A DIFFERENT GLOBAL AGENDA

New South/North Initiatives

War or Peace
Angola & Mozambique

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Of Links ... and Liberation

On numerous occasions over the past several years, SAR has registered the need to redefine the terms of solidarity that exist between supportive activists, Western and/or Northern, on the one hand, and southern Africans engaged in struggle on the other. As has been emphasized, we have come a long way from the days when support for liberation movements and "progressive regimes" provided an adequate rationale for southern African-related political work. Increasingly, the common circumstances—the negative impact of the globalizing imperatives of capital, the shared challenge of realizing the genuine empowerment of ordinary people—that bind together those at both ends of this relationship have permitted the development of new ways of defining our preoccupations and linking our activities.

At the centre of the current number of SAR are reports on two recent attempts to concretize further these "new terms of solidarity" in-the-making. The first is an account of the latest meeting of the fledgling South-South-North network (a previous meeting of the network was discussed in these pages in March, 1992), held in Harare, Zimbabwe. It highlights the range of issues of common concern that the delegates felt it useful to discuss together, and the mutual enlightenment that can flow from such an exchange. But it highlights, as well, the difficulties that arose as delegates—coming from very diverse contexts and with very different experiences behind them—sought both to address each other and to build institutions that could be expected to anchor their on-going relationships.

Both the difficulties and the opportunities inherent in this new kind of solidarity work were also apparent during the course of the second workshop reported on
here. Held in Toronto, it brought together trade unionists from both South Africa and Canada to discuss “trade union responses to global restructuring.” The latter is a complex issue and, as workshop participants quickly found, the most progressive and effective ways of addressing it are not self-evident. The terrain of “the new solidarity” is defined by ideologically-charged and eminently debatable questions. In consequence—and far more than was true of the “good old days” of relatively straightforward anti-apartheid solidarity—a fruitful exchange between Canadian and South Africans demands subtlety of understanding and a special tolerance for differences of opinion. But the rewards of such an exchange can also be great and, as their deliberations proceeded, trade union delegates—like their counterparts in Harare—were quick to acknowledge as much.

One other specific response to the newly emerging set of challenges posed by “the new solidarity” may interest SAR readers—since it is a response intended to speak, however modestly, to the imperatives of the current moment: having recently celebrated its twentieth anniversary, SAR’s parent committee, the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (TCLSAC), has readied itself for the next twenty years not only by changing its address (subscribers and contributors take note), but also by changing its name! As it happens, the recognition value of “Tickle-Sack”—hard-earned over the last two decades of “good works”—seemed too important to lose. But we did feel the need for a name more commensurate both with the current phase of developments in the region, and of our own undertakings. Enter, then, “The Toronto Committee for Links between Southern Africa and Canada”: aka TCLSAC.

Of course, Southern Africa does continue to warrant “liberating,” now as much as ever perhaps; since the continuing fall-out from destabilization and from the cruel imperatives of structural adjustment are helping to define a virtual recolonization of the region. Indeed, it is not difficult to see the vicissitudes of the latest rounds of the “peace processes” in Angola and Mozambique—so vividly evoked by Victoria Brittain, Pierre Beaudet and Judith Marshall in the trio of hardhitting articles that lead off the present issue—as merely the latest phase of the unresolved struggles for liberation from external dictate that we, in TCLSAC, have been supporting in “Lusophone Africa” throughout the twenty years of our committee’s existence.

What has changed? As noted, it may be merely that we now see our own fates in Canada as being linked to such struggles in ways that are more closely parallel than we had previously acknowledged. The fact that it is difficult, as participants in the Harare and Toronto workshops discovered, to find the language most appropriate to conceptualizing and substantiating such linkages—as regards the most effective responses to globalization, for example, or the most promising practices of democratization—need not discourage us. So venal is the “New World Order” that ensnares us all, and so high the stakes that encourage us to work politically across national and racial frontiers to redress global problems, that this should merely encourage us to do it better the next time we meet.
War and Peace and War

The grim ordeal that the recent history of both Angola and Mozambique has become grinds on. And wars, largely inflicted on these countries from without, prove far easier to set in motion than to wind down. Angola is the cruelest case. There Jonas Savimbi, the darling of the international Right, merely blows aside the democratic outcome that has so defied his boundless ambition and lets slip, once again, the dogs of war. Two accounts of this cruel moment in Angola may help readers to grasp its full horror. The first, by veteran SAR correspondent Victoria Brittain (of the UK's Guardian newspaper), serves to place the events in the broader global framework of imperial calculation while, simultaneously, giving them a human face - as she recalls several of the Angolan patriots who, in Huambo, have paid with their lives for Savimbi's present activities. The second article, by Quebec support activist Pierre Beaudet just back from Angola, further evokes the reality of a war that, despite the recent but short-lived episode of peace, now shows no sign of slackening. A related article on Mozambique - one that draws its strength from the first-hand impressions of Judith Marshall - shows a peace process in that country which, after a fashion, remains in place. But, ominously, it is one fraught with danger signs that are all too familiar from Angola's own recent past. We present, then, an unsettling trio of articles, scarcely light summer reading. But they provide essential information: food for thought, food for action.

A Wrecker's Role: Unita & Its Friends

By Victoria Brittain

Victoria Brittain is SAR's Angola correspondent.

The recognition of the Angolan government by the Clinton administration and the failure at Abidjan, after six weeks, of the UN-brokered peace talks between the government and UNITA in May, marked the beginning of a new phase of the struggle for power. All indications are that it will be long drawn out. Within days a general mobilization was ordered by the government, UNITA retook the key economic targets of Soyo and Kafunfo, and reports from across the country indicated that dozens of civilians were being killed almost daily in UNITA attacks on towns, while over one hundred perished in one attack on a train.

In SAR of October 1987, I wrote that that year Angola suffered the heaviest pressures yet of its 11 year independence - militarily, economically, diplomatically and politically. But the eight months since the elections of last September have dwarfed the pressures of 1987 on every front.

On the military and economic fronts the disaster is easily gauged.

Unita seized control of about two-thirds of the country - denying the government access to far vaster areas than ever before. The levels of destruction in town which Unita took, like Huambo, or tried to take, like Lobito or Luena, are what the South African invasions did in small towns like Ngíva a decade ago, but writ large. Homes, offices, factories, government buildings were razed to the ground. Reconstruction of major sabotage targets from earlier years of war, such as the Lomaum dam, have been set back months if not years with the destruction of thousands of dollars worth of repair material that arrived in the port of Lobito last year. In vast areas of the countryside crops have not been planted as a great tide of people displaced by the Unita offensive fled, often hundreds of miles on foot, to the relative security of refugee camps, on the outskirts of Luanda and Benguela in particular.

On the invisible diplomatic and political fronts the pressures have been enormous, and despite the change of public policy by Washington, are not over yet. Unita's old backers sought a power-sharing agreement (as in South Africa) which would give Unita areas of local autonomy and a definitive say in central government. Recognition was withheld with the excuse that this gave Washington leverage over Savimbi, but the real reason was the leverage it gave them over the MPLA to force political concessions - which were promised - to Savimbi.

However, the central question of Savimbi's own future remains undecided, the shape of a new UN mandate to replace the monitoring role that failed so dismally has yet to be designed, and the mechanism - military control over huge areas has yet to be determined. On all three points the US will have the decisive influence, though it is too early to see whether President Clinton will use that influence decisively to cut short the agony of this transition.

Over Christmas, with the Unita offensive in full swing, towns and municipalities falling daily, and the government army holding the line with an influx of volunteers signing up to defend their own areas, the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, offered to host a meeting between the two
sides in New York or Geneva. The proposal – for a Head of State to travel abroad to meet the leader of a rebellion against him – illustrated the grotesque position of the international community on the new war: that both sides were to blame and had the same legitimate concerns. In a travesty of justice the elections and the new multi-party government had thus not altered by a fraction the mindset of the international community, led by the Americans, towards the MPLA. And while Unita and the South Africans supporting them used the vacuum of power in Washington between President Clinton’s election and inauguration for the war to reverse the election results, there was only silence from the outside world.

It was to take two failed rounds of UN-sponsored peace talks outside Angola, in Addis Ababa and Abijan, and a two-month Unita siege of Huambo in which 15,000 people may have died, before the Clinton Administration decided on recognition. Pressure in Congress for it grew slowly from the first days of the new administration. It was heightened by intervention from the ANC leadership who briefed the large delegation sent from Washington to the funeral of the communist leader Chris Hani on the involvement of the South African military circles in the support for Savimbi, and the likely parallels with the carnage Chief Buthelezi could unleash in South Africa’s transition.

The intransigence of the Unita delegation in Abijan, following the Addis meeting which they never allowed to get off the ground, was rooted in their confidence that the past would dictate the future.

Miguel Nzau Puna, one of Savimbi’s leading Generals for years until his defection in early 1992, said recently the Americans had repeatedly assured Unita that they would win the election and that the MPLA had no future. The two key US officials, Herman Cohen and Jeffrey Davidow, throughout the post-Bicesse months studiously ignored the available evidence of Unita’s war preparations, systematic disruption of the election registration process, and paralysis of the Joint Monitoring team (CCPM). (see SAR Vol. 8 No. 3/4 Jan. 1993) With hindsight it is clear that this was a policy designed to ensure the outcome of their predictions of victory for Unita. Evidence of how deep was the conviction of Unita members, abroad in particular, that they were bound to win, has emerged recently in some bitter exchanges in solidarity meetings both in Canada and in England. The extreme feelings, often with racism as an ingredient, surfaced after the dramatic events around the failed Unita coup of 29/30 October in Luanda, and followed a more nuanced period in which at least some Unita cadres sought reconciliation. They augur badly for the future.

The real keys to all this lie in a much earlier period. Dr. Chester Voting in Luanda, 29-30 September 1992
Crocker’s recently published, *High Noon in Southern Africa, Making Peace in a Rough Neighbourhood*, (WW Norton $37.99 Canada) gives an invaluable picture of US policy through the critical eight years when he was Assistant Secretary of State for Africa. Much of what was written at the time about his ambitious diplomatic remaking of the political shape of Southern Africa through this period is confirmed unashamedly by the book. He took office with two explicit goals: oust the Cubans from Angola; bring South Africa back from the brink of violent and destructive explosion to which apartheid had brought it.

For those ends, he created the concept of linkage between Namibia’s independence and the departure of the Cubans. When he first suggested that the ending of South Africa’s illegal occupation of Namibia should be rewarded with the removal from Angola of a defence force against South African aggression brought in by a sovereign government fighting for its life, no one in the Frontline States believed that Crocker could, with such an unprincipled suggestion, thus remake UN policy. But time, and the spinelessness of the rest of the international community, proved them wrong. Crocker, for the Reagan administration, set the tone for the subservience of the United Nations to US policy which has underlain the shameful 17 months of Angola’s transition up to the election, and the even more scandalous abnegation of UN responsibility during Unita’s renewed war.

Of course what Crocker’s book does not cover in its 500 pages is the military muscle built up for Savimbi by the US, South Africa, Israel, Morocco, and Zaire. This muscle, which was the indispensable other side of the diplomatic game for nearly a decade, has been seen as never before in the eight months since the election.

It remains astonishing that, as far as I know, no UN staffer based in Angola through the transition, nor any of the prestigious international observers brought in to monitor the elections, reacted to the new war with a public self-criticism of what they had so clearly failed to see or monitor: the readying of Unita’s war machine for action in the event of a loss at the polls. (Several individuals have, however,
told me that they resigned from UN or NGO jobs horrified by their sense of responsibility for what they saw taking place.)

It is the nature of destabilization that this is clandestine, and it will probably take another John Stockwell to reveal what role the CIA played in the vast logistics and resupply of Unita that began from South Africa and Zaire in early October 1992. It may only take the anticipated changes in the command structure of the South African security forces during the transition period to discover who in South Africa directed their involvement. Dozens of supply flights from South Africa were monitored by Frontline States, a sophisticated network of former SADF personnel working as mercenaries were flown in (and a cover story that they were hired by the MPLA as security guards floated in the media), Zairian forces were deployed by President Mobutu. The capture of the diamond mines at Kafunfo provided Unita with resources. This coalition of forces against the MPLA was essentially a rerun of the struggle for power in the run up to Independence in 1975 and illustrated how little the hostile international context in which the MPLA had first sought its independence has changed despite the end of the Cold War.

