has gained significant influence in southern Africa. Moscow's influence results, in large measure, from its tangible support for the forces of change in the region that, for decades, have been seeking to end colonial exploitation and white minority rule. Concomitantly, U.S. influence in Africa has eroded because it was perceived as being on the wrong side of the conflicts in Mozambique and Angola, in Rhodesia (now known as Zimbabwe), in Namibia and in South Africa itself.

U.S. involvement and leadership in the negotiations for a Namibia settlement since 1977 have provided the US with new opportunities to strengthen its position in Africa and to create a more stable environment in the region for development.

Yet, the present administration's general posture of "constructive engagement" with the Pretoria regime may serve to undermine all the salutary good that could have flowed from a successful completion of the Namibia negotiations. Constructive Engagement argues that by having closer ties with Pretoria, Washington can quietly work to influence its behavior. As has been stated, little that is "constructive" has resulted from

the "engagement" with South Africa. South Africa has increased its intransigence in the context of the Resolution 435 negotiations; has stepped up its aggression against neighboring sovereign states; and has tightened the noose of oppression on its indigenous population by expediting its homeland policies; further curtailing black political rights; and by seeking to eliminate black leadership or organized opposition to apartheid.

A Namibia settlement would promote U.S. interests in southern Africa and Namibia by:

- Enhancing diplomatic credibility for the U.S. in Africa and advancing U.S. political influence in southern Africa in particular;
- Facilitating an eventual withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.
- Allowing the U.S. to pursue greater economic relations with Angola and an independent Namibia and to promote economic development in the region generally.

It often has been stated that the principal U.S. objective in the region is to curtail the expansion of the Soviet presence and influence in order to protect U.S. strategic interests. If this assertion is correct, then a speedy, peaceful settlement of the Namibia conflict is the best course to pursue. In this fashion, the U.S. would gain the credibility necessary to begin the difficult, and long overdue task, of working for a real democratic solution in South Africa itself. In the eyes of the current administration, the U.S. must "lay down a mantle of authority" in the region to assure security, stability and economic progress for the nations of southern Africa. Let that "authority" mean "positive influence" on the side of the legitimate aspirations of the majority of the region's people who have been exploited and repressed for so long. These people will soon be the masters of southern Africa's future.

Recommendations

After evaluating a detailed analysis of the historical and current situation in Namibia, we wish to make four specific recommendations:

- The United States should remove the issue of the Cuban presence in Angola from the negotiations on Namibian independence. The Cuban presence is not an issue under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 435, and its interjection into the negotiations has given aid and comfort to South Africa's intransigence, and has allowed South Africa the luxury of time so that it may proceed with an unacceptable "internal" settlement that will perpetuate the apartheid system within Namibia, albeit under another guise.
- We call upon Congress to pass a resolution or other appropriate legislation urging that the U.S. negotiating position be conformed to this view, and expressing the sense of the Congress that the administration should adopt a firmer position with South Africa. This position should include the threat of withdrawing all military, political and economic support should South Africa's intransigence continue.
- We urge the State Department to work more closely with other nations in the Western Contact Group to devise a more aggressive negotiating strategy with the South Africans, and to explore various political and economic pressures of a multilateral nature, including consideration of adopting Chapter VII sanctions

under the United Nation's charter.

- The current administration should begin to disengage from bilateral relations with South Africa if the talks continue to be unsuccessful. Moreover, the U.S. should first proceed with the rescission of those new elements in the United States-South African relationship that have been created as part of this administration's "constructive engagement" policy. This would include an end to the training of the South African Coast Guard, decreases in or elimination of South Africa's honorary consulates and defense attaches in the United States, a re-imposition of export controls on items to the South African military and police, and a refusal to receive South African dignitaries. In addition, as part of the process of disengagement, the United States should wholeheartedly support the multilateral pressures described above.

Hopefully, this report will confirm the validity of these recommendations and will heighten the awareness of the readers and the American people of the need for a stronger and more vigorous posture toward South Africa. And, hopefully this report will reaffirm in the minds of all who are concerned for freedom, justice, equality and the right to self-determination that the SWAPO cause and the cause of the Namibian people is a just one. It must have our political and economic support in the days ahead.

History

The original Namibians were the San and the Khoi Khoi; they were later joined by the Herero and the Nama peoples, who were traditionally cattle herders. It is believed that the Damara arrived with the Nama, and worked among them as herdsmen. The pastoral Ovambos, who grew maize and raised cattle, lived in the north. They were the largest group, and the only predominantly agricultural tribe. The Ovambos produced surpluses that supported development of skilled craftsmen such as blacksmiths, potters and woodcarvers.¹

By the time Europeans arrived, they found various highly organized social and political systems among the indigenous people. Collective ownership of natural resources prevailed. Grazing rights were a frequent cause for dispute, but the concept of individual ownership and large-scale dispossessions of land was introduced by whites.²

The first Europeans to land on the Namibian coast were the Portuguese, who arrived in 1484. They were followed by other Portuguese, Dutch, and British expeditions. By the late 1700s trade relations were fairly well developed. Larger groups of European missionaries, traders and businessmen arrived throughout the latter part of the 19th Century. The Germans colonized parts of Namibia in the 1880s in an effort to build an empire in Africa. This marked the beginning of the conflict between Britain and Germany for possession of the coastal areas of present-day Namibia. The Germans expanded their control inland through purchases and so-called "treaties of protection" with rival chiefs. In 1890, they signed an agreement with the British to allocate acquired territories in the region.³ Thus, German South West Africa, a territory three times the size of Britain, was created, while the British retained Walvis Bay.

German Rule

German colonial exploitation was extremely brutal; it encountered sustained resistance from African communities and resulted in rebellions throughout the late 1890s with constant warfare between 1904 and 1908. The colonizers responded to these strong uprisings of the Herero and Nama peoples by conducting the 20th century's first genocide. Extermination campaigns in concentration camps resulted in the massacre of 54,000 of the 70,000 Herero people and 30,000 of the 50,000 Nama.⁴ Survivors were dispossessed of all their land, and their political and social structures were destroyed, leaving them to become a large, cheap wage labor pool for white employers. White settlement rapidly increased and laws were enacted that institutionalized racial oppression in a manner suggesting the system of apartheid that South Africa would impose years later.

League of Nations: South Africa's Mandate

During World War I, South African troops, acting on British orders, occupied the German colony of South West Africa. In 1920, South Africa was given a mandate by the newly formed League of Nations to administer the territory. Under the terms of the mandate, South Africa was to "promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants."⁵ These terms were ignored and additional laws were enacted to deny Africans political rights and to ensure a cheap labor supply. Among the new restrictions were the Master and Servants Proclamation of 1920, the Pass Laws of 1922, and the Contract Labor System formalized in 1925.⁶ Frequent uprisings were crushed, and the population was subdued by force.

The United Nations

When the League of Nations was superseded by the United Nations in 1945, countries administering League of Nations Mandates entered into UN Trusteeship Agreements drawn to eventuate in full independence for the territories. However, South Africa refused the Trusteeship System - the only mandatory power to do so - and demanded the full incorporation of Namibia into the Union of South Africa. When the UN refused to accept this demand, South Africa proceeded to ignore the UN's authority over the matter.⁷

In 1948, The Afrikaner National Party came to power in South Africa. The new regime made Namibia a fifth, *de facto*, province of South Africa, providing six seats for members of Parliament from Namibia in the South African parliament.⁸ In 1950, the International Court of Justice ruled that South Africa could not unilaterally change the status of Namibia and that the Mandate was still in force. South Africa ignored this ruling, enacting legislation that imposed the National Party's *apartheid* policy on the people of the territory.

With the passage of Resolution 2145 in 1966, the UN General Assembly terminated South Africa's mandate and placed Namibia under UN control. In 1969, the Security Council concurred in this action by adopting Resolution 264, which declared South African occupation illegal and called on South Africa to withdraw from Namibia. It also called for international diplomatic and economic isolation of South Africa whenever it acted on behalf of Namibia.

In 1971, the International Court of Justice at the Hague confirmed the UN action declaring South Africa's occupation illegal, and concluded that the only legal action South Africa could take would be to withdraw. Yet, South Africa continued to defy the world community and remained in Namibia. Despite South Africa's claims that administering Namibia was a financial drain and that it was charitable for Pretoria to govern Namibia, its determination to maintain control over Namibia reflected the extent to which Namibia was and is a source of wealth for South Africa.

America's Economic Ties with Namibia

American economic and political involvement in Namibia began in the latter part of the 18th Century through extensive trading with the Namibian people and whaling in Namibia's waters. An influx of American missionaries and miners increased American involvement between the 1840s and 1860s.⁹ American commercial interests in Namibia continued to grow even after Germany formally colonized the territory near the end of the 19th Century.

When South African control replaced German colonial rule at the end of World War I, American investment in Namibia expanded. However, after the war, the United States

under President Woodrow Wilson was responsible, in large part, for preventing South Africa from annexing Namibia as it had hoped to do.¹⁰ South Africa was given a mandate to administer the territory instead, and American private investment continued to grow. At this time, U.S. investors were concentrated in the transportation sector and in Namibia's fashion fur trade.

