



## **South Africa: Change and Confrontation, Report of a Study Mission to South Africa**

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COMMITTEE PRINT

# **SOUTH AFRICA: CHANGE AND CONFRONTATION**

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**R E P O R T**

OF A

**STUDY MISSION TO SOUTH AFRICA**

**JULY 3-11, 1980**

TO THE

**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

**U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**



Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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## FOREWORD

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
*Washington, D.C.*

This report has been submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs by Hon. Stephen J. Solarz, chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa, and Hon. Benjamin S. Rosenthal of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, who conducted a study mission to South Africa from July 3 to 11, 1980.

The findings in this report are those of Representatives Solarz and Rosenthal and do not necessarily reflect the views of the membership of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, *Chairman.*

## LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

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CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
*Washington, D.C.*

HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,  
*Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,  
House of Representatives,  
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Since the National Party assumed power in South Africa in 1948, that country has adopted a unique national policy of racial segregation called apartheid. The continuation of this policy of constitutionally sanctioned discrimination over three decades has become an increasing source of concern in both Africa and the United States.

In the United States, religious groups, student organizations, labor unions, and private foundations have all urged the United States Government to reexamine American policy toward South Africa. And in the Congress, a number of Members have introduced legislation restricting American cooperation and trade with South Africa until that country changes its existing racial laws. Absent any movement by the South Africa Government to alter its domestic policy, pressure in this country will continue to mount for the institution of new policies toward that country.

In order to get a better understanding of South Africa's policies and to reexamine existing United States policy toward South Africa, we took a 9-day study mission to South Africa to assess firsthand what changes have taken place there and to determine what types of new initiatives—if any—the United States might pursue toward that country.

We hope this report will lead to a better understanding of recent developments in South Africa and suggest a few alternatives in our current posture toward that nation.

The views expressed in this report reflect the views of the study mission and not that of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

STEPHEN J. SOLARZ,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa.*

BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL,  
*Member, Committee on Foreign Affairs.*

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## INTRODUCTION

During the 1970's, U.S. and other Western Officials concerned with African issues focused their attention primarily on political and social developments in Namibia, Zimbabwe, and the former Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique. In the process, political developments in South Africa were frequently overshadowed and often neglected. Now, as we enter the 1980's with Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe independent and negotiations to resolve the Namibia conflict well underway, the attention of the international community has properly begun to shift toward South Africa.

South Africa's system of apartheid has been a serious concern ever since it was established over three decades ago. Since the Afrikaner-dominated National Party took power in 1948, South Africa's internal policies have edged that country closer and closer to a major racial conflagration. Institutionalized and constitutionally sanctioned racial discrimination has systematically denied South Africa's overwhelmingly black population their patrimony and relegated them to a legal status which makes them permanent sojourners and strangers in their own land. In recent years, more and more blacks have come to the conclusion that they have failed to improve their lot in any meaningful way through peaceful means. Protests, labor strife, and violence have consequently flared throughout the country on a recurring basis. The Government has reacted with a combination of tentative reforms and stern measures, including the arrest, detention, and banning of scores of black leaders and organizations. These actions have further embittered the black community and soured race relations between the country's 4 million whites and 20 million blacks, Coloureds, and Asians.

As black anger and resentment toward the system has risen inside the country, it has also risen outside. It is fair to say today that South Africa's system of racial injustice is a source of deep concern throughout Africa, and that most African leaders regard the political situation there as the continent's most explosive and pressing political problem. Because of South Africa's apparent unwillingness to grant blacks any genuine political rights, African leaders believe that South Africa's black population will soon abandon any hopes they still harbor for peaceful change and will turn increasingly toward violence and guerilla warfare. If this occurs, many observers believe that the conflict will not be contained within South Africa, but will probably spread in one form or another to Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. Under such circumstances, the prospects for regional instability and outside involvement will be considerably increased.

What ultimately happens in South Africa is also of deep concern to the United States. First, the prospects for regional instability, racial conflict and outside involvement make it a potential area of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. Should outside forces become involved in resolving the problems of South Africa, the United States might be reluctantly drawn in. Second, because of the large



number of black Americans in this country, increasing racial tensions in South Africa could have a dramatic impact on race relations in the United States. And third, the United States would like to be in a position to maintain its access to South African minerals. Although the United States is not totally dependent on any of these minerals, an abrupt cutoff or prolonged interruption of raw materials from South Africa might cause some temporary problems in the United States.

In an effort to gain a deeper understanding of developments in South Africa, especially in the aftermath of both Zimbabwe's recent and successful transition to independence, and the internal reforms which have taken place in South Africa, we undertook an 8-day visit to South Africa. The trip lasted from July 3 to July 11, and was intended to be both comprehensive and thorough.

During our stay in South Africa, we made every effort to expose ourselves to the broadest range of opinion and to visit black, white, and Coloured leaders in their own homes and communities. As a result, we held lengthy discussions with academics, senior Government officials, majority and opposition parliamentarians, and American, Afrikaner and black businessmen in Johannesburg and Pretoria; talked with black leaders in Soweto, including Dr. Nthatho Motlana, chairman of the Committee of Ten; spent the night in Soweto as guests in the home of a widely respected African family; held discussions with Coloured leaders and students in Capetown; conferred with academics, businessmen and Afrikaner students at Stellenbosch University; visited Afrikaner farmers and National Party parliamentarians at Warmbaths, where we were the overnight guests of an Afrikaner family; met with black homeland leaders in Johannesburg; met with the Central Committee of Inkatha, including Chief Buthelezi at Ulundi, the capital of KwaZulu; and spoke with New Republic Party officials, white English-speaking businessmen and black community representatives in Durban. The study mission also received several comprehensive Embassy briefings, visited a Pass Court near Cape Town, met with Jewish leaders in Johannesburg, and conferred with a number of foreign diplomats.

We are extremely indebted to all those with whom we spoke. Without exception, they shared with us in an open and candid manner their views on the complexities and challenges facing South Africa today.

Although we were able to meet with Foreign Minister Pik Botha, then-Minister of Coloured Affairs Marais Steyn, and several other senior Government officials, we regret that we did not have the opportunity to meet with four of the country's most important leaders—Prime Minister P. W. Botha; Minister of Co-operation and Development P. J. Koornhof; Minister of Public Works Andries Treurnicht; and Dr. Van Zyl Slabbert, leader of the parliamentary opposition. While we recognize this was not the most opportune time to visit South Africa inasmuch as Parliament was not in session, we still think it is most unfortunate that we were unable to meet with these four men, all of whom will have great influence and impact on shaping South Africa's policies in the immediate future.

We were accompanied on this study mission by Mr. Johnnie Carson, staff director of the Subcommittee on Africa; and Mr. Steve Wiessman, a staff associate of the subcommittee.

## CHANGE: REAL OR COSMETIC

Since Prime Minister P. W. Botha assumed power in September 1978, the South African Government has given the impression that change is not only necessary but desirable, and that it is committed to major modifications in the fabric of South African society and the way blacks and whites relate to one another. Although black and white South Africans of all political persuasions have differed about how far reaching and substantive these changes are, there is no doubt that the modifications have been wide ranging and unparalleled in South African history. They have also stirred up a great deal of debate within the white community and aroused unprecedented expectations among the black political elite.

Shortly after taking office, Prime Minister Botha appointed two of South Africa's most liberal Afrikaner politicians to important cabinet posts dealing with black affairs—P. J. Koornhof as Minister of Co-operation and Development (formerly the Ministry of Bantu Affairs) and Punt Janson as Minister of Education and Training. He also appointed John Knoetze, a "verligte," or more enlightened Afrikaner, as Chairman of the West Rand Administration Board, the government body which oversees Soweto, South Africa's largest black township.

These appointments were soon followed by visits to the independent homelands and the first trip ever by a South African Prime Minister to Soweto. It was during his brief visit to Soweto that Botha—in front of an assembled black audience—said that "we are all South Africans," giving the impression to many inside and outside South Africa that blacks—who have long been denied basic human rights in South Africa—would be given an opportunity to participate more broadly in South African society.

