Shaping the Story
The Media and South Africa

KEEING THE RIGHT IMAGE:
The Mainstream Media in South Africa

PERISH OR PUBLISH:
Consolidating the Alternative Voice

THE I LOVE LUCY SHOW:

BUILDING CIVIL SOCIETY:
Mase, Mavuso Interviewed
Southern Africa REPORT

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Whose Media?

Philosophy 101. If a tree falls in the forest and no-one is there to hear its fall, does it really make a noise? Communications 101. If a revolution is taking place and television cameras fail to record it, is it really taking place?

The latter is a question the anti-apartheid movement has had to ask itself many times over the years. When the apartheid government had some success in suppressing media coverage of events in South Africa and in keeping the starkest images off the small screen in Canada and elsewhere public concern for the struggle tended to recede. Equally important have been the ebbs and flows of coverage imposed by the waverering attention of the fickle and faddish international media themselves.

Beyond fads, however, there is also the question of power. It is a truism to say that, left uncontested, the mainstream media reflects primarily the opinions and interests of the politically and economically powerful. And this is no less true for Canada than it is for South Africa. It is no accident that Toronto's Globe and Mail (see the article entitled "Hard Pressed") now finds itself sympathetic not—heaven forbid—to apartheid, but certainly to the "reasonable" efforts of the South African government to constitutionally protect "property rights" from "majority tyranny" in a new South Africa! It is no more of an accident—as Jo-Anne Collinge and David Niddrie reveal in our lead article—that powerful media voices inside South Africa itself are seeking to shape perceptions of the negotiations process in ways similarly unsympathetic to the imperatives of genuine change.

However, in South Africa (if not in Canada) the very success of the popular movement that has forced negotiations onto the agenda has also begun to force hard questions regarding the media out into the open. There is certainly an impetus to do so that carries over from the precedents established as part of the broad-gauged struggle for
democracy of recent years: as Don Pinnock demonstrates in this issue ("When Actors Become Authors"), guerilla communications – the development of alternate media – has been one key means by which the democratic movement has succeeded in undermining the repressive status quo. Yet it is an even greater challenge to now contemplate the structuring, on entirely new premises and on a society-wide basis, of a full-blown democratic network of communications, particularly when the society is one as hierarchical and as complex as that of South Africa.

Certainly, the wielders of media power are not prepared to provide a stationary target for such an effort. As Collinge and Niddrie also reveal, such actors as the South African Broadcasting Corporation and the Argus Group are already moving quickly to protect themselves and their privileged role in the production of ideology by preemptive means (by privatization, for example, and by the whipping up of hysteria about the threat of nationalism). Indeed, the very complexity of the challenges that are beginning to arise regarding the democratization of the media (including, as another example, in the sphere of progressive publishing here analyzed by Glenn Moss) provides an exemplary case-study of the kinds of dilemmas that face a democratic movement – if, as and when it comes to power – in virtually every sphere of South African life.

Not that the ANC or anyone else professes to have any easy answers to the media question – as the statements cited by Collinge and Niddrie from ANC national executive member Aziz Pahad make clear. For the moment, however, what is important is that changing conditions at last begin to make it possible to pose such questions concretely and in a promising manner.

* * *

If no glib answers are available in South Africa, this is equally true here at home. Recent issues of *SAR* have suggested something of the debates that swirl within the southern Africa support network around such issues as how best to relate to a Mozambique whose original revolutionary trajectory has been substantially altered. And similarly complex questions spring from analyses in this issue of the troubled situations in Angola and Zimbabwe.

There is also the very considerable challenge of effectively characterizing a quickly changing South African scene (the discussion of the interplay between "civil society" and the political realm broached by Moses Mayekiso in the interview re-counted here providing particularly rich food for thought in this respect) and of moving forward to link supportively to fresh developments inside South Africa. Indeed, this latter challenge premised much of the debate at a recent national meeting of Canadian anti-apartheid activists, the "Taking Strides" Consultative Forum held in Ottawa on the weekend of 4-6 May.

As will be seen from our report on the Forum ("The I Love Lucy Show"), the question of how best to position South Africa’s leading liberation movement, the African National Congress, within the Canadian anti-apartheid movement gave rise to some controversy. More startlingly, however, controversy emerged around the question of what stance the Canadian movement should be adopting towards the Tory government in Ottawa regarding the latter’s South Africa policy. Should our stance *via-à-vis* the government be "conciliatory" or, as moderates at the Consultative Forum sought to pigeon-hole the alternative position with which they disagreed, "confrontational"?

It is true that the Canadian government has been slower than many other western governments to question the necessity of sustaining sanctions in order to bring pressure to bear on a South African government still very far from committing itself to an "irreversible" process of democratization. True, too, that Canada has, in recent years, supported a number of quite positive initiatives on the ground inside South Africa – if not supporting, in any very meaningful way, the ANC itself.

But surely no reader of Linda Freeman’s annual surveys of Canadian policy in these pages can doubt the slipperness of official Canada’s anti-apartheid stance – not least on the very issue of the implementation of sanctions, for example. Nor can there be much doubt that a free-trading, welfare-bashing Tory government will be far less enthusiastic about the need for dramatic socio-economic changes in a formally-democratic, post-apartheid South Africa than will most anti-apartheid activists. Indeed, we have made the point editorially before ("Opportunism Knocks," *SAR*, December, 1988) that on those occasions when the Canadian government has taken a relatively advanced position on South African questions, it has done so precisely to rein in, by preemptive action, a process of change in South Africa that might otherwise become too radical.

Confrontation, then? Not for its own sake certainly, although this is what anti-apartheid moderates, at the Ottawa Forum and elsewhere, seem to seek to imply when they wave the term around in an attempt to discredit their critics. What is required, however, is unremittting popular pressure, the better to realize some very concrete goals. The better to keep the Canadian government honest on sanctions. The better to encourage it to support, ever more overtly and wholeheartedly, the true protagonists of change in South Africa (especially the ANC). The better to make it as difficult as possible for our government to fall in "reasonably" behind outcomes (constitutional or otherwise) to negotiations in South Africa that could help undermine real political and socio-economic democratization.
Keeping the Right Image:
The Mainstream Media in South Africa

BY JO-ANNE COLLINGE & DAVID NIDDRIE

Jo-Anne Collinge and David Niddrie are journalists based in Johannesburg working for Work In Progress.

Since De Klerk lifted the restrictions on the African National Congress and other banned political organizations on February 2, released Mandela and started on the path towards negotiating with the ANC, there has been a startling similarity in the political messages projected by the National Party, the state-controlled media and major commercial newspapers.

This new-found unity has something to do with the National Party moving into political territory long contemplated by more liberal but less powerful white groups. But it also has an air of the privileged few sinking their differences in the interests of controlling change. And one of the most important changes they are working towards is to ensure that a majority government does not control the media as the apartheid regime has done.

Managing reform

“South Africa has only just put behind it more than a decade of crisis management. What is needed now is effective management of reform. It must be accepted that every step towards reform will feed black expectations and white fears. Therefore, reform must be managed so that neither of the two elements can become uncontrollable,” read an editorial in a May edition of the Afrikaans weekend paper, Rapport.

On the same leader page was a piece by Dr. Theuns Eloff, executive director of the Consultative Business Movement, an organization which for almost two years has been nurturing communication between significant business figures and leaders of the Mass Democratic Movement within South Africa.

Eloff argues that “radicals” at both ends of the political spectrum are ensuring that the ANC and the National Party are interdependent. “In the transitional period, the ANC and the National Party should become constitutional allies,” he says. “And this should be welcomed and encouraged by all right-thinking and peace-loving South Africans.”

This single page in Rapport reflects two recurrent themes in the political tune the media are currently singing – recognizing the legitimacy of the ANC and giving a lot of space to criticizing its policies.

The ANC, after nearly 30 years of illegality, has been restored not only to legality but to unprecedented political legitimacy. Its massive constituency has been graphically displayed in the papers and on television, with extensive coverage of the mass rallies addressed by Nelson Mandela and other ANC leaders.

Sympathetic coverage

The first face-to-face talks between the government and ANC on May 2 in the run-up to negotiations, received massive and sympathetic coverage. Newspapers across the language divide sought out the colour and the human sides in the historic moment. But above all, they strove to stress the element of progress – the possibility of discovering sufficient common ground from which to launch true negotiations.

As the talks-about-talks progressed through three days, the largest daily paper, The Star, editorialized: “Did the government have a mandate from the electorate to talk to the ANC? Probably not, but the Groote Schuur talks are in tune with the times. The fact that they are happening – regardless of whether any sticking points emerge – is the most hopeful sign for a peaceful resolution of South Africa’s conflicts that has yet emerged.”

However, in tandem with such acknowledgements, most major newspapers and the state-controlled South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) have given prominence to critics of specific ANC policies.

Under particular attack are the notions of simple majoritarianism – a one-person-one-vote system without concessions to “minority” or “group” rights; economic policy, especially nationalization; and the ANC’s longstanding and staunch alliance with the South African Communist Party.

Surprisingly, some of the strongest criticism came from the liberal national daily, Business Day. Editor Ken Owen has declared one-person-one-vote undesirable but inevitable. “There is no escape from one man, one vote, or from majority rule.”

Owen calls on liberals to fight to ensure that “the power to oppress be subjected to every possible curb and restraint.” The Afrikaans daily, Beeld, also concerned to preserve the rights of minorities, has been milder in its presentation of the case. Positioning itself behind the 12-point plan for protection of minorities outlined by Constitutional Development Minister Gerrit Viljoen, Beeld charges the government with the task of persuading the ANC by “taking the sting out of well-intentioned proposals” (group rights, for example), by ensuring that nothing smacks of racism.
Unanimity or a shoot out

The objective, says Beeld, is to "chafe away at representative viewpoints until a workable unanimity is achieved. The choice is this approach or shooting it out."

One of the areas where a lot of public chafing has occurred in the media is the economy - the questions of nationalization and redistribution of wealth and resources. It is no accident that The Star, in an editorial before the Groote Schuur, urged the ANC to drop the notion of nationalization (and the government stop enforcing the race classification law, the Population Registration Act) to "reduce friction" during talks.

The National Party mouthpiece, Die Burger, at the same stage carried a cartoon in which a sculptor creating an image of the ANC, remarks: "I can't improve your image with all the baggage you're carrying." The baggage being nationalization, SACP general secretary Joe Slovo and an AK-47 rifle.

Typically more cutting, Business Day, commented: "The longer the threat of nationalization is kept alive, the longer capital flight will continue and the longer investment in manufacturing and job-creation will be put off. If the ANC hopes to inherit the country, it must soon come to a decision to stop soiling its patrimony."

Despite an evident antipathy to nationalization and a wariness on questions of redistribution, The Star carried an interview with Slovo on ANC economic policy (Slovo is also a member of the ANC national executive). The opening assertion by Slovo is that "Pretoria will concede black majority rule if it can guarantee that white economic privilege will survive the end of apartheid."

No doubt the remark struck a resonant chord of recognition among the managers and directors of Argus Holdings which owns The Star - and the bulk of the country's English language press. The media, no less than other key sectors, have been re-structuring on this premise for some time.

But if the owners of South Africa's print and electronic media are happy with the negotiating process, they are less so with the idea of the ANC intervening in any meaningful way in the country's media after apartheid.

Pre-emptive moves

The owners of both the country's electronic and print media have begun pre-emptive moves to deny the ANC or any other post-apartheid government the kind of control the apartheid government and business exercises over radio, television and print.

The government-run South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), in particular, is an attractive target: In a country in which daily newspaper sales run to well below two million, SABC's 23 internal radio stations reach an estimated 14 million listeners a day. Combined with its four television channels, its daily audience on occasion nudges 20 million - almost two-thirds of the total South African population.

And with well over half the adult population functionally illiterate - thus exclusively reliant on radio or TV for anything other than word-of-mouth information - SABC exercises a powerful influence on the thinking and attitudes of millions of South Africans.

Segregated media

For 40 years it has done so exclusively in support of the National Party government and its policies. It rigidly segregated its stations and programmes along race and language lines when grand apartheid was in motion; then stealthily added black faces to TV screens and black voices to radio as Pretoria's policy shifted towards establishment of a multi-racial buffer against demands for non-racial democracy.