After World War II, new American investment grew in the mining sector. This proved to be extremely profitable area, because of the vast mineral resources of the land and the large cheap labor pool created by South African exploitation of the populace through the contract labor system. In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, U.S. investment grew more and encompassed new sectors, such as the fishing industry and off-shore mining. Today, approximately 130 American transnational corporations trade in Namibia. Thirty-five (35) maintain a direct presence in the territory. More than 70 percent of these companies entered Namibia through contracts with South Africa after the United Nations, with U.S. support, officially revoked South Africa's mandate over the territory in 1966.¹¹

Inside Namibia

In 1964, South Africa directly imposed its apartheid policy on Namibia by dividing the country into separate "bantustans" or "homelands" for the African population along ethnic lines. Using this device, South Africa hoped to convince the world that it was leading each "ethnic group" toward self-determination in order to gain international acceptance. These policies, which are virtually the same as those imposed on the African majority in South Africa, have several aims and objectives, including:

- To divide the Namibian nation along racial and ethnic lines and to foster tribal divisions through South African-promoted "ethnic" governments.
- To suppress the consciousness of national unity that had grown from early anti-colonial revolts.
- To ensure a continuous supply of cheap African labor to the white economy by forcing Africans into arid, small "homelands" that cannot sustain the population.
- To deprive black people of any rights in "white areas" where they work by making them "citizens" of a "homeland."
- To transfer repressive powers to the "homeland" governments while retaining overall control.¹²

These policies, along with a host of other repressive laws, have had a devastating effect on the lives of black Namibians. For example, the severely limited educational opportunities, health facilities and housing for the black population are allocated on a discriminatory and unequal basis. In the educational system of Namibia an estimated \$1,500 a year is spent on each white student, while only \$215 is spent on each black student.¹³ Infant mortality rates for blacks are high (163 for each 1,000 blacks versus 21 for each 1,000 whites), while life expectancy for blacks is 33 years, compared with 72 years for whites.¹⁴

The economy of Namibia is dominated by western transnational corporations and South African companies. Though Namibia is a country rich in mineral resources, the economy is profoundly distorted, with foreigners expropriating the wealth while the black population remains one of the poorest in the world.¹⁵

While the forms of Pretoria's political control in Namibia have changed over the years, these changes have represented only tactical shifts rather than any diminution of South Africa's absolute authority over the territory. When the National Party took over power in 1948 it argued that the mandate had ended and that South Africa now ruled by right of occupation. It proceeded to lay plans for the full annexation of the territory that were formally enacted in the 1960s. World opinion continued to oppose South Africa's occupation and when the political and military situation began to change in Namibia during the mid-1970s, resulting from the demise of the Portuguese colonial empire in southern Africa, South Africa began to look for alternatives to annexation

that would nevertheless maintain the political, military and economic status quo in Namibia. The result was a conference called by the all-white National Party of Namibia for all "peoples" in the territory to discuss its future. Only organizations representing single ethnic groups were allowed to attend.

This conference, called the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference for the building in which it was held in Windhoek, continued sporadically for several years. Its final proposals for self-rule along ethnic lines under a two-tiered government were eventually adopted as Pretoria's scheme for an internal settlement. In the meantime South Africa had appointed an Administrator General to Namibia who was given the authority to rule by proclamation.

South Africa held elections in Namibia in December 1978 to form a 50-member "constituent assembly." Boycotted by SWAPO and almost all of the country's 40-odd political parties, the election was essentially a struggle between the two white-led political alliances that grew out of the Turnhalle Conference. In 1979 the South African Administrator General converted the assembly into a "National Assembly" (first-tier government) and in 1980 established "Ethnic Governments" (second tier) for the homelands. He also created a "Council of Ministers" of 12 members from the assembly in 1980.¹⁶ Thus, while there was an internal government in the formalistic sense, its activities were subject to the approval of the South African Administrator General, as the ruling authority in the country, while South Africa's massive army of occupation was and continues to be the ruling force.

On Jan. 18, 1983, South Africa dissolved the National Assembly and announced that it was resuming "direct rule" in the territory. Few observers ever believed that South Africa had ever really abandoned *de facto* rule even during the tenure of the National Assembly and Council of Ministers.

The Economy

Under the South African division of land in Namibia, the "white areas" cover nearly two-thirds of the territory and contain almost all of Namibia's known mineral deposits, diamond reserves and the majority of the active agricultural and fishing sectors. Namibia's economy, therefore, is characterized by an extremely wealthy white-owned sector that controls all the territory's most valuable natural resources, as contrasted with a separate subsistence economy in the black "homelands." This unequal system provides a constant supply of black workers from the "homelands" who, in order to survive, must seek an income in the white economy (in the mines, on the farms or as domestics) to supplement what is raised in subsistence farming. Based on 1977 estimates, the average income for whites was \$3,000 per year, while the average for blacks was \$125.¹⁷ Roughly half of the black labor force (250,000) engages in subsistence agriculture with incomes around \$30 per year.¹⁸ Of the rest, 75,000 domestic workers earn between \$125 and \$200 per year; 50,000 laborers on white farms and ranches earn \$250 to \$400 per year. Only miners' incomes, at \$1,500 annually, approach half of the average white annual per capita income.¹⁹ While black contract labor has created Namibia's wealth and major industries, black workers and communities where they live receive few of the benefits.

Efforts to organize black workers in order to achieve greater work force equity and much-needed benefits were blocked outright until 1978. Since then, such efforts have been hampered by continued government restrictions on union activities. New legislation now permits trade unions to be organized, but this legislation is largely illusory. No unions with strong shop-floor organization have been permitted. The statutory

registration requirements are intended to place unions under strict government control. The National Union of Namibia Workers, a countrywide union organization affiliated with SWAPO, is debarred from registration and official recognition.²⁰ Unions are not allowed to engage in political activity and most African workers (those employed in the agricultural and domestic sectors) are without any form of union protection.

It is estimated that one-third to one-half of Namibia's Gross National Product (GNP) is taken each year by outside interests.²¹ The major sectors of the economy, mining and fishing, are dominated by overseas multinational corporations. About 90 percent of the mining industry production is controlled by two companies, Consolidated Diamond Mines and Tsumeb Corporation.²² Tsumeb is controlled by two U.S. companies: American Metal Climax (AMAX) and the Newmont Mining Corporation. The large scale exploitation of Namibia's uranium has recently become another major concern. This is concentrated in the Rossing Mine, the largest open cast uranium mine in the world, which is controlled by the Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation of Britain. All companies in Namibia operate in violation of UN Decree # 1. This decree prohibits exploitation of Namibian resources because of South Africa's continued illegal rule.

These economic and commercial relationships also have significance for South Africa. South Africa receives most of the taxes collected in Namibia and corporate payments for mineral rights. The black population cannot, by law and by organization of the economy, share in the revenues generated to either the public or private sectors. Clearly, despite the heavy costs of maintaining a military and governmental presence in the territory, Namibia provides a net cash flow to South Africa. This economic infusion results, in large measure, from the exploitative economic system imposed on Namibia by Pretoria.

Opposition and Collaboration: Political Parties in Namibia

The long tradition of organized opposition to South African occupation was reflected anew in the 1940s and 1950s. Black leaders (notably the Herero and Nama chiefs), supported by Namibian student groups inside South Africa, repeatedly petitioned the UN for Namibia's independence. However, the contract workers provided the most powerful base for development of a popular national liberation movement. That movement began in Cape Town in 1957 with the formation of the Ovamboland Peoples Congress, renamed the Ovamboland Peoples Organization (OPO) a year later. The OPO was open to all Namibians. Its immediate aim was to protest against the conditions of contract workers. The organization drew heavily on the support of contract laborers and was, in this manner, able to organize in almost all parts of Namibia. It also built support on the northern agricultural communities, largely through the strong organizing work of Herman Toivo ja Toivo, one of the founders.

In December 1959, protesters against forced removals of Africans to a new ghetto in Windhoek were attacked by police, who killed 11 and wounded 54. Subsequently, most of the nationalist leaders were arrested, banned or restricted.²³ These events fostered a broader form of resistance against the South African occupation of Namibia and exploitation of Namibian workers and resources.

SWAPO

On April 19, 1960, the OPO was reorganized as the South West Africa People's Organization. SWAPO's stated objective is the complete liberation of the Namibian people and their land from colonial oppression and exploitation. Under Sam Nujoma,

a railway worker who fled Namibia in 1960 to avoid arrest and detention, SWAPO has built external offices in Africa and Europe.

Since its inception, SWAPO has pursued its political objectives of national liberation for Namibia through negotiations, mass organization inside Namibia, and international campaigns. The organization had hoped that Namibia's independence could be gained through peaceful means but was increasingly met with a violent response. At a national congress in Windhoek in 1961, SWAPO resolved that political and military activity were complementary and should be pursued simultaneously.²⁴

Nevertheless SWAPO continued for several years to pursue only peaceful means to achieve liberation. The military campaign was finally launched in August 1966, while the political leadership sought to negotiate and welcomed UN efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement.

The People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), the military wing of SWAPO, is only one element of the broader political strategy the organization has pursued since 1960. SWAPO maintains informal study groups throughout Namibia while the Youth League, the Elders Council and the Women's Council have engaged in public education and mobilization campaigns. Though made illegal in 1981, public SWAPO meetings are frequent in some areas.

SWAPO has never been formally banned by South Africa, but extensive arrests, detentions, imprisonment of leadership figures and repressive laws and proclamations have made open political activity increasingly difficult and dangerous. Though SWAPO's Windhoek office is routinely raided and its workers detained, supporters inside Namibia continue many organizing activities, including some public rallies.

