South Africa: Charting a Foreign Policy

Regional Security: The 'New Security' in Southern Africa

Prisoner of the Past?: The 'New South Africa' Abroad
Southern Africa REPORT

is produced 4 times a year by a volunteer collective of TCLSAC, the Toronto Committee for Links between Southern Africa & Canada.

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Ten Years Young

Well, we did it. Now we'll just have to do it again. We're talking about ten years of Southern Africa Report. Not that we've won any National Magazine Awards here in Canada. We've never been cited in the Toronto Globe and Mail's prestigious "Magazines" overview. Nor have we ever had our existence noted by such Globe pundits as Robert Fulford or Rick Salutin. However, we do seem to have a loyal, to judge by renewal rates, and even growing (albeit by tens and twenties rather than hundreds and thousands) readership, both in Canada and abroad. Word of mouth, and the occasional letter, also tells us that both the aesthetic and political quality of what we've been doing remains at an acceptable level. According to our readers, we've managed to weather the transition from the heady days of liberation movements and anti-apartheid struggle in southern Africa to the present moment of greyer and more sobering realities in a reasonably convincing and interesting manner. Certainly the enterprise continues to convince and interest us.

The editorial collective still sports some of the same wizened veterans who helped launch our endeavours a decade ago, for example. And just enough young blood has since joined the magazine team to suggest that southern Africa support work is not merely an agenda for geriatrics. True, we've come close to los-
ing our zest for the enterprise from time to time. This spring we went through some soul-searching when we questioned, quite fundamentally and in concert with others beyond the working group itself, the present state of our finances, of our energy level, and, not least, of our sense of political purpose.

Political purpose? No problem, once we stopped to think about it. Who can doubt, as we’ve had occasion to emphasize in previous editorials in these pages, that southern Africa remains an instructive microcosm of much of what ails the world, even if globally inflicted structural adjustment packages and locally-generated despots have now replaced desiccated colonialisms and apartheid autocrats as the main indices of regional blight? Nor should we doubt that southern Africans – in the present issue Marlea Clarke tells us of two women who well qualify as shining examples – will continue to give us all lessons in what it means to fight back. And, as our shared vulnerability, North and South, to the vagaries of footloose global capital becomes ever more apparent, there is also a lot to be learned from the new kinds of ties that are being forged between Canadians and southern Africans in the post-apartheid period. Political purpose aplenty, then. As for finances, that’s another question. In this regard, we hope that any of you reading this issue will subscribe, if you don’t do so already, and will also get any institution you have access to (your library, for example) to subscribe as well. As hinted above, even the odd five or ten new subscriptions is enough to revive our energies when they start to flag. We’d also be further energized if readers were to take rather more active ownership of the magazine. Certainly, we’d welcome any advice you might have about the substance of what we’re doing: subjects to be covered, authors to be solicited, lines of analysis to be explored. And how about a few more “public” letters – the more argumentative the better – to enliven our pages and help push us all a step forward in our thinking. Help us, in short, to give you ten more years of something other than what the O.J. Simpson trial!

We hope, too, that you’ll forgive such slightly self-indulgent mid-summer musings on the occasion of our tenth anniversary. Your reward, in the rest of the magazine, is some of the same kind of strong stuff on southern Africa that you’ve become accustomed to. Front and centre are pieces by Roger Southall and Peter Vale on some key aspects of South Africa’s foreign policy-making, part of our on-going effort to determine what’s really new about the “new South Africa.” Not enough, Vale at least seems to suggest, and this is an opinion shared by Patrick Bond in these pages as he critiques an earlier article by our own Barry Pinsky on the ANC’s housing strategy. Look, too, for some illumination from Gerry Maré of the sinister doings that continue to unfold in KwaZulu-Natal. And, from Alexander Costy, a nice spin on the question of Mozambican NGOs and the state of “civil society” in that country. A good review, too, from long-time contributor, Bruce Kidd, reflecting back on the anti-apartheid struggle on the sporting front. And wait ‘til you see what we’ve got lined up for you in volume 11, number one. Yes, we really are going to do our first decade all over again.
Regional Security
The 'New Security' in Southern Africa

BY ROGER SOUTHWELL

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An era of regeneration and inter-state cooperation throughout the Southern African region seems possible with the fall of apartheid, the democratization process that has taken place throughout the region, and the winding down of the externally fuelled civil conflicts in Angola and Mozambique. Hopes for such a period of renewal have been symbolized and institutionalized by the transformation of the old Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) into the new Southern African Development Community (SADC), launched in 1994 with the new, post-apartheid South Africa at its heart.

The background to this is well known: how apartheid South Africa tried to dominate the region by drawing its most immediately dependent neighbours into a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS); how these same countries responded by forming SADCC in 1980 in the hopes of reducing their dependence on South Africa through mutual cooperation; and how South Africa replied with its policy of "total strategy" and a vicious military destabilization of those countries in the region that supported the ANC struggle.

The end of the Cold War was the precursor to the wider transition to democracy that has taken place throughout the region. Competitive elections since 1989 in Namibia (twice), Zambia, Lesotho, Malawi and Mozambique have contributed to enormously improved prospects for inter-state collaboration. Central to the new optimism that now defines the region has been the conviction that relations between South Africa and its neighbours will now be based on mutual trust in a shared project of regional peace and development.

The arrival of the new government in Pretoria headed by President Nelson Mandela has been viewed as synonymous not only with legitimate government but also with the birth of a new moral order. This perspective has drawn conviction from a series of ANC policy statements made both before and after the election. The most programmatic of these was the ANC's commitment, elaborated in October 1993, to a foreign policy future that would make central a preoccupation with human rights, the promotion of democracy worldwide, respect for international law, a striving for international peace, and commitment to the best interests of Africa generally and of the Southern African region in particular. Influential, too, was the view expressed by Kadar Asmal that post-apartheid South Africa would owe its regional neighbours compensation (via the forgiving of special relationships if not financial restitution) for the devastation it had wreaked upon them in the past. And more recently, the region took heart from the formal apology offered to Mozambique by new Speaker of the National Assembly, Frene Ginwala, upon the occasion of President Chissano's visit to the South African Parliament. Domestically, too, encouragement was drawn from the apparent meeting of minds around a new foreign policy orientation that seemed to emerge from meetings that drew the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and ANC personnel, together with representatives of other parties, foreign embassies and academia.

Inevitably, however, the restructuring of regional relations is not problem free. SADC is having to redefine its SADCC-inherited mission: whilst regional countries are looking to South Africa's industrial economy to jump-start the regional economy, they are no more keen today to become dependent upon a regional hegemon than they were before. This poses problems in formulating a policy for manufacturing that will both attract foreign investment (which will flow mostly to South Africa) and narrow regional disparities. Yet some of the most dramatic developments are occurring in the security sphere - important above all for guaranteeing human rights - where there is a quite remarkable willingness of former enemies within regional military and intelligence networks to work together towards a shared conception of a common, regional good.

The emergent structures and the potential of these new regional security arrangements are important for the promotion of a more humanistic, less state-centred conception of security. However, the possibility exists that the new South Africa's aspiration towards a human-rights based foreign policy could yet be derailed.

Towards a new security?

Peace in Southern Africa is forcing a dramatic re-thinking of the definition of security. During the apartheid era, South Africa looked to its borders as a defence against its enemies; its neighbours stared back in fearful anticipation of destabilizing military raids by the South African Defence Force. Today, with hostilities replaced by friendship, the ma-
 Major threats to states’ stability are increasingly viewed as coming not from any military quarter, but from the common enemies of poverty and lack of hope, unemployment and massive economic migration southwards, environmental degradation, AIDS, drug-running and organized crime, the alarming availability of a massive supply of small arms in the wake of numerous wars, and so on.

These are as much developmental as they are security challenges. Just as South Africa is seeking to tackle them through its Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), so other governments in the region are pursuing their own agendas. Importantly, however, the recognition that these are shared difficulties is providing some basis for regional cooperation. Hence, SADC is working towards promulgation of a protocol on the free movement of persons between states, and another on industry and trade. None the less, in so far as they may easily impact upon the stability of any or all the regional states, these problems retain an important security aspect. Indeed, defence establishments remain very much alive to the potential the “new” security challenges have for transforming themselves into more conventional threats to peace and democracy.

Out of this concern has come the commitment by SADC at its founding to set up “a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity and provide for mutual peace and security ...” Consequently, following South Africa’s accession to SADC in June 1994, the Frontline States (FLS) organization – the entente that served as the effective political arm of SADCC in the struggle against apartheid – dissolved and was replaced with a new framework for political and security cooperation.

The SADC secretariat is known to have favoured incorporation of this new structure within SADC but the meeting of SADC Foreign Ministers in Harare in March 1995 proposed instead the establishment of a separate, but parallel, Association of Southern African States (ASAS). Should this be ratified at the SADC Heads of Government Summit scheduled for August, ASAS will become the primary mechanism for dealing with conflict prevention, management and resolution in Southern Africa.

ASAS, which is meant to complement and not replace OAU mechanisms, will operate independently
of the SADC secretariat, but will report directly to the SADC summit. Bureaucracy will be kept to a minimum, its Chair will rotate amongst member states every two years, heads of government will be its decision-making authority, and all its decisions will be implemented by two Committees serviced by the Foreign Ministry of the Chairing state – one committee for political matters and one for defence and security matters.

If these arrangements are approved, it seems likely that the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), established by SADC states at Arusha in November 1994, will provide the basis for the ASAS defence and security committees. As established at present, this provides for a series of sub-committees for operations, intelligence, personnel and logistics under a Committee of Ministers, and is intended to focus on training and cooperation rather than on the creation of either a regional peace-keeping force or any form of regional command. Nonetheless, it is already recognized as important that such a multilateral organization be able to provide intelligence support for preventive diplomacy initiatives in the case of pending or actual conflicts within the region, as well as be able to plan combined operations and establish security arrangements between states on specific issues such as counter-terror weapons smuggling.