The country's print media - and particularly its newspapers - are only marginally less centralized with four publishing corporations accounting for almost 98% of newspapers published in South Africa. The four corporations, two strongly pro-government, also own...
the only non-government television channel, and hold shares in one of only two non-government radio stations. With two exceptions, South Africa’s English-language dailies – including the only one produced for black readers – are ultimately controlled by Anglo-American Corporation. The biggest of the four media groups, the Argus Group, accounts for more than 60% of daily newspapers sold. This figure is set to increase, following the decision by its Johannesburg-based flagship, The Star, to produce a morning edition – mainly to counter the launch of a daily by the publishers of the liberal Weekly Mail.

Limiting losses
For the past three years Argus executives have been quietly relocating the bulk of their capital and control structures from their newspapers’ publishing companies into its centralized holding company – a move intended to limit losses if a post-apartheid government nationalized any or all of its papers.

The SABC, too, is investigating means of removing the airwaves beyond the reach of a democratic, post-apartheid government. This follows an early demand from ANC foreign affairs secretary Thabo Mbeki – made while the Groote Schuur talks were still in progress – that the corporation should cease functioning as a 24-hour-a-day Nationalist Party political broadcast, and that control should be shared by “more than one party to the conflict.”

Ironically, as Mbeki made his demand, the ANC and its leaders were enjoying a bigger and better media profile that at any time in the movement’s 78-year history. Once De Klerk recognized the need for talks with the movement, he began, through SABC, to acclimatize broadcast audiences to the fact.

Most South Africans had never heard ANC officials talking before, nor seen their faces. And while the liberation movement is happy with the change, it recognizes it as serving De Klerk’s interests as much as theirs – withdrawable whenever it suits the government.

The ANC demand is part of a broader ANC insistence on a general withdrawal of National Party authority over the institutions of state, culminating, in the ANC view, in an eventual formal hand-over of power to an interim authority at the start of elections for a constituent assembly.

But with the struggle to end apartheid increasingly one of ideas, the ANC sees the process of normalizing South African political life – the foundation of its negotiation preconditions – as requiring an end to Nationalist control of the country’s most powerful information and propaganda medium. In advance of the ANC demand, however, Pretoria has begun investigating how to extend to SABC its attempt to place other state institutions beyond the reach of a post-apartheid government – through privatization and deregulation.

Media task force
In late March, the government announced the appointment of a special task force to investigate the broadcast industry and to include in its investigation “future broadcasting requirements,” including privatization and deregulation. The make-up of the force is strongly suggestive of the directions in which it is looking: In addition to the fairly predictable representatives from the SABC itself, and the Departments of Information and Posts and Telecommunications, it includes the chaplain-general of the South African Defence Force, the SADF’s director of ‘technology and electronic warfare’, the Department of Foreign Affairs official with special responsibility for the homelands, as well as representatives of Military Intelligence and the National Intelligence Service (NIS). All task force members are white males and, according to the Weekly Mail, more than half are members of the secret Afrikaner Broederbond – always a strong influence at SABC.

Even before the public announcement of the task force, however, De Klerk had indicated in what direction he would like to see SABC headed. Only weeks after the legalization of the ANC, SABC announced the scuttling of large sections of its foreign broadcasting service, Radio RSA. This dovetails neatly with other strands of government strategy. Formerly, government thinking held that to defeat its opposition, it must internationalize the country’s conflict, pushing its opposition as far as physically possible from South African soil. A corollary to this is that a major portion of the propaganda battle takes place in the international arena.

By drawing the ANC back into the country and offering to talk, Pretoria has taken on the movement in a contest of ideas on a battlefield where the state holds the high ground.

SABC has embarked on a process of scrapping its foreign language services to concentrate on the local market. It is combining the African language TV2 and TV3 channels. These have, however, only the medium-term benefit of increasing the capacity of a National Party-dominated SABC to intervene in the contest of ideas.

It will not help much if the SABC is politically ‘neutralized’ during a transition period, as Mbeki seemed to suggest. Nor would it help once – as De Klerk has acknowledged is likely – an ANC or ANC-led alliance inherits the broadcasting corporation when it takes power.

Privatizing the media
Well in advance of the task force’s appointment, government and pro-government media managers have been investigating possibilities for denying a post-apartheid government access to the massive influence the SABC has provided the National Party. At least four years ago, Ton Vosloo, Managing Direc-
tor of Nasionale Media (publishers of the major pro-government newspapers), was arguing strongly for privatization of regional broadcasting networks, and the licensing of local, city or town stations.

Vosloo's Nasionale, which had just acquired the bi-weekly City Press newspaper as a means to drive government policy into the towns, was on the lookout for further vehicles. KwaZulu's Gathsa Buthelezi, whose Inkatha movement had just bought the Zulu-language Ilange, was another potential buyer. Under P. W. Botha, who exercised even more personal control over SABC than any of his predecessors, the government refused to surrender control— even to economic and political allies. The task force has reopened the debate.

Among the issues feeding the decision to do so was growing pressure from M-Net, a fifth TV channel launched in 1986 with a license specifically prohibiting the broadcast of news or current events. Owned by the country's major newspaper groups, but with Vosloo's Nasionale as the biggest single shareholder, M-Net has been agitating for a second channel with the right to broadcast news, and to do so openly, rather than through the costly decoders currently needed to see all but two hours of M-Net's daily diet of 12 hours of largely North American trivia.

A second process of de facto privatization has been underway virtually since the launch of SABC TV in 1976. This has involved tendering out documentary and drama production to private film companies, in terms of an SABC-defined mechanism which effectively excludes all but a handful of the country's dominant private producers.

The Broeder Five
This preference given to the major producers, known derisively as 'the Broeder Five,' is similar to the process of preferential government printing contracts— for telephone directories and other large government orders— by which Pretoria has, over the past four decades, guaranteed the profitability and survival of the two main pro-government newspaper groups.

Disgruntled private producers say the SABC system has recently been formalized, with single-programme tenders now replaced by long-term, multi-programme contracts. This effectively means that, with the exception of sports and news, there is little of SABC's locally-produced content not in private hands. Whoever inherits SABC will thus be both contractually locked into a system which denies it direct control of much of what it broadcasts, and— even if it chose to break that tie-in— without the physical resources to produce alternatives.

Equally concerned at a hands-on ANC media policy, South African press barons and their editors are already offering up alternatives to attract the ANC away from earlier suggestions of nationalization or anti-trust legislation to break up the media monopolies.

As the most vulnerable of the media groups to such action, Argus has been the most vocal. In a comment column published while the ANC delegates to the Groote Schuur talks were still in the country, Harvey Tyson, editor of The Star and a strong advocate of Argus expansion, attempted to divert ANC thinking away from nationalizing the country's major papers.

Constant danger
"We have a long way to go towards normalization (of the press) and a better-serviced society," he wrote. "The press will be in constant danger unless it ensures that there is room for every kind of ownership to cater for the extraordinarily wide variety of needs. The media may even need to include state-owned and certainly state-subsidized publications as well as party-owned and privately owned newspapers.

"Politics will demand a national paper propagating the official line of the ruling party (post apartheid). Nationalization remains a threat... Far better would be for the financially-independent press to anticipate such moves by supporting a more diverse privately-owned press at all levels. Even in Britain
the idea is being mooted of a central fund to nurture new ‘diverse’ newspapers through their launch period."

Ironically, Tyson’s nervousness is increasingly out of touch with the direction of thinking within the ANC itself. While it remains strongly opposed to the South African media’s highly-centralized ownership, the ANC appears to be moving away from past advocacy of “taking control of the commanding heights of the media” through nationalization.

In the first major ANC contribution to local audiences on the subject, national executive member Aziz Pahad acknowledged to a gathering of the anti-apartheid Association of Democratic Journalists that “experiences in Eastern Europe shows that a press that becomes a mouthpiece of the party in power cannot be a healthy press, and cannot create conditions for democracy to flourish ... a free and critical press is necessary to enable the values for which we are all fighting to grow.”

The idea of anti-trust legislation to force diversified ownership of the media is clearly still on the ANC’s agenda: “Are we going to allow the monopolized commercial press to remain as it is? Or are we and other interested parties going to work out formulae to democratize the press?”

He argued that this process should be directed at ensuring that other interests than big business should have access, through control and ownership, of the press.

Regarding possible constraints on journalists under an ANC government, Pahad said: “We don’t want journalists to be propagandists for our movement. The ANC would welcome and encourage constructive criticisms of our policies.” The ANC, he said, would require “responsible journalism,” adding that “we do not want a situation in which ‘responsible’ means ‘controlled’.”

And while an ANC-linked daily seems increasingly unlikely, Pahad said “we are considering a paper which would reflect the democratic and alternative voices generally.”

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When Actors Become Authors
Radical Communications in the 1980s

BY DON PINNOCK

Don Pinnock is a South African activist currently lecturing in the Department of Journalism and Media Studies at Rhodes University in Grahamstown. This article is a condensed version of a longer paper entitled “Popularise, Organize, Educate and Mobilize: Some reflections on South Africa’s left-wing press in the 1980s” written in 1989.

The left-wing media which evolved in South Africa during the first half of the 1980s have been the subject of much discussion. Many ideas have emerged during late-night sessions over light tables and letraset. Analysts with media activists and students following the crippling press restrictions of the second state of emergency have also contributed to the debate.

By the mid-1980s nearly 30,000 South African activists had been detained under the various states of emergency and a considerable number of them were media workers of one sort or another. For the survivors of those heady years, when the end of apartheid seemed to be in sight, it was a time for reassessment. We were left with many organizations crippled or banned, a much-reduced terrain of operations and fundamental questions. What is mass communication? What is the relationship between media and movements, and between movements and technology? How do notions of class and the national democratic movement articulate? There were also broader questions. What, in ideological and cultural terms, were the 1980s in South Africa? How much credence can be given to the state’s claim that a revolution was imminent? In the turbulence of the time there had been little space for reflection. By the late 1980s, it was essential.

Given that theories and conclusions are provisional, and that activists tend to colour their history from their own paint-box, three general agreements have emerged:

• The left’s willingness to press the new print technologies into the service of the struggle led to a qualitative and quantitative leap in the use of print media
• The emergencies were the apartheid system’s answer to a massive leakage of executive legitimacy. While the Pretoria government seemed to be winning most of the battles of the period by force and repression, it was rapidly losing the people to an oppositional culture whose symbols were daily regenerated and refined through popular communications channels. This makes more comprehensible the shift of executive power from parliamentary to para-military structures, and explains why one of the main recipients of state restriction was the press.

The state – a failure of legitimacy

The South African state, with its obedient television, radio and press networks, did not just provide a focus for political opposition. It also set boundaries and often provided the spaces within which (and over
which) popular struggles occurred. Some have characterized the 1970s shift, from the limited Westminster parliamentary system towards a military-dominated elite with the State Security Council, as a "creeping coup." The extended powers granted to the SSC from 1977 represented a massive centralization of power. It was followed by a hawkish foreign policy and an attempt to defuse growing trouble in the townships by initiating reforms designed to win black allies and divide the disenfranchised by offering limited powers to elected township councillors.

Despite the use of state TV and radio to sell these initiatives, the success with which popular ideology and the popular movement systematically shredded them would eventually throw the state into a crisis of legitimation and control. But at the time, political spaces opened up and issues emerged around which the national democratic movement could and did organize.

Another unexpected space which appeared was in the judiciary. Emboldened by the growth of the mass movement and undoubtedly with an ear to overseas opinion, sections of the judiciary began to make more liberal judgments. These acted as a partial brake on excesses and often forced the state to reveal its hand in key cases against the press and the national democratic movement.

The Guild Press – a failure of will

The mass communications networks contributed by default to the rise of the left press. They appeared to lose popular legitimacy at a time when their owners would have most wanted to influence the course of political events. This corresponded to an increase in the credibility of popular media. The media are, of course, more than mere business enterprises. They are also purveyors of a class culture – the beliefs, mores, customs and maps of meaning of the dominant social groupings. South African journalists, particularly in the English-language newspapers, have been defensive when it is suggested that they may be writing anything but the obvious truth. But by simply conforming to particular professional practices, they work within the confines of a guild of understanding which tends to serve definitions of reality of the dominant forces in South African society. These guild practices are both professional and cultural blinkers which narrow the circumference of the journalists' vision. For many, this framing process blocked their political understanding at a time when popular insurrection demanded acute peripheral vision. And if the journalists saw little, media management saw less.