SWAPO has established itself as a national movement representing the Namibian people, not just the Ovambo tribe, as is often claimed by its opponents.²⁵ It has been noted by the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa that "Though Ovambos are among SWAPO's most numerous supporters, they are also the largest group of the Namibian population (40 to 50 percent) and will, in any independent government, form a majority of voters and representatives."²⁶ SWAPO's Executive Committee also reflects the diversity of its national constituency. The SWAPO permanent representative to the UN and leader of their negotiating team is not an Ovambo.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) recognized SWAPO as the liberation movement of the Namibian people in 1965, and, in 1973 the UN General Assembly accepted it as the authentic representative of the Namibian people. SWAPO was granted full observer status in 1976.²⁷

Material aid to SWAPO comes from several organizations and countries. The OAU donates large amounts annually through its African Liberation Committee. Religious organizations, such as the World Council of Churches (through its Programme to Combat Racism) and the Lutheran World Federation, provide money for educational and refugee relief work. Many African countries also provide bilateral aid, and some give sanctuary and provide facilities to Namibian refugees. The Eastern bloc countries and the Soviet Union also provide bilateral material support to SWAPO, as do several Western European countries, Sweden foremost among them. In addition, in Western countries that do not provide aid, community organizations and coalitions have raised monies and materials for SWAPO's refugee centers.

Minor Parties

There are more than 40 political parties in Namibia.²⁸ This large number reflects the racial and ethnic divisions fostered by South Africa, the inability of the parties to

organize nationally and the limited role allowed political parties in Namibia. These parties are confined to addressing only ethnic or local concerns, and are unable to alter the prevailing economic and political system imposed on the country. In contrast, it also reflects broad support for SWAPO resulting from its 22 years of organizing efforts throughout the country and its development of a viable strategy to gain independence for Namibia through a national liberation movement.

Of these minor parties, the principal African ones are the South West Africa National Union (SWANU), mainly supported by Hereros,²⁹ and the SWAPO-Democrats, a small group that broke away from SWAPO in 1978.

By boycotting the South African-run elections in 1978, the majority of these minor parties sought to demonstrate their desire for genuine independence through internationally supervised elections.

White Political Parties, Alliances and Control

The major white party in Namibia, the National Party, has close ideological and political ties with its counterpart, the ruling party in South Africa, and supports the same policies of separate development. Between 1950 and 1977, all the Namibia representatives in the South African parliament were National Party members (white representation from Namibia was abolished in 1977 as part of the internal settlement approach). In 1979 the party accused South Africa's foreign minister of "surrendering the whites of the territory."³⁰ Simultaneously, it withdrew from the National Assembly in Namibia to protest passage of the Abolishment of Racial Discrimination Act.³¹ The Act, while unenforced, purported to change petty apartheid in Namibia.

The National Party split in 1977 after Dirk Mudge, a prominent member of the white delegation to the Turnhalle Conference, made a bid for the leadership of the party and was defeated. Mudge then created the all-white Republican Party to develop a political base among whites that supported his leadership of the dominant political alliance to emerge from the Turnhalle Conference, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA).

Political control inside Namibia today is held by white-dominated bodies and South African-appointed officials. These include the civil service and the Administrator General's office, which both have direct links with South Africa, and the white political parties and white-dominated multi-racial alliances that are accommodating South Africa's plans for Namibia's future. The creation of a National Assembly, a Council of Ministers and regional "ethnic" governments inside Namibia did very little to alter the reality of South African political control over the territory.

The civil service, staffed by 15,000 South Africans, is considered the mechanism for political control among whites in the territory. It is the chief source of constituent support for the National Party's front alliance, formally known as the Action Front for the Retention of the Turnhalle Principles (AKTUR). AKTUR and its members have resisted even minor reforms to apartheid legislation in Namibia. In an effort to create the impression that South Africa is moving toward "self-government" in Namibia, the civil service has undergone some changes. Some of its functions will be carried out by an ostensibly "independent" Namibian civil service in the future. This service will, however, remain under South African control through the Administrator General, the highest political authority inside Namibia. The enforcement of politically repressive legislation and proclamations is, of course, carried out by the police and South African military.

AKTUR was one of the two new multi-racial alliances that grew from the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference in 1977. The other is the DTA. The DTA was formed by Dirk Mudge as an alliance between his Republican Party and the majority of the black groups that had taken part in the conference (primarily Bantustan representatives and South African-endorsed leaders of ethnic groups whose traditional leaders refused to participate in the Turnhalle Conference). The DTA dominated the National Assembly and had hoped to see that body become the executive and legislative authority in Namibia. Though publicly supporting continued negotiations for a UN-led internationally acceptable settlement, the DTA increasingly had pressed for Spring 1983 elections as a predicate for independence, whether or not the UN or SWAPO were involved. At a UN-sponsored "pre-implementation" conference of all parties in Geneva in January 1981, Mudge told the U.S. ambassador to the UN, Donald McHenry, that, "I am not going to agree to an election so long as I know I am going to lose."³² The DTA receives considerable financial backing from South Africa and from groups in West Germany.³³ Until he resigned in January 1983, Mudge headed the Namibian Council of Ministers, whose 11 other members also come from the DTA.

South Africa's decision to resume "direct rule" in Namibia simply removed the mask from South Africa's absolute control in the territory. Mudge and the DTA may try to use the new situation to portray themselves as true opponents of Pretoria but observers from all sides are skeptical about the chances for success of such a ploy.

AKTUR consists of the National Party and a few black representatives. The AKTUR alliance takes an even more extreme position, arguing that Namibia must retain an ethnic structure based on the homeland scheme. AKTUR proposes that homeland "governments" participate only in a second tier of a white controlled Namibian government. It had opposed granting the National Assembly more power. AKTUR's position on any proposed settlement is of considerable importance to the South African government. If AKTUR members feel betrayed in the final analysis, they could provoke strong internal opposition to the South African government within the National Party (of South Africa) and possibly precipitate large-scale disaffection from the party.

Other white political parties include the extreme right-wing Herstigte National Party and the Federal Party, which declares itself a non-racial political force in favor of national reconciliation.

The Church

Along with the other popular forces working for the independence of Namibia, the Christian church also is now an outspoken critic of the South African occupation.

Christian missionaries were among the first whites to establish contact with the indigenous people of Namibia in the mid-1800s. With the military defeat of African resistance to German colonial occupation, Christianity spread rapidly among all sections of Namibian society and became the prevalent religion. This had a strong influence both on the early (non-violent) struggle for independence and on the later political stand of the church.

In the 1940s and 1950s, Namibian churches increasingly became autonomous from European-based missionary societies. During this period, church leaders and missionaries also were among those petitioning the UN Trusteeship Council and protesting South Africa's occupation of Namibia. In 1972, the Evangelical Lutheran Church (with an almost entirely African membership of 193,000) and the Evangelical Lutheran Ovambokavango Church (with a mostly African membership of more than 316,000) adopted a federal

church structure that represents more than a third of Namibia's population. The Anglican Church's 60,000 members and the Catholic Church's 100,000 members also are mainly Africans.

While individual clergy have opposed the oppression of black people in Namibia for years, the church as an institution clearly began to identify with the struggle for independence in the early 1970s. In a letter to the South African Prime Minister in 1971, the Lutheran churches condemned the intimidation and humiliation of black Namibians and stressed the unity of the people as one nation. Since this open letter, the church has played an increasingly important role in focusing world attention on human rights violations in the country, providing internal opposition to mass detentions and torture, and in helping to shape international opinion generally. The Council of Churches of Namibia, formed in October 1978 and now composed of the Lutheran, Anglican, African Methodist Episcopal, Roman Catholic and Methodist churches, has helped to reveal the fraudulent nature of the internal settlement elections of 1978 and has stated its support for a speedy implementation of an unchanged Resolution 435. Many clergy have been expelled from the territory because of their support for national independence, and a seminary as well as church printing presses and offices have been destroyed by bombs.

The War

Extreme economic and political power disparities between blacks and whites in Namibia result from rule by coercion rather than by consent. Beginning with the German genocide campaign and continuing through South Africa's repressive police state legislation and emergency measures, the system of exploitation in Namibia, during each period of its development, has been sustained by massive force.

In 1966, SWAPO launched its military effort to end South African control in Namibia. This action was consistent with its 1961 decision, made at the National Congress, to pursue political and military efforts concurrently.

In the early years of the war, the PLAN guerrillas faced serious supply shortage and communication problems. During that period, attacks were limited to the north-eastern parts of the territory nearest to SWAPO bases in Zambia.

The South African build-up of troops and bases in Namibia began slowly, after a nationwide series of strikes that swept Namibia in 1971-1972. Troops were used to break strike meetings and carry out mass arrests in 1972. In 1975, South Africa used Namibia to launch a massive invasion into Angola in an attempt to install Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) as the government in Luanda during the civil war that broke out following independence from Portugal that year. Despite the South African invasion and CIA support for its opponents, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) maintained power in the country and with the assistance of Cuban troops, invited to Angola by MPLA President Agostino Neto, the South African troops were defeated and forced to withdraw in March 1976. During the invasion, South Africa established several large bases on Namibian soil. After their retreat from Angola, the South African forces remained in Namibia.

The independence of Angola in 1975, and South Africa's defeat in 1976, allowed PLAN to escalate the armed resistance to South Africa's occupation of Namibia and to create a new military zone inside the territory by using new bases in southern Angola. Each year since, PLAN has sharply increased the number of attacks, the level of penetration (operating in central and southern Namibia was well) and the frequency of successful missions against South African military and economic targets.³⁴ Throughout, PLAN has appeared able to secure and to expand the support of the local people by employing strategies that avoid civilian casualties and respect mission property and personnel.³⁵ South Africa's continued refusal to implement Resolution 435, the increased militarization of the country, and increased repression and human rights violations against the population have also served to broaden the support for SWAPO's military campaign, including support from sectors of the population that were formerly opposed to the use of violent force to help achieve independence.