The Crocker book, with its vitriol in particular against the then Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge, shows again and again in the details of the negotiating process and the shifting goal posts the American determination to subvert or crush the MPLA. Like the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, Maurice Bishop in Grenada, Thomas Sankara in Burkino Faso, and above all Fidel Castro in Cuba, the Angolan party, despite all its internal weaknesses, still posed a threat of a good example in the Third World.

Nothing more clearly illustrated the political character of the movement built as the tool of US policy and the symbolic threat of the MPLA, than the political murders in Huambo in October and November which preceded the taking of the town three months later. The agronomist and poet Fernando Marcellino, his wife, a leader of the women's organization OMA, his sister, a member of a religious order with a heroic past including an earlier imprisonment by Unita, and Dr. David Bernadino, a writer and the creator of a children's clinic, were the soul of that once-beautiful Central Highlands town filled with flowering trees and children's playgrounds. At the university and the hospital, where they were the key figures, the rigorous and enthusiastic standards of the first years after independence were maintained through the long years of Unita's blockade and terrorism. Despite the many attacks even inside the town which threatened to reduce life to a mere struggle for survival, Chimanga, the research station headed by Marcellino, contained greenhouses full of orchids and begonias, and Dr. Bernadino's house was famous even beyond Africa for its collection of classical music and films on video. After the Marcellino's murders by Unita gunmen lying in wait for their car outside Dr. Bernadino's house, the doctor stayed on – a one man demonstration of courage – with his routine unchanged eating lunch every day in the Marcellino's house. The day after two of the Marcellino's sons returned to Huambo the following month, Dr. Bernadino was shot dead outside the hospital. It was Unita's final warning that the Huambo in which such exceptional idealistic and independent men and women had been synonymous with the MPLA for nearly two decades would exist no longer.

Barbarism took over within weeks as Unita tightened the siege of the town, took the airport, closed the roads and seized one government building after another. Bodies lay in the streets, Unita soldiers entered the hospital and bayoneted the wounded as they lay in bed. A small garrison fought for two months to keep the governor's palace from falling, but finally withdrew on March 7, with a column of tens of thousands of desperate civilians.

In dozens of other towns similar sieges by Unita killed uncounted thousands. In late April the World Food Programme, which kept flights of food going where most other international agencies had given up because of the danger, finally stopped its flying following the death of a Russian pilot after his plane was hit by a missile in Luena.

Against this background in Abijan this April, Unita's Jorge Valentin publicly refused a cease-fire and demanded the effective partition of the country, while Savimbi flew a party of foreign journalists from South Africa to Zaire, then to Kafunfo and by road to Huambo, to hear his Chief of Staff boast that Unita was prepared to take Luanda. With the UN mandate due to expire, and Angola on the agenda of the Security Council, the failure of the US to recognize the multi-party government threatened to become an embarrassment internationally just as the Clinton administration was shifting for internal reasons, as outlined above.

The risk of social disintegration, as in neighbouring Zaire, is still a real one for Angola, despite the US recognition, the build-up of a new national army, and the prospect of change in South Africa. The unique moment of history when millions of Angolans stood in queues for polling stations for hours or days, when election officials slept by their ballot boxes for 48 hours or more without food and drink, because they believed in peace and democracy, has gone forever. Briefly then the MPLA gave this divided society a common vision which transcended both the dark episodes of the party's own past and Unita's legacy of fear. Such a moment will never come again as long as Savimbi remains in the country.
Angola: War Without End

By Pierre Beaudet

Pierre Beaudet, director of CIDMAA, the Centre d'information et de documentation sur le Mozambique et l'Afrique australe in Montreal and long-time observer of southern Africa recently returned from a visit to Angola.

Angola is holding its breath, just after the last round of negotiations came to an abrupt halt at the end of May in Abidjan, capital of the Ivory Coast. In spite of US recognition of the Angola Government, Unita refuses to accede to international pressure because, on the ground, Savimbi's movement has enormous advantages. Since the battle of Huambo last February, where more than 10,000 civilians and soldiers died, everyone has been wondering about the future of this country. Right now a de facto partition divides the country into two armed camps. Barring a last-minute agreement, fighting may well break out again. As a result of this catastrophic situation, famine is imminent, threatening more than three million people displaced by the war.

Fragile balance of power

The balance of power between the two leading political forces in Angola remains fluid. The MPLA government is benefiting from majority support within the population across several regions of the country. In the September election the MPLA won a majority in 14 out of 18 provinces. The bulk of the urban population has lined up behind the government (the capital alone accounting for nearly two million people). But in fact, their support is soft - more by default than anything else. "The people don't love the government much," maintains Fernando Pacheco, an official with an Angolan development organization, "but the prospect of Savimbi seizing power scares them enor-

Savimbi portrait at Unita checkpoint in Cuando Cubango, May 1992
"To spare the enemy is to prolong the war"
mously.” Throughout 1992 and especially during the electoral campaign, Unita has consistently proclaimed its intention of “cleansing” the country, which would have led without doubt to the mainly Ovimbundu southerners taking revenge on the northerners, the mixed race, and the whites — in short, all the urban world.

On the military front, the government army isn’t threatened with immediate collapse. The elite force, which the MPLA had already “transferred” from the army to the military police over a year ago, has demonstrated its abilities, notably in the battle for Luanda last December; and the air force, a monopoly of the state, remains relatively powerful. On the other hand, the defeat at Huambo has been costly.

Even so, on the economic front, the government can hope to survive, thanks to Cabinda’s petroleum. Angola’s production of 350,000 barrels a day ensures considerable income and remains relatively sheltered from possible Unita attacks because it’s basically located offshore. Because of this situation, the government is rearming. “The arms merchants of all nationalities are now jostling against each other in Angola,” asserts a diplomat with a posting in Luanda. The end of the Cold War has in effect “liberated” the market from all ideological “interference.” Americans, Russians, French, Brazilians, Israelis, and South Africans not only offer arms and equipment, but also “ready-to-use” systems, including mercenaries to handle the arms and materiel, and to train the Angolan army. But even if the financial situation remains buoyant in the short-term, the prospect of a prolonged war certainly scares the government. Arms must now be bought in hard currency.

The deficit in the balance of payments is estimated at more than $1.4 billion and Angola is not even in a position to meet the interest on its debt. In this context, negotiations with the IMF to reschedule the debt have been suspended since last January. The economic liberalization programmes promoted by the World Bank at the start of the 90s have prompted a strong rise in prices (inflation being over 200%), along with several thousand job losses in public enterprises, without any thread of security in place for the most destitute. In the shanty-towns of Luanda anger is brewing, especially as 55% are either underemployed or unemployed — an anger all the more intense since those privileged in power (high military ranks or government bureaucrats) don’t at all mind flaunting their wealth. Generally speaking, the MPLA can probably still hold on, at least in the short term. “It’s still not Kabul,” claims an official of a humanitarian agency in Luanda. Yet taking everything into account, the government is not strong enough to oust Unita from its bastions, and its strategy consists essentially of buying time.

The “comparative advantages” of Unita

In the face of this situation Unita remains an enormously powerful movement, as was strikingly demonstrated at the battle of Huambo. After the fierce fighting against
the government’s elite troops Unita
troops got the upper hand, in spite
of the aerial onslaught (although
at the price of very serious losses).
While more concentrated geographi-
cally, Unita’s base of support is also
more “dense.”

The Ovimbundu, which make
up over 35% of the population,
are not only more concentrated
geographically in the south-east, but
also constitute a very solid bloc
behind Savimbi, as the elections
demonstrated. On the military
plane, Savimbi has been able to
protect the bulk of his troops by
refusing to demobilize and disarm
throughout the process supervised
by the UN, with the result that it’s
estimated that he can count on more
than 40,000 men, including 10,000
to 15,000 well-trained soldiers. In
relative terms this army is highly
armed, since Unita has not only
preserved its stocks, but continues
to receive significant quantities of
arms such as munitions, artillery
and vehicles.

There are multiple networks
supplying Unita but the main line
is still found in South Africa. The
South African government proclaims
its neutrality in the present conflict
loudly and strongly, but powerful
sectors of the South African military
high command are doing everything
in their power to support Unita,
their “historical” ally; and President
de Klerk, though not necessarily
with much enthusiasm, shuf his
eyes. Since January there have been
almost daily flights originating in
the south, perfectly well observed
by Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe,
which claim however that they are
incapable of stopping them.

Beyond this semi-official traffic,
considerable support reaches Unita
from important sectors of the
Portuguese community, as much
among those who live in South
Africa (nearly 350,000) as within
the Angolan-Portuguese “diaspora”
back in Portugal. To sustain
these supplies Unita has important
resources at its disposal, notably the
profits extracted from the diamond
mines which Savimbi has seized
along the Zairean frontier. The
income from this trade is estimated
at more than $500 million and
because of the current rampant
chaos in Zaire, exports are rising
without limit.

Savimbi’s strategy is to hold fast
while capitalising on the temporary
disarray that has characterized
Luanda since the battle of Huambo.
For in the longer term, time is against Savimbi, who is seen
increasingly as a liability both
regionally and internationally. As he
continues to lose his backers, his best
chance is to move ahead militarily,
to maintain his momentum in the
medium term.

In the shadow of the “New
International Order”
The end of the Cold War had
encouraged the belief that Angola
would cease to be the strategic
battleground that originally led the
great powers to intervene in the
country. The New York accord
of 1988, followed by the Bicesse
agreement in Portugal on ways
of bringing peace to the country,
opened the door to the end of the
conflict. But the United
Nations, which had been entrusted
with the care of monitoring the
peace process, had failed. Even
the UN representative in place,
Margaret Anstee, now admits the
international community was not
given the means to help Angola find
its way to peace. The 450 unarmed
military observers were far too few
to truly impose demilitarization.
Moreover, the electoral process had
been rushed forward under pressure
from the US. Washington, which
was hoping for an easy victory for
its protégé Unita, frantically
promoted a delicate and fragile
process, which would demand much
more diplomacy and time.

Already in 1991 some independ-ent
Angolans, critical both of the
party in power and of Unita, foresaw
the unfortunate outcome of a bat-tle between the two leading forces
of Angolan politics, rather than na-tional reconciliation. A case in
point was Savimbi already announce-
ing several months before the elec-tion that he had to win, otherwise
the elections would be considered
“illegitimate.” Before the announce-
ment of the election results (even
though declared “free and fair”
by the UN), Unita was hurried to get
ready for a new round of fighting.

The international community
could have reacted at that time. The
US, for example, could have pushed
Unita to recognize the victory of
the MPLA, while encouraging
the latter to form a coalition
government, which President dos
Santos moreover would probably
have accepted. When Unita set its
sights on a military solution, there
could have been new pressures, such
as a clear and threatening message
to Pretoria to stop the convoys of
arms to Unita. But in the end
nothing was done. “Ultimately
the American administration is the
major player responsible for this
mess,” claims Joaquim de Andrade,
one of the first Angolan dissidents
to dare to criticize the party in power
in the 70s. Today, recognition of
the Angolan government comes too
late. The fact is that the American
president procrastinated too long
in the face of the powerful pro-
Savimbi lobby within the American
Congress.

Currently Unita controls more
than half of the country and now
speaks of “federalizing” it, which
could amount to a de facto parti-tion. This partition, all agree, is
not a lasting solution, and would
in fact enable Unita to prepare the
“final” assault. According to
Andrade, “only vigorous international
intervention could lead to peace. We
must push Unita to return to rea-son.” In the event of a return
to war, not only Angola would be
affected. Other African countries,
which themselves are also experi-
encing a fragile process of peace-
making, could follow this “bad ex-
ample,” notably South Africa and
Mozambique.
Another Angola?
Politics & Peace in Mozambique

When, in October last year, a peace accord was signed between Mozambique President Joaquim Chissano and Renamo's Afonso Dhlakama there seemed some modest grounds for optimism. Long months of negotiations had produced a compromise solution - pointing towards the imminent holding of a national election - that both sides seemed prepared to live with, and the United Nations gave promise of playing an important facilitating role in easing the normalization of politics in the country.