Under Prime Minister Botha's leadership, some reforms have been initiated in four areas: Labor legislation, influx control, urban areas, and political participation. During our stay, we made a serious effort to determine exactly how genuine these reforms really were, and how the blacks, who are supposed to be the principal beneficiaries of these changes, regarded them. For it was clear to us that if the changes were not perceived as being genuine by the black community, they would not achieve the government's objective of reducing black protests and assuring the future stability and security of South Africa.

### LABOR REFORM

The changes undertaken by the Botha government have affected many aspects of South African life but none have attracted as much international attention as the reforms in the field of labor. Since South Africa's emergence as an industrialized state shortly after the turn of the century, black workers have been denied any status under the law and black unions have been barred from participating—with

white unions—in negotiating wage agreements and conditions of employment. In fact, South Africa labor law simply did not recognize black trade unions. However, in an effort to stem black labor protest and to bring black and white workers under the same regulations, the Government established a commission, headed by Prof. Nick Wiehahn of Pretoria University, to suggest reforms in the country's labor laws. With the publication of the first sections of the Wiehahn Commission report, and the subsequent enactment into law of several of its key recommendations, black trade unions have been given the right to apply for official recognition and to bargain collectively on behalf of workers. Job reservations which officially excluded blacks from some 25 different categories of work have been all but abolished. The two exceptions are supervisors in the mining industry and municipal workers in the Cape Province. With this recognition has come the right to receive official checkoff privileges for union dues, access to industrial conciliation courts and the right to call legal strikes.<sup>1</sup>

Although many blacks have applauded the Wiehahn report and the introduction of the new labor legislation, they have been quick to point out that the Government, in extending trade union rights and privileges to blacks, was attempting to establish greater control over black trade union activity.

For some time the Government has been increasingly concerned about black labor unrest and the growing number of illegal wildcat strikes. The new labor legislation, blacks insist, is a way of bringing black labor unions and their leaders under tighter government control. As a result of the Wiehahn legislation, black unions can apply for official recognition from the Government. However, once they are registered and officially recognized by the Government they are required to file detailed reports to the Government on their membership, finances, and labor union activities.

In addition, these unions are prohibited from engaging in political activity and subject to the provisions of the 1976 Fund Raising Act which precludes them from receiving outside assistance from international labor unions. Any violation of South Africa labor law could result in fines and censure of the unions and their officials.

Many black union leaders with whom we spoke said that it is not altogether clear whether the South African Government will allow genuine black trade unions—such as those associated with the Federation of South African Trade Unions or the Council of Unions of South Africa—to register and take advantage of the new reforms. Although a number of these black unions have applied for registration since the implementation of the reforms, none have been certified for registration. Instead the Government has registered black trade unions previously affiliated with white unions or new parallel unions created by white counterpart unions to keep independent black trade unions from getting a foothold in particular industries.

Black union leaders also noted that Wiehahn's reforms do not address discrimination and unionization among black mineworkers.

<sup>1</sup> Originally, Professor Wiehahn recommended that black workers from the independent homelands be excluded from participating in organized black unions. Following a great deal of criticism from blacks inside the country and international organizations outside of South Africa, the Government amended its new law to permit black workers from the homelands to join black trade unions. Had black workers from the homelands been excluded from joining the newly legalized unions, it is estimated nearly 50 percent of the black work force in South Africa would have been denied the right to join black unions.

Outside of the agricultural sector, mines employ the largest single category of black workers in South Africa. Black mineworkers have not been allowed to establish legal unions or to bargain for wages. Nor have job reservations which exclude blacks from the best mining jobs been abolished. Although black unions have been recognized and allowed to engage in collective bargaining for the first time, it remains to be seen what impact these new changes will have on labor relations in South Africa.

### INFLUX CONTROL

A second area of change has centered on the pass law system which is regarded by most blacks as the most oppressive and dehumanizing aspect of living in South Africa. Under the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act and the Group Areas Amendment Act, nearly every movement and facet in the life of a black South African is rigidly and strictly regulated. Together, these laws define which blacks can reside in white areas and under what conditions.

On numerous occasions black leaders told us that abiding by these laws has caused untold suffering and human misery in South Africa's black community. Families have been permanently separated, with husbands working in urban areas and wives and children living in the homelands. Orphaned children and widowed spouses, who have no claim in their own right to be in the urban area, have been deported from white areas into their homelands, places in some instances which they have never seen. And black jobseekers who have not received proper documentation have been arrested, fined, and then bundled off to their original places of residence.

The extent to which black South Africans suffer for violating these onerous pass laws is graphically illustrated in the Government's own statistics. During the past decade, the Government pass law courts have handled an average of over 210,000 cases a year. In conjunction with its efforts to bring about overall reforms in the policy toward Africans residing in urban areas, the Government has begun to reexamine its influx control policy.

### URBAN AREAS

Apartheid, as practiced by the National Party, has always regarded blacks as temporary sojourners in the 86 percent of South Africa that is by law set aside for whites. Blacks were to have no legal rights or permanent status in those areas. Blacks were in the urban areas out of economic necessity to perform jobs and tasks for which there was insufficient white labor. This principle was so much an element of National Party policy that, in the 1960's, former Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd frequently boasted that by 1980 white South Africa would indeed be all white.

To attack the pass law and influx control problems, the Government established another commission, chaired by P. J. Reikert. Reikert proposed that the black worker (and his family) living in the white urban areas should no longer be regarded as merely a temporary sojourner in white South Africa but as a permanent resident in the black townships. In addition, Reikert proposed that the criteria for all black residents in white areas "should be the availability of housing and bona fide employment," thus allowing families to come into urban

areas with their spouses, provided there was adequate housing for both worker and family. It also shifted the onus of violating the law away from the illegally employed black worker to his employer, who became liable for a 550 rand fine for employing a black worker without proper documentation.

Most blacks with whom we met spoke disparagingly of the changes in influx control procedures. Although they acknowledged some minor benefits which might accrue to a few blacks, they noted that the new procedures did not alter the most egregious parts of the system. Blacks still had to carry passbooks; they could not be in a white area beyond 72 hours without facing arrest; and they still could not move about the country freely to live with their families or sell their labor on the open market. If Reikert had accomplished anything, it now made whites who employed illegally documented black workers as liable to the penalties of law as blacks.

To reverse over two decades of nationalist policy and to give some meaning to pronouncements that urban blacks are more than just guest workers in urban areas, the Government in 1979 announced with much fanfare that blacks with a legal right to reside in an urban area could now purchase 99-year leaseholds on the homes they occupied in the black townships. Previously, black homeownership and purchase rights were limited exclusively to the 13 percent of the land allocated to Africans under the 1936 Land Tenure Act. Following the Government's decision, some National Party officials quietly asserted that the Government would soon make additional concessions and that some urban blacks would soon be permitted to purchase the land on which their houses were located. As welcome as such a change appears to be, the fact that fewer than 150 leases have been granted is an indication of the limited value of this change. Moreover, as long as black South Africans face serious difficulties in securing loans and mortgages to purchase their homes, little change can be expected.

To go along with its new orientation toward urban blacks, the Government has renewed its commitment to increase government resources and social services in urban townships and to accelerate its long-stalled effort to electrify Soweto and provide its burgeoning population of over 2 million with indoor plumbing.

The Government has also relaxed its policies with respect to black-run businesses in white cities. Formerly barred from operating shops and commercial enterprises, Botha's government has quietly agreed to allow blacks to open and operate shops in some exclusively white downtown urban areas such as Johannesburg. Restrictions on commercial developments have also been relaxed in the black townships, and Africans have been encouraged to enlarge their fledgling businesses in those areas.

#### POLITICAL CHANGES

The area in which the Government has moved with the greatest hesitancy and deliberation is in the area of political reform. Although black nationalists have long regarded the need for a new political dispensation as the sine qua non of genuine reform in South Africa, the South African Government has only recently begun to think along these lines. Even so, the political changes which the South African Government has embarked upon are not the ones favored and sought by black leaders.