In the townships, the position was different. As the news frame of the guild media moved further and further away from township reality, people there continued to watch TV, listen to the radio and read commercial newspapers. But increasingly, the information which informed their choices and action came from elsewhere. It came from the popular circuits of communication and from events around them which together added up to a fundamental social transformation at the level of popular consciousness.

The Congress Movement – a new political force

The period between 1980 and the declaration of the second state of emergency in 1986 saw a breathtaking consolidation of popular sentiment and action around the symbols of the Freedom Charter, mass action and democratic organization. In the ensuing battle with the state, forces which are best described as popular were to engage in a bitter struggle for cultural hegemony in townships, factories and schools. History may show that the cultural gains at the level of popular lifestyles and understanding far outweighed those made in direct political confrontation with the state. Rather than finding a new way to "do politics," the popular movement found a new way to "do society."

From the late 1970s on, a new mood and a new practice of democracy had begun to emerge. The Freedom Charter was once again published and became a rallying point. The Fatti and Monis strikes in 1979 brought the community into an active link with labour. Strikes, school boycotts and a proliferation of community and student organization emerged. By 1981, 29 unions had come together to talk about forming a strong labour central.

The United Democratic Front (UDF) was launched in 1983 at a rally in Cape Town and by the end of the year, had more than 500 organizations as members. The launch itself became a symbol with more than 12,000 people present. As a broad popular assembly of organizations, the UDF had less resemblance to a political party or organization than to an "over-ground" legal vehicle for channeling political discontent. The UDF's style of operation, its emphasis on democratic accountability, its popularization of songs and symbols of resistance, and a rapidly-developed sympathetic media network, served to catalyze a culture of resistance. Its red, black, and gold badge spread like hot currency, appearing as buttons, posters, T-shirts, banners and newspapers through the townships and in schools, colleges and universities.

Alongside the political ferment in the community, a strong trade union movement was taking shape. By 1985, the giant Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) was launched in Durban. With leadership many layers deep, COSATU put militant trade union politics firmly on the map.

The new technologies – actors become authors

The significant mobilizing power of the new print technologies was an important factor in the political groundswell. The older
print systems - letterpress, phototypesetting, offset litho - were costly and required sophisticated skills and organizational backup. Indeed, from the workers' point of view, freedom to express opinions had always been a fiction, barred as they were from the means of ideological production.

The dramatic changes in print technologies changed all that. In South Africa, the number of treated-paper copiers increased steadily throughout the 1970s, but it was the use of the Xerox plain-paper copier in industry and universities which started the photocopy boom. Photocopying was fast, relatively cheap and produced near-perfect prints in great numbers on ordinary paper. Another technological leap took place in about 1979 with the introduction of copiers which could expand or reduce the size of the image.

As a result of the photocopy boom, cheap facsimiles of books, articles and images suddenly abounded. Copyright laws were virtually imposible to enforce with the proliferation of photo copy machines. Artful innovators, armed with photocopy machines and typewriters, went into the pamphlet business. Photocopiers became miniature printing presses, giving rise to a flood of pamphlets and newsletters. With the addition of leterset and pirated images, these had reached remarkable sophistication by the beginning of the 1980s. Other technologies were added, like inexpensive printing processes for T-shirts and "struggle" badges, overhead projectors to magnify onto cloth, producing huge banners of great complexity and sophistication, and portable video cameras for use in local organizing.

Initially, access to the new equipment was through universities, but by 1985 it could be found in the offices of many service, political and labour organization. The cheap technologies led to the development of smaller newspapers, producing camera-ready pages for printers with little more than a typewriter, photocopier and light table. Mass participation in a socialized production process was widely available.

By 1984 the first IBM personal computers found their way onto campuses. IBM clones appeared in 1986. The real breakthrough, however, was through Apple computers with their exceptional graphics capabilities.

In 1985, journalists from the just-deceased Rand Daily Mail got together to start a weekly tabloid with minimal funding. With some Apple Macintosh computers, an optical scanner and a laser printer, they were able to do the work of the entire editing and page make-up section of a normal newspaper in the space of a large desk - at a fraction of the cost. They soon added fax, teletype and inter-city computer networking. The appearance of the Weekly Mail on the streets demonstrated the possibilities of cheap high-tech newspaper production... and issued in the era of desk-top publishing.

Based on the "Mail's" experiences - and despite the state of emergency - other weeklies using similar technology began to emerge. This in turn created a pool of users able to support a growing network of independent news agencies based on the same data-transfer systems. These agencies, like many of the newspapers they served, became answerable to popular organizations and often acted as training grounds for community journalists. The actors were becoming authors.
The new media—culture as communication

Popular communications are vital to the development of popular culture, the way the dominated classes develop distinct patterns of life and give expressive form to their social and material life experiences. Popular culture encompasses social relations, systems of belief, customs and patterns of social and political organization. Popular communications include labour and union press, neighborhood press, university and school press, literacy publications, information bulletins and one-off publications, political manifestos, pamphlets, posters and graffiti. In the townships one should also add popular performance, community video, mass meetings, songs and even funeral orations. Social communication is more than simply facts and images. There is also a symbolic, and in a sense “hidden”, communication. This is well illustrated in an interview with the leader of the military chant called “toyi-toyi,” often sung at political funerals:

Toyi-toyi is a way of communication. Through it we know what is happening in the bush with the comrades who have left. You get to know about their training, their ranks and how they operate ... guns down, guns up ... you feel as if you are in training ... you can see the people sweating when they are doing the toyi-toyi ... they feel involved. I'm one of the people who normally leads toyi-toyi. When I'm leading I feel like a general and I feel like I'm holding my AK ... in that way toyi-toyi makes you strong. People use it as transport ... the cheapest transport there is.

Popular communications during the 1980’s, then, functioned on at least three levels of complexity. They functioned at the level of information, corresponding to a minimal organization structure with speeches, songs, slogans, signs, graffiti and limited publications. They functioned at the level of propaganda, aimed at more structured interventions in social conflicts. Their aim at this level was to agitate, organize and mobilize people on a scale ranging from a single community to the whole country. Banners, flyers and student, community and union newspapers were key instruments here.

The third and more complex level of communication practices in the 1980s took place at the level of culture. Numerous organized and relatively stable groups together developed a political lucidity and distinct regional and national forms of behaviour and ways of “doing society.” This shift from propaganda to cultural struggle began to go deeper and deeper into the most sedimented layers of the African population. By educating, organizing and mobilizing people, this struggle served to escalate the tempo of conflict. Every blow by the state became a focus for further mobilization. For example, when all other gatherings were banned, funerals became political rallies. This provoked police action which gave rise to more funerals and more political meetings. Throughout all of this, a class culture was being constructed, one which towards the mid-1980s, became increasingly self-conscious in the struggle for ideological hegemony.

The popular media of the 1980s was the expression of a popular political project, making demands for profound changes by the state. Popular communications networks articulated this project, making explicit the content of a new society while demonstrating the repressive nature of the old. These communications forms did not all speak with one voice. What developed was a movement of active community practices and forms pressing on each other, sometimes deliberately, sometimes not. It was a process rich with contradiction and self-contradiction, from which a new historical world view began to develop.

The circuits of popular communication were vital to the unfolding political processes. The political turmoil of the time was leading to the ideological transformation of a nation. On this level, culture became a site of struggle between the dominant class attempting to win a measure of consent for its reform process, and the popular democratic and labour organizations articulating a range of alternative radical projects through mass meetings, local organizations and the popular media. The cultural revolution from below has demonstrated its resilience in the face of repression. While the heavy repression of 1987 and 1988 caused a temporary lull in activities, the vibrancy of the popular movement has reasserted itself again in the current phase as a vital dimension of the ongoing struggle.
media

Perish or Publish:
Consolidating the Alternative Voice

BY GLENN MOSS.

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South Africa's "alternative" media - for so long the target of government action - faces a new threat to their existence.

Bannings and closures may not yet be issues of the past. Certainly, the legal mechanisms of censorship and control are still very much in force, and the statute books which limit publication of information. But changing political and social circumstances pose an even greater threat to this section of the media, which has a new and more difficult battle for survival on its hands.

For more than a decade, this stream of media has provided information, perspectives and analysis which its less democratic relatives in the mainstream have ignored. Bravely challenging censorship, risking closure and imprisonment of personnel, the "alternatives" reflected a world-view influenced by opposition and resistance to apartheid. They focused on actors and forces largely ignored by the "commerciales" - owned and dominated by various financial interests. They challenged conventional wisdom, and often confronted the more repressive institutions of the state - police, army, prisons, intelligence agencies and the like.

Despite the growing influence and size of this section of the media, it has always carried within it the seeds of failure. This is as true for the magazines and newspapers which form the bulk of the "alternatives" as it is for the book publishing houses which fulfil similar roles for different constituencies.

As currently constituted, most of the "alternatives" can never be economically viable or even hold their own in a hostile and badly-distorted market. As a result, they have little potential to reach the majority of their target audiences, and face the danger of producing "mass media" for elites in society.

A myriad of constraints confront the "alternatives" in their attempts to develop larger economies-of-scale, become more viable financially, and reach larger audiences. Two important monopolies - in paper and in retail outlets for books, magazines and newspapers - are high on this list of impediments. South African-produced paper is generally priced at just below the import cost of equivalent paper. And the giants which dominate the paper industry adjust prices upwards every six months. This is forcing the price of printed media up beyond a range of most South Africans who read, changing books - for example - into luxury items.

So bad is the crisis of paper pricing that, despite the weakness of the South African rand against other currencies, imported books are no longer much more expensive than local productions. Some publishers are even investigating the possibility of printing books in Europe and North America - at cheaper rates!

The structure of the retail trade is a second major factor transforming printed media into a luxury. Almost every South African media outlet of note is part of the massive CNA-Gallo group, which in turn is owned by the giant Premier conglomerate. While some of these outlets - especially those in the major urban centres - are prepared to stock the books, newspapers and magazines published by the "alternative" sector, the vast majority are not. And this means that the more distant a reader is from Johannesburg or Cape Town, the more difficult it is to obtain a range of thoughtful and relevant reading material of quality.

But this is not the only difficulty associated with the monopolization of retail outlets for books and magazines. The financial terms under which these outlets will stock reading material are crippling. Discounts of fifty percent and more are enforced on small publishers who cannot absorb this blow through large sales. And the magazine publishers face a standard fifty percent discount to the retailer, who pulps all unsold copies after a specified time.

Most alternative or progressive publishing in South Africa has been heavily subsidized from inception. Development agencies, church communication projects, large foundations and foreign governments have been prepared to pour millions into this sector as a contribution to the anti-apartheid struggle. Without this assistance few - if any - of the democratically-oriented publishing programmes would have started, never mind survived.

Within their small economies-of-scale, few of the existing "alternatives" have the potential for greater financial self-sufficiency. High costs of production and distribution, difficulties in reaching larger readership markets, and limited prospects for generating advertising revenue have left most progressive publications dangerously dependent on sub-
sidies. Little was done to build up self-sufficiency and subsidies have, thus far, been fairly easily available.

Now, this is changing: many agencies which previously supported a wide range of anti-apartheid projects are adopting a narrower developmental approach involving provision of basic infrastructure and social services, job creation, and formal education. In terms of strict priorities, this may well be a correct orientation, with the potential to improve the material quality of life for many South Africans.

Yet the less-quantifiable benefits of a vibrant media must not be overlooked. Building a broadly-based non-elitist reading culture is an important task in the development of a democratic order, and this is not something which will be facilitated by conventional commercially-oriented book, magazine and newspaper publishers. It is the embryonic “alternatives” which have the best starting point to undertake this daunting task – as long as they can overcome the substantial impediments to their viability discussed above.

Organizations like the recently-formed Independent Publishers’ Association of South Africa – IPASA – are beginning to explore these matters as an urgent priority. Cooperation between progressive publishers – as they explore warehousing and distribution and joining forces to challenge the paper and retail monopolies – is one of the few ways forward in the attempt to create a vibrant and democratic reading culture. The duplication in infrastructure which has been so obvious in “alternative” publishing is at last being challenged, although much of the commitment to shared resources and facilities is still more rhetorical than real. However, the imperatives of survival are likely to change this, as the “alternatives” attempt to transform themselves from marginal voices of opposition into mainstream structures of influence.