South Africa has responded to the escalation of the war by further militarizing Namibia, attacking SWAPO's civilian supporters and increasing the number of assaults on Angola. Troop escalation began in earnest following the South African defeat in Angola. From 1976 to 1979, the northern regions of Namibia became saturated with

new troops and heavy armor.³⁶ From 1980 to the present, the South African strategy has focused on sustained attacks against Angola. These attacks are directed more and more against Angolan infrastructure, civilian and military targets. South African troop levels are estimated by most informed observers to have reached between 70,000 and 100,000 in 1982. Forces have been concentrated, since June 1981, along and inside the Angolan border.

South African use of UNITA insurgents and mercenary forces (especially former white Rhodesian forces) in southern Angola had, for a time, hidden the extent of South Africa's war against Angola. The massive invasions of Angola in 1981 and 1982 represented major developments in the war. Supported by constant air strikes, South African troops engaged Angolan army units up to 120 miles inside Angola. Wide media coverage only recently alerted Western readers that the Namibian war, had, by all accounts, become a war against Angola. However, this situation had prevailed for at least two years.

South Africa began trying to "Namibianize" the war by recruiting several "ethnic" battalions of 600 soldiers each and by introducing conscription for all Namibians aged 16-25 in January, 1981.³⁷ Pretoria hopes that this will foster the impression of an "independent" South West Africa Defense Force, and lessen the number of whites from South Africa serving in Namibia. The conscription program has largely failed: within four months of its announcement, 8,000 young Namibians fled to join SWAPO.

South Africa's army of occupation intrudes upon every aspect of Namibian daily life. In an attempt to lessen popular support for SWAPO and to portray the South African Defense Force as the defenders of the Namibian people, South African soldiers have assumed numerous "civilian" roles, including acting as teachers, agricultural advisers and doctors. But the repressive role of the Security Forces remains painfully apparent. The General Secretary of the Lutheran World Ministries visited Namibia in 1979 and emphasized that "evidence of South African army brutality among all segments of the population is overwhelming, pervasive and capable of documentation."³⁸ In a report dated May 16, 1982, Bishop Kleopas Dumeni of the Evangelical Lutheran Ovambo Church provides a detailed account of an assault by South African soldiers on the congregation at Elombe Parish during worship service. The service was interrupted and men were tortured and beaten. A British Council of Churches team visited Namibia in 1981 and released a report in 1982 detailing their investigative findings on charges of South African troop brutality and torture. The report indicates that the assault on Elombe Parish was not an isolated incident.

As a result of the daily repression and harassment, thousands of Namibians have crossed the border to Angola or traveled to Zambia. From June 1978, when South Africa began registering voters for its own version of elections, refugees were crossing the borders at a rate of 550 a week.³⁹ Out of a total population of about 1.5 million, more than 70,000 Namibians are in exile.

Toward A Settlement

Since the official revocation of its mandate in 1966, South Africa has maintained control over Namibia in defiance of the people of Namibia, the United Nations, the International Court of Justice and world opinion. In that year, the United Nations was entrusted with the responsibility of defending the rights and interests of the territory and its people. Accordingly, in May 1967, the General Assembly established the UN Council for Namibia as the legal administering authority for Namibia. Though the council has been unable to play this role, it has performed several important functions. Through use of the United Nations Fund for Namibia, created in 1970 to finance its activities, the council has helped Namibian refugees, organized training programs for Namibians, issued travel documents and established an emergency program of economic and technical assistance to Namibia. In 1976, the UN Institute for Namibia—which provides civil service and administration training and conducts research into the economic and social problems of reconstruction for an independent Namibia—was opened in Lusaka, Zambia. Yet, the UN has been unable to fulfill its chief responsibility for the territory: to apply the principle of self-determination to Namibia and to end South Africa's illegal occupation.

Over the years, the UN has tried, in various ways, to pressure South Africa into acceptance of a Namibian settlement. The most forceful proposals for pressure have been consistently blocked in the Security Council by the "triple veto" of Britain, France and the United States. In December 1973, after two years of fruitless effort, the UN discontinued its policy of "dialogue" with the South African government, intended to bring a settlement. During the fall of 1974, a resolution to expel South Africa from the United Nations received 10 votes in the Security Council (one more than enough for adoption) but was defeated by the triple veto. The following year, a draft resolution for a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa was blocked by the first triple veto cast on a specifically Namibian issue. In 1976, another sanctions resolution was vetoed by the "Western Big Three."¹

A confluence of military and political events in the mid-1970s caused Pretoria to reassess its position in Namibia. In response to continued international pressure and to new political and military realities of the region (largely due to the independence of Angola and Mozambique and the war in Rhodesia, now known as Zimbabwe), South Africa began to pursue a new strategy.

Characterized as a "two-track strategy" by former US Ambassador to the UN Donald McHenry, this strategy allowed South Africa to appear responsive to international opinion by negotiating for an international settlement while, at the same time, pursuing an internal settlement. Initially, South Africa pursued only the internal settlement. But subsequent events have made it clear that this approach will only prolong the process for reaching a final settlement. Ambassador McHenry, the chief architect of United States' Namibia policy under the Carter administration, has argued that South Africa viewed an international settlement as in its own interest, because only such a settlement was

likely to end the political dispute in the international arena, as well as end the war in Namibia itself.² Yet, in four years, the Carter policy failed to gain South Africa's acceptance of a settlement. Arguably, obstructions to the application of international sanctions and lack of greater Western pressure only strengthened Pretoria's resolve to wait for an international settlement on its own terms. Failing to reach such a settlement, South Africa continued to pursue the internal settlement for which it had laid the foundations in the mid-1970s.

The Turnhalle Affair: Preparing for a *Fait Accompli*

Nowhere were South Africa's political intentions made more manifest than in the September, 1975 Turnhalle Constitutional Conference. The conference was convened at the Turnhalle building in Windhoek and was attended by representatives from 11 separate "population groups" and a white delegation. South Africa claimed that the Conference was to be an open debate on all options for Namibia's independence, but only delegations accepting the racial and ethnic divisions imposed by Pretoria and representing only one "population group" were allowed to attend. This precluded the involvement of SWAPO and others who rejected racialism or tribalism as the basis for an acceptable national solution.

The conference opened with a call for a government based on ethnic representation at the tribal level, a controlling *de facto* white-dominated National government with veto power, Bantustan authorities in the rural areas and multiple ethnic enclaves in the urban areas.³ The UN responded to the proceedings of the Turnhalle Conference in January 1976 with the unanimous adoption of Security Council Resolution 385, the basic resolution setting out the mechanism for achieving self-determination and independence in Namibia. The resolution provided that: (1) South African officials must withdraw from Namibia immediately to be replaced by a temporary UN administration; (2) pending its withdrawal, South Africa should dismantle the bantustans and implement human rights in Namibia (abolish discriminatory and repressive legislation, release political prisoners, etc.); and (3) there should be territory-wide, non-ethnic elections, on a one-person-one-vote basis, to be held under "United Nations supervision and control" to elect a constituent assembly to draft a constitution for the territory.⁴

The Turnhalle Conference (financed by South Africa) continued for two years. During this period, hundreds of SWAPO members and supporters were arrested and detained without trial in an effort to reinforce political repression and to isolate the broad opposition to the conference within Namibia. In March 1977, the conferees produced a draft constitution that provided for 11 ethnic governments, a 50-member National Assembly and a Council of Ministers (to consist of 11 ethnic representatives and a white representative who would become chairman). The Turnhalle group simultaneously petitioned Pretoria to recognize an interim government in Namibia based on this "constitution."

The African states at the UN responded by discussing draft resolutions calling for a mandatory arms embargo and an end to all new loans and investment in South Africa.⁵ Seeking to avoid another embarrassing veto, the Western members of the Security Council at that time (United States, Britain, France, West Germany and Canada) joined to form the "Contact Group," also called the Western Five, and offered to negotiate terms for Namibia's independence on the basis of free nationwide elections under UN supervision.

The Western Initiative

The Contact Group held four rounds of talks during the remainder of 1977, meeting separately with the South African government, SWAPO and the Turnhalle representatives. As a result, the Western Five gained South Africa's agreement to suspend plans for an interim government based on the Turnhalle "constitution" and drafted a plan for an internationally supervised settlement. South Africa, however, had taken two unilateral actions in Namibia, while the Contact Group was drafting its proposal, to strengthen its control in the territory and to increase its bargaining position in relationship to the Contact Group's plan. The first action was the July appointment of a South African Administrator General to administer the territory until elections were held. The AG was given the power to legislate by proclamation for the country. The second action was the South African proclamation of August 1977, which transferred the administration of Walvis Bay (Namibia's only deep sea port) to the Cape Province of South Africa, so that none of the provisions in the Contact Group's proposals would apply to this important port. Administered as part of Namibia for 60 years, Walvis Bay is the home of the country's fishing and fish processing industries, and railhead for the line that would, under stable political conditions, connect Botswana and even Zimbabwe with the Atlantic ocean. In September 1977, the South African-appointed Administrator General took office in Windhoek, and Pretoria abolished the provisions for Namibia's six white members' seats in the South African parliament.