The Government has sought to bring about political reform through the establishment of a President's Council. An outgrowth of a government commission headed by then Justice and Interior Minister Alwyn Schlebusch, the President's Council will be charged with looking into the creation of a new constitution and devising a new political dispensation to govern whites, blacks, and Coloureds. Although the responsibilities of the President's Council remain unclear, government and party leaders insist that no limitation will be placed on the type of constitutional proposals to be discussed and debated.

Under legislation passed by the South African Parliament in June 1980, the President's Council will consist of 60 members drawn from white, Coloured, and Asian leaders who are "nationally acknowledged experts in their respective disciplines and recognized by their respective communities as leaders." The Chairman of the President's Council will be South Africa's Vice President—a new position created by the legislation—and the Council will report to the state President.

Although the Council will have no limits set on its work, it will not have any statutory or legislative authority. Its role will be advisory and consultative only. Its advice can be rejected or accepted as the current Government sees fit.

Despite the fact that the Government justified this new Council as a vehicle for bringing about a new political dispensation for all of South Africa's different racial and ethnic groups, blacks have been relegated to a secondary role.

In a manner reminiscent of other South African legislation, blacks have not been included on the President's Council itself. To accommodate black interests and ideas, a black advisory council will be created to confer, on an ad hoc basis, with the President's Council on issues relating to the African community. The President's Council and the black advisory council members would meet in joint committee sessions to discuss issues affecting Africans.

Although the Government's legislation creating the President's Council moved quickly through Parliament, it has not won broad acceptance in either the Coloured or the black communities.<sup>2</sup> On the basis of our discussions, it was clear that the Government's expectation that Coloureds and blacks would accept membership on the President's Council were completely unfounded. Thus far no Coloured,<sup>3</sup> Asian, or black leader—in either the urban areas or in the not yet independent homelands—has stated that he would accept an appointment to either the President's Council or its black adjunct institution.

Blacks and Coloureds have all voiced the same concerns about the council concept. First, while it is a useful forum for discussion, it lacks any real power. It is a consultative and advisory body with no legislative or statutory authority. As one black leader told us, power to change the system will still reside in the hands of South Africa's National Party which controls 85 percent of the seats in the Parliament. Second, the South African Government has the authority to select the members of the President's Council and the black advisory group. Neither blacks, Asians, nor Coloureds will have any say in who

<sup>2</sup> Since the completion of this report, the South African Government has formally dropped its plans to establish a black advisory council because of the negative reaction of black leaders. Blacks will still not be included on the President's Council.

<sup>3</sup> The President's Council has now been established. Several Coloured leaders have agreed to sit on the Council. However, with the exception of Mr. Sony Leon, none of the Coloured leaders are considered leaders with any significant standing or support in their community.

their leaders are or in how they will be selected. When the South African Government selects members for the Council and the black advisory group, they can stack the bodies with leaders and officials who do not represent the real views of their respective communities.

In addition, blacks have criticized the proposals for excluding them from the main deliberative body. Many blacks allege this reflects the Government's refusal to recognize that the political, economic, and social status of black Africans is the key question facing South Africa. And, if the South African Government is not going to concede this point in the establishment of the President's Council, they believe it is unlikely to show good faith once the body is formed and begins its work.

Key leaders of other racial groups with whom we spoke also stressed that the President's Council was unacceptable to them because blacks were excluded from participating in the Council's deliberations on an equal basis with other South African ethnic groups. They stated that the time had come for blacks to be accepted and recognized by the South African Government on an equal footing with whites.

## BLACK AND WHITE ATTITUDES

The changes which have been undertaken have been viewed differently by South Africa's different racial groups. In general, it was our impression that most whites with whom we spoke regarded the Wiehahn Commission reforms on labor, the Riekert Commission changes on influx control, and the establishment of the President's Council as major developments giving blacks significant new rights that could possibly pave the way for additional changes. Most blacks, on the other hand, regarded all these changes as relatively meaningless gestures that have done little to advance their social, economic, and political interests. Moreover, in some instances blacks argued that the changes had actually set them back. Most Coloureds also dismissed the Government's reforms as too little, too late.

In order to bring into sharp focus the contrasts and differences in South Africa's diverse ethnic communities and to get a better understanding of the attitudes toward change among white and nonwhite leaders, we spoke to key leaders in the white, black, and Coloured communities throughout the country.

### WHITE ATTITUDES

The key to change in South Africa has always been white attitudes and perceptions. During the past 4 years events have played a major role in persuading whites of the need for at least limited change. The Soweto riots of 1976, the black and Coloured school boycotts, the sporadic acts of urban and rural terrorism, cyclical labor unrest, rising black employment in urban areas, and unabated black migration into the townships have all convinced a growing number of white leaders that apartheid, and the elaborate legal and administrative mechanism which keeps it running, is not working properly and that some type of change in South Africa's current system is required.

Even though the need for some change has become apparent, there is no consensus in the white community as to what changes should be made. Among the white political leaders we met, we found a range of views from those who favored only minor changes in the system to those who were prepared to permit blacks significant political power, provided whites were able to maintain a veto over unacceptable Government decisions.

### VERLIGTES-MODERATES

Those whites in the Afrikaner community advocating the greatest changes within the system have been identified as "verligte," an Afrikaans word meaning enlightened or moderate. Within the National Party and the Government, Prime Minister P. W. Botha has been the strongest advocate for change. In many respects, Prime Minister Botha has made this the work of his administration.



On repeated occasions since taking power, the Prime Minister has warned white South Africans that they now confront the most serious challenge that their country has ever faced, that the nation can no longer pursue old policies in a timeless fashion, and that they must "adapt or die." He has also told whites that it is unrealistic to think of blacks and Coloureds in South Africa as temporary visitors and workers and that Africans must be given—within the context of separate development—a new deal.

Within the Government, the Prime Minister's calls for change have been supported by a group of articulate Ministers led by P. K. Koornhof, Minister for Cooperation; Alwyn Schlebusch, Minister of Interior; and others. Other key supporters have come out of the Defense Ministry and the army, which has become increasingly concerned about the need to reduce the country's internal security threats by gaining the loyalty of the country's urban black population. These two groups have been joined by an increasingly influential and powerful group of young urbanized Afrikaner professionals and oldline businessmen. Concerned about the shortfall in white skilled labor and the need to foster South Africa's economic growth, businessmen have endorsed the reforms as a way of protecting both their own financial interests and continued economic growth in South Africa.

Despite the implementation of a number of reforms, the Afrikaner moderates inside and outside of the Government do not seem to have a set strategy or clear plan of action to bring about reforms. Although many reforms have been instituted, they have been administrative reforms, reforms which have modified the facade of the system without altering its purpose or foundation. With the exception of the labor reforms, most of the other significant reforms—elimination of segregated sports, the opening of selected hotels and restaurants to people of all races and the elimination of job reservations based on ethnic background—have been carried out by giving Cabinet Ministers the right to make exemptions, not by discarding any laws or changing the Government's basic discriminatory legislation.

Outside of the Afrikaner community, a variety of predominantly English-speaking political parties and interests have supported the Government's reformist tendencies and, in some instances, encouraged it to go further. Principal among these have been the Progressive Party and the New Republic Party, the country's two major opposition political parties.

The New Republic Party, based in Natal and composed mostly of English-speaking whites, has gone about as far as any white political party in South Africa in laying out a comprehensive strategy for a new multiracial society in South Africa. The centerpiece of its strategy is a new nondiscriminatory federal constitution which recognizes the right of all races to live in South Africa and which decentralizes the current Government's power by allowing whites, blacks, and Coloureds to govern themselves in their own areas through locally elected municipal authorities. These local authorities would have the final word over such matters as residential segregation, influx control, educational standards, and a variety of municipal services. All of these autonomous city states and regional authorities would, in turn, be represented in a Federal legislature responsible for national issues.

To prevent one group from imposing its will over others, decisions would be reached on a consensus basis, with a minority veto capable of blocking any legislative action.

Under the New Republic Party strategy, the homelands policy would be modified, registration and classification of races by ethnic groupings would be severely curtailed, urban blacks would be allowed to participate fully in the new Federal system within their autonomous local units, and all forms of "petty" discrimination would be terminated. To accommodate the three independent homelands (Bophuthatswana, Transkei, and Venda), a con-federal government would be established in which all these entities would be allowed to join.