One of the most encouraging aspects of these developments has been the leading role played by South Africa, in particular the commitment displayed by senior figures in the South African National Defence Force (SANDEF), most of whom have been retained from the former SADF. Whatever their past involvements in fighting apartheid's battles, they are now ostensibly committed to serving under Defence Minister Joe Modise and Deputy Minister Ronnie Kasrils. That means subscribing to key tenets of the new defence strategy, notably:

- that any South African military engagement outside the country will always be conducted within the framework of international law;
- that any participation in peace support, peace keeping or peace making operations will be driven by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), and not by the Department of Defence; that military force is not an acceptable instrument for conducting foreign policy and settling disputes; and that the long term objective of South African defence policy within the region should be the prevention of conflict in the first place.

The SANDEF – which is still being forged in the integration of SADF, homeland and liberation armies – argues that its commitment to the new agenda could be exemplified by its engagement in such major operations as mine-clearing in Angola and Mozambique, demobilization and disarmament of paramilitary and irregular forces, and monitoring of peace agreements. It has also been made aware of the enormous sensitivity to the South African defence presence within the region, and the need to avoid any suggestion of attempts to impose a new, even if benevolent, military hegemony.

Against this, whilst there are these encouraging indications that the SANDEF is learning fast how to behave within the region, there are disconcerting signs that its better efforts are being undermined by other elements within the Defence and Foreign Affairs establishments.

**Remaking South African foreign policy**

The replacement of Pik Botha as Foreign Minister by the ANC's Alfred Nzo, and the appointment of Aziz Pahad as Deputy Minister, were widely deemed as providing a progressive shift in South African foreign policy and policy-making structures. However, some fifteen months later, criticism of what the Mail and Guardian has now dubbed the “Department of Floundering Affairs” is now reaching a crescendo. The concerns voiced by critics are numerous, but they centre around the failure of Mandela's South Africa to provide moral leadership in international affairs, together with the DFA's apparent reluctance to restructure.

In recent months, disturbing reports have surfaced in the press about how post-1990 covert supply of arms by Armscor, the South African arms manufacturing para-statal, have helped to fuel the civil conflicts in Yemen, Rwanda, Croatia and Angola in defiance of various UN embargoes. Although Defence Minister Joe Modise responded to early signals by appointing an investigatory commission under Judge Edward Cameron in September 1994, and although responsibility for such illicit trading lies with the former regime, there is widespread concern that – between them – the DFA and the Defence Ministry have not yet subjected Armscor to anything like adequate accountability. Indeed, the major worry is that in its concern to promote exports, boost employment and fund the RDP, the government is failing miserably to address the key issue of how participation in the international arms trade may undermine any serious commitment to a human rights-based foreign policy.

Controversy has also erupted around the possible purchase by South Africa of four corvettes for the Navy from Yarrow, a subsidiary of GEC, Britain's largest electronics and defence contractor, which has a long record of supplying weapons to non-democratic countries (such as Brazil, Nigeria and Indonesia) that violate human rights. Indeed, counter-trade proposals put by Yarrow suggest that GEC wants to co-opt South Africa into manufacturing British weapons under licence for export to politically sensitive regions such as the Middle East.

Concerns such as these are supported by the controversial deci-
sions to establish diplomatic relations with Sudan and Indonesia, whose regimes have come under widespread international criticism for their gross abuse of human rights. Worse, accusations – which have not been convincingly rebutted – have been made that the connection with Indonesia has been forged because President Suharto made financial donations to the ANC before the election. Combined with further allegations that the government’s support for the US stand on the renewal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was connected to subsequent approval of an IMF loan, the broader worry is that some aspects of South Africa’s foreign policy are coming up for sale. The apparent clash between the ANC’s foreign policy aspirations and real policies are linked by critics to the continued domination of the DFA by old-guard bureaucrats. Led by Director-General Rusty Evans, retained to lead the Department by Nzo, these bureaucrats have been accused of resisting recruitment of ANC and other potential diplomatic recruits trained abroad before the election in favour of so-called “foreign policy” personnel previously employed by the “Foreign Affairs” departments of the formerly “independent” homelands.

Finally, and importantly, severe criticism has been directed at the DFA by the all-party National Assembly Committee on Foreign Affairs under the chairmanship of the ANC’s Raymond Suttner. Apart from adding to the concerns already mentioned, the Committee has also sharply criticized the DFA’s proposed budget allocation of only R105 million of its allocated R645 million on the servicing and extension of South Africa’s diplomatic missions on its own continent of Africa. Suttner has been quoted as calling for a “rupture” with the past in the DFA, especially with regard to its policy process, and has demanded that foreign policy be rendered more accountable to the people of South Africa.

Regional implications

The major role that South Africa has played in re-thinking the nature of security and in devising more appropriate structures to orient the military towards peace support operations testifies to the new government’s desire to place human rights and development at the centre of its regional foreign policy. Its high profile diplomatic role, with Botswana and Zimbabwe, in resolving the constitutional crisis in Lesotho in August-September 1994 indicates its commitment to the maintenance of democracy throughout the region. However, while the new government’s moves within the sub-continent can yet scarcely be faulted, the wider context of its foreign policy poses questions that cannot but have eventual implications for Southern Africa:

Can South Africa speak authoritatively on human rights within the region and Africa if in its wider foreign policy it has friendly links with regimes like those of Sudan, Nigeria and Indonesia?

Is the ANC in sufficient control of the DFA to shift foreign policy towards a more Africa-centred focus?

Is the new government prepared to back its commitment to a peaceful world order by imposing a firm grip on Armscor, and by seriously questioning how much the moral basis of its whole foreign policy may be undermined by its engagement in the international arms trade?

These are early days. But an urgent question is already being asked: Is it possible for the new South Africa to combine a human rights and peace-based policy in Southern Africa with a more dubious foreign policy thrust elsewhere?
Prisoner of the Past?
The New South Africa Abroad

BY PETER VALE

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The text and sub-text of South Africa's foreign policy were quite simple during the apartheid years. Slavishly committed to the central tenets of western economic interests, the country's security was dedicated to ensuring the preservation of white supremacy. The making of this foreign policy was closed, confined to "a kind of an elite" almost exclusively made up of white Afrikaner males. Even within the confines of the limited (and limiting) minority democracy, foreign policy was the preserve of dictatorial figures such as Hendrik Verwoerd, responsible for the decision to declare the Republic of South Africa, and P.W. Botha, the guiding hand on the country's policy of destabilizing its neighbours.

The traditional narrative around South Africa's foreign policy was standard to the Cold War period. At its root was a haughty confidence that rejected any considerations of the nature of the South African state or the realities of the international scene. This perspective reinforced patterns of official behaviour and determined - as it still appears to - the country's response to international initiatives.

But deeper forces are at work within South Africa and understanding these is only possible against the backdrop of the country's image and self-image. This is especially important in foreign policy where the late-Victorian values of firmness, discipline and thrift have underpinned South Africa's appreciation of itself within the international context. In the much-loved but analytically threadbare dichotomy represented by the poles of order and justice, South Africa was quintessentially for "order." It is difficult to find a single instance of South Africa's behaviour in the world that has not been influenced by this consideration.

South Africa's national weltanschauung profoundly influenced, and was influenced by, the idiom within which the state conducted its international relationships. It is not possible to overestimate the importance of the narrow security-driven idiom that closed off all other avenues of discourse. Less than a decade ago, South Africa's ambassador to the U.N. challenged the Security Council "to do their damnedest," and evidence of apartheid's extra-territorial mischief-making, in the name of fighting a "total onslaught," was to be found in places as far apart as Oman, France and Sri Lanka.

In framing this behaviour, apartheid's foreign policy makers drew upon the crude realist paradigm that has inspired most modern discourse in international relations. This approach was embedded in the belief that, irrespective of the challenge to its domestic political legitimacy, South Africa had real, even 'legitimate,' interests in the international system. As criticism of the apartheid state deepened in the 1970s and 1980s, South African foreign policy makers appeared to believe that any methods could be used to defend the country's sovereignty and to secure its self-interest. Why else would the country manufacture seven and a half atom bombs?

Many of these features were not exclusive to South Africa's foreign policy, of course. During the Cold War, most countries used realist templates to understand and respond to international questions. But three important differences set South Africa apart from the general cases.

First, the policy process in South Africa was entirely cut off from domestic politics. Organized public interest in foreign policy and international relations supported, rather than challenged, exclusivity around the making of foreign policy. This contrasts with experience elsewhere; in the 1980s, organized public interest increasingly became a feature of foreign policy making in most democracies. Indeed, the international response to apartheid was a case in point. Official shifts on the issue in the United States and in Britain were orchestrated by organized public pressure.

Secondly, sanctions against South Africa compounded a problem associated with the country's geographic isolation. Located far from competing centres of power meant that even the limited public discussion that took place was self-centred and parochial. As taught in its schools, the country's positioning in the world was little more than a paranoid listing of the international "wrongs" the country had suffered at the hands of its enemies. When it moved beyond this, the dominant themes were pro-western: Reagan's Washington and Britain under Thatcher were far more relevant in the mind of South Africa's voting public than were Swaziland or Lesotho.
Finally, there was a serious disjuncture between the theory that drove apartheid’s foreign policy and its practice. However, appreciating this was rendered impossible by the limitations of orthodox international relations methodology which was largely uncomfortable with liberation movements. Were they, like the Basque separatist movement, ETA, representative of sub-national elements within established nation states? Or, as in Zimbabwe’s case, were they part of the Cold War contest for the state itself? Moreover, in South Africa, something else was in place. The ANC had features of both ETA and ZANU/ZAPU but it also had a distinctive international personality that enjoyed extensive legitimacy, at times having a higher profile in world affairs than did the South African state. Like many other aspects of South Africa’s international relations, this dimension was silenced by draconian security legislation.