The danger, of course, is that the very diversity of democratic perspective which is a hallmark of the alternative press could be lost in this process. Smaller and weaker book, magazine and newspaper publishers may fold, or be absorbed into growing enterprises as economies-of-scale demand increasing centralization in production and distribution. The seeking of advertising revenue – probably the only major option to replace the donor funding – may impose a caution and uniformity on those media currently known for their bravery and diversity. And pressures to promote political uniformity and uncritical support for the mainstream of opposition could intersect with these other factors threatening the independence of the progressive media.

The stakes are high in confronting these new dangers. Survival in the face of a hostile government is no longer the priority for progressive media. Moving from the politics of opposition to the realities of influence and power – without abandoning the diversity, critical perspectives and vibrancy which is the essence of a democratic media – is the battle which the progressive media must win as their contribution to the building of democratic South Africa.
South African President F. W. De Klerk has shifted the terms of debate about South Africa’s future with appalling ease — at least in some circles. A case in point: Toronto’s *Globe and Mail* newspaper. Both correspondent Michael Valpy ("Pretoria plan keeps ‘brake’ on majority rule," *Globe and Mail*, April 19) and *Globe* editorialists ("A bicameral model for South Africa," *Globe and Mail*, April 23) now apparently agree with South African constitutional planners that a bi-cameral political solution would be a useful antidote to “the unbri- dled power of majority rule” in that country. They even seem to think that Canada’s federalism has something to teach South Africans.

It is not the first time the *Globe* has been tempted by such arguments. Last year, after a private briefing of the *Globe* editorial team by South Africa’s ambassador to Canada, Hennie De Klerk, the paper whistled up a “news story” ("Canadian Constitution viewed as guide for Pretoria,"

October 18, 1989) in which the ambassador likened the situation of his embattled white confrères to that of the Québécois. ("South Africa is looking to Cana- dian’s Constitution as example of how to change the country — complete with a distinct society provi- sion to protect whites, Ambassador Johannes Hendrik de Klerk says.")

Now, with the threat of real negoti- ations on the agenda, *Globe* editorialists have gone much further on their own (although their editor- al still reads too much like a press release from the South African embassy). While one chamber of this new “bi-cameral” South Africa

would “elect members through a system of universal suffrage,” the editors accept that another (the “house of communities”) should be made up “of representatives of the country’s various racial, ethnic and other groups.” This second cham- ber would have powers to “safeguard group interests such as lan- guage, education, culture and property rights.” Sounds reasonable enough to Canadians, eh? But it’s not.

The previous issue of *SAR* (Vol. 5, No. 5) charted President F. W. De Klerk’s current strategy. In the wake of South Africa’s near insurrection of 1984-86, Pretor- ia chose the route of systematic re- pression, rather than real reform, to safeguard the status quo. Yet by 1989, dramatic internal resistance — even if it still fell short of being a full-scale revolutionary threat — had also revived and resuscitated the global anti-apartheid lobby.

Sensing that the stalemate created by repression can not be main- tained, the De Klerk team has moved to open up the political process to new possibilities.

Faced with “negotiations,” De Klerk now hopes to safeguard both business interests and a significant proportion of the privilege that accu- rues to white South Africans. One sector is education, where the vast discrepancies in the state allotment of educational expenditures along racial lines has been one crucial de- terminant of privilege. This rep-resents an injustice that requires re- dressing, not a “right” that warrants "safeguarding.”

The *Globe and Mail* may re- joice to find in such constitutional "checks and balances" a guarantee that black South Africans can be blocked from correcting the deep- seated socio-economic inequalities that are so characteristic of South Africa’s apartheid society. But the rest of us should not be naive about the significance of the phrase “property rights,” so blandly slipped alongside “language” and “culture,” as something legitimately to be pre- served.

De Klerk continues, quite ruth- lessly, to use the security arm of the state to advance his purposes (as witness another, very different re- port by Michael Valpy on “Pretor- ia’s Brute Force” in the *Globe* of April 21). But De Klerk’s introduc- tion of the mumbo-jumbo of consti- tutional manipulation (including bicameral-speak) into the political equation is no accident. Neither is his attempt to gain ground by another age-old policy of the National- ist Party, that of divide and rule.

Not that De Klerk has himself created the linguistic and cultural differences that do exist in South Africa. Yet the Nationalist Party’s "separate development” policy was designed to breathe political life into such differences at the very moment in history when economic change and urbanization are making them ever less tolerable for black South Africans. As bantustans like the Transkei and the Ciskei now seek to reverse their “independences,” it makes even less sense than ever to embrace the apartheid regime’s own language of “ethnic group” repres-entation as an excuse of bicameralism.
Chief Gatsha Buthelezi and his KwaZulu-based Inkatha movement is no exception. The considerable violence in South Africa's Natal province is not about violence between ethnic groups. It is precisely because more and more Zulus have come to embrace nationally focussed democratic organizations like the United Democratic Front and the Congress of South African Trade Unions that Buthelezi (tacitly backed by the South Africa state) has moved to defend his own political turf so brutally. Ignoring this reality is another misrepresentation that is fast becoming the stock in trade of willful Canadian journalists.

Take as one depressing example the Toronto Star's Johannesburg bureau chief, Bill Schiller, his fawning interviews with Buthelezi (“Africa's Zulu leader Buthelezi fights 'collaborator' image,” April 15, 1990) and his misleading articles about the Natal violence (“No one really wants peace: All sides share blame as fear, ignorance and death stalk a lush, green land,” the Star, April 27, 1990). To grace Buthelezi with the legitimacy of such a reasonable-sounding posture as the demand for “ethnic representation” in a “house of communities,” as the Globe editorialists now apparently seek to do, would be a cruel irony.

And how much better to allow for open-ended economic experimentation on the part of a new, democratically-elected, non-racial South African government than to attempt, constitutionally, to pre-empt it.

It's late in the day for anyone to feel absolutely confident of the exact meaning or purpose of “socialism” anywhere in the world, including South Africa. Yet some major measure of redress of the economics of apartheid is in order. South African whites, so long the beneficiaries of the cruelest forms of exploitation, cannot be allowed to veto that.

The Globe and Mail may think the days of constitution-making have definitely arrived. The ANC, while it will certainly have to be on guard against allowing De Klerk to set the agenda of constitutional negotiations, is unlikely to make the same mistake. The ANC knows that De Klerk, in fact, is still very far from offering up even the half-loaf of bi-cameralism to the democratic movement. The ANC, quite correctly, persists in stating that substantial pressure, internal and external (including sanctions), must continue to be applied upon De Klerk and company.

It should be emphasized that the ANC's demand for “one person, one vote in a united South Africa” is really the only “reasonable” position on offer. The fact of the matter is that the Canadian “model” of bicameralism has little to teach South Africans who really want to transform their country. Its invocation as a model, whether by Ambassador De Klerk, the Globe and Mail or possibly, further down the road, the Canadian government, can only serve to obscure the essence of the South African situation.
Canadian anti-apartheid activists who gathered in Ottawa in May for their third national conference were hoping for great things—new ideas, new approaches, perhaps the formation of a national network. Only some of that emerged. And along with their disappointment, participants took home with them a feeling that the movement, created and nourished by grass-roots activists since the late 60s, was in serious danger of being domesticated.

The title chosen for the Ottawa meeting sought to capture the moment: “Taking Strides—Towards a Non-racial Democratic South Africa” and stated the “main objective” to be “to come up with concrete means of intensifying support for the democratization of South Africa through improved support for the African National Congress and intensified application of Canadian sanctions against South Africa.” Or, in the words of one of the other directive documents of the conference, the Forum’s goal was “to bring together anti-apartheid activists from across the country to develop strategies to (a) strengthen support for sustained/increased sanctions and (b) to strengthen support for the ANC and democratic forces inside South Africa.”

There were some good reasons to think the results of the Forum were positive. We seem to be closer to the establishment of a national anti-apartheid network. The meeting also reaffirmed our insistence that the Canadian government act ever more firmly against the South African government—and for the ANC.

Conference directives ignored

Yet this was not the whole story. Both the ‘successes’ of the conference have a negative side. Some directives established by the conference for setting up the national network have already been ignored. And however firmly the conference participants may feel about the role of the Canadian government, External Affairs was clearly there to talk, not to listen.

Organizing for the meeting was done by the NGO-dominated InterAgency Working Group on Southern Africa (IAWGSA), established as a committee of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC) and representing some twenty NGOs. It worked through a steering committee that also drew in several additional members—one each from the anti-apartheid networks in B.C., the West and the Atlantic region and a representative from the African National Congress. This committee in turn set an agenda, commissioned a series of background papers and invited the 100-plus participants, who included representatives from member organizations of IAWGSA, anti-apartheid coalitions and groups from across Canada, the ANC and SACTU and other South Africans. And finally, the committee identified a number of “resource persons” and “facilitators” for the working groups into which the Forum was to break from time to time.

Even in the run-up to the Conference, there were signs of behind-the-scenes manoeuvrings by NGO delegates on the Steering Committee that suggested an attempt to narrow and control the Forum’s agenda. The whole idea of having “resource people” was put in doubt by several on the steering committee, at the eleventh hour of preparation for the Forum. They apparently feared that designated resource people like Ottawa’s Linda Freeman, Toronto’s John Saul and Calgary’s Don Ray would be a bit too outspokenly critical of Canadian government policy. Although the Steering Committee entertained the idea of cancelling participation by the resource people,
they rejected that in favour of warning them against 'dominating' discussions.

These manoeuvrings were not readily visible to conference delegates, but in the very first plenary there were visible signals that all was not well. Two delegates from South Africa spoke – Paulus Mashatile of the United Democratic Front and Nomvula Mokonyane of the Federation of Transvaal Women. (The third scheduled South African, Moses Mayekiso of COSATU and the Alexandra Civic Organization was unavoidably delayed and spoke the next morning). But no spokesperson from the Canadian anti-apartheid movement was invited as the third speaker. The only other speaker chosen by the Steering Committee was Lucy Edwards, head of the Southern African Task Force of the Ministry of External Affairs. Edwards didn’t say much that hadn’t been heard before. She presented Canadian sanctions in the most positive light, ignoring statistics that show trade with South Africa continues to increase. She milked the government role in establishing the Mandela Fund for all it was worth and suggested that there was money for 'non-political' ANC activities.

No anti-apartheid voice

Many delegates were aghast that no-one of comparable stature from the anti-apartheid movement was given a position on the platform to challenge Edwards’ remarks – and the Canadian government. Certainly, Linda Freeman (who annually chronicles the shortcomings of Canadian government policy in SAR) would have been an obvious candidate for this task. Suzanne Dansereau of CIDMMA and Dennis Lewycky in Ottawa had also written an informative background paper on the subject for the conference.

This background paper, and others prepared and paid for by the Forum, were included in delegate kits, but were never referred to throughout the course of the conference. Some critical questions for the speakers did come from the floor, and took the opportunity to query some of Edwards’ more outrageous statements as to the exemplary nature of Canada’s sanctions performance.

The Canadian government’s record is not the worst in the world. Clark has resisted the temptation to abandon the idea of sanctions until there are much stronger signs of what he terms “irreversible change.” But there are also severe limits to how far Canada is prepared to go and there is a Canadian government agenda that seeks to limit change in South Africa as much as it seeks to facilitate it. The Forum would have been an excellent opportunity for activists from across Canada to reach a common and critical understanding of official Canada’s policies. It was an opportunity lost.

“Mistakes were made”

In response to strong criticism from the next day’s working groups of the decision to give Lucy Edwards a platform, the Conference’s steering committee admitted a “mistake” had been made. But the evidence suggests it was more than a mistake. Key members of that committee – Ted Scott, former Anglican Church Primate and government-appointee to 1985’s Commonwealth Eminent Persons’ Group, and Ann Mitchell, executive director of the Ottawa-based International Defense and Aid Fund of South Africa (IDAFSA) – were frank in private conversation about their feeling that a “conciliatory” approach to the Canadian government is in order, rather than what they feel is the old-fashioned “confrontational” approach.

These differences are not new. Ted Scott, despite his long and honourable history of anti-apartheid work, has always been seen by church militants as something of a mixed blessing. His commitment to the southern African cause has helped legitimate anti-apartheid work, in the eyes of government and parishioners. But it is testimony to his ‘acceptability’ with government that he now holds a number of key positions in the proliferating NGOs. He is considered the de facto church representative to External Affairs, he is on the board of the South African Education Trust Fund, president of the IDAFSA and, since earlier this year, chair of IAWGSA. But he has remained conservative in his political outlook and something of a “loose cannon” in his political style.
Are the benefits he brings to the movement (not least the credibility he lends it) outweighed by his role in helping, however unconsciously, to domesticate it?