Although the ideas enunciated by the New Republic Party might constitute an interim step toward a more acceptable political dispensation, they would never get through the existing National Party-dominated Parliament. With only 10 representatives—out of 165—in the Parliament, its views and ideas carry little weight in either Cape Town or Pretoria. Moreover, even if they were enacted, they would fall far short of what blacks would regard as a fair and equitable political accommodation. Furthermore, it was quite clear from our discussions with black leaders that any solution imposed on blacks by whites is doomed to failure. The only one which will work is one that is hammered out by all the people of South Africa.

The Progressive Federal Party (PFP), long regarded as the conscience of racial justice in South Africa, stands as the official opposition in the South Africa Parliament. Although critical of Prime Minister Botha and the verligtes for not moving fast enough to eliminate racial discrimination and to implement genuine reforms, most Progressives also remain fearful of being overwhelmed by blacks and thus do not advocate the kind of political realignment that most black urban leaders want. Progressives talk about a need for a new constitution in which everyone in South Africa is given full rights as a citizen and in which there is genuine power sharing among racial groups. Under such a system, the homelands policy would be scrapped and blacks would be allowed to vote and be represented in a new broad-based national government. However, blacks would not be allowed to dominate a new government. Whites would be permanently protected by a minority veto and other special constitutional arrangements. And in certain areas of the country they would retain dominant control.

A few PFP members go further than their party. One such person is Helen Suzman, the best known and most highly regarded opposition Parliamentarian in South Africa and, perhaps, the world. Recognizing that urban blacks will not be forever bought off with half measures, a small number of PFP members like Suzman advocate immediate and genuine consultation with black leaders leading to a new political dispensation which includes one man, one vote in a federal state. However, even among English-speaking liberals, this solution to South Africa's problems is regarded as radical and clearly out of step with what the most progressive elements in the white community might be willing to accept today.

Virtually all verligtes, whether they are Afrikaners or English, members of the Government or the public generally, share one thing in

common. They do not support the immediate creation of a one-man, one-vote political system in a unitary state. While they recognize the need to undertake some type of political reforms, they are not prepared to make the kinds of modifications in the system which will win the support of blacks. Nevertheless, it is possible that the kinds of gradualist changes which are supported by the *verligtes* could—if intensified and drastically speeded up—serve as the basis for an interim dispensation for blacks in the future, one that could be expanded upon in later years. To be fully accepted by black South Africans, however, these changes will have to be perceived as genuine steps toward a truly multiracial society and not as an end in themselves.

#### VERKRAMPTE

Those who are totally opposed to any change in South Africa have usually been identified as “*verkrampes*” or hardliners. Following the philosophy outlined by former Prime Minister H. F. Verwoerd, they remain committed to the need for ethnic purity and racial segregation. In their view, separate development should be pursued vigorously in order to avoid conflicts between blacks and whites; and if urban blacks wish to exercise their political rights they should do so in the homelands. Blacks living and working in the urban areas should be treated as guest workers—just as foreign workers are in Europe—and when they are no longer needed should be required to return to their homelands.

While more sophisticated *verkrampes* argue that separate development allows each ethnic group to express itself according to its own cultural, social, and political traditions, for many, particularly older and rural Afrikaners, this rhetoric is only a thin veneer covering a very deeply rooted racism. For this group, all blacks are seen as inherently inferior, backward, and tribally oriented individuals who will never be able to effectively govern themselves—let alone whites. To buttress this argument, they point to the civil strife which has erupted following the independence of such countries as Nigeria, Zaire, Burundi, and the Sudan. Left out of their world view, however, are such African success stories as the Ivory Coast and Kenya, where there are as many or more whites at present as there were before independence and where the whites who remain are generally doing quite well.

Five or six different groups (the Dutch Reformed Church, the South African Broederbond, elements of the National Party, and the South African Civil Service) give sustenance and strength to the *verkrampte* cause. However, in recent years the two strongest bulwarks of separate development have been the conservative wing of the National Party and the Government bureaucracy.

#### NATIONAL PARTY VERKRAMPTE

At the center of the opposition against any change is Dr. Andres Treurnicht, Minister of Public Works, Statistics and Tourism. In many ways, Treurnicht epitomizes the hardline *verkrampte* attitude. A former Dutch Reformed Church clergyman, Treurnicht has written several books on Afrikaner religious philosophy which outline

the tough Calvinistic fundamentalism which is the basis of much of the thinking and ideology of separate development.

According to Afrikaners with whom we spoke, Treurnicht has made no secret of his opposition to Prime Minister Botha's liberal statements and modest moves away from total segregation. For Treurnicht, separate development is theologically ordained, and any movement away from it will only bring South Africa's different ethnic groups into open racial conflict and disharmony. Not surprisingly, Treurnicht has opposed virtually every modification the Government has made in its racial policies during the last 2 years, particularly the Government's multiracial sports policy and new labor legislation.

He has also been critical of calls for a new political dispensation for blacks, and has generally dismissed ideas for a con-federal system as not applicable to South Africa. Although he has reluctantly gone along with the Government's plans to establish a President's Council, he is known to oppose any efforts by verligte members of the Government to broaden the Council to include blacks along with other nonwhites.

As National Party leader in the Transvaal, Treurnicht commands a large political following. Nearly one-half of the National Party caucus is from the Transvaal, and most can be counted upon to follow Treurnicht's conservative lead. In any showdown with Botha and the verligtes, a majority would probably follow Treurnicht.

If public attitudes are any indication, Treurnicht's beliefs enjoy considerable support in the white community. In our conversations with South Africa's leading public opinion analysts, Prof. Lawrence Schlemmer of the University of Natal, he said that his recent surveys confirmed that a majority of whites in South Africa regard blacks as inherently inferior and do not favor any significant political concessions to them. More importantly, Schlemmer's survey also indicated that among South Africa's dominant Afrikaner community 72 percent still support the Immorality Act; 81 percent object to blacks sharing the same recreational facilities; and 82 percent oppose mixed residential areas. (In almost every instance, English-speaking whites were far more willing to accept these changes.)

#### THE CIVIL SERVICE

The other bulwark against change is the civil service. The South African civil service has a vested interest in the institutions which have been devised to run the country's system of apartheid, and resistance to change among most Afrikaner civil servants and bureaucrats runs very high. Because of their importance in administering the program of separate development and their voting strength within the National Party, their overall importance cannot be underestimated.

According to the South African Institute of Race Relations, there are no less than 353 specific acts of Parliament and some 2,000 other laws and regulations governing virtually every aspect in the daily life of a black South African. Responsibility for administering these regulations has led, over time, to the creation of scores of different departments, bureaus, and agencies to handle nonwhite affairs.

To staff these Government agencies and to administer the country's apartheid legislation, successive South African Prime Ministers since

1948 have employed hundreds of Afrikaners who are politically committed to the National Party and its ideology of separate development. Many of these employees and their families are party activists, people who attend local party meetings, deliver party materials and ring the doorbells to get the vote out at elections. This has given these civil servants a disproportionate influence in the party.

To get some idea of the strength and influence of this group, it is worth noting that 40 percent of the Afrikaner community is employed in the public sector. Eighty percent of the country's civil servants are Afrikaners, and over 50 percent of these Afrikaners administer programs governing black life in South Africa. With so many Afrikaner civil servants actively employed in controlling and regulating black affairs, the Government would be hard pressed to undertake a program of reform which would probably result in the dismissal of so many Government employees, many of whom are also political stalwarts.

One of South Africa's leading Afrikaner scholars, Herman Gillomee, with whom we spoke, summed up the critical importance of the Afrikaner civil servants: The apartheid bureaucracy is staffed mainly by men dedicated to the ideology of separate development. And they form the resident opposition within the National Party to any attempts at reform of the Verwoerdian blueprint.

Although there are major elements within the Nationalist Party who are supportive of change and some who would even favor far-reaching changes, including giving blacks political power in their own areas within South Africa, any efforts to push this through the Nationalist Party caucus would engender fierce opposition. And given the widespread fear of a split in the Nationalist Party, the verligtes are reduced to seeking incremental changes which may constitute progress to them but which are regarded by most blacks as representing little or no change at all.