Politically things are very different now in South Africa. The country’s foreign policy is being conducted in a near carnival atmosphere, a holdover from the fanfare that heralded its return to the international community. The April 1994 election results suggest that, contrary to what the world believed, South Africans can rise to the essential challenge of the times and find a way for disparate races and cultures to live together in peace and harmony. More important over the short-term, Nelson Mandela’s courageous life and his towering stature have marked him as one of the last true heroes of the twentieth century. Monarchs, statesmen and common garden-variety political leaders from around the world have beaten a path to his door. The country has established diplomatic relations with 163 countries and has acceded to 86 bilateral and 21 multilateral treaties since the inauguration of Nelson Mandela. The country’s geographic location – once the bane of its efforts to maintain a place on the international stage – appears to have become an asset. Aid agencies and, to a lesser degree, international companies, are using South Africa to service the region and the continent. But all these accoutrements have not made for a coherent foreign policy; indeed, in making foreign policy, the new South Africa looks decidedly like the old.

As in many areas of its emerging personality, South Africa’s “new” foreign policy suffers from a crisis of multiple identities. The challenge of creative international policy in a confusing new world appears to have flummoxed experienced foreign policy makers and politicians in most countries. In post-apartheid South Africa, however, one can find very specific symptoms of this malady.

Consider the issue of idiom. The mythology around George Bush’s “new world order” has been surprisingly evident in South Africa’s framing of post-apartheid foreign policy. Nelson Mandela’s speechwriters have cued the President to use uncritically the “new world order” phrase on several occasions. Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo has also used it, most recently in the speech to parliament on the budget vote. Understanding the immediate reasons for this particular rhetoric is not difficult. The ending of the Cold War has produced very few coherent explanations for the pattern of deteriorating inter-state relations. For the most part, the process of drafting Presidential and Ministerial speeches on international relations topics fall to the Department of Foreign Affairs which has uncritically absorbed the language on the post-Cold War world from the Bush Administration.

Understanding this raises questions about DFA bureaucracy. Although potentially the strongest department of the apartheid regime, the DFA was cowed by the long years of fighting isolation and acutely affected by the 16-year stewardship of former Foreign Minister, Pik Botha. Anecdotal evidence suggests that within the DFA ranks are substantial pools of competence, but that these were side-lined by cronyism and an emerging ennui in the mid- and late-1980s.

The DFA has other shortcomings. These have less to do with individual personalities than with the situation in which the country found itself in the 1970s and 1980s, decades that were important to the development of modern diplomacy. In crucial areas in the DFA, there is little or no expertise. Excluded from all but a handful of rarefied international organizations, apartheid had little need, or opportunity, for multilateral relations. This lack of experience may well prove to be a considerable handicap in a world in which multilateralism has become the prevalent form of diplomacy.

Arguably the ANC had more multilateral experience than do those who were apartheid’s diplomats. The ANC were active in the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the Non-Aligned Movement. Both the late Johnny Makhathini and Oliver Tambo built solid reputations as liberation diplomats in multilateral fora. But access to this source of knowledge has been largely blocked by the slow absorption of the liberation movements by the DFA. Much of the formal blame for this lies in the confusion around the sunset clauses in the transition arrangements; in particular, the undertaking to absorb the “foreign ministries” of the former homelands. The irony is that in this new period, the diplomats from apartheid’s independent homelands seem poised to play a greater international role than was ever previously afforded them. There is an impoverishing side to this: cadres with real international experience have been excluded.

Even when exile diplomats have been drawn into the DFA, this has not been gracefully done. Again, anecdotal evidence suggests that

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levels of resistance have been high. Inevitably incumbent bureaucrats resist those regarded as intruders, and South Africa's diplomats are no exception. South Africa's long-serving diplomats have been at some distance from the raw passion of the country's day-to-day politics. Posted abroad and cut off from the intense struggles of the 1980s, they may have little appreciation for the great wells of talent within the ranks of the country's majority. This distance may have been compounded by the DFA's elitist self-image.

The process of transforming the DFA has also been both skewed and slowed by the rush to appoint black staff to foreign missions that has left the internal workings of the ministry untouched. In most cases, the "new" foreign policy appears to be made by those who made the "old" foreign policy. Hopes that this might be changed by the appointment of senior staff in the ministry have been put on hold. It has taken more than a year to appoint second-tier leadership. The decision to retain Rusty Evans, the incumbent, Director-General of Foreign Affairs, until the end of his current tenure, was not without controversy.

All this may have affected the public image of the DFA and brings us back to the flamboyant Pik Botha. He remains a master of the sound-bite: in conferences and on the hustings, his dramatic performances gained him international notoriety. But it was on television where a single two-minute appearance would guarantee voter approval for the DFA, that he is most sorely missed. This digression should not be read as an attack on Alfred Nzo. He is very different from his predecessor, far more the Victorian gentleman than any previous South African foreign minister. Nzo's contribution to the process of building a new set of international relationships is, frankly, unknown. Official sources credit him with securing the sets of relations with the African continent, but whether this has actually turned on his President or on Africa's joy at South Africa's return is uncertain. The point of the comparison is that a central threat to South Africa's "new" foreign policy may well be the absence of a clearly-defined public profile. This promises to be important in South Africa where budgets and efficacy of government departments will be closely watched.

The ending of the Cold War has witnessed the rise of a new genre of realism in international relations—trade and economic determinism. It holds that the new conflicts are economic, that only countries who are positioned to respond to this can become "winning nations." Of course, there is ample superficial evidence to support this view, but it has been driven by economic interest groups in most countries and South Africa is no exception. The watchword of this neo-mercantilism is clear. The business of foreign policy is finding business.

This perspective has been enthusiastically embraced by the DFA who see it as a means of contributing to the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). But they face an immediate challenge from the increasingly vociferous Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), previously a bureaucratic backwater. The DTI has to all intents and purposes cornered the market on South Africa's international economic positioning. They have steered the debate and the negotiations over South Africa's links with the all-important European Community and set out the issues on the country's association with its immediate neighbours through the still-to-be-refurbished Southern African Customs Union. In all this, the DFA has followed, although it's fair to say that individuals from the DFA have made a difference particularly on the EU question.

If economics is one face of the 'new world order' debate in South Africa, the other is security. Here, too, the discourse has not been carried by DFA. In this case, the dominant leadership has been the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). Like many other transitions—in Spain and Portugal, for example—South Africa's has been powerfully cast within a distinctive security-conscious mindset that has unerringly continued the idiom of the security debates of the past.

True, the simplistic notions of a "total onslaught" that were driven by crude strategic logic have been replaced by a set of new issues such as migration, drugs and small arms proliferation. While each represents distinctive challenges to South Africa's government, whether individually or together they represent a threat to the security of the state in an altogether different question. The necessary unpacking of each suggests how dangerously simplistic policy approaches to these kinds of issues can become when they are cast within the restricting logic of traditional strategic thinking. In South and Southern Africa, each of these issues is only properly understood and responded to within wider social contexts: migration is a significant part of the region's political economy, drugs are an integral part of the country's culture and of rural economics, and small arms are a by-product of township violence and the struggle for scarce resources at the local level.

The strategic logic that underpinned the ancien regime makes some sense in the context of, say, maritime security intentions, but even in the context of the hotly-debated issue around the navy's desire to purchase four Corvettes, it has been shown to be wanting. The country's maritime interests may be best served by the development of a comprehensive maritime policy in which the navy might play a major, though not the dominant, role.

These macro and micro-security concerns touch the very core of South Africa's foreign policy, the
country’s relations with its neighbours. And, quite understandably, Southern Africa has been identified as the priority by Minister Nzo, his deputy Aziz Pahad and senior bureaucrats in the DFA. Beyond these declarations, however, there seems to be a void. Although an elaborate scaffolding is in place both for a new regional security and economic structure, South Africa appears to be hesitating. In limited ways, the country is caught in a complex dilemma: does it follow or lead the region into the 21st century?

Along with Botswana and Zimbabwe, South Africa has shown the capacity to deal with the deteriorating situation in Lesotho by using a judicious mix of traditional diplomatic instruments. Lesotho’s tragedy, however, is that it may defy the solutions that these offer. Until and unless the security of Lesotho’s people becomes part of a wider regional context that ensures them access to some of the wealth they have brought South Africa, there can be no lasting peace in that country. This means that the sub-region’s borders will have to be re-examined: Lesotho might only be stabilized by incorporation in a greater South Africa. The same logic applies to Swaziland and, perhaps, Botswana. There is, however, no indication that those who make regional policy are prepared to move the debate beyond the set routines of preventive diplomacy.

Underlying all this, of course, is the nagging question of whether the ‘new’ South Africa will be sufficiently confident to draw upon its domestic experience of reconciliation and help chart new directions in Southern Africa. There are hard choices to be made in southern Africa: these are not to be found within the narrow discourse of orthodox realism but within the emerging global contours that are to be found beyond the nation-state.

Innumerable other issues of both theory and policy remain. Much to the chagrin of the DFA, the increasingly assertive Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs recently pointed out the inherent contradictions in the re-prioritization of the country’s foreign policy. While Africa enjoys precedence over both Europe and North America, budget reallocations to match these new priorities have not been made. At issue here is the immediate problem of bureaucratic transformation, but much deeper is the issue of foreign policy-making in a democracy. How free is South Africa to produce an individual and authentic narrative of itself in the world beyond the Cold War?

In the instance of the non-proliferation treaty, where it seems South Africa did decisively manage to re-direct the course of events by leading and directing a third approach to the issue and ensuring the extension of the treaty, nearly all the kudos were lost because the country has been seen to be too close to the United States. If, as the South Africans claim, they did manage to increase the prospects for the extension of the non-proliferation treaty, why has the US been reluctant to allow the “new” South Africa to claim the credit?

Then there is great confusion around President Mandela’s approach to foreign policy issues. Both China and Indonesia demonstrate the problem. For a mix of economic and sentimental reasons, plus a certain amount of confusion, the country continues its formal recognition of Taiwan. The imminent end to British rule in Hong Kong suggests that this policy has a limited shelf-life. Nevertheless, President Mandela continues to make conciliatory noises towards the island. Indonesia is a slightly different case. The President visited the country on two occasions. On a recent trip he is reported to have raised his concerns over East Timor. But has he been forceful enough in promoting an appropriate human rights narrative?