However, half a year later it is apparent that things are not going nearly as smoothly as was hoped. The projected role of UNOMOZ (the United Nations Observer Mission to Mozambique) has fallen well short of expectations, dogged by half-hearted commitments and financial shortfalls on the part of the international body. Equally importantly, the Renamo leadership has continued to do a great deal of foot-dragging of its own. Small wonder that Judith Marshall, in reporting back to SAR after a recent visit, could conclude that "the nine days I spent in Mozambique in March raised more questions for me about the peace process than they answered, my earlier nine years of residence there notwithstanding."

The UN's role
Marshall did find some positive signs of change: "The virtual end of violent attacks by Renamo forces is one palpable measure," she notes. "Mozambique's roads are now open to public and private vehicles, after a decade in which travellers were confined to national, provincial and district capitals that could only be reached by airplane. The roads are suddenly crowded with people, driving to rich agricultural districts..."
like Ribaue and Manjacaze and fabulous Indian Ocean beach resorts like Bilene and Ponto de Ouro. I was able to drive from Maputo to Swaziland, something unthinkable over the last decade except as part of a military convoy. The normality of it was what struck me. The lush greenery along the highway was unmarred by burned out trucks. The only reminder of the terrible war was the road itself, the last stretch on the Mozambican side before reaching the Swazi border little more than a dirt track.”

But beneath such surface calm run more disturbing currents, some of them linked to the demonstrated incapacity of the UN to play the role for which it originally nominated itself. This may seem ironic in light of the active interest that external forces once took – during their long years when they were fomenting destabilization, for example – in outcomes in Mozambique. Yet even when the country had ceased to be “a threat” – its domestic project of constructing an alternative socio-economic structure destroyed and the direct support it gave to the ANC and other forces opposed to apartheid substantially qualified – no one seemed particularly ready to wind the war down. The uncertainties that dog the current peace process seem further to reflect this recent lack of interest in Mozambique’s problems by major powers, and by the United Nations Organization itself, who prefer to prioritize issues they consider to be more pressing.

Thus, defusing the potential for on-going violence would seem to be a particularly crucial goal, not least because of the spectre of recent events in Angola that hovers over the Mozambican peace process. The hope has been that the international community had learned a lesson in the former country and would not allow elections to proceed (as they did in Angola) without first demobilizing the fighters and putting an integrated national army in place. But the projected formation of a 30,000-strong unified national army has become a political football, in part because of the UN’s inability to live up to its initial dramatic promises.

Both bureaucratic delays internal to the organization and the failure of the Security Council to allocate adequate resources to the operation help account for this and they have meant, most importantly, that UN forces have been very slow to arrive. This, in turn, has impeded plans for setting up concentration points (the grouping of combatants at 49 assembly points that was to have occurred within a few weeks of the signing of the accord was, over six months later, largely stalled), for handing over weapons and for demining operations. In Nampula (the northern regional headquarters for UNOMOZ), for example, Marshall found that only a handful of UN forces had arrived by early March – although fifteen hundred more soldiers were expected eventually to appear, including a large contingent from Bangladesh, along with 300 observers, and four assembly areas had been identified.

Renamo’s reluctance

There was another level to the problem, however. The UN Special Representative in Mozambique, Aldo Ajello, finally announced in mid-April that the first 100 soldiers in the new, unified armed forces were expected to begin their training at the end of the month at the Nyanga base in eastern Zimbabwe. British instructors had been lined up to carry out the training with support from Britain, Portugal and France. The Mozambican army had identified its first fifty participants but, one week later, Renamo announced its refusal to identify fifty trainees … until full demobilization had taken place! Here, as elsewhere, the suspicion is that one effect of the flawed UN operation has been to provide the Renamo leadership with further excuses to stall, for reasons of its own, on wholehearted implementation of the peace accord.

Marshall found Nampula to be typical of some of the contradictory dynamics currently at play. Four Renamo bases remain in existence and raids have continued on neighbouring populations – and yet Renamo forces apparently now move freely about in the major cities. Meanwhile, promising instances of potential cooperation all too quickly come unstuck. Since the peace agreement, for example, the government has allocated food aid to Renamo to be distributed through CARE, German Agriculture Action and CARITAS. But in one case, when Renamo senior officials insisted on distributing the food directly, much of it made its way to the black market shortly after. More generally, Renamo has tended to make delivery by road of such supplies difficult.

A similar pattern holds at the national level. Thus, during the long drawn-out negotiations leading to the October accord, Renamo bargained hard for parity, demanding equal representation on the various committees linked to the UN peacekeeping force and its operation. And yet, at present, the rebel group’s lack of staff – and apparent lack of will – makes it difficult for it to participate actively, whether at the national or local level. Meetings fail to happen because Renamo is not present, or they happen with government representation only, prompting Renamo to claim later that the UN favours the Frelimo Party. Renamo has also been boycotting both the Supervisory and Control Commission, the body in charge of implementing the peace accord, and the Ceasefire Commission. And Renamo’s leader, Anfonso Dhlakama, has even refused to leave his bush headquarters in central Mozambique to come to Maputo: for lack of a house and allowance of sufficient size!

In recent weeks, Italian officials and Tiny Rowland of LONRHO have worked together to try to
placate Dhlakama and entice him to Maputo. Rowlands has offered space for Dhlakama's entourage in the newly renovated, and now South African-owned, Cardoso Hotel. This has encouraged the other 15 political parties to put forward demands of their own for houses and allowances. Ordinary citizens trying to get on with their lives in the post-drought and post-war climate are treated to regular headlines in the press about those clamouring to represent their interests feeding at the public trough. Earlier optimism - based, for example, on instances of spontaneous fraternizing between the Frelimo and Renamo sides, especially in the south, immediately after the peace agreement - tends to evaporate amidst the coarser realities of this kind of "politics of transition."

The spectre of Angola?
Appropriate accommodation for Dhlakama is probably only the tip of the iceberg of Renamo's aspirations, in any case. As Southscan has noted (4 June 1993), Mozambican officials have recently warned about the de facto "institutionalization" by Renamo of a territorial division within the country, noting the closed nature of the movement's continuing control over certain areas and its "unconstitutional" refusal to allow, for example, certain businesses to operate in such areas without its assent. Meanwhile, even as it drags its feet within Mozambique itself, Renamo has gone on an international offensive, seeking ever larger, even extortionate, sums for its own political purposes before agreeing to demobilization, for example, and trying to line up fresh diplomatic support in various western countries.

Mozambican Foreign Minister Pascoal Mocumbi has also expressed the fear that Renamo is having some success in manoeuvring the UN into playing the on-going role of "mediator" between what it conceives as "the two sides" in Mozambique, rather than merely helping to establish the context for a democratic transition. In these ways, too, the precedent of UNITA's manipulative use, in Angola, of a "peace accord" for only so long as it serves its immediate interests looms large in Mozambique. Not that any one is quite ready to predict that the Angola situation will merely replay itself in Mozambique. Some argue that Renamo historically has been much weaker than UNITA as an organization and, even more than UNITA, has been controlled by outside forces rather than being supported by any coherent social base within Mozambique. And there is still some hope that the international community will not mismanage things as badly as it did in Angola.

Time alone will tell. For the moment, however, Frelimo is a far more active protagonist of a genuinely democratic settlement than is Renamo. True, the Frelimo camp does have some very real contradictions of its own. The Mozambican armed forces, for example, seem themselves to be in a permanent state of crisis and there is more than enough evidence to point the finger of suspicion at both the top and bottom ranks of the military hierarchy. Thus, for years, army conscripts have been left without food supplies and pay and have resorted to armed robbery to survive - as, it is suspected, some continue to do. Meanwhile, senior officials have been skimming off army supplies to bankroll their private business interests: in recent years, the Ministry of Finances has actually had to take management of the payroll out of the hands of the Ministry of Defence to make sure soldiers are paid. (During Marshall's visit soldiers were mutinying, making demands for back pay dating from 1990 with, in one instance, Renamo and government soldiers actually joining forces to accuse publicly senior officials from both sides of living high at the expense of the ordinary soldier and citizen).

Mozambican soldier, July 1992

But Frelimo has at least given some attention to preparing itself for an electoral process, beginning to develop some of the rudiments of a programme and an organization for that purpose. In doing so, it can take some encouragement from preliminary polls that suggest it to be in front - although there are, to
be sure, marked regional variations. For the moment, however, election dates are being bandied about by various players with little sense of what such an undertaking would actually mean. Some people suggest that elections should be put off until some kind of significant voter registration can take place, even if this means waiting until 1995. The argument is that as long as the population is so mobile, there is little hope for a proper electoral register and meaningful choices of local candidates. Others concur with this logic but think the international forces pushing for an election—this is certainly the main official task of UNOMOZ head Ajello—will force a much earlier date, April 1994, being most often mentioned.

On the ground
Ironically, Judith Marshall found ordinary Mozambicans, caught in the midst of these machinations, to be in much less of a hurry, inclined to see elections as likely to cause as many problems as they resolve. They are, in any case, far more pre-occupied with the challenge of daily survival, their attention fixed on the immediate implications for them of Mozambique's orthodox structural adjustment programme rather than on any longer-term visions: "The unions, coops and community groups with whom I spent time," she notes, "seemed caught up in micro-projects, getting their own organizational houses in order without much appetite for speculating on what struggles over the larger issues might produce. In fact, peace continues to be the only real item on the agenda. I was left with the sense that, come elections, people will make entirely pragmatic choices about which party— with its foreign backers, whether military or business—will most likely guarantee peace. Shifts in the geo-politics of Southern Africa and the globalization of the economy make such a reading very elusive, of course. But, in the meantime, life goes on, rural producers return to their land, new civic organizations and parties emerge, new business interests assert themselves."

In particular, Marshall recounted the tangible insights she had gained regarding the grass-roots impact of the peace agreement from a long conversation with the Governor of Nampula province, Alfredo Gamito. During the war, there was a tremendous displacement of people within Nampula province, plus a significant number of refugees coming from neighbouring Zambezia province. People from tiny rural hamlets had sought refuge in the larger towns while those around the towns moved off their land and camped around the district capitals. Eventually, the provincial capital of Nampula city had at least 500,000 extra residents, the town of Angoche an extra 200,000 and Nacala 100,000 more.

Since the peace agreement signed last October, Governor Gamito estimated that—thanks to a combination of rains after a long drought and the promise of an end to violence—about 150,000 of those rural dwellers have made the trek back home. If the peace agreement had come two weeks sooner, the first wave of returnees would have been much bigger. The second wave of planting is likely to see another small wave of farmers on their way home and then there won't be much movement until the next planting season. Gamito believes that, under the present favourable conditions, the relocation of internal war refugees will take at least three full agricultural cycles to complete.

Getting rural producers back to their fields is an important step in making Mozambique self-sufficient and re-establishing the agricultural system. But the returnees are suffering from a shortage of seeds and hand tools. The goods are usually supplied by the state marketing board, AGRICOM, or the Ministry of Agriculture but structural adjustment has changed that. With privatization an important ingredient in the IMF recipe and the Ministry of Agriculture reduced to a policy and training role, the "market" is meant to assert itself. Agricultural supply shops run by the new business class should spring up to fill the demand.

Unfortunately, business interests in Nampula prefer to supply luxury goods and Castle beer from South Africa. Presumably the profit margins on hoes and grain sales hold little attraction. Appeals to the international community, according to Governor Gamito, have produced meagre results—only 25 percent of the seeds and hand tools that peasant farmers need have materialized. Gamito's account underscored for Marshall the fact that, even if peace does finally take hold, the task of rebuilding the shattered country that Mozambique has become will remain a daunting one. Nor—neither in Nampula nor more broadly—can it be easily assumed that the virtually unqualified commitment to market solutions extracted from the new Mozambique promises the kind of development that is so necessary to meet popular needs.