#### BLACK ATTITUDES

Blacks who are politicized and involved in South African politics can generally be divided into three categories: Urban black leaders, rural leaders of homelands that are not independent, and leaders of independent homelands. Although the views of these leaders differ sharply on many issues affecting relations between the black community and the South African Government, their views—irrespective of their political philosophies, geographic locations, or administrative associations with the Pretoria Government—on the need for change are the same: They all favor more fundamental changes in South Africa's system of apartheid.

There is also a universal feeling among black leaders that Prime Minister Botha has failed to live up to his early promises about initiating extensive reforms in South Africa's system of apartheid. In the first several months after assuming office Botha made numerous statements indicating that he would make significant changes in the structure of his country's race relations and that some of the fundamental laws underpinning apartheid would be scrapped during the next parliamentary session. Although many blacks genuinely thought major changes were imminent, nothing happened. With the exception

of the labor reforms, the parliamentary session opened and closed without the Prime Minister or his party repealing or modifying any of the country's racial legislation. His inaction has affected black attitudes throughout South Africa, especially among urban Africans.

#### URBAN BLACKS

Urban black leaders are at the forefront of the effort to bring about change in South Africa. Clearly, they constitute the most consistently vocal and articulate opposition to the Government's policies of separate development. And they dismiss the recent reforms undertaken by Prime Minister Botha's government as superficial and meaningless. In their view, these reforms are designed to modernize the face of apartheid in order to give it a more acceptable image abroad and to meet changing economic realities at home.

Black urban leaders with whom we talked had a clear vision of the types of change they wish to see in South Africa. First, they want a totally new political dispensation. They want to participate fully and at every level in the political processes of the country. They want the right to vote in all local and national elections and to be able to elect members to representative Government bodies. Second, they want some say in how the resources and economic wealth are divided among all the people who live in South Africa. And last, they want a complete end to South Africa's system of apartheid. This includes the elimination of the Group Areas Act, the Influx Control Laws, the Mixed Marriages Act and all of the security and terrorism statutes which are designed to curb black political activity. Most blacks and Coloureds with whom we spoke said that any changes which do not address these three fundamental issues are irrelevant and meaningless since they would not be addressing the problem of black powerlessness.

While most black leaders would like to see these aspirations realized in a unitary state under a constitution based on the principle of one man, one vote, it is quite possible that they would accept some type of federal system which gave them significant political influence but not absolute power and control. Such a system might include a plan which provides for a weak central government, controlling matters related to defense, foreign affairs, natural resources, roads and the national budget, and strong local government units, controlling housing, education, health care and other municipal services. Based on our conversations, there is no indication that anyone with real power and influence in the white political establishment is prepared to enter into meaningful discussions with black urban leaders on any of these three fundamental issues.

Even though black urban leaders hold out little hope for any immediate changes in the system, they would regard some significant modification in the homeland system as a signal of a change in South Africa's overall policies. Black urban leaders abhor the homelands policy. They see it as the cornerstone of apartheid and as a way to balkanize and permanently divide South Africa's majority black population. Members of the Soweto Committee of Ten, a group of leaders from 10 organizations in South Africa's largest urban township, and black church leaders categorically reject the notion that blacks who have lived their entire lives in urban areas should have to establish new

links with, and express their political views in, weak independent homelands. Nevertheless, while whites cling to the notion that this policy is viable, it is increasingly clear that it cannot and will not be an acceptable accommodation for blacks.

The most degrading aspect of the homelands policy, however, has been the issue of citizenship and passports. The South African Government has adopted a conscious policy of trying to force all urban Africans who are Xhosa, Venda, or Tswana to take out homeland citizenship, thus forcing them to forfeit their claim to South African citizenship. Although the Government has pursued this policy in a variety of ways, one of the most blatant ways has centered around the denial of South African passports. The South African Government has adamantly refused to give South African passports to any urban black South African whose homeland has been granted independence. These individuals have been forced to accept homeland travel documents (even if they have never been there or never intend to go there) or to forgo the right to travel abroad.

As a result of the slow pace of change, younger blacks in urban areas are adopting a much more radical and militant approach than church leaders and members of traditional black elite groups. While they share the same political objectives as older black leaders, they have become convinced that it is futile to talk to white leaders and government officials (as well as outsiders) about change and thus have refused to meet and participate in such discussions. They also feel that the black community must organize itself and become more vocal and militant in its demands. In addition, they are increasingly of the persuasion that violence and massive strikes are the only way South African whites and government officials will undertake the changes which blacks seek.

Many of South Africa's younger "radical" blacks are members of AZAPO (the Azania People's Organization). They draw most of their intellectual inspiration and political philosophy from the late Steve Biko (who was killed by South African police while in detention in 1977) and the now banned BPC (The Black People's Convention) which spearheaded South Africa's black consciousness movement. Although it is difficult to determine how large a following these "new radicals" have, they are clearly moving rapidly into the forefront of black thinking in urban areas. As moderate urban leaders grow older or are banned, detained, and arrested or lose credibility, they will take on greater importance in future years.

The recent independence of Zimbabwe and the successful liberation struggles in Angola and Mozambique have also had a tremendous impact on the thinking of younger blacks. Events in those countries have convinced them that whites will not voluntarily relinquish or share power, that protracted guerrilla struggles—even against what seem to be overwhelming odds—can be successful and that time and history are on their side. The success of the Zimbabwean liberation movements have also contributed to what appears to be a resurgence of the African National Congress, South Africa's principal independence movement. Once considered to be nearly moribund inside South Africa, we detected numerous signs that the ANC is growing in popularity and strength in black urban areas.

## INDEPENDENT HOMELAND LEADERS

South Africa's three independent homeland leaders are President Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana, President Kaiser Matanzama of Transkei and President Partick Mphephu of Venda. The study mission met with President Mangope in Johannesburg.

The independent homelands—where only one-fifth of black South Africa's population resides—are a creation of South Africa's system of apartheid, and because of this most homeland leaders are regarded as stooges and sellouts by many urban blacks for participating in South Africa's scheme of separate development.

Despite the fact that homeland leaders are bitterly resented by younger urban Africans, black homeland leaders like Mangope feel that they have achieved a great deal for themselves and their people by accepting independence. They claim that they have gained genuine political and economic freedom in their so-called "independent" countries and that apartheid and discrimination in the areas they control have been eliminated. They also contend that their people have been given a measure of human dignity and equality which they were unable to receive in the Republic and that political and voting rights have been extended to everyone.

Whatever the advantages of independence to those who live in the homelands, it was our view, based on extensive conversations with black leaders that they will never be accepted by the majority of blacks as legitimate African states. With very few natural or mineral resources and thousands of acres of overgrazed and barren land, the homelands are not now (and probably never will be) agriculturally self-sufficient or economically viable. Politically, they will remain pariahs in Africa and the international community. To date no sovereign state (except South Africa) has recognized any of the homelands and none is likely to do so. Moreover, because they have disassociated themselves from the aspirations of most urban black leaders, they have temporarily dealt themselves out of the current round of confrontation and consultation which is going on between urban blacks and the Pretoria Government. As urban blacks gain more strength and the South African Government moves to alter its homelands policy, we may see homeland leaders start to reconsider their political objectives and to align themselves more closely with urban black aspirations. However, given their financial and political dependence on the South African Government, this may be a number of years away.

## NONINDEPENDENT HOMELAND LEADERS

Somewhere between the urban leaders and the independent homeland leaders are a group of black leaders who, while working within the system, have refused to accept homeland independence from South Africa under nearly any circumstances. Most typical of them is Chief Minister Gatsha Buthelezi of KwaZulu, with whom we met at Ulundi, the capital of KwaZulu.

While Buthelezi is strongly critical of South Africa's system of apartheid and rejects many of the Government's policies, he does not believe that violence and terrorism are the way to bring about



reforms in the system. Confronted with South Africa's effective and lethal security force, Buthelezi argues that blacks would have absolutely no chance of achieving their political and social ends by taking up arms or resorting to bloody strikes. Moreover, Buthelezi contends that widespread and indiscriminate violence would irrevocably divide blacks and whites and destroy the infrastructure of the country which would be needed by an independent black state.