All the evidence suggests that South Africa’s foreign policy continues to be made by an elite that is deeply influenced by the country’s past international experience. This raises serious questions for progressive research. For too long the theory that underpinned South Africa’s foreign policy was unchallenged ground within the country. With few exceptions, intellectuals uncritically accepted the necessity of the realist paradigm that did little more than promote sectional interests.

The ending of the Cold War has opened up new discourses in international relations which the debate in South Africa on its emerging foreign policy must draw upon more heavily. In important ways, South Africa can play a significant role in changing the debate on the course of international relations. The rainbow option can become a force for intense new understanding of human relations as the 21st century approaches. Moreover, Mandela’s personal history needs to inspire more than failing politicians, retired statesmen and ageing monarchs. Foreign policy-makers will have to draw on the insights and energies of community groups and unions, and they will also have to turn to the talents offered by a new and critical generation of intellectuals.
The Sad Saga of KwaZulu-Natal

BY GERHARD MARÉ

Gerhard Maré, a sociologist teaching at the University of Natal, Durban, is author of Brothers Born of Warrior Blood: Politics and Ethnicity in South Africa and is co-author of An Appetite For Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and the Politics of "Loyal Resistance".

The outline of the province of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), as constituted within a democratic South Africa, is shaped in part by geographical features (the Indian ocean on the east and the Drakensberg mountains in the west and southwest), and partly by historically and presently contested political boundaries (those in the north with Mozambique, established through British colonial annexation in the 1890s; and those in the south by British colonial needs during the nineteenth century and then by the apartheid state). The greatest threats to the territorial integrity of this region came through apartheid bantustan fragmentation and attempts in the early 1980s by the National Party government to hand over a part of the territory to Swaziland.

But space, as we are frequently theoretically and practically reminded, is socially created and filled — and fought over (the nineteenth century history of the region is graphic proof of that contest). The central issue at present, as it was throughout the 1980s and early-1990s, relates to who will control this space, now the province of KZN, previously (since 1970) the KwaZulu bantustan and the province of Natal. From that flows more questions: what relations of control will determine who does what to whom within it; on what basis will decisions as to the future of the region be made; what will internal contes-tations be about; what are the relationships between identities, the ba-

sis of control ('race', class, gender, ethnicity) and space here?

On one level there has been little change in KZN. For the past fifteen years, the manner in which political power relations have been contested has, to a considerable extent, been through violence. That has not changed. The violence continues unabated. For example, a terror campaign in and around the Isithebe/Sundumbili area, an industrial growth point north of Durban, during May, left ten dead, bringing the death toll this year to 60 in that area alone. It was at the funeral of some of these people that President Mandela repeated his threat to cut funds to the province. Attacks on train commuters happened again in June, while sporadic violent incidents continue through much of the province.
It is difficult to see how violence can be contained, never mind removed. On all levels, a conflictual style of engaging in political activity continues. Threats fly back and forth, while no constructive suggestions seem to be on the cards. Control over the security forces and the weeding out of apartheid criminals would seem to offer some hope, but the new locus of control (whether it be provincial or central) is contested. On the ground the legacy of 'no-go areas', and the removal of opponents from such space, has caused social disruption, anger and suffering that will take many years to heal, even under conditions of calm and reconstruction. But the conflict between the Inkatha Freedom Party and the ANC remains.

What are the most important issues in the unfolding saga in which Buthelezi and the IFP occupy centre stage?

First, although the issue of geographical space is largely untested, the southern border with the Eastern Cape is contentious. While there has been extreme tension around this divide, with boycotts, marches and threats, the sides reflect largely provincial rather than party political lines of division. The ANC in KZN, the provincial opposition, supports the IFP in its call to maintain pre-election boundaries. This issue is to be resolved through a judicial commission.

Second, the extent of and responsibility for violence remains as a terrible reminder of the failure of the elections to solve all problems. There have been several allegations of IFP complicity in violent incidents (such as the murder of 13 people in one incident in 1987) and close collaboration with state agents, both from the security police and military intelligence. Arrests have been made, including Zakhele 'MZ' Nxumalo who featured in the 'Inkathagate' revelations a few years ago (see *Southern Africa Report* v.7, n.2, November 1991).

However, unless the Investigation Task Unit (ITU), appointed by safety and security minister Sidney Mufamadi, can show that it has not been created simply to harass and prosecute the IFP for sins of the past, but also uncovers ANC
assassination squads and murderers dating back to the same period, it promises to add to the tension rather than reduce it. Prosecuting IFP members for crimes committed eight years ago, and exposing the details of state-IFP collaboration, which many knew was the case at the time, while essential to establishing trust in the police and the justice system, will not in itself bring violence to an end. The ITU has promised to act with impartiality, and to bring ANC members and supporters to court as well if evidence should be found. However, Mandela used the opportunity of a visit to Tanzania (at the end of May) to accuse his minister of home affairs, Buthelezi, of being responsible for the conflict in KZN, adding fuel to the fire of accusations of bias in the government’s approach.

The latest on the on-going issue of the ‘Shell House massacre’ is of relevance. During the first week of June, President Mandela announced in parliament that he had given the order to defend Shell House, the ANC head office in Johannesburg, during an IFP march just before the elections, even if it should require killing people. The important questions being asked now, with few answers, are why Mandela waited more than a year before revealing this fact; how it relates to his immediate and direct prevention of police to enter Shell House and to remove weapons and question people; why it has taken more than a year to collect some of the weapons employed by ANC guards. Extreme threats have been made by people speaking in the name of the IFP, denied by the leadership, of the consequences unless Mandela is charged with the murder of those killed by Shell House guards.

It appears, from the number of calls upon, and also threats from Mandela, that some ANC and COSATU officials and parliamentarians believe that a state of emergency in the province is essential to resolve the issue of violence. It is doubtful that what failed for the NP will succeed for the ANC.

Third, the issue of ‘traditional authority’, including the position of the Zulu king, drags on. Here, once more, no constructive progress seems to be possible. Until the ANC clearly spells out its position on the powers it intends for chiefs and ‘traditional authority’ generally, and not only in Natal, the contradictions with other commitments remain (such as to equal status for women; to equality for people in rural areas; to democracy through decision-making powers for all anywhere in the country). In addition, the source of payment for the salaries of ‘traditional authority’ has now come to a head.

The central government has tabled a bill to remove payment of chiefs and other ‘traditional’ leaders from the provinces. This does not solve either the wider question of the status of ‘traditional authority’, or that of the obvious similarities of this move with colonial and apartheid control over chiefs. On this question it appears that the IFP government of KZN has the constitution on its side in that such payments should be a provincial concern. It has been speculated that the ANC may meet with opposition from within the alliance with the SA Communist Party and the trade union federation COSATU at least questioning the lack of legitimacy that many such chiefs have, as previous agents of apartheid.

Whoever pays them, it remains a very large expense to incur for an authority whose standing has not been clarified, whose roles contradict several aspects of the Bill of Rights, and who will remain contentious wherever they operate in areas also contested by democratic authority. It was estimated in a recent article that there were ‘some 20 kings and paramount chiefs, 800 chiefs and about 1,000 headmen’. Of these King Zwelithini of the Zulus is the highest paid, receiving R305,000 per annum, but it is claimed that another R20 million goes to maintaining him, his wives, farms and palaces. If they were paid the exorbitant salaries and perks proposed by Mandela, equal to those of MPs, one calculation has it that they will cost somewhere between R300 million and R490 million per annum.

Why the position of the chiefs is so important is that in KZN they are essential to the ability of the IFP to hold on to political power. There is little doubt that without the support of the chiefs, and a large majority still support the IFP and Buthelezi, the party would not have gained the votes they did during the election. The very intensity with which the battle over payment is fought, and the ironic glee from ANC spokespeople (who would otherwise deny any ulterior motive to these moves) who claim that chiefs will now abandon the IFP, is sad proof of their real or perceived power, and the unprincipled power play that is at work from all sides.

King Goodwill Zwelithini’s role remains contentious. It still seems that the ANC does not know what to do with him, now that he has joined ‘their side’. Statements continue to be issued from his council rather than directly from him, and it appears that as a realistic acknowledgement of his lack of power he has not been called upon to get chiefs to rally to his cause. Meanwhile, the IFP remains committed to the institution of the monarchy, if not to the person, and has proposed that the name of the province be changed to the ‘Kingdom of KwaZulu-Natal’.

Fourth, to go to the central issue, the powers of the province against the central authority remain and will continue to be a constant issue. Two IFP documents that relate to this issue have been leaked or revealed recently: first, a discussion docu-
ment, which comes close to calling for secession and is at least a confederal proposal; second, sittings have started on the process of writing a constitution for the province, where details of the IFP proposal have been reported on. Inkatha, now the IFP, has had considerable experience in presenting constitutions. In 1986 the ‘Indaba’ negotiations, initiated and dominated by Inkatha, produced a constitution for the region that would have made it the first state within a future federal South Africa. In 1991 another federal constitution was released by the KwaZulu government. Both the discussion document and the present constitutional proposals demand a large amount of autonomy for the province, including, as in previous documents, control over ‘security and protection services’.

The IFP withdrew from the Constitutional Assembly (parliament and senate operating jointly to draw up a constitution under which the country will be governed after 1999), because negotiation did not take place. Mediation was contained in the agreement that brought the IFP into the elections a week before the event. One inference that can be drawn from the ANC’s failure to implement the apparently clear clause is that it relates to the issue of regional power, and that it does not want further restrictions placed on the type of constitution that is being drawn up. It seems from statements already made that the ANC wishes to step back from the degree of regional power that it agreed to under the interim constitution.

In a TV interview, a few weeks ago Buthelezi, repeated that he doubted the ANC’s commitment to the agreement. He mentioned that the transfer of the issue from Deputy President Mbeki to Constitutional Assembly Chair Cyril Ramaphosa was a clear indication that Mandela was not serious, a reference to the IFP perception that Ramaphosa sank mediation moves just before the elections. That this issue has long-term implications is clear from Buthelezi’s threat that ‘if they don’t take us seriously we will not accept the [new] constitution’.

Because the ANC still functions as a movement and as an alliance, and not as a political party, more issues than would otherwise be the case are located in central power, and are thus ‘politicised’.