Meanwhile, for better or worse, the reabsorption of Mozambique back into the global capitalist economy continues. The newest player, Marshall found, is the BFE, a Portuguese-controlled investment bank that recently reopened in Maputo. It had closed in 1979 when the Frelimo government put severe restrictions on foreign banking. Portugal chose to send a high-level delegation to the bank's opening with the announcement that the former colonial power intends to auction off 150 million of Mozambique's 500 million debt to Lisbon as investment capital for Portuguese businessmen. As Marshall notes, it is probably accurate to read this as yet another sign that peace, however reluctantly, is breaking out. Unfortunately, she fears, it may be equally accurate to read it as a sign of Mozambique's re-colonization.
When the subsidy on bread was removed in Zimbabwe in March, participants in the South-South-North Network were meeting at a small suburban hotel in Harare. The price of a loaf rose by about 40% overnight. During that week too, the Zambian government declared a State of Emergency in the wake of detentions of opposition government members and riots in Lusaka.

Gabriel Banda, a researcher with Zambia’s Institute for Policy Studies, took time out from the meeting, anxiously phoning Lusaka for the news as it broke. A range of social tensions underlay the riots, he told us. Structural adjustment policies, imposed in ever-harsher versions since the mid-80s, had eroded even minimal social services and people’s access to basic survival goods. Most Zambians were angry and ready to resist any further changes.

The gulf between those who could pay for services and those struggling to sustain themselves had widened, as had the divisions between factions of the ruling elite who couldn’t agree on questions of ameliorative economic policy. Gabriel saw the State of Emergency as the government’s attempt to draw popular attention away from the pressing economic issues.

The network of groups from the South and North, first formed in October 1991, was itself a response. It had been an attempt to build a form of popular organizing that could present an alternative to the profit imperative and anti-democratic ethos of the global corporate agenda. Morgan Tsvangirai, General Secretary of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), captured the rationale for the network in his opening address to the meeting.

Organizations of civil society in both the South and the North must be strengthened, Tsvangirai argued, as must be the collaboration between them. This was vital to counter the alliance of local ruling elites and international financial powers which had so impoverished the majority of people as well as the content of democracy in both hemispheres. The exercise of formal, administrative “democracy” in Africa had resulted in instability because of its failure to empower people.

Though he did not refer specifically to Canada, the Canadian participants could recognize that the sense of powerlessness among their compatriots in the face of detrimental economic restructuring was a direct result of a deficient concept and practice of “democracy” there, too.

Consolidating the network
Networks don’t necessarily gel or “work,” no matter how pertinent the rationale for their formation. The pressing goal of this meeting was to consolidate and activate the South-South-North Network. This involved, on the one hand, further developing an analysis of economic restructuring that would reveal the global-local tendencies and ties. It was work that had begun at the previous Network meeting (see SAR vol. 7, no. 4, March 1992). On the other hand, we needed to identify...
practical forms of solidarity between us, ways of operating that would enhance our organizational work while building collaboration.

There are several features of this nascent network that represent real challenges to the possibility of its developing as a mutually valuable resource. Though we came together explicitly out of a shared concern to understand and organize around global economic restructuring, the groups are differently located in relation to that process in a number of ways. Working from and across these differences during this week-long meeting brought out both the challenges and the strengths of this kind of international networking.

First, this was a multi-sectoral gathering. Represented were research bodies and trade unions whose focus of work was regional economic development; women's rights organizations whose interest in adjustment programmes was rather more tangential; popular education organizations whose concern was to reflect back and popularize the issues resulting from economic and political policy; news and information agencies, and rural and urban development groups. This made for an unevenness in the levels of expertise and knowledge about some topics, particularly about regional economic processes. There were consequently threads of discussion that felt removed from the specific concerns of one or other sector, moments of vagueness and disconnection. Because some countries were represented by only one sectoral organization, their sketches of the patterns of structural adjustment and popular organizing were not as well-fleshed out as reports from other countries.

But we had in our midst participants with extensive knowledge of economic relations within the southern African and north American regions who could trace the interconnections and colour in the picture where necessary. There's little doubt that South-North organizational linkages within one particular sector would have produced more immediately relevant and in-depth exchanges. But the advantages of cross-sectoral networking made themselves richly evident in the discussions that took place over the week.

In bringing to bear on the discussion of economic restructuring and political organizing our ranging perspectives, we painted a much more textured and coherent picture of the processes involved and the different ways in which to view them. The presence of women's organizations in this collaborative analysis ensured, for instance, that the exhaustive extension of women's unpaid labour under structural adjustment would not be left out of the picture. The representation of a rural constituency contributed a perspective on the crisis of subsistence production which talk of industry decimation and trade deregulation always threatens to obscure. On the other hand, the absence of representation from an environment group meant this important set of concerns slipped too easily out of our discussions.

The case for broaching economic restructuring from a range of perspectives was powerfully underscored by a presentation on the ZCTU participatory research project about the broad health effects of structural adjustment. Although there is a lot of research and information on this topic, it isn't available to ordinary citizens, nor is it particularly accessible or resonant, having been produced from outside the terms of their experience. To get a deeper understanding of what structural adjustment means in the life of working people requires a research process that sees those experiencing the effects as active producers of that knowledge. This was the rationale of the ZCTU project which is now being replicated in other African countries.

Besides the clearly empowering effect of actually involving workers and their union in the research process, this kind of project also validates another kind of knowledge about economic restructuring - a "street knowledge" as opposed to an "economic analysis." And it is these popular perceptions that can provide a much more refined and pertinent basis for developing appropriate and grounded organizing strategy.

For example, one of the important findings of this first stage of research was the disparity between the verbal commitments of people to the value of collective resistance and their actual coping strategies, which were very individualized. This kind of knowledge can help activists figure out why economic literacy and organizing in both southern Africa and north America has so often floundered,
why neo-conservative economic policy has not provoked definitive popular uprisings.

Different lives, shared experience

A second set of challenges to the building of useful inter- and intra-regional links lay in the differences between the participants’ national and regional political contexts. How could there be real in-depth exchange about alternative democratic policy and strategy given the very different political moments and cultures in each country.

There was Angola debating the wisdom of decentralized economic control in the face of an ongoing war, Mozambique facing an election with a “legitimized” Renamo, South Africa immersed in the politics of transition and negotiation on all fronts, Canada witnessing the decimation of social programmes and sovereignty … etc. etc. Also shaping political possibilities and organizational issues were the relative strength and size of respective NGO communities – or civil society – in each country.

In Angola and Mozambique, for example, the sector was small and new. In countries exhibiting the devastating social effects of structural adjustment programmes and war, NGOs were often relief or welfare-oriented, not forms that were particularly sustainable or promising of longer term local empowerment and capacity. In contrast, South African NGOs were struggling with issues around the realignment of their roles and jurisdiction.

Then there was the challenge of our coming from countries and regions that seemed differently disadvantaged or privileged, or at least differently phased, in relation to adjustment policies, social spending cut-backs, industrial restructuring and the like. Here the value of cross-national and cross-regional exchange revealed itself in a contradictory way. On the one hand, the remarkably parallel experiences of the apparently seamless and all-consuming control by international financial powers over national economies threatened to instill a profound sense of futility. On the other hand, hearing the narrative of each specific country’s relationship to the IMF and World Bank revealed both the extent of the similarity and the nature of the differences. Along with them emerged glimpses of alternatives, awareness of lessons to be learnt, perceptions of possible paths for trying things differently or for, at least, taking heed and heart.

What we learnt by comparing notes was that while the Bank and IMF objectives and policy patterns were basically the same across time and nations, their strategic operations were often adjusted to fit in with relevant local personnel and institutions, and with prevailing discourses of politics and development. And this is where an ongoing monitoring and analysis of the Bank and IMF operations in both South and North could be critical, a clear role for the Network.

Network Participants

This list of participants demonstrates the broad range of both mass-based and service groups that are committed to cross-sectoral, south-south and south-north linkages on economic issues. Participating groups work in eight countries.

Solidarity, analysis, & publications:
Toronto Committee for Links between Southern Africa & Canada (TCLSAC), Canada – Luszi Manicom
Ecumenical Coalition for Economic Justice (ECEJ), Canada (not present)
International Labour Research and Information Group (ILRIG), South Africa – David Szollosy
Africa Information Afrique (AIA), Southern Africa – Stephanie Wells, Ann Pillay

Popular and Adult Education:
Popular Information Collective (PEC), Zimbabwe – Regis Mtutu
Centre for Adult and Continuing Education (CACE), South Africa – Shirley Walters (not present)
Brasilian Institute for Social & Economic Analysis (IBASE), Brasil – Atila Roque (not present)

Labour:
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), Zimbabwe – Morgan Tsvangirai, Tapiwa Mashakada
Steelworkers Humanity Fund, Canada – Judith Marshall

Women:
National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC), Canada – Alice de Wolff
Tanzania Media Women’s Association (TAMWA), Tanzania – Chemi Che Maponda
Associação Moçambicana para Mulher e Desenvolvimento (MULEIDE), Mozambique – Judite Santos
Women’s Action Group (WAG), Zimbabwe (not present)

Rural:
Action for Rural Development and Environment (ADRA), Angola – Mario Sousa

Alternative Policy Research:
Institute for Development Studies (IDS), Zimbabwe – Bornwell Chakoza
Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), Zambia – Gabriel Banda
Centre for Southern African Studies (CSAS), South Africa (not present)

African Network for Economic Policy, Equity and Health, Zimbabwe – Rene Loeverson

Urban organizing:
Planact, South Africa – Stan Mzobe

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Mario Sousa told us how Angolan economists had authored an adjustment programme that was less punitive for the Angolan people than the usual SAP recipe. And yet, as the Bank itself had acknowledged, it met the criteria and conditions for Bank loans. What had prevented this home-made programme being put in place was a lack of political support within the Angolan government. The lesson? Contrary to the mainstream representations of structural adjustment policies as being inevitable and inexorable, they don’t happen on their own. They are mediated, and their terms defined, by politicians and political struggles.

The Network’s decision to endorse and take up the international campaign against the policies of the World Bank and IMF in 1994 flowed easily out of the perspectives we were adopting. The campaign represents an instructive model of collaboration between NGOs in the North and South. It is encouraging NGOs in all regions to some locally appropriate activities on or around the 50th anniversary of the Bank in July 1994. Information about local actions are to be centrally gathered and publicized to maximize the impact of the campaign and reveal the extent of international opposition to imposed and undemocratic restructuring policies. Groups in the North were asking for the Bank and IMF to be accountable to themselves, as a tax-paying constituency, rather than seeing the Bank as “the South’s problem.”

Another significant theme of discussion that ran through the week of discussions was that of tariffs, trade agreements and trade areas. Dot Keet of the South African Macro-economic Research Group made a strong case for anticipating pressure from the international financial powers to set up a trade area in the region with South Africa in some kind of supervisory role. At the moment there are industry-specific bilateral trade agreements in the region that are dramatically shaping and breaking local industry and removing any chance of a negotiated integrated regional development programme.

Network participants saw a vital role for the South-South-North Network here, in using local connections to find out about and publicize the shifting tariffs and regional trading patterns that were being rather surreptitiously put in place, and to develop a more coordinated response. There was also much to be learned from the coalition and linking strategies that had been tried within and between popular organizations in the NAFTA countries.

**Working for collaboration**

But despite this the final set of challenges came from the potential persistence of “traditional” power relations and entrenched perceptions of roles between “the North” and “the South,” that might have undermined the equal exchange we were striving for within the Network. Such dynamics were largely residual, and here the careful consultation with participating organizations and joint North-South planning in preparation for the meeting must be credited. Tellingly, however, some stereotypes did manifest themselves in discussions about the practical operations of the network and in particular, the question of funding. The founding premise of South-South-North Network was that participants would be from non-governmental and non-donor organizations, sharing an activist oppositional stance to a common set of issues. But there was sometimes a quick slippage into a perception of the Northern groups as bearers of money, with more access to more ability to raise funds, a view that was hastily contested.

In caucus and plenary, groups from the South were self-critical about their failure to assume the initiative in managing the Network in the interim since the last meeting. The tragic death of Frances Munyuki of the Popular Education Collective who had undertaken to coordinate the Network from Zimbabwe had clearly set things back. Participants from the North felt they had judiciously avoided seizing the reins but finally had felt constrained to push and raise money for the follow-up meeting.