Something of the ambiguous feelings the movement has towards Scott's role surfaced in the Forum when Lucy Edwards herself announced that Scott would be briefing Joe Clark on the Monday following the Forum on the results of its deliberations. Most delegates seemed to feel Scott's willy-nilly appointment as sole conference spokesperson to the federal government was not quite adequate as a way of representing the views of the assembled anti-apartheid movement.

**Different strategies needed**

There is room for different strategies by different anti-apartheid groups in dealing with the Canadian government. It's too simple to see Ann Mitchell's preference for taming the anti-apartheid movement as springing directly from the fact that IDAFSA is the beneficiary of Canadian government funding. But most of us are experienced enough as activists to know that receiving government money plays a role in the decisions you make about your work.

It was hard for SAR workers who were present at the Forum to escape the feeling that some of the machinations there exemplified the dangers identified in an earlier **SAR** article ("Buying Silence?", February, 1990).

In any case, the real loss to the conference was the fact that virtually none of these issues were debated by delegates to the Forum.

Part of this may also have been due to the Forum structure. In the laudable pursuit of a genuine democratization of the proceedings, emphasis fell upon the six to eight workshop sessions for doing the bulk of the Forum's work. In many of these, questions about the underlying premises of our activities did surface. But the energy generated in the groups rarely found its way back to the brief plenary sessions interspersed throughout the two full days of the Forum.

However, by the end of the conference some momentum had been recouped from the first day. The basic mood of the delegates, particularly from the broad anti-apartheid network and from Canada's regions, was much more sceptical of the Canadian government's southern Africa record and consequently more confrontational than some of the Steering Committee may have wished. In its final communique, the Conference did "call on the Canadian government to adopt a clearer and bolder approach in support of democracy in South Africa," including “maintaining and extending the economic sanctions against South Africa; downgrading diplomatic relations with official South Africa and upgrading relations with the ANC and the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa."

**ANC agenda**

The ANC had its own agenda at the Forum, some signs of which also surfaced during the period of run-up to the Ottawa meeting. The ANC representative on the conference steering committee queried the propriety of a paper prepared by **SAR** at the request of the conference coordinator. The problem? The paper raised the question of socialism in South Africa too overtly and was too critical in its examination of the various forces working for and against the long-term socio-economic transformation of the South Africa that is now in the making.

What seemed even more crucial to ANC preoccupations was its concern to further institutionalize its centrality—perhaps even to guarantee for itself exclusive standing—at the core of the Canadian anti-apartheid movement. There's no argument against the proposition that the ANC is the key political actor for democratic change in South Africa at present, and so deserves the full support of all Canadians and of the Canadian government.
But there are other questions to be raised about South Africa by anti-apartheid activists. One of the most important is what degree of exclusivity of support for the ANC is advisable. The descriptive phrases in the two guidelines for the conference quoted earlier speak, in one case, of “support for the ANC,” in the other of “support for the ANC and democratic forces inside South Africa.” The conference seemed to oscillate back and forth between these two positions. The tension between the two formulae was one that remained implicit in much that occurred during the conference, but was one more point that was never really talked through. In consequence, the potential implication of such issues on the terms of our support work was largely lost.

Building a “civil society”
The case for “pluralistic support” is not an easy point to make in a context like the Ottawa Forum. Both the ANC delegation and some Canadian participants in the Forum tended to regard any qualification of support for the ANC as hostility. Yet those who raised the question were not agents of forces like the Pan-Africanist Congress or Inkatha. They saw themselves close in spirit to the position of Moses Mayekiso, the COSATU representative who spoke Saturday morning, and confirmed that this issue is up for debate within South Africa itself.

Without querying the crucial importance of the ANC, Mayekiso made the strongest of cases for the existence in South Africa of autonomous trade unions and civic associations. These organizations, he argued, deserve the direct support of Canadians both in their capacity as prominent voices for democratic change in its own right and as a force for keeping the long-term necessity for socio-economic transformation on the agenda of even a formally democratized South Africa. (See “Building Civil Society: Moses Mayekiso Interviewed” in this issue of SAR).

Other prominent ANC members have voiced similar points of view. Joe Slovo, a member of the ANC negotiating team meeting with De Klerk, has written of his concern that in the failed “socialisms” of Eastern Europe a key weakness was that “the trade union movement became an adjunct of the state and party” and that women’s and youth organizations “instead of being guided by the aspirations and interests of their constituencies ... were turned into support bases for the ongoing dictates of the state and party apparatus” with entirely negative results. “Old-style commandism and sectarianism” must give way to “effective autonomy” and “political pluralism,” says Slovo.

The same position can be found in statements by ANC National Executive member Aziz Pahad, who recently said that the ANC must become a broad front in order to wrest political rights from the De Klerk government: “A front cannot just be a get-together of all tendencies where there are no ideological battles taking place. The very nature of a front is that you fight for positions.” In short, in addition to support for the ANC, support for the building of a strong and diverse “civil society” (in Mayekiso’s phrase) must be seen as an essential part of an effort to create effective political and socio-economic democracy in South Africa – whatever political party may be in power.

ANC role in national network
The majority of delegates to the Forum did not see the importance of

Moses Mayekiso talks to Saturday’s session while Strini Reddy & Ann Mitchell look on
such questions – although a related matter did surface more heatedly. It was the question of how the ongoing relationship between the ANC and the new national anti-apartheid network-in-the-making is to be institutionalized. The ANC saw itself as becoming not just an integral member of that network, but a member of any national coordinating committee that is now to be established.

Only in the Ontario regional caucus was this premise seriously questioned. Some Ontario delegates felt the idea of the ANC becoming an actual member of a Canadian organization, let alone a member of its coordinating committee, to be both unprecedented in support-working experience and to be questionable practice in political terms. One delegate wondered what might happen in a situation where either the ANC disagreed with the anti-apartheid network or the anti-apartheid network disagreed with the ANC. The ANC is being forced to develop very complex relationships with the Canadian government. It’s not too difficult to imagine a situation in which the ANC, for perfectly good diplomatic reasons, found it advisable to take a softer public line towards the Canadian government than the Canadian anti-apartheid movement was prepared to do. Wouldn’t an arm’s-length relationship be more advisable all round? was the argument.

In any event, in the Ontario caucus, the principle of ANC inclusion as a member of the national coordinating committee carried the day by straw vote.

In the final plenary, the majority for ANC inclusion was overwhelming, most delegates feeling comfortable with a definition, in practice, of anti-apartheid activists as a virtual support network for the ANC. Peter Mahlangu declined the voting rights on the coordinating committee that some delegates now urged upon him, arguing that, in any case, with the ANC on the committee, and the practice of consensus decision-making, such rights would be superfluous.

Yet almost immediately thereafter Mahlangu was on his feet again, querying the use in the final communiqué of the phrase “it is important to support the democratic anti-apartheid organizations” (used once, in a text with numerous other direct references to the ANC) as insufficiently specific with regard to the primacy of the ANC.

The strong support by conference delegates for ANC centrality tended to mask an uneasiness on the part of others, including those from some of the larger constituencies within the network (the churches, for example), at the ANC’s centrality and its propensity to seek to control outcomes. These constituencies have formed their own direct links with South African counterparts in ways that manifest some of the best support work by Canadians. This work is increasing in importance because of the growing number of western investors – including the Canadian government – looking for ‘reasonable’ voices they can support. The anti-apartheid movement must intensify its own work, making sure that the voices and needs of women, workers, youths and others who demand real transformation don’t get muffled.

Nelson Mandela Fund
All members of the network will support the ANC pretty unreservedly and if the network can put new resources at the ANC’s disposal, that will be a laudable outcome. There is already in existence the Nelson Mandela Fund, a non-governmental initiative to collect untied funds in Canada to be put at the disposal of the ANC. This was originally suggested by Joe Clark as an alternative to direct governmental support for the ANC’s political struggle. It may also have been his attempt to simultaneously distance the Canadian government from overt political support for the ANC, while scoring points with the movement for taking its cause seriously. It is therefore something of a two-edged sword for those who seek to expose the contradictory nature of Tory foreign and domestic policies.

Beyond the Mandela Fund there is also the question of possible direct Canadian governmental assistance to the ANC. Lucy Edwards fudged this issue at the Forum, ignoring the government’s bleak record on this front over the years. But she did suggest the door is now wide open for the Canadian government to back the movement’s “non-political” activities. And finally, what about the ANC’s “Relocation Fund”? It was designed by the ANC as a global initiative to help facilitate the return to South Africa of thousands of exiles and refugees and identified in the Forum’s final communiqué as a priority item. Shouldn’t the Canadian government be expected to contribute to that Fund – and shouldn’t it be pressured to do so?

There is, in short, plenty of work awaiting the new network. How soon will that network become a concrete reality? That brings us to the last disturbing aspect of the conference.
The 'how' of the new network

The need to propose some mechanism for following through on Forum decisions should have been foreseen by organizers. Apparently it wasn't. In the final plenary, after regional groups had discussed and presented what they felt the national network was to look like, delegates had to decide who would organize the Forum's recommendations, including the new network. Some delegates wanted a brand new interim executive, with strong representation from grass-roots forces, to avoid the Ottawa-centric nature of so much of the Forum activity. A stalemate was developing.

But many participants were within minutes of departing for the airport. The pressure to find a solution very quickly was strong. One delegate suggested it be left in the hands of the conference Steering Committee. Even without any discussion, the unpopularity of that suggestion was obvious. A change was made — leave it to the expanded committee (comprised of the Steering Committee plus about eight more people who had acted as "facilitators" at the forum and who did represent a rather wider regional and sectoral spread than the Steering Committee alone). Many objected to giving the conference organizers such a pivotal role in setting up the national network. But there was a vote, and the Conference Committee became the proposed network's Interim Committee by a narrow margin.

Ironically, when this Interim Committee met immediately after the final plenary session, a resolution, put forward by a member of the original Steering Committee, proposed that the work be left solely to that Committee. Objections were made, but they were overruled. And so the very group that had brought us the "I Love Lucy Show," and that has the most to lose in a high-profile, vocal, critical anti-apartheid network, is at the helm, its most important task the drawing up of a model for a national anti-apartheid network.

If the Consultative Forum did anything, it exposed the complexity of issues around anti-apartheid work in Canada. Many of those issues have not been fully explored by activists. In the months to follow many anti-apartheid groups will meet as regions, to carry forward their own work. Eventually they will be called on to examine — and accept or reject — the structure that the network's Interim Committee will propose. That means that this important issue — what we want the network to do and how we want to do it — will be back on our plates within the next few months. It will need all our attention, plus close consultation between regions, to make sure that it truly reflects the wishes of all true activists.
Building Civil Society
Moses Mayekiso Interviewed

Socialism. The need for many voices to be heard within the South African revolutionary process, from a robust and assertive "civil society." These were Moses Mayekiso's terms of reference when he spoke at the "Taking Strides" Consultative Forum in Ottawa in May. They struck a challenging note at the otherwise rather sanitized proceedings of that meeting (see "The I Love Lucy Show," p. 15).

Mayekiso has become something of a legendary figure, with demands for his release from detention having been a focus of international campaigns throughout the four years (1985-89) of his incarceration. He has come to exemplify the close link between trade union and township struggles. He emerged from the shop floor of Toyota's Transvaal plant to become General Secretary of the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) and, later, of its successor organization, the National Union of Metalworkers, South Africa (NUMSA). But he was also to become President of the Alexandra Civic Organization, the spearhead of an innovative pattern of grass-roots community organizations in that Johannesburg township during the dramatic upsurge of popular resistance of the early 1980s. It was this role that led most directly to his prolonged detention.

Now back at work both in the trade union movement and with community groups, Mayekiso proved to be an exciting and innovative informant on the theory and practice of the South African struggle when SAR interviewed him in Toronto shortly after the Ottawa weekend.