Though 1977 discussions conducted by the Contact Group were generally kept secret, they were reported to have gained the initial endorsements of the two principal contesting parties (South Africa and SWAPO) on certain compromises. The major issues agreed upon in the negotiations that year were as follows:

- The Turnhalle Conference would be disbanded. (It finally was dissolved in November 1977).
- South Africa would hold elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage with the participation of all political parties.
- An Administrator General would be installed in Namibia until independence. (This was an accommodation to what South Africa had already imposed.)
- UN supervision and control would be established through a Special Representative appointed by the UN Secretary General.
- The Special Representative's chief role would be to ensure that conditions were established allowing free and fair elections and an impartial electoral process.
- The Administrator General would repeal all discriminatory and repressive legislation.
- Law and order would remain the responsibility of South Africa.⁶

After "proximity talks" with South Africa and SWAPO between January and March 1978, the Contact Group formally offered its "Proposal for Settlement in Namibia" on

April 10, 1978. In addition to the principal agreements reached earlier in the negotiations, the proposal contained provisions for the following:

- The release and return to Namibia of all political prisoners.
- The return of all Namibian refugees.
- A cease-fire and the restriction of South African and SWAPO armed forces to bases.
- Phased withdrawal from Namibia of all but 1,500 South African troops within 12 weeks and prior to the start of the election campaign, with the remaining troops restricted to base.
- Demobilization of citizen forces, commandos and ethnic forces and the dismantling of their command structures.
- The peaceful return of SWAPO personnel outside of Namibia through designated entry points to participate in the elections.
- A United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) with military and civilian components to ensure the observance of the aforementioned provisions by all parties.⁷

South Africa accepted the plan two weeks later, but expressed reservations over the issue of Walvis Bay. On May 4, 1978, the South African army and air force attacked a SWAPO refugee camp at Kassinga in Angola, killing nearly 700 people, mostly women and children, and injuring another 1,500.⁸ Many believed that this action was intended to prevent SWAPO from accepting the settlement plan but on July 12, 1978, SWAPO accepted the plan. Later that month the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 432, insisting on the reintegration of Walvis Bay with Namibia.

On Aug. 20, 1978, UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim issued a report on the implementation of the Western Plan. South Africa immediately used the publication of the Secretary General's report to raise new objections. Pretoria objected to the size of the proposed UN military peacekeeping force of 7,500, the executive powers of the UN police and the date for the elections. SWAPO accepted the Waldheim Report in general. On Sept. 28, 1978, South Africa announced that it would unilaterally hold elections in Namibia by the end of the year. On Sept. 29, 1978, the Security Council adopted Resolution 435 endorsing the Waldheim Report. The UN hoped to force South Africa to abandon its plan for ethnically based elections and to prove its commitment to hold free elections under UN supervision. In November, 1978, the Security Council adopted Resolution 439, declaring that any South African-controlled elections would be void and that any person or body elected or created as a result of such an election would not be recognized.

Between 1978 and the present, South Africa has proved only its commitment to avoid the implementation of Resolution 435 at all costs while proceeding with its effort to impose an internal solution. Despite UN and Western Five efforts to accommodate South African criticism of the implementation plan embodied in Resolution 435, Pretoria insisted on holding its internal elections. South Africa justified these elections by asserting that they would not lead to independence, that it was still willing to cooperate in the implementation of the Western Plan, and that the elections should be regarded as an internal matter. The elections were held in Namibia in December 1978. South Africa utilized extreme military and employer intimidation of the populace in an effort to produce a larger turnout than was likely because of the general boycott of the "elections."

The results were denounced as void by the UN, Namibian churches, SWAPO and most of the minor parties in the country as well. The Constituent Assembly, formed after the elections, was transformed into a National Assembly in May 1979 by the Administrator General. The DTA held 41 of the 50 seats in the assembly, and Dirk Mudge became chairman of the 12-member Council of Ministers also established by the Administrator General. The Administrator General maintained overall power over the Minister's Council, continued to make laws by proclamation and held a veto over any legislation drafted by the National Assembly.

Yet, the failure of the Western initiative in 1978 and the attempted internal solution by South Africa still did not persuade the Contact Group to impose sanctions against South Africa. Critics argue that it was the Western Five's refusal to seriously consider sanctions that emboldened South Africa in its delaying tactics. Leverage forsworn was leverage lost.

Throughout 1979 and 1980, the Contact Group's efforts to achieve an agreement on the implementation of Resolution 435 met with continual South African objections to certain parts of the UN plan. However, Resolution 435 represented a concession to South Africa by weakening most of the provisions of Security Council Resolution 385, the basic resolution on Namibia (adopted in January 1976) that established the mechanism for achieving self-determination and independence in the territory. While Resolution 435 was characterized as being "in accordance with" Resolution 385, it was a significant departure in several important ways: (1) The South African occupation regime would remain in Namibia and administer it until independence instead of being required to withdraw before elections; (2) Pretoria would not be required to dismantle the Bantustans; (3) The election would be run by South African officials who would choose the electoral system, register voters, provide ballot boxes and count the votes while the UN would be reduced to merely monitoring their conduct; and (4) The removal of Walvis Bay from Namibian jurisdiction was allowed, though the UN would seek its reintegration by supporting the "initiation of steps" to that end.⁹

Nonetheless, South Africa demanded more concessions. Initially, Pretoria's objections focused on the presence of SWAPO bases inside Namibia and the monitoring of SWAPO bases in neighboring countries. A proposal for a 50-kilometer wide demilitarized zone (DMZ) along Namibia's borders made by the late President Agostino Neto of Angola diminished that particular obstacle temporarily. South Africa then demanded that the "internal parties" in Namibia receive equal recognition and an active role in the negotiations. Next, South Africa demanded an end to all UN financial contributions to SWAPO and Namibia programs. Later, South Africa suggested that their secretly backed insurgents in Angola, UNITA, be included in the negotiation process.

During this period of South African stalling tactics, the Carter administration and the other Contact Group members defended their opposition to sanctions against Pretoria by arguing that these objections of South Africa could be overcome through negotiations. However, it was usually SWAPO, and not South Africa, that made concessions on several of these issues, in hopes of actually moving forward on implementation. South Africa consistently found new issues to raise as obstacles to the settlement plan. To its credit, the Carter administration did maintain that Resolution 435 was the only acceptable formula for a settlement and refused to allow any further weakening of the implementation plan.

In August 1980, South Africa indicated to the UN Secretary General that it had only two remaining major objections to implementation: the question of UN impar-

tiality toward SWAPO and the alleged lack of consultation by the Contact Group with the "internal parties" in Namibia. The Contact Group proposed an all-parties "pre-implementation" conference in Geneva to resolve these two issues and to set a cease-fire date. The Geneva Conference marked the culmination of the Carter administration and Contact Group's four-year effort to achieve Namibia's independence. In Geneva, the Western Five had hoped to gain agreement on a cease-fire date and to begin implementation of Resolution 435.

On January 5, 1981, the delegates assembled in Geneva for the opening of the conference. South Africa proceeded to use the conference as a propaganda platform for its various internal parties that formed its delegation (DTA, AKTUR, and a few other politically insignificant groups). In contrast, the SWAPO delegation showed restraint and stated its willingness to sign an immediate cease-fire and to abide by Resolution 435. After assailing what it alleged to be the partiality of the UN in favor of SWAPO, South Africa walked out, causing the collapse of the conference, and refused to sign even a declaration of intent. South Africa's performance at Geneva was not surprising to many. Most observers had anticipated another dilatory tactic by Pretoria to slow the negotiations until the administration of U.S. President Ronald Reagan could take office in Washington. South Africa believed that the new U.S. administration would be more favorably disposed toward South African concerns in Namibia and that, in conjunction with a conservative government in Britain, a new U.S.-Britain alliance would mean new possibilities for policies of even greater accommodation within the Contact Group.

The Reagan Approach

Even before the Reagan administration publicly declared its position on Namibia and South Africa, its principal objective to curtail expansion of the Soviet Union's presence, influence and control of resources in regions of importance to Washington, such as southern Africa, was widely known. This view, coupled with several events in early 1981, pointed to the likelihood of a much more accommodating U.S. approach to South Africa.

In a major television interview in early March 1981, President Reagan described South Africa as a "friendly country" and stressed that South Africa was "a country that strategically is essential to the free world in its production of minerals that we all must have."¹⁰ Two weeks later, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick, along with National Security Council and Pentagon officials, met with five South African military officers, including Pretoria's highest-ranking official in military intelligence. All these persons were in the U.S. illegally because the meetings constituted a violation of longstanding U.S. policy and of the UN mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. In March, the DTA leadership also visited Washington for talks with the administration; high level State Department officials met with the South African-backed leader of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi; and President Reagan asked Congress to repeal the Clark Amendment. The Clark Amendment, passed by Congress in January 1976, prohibited the flow of CIA funds and support to insurgents in Angola, and forbade U.S. sponsorship of paramilitary activities by anti-government insurgents such as UNITA.

In April, 1981 the assistant secretary of state-designate for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, made a two-week trip to 12 African countries to discuss the Namibian negotiations. He refused to meet with SWAPO leaders during the trip. During conversations with South African Foreign Minister Roelof "Pik" Botha and Defense Minister Magnus Malan in Pretoria, Crocker was informed that South Africa would not rule out an internationally acceptable settlement, but that it could not live with a SWAPO victory that left SWAPO with unchecked power.¹¹ At this point, the U.S. began promoting the idea of drafting a constitution before elections. Such a constitution would be intended to guarantee white minority "rights" (encompassing land and property privileges) and to limit the authority and independence of a future Namibian government. On April 30, the U.S., France and Britain again cast a triple veto in the Security Council to defeat a resolution for sanctions against South Africa. The resolution had been introduced in response to the regime's intransigence on Namibia.