The strategy of South and North caucusing for a half day of the meeting proved fruitful. Southern groups acknowledged the value of a South-North Network but also argued for consolidating regionally, planning an independent meeting prior to the next S-S-N Network meeting. The North caucus thought about extending the network in its region as well as making connections with similar networks that might exist in relation to the European Community as another trade area.

In general, collaboration was enormously congenial and constructive, reflective of a comfortable solidarity and mutual respect. The relations of race, gender and language, which are so often tied in with the issues of exclusion and dominance at meetings such as this one, went unchallenged in the meeting although pondered in the corridors. This may have had to do with a propitious balance of power-conferring identities, but it was also clearly due to the fine and pleasurable meshing of this particular group of people, a feature that had also characterized the previous meeting.

The work done during this meeting to set up a funded secretariat for the Network and ensure that we maintain active exchanges will help to keep the Network going. But its vibrancy and viability will also depend on the commitment and energy of the people who participate. Network members have to feel that this link, and the unpaid labour time necessary to service it, contributes in real terms to their organizational and political work. Judging by the exchanges and constructive engagement of participants from different countries, regions and sectors, ongoing networking would seem compelling.
Workers of the World Debate: A South Africa/Canada Workshop

A recent workshop at Toronto's York University, held under the auspices of the university's Centre for Research on Work and Society, brought together a group of trade unionists from South Africa (eight in all, plus a representative of the ANC's Department of Economic Planning) and a group from Canada (a dozen or so, representing various sectors of the Canadian labour movement) to discuss issues of mutual concern.

The workshop demonstrated some of the positive possibilities of such exchanges, as well as some of the very real problems inherent in forging new kinds of linkages appropriate to the present situation — in Canada, in South Africa and in the world at large. Both the positive possibilities revealed and the problems encountered bear reflecting upon.

The premise

The workshop grew out of a heightened sense — parallel to the premise that has anchored the on-going "South-South-North" initiative discussed in the previous article — that the ground for solidarity between Canadians and South Africans has been shifting in recent years, throwing into question the premises of many long-established linkages, but also opening up novel opportunities. Thus, for years, "anti-apartheid" politics has been centre-stage in the relations between us, with various progressive groups in Canada, including trade unions, tending to define bonds of solidarity with South Africans in terms of "our support" for "their struggles" against the system of institutionalized, legalized racism known as apartheid. Of course, the anti-apartheid struggle has not concluded — as various substantial hitches in the process of negotiating a truly democratic constitution for South Africa amply demonstrate. But the fact remains that South Africans are also already living the "post-apartheid moment" and that the struggle to define the nature of the post-apartheid economy and society is well underway. Moreover, as the latter challenge becomes an ever more prominent one for South Africans, it is also apparent that the struggles of workers in South Africa and Canada have a great deal more in common than such workers might earlier have anticipated.

Thus, in South Africa, capital — both local and international — is working hard to set narrow limits to the post-apartheid economic strategies that will be open to the popular classes. These limits are presented not merely in terms of the presumed logic of the local economy but, even more importantly, in terms of the logic of the global economy. More specifically, these limits are said to be set by the increased "globalization" of economic activities and by the imperatives of "competitiveness" that arise from that process. Any "restructuring" that the South African economy might require in order to recover its capacity to "grow" and "develop" must spring, so the argument goes, from conforming to the dictates of globalization — and not, in the first instance, from the egalitarian imperatives that might otherwise seem the first order of post-apartheid business in a South Africa that is so dramatically stratified in terms of class, race and gender.

As it happens, this kind of language is increasingly familiar to Canadian workers who are now being asked to propitiate highly mobile global firms by adapting to such firms' "lean and mean" profitability criteria — or else, capital warns, it is ready to take flight. Such a threat looms large (not least within the boundaries of the prospective economic bloc defined by the North American Free Trade Agreement/NAFTA). Moreover, simultaneously, the state sector in Canada faces the prospect of a dramatic "restructuring" of its own. At both federal and provincial levels (in several cases, under the auspices of social-democratic parties), governments are presiding over an erosion of social services in the name of "deficit reduction" — and a significant dismantling of the state's presence in the economy. As these facts about the Canadian situation become more salient, it also becomes clear to many Canadians that what binds working people together across national frontiers is, increasingly,
their shared vulnerability. That, and a mutual interest in "restructuring" the economy — the global economy as well as diverse national economies — in ways that serve other values than those defined merely by the dictates of "the market" and by the demands of capital.

To be fair, relations between trade unionists probably have been less narrowly cast in terms of "anti-apartheid solidarity" than have other relations established between South Africans and Canadians. There has, in fact, been a recent history of exchanges that have highlighted mutual learning around questions of collective bargaining strategies, of health and safety issues, of training and worker education, and the like. However, the York workshop sought to highlight the linkages that might seem to bind workers' concerns together at a broader level, at the level of, precisely, their shared vulnerability to the workings of the "post-Cold War," "New World [Capitalist] Order." The premise: that there would be mutual benefit in the sharing of experiences and the comparing of perspectives between South African and Canadian trade unionists regarding both the macro-economic realities of their two countries and the strategic options open to workers in confronting them.

The practice

In the end some of these expectations were realized, but the fact remains that the two groups of trade unionists had difficulties at the outset in finding a shared perspective from which to approach the global conjuncture they both confront. Some of this might have been anticipated from a reading of the reflections of the CAW's Sam Gindin (in the previous issue of SAR), which expressed the unease he experienced, during a recent visit to South Africa, at certain trends in trade union thinking there regarding post-apartheid economic strategy.

As SAR readers will recall, Gindin, in discussing, in particular, the work of the COSATU-linked Economic Trends Research Group (ET), argued that South African unions run the risk of buying into far too much of the theory and practice of "competitiveness" and of export-driven global marketeering, at the expense of finding a domestic industrial strategy, premised, centrally, on the meeting of local needs. In repeating some of the same points as an active participant in the York workshop, Gindin further emphasized to South Africans the South African economy both more efficient/competitive and more productive. Encouraging capitalists — who, it is argued, continue to have some real stake and real interest in the overall health of South African economy — to be more productive than they might otherwise be if left to their own more anarchic impulses: this, not some more dramatic but ultimately unrealistic recentering of the economy, seemed to be at the core of such a South African trade unionist strategy.

The tension was real enough, although, as the workshop progressed the apparent dichotomy between the Canadians and the South Africans on this issue came to seem a little less stark. Only one of the South African delegation — and he (the ANC's Tito Mboweni) not a trade unionist at all — seemed, in the end, to be almost arrogantly dismissive of the kind of structural/socialist questions that Gindin and others were raising and to be comfortable with acceptance of an almost wholly market-driven agenda. In contrast, when Fana Mthombeni, a shop-floor unionist from Pretoria, spoke, he evoked a world familiar to most trade unionists: in his plant, owners evidenced not corporate statesmanship but rather a persistent drive to forestall worker demands at every turn. And when Marcel Golding, a senior mine-worker leader, described the various national economic forums within which COSATU is negotiating with business representatives over industrial policies, he argued the necessity to use these forums as contexts for on-going worker empowerment and to avoid allowing them to become mechanisms for a merely corporatist cooptation of the trade union movement. In such presentations (and also in those by Enoch Godongwana and Adrienne Bird of the National Metalworkers Union) some clearer sense was conveyed that consciousness of "class struggle" had not disappeared from South Africa.

Meanwhile, on the Canadian side, the competing time com-

Will the ANC follow the line of least resistance to capital as readily as has Bob Rae?

the extent to which his critique sprang from his own reading of the near fatal consequences for the Canadian economy of being swept, by "Free Trade," into a "high-tech, high value-added," competitiveness mode. And his premises were reinforced by the analyses of the grim logic of capital's activities on a global scale provided by John Loxley and Fred Bienefeld, two Canadian economists with substantial African experience whose overview presentations launched the workshop.

A number of the South African delegation had read Gindin's article and their negative reaction to it may account for some of the tensions that initially threatened to short-circuit effective exchange at the Workshop. Taking the presence of the massive power of capital more or less as a given, a central paper by David Lewis (and co-authors) of ET sought to define ways of cajoling and pressuring capital, sector by sector, to develop new kinds of economic activities and market strategies that, cumulatively, could render
mitments of some potential delegates meant that Canadian trade unionists who might have been more inclined than Gindin and others to defend the plausibility of a competitiveness-driven workers’ agenda were not present in sufficient numbers to do so. Perhaps a larger delegation from the Steelworkers would have thrown this argument up more forcefully. Still, Peter Bakvis (from Quebec’s CSN) was one who did advocate eloquently a “pragmatic” and “realistic” approach in this regard. And even Gindin himself underscored the extent to which the day-to-day work of his own CAW is driven by the need to direct its energies towards alleviating the costs (retrenchments, plant closures and the like) of the corporate agenda, rather than to displacing that agenda altogether. This was also a theme evoked by a number of other Canadian delegates – notably Alex Dagg of the International Ladies’ Garment Workers – when the discussion actually got around to discussing the concrete negotiating and organizing imperatives of their own unions.

And yet – not surprisingly, given the current conjuncture – the spectre of Free Trade/NAFTA, and related macro-economic questions did loom very large for all the Canadians present at the workshop. In consequence, much of their discussion bore on attempts to develop in Canada new initiatives (including, for example, the building of coalitions like the Action Canada network and the forging of links between the trade unions and the women’s movement) that might eventually provide the political basis for articulating more effectively left-wing economic strategies. A number of the South Africans were less than satisfied with this discussion, however; suggesting that criticisms of their own approach from the Canadian side were not backed up by presentation of an adequate alternative economic strategy – for Canada or anywhere else – that might offer both effective resistance to the dictates of global capital and a new basis for economic development. In particular, they found the critique of Canadian involvement in NAFTA offered by one leading trade union activist in a session on that subject to be far too rhetorical. Was this suggestive, they asked, of a more general difficulty of the Canadian labour left in moving beyond critique towards spelling out what an alternative, more nationally-focused and transformative economic policy might actually look like in practice?

Here the central paradox of the South Africans became more sensitive to Canada’s current economic crisis

the workshop surfaced most clearly. One participant summarized the discussions in the following way: the Canadians, on balance and with convincing evidence at their disposal, seemed to be saying that we in Canada have tried the competitiveness route and it is failing us – indeed, in principle, it can’t work under present global circumstances – and it is even less likely to do so in a country like South Africa with a vast, underemployed and marginalized population; the South Africans seemed to be saying, also quite plausibly, that we in South Africa have no alternative but to adopt the strategy of cajoling/pressuring capital to play the economic game more effectively and efficiently – and what, in any case, could an alternative strategy possibly look like, given the power of capital, world-wide and local. A stalemate in the discussion, then; and yet, what if both sides were actually correct and, to put it crudely, the only “realistic” strategy “won’t work”? This would be a particularly sobering, even dispiriting, conclusion to come to.

The politics

No one at the workshop was quite ready to admit such a starkly negative reading of contemporary possibilities for working class action – although it may be correct to say that the dilemmas inherent in such a phrasing of the problem did stalk the discussion from beginning to end. Nor were the contradictions over such large strategic issues ever really resolved. And they informed – although, fortunately, did not impede – the more detailed discussion of various sectoral responses to global restructuring that complemented the more general sessions of the workshop and sparked lively debate. Mention has already been made of Gindin’s and Dagg’s interventions (with reference to the Canadian automobile and garment industries, respectively), but similarly useful studies from South Africa were also forthcoming: Rod Crompton on the chemical industry, Enoch Godongwana on the motor industry, Adrienne Bird on training, Salie Manie on the state sector, and Claudia Manning on the informal sector.

What kind of comparisons were in order regarding the political fallout of the current moments in South Africa and Canada: this was another theme that haunted the workshop both implicitly and explicitly. As it happened the workshop occurred at the very peak of the crisis in trade union/NDP relationships sparked by Bob Rae’s attempt to inflict his “social contract” on Ontario’s state sector workers. The South African were quickly inducted into the tensions this has given rise to for Canadian trade unions, as much by the studied, even embarrassed, silence of some in the workshop who might otherwise have been expected to speak as by the sharp commentaries from others (Margot Young from CUPE, for example). Intriguingly, there was also a parallel line of discussion – albeit one that
was as often debated outside the formal sessions of the workshop as within them—concerning trade union/ANC relations. Could the ANC be expected in future to follow the line of least resistance to capital’s dictate as readily as has Bob Rae? Some of the South Africans apparently feared as much. What practical measures might be necessary if this were indeed to be the case? Unfortunately, this was not the kind of question that it proved easy to place firmly on the workshop’s agenda—although it is clear that none of those in attendance could, in the end, avoid thinking about it.