The message Mayekiso brought to the Ottawa Forum was the same one he delivered to many trade unionists during his brief stay in Canada, notably to the delegates of this year's Canadian Labour Congress annual convention in Montreal. Mayekiso underscored the socio-economic dimensions of the struggle now being waged in South Africa. He argued that De Klerk's approach to "negotiations" evidences merely a continuing desire on the part of the white community to retain power for itself, but by new and rather more sophisticated means. It is crucial to De Klerk to interpret proposed qualifications to the principle of "one-person, one-vote" in South Africa as exemplifying a "special kind of democracy" well-suited to the peculiarities of South Africa.

But, said Mayekiso, all the currently fashionable talk about "minority protection" and "group rights" is primarily designed to blunt any challenge to South Africa's socio-economic inequalities. "We know we can't tilt the balance of socio-economic power at the negotiating table, but we need genuine political democracy in order to have the possibility, eventually, of realizing economic equality. ... If we talk now of merely getting political power, this won't, in itself, overcome the imbalances created by three hundred years of white power," said Mayekiso. There is a very real danger, he emphasized, of a preoccupation with minority rights giving white-cum-capitalist interests a veto over such transformations, allowing the desperate economic plight of the vast majority of black people to go unredressed.

Thus, in the very first rounds of negotiations, the question of economic freedom is being posed. Not that the struggle for such freedom can be reduced to some crude formula like "nationalizations." What is needed, according to Mayekiso, is "democratic control" of the economy, with the people having a powerful say regarding the pattern of investment, the distribution of surpluses and the like. What he sees to be necessary is socialism. In Mayekiso's eyes, recent global developments do not suggest that socialism has failed — although the model of what he terms to be "a commandist state-centred economy" has failed. But, he emphasized, it is the free enterprise system that has failed South Africa. The parameters of a new South Africa's own brand of socialism are currently under debate, but the radical direction of Mayekiso's chief concerns were patent throughout his Canadian visit.

A second theme surfaced in Mayekiso's Ottawa presentation. He emphasized the necessity to consider the Congress of South Africa Trade Unions (COSATU — the large umbrella workers' organization of which NUMSA forms a part) not as an appendage of the ANC, but as both the latter's ally and as an autonomous voice of the organized working class in South Africa. He identified COSATU as the "main machine" fighting such crucial battles as those directed against the Labour Relations Act and against such abusive labour practices as the hostel system. He also saw it as a crucial actor, in the longer run, in guaranteeing the socialist content of the transformation process in South Africa.

Mayekiso's views on "negotiations" were instructive. Even with
the best of intentions on the part of the ANC, he said, these could degenerate into an intra-elite bargaining process - if mass-based organizations are not further developed to focus steady strong pressure upon all participants. It was at this point that Mayekiso sought to expand the terms of discussion about the likely nature of the transition to democracy in South Africa. He reaffirmed the importance of the ANC and of the present moment that finds the ANC transforming itself from a liberation movement to a political party. He also stressed the need to work further to build and strengthen the ANC and to deepen its own mass base.

But even while doing so, he stressed that solutions could not be found only in the political realm inhabited by a movement-cum-party like the ANC. What he chose to term “civil society” is of at least equal importance to the democratization of South Africa. Moreover, this civil society must be built up and strengthened independently and in its own right.

What is “civil society”? Mayekiso describes it as the population at large as it gives expression, through its own grass-roots organizations, to demands that its most immediate needs be met. “The masses are not interested in political parties, as such. Their interests are in houses, schools and health care. The job of a political party is to respond to these demands. Leadership must communicate with the masses, responding to this level of need either with resolution of the problems, or with clear communications about why this is not possible.”

The idea of a vibrant network of such grass-roots organizations is not an abstraction in South Africa. The revolutionary process there has thrown up an array of trade unions in the workplace, of civic associations in the townships, of village committees in some of the rural areas and of women and youth...
organizations as well. These organizations must be strengthened and guaranteed autonomy from both party and state. Not merely the substance of negotiations, but the health of a future South Africa depends on this, Mayekiso urged.

The trade union movement is the most developed example of this kind of crystallization of the institutions of the civil society. COSATU has now allied itself for many purposes with the ANC and the South African Communist Party, but it also struggles independently on many fronts. At the same time, it gives broad programmatic guidance to its working class members through initiatives like its "Workers' Charter."

"COSATU members are urged to get involved in civic associations as members," says Mayekiso. "Unions are involved, not as unions, but through their members, who bring organizational know-how that can contribute to building strong civic organizations."

Drawing on his own Alexandra experience, Mayekiso stressed that local civic associations should be quite independent of local ANC branches, and be able to accommodate in their street committees people from many different political tendencies. Similarly, the rural-village committee structure — though less highly developed at present — must also recruit from and (around the question of land, for example) organize across a wide spectrum of people possibly linked to diverse political tendencies.

It is these institutions of the civil society that may then "push any political party that may find itself in power ... push it for changes beneficial to the masses." That includes the ANC, says Mayekiso. "Because of the nature of the broad alliance of social forces that the ANC has come to represent, there may well be limits beyond which that party cannot go" in terms of radical policy — unless, that is, it is driven forward by the insistent voices of a well-organized civil society. Mayekiso reiterated a key point made in his Ottawa speech: that independent linkages be established by Canadian supporters with unions, churches, civic associations and other structures that make up the civil society.

A particularly interesting part of the interview turned around the organizing undertaken by women around their own issues and demands. At one level, Mayekiso could see a case to be made for establishing an autonomous national women's organization, parallel to the national trade union central or a national civic association. He did suggest, however, that this would not be as easy to accomplish as in these other cases. "Women's organizations have a history of existing as a right arm of the ANC," he said, "or as branches of other organizations. That makes it harder to build an autonomous organization." And he even felt some misgivings, he confessed, about the very principle of women organizing as women.

"In COSATU, women are organized in a women's section but it isn't very satisfactory. It separates what are 'our' issues as women from what are 'your' issues as men," says Mayekiso. "Women deal with their issues separately and vent their anger and frustration in sessions with other women. By the time these issues are raised in assemblies with men, the emotion is gone and it is just rhetoric ... they bring the finished product to the congress and want immediate assent. Since men haven't been involved in preparing the decision, this feels like having things railroaded through. Since the men have not been involved, they feel it is just a women's issue and tend to undermine it or get defensive."

"I'm not sure about some of these things," Mayekiso acknowledged. "Maybe I'm not saying the right thing — but it isn't working very well as it is now. COSATU today is on record with progressive motions about women, but not everybody has been involved in shaping them."

Moses Mayekiso had no easy answers. But there was plenty of the spark and crackle that spring forth when serious political issues are being discussed by an intelligent and deeply committed shaper of history. A rewarding interview. And one more promising herald of the new South Africa's future.
Nicaragua Revisited?
Peace & Democracy in Angola

BY DANIEL DOS SANTOS AND FRANK LUCE

Daniel dos Santos is a sociologist at the University of Ottawa. He recently returned from a visit to Angola. Frank Luce is a labour lawyer writing a thesis on labour law in Angola. He recently returned from a visit to Portugal.

All sides in the Angolan conflict now favour peace and democracy. How peace should come about and what shape democracy should take remain subjects of contention. For the MPLA and its supporters, it's an open question whether the price of peace will be to put further barriers in the way of the socialist project.

Recent developments in the peace process, the military situation and the domestic political scene indicate how open the question remains. The Angolan government and UNITA have entered a phase of face to face talks from positions which seem to be quite opposite. On the one hand, the government has proposed a nine-point peace plan which requires full recognition of the sovereignty and the legality of the state and the government, to be followed by a ceasefire. The government considers both steps to be essential pre-requisites for the security of the population and for economic recovery; only then could a reasonable discussion about political reform take place. UNITA, on the other hand, presents a position which is full of contradictions and which changes virtually from week to week. UNITA initially accepted the government's plan at Gbadolite in mid-1989, and then rejected it completely. UNITA demanded instead a transitional government and elections in 18 months in a multi-party system. Only with this already agreed to would UNITA entertain a ceasefire. Nearly a year later, in April 1990, UNITA accepted the principle of the sovereignty of the state but not the legality of the government; it agreed to the integration of UNITA's fighters into the Angolan armed forces and to sign a ceasefire.

It is true that surrounding the Angolan peace process, there are questions whose implications are both important and dangerous. What should democracy mean for Angolans? Can the MPLA's socialist project, already struggling for survival, be maintained in a multi-party democracy if the electorate, as in Nicaragua, is faced with the prospect of endless warfare inspired, supported, financed and manipulated by American foreign policy?

The peace process
Portugal, the former colonizer, has already become a replacement for Zaire as the principal outside protagonist in the peace process. Face to face talks were engineered through the office of the Portuguese Prime Minister, Cavaco Silva. While Zaire's President Mobutu remains the official mediator, the Portuguese-inspired process involves direct talks without mediation, at least in the initial stage.

There is no doubt that Portuguese politicians and businessmen harbour neo-colonial ambitions. It
is Portugal's economic weakness in the European community which has brought about the ambition to "return to Africa." That same weakness requires Portugal to rely on its cultural and linguistic ties and propose for itself the role of intermediary for European and American capital. Portugal may also hope to rely on the thousands of "Luso-Angolans" and Angolans resident in Portugal who have now accepted the reality of political independence and are prepared to do business in and with Angola if the conditions are ripe.

The prospect of sponsoring a peace agreement for Angola has given rise to open competition between Prime Minister Cavaco Silva and President Mario Soares. Soares told the audience at the celebrations for the anniversary of the April 25 coup that the time had come for Portugal to return to Africa. Soares is, however, known as a friend of UNITA and its leader Jonas Savimbi and he is remembered for his opposition to the recognition of the MPLA government when he was Foreign Minister during the decolonization process.

Cavaco Silva and his Secretary of State for Foreign Relations and Cooperation, Durão Barroso, have won the confidence of both sides; they have been described by the Angolan Ambassador to Portugal as "good friends of Angola." Nevertheless, Cavaco Silva has his own agenda for Portugal's return to Africa. During South African President De Klerk's recent tour of Europe, Cavaco Silva announced that his government would lead the campaign in the European community to have sanctions lifted immediately.

South Africa has a Portuguese community of several hundred thousands, many of whom fled there in supposed fear of the FRELIMO and MPLA governments, and who would be pleased to renew business links between South Africa, Portugal and Angola. Already these Portuguese-South Africans are investing heavily in Mozambique.

At the invitation of Durão Barroso, the Angola's Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs recently spent two days in private talks with UNITA representatives near Lisbon. The negotiators signed a memorandum of agreement with respect to the conduct of future negotiations, the contents of which remain secret at present. Since that time, Savimbi has called for a ceasefire to take effect in June, and he has called on Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos to meet with him personally to attempt a final settlement.

The response of the Angolan government will likely be decided by the party's Central Committee, which was scheduled to meet in May. Dos Santos has already made some moves to introduce political reforms that aim at a separation between the party and the state, the complete autonomy of mass organizations, civic and professional associations, a new electoral law which forces party candidates to compete with independents, the opening up of party membership, and a constitutional review in two to five years. None of the contending tendencies inside the MPLA government has questioned the one-party system. That debate should come as part of the constitutional review.

The SEF (Economic and Financial Reform) meanwhile is progressing slowly, and there remains some resistance to the "structural adjustment programme" prescribed by the World Bank and the IMF. A party congress is scheduled for December 1990, when the competing tendencies, described generally as "hard-line" and "moderate," will likely contest openly for control. Some people are already asking that the Congress be moved ahead to July to speed the pace of both political and economic reform.

Savimbi now recognizes the legitimacy of dos Santos as head of state but refuses to recognize the MPLA government. On May 14, however, Savimbi told the foreign press that UNITA no longer sought to be integrated into a transitional government pending general elections. The MPLA may be less inclined to accept the legitimacy of Savimbi's leadership, and the role of UNITA in the future political life of Angola remains uncertain. After Gbadolite, it is difficult to imagine that dos Santos would be prepared to meet Savimbi personally at this stage.

Mobutu had succeeded in manipulating Savimbi and dos Santos into agreeing to a ceasefire agreement at Gbadolite in June 1989, in the presence of 14 African heads of state. When the Angolan armed forces, FAPLA, let down its defences to put the ceasefire into effect, UNITA attacked. It appears that Mobutu had neglected to consult the American State Department about the terms of his "African solution" to the conflict, and America was not prepared to allow UNITA's demise. Savimbi reneged and denied that any such agreement had been reached, leaving Mobutu in a state of embarrassment.