In conclusion, the conflict in the province will continue – over regional power in relation to the central government; and over the degree and type of recognition given to ethnically-distinct political demands. The range of issues, some of which have been mentioned above, that will provide sparks for this conflict will no doubt expand over time. What remains to be seen is whether the ANC, and the government of national unity, can find proactive strategies that can both incorporate legitimate demands for democratic decentralisation and for recognition of difference, and also deny the political mobilisation of ethnicity and confrontational politics as practised by Buthelezi and the IFP. There are few signs that this will happen.
BY ALEXANDER COSTY

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During a recent visit to Maputo I was struck by the extent and high-profile of the international presence in Mozambique. Less visible, but perhaps more significant to Mozambique than the dazzling display of international assistance, however, is the rising tide of national NGOs now sweeping the capital. The precious few cars at their disposal are unmarked and weathered, but they represent an emerging civil element which testifies to the many profound changes in Mozambique.

Numbers are difficult to come by, but an estimated 120 national NGOs are active in Mozambique today. Some, like the Organização da Mulher Moçambicana (OMM) and the Organização da Juventude Moçambicana (OJM) are carry-overs of the mass organizations (ODMs) set up by the formerly marxist FRELIMO government in the post-independence period. Others are remnants of the old agricultural co-operative system or surviving state-sponsored professional associations. The vast majority of them, however, sprang to life after 1990 with the introduction of a new constitution allowing, for the first time, for free association among citizens. At the same time, the shift from a managed to a market economy has significantly reduced the scope of government spending, while the outbreak of peace in 1992 and first-time multiparty elections in 1994 have created a new space for social action. Today, national NGOs cover a wide range of social, educational and, to a lesser extent, technical fields connected with humanitarian and developmental objectives. Their activities span the range from public health, family planning and AIDS prevention to rural development, primary education and professional training. Their growth in the past five years has been such that a secondary service industry has mushroomed up around them, offering strategic advice, legal counsel and access to office space and equipment.

I recently attended a two-day conference hosted by the Centre for African Studies (CAS) at Maputo's Eduardo Mondlane University, where about thirty national NGO leaders convened to discuss their purpose and identity within the emerging civil society in Mozambique. For many, it was a first-time opportunity to exchange ideas and discuss strategies for the future. The encounter ended on an optimistic note with a closing speech by CAS director Isabel Casimiro, who concluded that national NGOs reflect the vitality of this new phase in Mozambican history, and that they should prepare for interesting and challenging times ahead.

My own impression from the conference and from subsequent discussions with NGO officials was less bright, however. As I shall argue, NGOs here appear caught in an increasingly awkward position between international donors and the community they wish to serve, especially in the rural sector. Generally, they are also unduly defensive towards the government, and they tend to compete amongst themselves rather than to work together. Such problems will weigh heavily both on their capacity to face future devel-
development challenges in Mozambique, and on the prospects for their own survival.

The partnership problem
As noted, recent political changes have created a favourable context for the emergence of a community of national NGOs in Mozambique. But this community's organizational form, philosophy and development strategies are shaped overwhelmingly by the 180 or so international agencies, NGOs and bilateral donors which flooded the country at the turn of the decade. A key strategy among donor organizations during the Emergency period was to sponsor the formation of national NGOs as "partners," or intermediaries between themselves and the communities they wished to serve. This was meant to involve Mozambicans in the relief effort, and to bypass the political and bureaucratic obstacles of government by opening-up direct channels for the delivery of goods and services to recipient communities. National groups were involved in facilitating or executing the emergency assistance programme, providing valuable logistical and communications support. Many agree that the relief effort and subsequent electoral process were well served by such close cooperation between national and international organizations.

Now, with the emergency officially over, long-term rural development is the order of the day, and many national NGOs are looking to change their orientation accordingly. However, the initial partnership framework remains intact in the post-emergency phase, and, as things now stand, national NGOs are 90 to 100 percent dependent on foreign financial support for their prospective development activities. The relative availability of money from abroad is matched by the virtual non-existence of local funding sources: government spending is restricted and the domestic private sector extremely weak.

Moreover, the increasing impoverishment of most Mozambicans excludes the possibility of reliable income coming through membership fees or service charges. This framework of dependency prevents the local NGO community from building essential national alliances which would strengthen their operational capacity, broaden their scope for independent decision-making and enhance their sustainability. More seriously, it threatens to fragment, rather than unify, national efforts towards development.

Partnership with the community?
In a rare public utterance on this problem - published in the new national weekly Savana - one reader bluntly noted that the only difference between yesterday's mass democratic organizations (ODMs) and today's NGOs is in their political (and economic) masters. Leadership in the social sphere has been transferred from the state to international doadores (donors), and, he adds, there is no sign that the new breed represents broader societal interests any more than did the old. In fact, the Mozambican population was not actively involved in this shift. Unlike the Western interest groups and social associations after which they are modelled, Mozambican NGOs did not emerge historically from the spontaneous organization of voluntary social interests. They thus suffer from the lack of a strong popular base.

Today, NGOs are unclear about how to deal with this "representation deficit," which goes to the very heart of their organizational identity, inhibits their work in the field, and ultimately threatens their purpose within the development process. Some facets of the problem are readily apparent. The majority of national NGOs are located in the capital, the seat of international donors, while 70 percent of Mozambicans live in small rural communities scattered across the countryside. Because of their own short history and the "hurry-up" nature of the emergency and electoral work they have primarily been engaged in to date, NGOs have had no opportunity to cultivate meaningful links with rural communities. National NGO officials are urban recruits with a mainly administrative background, apt in dealing with donors, but with little first hand knowledge of socio-economic forms of organization in remote areas. Moreover, they belong predominantly to the ethnicity of the South, and are schooled in Portuguese, an official language which, according to this year's government estimates, three quarters of the population do not speak.

Narrowing the gap between national NGOs and the community was a central survival strategy discussed at the CAS conference. Within the current funding framework, rural intervention is primarily project based. Running an internationally financed project is therefore essential for immediate survival. An increasingly popular funding strategy for groups like AMRU and MBEU (focusing on rural women), ADCR (on integrated rural development) and AMODEFA (on family planning) is to conduct brief, on-site "socio-economic" studies in order to involve local communities in determining social needs in selected districts of the country. These studies, it is hoped, will generate representative, needs-based projects for proposal, or, as one NGO official candidly told me, "for sale" to international donors.

Thus projects are conceived within a competitive logic, with an eye on increasingly smaller slices of the international project-funding pie. Yet this type of "project writing" is of extremely limited representational value. Studies typically involve contracting an economist or sociologist to conduct field-work for a period of up to six
weeks, hardly the time needed to lay the ground-work for long term partnerships. At the same time, the limited time-frame of most project funding also provides little sustained incentive to become firmly rooted in remote communities.

In sum, by engaging in a project-funding race, national NGOs risk establishing little more than a cosmetic representational link with rural communities. Yet, in truth, they may have little choice: the economic situation is extreme, and not likely to improve any time soon. Meanwhile the current framework, which incites them essentially to put development up “for sale” for the sake of self-sustainment, keeps them closer to international donors than to their potential social base.

Partnership among equals?

Many NGOs do similar kinds of work. For example, five national organizations, including Forum Mulher and Mulheir, work alongside the veteran OMM on women’s issues. The Associação Amigos da Criança, the Associação de Apoio a Criança da Rua, KANINBO, and GYNANA all work with children. Many other groups, like MOCIZA and AAIM, MBEU and ADCR, take an integrated approach to development, and carry out multi-sector activities ranging from education and agriculture to maternal and child health and community development.

The NGO community as whole could fight such overlap and consequent fragmentation of their efforts by setting-up frameworks for collaboration within specific areas of action. This is especially true in the more technical spheres of development like nursing, teaching and on-site professional training, where national NGOs suffer from a scarcity of resources and qualified personnel. And, as it happens, many NGO leaders agree with this point in principle: coordinating facilities like KULIMA and LINK have emerged to promote dialogue and information sharing, for example. But the desire to coordinate is tempered by a general fear of encroachment or not a little bad faith, while, more generally, a competitive atmosphere prevails. NGOs (no doubt understandably) are eager to build their institutional autonomy and make a name for themselves in this new era of opportunity. As a result, practical coordination strategies, such as joint planning and project-sharing, technical cooperation, personnel exchanges, joint-training and the common use of limited transport and communications materials, are slow to be seriously considered.

Such measures would, of course, help to overcome the technical and
material shortcomings which weaken the position of national NGOs, and enable them to begin to face the enormity and complexity of the development work at hand. Any loss of autonomy among equals would also be made up for by a new collective autonomy vis-à-vis international donors. Unfortunately, here again it is their dire financial circumstances that dictates outcomes, encouraging national NGOs to respect the incentives and constraints of a development framework which privileges vertical links over constructive horizontal ones. Groups already partnered with international agencies and NGOs tend to value that relationship more than potential links with similarly focused indigenous groups, while those on the outside mainly aspire to get into the international linkage game. Apart from discouraging a more coordinated development effort, this competitive dynamic also reinforces the conditions that have given rise financial dependence in the first place.

**Partnership with government?**

The model for national development presently being implemented in Mozambique reflects a powerful international trend in current developmental and humanitarian thinking. This model focuses on developing the “civil society,” and is decidedly non-governmental, even anti-governmental: direct government to government transfers are on the wane, while the idea of channelling assistance through large, transnational NGOs and international agencies is rapidly gaining currency. Domestically, this translates into a dramatic reduction in state intervention in key areas, and into a parallel increase in the participation of non-state institutions, said by proponents of this model to be more sensitive to development needs because of their relative proximity to citizens.

This model speaks powerfully to NGO leaders in Mozambique, because it is set against a historical background of strong, often repressive state intervention in society. Thus, despite recent constitutional changes, elections and a commitment to social and economic freedoms, government continues to carry the burden of past mistakes. Today, the idea of an active state quickly conjures up old ghosts and is regarded, to borrow the words of one NGO director, as a “passed form of governance.” And, indeed, the Mozambican government does have grave limitations, not least an archaic bureaucracy and a serious lack of technical and organizational capacity. Information-gathering in the field also needs to be improved seriously, and corruption has increased exponentially in recent years. Besides, like any government, it has its own political interests, thus opening up plenty of room for conflict with NGO objectives. Moreover, as former civil servants, many national NGO officials know the shortcomings of government well!