No doubt it was inevitable that many such questions were left hanging and inevitable, too, that not all of the tension that seemed, from time to time, to hang over the proceedings was dissipated. Was there some disappointment on the part of Canadians that a revolutionary process in South Africa had not shifted the goalposts of dealing with capital more radically than it seems to have done? Was there some resentment on the part of South Africans that Canadians, provided with a capitalist economy that, on the surface at least, appears to be a quite prosperous, were being unduly judgmental about their own attempts to find what they consider to be a relatively progressive accommodation with capital’s power? Perhaps so, but at least by the end of the workshop it appeared that almost all those in attendance could hear each other rather more clearly than they had on Day One, the South Africans more sensitive to the depth of Canada’s current economic crisis, the

the Canadians became more aware of what South Africans saw as their real range of options

Canadians more aware of the South Africans’ reading of their own range of actually existent options.

Differences (sometimes quite sharp differences) of approach and emphasis persisted. When working class organisations get down to the hard business of defining concrete strategies to deal with capital, whether at the plant level, the national level or the global level, much more contested and highly debatable issues are at stake than in the old anti-apartheid days of unproblematic unity and easy “correctness” of line. Different national circumstances, as concretely defined by different historical experiences and as played out on different rungs of the global hierarchy, are not automatically commensurable. Nor are diverse perspectives regarding strategic and ideological imperatives easily blended, either within or between national delegations. But, whatever else occurred at the York workshop, most trade unionists in attendance agreed that they had begun to learn something useful about how to talk to each other. They sensed that their relationship, South Africa-Canada, could indeed move beyond the level of worthy platitudes and provide a context for genuine debate—sometimes uncomfortable but no less useful because of that—and even mutual enlightenment.
All observers are agreed that the loss of Chris Hani is a grievous one for the progressive forces in South Africa, in ways that are just beginning to be assessed. For example, the most recent issue of the South African periodical Work in Progress leads a useful symposium on “What’s left for the left?” with a reading (by Moletsi Mbeki) of how important Hani might have been for sustaining a vibrant socialist agenda in the new South Africa; and many other tributes and appreciations have also appeared. In this issue, SAR is fortunate to draw on the services of Nthoana and Mbulelo Mzamane, two people who knew Chris Hani well through ties of family — Hani’s wife is Nthoana’s sister — and friendship, for their own appreciation of Hani’s life and promise. The Mzamanes, who have worked for many years in exile, most recently at the University of Vermont, are returning to South Africa later this year to take up professorial appointments at Fort Hare.

“I’ve lived with death for most of my life ... I want to live in a free South Africa, even if I have to lay down my life for it.”

Chris Hani, in an interview shortly after his return from exile in 1990

Chris Hani, the Secretary General of the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the most popular political personality in South Africa after Nelson Mandela, was assassinated outside his Dawn Park home in the East Rand town of Boksburg at 10:15 am on Saturday, April 9.

There will be those who will see divine justice that a man who led guerillas against the evils of his time should himself fall victim to an assassin’s bullets. There will be others who will think that he signed his own death warrant by going soft on his enemies who had always wanted to snuff out his life. Neither stereotype fits the man who fought to give others peace, liberty and life — and paid the highest price for acting courageously on his convictions.

Chris was neither a hawk nor a dove, but a person who dealt with difficult tensions in a creative way. He was remarkably bright and brave; relentless in his fight for justice; unsparing in his criticism of those, even within his own party, who had become a threat to peace; a selfless person who, three weeks before his death, on his last trip through the rugged Transkei countryside where he grew up, stated: “I’ve never wanted to spare myself for this struggle. What right do I have to hold back, to rest, to preserve my health, to have time with my family, when there are other people who are no longer alive — when they have sacrificed what is precious, namely life itself?”

There can be no denying Hani’s stature as the most important and powerful figure of the emergent generation of South Africa’s leaders. The paroxysm of disbelief, anger and outrage which shook the country following his murder testifies to the importance of his leadership and the deep significance of his life.

Chris Hani, who was born Martin Thembisile Hani on June 28, 1942, in Cofimvaba, Transkei, became active in politics as a high school student in Cape Town in 1957. Recalling his political initiation, he once explained: “For about six months I was in the Unity Movement. But later I began to examine the movement and I didn’t see them in the mass struggle of our people. Their struggle was in the mind, in the head. The activism of the ANC began to make me shift from the Unity Movement to the ANC.”

After graduating from Rhodes University with a B.A. degree in Latin and English, he received instructions from the high command of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the ANC’s newly formed military wing, to leave the country for military training. His life thereafter came to be characterized by many close encounters with death.

In 1967 he was political commissar for the Luthuli brigade, the unit that launched MK’s first armed attack from Zambia against the Rhodesian security forces at Wankie in 1967. He explained his unit’s military mission thus: “We had to work with ZAPU [the Zimbabwe African People’s Union] to create an infra-
structure in Rhodesia that would take us to South Africa."

He was elected to the ANC's national executive council in 1975 and appointed MK deputy commander in 1982. That same year, South African forces raided Lesotho, his base in the 1970s from which he set up networks in South Africa that would support a military incursion. When we arrived in Maseru, the capital of Lesotho, for the funeral of the 40 people killed in the raids, we found the Hani home destroyed; his wife, Limpho and their infant daughter — the same one who rushed out to find her father lying in a pool of blood — were fortunately away from home on that occasion. Chris, who for years had not spent two consecutive nights under the same roof, had survived yet another of countless plots to murder him.

He continued to rise through the ranks to become MK chief of staff in 1987, the number two post in the commando organization, a position he relinquished only in 1992. Nonetheless, Chris always saw the military struggle as a means to an end, and that end was very clearly defined in his head. He could thus announce — and perhaps, because of his record, he could do this with greater authority than anyone else in the movement — the termination of that phase of the struggle when the time came. A week before his assassination he had been promoting the creation of a "peace corps" among youth to curb internecine warfare in the country. He had also been working to shore up the ANC's fractious militant wing and to assert control over self-defence units, originally set up to defend communities from state sponsored violence but increasingly embittered in recent months. He died only four days after his dramatic appeal for peace. "I don't accept people calling for war," he told thousands of ANC supporters in the East Rand, "because I feel we have achieved something in this country, where those who oppressed us in the past are actually talking to us and showing readiness to negotiate for democratic elections. I am saying to these comrades here that everyone should be a combatant, a fighter for peace."

Fears were expressed, following Hani's death, that his passing now placed a negotiated settlement in great jeopardy. However, the total collapse of negotiations is neither in the interests of the ANC nor of the De Klerk government. The process, whose fragility at this stage is apparent to both parties, is likely to accelerate. Further swift concessions on three crucial ANC demands can be expected to expedite negotiations: the establishment of a Transitional Executive Council, as early as July; the drafting of an interim constitution, as a matter of urgency rather than mere expediency; and the announcement of a date for elections to take place no later than May next year [now apparently announced for April 27, 1994]. Thus, if the objective of right wing forces behind the assassination was to fan the flames of civil war, it is unlikely to be realised. Beyond the anger and the fear aroused by Chris Hani's death,
there is only one sensible direction for South Africa to move: toward a negotiated settlement.

And yet to the ANC, as it tries to negotiate an end to white minority rule, Chris Hani's assassination has been a staggering blow. For Chris was unique in one further respect. Unlike any other leader of the liberation movement, he had a solid urban as well as rural base. Until required on a regular basis to take part in the negotiations, he was the only Congress leader of such popular standing to make his home in the rural areas, where he came to be regarded increasingly as a unifying figure, even between supporters of the Congress Alliance and members of rival organisations such as the Pan Africanist Congress and the Azanian People's Organization. Moreover, with his impeccable credentials as MK leader and his charismatic appeal to angry alienated youth, he gave the ANC credibility among its most disgruntled, volatile constituents. Without him, it will be harder to sell to disadvantaged and oppressed groups any kind of apparent compromise — however tactically astute — with the apartheid regime and to galvanize young voters for the first all-race elections, expected to take place in about a year.

It is one of the saddest ironies of our time that many of the greatest of modern figures, many of the brightest beacons of hope for the future, have been assassinated in their prime. For all South Africans, for all the struggling masses in our world, Chris Hani's death, like that of so many other African visionaries killed in the first act of nationhood — Patrice Lumumba, Amilcar Cabral, Eduardo Mondlane, Samora Machel, Steve Biko — will be meaningless if the work for which he lived is not carried forward. Mandela's appeal in his April 13 televised address to the nation must be heeded: "Now is the time for all South Africans to stand together against those who, from any quarter, wish to destroy what Chris Hani gave his life for — the freedom of all of us." The hope he gave us must never be extinguished. In death his example must remain as bright and potent as it was in life.

We want to remember Chris for the light he shed that others might see; for the life he shared so selflessly; and for the vision, the wisdom, the dedication, and compassion he dispensed so generously. We will remember him as the husband, father, brother, friend, and comrade that he was. We want to remember him for the cause that he espoused, which turned into his own life's quest for a humanity liberated from the stranglehold of tyranny, fear, hatred, prejudice, ignorance, and rapaciousness.

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A Tale of Two Homelands

BY JANET CHERRY & LESLIE BANK

The end of the 1980s saw the collapse of apartheid's puppet regimes in the Giskei and Transkei, the "homelands" designated for the supposed "self-rule" of the Xhosa-speaking population of the Eastern Cape region of South Africa. In the place of the Matanzima and Sebes, there emerged military regimes which seemed for a time (in 1990-91) to be encouraging genuine democratization and the relatively straightforward reincorporation of their territories into the mainstream of South African political life. However, as Leslie Bank and Janet Cherry (both of South Africa's Rhodes University) explain below, these regimes have come to play rather more contradictory - if very different - roles in the wider politics of transition that now defines the South African situation.

The Transkei: The Long Road to Democracy

After the fall of the ruling Matanzima family in September 1987, and Stella Sigcau's brief 12 weeks as premier, Major-General Bantu Holomisa of the Transkei Defence Force took control in December 1987 on an 'anti-corruption ticket'. He began by combining his battle against corruption with a ban on the "propagation of political ideologies" and the detention and trial of ANC and PAC members; for these actions he received the cautious support of the South African government. Yet Holomisa proved himself to be alert to the deeper sea changes that were occurring in South African society: within two years he had declared that he had long been a supporter of the liberation movements and that he would not hesitate to reverse Transkeian "Independence" if the people of the region were found to be in favour of such a move.

The first issue Holomisa was forced to address was the appalling lack of protection given to Transkeian workers under the old regime. In October, 1989, for example, 10,000 workers marched in Umtata, demanding new labour laws and the granting of full trade union rights in the homeland. Holomisa's response was to scrap much of the old labour law and, soon, to grant trade unions, including the Congress of South Africa Trade Unions (COSATU), the freedom to organize. Even more dramatic were the lifting of the state of emergency, the releasing of large numbers of political prisoners, a promise to review Transkeian security legislation, and the unbanning of the ANC and the PAC.

Thus, between November 1989 and January 1990, Holomisa appeared on political platforms alongside ANC leaders - Walter Sisulu, Nelson Mandela, Cyril Ramaphosa - and was congratulated by them, on these occasions, for his progressive reforms. Representatives of the Military Council also met with PAC leaders in Tanzania (eventually arousing the ire of Pretoria by actually allowing a relative freedom of operation to the armed wings of both the ANC and the PAC). Moreover, such initiatives were linked with an attempt to rout the old Matanzima and Transkei National Independence Party influences in government and to transform the political culture of the administration. Holomisa spoke out strongly on the need for a "clean administration." These various steps have begun radically to transform the nature of politics in this region with, at present, the Transkei government being clearly aligned with the ANC and PAC leaders in Tanzania (eventually arousing the ire of Pretoria by actually allowing a relative freedom of operation to the armed wings of both the ANC and the PAC).