Buthelezi advocates an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary approach to the problems confronting South Africa. His approach involves working within the system (but not accepting homeland independence), building strong black political and cultural organizations like his Inkatha movement, and gaining political leverage through carefully planned peaceful strikes and consumer boycotts.

His argument goes: Once whites recognize the power of blacks, they will begin to deal with them more rationally and fairly.

Like many other leaders whose strength is based in the homelands and whose power derives in part from inherited chieftainships, Buthelezi has not supported the black, and Coloured school boycotts or the continuing cycle of labor unrest. KwaZulu officials close to Buthelezi insist that the recent boycotts, labor strife, and student protests have been ill-timed, poorly organized, and lacking in political and economic purpose. Thus, they have only dissipated black strength and led to the destruction of black leaders after the Government has begun its crackdowns.

Despite his moderate approach, Buthelezi claims that much of his political philosophy, as well as that of his Inkatha movement, is derived from the African National Congress (ANC). To support his claims, Buthelezi points to his former membership in the ANC and his on-again, off-again dialog with external ANC leaders. Buthelezi is also quick to indicate that he has rejected homeland independence for KwaZulu, that neither he nor Inkatha have endorsed the Government's recent political reforms, and that, like most urban leaders, he has refused to participate in the President's Council because it does not give blacks parity with Coloureds, Asians, and whites. Moreover, Buthelezi and other Inkatha officials in Johannesburg have been reluctant to commit Inkatha to participate in the urban township elections scheduled for late 1980. Although the South African Government has encouraged Inkatha's participation, Inkatha officials have so far remained aloof because they contend black township councils do not have the same power as their white counterparts.

Despite his strained relations with both black urban leaders and white South African authorities, Buthelezi and other semitraditional leaders are likely to play an important role in determining the future of South Africa. They, after all, represent and speak for millions of rural blacks and their stature precludes them from being easily silenced, detained or banned. However, their position of espousing change while working within the system will continue to make them suspect among many urban blacks who regard any participation in the system as simply playing along with and legitimating apartheid.

## COLOURED COMMUNITY ATTITUDES

South Africa's Coloured community, which numbers slightly over 1.2 million, has always been linked culturally, religiously, and linguistically with the Afrikaner community. Because of these historic ties, Coloureds have generally enjoyed a status above that of blacks. They have been given preferential employment rights in the Cape Province and better educational, employment, and housing opportunities throughout the country. Recognizing its relatively privileged position, the Coloured community for many years was seriously divided on whether it should identify itself with black aspirations or with the white elite.

Based on our conversation with over two dozen Coloured leaders in and around Cape Town, this situation has now changed. Coloured leaders are now convinced that they will not and cannot attain full equality with white South Africans. Coloureds now share the same goals and objectives as blacks: They want to participate fully in every phase of South African life; they want the right to vote for representatives of their choice, as well as the right to say how the resources of South Africa are divided; they also want an end to all aspects of segregation. Under existing circumstances, they see no way in which their goals and objectives can be met.

As their attitudes have changed, Coloureds have begun to distance themselves from the South African Government policies intended to draw them closer to the white community. Almost all Coloured leaders with whom the study mission spoke were unanimous in their rejection of the Prime Minister's proposal on the establishment of a President's Council. Even though they would be allowed to sit on the President's Council with whites, they dismissed the Council as essentially a consultative group with no substantive or binding legal powers. Even black representation on the Council would not solve the country's real problems. They also felt that no Coloured leader of any stature would accept an invitation to sit on the President's Council. Any Coloured leader willing to do so would be branded immediately as a government stooge and ostracized within his community. It was our view that any hope that the whites had of regaining the support and confidence of the Coloured community was illusory and that Coloureds were clearly allied with the blacks and not the whites.

The Coloured community's growing unease with the status quo and the government's slowness in bringing about reforms has also produced an unprecedented wave of militancy in the Coloured area in the Cape region. This is reflected in the recent wave of strikes which have taken place in and around Cape Town in 1980. In early April, Coloured students began what eventually turned into a sporadic boycott of schools in Coloured townships throughout the Cape. The strikes were called to protest inferior teaching and curriculum in Coloured schools and the disparity in government spending on white and Coloured education throughout the region. During the wave of strikes, at least three dozen Coloured students were killed.

Encouraged by the student strikes, other segments of the Coloured community have taken to the streets to protest their grievances. In

May, Coloured meat workers led a relatively short-lived but successful boycott of all Cape Town butcher shops until they won a bitterly contested wage dispute, and Coloured citizens carried out a boycott of public transportation in the area to protest increased fare rates for Coloured township riders.

As Coloureds continue to see their fate as increasingly linked with South Africa's black community, the level of coordination between the two communities will grow. As a result, the tension between whites and Coloureds in the Cape region will rise and the sporadic wave of school boycotts, community protests, and labor unrest will increase.

## PROSPECTS

There is still a sufficient amount of goodwill and time for South Africa to work out a reasonable and carefully constructed political dispensation which blacks might accept. Most black leaders—however militant—recognize the consequences of a protracted struggle in terms of the blood and resources which will be lost. While they may currently despair over the incremental progress and the refusal of the white leadership to adopt any meaningful reforms in the system, they would still be willing to participate in a process designed to bring about peaceful change so long as they felt they were moving in the direction of establishing a system in which they could participate on equal terms with white South Africans.

While the vast majority of whites remain opposed to any major accommodation to black demands, there are some indications that Prime Minister Botha could probably initiate more far-reaching political, social, and economic reforms than he has so far without splitting his party. Polls conducted by Professor Schlemmer dramatically illustrate that white opposition to proposed changes shifts dramatically once the Government has actually instituted the reforms. Before the Government permitted integrated sports programs, desegregated major hotels and restaurants and eliminated petty apartheid, most whites objected to these changes. But once they were instituted, a majority of whites said they supported them. Schlemmer's work also demonstrates that despite the *verkramppte-verligte* split in Afrikaner thinking, only a very small minority of whites would break with the party over its apartheid policies. Many Afrikaners truly believe that the National Party is working for the interests of its members and Afrikaners as a group, and they will continue to follow it.

Between black demands for reform and white insistence on maintaining the status quo, there are a variety of possibilities for a serious political dialog to occur. A reasonable political dispensation might take the form of a federal or Swiss cantonal system in which the responsibilities of local and regional bodies would be expanded and those of the Federal Government sharply reduced. State and municipal governments would control such functions as education, voting rights, housing, health, influx control, and local police. The Central Government would retain authority over national defense and finance. In the Federal Parliament, agreements would be reached by consensus, and no segment of the population would be able to impose its will on the other. As a part of this dispensation, the Government would have to completely abandon apartheid as a national philosophy, terminate the homelands policy, and adopt a system of government in which everyone has the right to vote. There would also have to be some mechanism for allowing the already existing independent homelands to rejoin a greater South Africa.

Although there is no absolute guarantee that blacks would ever accept such an arrangement or that whites might ever offer it, the consequences of not seeking a genuine solution to South Africa's problems are increasingly ominous for both blacks and whites. As the Rhodesian case so graphically demonstrates, concessions which may be acceptable today will not be acceptable a year from now, and concessions which are acceptable a year from now are unlikely to be acceptable in the context of increasing violence a year later.

If the Government fails to make meaningful progress toward a new political dispensation, black demands for a total end to apartheid and the creation of a unitary state based on a franchise of one man, one vote will become more strident. And their willingness to negotiate and discuss other political alternatives and arrangements will diminish. At the same time, the instances of low-level violence are likely to increase: Student unrest is likely to recur and labor strife is likely to become endemic, as laborers use their new-found economic power to press for political as well as economic gains.

The character of black protests will also change. African violence, which has been largely confined to black townships, could spread into white urban areas. Attacks on white economic institutions could become more commonplace. There is also the possibility that some black nationalist groups might shift their attacks from white economic institutions to individual whites and their families. And, as black groups become more powerful, sporadic general strikes and selective consumer boycotts are likely to occur.