Yet it should also be emphasized that the state has been engaged in integrated development work for over two decades, making it the single most experienced entity in the country, both in terms of its successes and its mistakes. It is in a unique position to lend valuable institutional support to the long-term humanitarian and development objectives of NGOs.

If the national NGO community presently enjoys the favour of international donors, government possesses by far the widest available administrative reach in the countryside. It also has vast technical superiority in key development areas such as education, health and agriculture. Cooperation could be fruitful. Joint programming would reduce potential overlaps and enhance the distribution of development efforts across the national territory. Urban-based NGOs could “piggyback” on existing government structures and networks in remote rural areas, thus extending their own reach and experience while reinforcing the central development programme. Joint gathering of demographic and statistical information from the field would mutually enhance the capacity to properly assess ongoing rural projects and plan future ones. The list of potential benefits from cooperation goes on and on, and, as many development-watchers here will attest, the perils of non-cooperation with government are just as numerous.

During the CAS conference, a National Planning Commission official invited NGO leaders to participate in creating a dialogue. The reaction was cool. In the present economic climate, the immediate benefits of present links to donors far outweigh the distant advantages of partnership with government. International donors are perceived as more reliable, and inspire less suspicion. Here too, the temptation for emerging NGOs to go it alone and strike a strong public image on the basis of which to solicit new international funding is strong. So is the desire to work autonomously and at first hand in the field. Yet as one well informed observer once suggested, “It may be personally more satisfying to work with a handful of peasants ... but it helps more people to strengthen government structures” (Joseph Hanlon, Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots?, 1989). Indeed, international partners may come and go as they please, but the government is permanently tied to the country and its people. In the end, both the government and NGOs share a strong stake in building their capacity and legitimacy within the community.

**A word on civil society**

I was surprised to hear the term “civil society” so frequently repeated during the CAS conference and in my later talks with Mozambican NGO officials. Maybe this was naive of me, because civil society is the natural habitat of NGOs, and they have every interest in
nurturing and preserving it. Yet, like many interested observers, I am not entirely sure what it means. The civil society debate in Europe and North America is far from settled. But there is general agreement that the term refers to a modern form of social organization meant to buffer the individual's welfare from the excesses or failures of states and markets. Indeed, the civil society, and the complex web of civic organizations, local associations, interest groups, lobbies, political parties, unions and professional communities which make it up, presupposes a social environment in which people are educated enough, healthy enough and economically secure enough to identify and forcefully articulate their interests in an organized manner.

Perhaps my surprise at the widespread use of this concept in Mozambique sprang from the fact that this latter picture was not at all what I saw around me in Maputo, much less in the provincial centres and rural districts I visited during my short stay. I feel obliged to emphasize here that Mozambique is among the most impoverished and indebted countries in the world, and registers some of the lowest of human development indicators. Over a quarter of children die before the age of five. Up to 70 percent of rural households live in extreme poverty, and the adult literacy rate is 33 percent (16 percent for women). Prices in Maputo have risen to the point where over half the monthly minimum wage is absorbed by transportation costs to and from the workplace. Crime and rural banditry have risen exponentially, contributing to a severe sense of insecurity around the country. Meanwhile, there is virtually no local production, and government has been truncated by two decades of war and external interference. It is a country in which children crippled by disease or mutilated by land mines crawl begging on restaurant floors, and where villagers scramble after the rainfall to collect water from roadside ditches. Mozambicans, in short, are in no strong position to organize.

In consequence, it is by no means clear to me just how the notion of civil society – and the developmental model built-up around it – fits into Mozambican reality. The same is true for Mozambican NGOs, whose preoccupation with competitiveness and organizational entrepreneurship (however much imposed by financial constraints upon them), somehow misses the point as to the kind of developmental work that needs most urgently to be done.
Gender Field Workers: A Toronto Visit

BY MARLEA CLARKE

Marlea Clarke is doing graduate work in Southern Africa politics at Toronto's York University. Her particular interest is gender in politics.

Despite the important role played by women in national liberation struggles and the promises made of greater gender equality, the emancipation of women has been a secondary issue in the struggle for independence in both Mozambique and South Africa. Nevertheless, women have organized and mobilized and have brought about the development of explicit policies on gender equality in both countries, policies that are sadly lacking in other countries in the region.

Canadians were privileged to meet recently with two visitors from southern Africa who could give first hand information about the efforts by women's organizations to broaden the process of democratization and to ensure that women's interests are not compromised during this period of reconstruction. Mampe Ntsedi of South Africa and Terezinha da Silva of Mozambique brought hope that lessons learnt from past practices of sidelining gender issues, combined with the new political context in both countries, may now transform social relations.

Ntsedi, a Gender Field Worker for the Farmworkers Research and Resource Project in South Africa, works primarily with women labour tenant and farmworkers. In contrast to this more specific work on gender and land reform, Terezinha da Silva's work with the women's organization Forum-Mulher extends across a variety of sectors, issues and communities. Forum-Mulher is an umbrella organization for women's groups, trade unions, agricultural organizations and other governmental and non-governmental groups in Mozambique working on gender-related issues. Both women focus their work on organizing women and supporting the extension of gender training within various groups. Their aim is to advance women's participation in the new forms of political mobilization and participation emerging within civil society.

Organized by Alternatives, a Montreal-based NGO as part of an ongoing effort by Canadian NGOs to "keep Africa on the map," they provided Canadians with an opportunity to hear first hand of the efforts women are making to ensure that gender equality remains central to social transformation in their countries. They focused attention on the particular challenges facing women in the region and the strategies they are using to address these challenges.

Women and land reform

Ntsedi emphasized the importance of mobilizing rural women and promoting women's rights in the context of land and agrarian reforms such as restitution, redistribution and land tenure. According to Ntsedi, each of these offer both promise and pitfalls for women.

The promise springs from the land redistribution programme which represents the first step in the government's five-year plan to parcel out 30 per cent of the country's arable land to the rural poor. Furthermore, the Restitution of Land Rights Act promulgated last November provides for land to be restored to communities who, since 1913, lost their land rights because of race-based laws and forced removals. This Act created a Land Claims Court and a five-member commission to provide information about who qualifies to make claims, to hear cases and to negotiate with the contending parties to resolve claims. While the Act addresses land claims made by those whose land was taken away, and by their descendents, Tenure Reform will re-examine the property clause in the constitution, thereby providing the basis for constitutional and legal challenges to land tenure, and rights to land.

However, Ntsedi pointed out, while these measures do represent an important step in redressing apartheid injustices, they may not be enough to ensure women equal access to land. Structural factors including customary law, current land ownership and poverty could limit the impact of redistribution for women. Farmworkers, labour tenants and other potential claimants may not have the opportunity to lay claims to land. While the Restitution Act covers all "vulnerable groups," and women are included in this category, the Act does not distinguish among the various types of tenure women had in the past. Further, Ntsedi critiques the Act for its treatment of women as a homogenous group. It doesn't consider the different conditions under which women live; for example, some women lost farmland, while others were victims of forced removals from shantytowns. As long as women can have access to land and land management only through their husbands or other male relatives, many women will be unable to benefit from land reform.
Although the land affairs minister points out that those who do not qualify for restitution can attain land through the redistribution programme, Ntsedi is not optimistic. Land reform will be meaningless, she says, if women’s economic position is not first taken into account. Influenced by the World Bank, South Africa’s land available for redistribution is being sold. This limits the prospects for redistribution to women and the rural poor. This type of land reform is not repatriation; it is a market-driven scheme which presupposes that people have the resources to buy the land. Although individuals can apply for government subsidies when purchasing land available for redistribution, Ntsedi points out that there are many hidden costs that make land unaffordable for many women.

The Farmworkers Research and Resource Project has recognized the marginalization of women and works to promote women’s rights on farms in the Eastern Transvaal by organizing women farmworkers into committees and by supporting capacity building activities. It is this work, Ntsedi believes, that will be key to channelling women’s issues into broader processes of land and agrarian reform.

Women in politics
As in South Africa, women’s rights in Mozambique are protected in the Constitution. However, with the majority of women living in rural areas and relying on subsistence farming for their families’ survival, women’s needs and interests are often not represented in formal politics and in policies. Terezinha da Silva, Vice President of the Forum Mulher, says that the persistent economic and political crisis in Mozambique is serving to perpetuate gender inequalities. Two trends have emerged, she says.

First, more and more households are being headed by females. Women make up about 52% of the population but head up over 60% of households. Second, although women have been most affected by war, drought and structural adjustment programs and are playing an ever important role in their families and communities, only 26% of
the seats in Parliament are held by women. The work and lobbying by Forum-Mulher has been responsible for raising this figure to even this level. (By Canadian standards, where women in parliament number 16%, this figure looks good.) As da Silva notes, both national and community level decision-making structures have continued to reinforce women's exclusion from political and economic structures.

Similar to South Africa, women have rejected the establishment of a "Women's Ministry" as an effective way to address women's needs. However, in Mozambique, 'focal point' people have been appointed in all ministries to ensure that women's interests are integrated and represented in all policies and programmes. Terezinha da Silva suggests that these people, along with active women's groups throughout the country, are critical in advancing development and reconstruction that transforms social relations rather than entrenches gender inequalities.

Forum-Mulher was established in 1990 to co-ordinate activities by women's and other organizations that share a common interest of promoting women's equality and empowerment in Mozambique. The Forum currently has almost fifty members. The organization is still in an early stage, but the inclusion of international agencies and foreign NGOs as members does not appear to result in what Alexander Costy, writing on NGOs in Mozambique on other pages of this magazine, views as a foreign-aid directed agenda. On the contrary, the participation of community level groups has been important in defining Forum-Mulher work. This diverse membership suggests there is more of a base at the grassroots than Costy fears might be the case.