As Holomisa's regime in the Transkei has seemed to be seeking a way forward, utilizing the slogans of liberation and democratization. At the same time attempts to gently nudge the Transkei along the path of greater freedom and democracy have not been without their contradictions.

Chiefs and civics

The most central contradiction springs from the fact that, even though the security forces have been trimmed and some ANC and PAC figures have been elevated to top government positions, the basic structure and the personnel of local administration remains the same. The vast majority of the Transkei's population lives in rural villages or peri-urban areas that fall under the control of chiefs and headmen who are organized into tribal and regional authorities. The chain of tribal command extends upwards from sub-headman at the bottom to Paramount chief at the top. This system of power, authority, and control in rural areas has been an instrument of political domination and repression in the Transkei since the colonial days. It has been premised on the denial of the democratic rights of rural people.

The Holomisa government has not changed this system since coming to power, although it has removed a number of repressive chiefs and has definitely created the political space for their authority...
to be challenged. As in the Ciskei, the organizations which have filled this space have been the “civics.” These community-based organizations have spread through the rural areas like wildfire since 1990. In many villages, the youth have been particularly instrumental in initiating civic structures. But they have been joined by workers, teachers, traders and others in their demands for a more democratic and accountable system of local government. The clashes between civics and chiefs have not been abstractly ideological, however, but rather have turned on such practical matters as the allocation of land and development resources.

Civics have also challenged the way in which chiefs administer their villages. For instance, they have lashed out at the systematic corruption and bribery of village life and the uncooperative approach of chiefs and headmen when it comes to helping people acquire pensions and other services. They have also demanded that chiefs consult more widely before they embark on new development projects. In the Xalanga district, where chiefly powers were widely abused during the Matanzima era, civic leaders have joined together to form a united front called the Xalanga Campaign Action Committee (XCAC) to bring the alleged abuse of tribal power to the attention of the Holomisa government. Throughout 1992, XCAC convened meetings and sent petitions to the government. In July 1992, a government delegation was sent to meet with XCAC but failed to come up with any solutions to their basic grievances. By the end of 1992, XCAC members were disillusioned and were seeking new strategies that the Holomisa government could not ignore.

The intense conflict between civic leaders and chiefs in Xalanga was less evident in other districts, where chiefs were not so closely associated with the Matanzima regime. In parts of Pondoland and other deep rural areas, chiefs remain the unquestioned leaders of their communities, have actively engaged in struggles against land expropriation and removal, and have even become actively involved in the civic movement themselves. Nonetheless, despite the considerable variation in arrangements on the ground, escalating tension between civic structures and traditional authorities has been a key feature of Transkeian politics over the past three years, a pattern reinforced by the hardships produced by drought and rising unemployment (especially in the mines) for would-be migrants. Rising conflict with the tribal authorities was inevitable as rural people tried to cope with hunger and frustration: on tight rural budgets, it is not surprising that people have lost patience with chiefly corruption and mismanagement of resources.

Squatters and town councils

One of the consequences of the deteriorating conditions in the Transkei countryside has been the phenomenal numbers of former migrants now flocking into Transkeian towns, becoming shack dwellers and creating — especially in Butterworth and Umtata but also elsewhere — a “squatter problem” of dramatic proportions. This influx of the marginalized rural poor into small towns has proven to be a nightmare for the local Town Councils which, throughout the Matanzima era, had been notorious for their corruption. After “Independence” they received very little by way of financial assistance from the state to maintain and expand already dismally inadequate levels of urban services. Moreover, such housing projects as were initiated in the 1980s were for the “middle income groups;” there were none for lower income groups. In short, when the squatters arrived in the 1990s — often merely seizing land on town commonage, for example — they were able to work with various youth organizations and civics, but the town councils were unprepared to deal with them.

Lack of housing development, of provision of water (an even more emotive issue than housing), and the like: it is such issues that have focused popular attention on the role of town councils in the Transkei. Residents feel, increasingly, that the councils are corrupt and calls for their resignations have reverberated through Transkeian towns. Like the chiefs, the councillors have not accepted their plight lying down, and certainly there have also been cases where councillors have been unfairly accused of mis-management and corruption. In some of these latter cases, the newly elected civic and the old councillors have actually come together to address the root cause of their problems. In doing so, however, they have tended to reach the same conclusion as that reached by people in the rural areas: that they have been “had” by the Department of Local Government and Land Tenure and that the Holomisa government is not doing enough to rectify the situation.

In short, by creating the political space for oppositional forces to operate (and by being unable to deliver any real solution to fundamental economic problems) Holomisa finds that he has opened up his administration to severe criticism. Paradoxically, however, his government’s response to such criticism has tended to be the upholding of existing structures. When town councils are forced to resign, for example, they are being replaced by Umtata-appointed administrators, suggesting that, despite calls for “negotiated development,” things continue to be decided unilaterally.

Here then — as in the rural areas — the central contradiction of Holomisa’s regime is illustrated: he claims to be democratizing even as the old power structures of the bantu states remain in place. Tribal and regional authorities of the past have been left virtually untouched by the Military Council; and even though chiefs and headmen have been encouraged to join Contraless
(the ANC-aligned Congress of Traditional Leaders) and have been advised to cut out bribery and corruption they are not obliged to follow these directives. Similarly, local authorities (such as town councils) are told to be "sympathetic" to the needs of the people and to behave in a "responsible and democratic manner" - but again without the creation of mechanisms that might compel the relevant officials to abide by these directives or make them more accountable for their actions.

In short, Holomisa’s reform programme has been sufficiently aggressive to raise popular expectation and insufficiently thorough-going to deliver any real changes in the everyday life of ordinary Transkeians. Lennox Sebe once said, in a rare humanitarian moment, that Ciskeians "could not eat flags and constitutions." Many in the Transkei are beginning to realize that life on Holomisa’s diet of liberation slogans and rhetoric is no more nutritious. There is now widespread questioning as to what “political liberation” actually means in the Transkei.

Counter-revolution?
It is in this context that the poor are beginning to take matters into their own hands. It has been conventional to argue that such “counter-revolutionary potential” as exists in a place like the Transkei springs from the fact of its bloated apartheid bureaucracy. This must necessarily be trimmed as the territory is re-incorporated into South Africa proper. Middle-class elements (those who will then be left without a state apparatus to manipulate in pursuit of profits) are then likely to become disaffected, it has been suggested, and to organize a “counter-revolution” against the transitional process as led by the mass democratic movement. But while this was one plausible reading of the political situation in the Transkei in 1990, it is no longer valid.

To be sure there are many civil servants in the Transkeian bureaucracy who fear for their jobs and stand little chance of getting placements in the new South Africa. But while some of these individuals have withdrawn into their shells, many others have changed political sides and have actually become active in the ANC - and there can be little doubt that they have been pleased at the extent to which the liberation movement has been prepared to absorb them into its ranks. In fact, this shift in support has led the middle class into the civic movements and into positions of prominence within the newly emerging political dispensation. "Transition," in many areas, has begun to take the form of an alliance between the better educated youth and the middle class - with the very real risk that the interests of squatters and the poor are being submerged, both within the civics and within the broader polity.

Thus, as civics move towards negotiated settlements - both to enhance their own credibility and (they argue) to provide some of the services they have promised the people, it looks more and more like they are being co-opted and the real interests of the poor
neglected. As one squatter in Cala remarked: "They do not feel the pain." But what if any such negotiated partnership — between the councillors, civic leaders and the state — does not, in fact, address the aspirations of the poor who have now learnt the politics of liberation and have witnessed the power of mass politics and demonstration? Isn't it quite possible that any counter-revolution — any resistance, that is, to the terms of the currently emerging transition to a "democratic South Africa" — will then be led from the peri-urban areas and from the squatter camps where the needs are so great?

What would be the possible consequences of this kind of popularly-based "counter-revolution," one so very different from the middle-class variant discussed above? On the one hand, one might hope to find the poor increasingly taking over the emerging democratic structures such as civic organizations, finding new space to participate in decision-making, and thereby ensuring a really thorough-going democratization in the region. On the other hand, the outcome of this process of structural decay and further marginalization of a large percentage of the population might merely be an increasing instability in impoverished rural areas. Already one clear trend is the rise of "social banditry," expressed in attacks on vehicles driving through the Transkei, stock theft and arson, and destruction of buildings. In addition, the more militant-sounding politics of the PAC — finding expression in such actions as sit-ins that have rendered some local government structures non-functional — are finding resonance with the poor in many areas of the Transkei.

It is true, of course, that political violence within the Transkei itself has been at a low level since Holomisa's "conversion" to the cause of liberation; only 3 deaths occurred due to political violence in the period between June 1990 and June 1992. However, violence has spilled over the borders of the Transkei into nearby white farming areas, with stock theft and arson attacks being interpreted by some as signs of land hunger linked to political motivations. Moreover, conflict around land ownership in the area is likely to be an ongoing phenomenon, and here too the PAC has generated some support in the Transkei and Border regions — through use of its slogan of 'One settler, one bullet' and its focus on reclaiming the land for the dispossessed.

Towards reincorporation

As is well known, the war of words between the government and Holomisa over his provision of support and "bases" for the PAC's armed wing, APLA, has heated up over the past few months. Contributing to this have been the blockade of the Transkei border by South African security a month ago, Holomisa's disclosure of the Ciskei coup plan (Operation Katzen), and his refusal to have Transkei investigated by the Goldstone Commission on Violence. Holomisa's blustering and belligerence is no doubt aimed at building his legitimacy, not only with the liberation movements, but with the residents of Transkei who may not yet be convinced that they are indeed living in a "new South Africa."

Of course, some of the heat will be taken out of this immediate confrontation as the South African government proceeds with the "reincorporation" of the former "independent" homelands. For there seems little doubt that if the national negotiations process advances as planned, all citizens of South Africa, whether living in "independent" or "non-independent" homelands, will vote in the forthcoming elections for a nation-wide constituent assembly. Holomisa's clever opportunism has been based on a shrewd realization that his bread is buttered on the ANC side; while retaining no hopes of being a "ruler" in the new South Africa (he has recently been quoted as saying that his "biggest regret" is "to find myself running a country"), he may envisage a future for himself occupying a high position in the new South African Defence Force. But even if Holomisa — and, indeed, the Transkei itself, at least as it has been formally constituted in recent years — were to pass from the local scene, the dilemmas of local governance described in this article will remain for any successor regime (including an ANC-dominated central government). As we have hinted, the ANC already runs the risk — like Holomisa before it — of being absorbed into one or another structure of established privilege in the Transkei. Might it, in consequence, miss the opportunity of grounding itself firmly in a political process of genuine popular empowerment there? Time alone will tell. For the moment one must conclude that the question as to just what kind of democratization the current transition actually promises for the Transkei remains an open one.

The Ciskei: Following Buthelezi's Path?

If the Transkei's Holomisa has, on balance, decided to go with flow of current democratic developments in South Africa (see accompanying story), the Ciskei's Oupa Gqozo has chosen quite a different course. Holomisa was already in the process of aligning himself with the ANC when the Ciskei experienced a military coup of its own on 4 March 1990. Brigadier Gqozo's initial accession to power was welcomed by most residents of the area; the majority of Ciskeians had a deep antipathy to corrupt and repressive "bantustan" rule, and a tradition of support for the ANC and other liberation movements. At the time, it was anticipated that the new military government would follow in the footsteps of the Transkei's Holomisa and not only lift all restrictions on political expression and organization, but also develop a close relationship with the liberation movements.

And "Oupa" did begin his rule in a conciliatory manner, wooing ANC leaders, introducing a Bill of Rights, abolishing the death penalty, ending the "headman" system and granting favourable dispensations to squatter communities. For much of 1990, in what is now referred to as the "Bisho Spring," civic organizations, trade unions and political organizations set up organizational structures across the bantustans, and it still seemed possible that Gqozo would become a progressive force in the region.

As grassroots movements swelled and support for the now unbanned ANC grew in the Ciskei, however, 'Oupa' changed his tune. He reversed his position on squatters, and reimposed the "headman" system in villages in July 1991, generating enormous localized conflict. And he made an about-turn as regards the ANC. His suppression of political opposition now included the reimposition of a State of Emergency, the banning of all residents' associations, and the use of the Ciskei Defence Force against striking workers. This resulted in a predictable backlash among the highly politicized population. The ANC's mass action campaign demanded reincorporation of the Ciskei, democratic rule and free political activity, the ultimate result of this clash of wills being the infamous Bisho massacre of September 1992, in which 29 people were mowed down.