Black political organizations, which have been so effectively controlled by detentions and arrests in the past, will reemerge as important vehicles for protest and violence. The ANC, banned in South Africa since 1960, is already undergoing a period of renewal inside South Africa and could easily become a powerful internal force, propagandizing in the black community and perpetrating acts of violence in white areas. As it grows inside the country, the ANC is likely to grow outside as well, stimulated by a continuing flow of recruits and by more secure sanctuaries in neighboring states.

In this scenario, South African leaders will not stand idly by. Although they will attempt to placate blacks with more reforms, they will react to unrest as they always have—harshly. Black leaders and groups will be arrested and banned, resulting in the elimination of another group of moderate black leaders and the creation of another generation of younger, more radical blacks, who will be even less eager than their elders to do anything but fight.

In the end, it is difficult to say what single event will trigger the full-scale urban unrest and racial conflagration that looms ahead. But surely it will come, if South African leaders do not act in a serious and meaningful way in the very near future to bring about reforms that are not only acceptable in the white community but which are equally acceptable in the black community.

## ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

The future of South Africa will ultimately be determined by the people of South Africa themselves. While the United States does have a role to play, it would be neither practical nor propitious for the United States to prescribe any arbitrary formula by which the future dispensation in South Africa will be determined. In the final analysis, it is up to the people of South Africa, white as well as black, working together on the basis of equality to determine their own destiny. This does not, however, mean that the United States has no policy options to follow toward South Africa.

Broadly speaking, the United States could pursue several different policy options toward South Africa:

First we could embrace South Africa. Because of South Africa's strategic location along the cape route, its possession of nearly half a dozen critical minerals and its strong anti-Communist posture, we could take the position that good relations with South Africa are in the national interest of the United States and that we should do everything possible to strengthen those ties.

Although this option appears attractive since it theoretically takes into account our global interests, it is not. It is based on simplistic reasoning and would in all probability turn out to be totally counterproductive. First, neither the protection of the cape route nor access to South Africa's minerals are of sufficient and strategic importance to the United States to risk jeopardizing our relations with the rest of Africa. Second, if the Soviets wanted to interdict the flow of oil around the cape route, they could probably do it easier at the source and not on the high seas. And finally, by embracing the South African Government, we would be advancing the Russian cause in southern Africa. They would be able to identify the United States as an ally of a white-dominated regime while portraying themselves as the champions of social justice and majority rule. Thus, instead of impeding the Soviet advance in Africa, our actions would facilitate it. In the end, the United States would be the real loser.

Second, we could adopt the position that we have no alternative but to do nothing. Since the United States has few diplomatic, economic, or commercial levers to force the South African Government to bring about meaningful and comprehensive reforms in South Africa, it could be argued that it would be unwise for the United States to get involved in the issue. Such a policy however, would be inconsistent with our national values as well as an abrogation of our responsibilities as the world's leading democracy. Since the adoption of South Africa's system of apartheid, the United States has consistently spoken out against the racial oppression and injustice which exists in that country. If the United States were to adopt a "do nothing, say nothing policy," it would undermine our credibility in Africa as well as precipitate strong protests from black American

leaders at home. The United States clearly does not enjoy the luxury of standing idly by on this issue.

Finally, an effort could be made to win adoption for a policy of comprehensive economic sanctions, mandatory disinvestment, and a complete ban on all new investment by American companies. The successful adoption of such a policy would clearly demonstrate our total abhorrence of South Africa's policy of apartheid, but it would clearly leave us with no other options to exercise in the future. Nor would our actions bring South Africa to its knees. Furthermore, the adoption of stringent and comprehensive economic measures against South Africa would not be viable in the current American political climate. Given the recent power shifts in this country, neither the legislative branch nor the executive branch would probably approve of such strong economic measures, however warranted.

Instead of adopting a policy of total support or total opposition, or a policy of essential indifference to South Africa, we suggest that the United States does have another option to pursue toward South Africa which would not only be compatible with our national values but would also be politically possible within our current domestic atmosphere. Such a policy would also demonstrate our commitment to racial justice as well as our firm desire to translate our rhetorical statements into meaningful actions. Such an option would include the following elements:

#### ZIMBABWE'S IMPACT ON SOUTH AFRICA

The peaceful transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe is clearly one of the most significant political and diplomatic developments in the history of southern Africa. It is a development which could have profound consequences not only for the future of that very important country but also for South Africa itself.

Probably, more than any other single factor, what happens in Zimbabwe over the course of the next few years will have a major impact on the prospects for peaceful change in South Africa itself. To the extent that Prime Minister Mugabe's government can provide opportunities which make it possible to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the African masses while at the same time creating conditions which facilitate the retention of the white minority, this could significantly strengthen the forces of peaceful change in South Africa. However, if the Zimbabwean Government is unable to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the African majority and if economic chaos or political conflicts should erupt between the black and white communities in that country, it would probably increase the feeling among white South Africans that no form of equitable power sharing or majority rule will work in their country.

As a consequence, we believe the Congress should do everything it can to support the new Government in Zimbabwe and to greatly expand the level of foreign assistance the United States provides to Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's government. Without substantial economic and political support from this country, we run the risk of losing both Zimbabwe and South Africa.

## SCHOLARSHIPS AND EDUCATION

The South African Government has used education as a political instrument to keep black South Africans in a semipermanent state of ignorance and economic deprivation. Since the South African Government passed the 1953 Bantu Education Act restricting severely the type of subjects taught in African and Coloured schools, the quality of black education has declined sharply. Moreover, the Government has continued to spend approximately 10 times as much money on each white student as it does on each African student.

Although there are 18 million blacks in South Africa, there are only 3 black universities, enrolling fewer than 7,500 full-time day students. As a result, in 1976 only 563 blacks received university degrees, almost all in the liberal arts. For 5 million whites, there are 10 universities with over 80,000 students. In 1976, 11,214 whites received university degrees. There are no black law, medical, engineering, or business schools, and those Africans who wish to attend such institutions must request special permission to go to white institutions. In an overwhelming number of cases, this permission is not granted. According to the South African Institute of Race Relations, in 1978, 1,700 blacks requested permission to attend white academic institutions; only 347 of those requests were granted. Although the United States cannot be expected to shoulder South Africa's responsibility for providing equal and quality education for its black population, it can—as it has done in the past in preindependence Zimbabwe, Angola, and Mozambique—demonstrate its commitment to black advancement by establishing a substantial scholarship program to train blacks currently living in South Africa for the day when they will be able to participate more fully in the running of their own country. These scholarships would be made available for undergraduate and graduate study in the United States.

The Congress can take the lead in this program by authorizing and appropriating funds for the creation of this type of scholarship program. Black South Africans with whom we spoke would welcome it, and it would be a relatively inexpensive way of manifesting our support for African objectives.

## U.S. BUSINESS—FAIR EMPLOYMENT CODES

American companies have a major economic stake in South Africa. There are over 350 American companies in South Africa, employing nearly 100,000 workers. According to the Department of Commerce, the book value of this investment is over \$1.99 billion, making the American stake in South Africa second only to that of Great Britain.

In addition to this extensive investment, trade between South Africa and the United States is extensive. In 1979, the last date for which reliable figures are available, total U.S. trade with South Africa was \$3.4 billion, making America South Africa's largest trading partner. Moreover, overall United States-South African trade has shown a steady rise during the past decade and will probably continue to increase.

U.S. businesses can no longer be apologists for South Africa. They can no longer politely condemn apartheid while reaping the large



profits that are in part made possible by South Africa's system of discrimination. Most black South Africans already regard American businesses as a tool of apartheid. Younger blacks go even further in their denunciations and criticisms of U.S. business activity in South Africa. They argue that the exploitive and cheap labor practices of American companies have helped create a fertile environment for apartheid. Although it was the opinion of the overwhelming number of blacks with whom we spoke that the U.S. Government should force all U.S. companies to withdraw their investments or, at the very least, restrict new investments, they agreed that if U.S. companies are to remain in South Africa, they should abide by and live up to a fair employment practices code which eliminates racial bias and provides equal opportunity in the workplace.