The government now appears eager to bypass Mobutu's attempts at mediation. Dos Santos was quoted recently as saying that Mobutu, himself a recent convert to multi-party democracy, is an interested party in the conflict. Millions of Angolans live in Zaire, and Zairian forces invaded Angola in support of the FNLA. American supplies to UNITA now arrive through Zaire, with Mobutu's approval and support.

The military situation

When it became obvious after Gbadolite that there was no ceasefire, dos Santos backed an attempt at a military recovery in order to put more pressure on UNITA to return to the negotiating table. The military operations centred on the southeastern province of Cuando Cubango, where Angolan forces defeated the South Africans at Cuito Carnavale. UNITA is headquartered at Jamba, also in Cuando Cubango province. Within 100 kilometres of Cuito Carnavale is the town of Mavinga which has a major airbase
for resupplying troops. It also has a bridge that gives access to the central highlands where UNITA forces are relatively free to move among the mostly Ovimbundo population, the ethnic group upon which UNITA depends for its tribally-based support.

FAPLA launched a major offensive against Mavinga in December 1989, the first conventional conflict between FAPLA and UNITA without the presence of the South Africans or the Cubans. FAPLA’s strategy was to control the bridge and the airbase at Mavinga; once Mavinga was consolidated, FAPLA would move on for a final assault on Jamba. After three months, FAPLA won control in February, although UNITA’s forces were never totally dislodged from the region. But this defeat was a major set back for UNITA.

The Bush administration was mobilized into action, and emergency supplies were sent to UNITA in Zaire. Mobutu allowed UNITA to cross into Zairian territory to receive American supplies. UNITA could again infiltrate back into the north of Angola, shifting the focus of its attacks to the northern provinces and closer to the capital of Luanda. The Angolan government has alleged that Zairian army officers and Portuguese mercenaries are involved in these sabotage operations, and it accuses South Africa of allowing its extreme right to back UNITA in the south.

A few weeks later, American U.S. Secretary of State James Baker reportedly made it clear to Angolan President dos Santos that under no circumstances would the Bush administration tolerate the fall of UNITA’s headquarters at Jamba. Faced with the certainty of further U.S. intervention were a military solution to the civil war attempted, dos Santos decided to back down and again try for a negotiated settlement. With the abandonment of FAPLA’s strategy to move on to Jamba, and the shift of focus by UNITA towards the north, the government withdrew from Mavinga on May 8. UNITA then claimed that FAPLA had fled Mavinga in the face of a UNITA assault that, in fact, never occurred; Savimbi toured the area in the company of the foreign press on May 14 to show the scene of the UNITA “victory.”

The increased American intervention has enabled the Bush administration to block a military victory, leaving the current negotiations as the government’s only way out. The June ceasefire date proposed by UNITA may be unsuitable to the government since June marks the start of the dry season when FAPLA would have the capacity to move against UNITA’s guerillas in a conventional manner. Without a ceasefire, the government will be faced with continuing guerilla activity in the Luanda region. This is the strategy which U.S. advisors have favoured since they took over from the South Africans as UNITA’s sponsors. The war in Angola becomes increasingly Contra-like.

The emergence of a third force?

The Alvor Accord, which led to Angolan independence in 1975, excluded from the political process any parties other than the three independence movements (MPLA, UNITA, and the FNLA). Recently the government has signalled its openness to the development of organizations completely independent of state or party control, sparking the forma-
The Angolan Civic Association (ACA) has formed as a private organization, independent of party and state.

In Lisbon, Mario Pinto de Andrade, the first president of the MPLA and the former leader of MPLA dissidents known as the Active Revolt, is prominently involved with a “study group” on Angolan peace. The group has made a well-received proposal that peace talks take place in Angola, mediated by prominent Angolans. Their proposal is symptomatic of the growing strength of Angolan nationalism as a force for peace and national reconciliation. A less likely source of internal mediation is Holden Roberto, who has resurfaced with the suggestion that his FNLA, a spent force militarily and organizationally, maintains a claim to a share in power under the terms of the Alvor Accord. Roberto has claimed that he may be able to bring the two sides together, although he clearly would be unacceptable in MPLA circles and UNITA would not be willing to give him a major role.

The potential strength of petit-bourgeois interests was evident in Lisbon in April when prominent Angolans held the First Congress of Angolan Cadres Abroad. The conference was aiming at a patriotic platform, to bring together expatriate professionals to discuss development problems in a non-political atmosphere. About 1,500 Angolans from around the world attended the Congress, although the vast majority are resident in Portugal. Party politics were forbidden by the organizing committee, which nevertheless made clear its advocacy of a multi-party democracy in Angola. Congress organizers recognized the legitimacy of the Angolan government, and the Angolan Embassy sponsored the official dinner which closed the Congress on April 28. UNITA had a large delegation in attendance but was denied official status.

At the request of the Congress organizers, the Angolan government refrained from active participation in the proceedings and deliberately refrained from any form of partisan presence. The technocrats from Luanda who spoke were not members of MPLA, and their presentations were restricted to the technical aspects of the issues at hand.

The way was left open to UNITA to attempt to manipulate the proceedings in its favour. The acceptance of the legitimacy of UNITA is of course implicit in the concept of multi-party democracy. The participants made repeated calls for multi-party elections as a pre-condition for the “return” of the expatriates to work in Angola. The concept of remuneration and living conditions commensurate with those available abroad, and at least equal to those provided for foreign experts in Angola, received wide applause. While almost all participants called for peace and democracy in the name of patriotism, absent from the discussions was any mention of the peasants and the workers who form the vast majority of the population and who have no hope of achieving the living standards the professionals were demanding as the price of their return.

At the closing ceremonies, the UNITA delegation paraded into the auditorium after everyone else was seated; their supporters rose on cue for a standing ovation. The Jornal de Angola concluded that the Congress had been manipulated into becoming a forum for UNITA. Of those who rose to cheer the UNITA delegation, most were what Soares had described in his opening remarks as “Luso-Angolans,” Portuguese who had left Angola at independence and who now wanted to be part of Portugal’s return to Africa; among them was a former colonial governor-general.

The tacit alliance which appears to be developing between UNITA and patriotic Angolan professionals and small businessmen is ironic. UNITA has a deplorable human rights record which contradicts its claim to be the guarantor of democratic freedom. Savimbi leads through a power cult and tolerates no opposition. UNITA’s claim to be a patriotic force is tainted by its consistent history of dependence on foreign sponsors, first Portugal, then South Africa, and now the United States. Moreover, UNITA’s support within Angola depends on its appeals to tribalism; it commonly attacks the MPLA government along racial lines with the claim that it is dominated by mulattos.

What kind of democracy?

In the context of recent events in Eastern Europe and America’s ability to ensure the organizational survival of UNITA, the MPLA government will likely be forced to accept some sort of multi-party elections in order to bring about a negotiated peace. The MPLA proposal to democratize its own party and to hold open elections in which individuals may oppose party candidates is unlikely to satisfy UNITA and the Bush administration in the current context, since their real goal is the MPLA’s complete destruction. It may be in the interest of the MPLA to allow the private groups like the ACA to prosper so that popular discontent with the war and the dismal economic situation, for which it is easy to blame the MPLA government, will not translate into votes for UNITA.

At this stage, and even if the Ovimbundu are the largest ethnic group, it is far from certain that UNITA could win an election. This is why UNITA tries so hard to flirt with the petty-bourgeois elite abroad, as only a fraction of that same social class inside Angola, which has supported the MPLA since the beginning, would ever vote for Savimbi. During a recent trip to Angola, most people interviewed seemed desperate. They are unhappy with the war, they are tired of working without results; but even if they are not satisfied with MPLA’s
administration of the state, they still think it would be worse with UNITA. In the face of this situation, it is essential for the government to implement reforms rapidly and compromise with new forces in an alliance that can isolate UNITA.

What is crucial to the MPLA position is that multi-party elections be held two or three years after a ceasefire, when UNITA’s army has been demobilized and the economy has gone off a war footing. Immediate elections demanded by UNITA could mean a repeat of the Chamorro campaign in Nicaragua. The electorate would be asked to choose between a promise of peace and American development assistance with Savimbi, or the threat of a renewal of an American financed “civil war” if MPLA retains power.

Even if MPLA is reasonably confident it will remain in government, the question remains what policies it will adopt amidst the shifting and conflicting array of forces. Apart from international economic pressure exerted mainly through the World Bank and the IMF, internal pressures arising out of the need to open up to the influence and demands of the technocrats may further weaken those forces in the party still committed to the socialist project. The party’s base among the workers and the peasants whom socialism is intended to benefit remains weak. A democracy for the workers and peasants would require structures which are not found in the existing multi-party models which have recently come into fashion.

The next MPLA congress becomes, in this context, of crucial importance. The congress will focus on a major restructuring of Angolan society, to make it more open. But will it also try to preserve a political, economic and social space vital to the struggle against “underdevelopment” and in favour of a socialist and democratic Angola? In the past, MPLA has argued that democracy without social justice is an empty shell.
Zimbabwe Ten Years After
Prospects for A Popular Politics

BY LEE COKORINOS

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Zimbabwe’s celebration of ten years of independence on April 18 provides a good opportunity to look back, not only on the achievements and setbacks of the past decade, but also at those of the North American solidarity movements with respect to a key Frontline state. Much has been written about the dashed hopes and sobering effects of Zimbabwe’s experience of majority rule, but less about what might be learned by examining the effects of Zimbabwe’s independence on the fairly potent movement in solidarity with the Patriotic Front that existed at the end of the 1970s. Those lessons may be useful as we continue to discuss how recent political changes in South Africa affect the strategic horizons of the anti-apartheid movement (see Bill Martin and Jim Carson in SAR Vol. 5 No. 5, May 1990, p. 22). When majority rule comes to that country, such lessons will become even more relevant.

Zimbabwe ten years after

On “balance,” Zimbabwe’s setbacks and difficulties over the past decade have been outweighed by its achievements. Peasant agriculture under the ZANU(PF) government has experienced mixed but unmistakable success (at least for those who have land, credit and inputs); formal racial segregation in public facilities has been outlawed; clinics and schools became available for the first time for millions of poor people; regular elections were held which gave the population a voice in government they never had before; university enrollment skyrocketed; the labor movement, though rocked by scandal and repression, is beginning to consolidate itself; control of the judiciary has been taken out of the hands of racist Rhodesia Front-appointed judges. The Mugabe government on several occasions stood up to the Reagan administration on international issues like the Grenada invasion and destabilization of Nicaragua, and brought credit on itself by its effective stewardship of the Non-aligned movement. It has resisted American and British arm-twisting tactics against the Angolan government when other Frontline and African states displayed more flexible backbones. And the legal regime covering women’s rights, while still leaving much room for improvement, has been made less repressive. Perhaps most importantly, the political/military contradiction that dominated not only the first decade of independence but the entire liberation struggle – that between ZANU(PF) and PF-ZAPU – was resolved by the merger of the two parties.

Nevertheless, serious problems confront Zimbabwe in all these areas. Any discussion on Zimbabwe today will inevitably point out that although peasants bore the brunt of the Smith regime’s repression and provided the majority of rank-and-file guerillas for the liberation movements, they have still not received the land and resources they were promised. Many ex-combatants who dropped out of school and sacrificed their education have seen others who sat out the war and gained credentials and lucrative positions in the state and private business. Segregation has taken on new forms, more economically than racially based. The most recent election, held in late March, was characterized by widespread intimidation, procedural irregularities and lack of a genuine popular opposition force. The head of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), Morgan Tsvangirai, was detained three times last year under emergency regulations inherited from the Smith regime.

Women delegates to the December ZANU(PF) congress complained they had not been allowed an input into the draft party constitution. “Some of the women at the central committee meeting were booed before they could even make their contributions,” according to Thenjiwe Lesabe, deputy secretary of the united ZANU party’s Women’s League. Young people face massive unemployment, with some 100,000 school-leavers chasing about 7,000 new jobs a year. The decisions of the judiciary have been repeatedly challenged and ignored by the government. The student movement at the university and polytechnic has faced severe repression, and its leadership was detained for daring to protest the discrepancy between socialist words and capitalist deeds. Even grumbling about the lack of benefits from the unity accord is being heard.