Indeed, activists in the region now fear that Gqozo's "African Democratic Movement" is seeking to play the same wretched's role as Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party in Natal. On 27 October last year Jackson Lufefe, an executive member of the ANC's border region, was assassinated by a group claiming to be a "headman". This has been the ultimate result of this clash of wills, being the new infamous Bisho massacre of September 1992, in which 29 people were mowed down.

Within the Ciskei itself the gap left by Gqozo's suppression of political organization has, at least momentarily, discomfited the ANC and even facilitated an upsurge of support for the PAC - marked by, among other things, an increase in the number of attacks conducted in the nearby Border area by the latter's armed wing, APLA. Moreover, as repression in the Ciskei continues, the living conditions for the majority of landless, workless inhabitants of this impoverished area continue to deteriorate. Eighty per cent of the Ciskei's budget comes from Pretoria; 90% of households have no land or else plots far too small for subsistence; only 23% of the land is free from erosion, while 50% is moderately or severely eroded; 40% of the male population are migrants to 'white' South Africa, and they bring in 67% of the GNP; the average monthly income of Ciskei "citizens" is R 83.

Certainly, the erstwhile cozy relationship between the bantustan governments and Pretoria no longer exists and, as with the Transkei, the Ciskei's reincorporation is inevitable. But Pretoria seems at a loss as to how to deal with Gqozo who, despite a changing context, has reverted to many of the policies and strategies of the Sebe era. Gqozo's attempt - in the limited time he has left with the levers of power in his hands - to assert himself may be a vain one, but the fact remains that, like Gateha Buthelezi, he can still inflict a considerable amount of damage on the transition process. And the stark legacy of his present actions can only exacerbate the daunting difficulties that face any successor regime in dealing with the Ciskei's underdevelopment.
Women’s Writing: What’s New in South Africa

BY CHERRY CLAYTON

Cherry Clayton is currently a lecturer in the Department of English at the University of Guelph. She is also the editor of Women and Writing in South Africa: A Critical Anthology.

It is only recently that a sufficient spectrum of writing by white and black women has emerged that can flesh out the complex positions and lived experience of all women in South Africa. This spectrum has been apparent in the appearance of anthologies of women’s writing, journals and perhaps most significantly, the publication of a whole new generation of women’s voices forged in the recent struggles around gender and race. These South African women have argued that gender and racial oppression go together and should be contested simultaneously. Recent writings testify to many subtle forms of silencing, an internalizing of male norms, a depiction of conventional colonial marriage as a prison (a key early text here was Doris Lessing’s *The Grass is Singing*) as well as testimony to the brutal control of black women by traditional African patriarchy and arranged marriages. Dramatist and popular story teller Gcina Mhlope’s story, “Nokulunga’s Wedding” reveals the abuses inherent in traditional African power structures.

Other stories and sketches represent the predicaments of contemporary African women resulting from a double standard of sexual morality, harassment and assault on overcrowded township trains, the breakdown of traditional extended family support, and the impact on the family of decades of violent struggle.

It has been said that patriarchy was re-invented in the colonies. The complex interweavings of racial and gender oppression in South Africa, despite the class and economic differences which separate white from black women, have made women a marginal group both in the traditional power structures of British...
imperialism and Afrikaner nationalism and in the current restructuring of the South African polity. Historian Jeff Guy has argued that the appropriation and control of women’s productive and reproductive capacity by men was the central dynamic of pre-capitalist farming society in Southern Africa. Nevertheless, women had some autonomy and control of the agricultural process.

In the uneven transition to capitalist relations of production new forms of oppression emerged and the assumption of male authority over women was reinforced. Western norms circumscribed the position of black women, migrant labour created intense pressure on the African family, and missionary interventions weakened the older family support systems. Colonial authorities entrenched customary law in a way which exacerbated the difficulties of African women: the outer form of the indigenous sex-gender system was preserved while its inner logic was destroyed. Settler native policy evolved in the context of a voracious demand for cheap black labour and the reserve system which underwrote this male black labour system in turn created new constraints on the freedom of black women. Black women, as writer Ellen Kuzwayo recently pointed out, were the last to reach the cities and attempt to tap into a swollen squatter population and dwindling opportunities. Prostitution, beer-brewing and domestic service were the poor choices available. Historian Philip Bonner has argued that the beer-brewers and prostitutes on the Rand could at least claim...
some autonomy for themselves in their flight from a shattered family system.

Thus modern South Africa has a racially-stratified sex-gender system in which South African women are discriminated against as blacks and as women. Some sociologists argue that this system turns white women into Southern-type managers of the estate's slave labour: certainly the fiction of a writer like Nobel Prize winner Nadine Gordimer has constantly testified to the interdependent but unequal prison of madam and maid in the South African household. Gordimer's main target has, however, always been the racially oppressive system of apartheid, so much so that she could dismiss the feminist protests of her forerunner, Olive Schreiner as an irrelevant side issue. Gordimer's 1987 novel, *A Sport of Nature* was problematic for many feminists, but some younger readers feel it attempts to validate a discourse of the body which at least opposes the discourses of racial categorization.

A second major international figure, J. M. Coetzee has also begun to give gender issues more space and attention. Coetzee's *Age of Iron* is a moving novel as letter from a dying mother (and a dying liberalism) to a daughter in North America. The letter is thrown across a cultural gap whose damaging effects are chronicled in the mother's story. The novel may also suggest that the loss of liberalism, and the long political struggle for a kind of justice in South Africa, with the sacrifices involved, may have resulted in a petrification of the heart for all concerned. The death of Coetzee's protagonist, Elizabeth Curren, may also mean the death of a compassionate nurturance which she also represents. Coetzee's constant attempts to engage with a female sensibility represent a continuing effort to broach the boundaries of gender. Another male writer who has attempted to give women's lives a central focus is Sipho Sepamla, whose *Third Generation and A Scattered Survival* show the details of women's resistance in township domestic life as a continuing and important aspect of South African life.

But the new situation of emergent women's voices has been stimulated by a number of other factors. Two major historical anthologies of women's writing appeared in 1990: Cecily Lockett's *Breaking the Silence* (poetry) and Annemarie van Niekerk's *Raising the Blinds* (short stories). These anthologies have made some kind of historical overview of the two genres possible, and they both treat writings by women of all races as a continuum, and acknowledge the role of women's writing as testimony and historical documentation. Nevertheless, the "minor" colonial voices drawn into their picture reveal how colonial women were often condemned to a realm of genteel triviality which was in itself imprisoning. Smaller but significant anthologies, such as *Women in South Africa: From the Heart*, have come from the black feminist publishing house, Seriti sa Sechaba in Johannesburg. For the first time women actually employed as domestic servants were writing or inventing their own stories and poems and finding a forum other than magazines like *Staffrider* in Johannesburg (in which women were always underrepresented).

A few journals have also assisted in the process of making women visible. *Current Writing*, a strong critical journal from the University of Natal, has made gender issues a major concern. The *Southern African Review of Books*, now relocated from London to Cape Town, has begun to give gender issues more visibility and attention.

Another factor has been the continuing visibility of a few black women who have continued to write against the odds: Miriam Tlali and Ellen Kuzwayo. Miriam Tlali's first novel, *Muriel at Metropolitan* was an investigation of the daily treatment of a few black women in urban employment as second-class citizens; Tlali's recent writings, such as *Footprints in the Quag* have been more powerful interweavings of feminist anger and racial injustice. Ellen Kuzwayo's autobiography, *Call me Woman*, was an invaluable contribution to the documentation of African women's experience under Christianization, forced removals, unhappy marriage, urbanization, and politicization through a younger generation in the seventies.

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Women like Tlali and Kuzwayo in turn act as role models and stimulus to younger women who often lack the confidence to move into the cultural arena at all.

The cultural dimension of the recent political struggle has also played a role in that women within organizations such as COSAW (the Congress of South African Writers) have become more active and vociferous. Women praise poets drawing on a revitalized oral tradition, such as Nise Malange, have shown how women activists can harness language and public performance to trade union activity and general consciousness-raising.

The past decades of struggle have drawn women of different races together in new forms of cultural and political activity. Women writers continue to pose new questions that reveal the racially stratified sex-gender system that discriminates against South African women. One writer who reflects this world is Menan du Plessis, who has now written two novels exploring the mixed responses of young people in Cape Town, *A State of Fear and Longlive*. In her fiction the chequered idealism and personal loneliness of a younger generation growing up amidst constant violence are vividly portrayed. A changing political order has also meant more movement and reconciliation in the exiled community: writer Lauretta Ngcobo, long exiled in London, has visited South Africa and produced a most triumphant and movingly elegiac novel about rural women's lives over many generations: *And They Didn't Die*. The circular structure of this novel suggests how many abuses of power remain, yet its main character embodies the continued expression of female resistance and strength. A younger writer, Zoe Wicomb, now teaching at the University of the Western Cape, has become a most articulate critic combining political acumen and literary insight. Her collection of short stories, *You Can't Get Lost in Cape Town*, is an extremely strong and well-crafted vision of a 'Coloured' childhood, of belonging and not belonging at many levels, to the country of one's birth. Her role as a critic and writer is very promising, as a new generation of voices is needed to forge a common culture where so much has been unquestioned for so long.

Much of the writing discussed here represents the continuing effects of many forms of dispossession, injustice and physical suffering in Southern Africa. Women's voices are now beginning to be more fully heard, and the complex interrelationship of racial and sexual oppression more fully documented. These writers form a crucial platform in the broad attempt to forge in South Africa a society and culture which will move out from under the shadow of a long and traumatic political tyranny and social fracture.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


**Readers' Forum . . .**

Disappearing Africa

7 June 1993

Thanks for your consistently fine journal. I particularly appreciated your most recent May 1993 issue, especially the articles on the Mozambican labour movement (I was a co-operative in Beira 1982-84) and the state of the US solidarity movement. One sentence struck me in the article on the US movement — "... Africa seems to be disappearing from the political map of the United States." That is true, but it is not alone. The entire US Left and any effective oppositional movement is also disappearing from the US political map. The same can be said for the socialist movement worldwide. Until this situation is turned around, not only Africa but many other worthy causes will languish on the margins of serious politics. We've got a big job ahead of us.

Steve Tarzynski
National Political Committee
Democratic Socialists of America
John S. Saul is a widely respected commentator on southern African affairs. Politically active with the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (TCLSA) and as a member of the editorial working group of Southern Africa Report, he taught for many years in Africa and now lectures at York University.

John S. Saul

Recolonization and Resistance in Southern Africa in the 1990s soberly registers both the successes of the on-going revolution against white minority rule in southern Africa and the nature of the counter-revolution that has gathered strength across the region in recent years. Focussing on the cruel trend of events that has transformed once-proud Mozambique and Angola into medicant states, Saul traces the virtual recolonization of large parts of the region that the post-Cold War ascendency of "structural adjustment" and global capitalist restructuring have helped define. Even in South Africa, where changes that are far more positive have recently occurred, the dangers of either a chaos-producing stalemate or a merely "neo-colonialist" post-apartheid dispensation are shown to loom large.

Recolonization and Resistance in Southern Africa in the 1990s also focuses on the on-going resistance to such outcomes in South Africa and beyond. He suggests that there are lessons to be learned from a critique of the brutal practices of a movement like Mozambique's Frelimo that can prove useful as a popular antagonism to recolonization once again manifests itself. He examines in detail the current efforts that spring from South Africa's democratic movement to keep alive the struggle against oppressive structures of class, race and gender. And in so doing he explores the theory and practice of "structural reform" — an approach very different from either mere reformism or a largely rhetorical "revolutionism", and one that he finds to encapsulate the most positive possibilities for social transformation that still exist in South Africa. Finally, in a compelling "afterword" Saul sketches some of the possible implications of his analysis for the practice, in the nineties, of both southern African-related solidarity work and the craft of "scholar-activism" amongst students of the region.

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