In early May 1981, the Contact Group members met in Rome and agreed that they should develop new proposals in several areas to move the settlement process forward. They also reconfirmed that Resolution 435 provided a solid basis for a settlement. This represented a compromise within the Contact Group. For while the United States' commitment to Resolution 435 now seemed subordinate to combating "Soviet expansionism" in the region, and was conditioned on writing a constitution before elections (thereby undermining the essence of Resolution 435), the other members of the Contact Group

were unwilling to abandon or significantly alter Resolution 435.

In mid-May, South African Foreign Minister Rieff Botha led a delegation to Washington for talks with Secretary of State Alexander Haig and President Reagan. Thus, Botha became the first official from Africa to be received at the White House by the new administration. During this series of talks, the U.S. indicated to the South Africans that, "The political relationship between the U.S. and South Africa has now arrived at a crossroads of perhaps historic significance . . . the possibility may exist for a more positive and reciprocal relationship between the two countries based upon shared strategic concerns in southern Africa."¹² The United States cautioned, however, that the problem of Namibia, which complicates U.S. relations with Europe and Africa, was a primary obstacle to the development of a new relationship with South Africa. Further, it was stated that the United States was willing to work with South Africa toward an internationally acceptable settlement that would not harm Pretoria's interests.¹³

This policy of accommodation became known as "Constructive Engagement." Under this policy, the Reagan administration maintained that it would be far easier to influence South Africa to settle on Namibia and to begin a process of change internally if the United States built a closer friendship with the white minority regime than if the U.S. adopted a confrontational approach. Critics in Africa and elsewhere argued that this new U.S. policy was clearly racially and economically motivated and that it identified U.S. interests with those of white South Africa rather than with the legitimate aspirations of the 1.5 million people of Namibia whose land South Africa illegally occupied, or with the 22 million ruthlessly dominated black people inside South Africa.

During the summer of 1981, the Organization of African Unity denounced the Reagan administration's policy on Namibia, calling the new U.S.-South Africa alliance an extremely dangerous development. The Contact Group continued to meet to discuss the "constitutional guarantees" approach. Canada and the European members of the Contact Group grew more irritated with U.S. attempts to undermine Resolution 435 by proposing detailed constitutional arrangements as part of the ongoing negotiations. These arrangements were, in fact, the responsibility of the constituent assembly under provisions of Resolution 435.

In August 1981, South Africa launched a massive invasion of Angola with widespread air and ground assaults. The international community condemned the invasion and called for the South Africans to withdraw. At the same time, the United States cast the sole veto against a U.N. Security Council Resolution condemning the invasion. The Reagan administration issued a carefully worded statement blaming SWAPO and the Angolan government for the South African raid. This was viewed by observers as further evidence of a growing *de facto* alliance between the United States and South Africa—an alliance euphemistically described as "constructive engagement." Other evidence of growing rapprochement included: the enlarging of the U.S. military attache in Pretoria and South Africa's counterpart in Washington, allowing South Africa to establish more honorary consulates in the United States, changing export controls to permit sales to the South African military and police (later to be relaxed even further), training South African Coast Guard personnel, and training South African nuclear technicians at U.S. government facilities.¹⁴

Finally, in October 1981, the Contact Group traveled to Africa and presented constitutional proposals and a "non-paper" on a proposed non-aggression treaty to South Africa, the internal parties, SWAPO and the Frontline African States. The proposals addressed three areas: the make-up of the constituent assembly, principles designed to

guarantee the rights of the white minority, and the distribution of power among the various branches of a future Namibian government.

SWAPO and the Frontline States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) responded by indicating their objections to the idea of amending Resolution 435 in such a manner as to set forth specific items to be included in a constitution. They argued that the proposals would pre-empt the work of the constituent assembly, but refrained from rejecting them as guidelines. In their official response, the Frontline States and SWAPO amended the first section dealing with the constituent assembly by deleting provisions that would entrench racial and ethnic division in Namibia. Their response reiterated the electoral provision of Resolution 435 and reaffirmed the authority of the constituent assembly to determine the governmental structure of a future independent Namibia. No official response was made to the non-paper on a non-aggression treaty between Namibia and South Africa. It was dismissed as a poorly disguised attempt to circumscribe the military and security prerogatives of Namibia before independence was even granted.

At the time these first Contact Group proposals were offered, a timetable was also established for completing the negotiations and moving toward implementation of Resolution 435. The comprehensive offering, essentially the program of the U.S., was a three-phase approach. The constitutional proposals and the electoral system constituted Phase I. Phase II would require the negotiation of issues directly related to the implementation process, such as the question of UN impartiality, the make-up of the UN Transition Assistance Group, and monitoring of the armed forces of the contending sides during implementation and elections. Phase III consisted of the actual implementation of Resolution 435. The timetable put forward assured that Phase I would be completed no later than March 1982, with Phase II taking only a short time and implementation and possibly elections taking place before the end of 1982.

In December 1981, the Contact Group presented its revised proposal, which incorporated Frontline States/SWAPO amendments. The group simultaneously offered an electoral system, however, that raised further objections. The group proposed a mixed electoral system, with half the members of the constituent assembly to be elected on a national basis by proportional representation and half on the basis of single-member constituencies. The Frontline States and SWAPO found this unacceptable because it was unnecessarily complicated and likely to cause confusion among a largely illiterate populace that had never before been given an opportunity to participate in free and fair elections. They maintained that the elections should either be based on proportional representation or single-member constituencies. Choosing one, they believed, would be practical and easy to administer, ensuring a genuine representation of all the people of Namibia. South Africa, on the other hand, accepted the mixed system and later insisted on it.

For the first six months of 1982, well past the stated cut-off date for Phase I negotiations, the electoral system continued to be a sticking point. SWAPO and the Frontline States argued that the mixed electoral system proposed had created confusion. They also asserted that they were being unfairly accused of stalling, while South Africa used the proposal to claim a willingness to settle. Never, during that period, did the Contact Group take SWAPO's preference for proportional representation to the South Africans for consideration.

This underscored the "uneven diplomacy" of the Contact Group, as criticized increasingly by the Africans. The United States, as the group's leading member, was par-

ticularly cited. Between January and August of 1981, the Contact Group had not contacted the Frontline States' ambassadors and SWAPO representatives at the UN, all of whom had been the chief negotiators since 1978. Nor had there been any contact with the Council for Namibia, the legal authority over the territory. The prevailing UN view was that the Contact Group had taken the whole Namibia settlement question outside the authority of the UN since 1978. Moreover, the advent of the Reagan administration caused the process to become a bilateral affair between the U.S. and South Africa, with comments solicited from SWAPO and the Frontline States occasionally. These criticisms also resulted from procedures the Contact Group had followed since early 1981. For example, private U.S.-South Africa bilateral discussions would precede each Contact Group consultation. These consultations would then be followed by talks with the Frontline States and SWAPO, though sometimes SWAPO would be excluded altogether, as during the first seven months of 1981.

The Collapse Of The Negotiations

Suddenly, in early June 1982, the State Department announced that significant progress had been made in the negotiations and that there was now a basis for optimism that elections could be held in March or April of 1983. This target deadline required that all remaining unresolved issues be settled by the end of the summer in 1982 so that the seven-month implementation process leading up to the election could begin in September.

In a document titled *Informal Summary of Points Presented by Contact Group – June 1982*, the Western Five set forth their claims to progress and an outline for a rapid completion of the negotiations. The document stated that all Phase I issues had been settled with the exception of the choice of the electoral system to be used. The basis for the U.S. optimism at the time rested on an agreement to proceed to Phase II issues by setting aside the electoral question for the time being. The State Department also was encouraged by what it considered a favorable South African disposition toward Phase II as well as an eagerness to move toward elections as soon as possible.

It was hoped that the Phase II talks could be completed in a matter of weeks. The South Africans publicly set August 15, 1982, as a date for a cease-fire. The U.S. described August 15, 1982, as a target date for concluding the negotiations. The Phase II issues included the size and make-up of the military component of UNTAG and the South African's posed question of assuring UN impartiality in its supervisory role in Namibia. The issue of deployment levels was linked closely to a third issue of monitoring of the SWAPO forces. If an agreement could be reached on the monitoring of SWAPO bases in Angola and Zambia, the provisions for a demilitarized zone could be eliminated, thus facilitating a reduction in UNTAG force levels.

Though August 15 passed without a conclusion of the negotiations, there seemed to be general agreement on most Phase II questions. The size and make-up of UNTAG was nearly completed, with four of the seven nations to participate in the military component already named and an upper limit of 7,500 troops confirmed. SWAPO appeared to have accepted UNTAG monitoring in Angola and Zambia, and the impartiality issue had been resolved through language in the draft reports to the Security Council from the secretary general and the Contact Group reaffirming a neutral UN role.