To facilitate the exchange of information and experiences, the Forum has set up communication net-works, assists in training members of participating organizations and other groups, and lobbies for policies to advance gender equality and women's rights. Overall, these activities aim to increase organizations' and government's knowledge of gender issues and to raise the standard of efficiency of their work in support of women.

While training for government and non-governmental organizations is open to both men and women, groups have been set up to train women. Da Silva was not fazed by criticisms of reverse discrimination, arguing that setting up and expanding groups that target women specifically represents an important and critical step in realizing gender equality.

Despite the formidable challenges facing women in these societies, the gendered nature of economic and political restructuring has often been ignored, even in the post-independence period. Indeed, despite the important role women have played within movements in southern Africa during the wars of independence, gender inequality and oppression have been entrenched rather than reduced or abolished in the post-independence period. Further, international attention from the media, NGOs and others has too often perpetuated this silence by uncritically supporting 'progressive' sectors in society which were slow to articulate and advance policies and programs aimed at transforming women's place in society. Da Silva and Ntsedi's visit to Canada has served two purposes. It has increased our knowledge of the activities in which women are engaged, both in South Africa and Mozambique, and it has contributed to "breaking the silence" providing insight for Canadians into lives, struggles and victories of women elsewhere.
Undermining the RDP: A Reply to Barry Pinsky

BY PATRICK BOND

Patrick Bond lectures in social policy at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. In 1994 he served as an editor of the RDP and the RDP White Paper.

The March 1995 issue of Southern Africa Report carried an endorsement by Barry Pinsky of the South African Department of Housing White Paper which was understandably couched as a tribute to the late South African Housing Minister, Joe Slovo.

But if the most sincere tributes to Slovo are inspired by and draw upon his life-long commitment to the interests of poor and working people on the subcontinent, and if such tributes are to meaningfully advance the ideals for which he stood, and if those ideals are being translated into their opposite in practice by demonstrably inept capitalists and a stable of white bureaucrats, then the policy debate requires a more critical perspective.

After all, Slovo had promised that in his first year as housing minister, 90,000 houses for low-income people would be built. Figures recently released by government show that during the eight months he served, plus the four preceding months, fewer than 5,000 houses were actually delivered.

Much of this time, of course, was spent in formulating the new policy and in implementing a market-oriented compromise policy struck between the multi-party National Housing Forum (NHF) and Slovo's...
predecessor as minister, Louis Shill (an incompetent and irascible insurance executive, by even the judgment of Business Day newspaper). The ANC (including Slovo) had okayed the February 1994 agreement at executive level.

That deal's profound failure is self-evident, but inexplicably, the Housing White Paper (IIWP) seems to endorse and build upon this shaky foundation: “Policy positions were developed through a process of bilateral negotiations between the Department of Housing [under Shill] and the NHF, representing the most inclusive process of policy development ever undertaken in South Africa in respect of housing.” In fact, however, it was the RDP housing policy that was far more democratic and representative, unburdened by the NHF’s excessively technocratic, conservative and unaccountable processes.

A critical assessment of market-oriented housing policy is important especially if South Africa’s progressive forces want to celebrate and reaffirm Slovo’s socialist inclinations (which by all accounts were less in evidence during the 1990s). The new housing policy also deserves more attention because of an overriding problem now apparent in recent progressive strategy and tactics: the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) vehicle so arduously wheeled into place during 1993 and early 1994 is being held up and possibly hijacked.

Too many movement leaders and activists are sitting by the side of the road, choking in the dust as the RDP vehicle speeds off to the right with big business and apartheid-era bureaucrats at the wheel. Able to respond primarily through mass action, they now find themselves coming under blunt attack from President Mandela. Worse, the mainstream media regularly hints that blame for the little-altered system’s failure to deliver the goods will be attributed largely to township anarchy, to ineffectual ANC political leadership (especially the alleged “radical populists”) and to the so-called culture of non-payment.

I would propose, in contrast, that the Left apply its own spin control, particularly to those who give the RDP lip-service and then blatantly violate its provisions. One of the best places to start is with housing policy, where RDP promises have been definitively broken notwithstanding this IIWP vow: “The RDP sets out a clear vision for housing in the future. It is therefore imperative that future housing policy and strategy be developed in accordance with this vision and guidelines.”
To highlight the many shortcomings in the HWP requires taking what may appear as an excessively hostile position. To be sure, various positive features of the HWP (which Barry Pinsky recorded in the last SAR) are not emphasised in this article, for the purpose, instead, of alerting comrades and housing policy wonks to what I perceive as its most serious political and technical problems.

My conclusion is that notwithstanding some significant advances beyond the apartheid-era approach, the HWP’s deviations from the RDP are so serious as to ensure continued conflict, ineffectual delivery, inefficiencies associated with oligopolistic practices (by banks, developers, construction industry suppliers, estate agents), and inequity in the housing sector. Since so few of the HWP’s flaws have been publicly discussed, explaining those flaws, then, will be the essence of the following ten questions and answers, which compare the divergent RDP and HWP approaches to housing policy.

1. **What is the cause of the housing crisis?** The HWP Preamble traces the housing crisis to the “bureaucratic, administrative, financial and institutional framework inherited from the previous government.” In contrast, the RDP also blames “the limited range of the capitalist housing markets.” In failing to acknowledge limits to the market, the HWP advocates a system for housing delivery and financing which is bound to reproduce market failure. Indeed, the HWP affirms “the fundamental pre-condition for attracting [private] investment, which is that housing must be provided within a normalised market.” Taking an entirely different approach, the RDP advocates both a housing bank (to attract private resources such as pensions out of the stock market and luxury real estate and into a state-controlled institution for on-lending) and that the subsidy be provided via non-speculative housing (i.e., it must be repaid upon selling the house, or is invested in public housing or a housing cooperative).

2. **Why can so few South Africans afford housing provided by the market?** The primary reasons the black housing market was never as “normal” as the white market, of course, were enforced geographical segregation and lack of affordability. Setting aside the inherited apartheid-capitalist income distribution and continuing economic stagnation, the most crucial determinant of housing market affordability today remains the interest rate on home loans (also called “bonds”). If the average rate were 3%, then all South Africans could afford to pay for housing; instead it is over 16%. When the interest rate for housing loans soared from 12.5% to 20.75% from early 1988 to late 1989, the unprecedented affordability crisis led to massive numbers of involuntary defaults. Yet inexplicably, the interest rate is completely missing from the HWP’s long list of “economic issues” which “militate against a massive increase in effective demand” for housing. The HWP authors appear anxious to avoid any confrontation with the ultra-conservative bureaucrat who sets the interest rate, Reserve Bank Governor Chris Stals.
3. What prevents government from resolving the affordability problem?
The HWP contends that “budgetary constraints do not allow sufficient subsidy money per household to enable the construction, at State expense, of a minimum standard complete house for each household not able to afford such a house.” (It is assumed that a minimally-decent house costs approximately R25,000, and that SA’s income distribution requires an average 50% subsidy.) Compared to the previous policy, the HWP does allow a slight increase in the maximum housing subsidy to the very poor, but it is still R10,000 too little and the average subsidy is also too low. More to the point, the HWP fails to consider the actual cost to the budget of meeting the RDP goal of one million new houses over five years (an average of 200,000 per year). At an average cost to the state of R12,500 per house – not including the other R12,500, which should come from private sector resources such as pensions via the national housing bank (to be repaid at the market rate of interest) – the main RDP housing subsidy would cost the government just R2.5 billion per year. Consistent with the RDP, the HWP’s – and government’s – stated goal for resource allocation is to acquire 5% of the budget for housing by the year 1998. In constant rand terms based on the present budget this would be R7 billion, far in excess of the R2.5 billion the RDP requires. Simple mathematics shows the inaccuracy of the fiscal constraint argument.

4. What kinds of housing subsidies? Not merely the amount, but the character of subsidies, has been hotly contested. The HWP mostly ignores the RDP insistence that housing subsidies be non-speculative in nature (with the exception of a very minor cooperative subsidy programme which is still not operational). Moreover, the HWP’s neoliberal commitment to the up-front capital subsidy approach (rather than lower interest rates spread over time) is a direct violation of the RDP, which insists that “Interest rates must be kept as low as possible.” (Worse still, the HWP seems to endorse a bank plan to charge “a higher interest rate on bonds [for low-income borrowers] than the prevailing bond rate”; the Department of Housing may actually reward this despicable form of class discrimination with administrative support.) Finally, the HWP rigidly announces, “it is not envisaged that subsidy mechanism or level variations on a provincial or local/metropolitan basis will be possible.”

5. What are the financial market constraints? When considering private sector financial resources, the HWP explains that declining rates of personal savings “reduced the availability of savings for investment in housing.” This is nonsense, given the massive increases in credit granted by banks during the late 1980s (when savings rates were extremely low). Indeed, the SA financial system has shown an impressive ability to disregard savings and instead to create housing credit (mainly for the white market) based on factors such as the property market cycle, financial deregulation, interest rate levels and inter-bank competition. The failure of the HWP drafters to recognise this again reveals a very conservative economic bias and bodes ill for future interventions in housing finance markets.

6. On what terms is private housing finance to be provided? The flaws in the October 1994 insurance scheme between the Department of Housing and the commercial banks are too numerous and serious to be discussed in depth here. In short, however, the scheme disempowers communities (by taking away their sole leverage to prevent foreclosure), ignores the underlying reasons for bond boycotts or defaults, gives too much leeway to banks, and hence will simply not make much of a difference to the availability of housing credit in areas where it is most needed. (The scheme also directly violates the RDP provision that “Unemployment bond insurance packages and guarantee schemes with a demand-side orientation must be devised.”) Moreover, the HWP proposal for a National Housing Finance Corporation rejects the RDP suggestion that “Government funds and private sector funding must be blended in order to make housing finance affordable.” And by serving as “a conduit for international investment” the Corporation will also violate the RDP warning to “use foreign debt financing only for those elements of the programme that can potentially increase our capacity for earning foreign exchange.” Moreover, the HWP’s emphasis on mobilising consumer savings is misplaced given the limited disposable income of poor people. Finally, the HWP ignores the RDP insistence that “relining’ and other forms of discrimination by banks must be prohibited”; indeed, discriminatory behaviour by banks continues virtually unchecked.