Mixed election results

For the solidarity movement, one of the more vexing questions regarding the March elections was the absence of an effective opposition that clearly articulated the interests of poor peasants, workers, women, the unemployed and the radical intelligentsia. By now there is ample evidence that ZANU(PF), while containing within its ranks dedicated and honest representatives and members of these strata, is dominated by what Tsvangirai has called “the old African nationalist leadership” seeking to “close off
challenges to their long-term benefits.” The “wait and see” attitude vis-à-vis Zimbabwe held by many in the solidarity movement in the early 1980s (in some ways paralyzing it politically) has clearly become untenable. The opposition Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), on the other hand, stands for an even more vigorous and free-wheeling capitalism the Zimbabwean downtrodden could hardly be expected to vote for. ZUM also concluded a foul alliance with the Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe, the party of Ian Smith. Before his desertion of the ruling party, it should be added, ZUM leader, Edgar Tekere, had also distinguished himself as one of the most feared intellectual authors of the atrocities in Matabeleland in the mid-1980s. Who does one support in such a situation?

Much of the limited information available about Zimbabwe in the West came through the distorting prism of the dominant media, which frequently cast the Zimbabwean people as a persecuted southern African equivalent of the "movements for democracy" in eastern Europe. Not that there are no parallels. To take two examples: in the election campaign Tekere made liberal use of comparisons between the government’s support for a one-party state and the experiences of eastern Europe; and a day before the way, shared a freedom of Harare honour with Nelson Mandela as the result of a 1983 visit.

Yet the contending parties in the election have grown out of Zimbabwe’s distinctive society and history, and cannot be understood by referring to examples elsewhere. Senior ZANU figures like Dumiso Dabengwa, the former military leader of PF-ZAPU, public service minister Eddison Zvogbo and the current Minister of State for National Security, Sydney Sekeramayi, have vocally opposed both “dogmatic socialism” and the one-party state. The experiences of the past decade certainly have had an effect in shaping such attitudes, since establishing a one-party state would involve banning opposition parties like ZUM, and of course preclude the formation of parties to the left of ZANU(PF). Dabengwa has been drawing huge crowds, while the campaign appearances of some other ex-ZAPU officials associated with government policy were virtually ignored. The point here is that Zimbabweans are paying attention to what their politicians are saying and do not relate to the candidates as interchangeable commodities. This also casts a different light on the widely touted voter apathy in the elections.

Coverage focusing on the one-party/multi-party issue has also obscured the fact that the process for selecting ZANU(PF) candidates, while centrally controlled, did take place under new rules which made for some sharp contests over policy and program. Western political analysts managed to ignore the fact that important issues were at stake in some ZANU(PF) candidate selections or deselections. The independent Zimbabwean monthly PARADE, by contrast, did note that in some cases these contests “enabled the grassroots organs of the party to deliver a clear message against complacency to their representatives,” though the experiment ultimately ended a fortnight later “with tears, joy, tribalism, fights, regionalism, feasting...and finally dictatorship prevailed.”

Several patterns emerge from the elections. The first of these is that ZANU(PF)’s influence in the eastern part of the country, along the border with Mozambique, is declining. Votes for opposition candidates in one district in the border town of Chipinge totalled over 15,000 to the ZANU(PF) candidate’s 7065. The candidate for the ZANU-Ndonga party – that of former “internal settlement” leader Ndabaningi Sithole, who now lives in Maryland – won in Chipinge South (where the opposition candidates won 17,500 votes to the ZANU(PF)’s 3616). Overall, however, the number of opposition MP’s only rose from two to three, though Tekere is likely to win a delayed poll in the Chimanimani constituency along the Mozambique border.

There have been reports from villagers and security forces in this border area of signs of stepped up collaboration between MNR bandits and some locals in Manicaland. Although more complaints are being heard about the lack of security force presence than abuses, the U. S.-based human rights organization, Africa Watch, citing MNR activity and the government’s eviction of peasants from their land, recently drew a parallel between the situation in the east and in Matabeleland in the mid-1980s. “Instead of making a clear distinction between legitimate political dissent and armed opposition,” Africa Watch said, the government “is amalgamating ZUM, Renamo and South Africa, in precisely the same manner as it did in Matabeleland.” The report asks whether “the lessons of Matabeleland have been learned – or whether the human rights emergency is destined to be repeated in eastern Zimbabwe.”

Nonetheless, ZANU(PF) won the election resoundingly, taking 116 of 120 elected parliamentary seats (30 more are appointed by Mugabe). This exceeded the widely-quoted predictions of some “independent observers,” such as the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace. In a separate presidential poll, Mugabe received 2.5 million votes to Tekere’s 413,000. Although Mugabe stated that he took the results as a mandate for a one-party state, this plank had in fact been quietly removed from his party’s election manifesto. The manifesto instead warned that “any division or split in the ranks of the main pro-
ducing classes must be resisted and prevented as such division will provide the petty bourgeoisie with the opportunity to defeat the objectives of socialism. The workers and peasants have thus everything to gain and nothing to lose by uniting under the umbrella of ZANU(PF) ... The next phase of our revolution will seek to give the people economic power and independence.

Another pattern emerging from the poll was ZUM's national showing, particularly in the larger towns. While generally taking a drubbing in rural areas not on the eastern border, Tekere's party was able to attract some significant support from disaffected urban voters. This demonstrates once again the danger of drawing simple equations of class support for particular parties, since many who voted for ZUM's candidates did so more out of protest at the slow pace of ZANU(PF)'s transformation of the economy (see SAR December 1989) than out of agreement with ZUM's commitment to the "free-market" and "democratic pluralism." In a medium of social crisis, political dissent seems to have expressed itself either in a protest vote for ZUM, or, more frequently,
in a boycott of the poll altogether: the turnout was only 54% of the reported 4.5 million registered voters (which, as the British historian Terence Ranger has noted, is probably an inaccurately high figure). It cannot be known where these voters would have gone if an opposition party standing firmly for, say, more spending on education and job creation, distributing land to poor peasants, or opening up the collective bargaining process, had been on the ballot. But almost certainly the ruling party would have gotten a run for its money.

Structural constraints
In a very real sense, however, thinking along those lines involves more idealism than sober reflection. For a party to the "left" of ZANU(PF) to emerge, some necessary conditions would obviously have to exist. First, leaders with credibility among poor and working Zimbabweans would have to be willing to bolt from the ruling party. While some have done so, or, as in the case of many militants from the war, have simply gone home and dropped out of politics, by and large genuine socialists have stayed in ZANU(PF) while combining their party membership with activity that consolidates and hopefully extends mobilization along class lines. There have been reports, for instance, that some senior ZANU(PF) figures, not wanting to compromise their positions in the state, remained secret members of ZUM. Others have said that such accusations are a smokescreen for intra-party witch-hunts. Even if true, however, it could not be taken for granted that those riding two partisan horses in this way would necessarily be doing so to prepare the way for launching a left alternative to the ruling party. They might simply be "expanding their options" the way opportunist politicians everywhere do. For the time being, a more open and politically far-sighted strategy may have been followed by Dabengwa, who reportedly consulted his constituents before deciding to accept a deputy ministry in Home Affairs. One interpretation of this move might be that the criteria of accountability must be extended beyond the boundaries of the good graces of party central.

Secondly, the experience with ZUM means that any militants contemplating such a move would have to ensure that the alliances they formed were not ones that would compromise them. Some politically quite sound people were badly burned by Tekere.

Finally, any serious Zimbabwean militant would have to assess for him/herself the scope that exists for making a direct challenge to the existing social structure. Could Zimbabwe cope with a cut-off of loans from international agencies like the IMF and World Bank? What would be the effect of an end to commercial lending? Would the agricultural and manufacturing sectors be able to survive outside pressure? Is the degree of political unity among socialist forces - and between these forces and their "mass base" - strong enough to withstand such pressures until the economic benefits of self-reliance, diversification of trade and increased domestic production come on line?

Many in the solidarity movement would give automatic "no" answers to all the above questions. Many in Zimbabwe, however, knowing the costs of the present economic strategy, feel the answers might be "yes," though perhaps to less dramatically posed questions. Zimbabwe's industrial base is already under attack by the Bretton Woods institutions. Its financial system is fairly sophisticated. If people need your products, such as maize and tobacco, they will buy them, as they did before 1980. And "structural adjustment" can place strains on political unity at least as bad as imperial wrath. There were and are serious debates about "the lessons of Nicaragua." Virtually no one, least of all Zimbabwe's workers and peasants who cherish access to regional markets, wants autarky.

Solidarity with whom & what?
Before independence in 1980, there was a vibrant and well-organized Zimbabwe support movement in North America which was taken seriously by the Washington policy establishment. That is no longer the case. As the basis of solidarity shifted from morality to economics, from opposing white minority rule to opposing the logic of "structural adjustment" in Zimbabwe, the movement not only shed support but literally disappeared. The irony in this is that many of the same issues that animated the liberation struggle itself and galvanized overseas support - disproportionate white power in Zimbabwean economy and society, unequal distribution of land, inequality in educational opportunity, lack of labour rights, political disenfranchisement and scorn, remain in some cases at the same or even worse levels than they were in the 1970s.

In the meantime, elsewhere in Africa, some World Bank and IMF officials have begun to talk about the need to "rethink the question of national sovereignty." One senior World Bank official remarked last year on what he saw as the need to "rethink the viability" of Niger as a nation. Going almost unnoticed as the dramatic struggles of the continent's "last colonies" are reaching their conclusion is a trend toward the recolonization of the rest of Africa. By this I do not mean indirect economic "neocolonialism" of the type Kwame Nkrumah wrote about so eloquently, but political colonialism - "direct" and "indirect" rule, the massive presence of "bilateral," World Bank, and IMF personnel within the African state. They are said by those institutions to be bringing, as in days of old, "good governance" to Africa.

Such talk has yet to reach Zimbabwe (though it is being more frequently heard just over the Zambezi), but is this to be the future
of all of southern Africa as well in a few decades time? If so, what will become of the “happily ever after” scenarios which so often guide the vision of the solidarity movement, sentiments which we recently saw again in abundance in Windhoek? Has nothing been learned? If this course is to be resisted, a shift of emphasis must take place from simply fighting racial domination to fighting imperialism. Though often confused, they are not one and the same thing.

Two tasks stand out here: reconstituting the political and social base of the solidarity movement at home (involvement in the fight against cutbacks, racism, capital flight, plant closures, slashing the social wage, etc.); and linking up with grassroots movements fighting austerity and the economic destruction of Africa. Both tasks will be exceedingly difficult to manage.

Intellectually, this means fighting the language and mentality of “competitiveness” at home, and “structural adjustment” in countries like Zimbabwe. One lesson of the past is that the intellectual tools to do this are not necessarily sharpened in a fight against racial domination, not least since all classes of oppressed African populations suffer from white minority rule, and the ruling classes of the West have easily supported such struggles under the guise of “democracy.” They are doing so once again with millions of welcome “National Endowment for Democracy” dollars for the ANC.

Nor are the organizational alliances adequate. Solidarity work must also be restructured on the basis of a critique of production relations in Africa, and an understanding of how the world economy has changed since the 1960s and 1970s when many of the original critiques of neo-colonialism and imperialism were formulated. What is politically at issue in these struggles can only be learned through direct links with both the grassroots and larger, umbrella organizations doing the same work in Africa.

At home this involves actual organizing against the IMF/World Bank, in an attempt to gum up, disrupt, and discredit their work as thoroughly as the formal and informal “public relations” apparatus of the apartheid regime was undermined by the solidarity movement during the last decade. It also involves being analytically sharper and more vocal in criticizing the many corruptions of socialist ideas in African “liberation movements” and in the solidarity movement. Judging by events, these will have to be more rigorous and thorough than those being currently deployed in eastern Europe, where the depredations of capitalism are less directly familiar than they are in Africa.

Regarding Zimbabwe itself, reconstituting systematic and regular relations of solidarity will involve a prodigious task of hooking up with both rural and urban cooperatives, the alternative press, the students’ movement, and the trade unions. The links forged with South Africa along these lines show that they can be made, despite official skepticism or resistance.

Besides creating and strengthening movements to press for the political and economic liberation of our own countries, the soundest form of solidarity we can extend to the poor and exploited in southern Africa is to make the leap with them from the struggle against racial domination to that against global marginalization and domination. Judging from the past decade’s experience regarding Zimbabwe, this will not occur by itself. In fact, it suggests we may well look back on the early 1990s as the high point in intercontinental solidarity, which would be a tragedy.