While Phase II appeared near completion, the State Department's optimism continued to be criticized by the Frontline States and SWAPO. They consistently questioned South Africa's willingness to allow elections to be held in Namibia in the foreseeable future. They also pointed out that Phase I had not been completed and further argued that the purported agreement on constitutional principles reached earlier in the year had been misrepresented by the Contact Group to the Security Council. The Contact Group asked the Security Council to circulate a document that ostensibly represented the agreed-upon constitutional principles. According to SWAPO, the document did not reflect the final agreement reached. The document omitted three important revisions related to the relationship between the three branches of government that were to be

defined by the Constituent Assembly, the restructuring of the Public, Police and Defense services and the establishment of local councils or regional administration only by an act of parliament. SWAPO and the Frontline States have not, at this writing, however, objected formally to the document or sought amendments.

For all practical purposes, the formal negotiations were said to be finished, aside from certain details being worked out by the UN Secretariat. All that remained was for the South Africans to choose between the two electoral systems. The Contact Group already had prepared a draft letter calling on the Security Council "to set in motion the implementation of Resolution 435." Yet, the letter, which had stated that "agreement has been reached among all the parties concerned" to begin implementation, was not delivered. Its conveyance became bogged down in the wash of a U.S. concern about the 15,000 to 20,000 Cuban troops in Angola.

In a news release dated June 21, 1982, South African Prime Minister Pieter Botha had stated that, "I have said that we cannot enter into the third phase (actual implementation) of the agreement with the Western Five unless the Cubans are withdrawn from Angola. I stand by this statement."

The matter of Cuban troops in Angola had been raised earlier by the Reagan administration in an attempt to link the issue to a Namibian settlement. Cuban withdrawal from Angola has been one of the primary U.S. objectives in the region—an objective the South Africans have embraced as the most recent in a long list of objections to implementation. This issue, however, is neither part of Resolution 435 nor is it within the mandate of the Contact Group in negotiating the UN settlement plan. The United States remains the only Contact Group member that has been attempting to make it a part of the settlement.

The Angolans have stated consistently that the Cubans would be withdrawn once Namibia was independent and the South African threat was removed. On Feb. 4, 1982, Angola and Cuba issued a joint communique that stated that they were both ready to resume repatriation of Cuban troops as soon as South Africa withdrew its troops from Namibia. The statement recalled that the Cubans were first invited to Angola by the late President Neto in October 1975, after South African troops and mercenaries invaded Angola (with the collaboration of the CIA) and encircled the Angolan capital. A major criticism of the United States' southern Africa policy has been that the Reagan administration has failed to differentiate between the legality of the Cuban presence in Angola and the illegality of the South African presence in Namibia. Critics add that the United States has not been sensitive to Angola's security problems caused by South Africa.

Underscoring Angola's security assistance needs was the third massive invasion, in August 1982, deep into Angolan territory by the South African forces and the continued occupation of parts of southern Angola by South Africa. This invasion fueled charges of U.S. duplicity, for while the United States was involved in on-going bilateral talks with Angola, principally regarding the Cuban troops, the United States had advance knowledge of South African plans for a major assault on Angola. South Africa's military aggression against Angola discredited its own claims that it was seeking a cease-fire. The escalation of its military presence inside Namibia also undermined U.S. diplomacy, which rested on the assumption that South Africa saw a Namibian settlement as desirable and in its own self-interest.

All the statements regarding progress in Phase I or Phase II of the talks diminished in significance when viewed against the intransigent position of Pretoria and Washington

regarding their demand for an immediate Cuban withdrawal. During the summer of 1982, South African officials in Washington frankly stated that they could be flexible on several issues because the United States had given them an assurance that the Cuban issues would be resolved if Namibia was to gain its independence.

The administration used its stepped-up bilateral talks with the Angolan government to assert that there was flexibility on both sides. U.S. officials have stated that "parallel" withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia with Cuban troops from Angola has been discussed and that the talks would continue. However, at the beginning of October 1982, the bilateral talks were characterized as being at their lowest ebb and a meeting between Angolan Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz on Oct. 5, 1982, failed to produce any new momentum. In early October 1982, Frank Wisner, deputy assistant secretary of state for Africa, visited Luanda but was unable to meet with Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who met with him on three previous visits. The talks were said to be deteriorating because of the U.S. insistence on a Cuban withdrawal and Angolan skepticism that the United States could guarantee against South African attacks once the Cubans were gone.

There are, of course, great pressures on Angola to agree to one of the Cuban troop withdrawal plans. Angola, more than any other neighboring country, has suffered most during the Namibia conflict because of its unwavering support for SWAPO. Since its independence in 1975, Angola has not been able to rebuild its economy largely because of South African attacks and destabilization attempts aimed at bringing down the government. At a time when economic conditions inside Angola are deteriorating, the United States has held out the promise of diplomatic recognition and bilateral economic assistance should the Cubans be withdrawn. But the U.S. has not provided the needed security guarantees.

Most observers now believe that American officials were being deliberately misleading with their sudden expressions of optimism. The statements have been criticized as an attempt to portray Angola as the uncompromising party and obstacle to independence. Observers argue that the joint U.S.-South African demand for a Cuban withdrawal is being used by South Africa to thwart implementation of the independence plan. Washington and Pretoria now place the responsibility for the failure on Luanda, while seeking to legitimize the South African occupation of southern Angola.

Other observers argue that the Cuban issue could be resolved by bringing greater pressure to bear on Angola and by giving other security assurances to South Africa regarding regional stability after Namibia's independence. In late September and early October 1982, CIA Director William Casey traveled to South Africa and held talks with the prime minister, the foreign minister, defense minister and the chief of military intelligence. The talks reportedly were intended to assess South Africa's stated security needs and to offer possible American responses or guarantees for those needs. Absent has been any consideration of Angola's legitimate security needs, contrasted with the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the illegitimacy of the Pretoria regime itself. Also ignored have been the general constraints on Angola in agreeing to this U.S.-South African demand, which infringes on Angolan sovereignty. With a marked increase in South Africa's armed attacks on Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe as well as Angola, security considerations facing the Angolan government remain severe.

Yet, South Africa's commitment to proceed with elections was not seriously demonstrated, and many observers believe that Pretoria has no such intentions whether or not the Cubans were withdrawn. It is often overlooked that for Pretoria, a Namibia

settlement has always posed two questions that have yet to be answered: Can the National Party government risk the domestic costs of a SWAPO victory in elections in Namibia? Do South Africa's military strategists believe they can better defend the white minority's rule in South Africa by conceding the war in Namibia and Angola? The available evidence suggests that neither the government nor the military believes that now is the time to settle on Namibia.

Using the American insistence on a Cuban withdrawal from Angola, South Africa now is able to block the settlement attempts by continuing to attack Angola, thereby assuring a continued Cuban presence. The Reagan administration, which initially prescribed a Namibia settlement as the necessary vehicle for closer U.S.-South Africa relations, now describes the South Africans as compromising and the Angolans as uncompromising. This characterization also masks an attempt to justify proceeding with the strengthening of bilateral ties with Pretoria though no settlement has been reached.

The failure of the negotiations is, most important, a tragedy for Namibia and its people. The destruction of life that will occur between now and the day of Namibia's independence will no doubt be viewed as the result of the Contact Group's failure to begin the implementation of Resolution 435 in 1982. Undoubtedly, the U.S. will be charged with the largest measure of responsibility.

Conclusion

"Our view is that South Africa is under no early military pressure to leave Namibia. The decision belongs to [the] South African Government, and ways must be found to address its concerns. [The] United States Government assumes Soviet-Cuban presence is one of those concerns, and we are exploring ways to remove it in context of a Namibia settlement."

—Chester Crocker
Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs
Pretoria, April 1981
Memorandum of Conversation

South Africa is spending nearly \$600 million a year on the war in Namibia. Reportedly, expenditures will be increased to \$1 billion for 1983. Formerly, it was argued that the war also was costing South Africa the possibility of a closer relationship with the United States. This view can no longer be advanced because of this high level of renewed U.S.-South Africa bilateral ties, despite the failure of the Namibia negotiations.

The basis for the Reagan administration's "constructive engagement" policy toward South Africa has been its perception of "shared strategic concerns" in the region between Washington and Pretoria. It was also founded on the belief that is easier to influence nations with which American maintains good relations and on the assumption that South Africa would acquiesce on Namibian independence as a result of this new relationship.

However, South Africa's foreign minister told a visiting U.S. Congressional delegation in August 1981 that South Africa was not likely to be wooed into accelerating the pace of a Namibia settlement because of the new U.S. policies. The foreign minister said that South Africa was not impressed that the United States had permitted South African Coast Guard personnel to be trained the U.S., upgraded the level of military representation in Pretoria and allowed the South African government to establish several honorary consulates in the United States. In essence, the Foreign Minister was explaining how keenly aware Pretoria is of Washington's limitations. He argued that these actions were motivated by a certain view of U.S. self-interest and were not concessions to South Africa. He also made clear that his government knows that anything the Reagan administration might do that is not grounded in specific legislation could be undone within days or weeks after a new administration assumed office.¹⁵

If the Reagan administration genuinely believes that a friendly approach toward South Africa can affect South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia, then the degree of naivete demonstrated by this policy is a serious cause for concern.

Another possible explanation for the United States' misleading sense of optimism regarding South Africa's intentions to settle the conflict was offered by former U.S.

Ambassador to the UN Donald McHenry. Ambassador McHenry pointed out the significance of the numerous turnovers of the Western Five's foreign ministers during the past five years of negotiations while South Africa's principal negotiators have remained the same. McHenry said, "The South Africans have a very distinct advantage in these negotiations. . . . They have an institutional memory. They know what tricks, or what paths, or what options have already been played, how long ago they have been played, and they have the advantage of knowing that their colleagues across the table do not have this knowledge."¹⁶

Other observers argued that it was a miscalculation of domestic policy factors in Angola and South Africa that allowed the U.S. to suggest that there were enough benefits to be gained for all the participants by a Namibia settlement to encourage optimism.