7. What kind of housing tenure (individual ownership, rental, cooperative)? First, the HWP does not even consider rental stock, and even omits public housing stock from a list of housing functions to be fulfilled by local government. The RDP, in contrast, proposes that “Sufficient affordable rental housing stock should be provided to low-income earners who choose this option.” Though the HWP gives lip service to cooperative housing, the inner-city Johannesburg pilot project Slovo selected in September 1994 has still not been launched or even fully financed. So while the HWP claims that “Government rejects the elevation of the individualised private homeownership above other forms of secure tenure,” HWP policies and practices are geared to precisely that. As a result, the HWP subsidy policy encourages churning, speculation and downward-raiding, instead of permanently affordable housing protected from market vicissitudes.

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Sporting Colours

BY BRUCE KIDD

Bruce Kidd, director of physical and health education at the University of Toronto, has had a long involvement in the struggle against apartheid in sports.


In the four years since athletic teams representing the 'real South Africa' (in Sam Ramsamy's insistent phrase) have begun to compete in international sports, perhaps no event signalled the end of the old white supremacist ways and the beginnings of the new non-racial ones as the very first 'coming out,' the 1991 cricket tour in India.

The announcement of the tour caught the entire sporting world by surprise. Less than two years previously the Mass Democratic Movement had shut down white cricket czar Ali Bacher's last opportunistic attempt at a 'rebel tour,' and brought an end to his cosmetically staged coaching program in the townships. It seemed hardly likely that the new South Africa would first emerge in a sport where the leading association had been so thoroughly discredited.

The touring cricket eleven was the first in South African history to be racially integrated, and it played against an opponent white South Africa had never deigned to play. During all the years of the international boycott, apologists for apartheid continually harped on the need for selection on the basis of merit, and the importance of 'bridge-building' through sports, ignoring the fact that white South Africa had always denied black South Africans a place on 'representative' teams. It had never wanted to play India, Pakistan or the West Indies, often very best in cricket, and tried to stop other opponents from including athletes of colour on their teams.

Moreover, it was the ANC which made the tour to India happen, even though it was still a long way from achieving formal political power. In a dramatic demonstration of the long-banned organization's ability to control the agenda for change and its willingness to take risks to advance it, ANC leader
Nelson Mandela and sports chief Steve Tshwete made the calls to the international community to bring down the longstanding moratorium and start the normalization of South African sports.

The leadership of the tour was racially mixed as well, heralding the sweeping organizational changes the ANC and their allies in the anti-apartheid sports movement were bringing to South African sports. The new, non-racial cricket organization which undertook the tour had been forged in a merger between the white cricket union and the long-suffering non-racial cricket board, setting a model for similar "unity" federations in other sports.

The stunning turnaround in South African cricket provides the narrative framework for British-based cricket writer Mihir Bose’s popular account of the long struggle against apartheid sport. It is a victors’ tale, of justice, courage and persistence triumphing over brutal oppression and hypocrisy. Bose tells it well, integrating portraits and personal reflections of the major players, including Dennis Brutus, Ramsamy, Muhleki George, Ngonde Balfour, Tshwete and Bacher with his account.

In explaining the gradual success of the anti-apartheid organizations, first to isolate white South Africa in sport, and then to achieve sport unification under a non-racial banner, Bose gives the greatest weight to actors and events within South Africa.

He is convinced that the international boycott would never have garnered support had it not been for the arrogant stupidity of the white sports officials. During the days of petty apartheid, so many of their counterparts in the leading sports organizations around the world seemed ready to turn a blind eye to apartheid, he suggests, that misrepresentation and the promise of cosmetic change might have carried them through. But they stuck to their guns so fiercely that it became impossible for anyone to defend them.

In 1970, for example, at a meeting of the International Olympic Committee, white South African Olympic leader Frank Braun attacked the critics of apartheid so aggressively that even his friends like IOC president Avery Brundage were unable to prevent South Africa’s expulsion. The tide turned in cricket that same year when South African president John Vorster warned that Basil D’Olivera, a South African black who had been forced to emigrate to England to play the game at the top level, would not be allowed to enter the country if he was named to the English team for a forthcoming tour. The announcement put the South African sports establishment on the defensive for good.

Likewise, Bose gives the greatest credit for the creation of the new, non-racial sports organizations and their entry into international competition, to sports-loving ANC veterans like Balfour, Tshwete, and George working within South Africa. It was their fierce desire to improve sporting opportunities for blacks, even under the conditions of apartheid, which led them to go beyond the strategy of ‘no normal sport in an abnormal society’ and the complete boycott of all South African sport which activists pursued during the 1970s and 1980s. To do this, they devised a ‘two-track strategy,’ seeking to develop international links for the non-racial sports movement alongside the anti-apartheid boycott. They shrewdly took up the empty ‘bridge-building’ rhetoric of the white apologists and tried to give it substance within their own activities. When the ANC was unbanned and the ‘pillars of apartheid’ came down, they hit the ground running and have been able to control the direction of development ever since.

Bose does acknowledge the international campaign especially the contributions of the African and socialist governments and the anti-apartheid organizations – and the extra-sport economic and military factors, but he ascribes considerably less attention to them than I feel is appropriate. A more complete account would devote more attention to the mounting pressure these factors produced.

While it is gratifying to read about such a clear triumph – Sporting Colours has little of the tension and raw anger of earlier books on this subject, most of which were written by activists caught up in the uncertainties of difficult struggle – it is far too early to bring closure on the perplexing strategic issues of the long campaign. Bose alludes to some of the strategic dilemmas which divided activists like Brutus and Ramsamy along the way, but neither delineates nor discusses them, as if they can be forgotten in the celebration of victory. In his analysis of the last few years, he suggests that there was little risk to the ‘two-track’ strategy initiated by the young activists in the late 1980s, with nary a word about the doubts many others held at the time. But I still wonder if they could have achieved the differential boycott, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, whose solidarity had ensured the isolation of the white South African sports organizations for so many years.

Fortunately, the apartheid regime began to unravel about the same time, so the ‘two-track’ strategy was never put to the test – i.e. the anti-apartheid movement never had to call upon the IOC and countries like Canada to recognize and significantly assist the non-racial bodies while maintaining the boycott against the white South African sports establishment. Nevertheless, the ‘two-track’ strategy did accelerate the timetable for ending the moratorium, because it had many activists thinking and dreaming about international co-
do not exist, despite the fact that they played important roles in every aspect of the struggle, and in cricket, do most of the coaching of youth in large townships like Soweto. (One of these coaches is shown in the book's photographs, but is not named.) He describes Arthur Ashe as 'the first great black player to emerge in modern international tennis,' forgetting about Wimbleton champion Althea Gibson a generation earlier, and jars controlled building materials suppliers must be encouraged, possibly with government subsidies to enhance competitiveness. An enforceable Code of Conduct must be established to guide developers. The HWP distorts or contradicts the RDP. The HWP also ignores the RDP's more proactive suggestions, such as preparing new legislation to protect tenants' rights, squatters' rights, and the rights of people living in informal settlements, and addressing evictions and exploitation in rentals. The HWP is silent on gender discrimination, whereas the RDP demands that "All legislative obstacles and constraints to housing and credit for women must be removed." And while the RDP suggests that "Locally controlled Housing Associations or cooperatives must be supported, in part to take over properties in possession of banks due to foreclosure," the HWP simply ignores such a solution.

Perhaps most worrisome of all, the HWP Preamble states, "The time for policy debate is now past." While no one denies that mass housing construction is already long overdue, this is an unnecessary closure of debate and threatens to shut out those social forces which will have fundamental objections to the HWP as its shortcomings are recognised. Hopefully, as land invasions, occupations of vacant buildings, rent strikes and other legitimate forms of popular resistance continue, there will be time again for revisiting policy.

If progressives within the state and civil society fail to recognise these policy distortions in the interests of a mythical social contract harmony model or in memory of a socialist leader who must have been, at best, only indirectly responsible for the HWP's most retrogressive provisions, the tragedy would be greater. And if poor and working people in South Africa fail to mobilise pressure to restore the RDP and hence to dispense with faith in capitalist housing markets and the apartheid-era bureaucracy most responsible for the HWP, that tragedy will be multiplied many times.

Undermining the RDP
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8. What role for community organisations? Though households, non-governmental organisations and "communities" (not organisations) are given passing mention, nowhere in the HWP is there mention of government and other community groups specifically cited as partners. In contrast, the RDP housing guidelines declare that "Capacity building and funds for community-based organisations must be made available." Dozens of opportunities in the HWP to support civics and CBOs are ignored.

9. What role for small housing developers? The HWP disparages black developers - "the growth and support of the emerging construction sector is not seen as a primary housing responsibility and therefore does not justify the allocation of housing funds" - even though the RDP urges, "The development of small, medium-sized and micro enterprises owned and run by black people must be incorporated into the housing delivery programme."

10. What regulation for the building materials and construction industries? The RDP states, "Cartels, price agreements and market share agreements must end, and consideration must be given to public, worker and community-based ownership where the market fails to provide a reasonably priced product. Community-controlled building materials suppliers must be encouraged, possibly with government subsidies to enhance competitiveness. An enforceable Code of Conduct must be established to guide developers." The HWP falls far short in addressing anticompetitive practices in these industries (such as inordinate price inflation), which are known to be virtually impossible to self-regulate. And there are no firm HWP commitments on consumer protection.

These ten comparisons (there are many more) illustrate how the HWP distorts or contradicts the RDP. The HWP also ignores the RDP's more proactive suggestions, such as preparing new legislation to protect tenants' rights, squatters' rights, and the rights of people living in informal settlements, and addressing evictions and exploitation in rentals. The HWP is silent on gender discrimination, whereas the RDP demands that "All legislative obstacles and constraints to housing and credit for women must be removed." And while the RDP suggests that "Locally controlled Housing Associations or cooperatives must be supported, in part to take over properties in possession of banks due to foreclosure," the HWP simply ignores such a solution.

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