These black leaders and union officials also insist that any American code which is established should avoid the limitations of Rev. Leon Sullivan's fair employment practices code. For example, the Sullivan code is voluntary and thus far less than half of the 350 American companies operating in South Africa have formally agreed to implement its principles. Moreover, many of the companies that have signed the Sullivan code have tended to honor it more in the breach than in the observance. As a result, black leaders contend that an American code should be mandatory and enforced by the U.S. Government.

Since disinvestment is not politically feasible at this time, we think all American companies should be required by U.S. law to adhere to a fair employment practices code which is strictly monitored by U.S. officials in conjunction with black union officials and other concerned South African leaders. Any corporate violator of this code should be strictly penalized for not carrying it out. However, the enactment of this code should not be regarded as legitimatizing the presence of American businesses in South Africa. Nor should it be viewed as a vehicle for bringing about genuine reform in South Africa as a whole. Such change can only be brought about by the people of South Africa and their Government.

#### U.S. BUSINESS—BANK LOANS

American banks have played a special role in fueling South Africa's economic growth. At critical periods, when South Africa has been short of foreign exchange and capital to maintain its economic growth and to underwrite new development projects in the public sector, American banks have provided large loans to the Government. Although South Africa's economy is extremely buoyant today because of gold earnings, American banks have in the past loaned South African public and private enterprises over \$2.2 billion. These loans to the private and public sectors have not gone unnoticed by South African blacks, and they are highly resented. They are also offensive to many Americans, who regard these transactions as propping up South Africa's system of racial discrimination.

A number of American banks have voluntarily suspended making loans to the South African Government and its parastatals. Some have not. In the past 2 years, several major American banks have

made loans to South African Government agencies to finance new housing and hospital facilities for blacks. Since these loans will improve the social lot of Africans, these banks have reasoned that their loans are both politically and morally sound. This is a shortsighted policy which plays into the hands of South African officials who continue to seek political respectability and economic creditworthiness through international loans from major Western banks. As long as American banks finance major housing and hospital projects which are established exclusively for blacks and are confined to black areas, they only perpetuate rather than ameliorate South Africa's oppressive system of apartheid. Moreover, most blacks with whom we spoke said they would prefer to see the U.S. Government ban all loans—even those benefiting blacks in black areas—until South Africa changes its overall policy of apartheid. To support additional loans to South Africa to construct segregated housing and health facilities only entrenches apartheid.

Legislation should be developed to prevent all further bank loans by American financial institutions to the South African Government and its state-run and state-owned companies. The passage of such legislation would have the effect of demonstrating that the United States will no longer let American banks directly contribute to a national government which on a daily basis violates the fundamental human rights of a majority of its citizens.

Although such a move will be strongly criticized by the American banking and business community, it is imperative that the United States begin to use what leverage it has at its disposal to demonstrate to South Africa's black population that we in the United States recognize and sympathize with their plight and to demonstrate to the current South African Government that we will no longer allow American institutions to directly strengthen it or its state-run companies.

#### KRUGERRAND SALES

South Africa has benefited enormously from the sale in the United States of South African krugerrand—a gold coin containing 1 ounce of pure gold. Since the U.S. Government removed the restrictions on the purchase of gold by American citizens in 1975, South Africa has flooded the U.S. market with kruggerand. In 1978 and 1979, Americans purchased nearly half of all the krugerrand sold by South Africa. In 1978 this amounted to nearly \$600 million and in 1979 the figure totaled over \$800 million. As a result, Americans today own in excess of \$2.5 billion of krugerrand. Most of these krugerrand have been marketed and sold in this country through commercial banks and financial brokerage firms.

South Africa has used the sale of krugerrand to help push the cost of gold to abnormally high prices. And the resulting upsurge in the gold prices has been the principal stimulus in the resurgence of South Africa's economy. It is now estimated that for every \$10 increase in the average annual price of an ounce of gold, South Africa receives an additional \$226 million in foreign exchange. A considerable portion of this foreign exchange has come from the United States.

South Africa has not used its increased wealth to promote genuine social change. Contrary to the notions espoused by some American businessmen and South African leaders with whom we met, there is

absolutely no indication that the increase in gold sales and the growth in South Africa's economy has led to any meaningful political and social changes in that country. As gold prices have risen, the South African Government has not undertaken any steps to dismantle apartheid, institute a nondiscriminatory franchise, end residential segregation, terminate its homelands policy, or to put large sums of money into black education and social services. The majority of the Government's increased earnings have gone into defense expenditures, major industrial and commercial projects run by the Government, and to expand social services for whites—not blacks.

As a result, the Congress should not allow South Africa to continue to drain precious foreign exchange away from this country in order to support apartheid. Therefore, we think the Congress should bar the importation into this country of krugerrand until such time as the South African undertakes fundamental changes in its social and political system. Such an action will not have any adverse effect on the U.S. economy. It will, however, be another strong indication to the South Africa Government that the United States seeks genuine change in South Africa. It will also symbolize to black South Africans that the United States is increasingly aligned with their struggle for human rights, social justice, and complete political equality.

#### PASSPORT POLICY

The South African Government has used the issuance of passports as an instrument in enforcing its policy of apartheid. The South African Government has consistently refused to grant passports to critics of the Government and to those Africans who are eligible for homeland passports but who refuse to accept them because it would mean the automatic loss of their South African citizenship and acceptance of their status as homeland citizens. Since the implementation of this policy, the South African Government has confiscated or refused to issue passports to numerous black leaders and clergymen, including Bishop Desmond Tutu, Dr. N. Motlana, Mr. Fanyani Mazibuku, and Mr. Curtis Nkondo. Although the confiscation or denial of many passports goes largely unnoticed outside of South Africa, since January 1980, at least 20 black leaders invited to visit the United States by the American Government have been denied passports to leave South Africa.

The right to travel is regarded as a fundamental freedom in every democratic country in the world. As a matter of policy, the U.S. Government is committed to making this freedom a universal one. If South Africa persists in denying ever larger numbers of blacks the right to travel abroad (as well as refusing to allow large numbers of black and white Americans to enter South Africa), the U.S. Congress should take action to insure that South Africa will not be able to openly discriminate against black critics of the regime with impunity. Such action might take the form of legislation excluding South African Government officials and businessmen from entering this country until South Africa changes its policies.

## CONCLUSION

Change in South Africa is inevitable. The tides of history cannot be forever forestalled. The questions facing South Africa are when will this change come and how will it occur? There is still time for peaceful change. However, should this change come about as a result of prolonged bloodshed and violence, the consequences for all the people of South Africa—black, white, Asian, and Coloured—will be disastrous.

In the short term, the greatest momentum for change will have to come from the white community. While American policies should be directed at attempting to elicit these changes from that community, that should not be the only consideration of our policy. It may be that nothing we do will be sufficient to alter the thinking, attitudes, and policies of white South Africa. Nevertheless, despite our limited ability and influence to bring about change, there are sound reasons for trying to use what power we have to help avoid a major racial conflict.

First, given the historical inevitability that blacks will play a major role, hopefully with whites, in governing South Africa, we have a real interest in making it clear to South Africa's black leaders that we do not support apartheid and that we are committed to carrying out policies and actions which will promote social justice and racial equality in their country.

Second, we must remain sensitive to our interests in black Africa. To the extent that we adopt policies toward South Africa which are intolerable and unacceptable to most African countries, we run a great risk of jeopardizing our interests in such important states as Nigeria, Tanzania, and Kenya. We have an interest in being perceived as being on the right side of this issue. If we are not, our political, economic, and commercial interests in the rest of Africa—and perhaps all the Third World—will suffer.

And finally, a more affirmative policy toward South Africa is clearly in our domestic interest. Outside of Nigeria, the United States has the largest black population of any country in the world. For all the inequalities in our own society, in recent decades the United States has become a symbol in black Africa of racial tolerance and fairplay. Indeed, a policy of benign neglect toward or active support for South Africa would be incompatible with our own principles of freedom, liberty, and justice. We must not turn our backs on that tradition—now or in the future.