On the question of the U.S.-South African demand for a withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola, many observers and participants believed that the United States thought it could pressure the Angolan government to send the Cubans home through a well-crafted combination of threats and economic incentives. Facing both extreme security problems and dire economic conditions, the Luanda government initially welcomed the bilateral talks with Washington. But, as it became clear that the U.S. sought to intrude on what Angola considered an internal prerogative, the talks quickly chilled.

There exist general theories about why the State Department had taken an optimistic view regarding the possibility of an early settlement and elections in Namibia. The prevailing theory, however, suggests that for the United States the issue was not Namibia's independence at all, but rather East-West rivalry and the maintenance of South African stability and dominance in the region.

"Constructive Engagement" must then be viewed as the diplomatic curtain behind which the United States can help Pretoria provide for its long-term security and maintain the status quo. It is a way of deflecting international criticism of U.S. support for South Africa. In the case of the Namibia talks, the belief is that if the Angolan government can be blamed for the failure of the negotiations, both international criticism and the issue itself can be diffused.

In the final analysis, the Reagan administration's perception of South Africa—as a bulwark against communism, reliable producer of strategic minerals required by the U.S., protector of the Cape sea lanes, and the center of a free enterprise system encompassing the southern region of the continent in a constellation of dependent states—will lead toward counter-productive results. Such perceptions as underpinning for policy will only make U.S. interests in the region hostage to an increasingly unstable and repressive regime, and will alienate the United States government from the majority of the nations of the world.

If the United States continues to be a part of the South African strategy on Namibia, Washington will almost certainly lose all credibility with the nations of Africa as well as with the other members of the Western Contact Group who will seek to distance themselves from the U.S. to reduce their own losses in Africa. France already has become critical of the American insistence on linking the Cuban issue to a Namibian settlement. This loss of stature is likely to lessen the prospects for preventing an escalation of regional conflict in southern Africa and will make U.S. participation in conflict resolution in the region in the future undesirable to the Africans in the region and to other parties that seek a speedy resolution to the region's problems.

During the tenure of the Western-led negotiations on Namibia, the Contact Group has never threatened to impose rigorous economic sanctions against South Africa. The

lack of such pressure has likely contributed significantly to South Africa's intransigence. This opposition to sanctions against South Africa, on the part of the U.S. was seen to be invidious and hypocritical during a recent debate on the application of rigorous sanctions against Poland.

With the collapse of the negotiations, no consideration should be given to any alternative settlement plans such as an externally drafted constitution proposed earlier by the United States. UN Security Council Resolution 435 continues to provide a viable and internationally acceptable settlement plan. Achievement of Namibia's independence based on the implementation of this plan is, in its entirety, in the best interests of legitimate United States interests in the region.

Since South Africa's only remaining objection to beginning the implementation is the issue of Cubans in Angola, the United States must refuse to legitimize this objection and must withdraw its demand that the Cubans leave Angola as a part of the Namibia settlement. This is the only sensible course, particularly when there is every reason to believe that the Angolans will themselves initiate the withdrawal of Cuban troops when Namibia is independent and when the South African threat to Luanda is removed.

Once the U.S. removes this cover for South Africa's intransigence, Pretoria will be given an opportunity to fulfill its stated commitment to allow free elections in Namibia. Failing to do so, the United States should move to a firmer negotiating position by beginning a withdrawal of those "carrots" given South Africa in the spirit of "Constructive Engagement" (i.e., downgrade South Africa's military attache in Washington, reduce the number of South Africa's honorary consulates in the U.S., reimpose the foreign policy export controls that were lifted in June 1981 and February 1982 against South Africa's military and police, cease training of the South African coast guard and nuclear technicians, etc.).

Finally, should South Africa ignore even these serious signals, the United States should initiate consultations with its western allies on the application of multilateral sanctions against South Africa, including the consideration of adopting Chapter VII sanctions under the Charter of the United Nations.

A peacefully negotiated settlement, just months ago said to be near at hand, is rapidly sliding toward an escalation of the protracted and humanly costly military struggle. An administration that is disinclined to pressure the South Africans to accept an independent Namibia resulting from the implementation of Resolution 435 is likely to ensure that chances for a peaceful solution will be lost. Real commitment is absolutely necessary for the successful resolution of any international conflict. The United States must prove its commitment and demonstrate that a resolution of the Namibia conflict does not require an end to the reliance on U.S. leadership in the negotiation process.

Footnotes

Part I: Namibia

- ¹*Namibia: The Facts* (London, England: International Defence and Aid Fund, 1980) p. 1.
- ²W. Nachtwei, quoted in *Namibia: The Facts* (London, England: International Defence and Aid Fund, 1980) p. 7.
- ³*Namibia: The Facts*, op. cit., p. 8.
- ⁴*Namibia in the 1980's* (London, England: Catholic Institute for International Relations and the British Council of Churches, 1981) p. 10.
- ⁵*Ibid.*
- ⁶*Namibia: The Facts* op. cit., p. 10.
- ⁷*Namibia in the 1980's* op. cit., p. 11.
- ⁸*Ibid.*
- ⁹Allan D. Cooper, *U.S. Economic Power and Political Influence in Namibia, 1700-1982* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982) pp. 2-5.
- ¹⁰*U.S. Economic Power and Political Influence in Namibia, 1700-1928*, op. cit., pp. 20-23.
- ¹¹Allan D. Cooper, "An Overview of American Corporate Investments in Namibia." (Paper presented at the International Seminar on the Role of Transnational Corporations in Namibia, Washington, D.C. November 29 - December 2, 1982) p. 5.
- ¹²*Namibia: The Facts*, op. cit., p. 16.
- ¹³Gail Hovey, *Namibia's Stolen Wealth* (New York, New York: The Africa Fund, 1982) p. 11.
- ¹⁴*Namibia: The Facts*, op. cit., p. 20.
- ¹⁵J. H. Mensah, "Review of the Economic Conditions in Namibia and South Africa." United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, TD/B/869, August 26, 1981, p. 9.
- ¹⁶Elizabeth S. Landis, *Namibian Liberation: Self-Determination, Law and Politics* (New York, New York: Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa, 1982) p. 8.
- ¹⁷*Namibia in the 1980's*, op. cit., p. 31.
- ¹⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.
- ¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 32.
- ²⁰Gillian and Suzanne Cronje, *The Workers of Namibia* (London, England: International Defence and Aid Fund, 1979) p. 76.
- ²¹*Namibia: The Facts*, op. cit., p. 23.
- ²²*Ibid.*, p. 24.
- ²³*Ibid.*, p. 44.
- ²⁴*Ibid.*
- ²⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.
- ²⁶*Ibid.*
- ²⁷*Namibia, A Unique Responsibility* (New York, New York: United Nations Department of Public Information/631, undated) p. 15.
- ²⁸*Namibian Liberation: Self-Determination, Law and Politics*, op. cit., p. 7.
- ²⁹*Namibia: The Facts*, op. cit., p. 46.
- ³⁰*Windhoek Advertiser*, July 26, 1979.
- ³¹*Rand Daily Mail*, July 25, 1979.
- ³²*U.S. Policy Toward Namibia: Spring 1981* (GPO Washington, DC: House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, July 17, 1981) p. 24.
- ³³*Namibia: The Facts*, op. cit., p. 50.
- ³⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.
- ³⁵*Namibia in the 1980's*, op. cit., p. 39.
- ³⁶*Ibid.*

³⁷Ibid., p. 43.

³⁸*Namibia: The Facts*, op. cit., p. 54.

³⁹Ibid., p. 58.

Part II: The Negotiations

¹*Namibian Liberation: Self-Determination, Law and Politics*, op. cit., p. 11.

²*U.S. Policy Toward Namibia: Spring 1981*, op. cit., p. 23.

³*Namibia in the 1980's*, op. cit., p. 19.

⁴*Namibian Liberation: Self-Determination, Law and Politics*, op. cit., p. 5.

⁵*Namibia: The Facts*, op. cit., pp. 60-61.

⁶Ibid., p. 61.

⁷*Proposal for a Settlement of the Namibian Situation* (Letter from the representatives of Canada, France, West Germany, Britain and the United States, April 10, 1978).

⁸*Remember Kassinga* (London, England: International Defence and Aid Fund, July 1981) p. 31.

⁹*Namibian Liberation: Self-Determination, Law and Politics*, op. cit., p. 7.

¹⁰CBS News Program, Walter Cronkite interviews President Reagan, March 3, 1981.

¹¹"Memorandum of Conversation" (U.S. Department of State document restating discussion in Pretoria between South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha, South African Defense Minister Magnus Malan, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Chester Crocker, and Alan Keyes, April 15-16, 1981)

¹²"Scope Paper" (Memorandum from Chester Crocker to Secretary of State Alexander Haig, in preparation of Haig's May 14, 1981 meeting with Roelof Botha.)

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa Memorandum on "Changes in U.S. Policy Since the Beginning of Constructive Engagement." July 1982.

¹⁵*Africa: Observations on the Impact of American Foreign Policy and Development Programs in Six African Countries* (GPO Washington, D.C.: Report of a Congressional Study Mission to South Africa and Five other African Countries, August 4-22, 1981. Submitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, June 1982) p. 18.

¹⁶*U.S. Policy Toward Namibia: Spring 1981*, op. cit., p. 21.