Canada–S.A. 1989: Waiting for de Klerk

LEADING FROM THE REAR

Canada and S.A. 1989
Linda Freeman

IN A DUEL
Canada vs. Apartheid Movement
Peter Ramsey

QUO VADIS, SOUTH AFRICA?
Molly Nesom

THREE SPORTS BOYCOTTS
Baseball, New Yorkers, France

MULRONEY BREAKTIES
ECONOMIC BREAKTIES
DIPLOMATIC

JAN 2 - 1989
December 1989
Southern Africa REPORT

is produced 5 times a year by a volunteer collective of the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (TCLSAC)
427 Bloor St. W.
Toronto, M5S 1X7
Tel. (416) 967-5562

Submissions, suggestions and help in production are welcome and invited.
ISSN 0820-5582
SAR is a member of the Canadian Periodical Publisher's Association.

Subscriptions

Annual TCLSAC membership and Southern Africa Report subscription rates are as follows:

SUBSCRIPTION:
Individual (1 year) .... $18.00
Individual (2 years) ... $35.00
Institution ............. $35.00

MEMBERSHIP: (includes subscription)
Regular ................. $35.00
Unemployed Student ... $18.00
Senior .................. $18.00
Sustainer ............... over $100.00
Overseas add $5.00

Contents

Editorial
Waiting for de Klerk .................. 1

Leading from the Rear:
Canada and South Africa 1989 .......... 4

In a Lull: Canada's Anti-Apartheid Movement .... 9

Tough Talk: Chikane in Canada .......... 12

Quo Vadis South Africa? ............... 14

Rescheduling Apartheid ............... 18

Beating Around the Bush .............. 21

A Ruse By Any Other Name .......... 25

Zimbabwe: Economic Crisis & the Politics of Venality ... 26

The Sports Boycott:
Old Ploys vs. New Players ........... 30

Coming Out Against Apartheid:
Gay Activist Speaks in Toronto ....... 32

Letters ............................. 33

SAR Collective

Chris Cavanagh, David Cooke, David Galbraith, Anne Gillies,
Linda Guebert, Dave Hartman, Lee Hemingway, Carole Houlihan,
Johan Jacobs, Jo Lee, Mary MacNutt, Judith Marshall, Alberto Mourato,
Colleen O'Manique, Otto Roesch, John S. Saul,
Jamie Swift, Joe Vise, Mary Vise

Cover design by Art Work
Cover photo by David Maltby
Waiting for de Klerk

Plus ça change ... In this issue, as in previous years, Linda Freeman writes eloquently about the Canadian government’s southern African policy, meticulously documenting the one step forward and many steps back that have once again characterized it. By now her annual surveys, as published over the past number of years in these pages, represent in their precise detail and in the cumulative thrust of their critical analysis, an indispensable point of reference for the student of Canadian foreign policy ... and for the anti-apartheid activist. Yet their annual appearance also begins to pose a considerable challenge for SAR’s Editorial Working Group. We leave to Linda Freeman the concrete expertise that invests these surveys with their considerable authority. How, then, to make the broadly argumentative points that must frame her article editorially without, at the same time, repeating ourselves? As regards the Mulroney/Clark approach to southern Africa it is, indeed, la même chose.

Fortunately, however, in South Africa itself things are not quite the same. The broad democratic movement has, this year, recovered much of the momentum lost to the fierce repression of the several state-imposed Emergencies since 1985. The apartheid state, once again besieged by internal resistance and international pressure, has sought to buy further time for itself by desperate improvisation, releasing Walter Sisulu and other key political prisoners (though not Nelson Mandela) for example, and permitting unprecedented public rallies organized by the muscular Mass Democratic Movement. And the vocabulary of “negotiations” has slipped centrally into the lexicon that swirls around South Africa, mumbled defensively by the de Klerk government, embraced, however gingerly, by the ANC and other main actors within the popular movement, trumpeted, increasingly, by the likes of Margaret Thatcher and the Bush administration. It is, in fact, such developments that provide fresh and important grounds for critiquing anew Canadian policy.

Of course, these developments do, in and of themselves, require careful scanning. As South African
researcher and activist Monty Narsoo reminds us in these pages not much that is really essential about apartheid’s rule has changed. Oppression grinds on and Pretoria, even at its most accommodating, talks not of genuine one-person-one-vote democracy but of the dangers of “majority tyranny” and the need for long-term defense of “group rights” (read: white privilege) in any future novel constitutional dispensation. Certainly, the South African government remains without even the most minimal claim to legitimacy, however rapidly western governments (including Canada, as Freeman argues) may rush to give new President de Klerk some fresh benefit of the doubt.

More controversially, Narsoo worries about the kinds of pressure that may build upon the democratic movement (the ANC, the “Mass Democratic Movement”) to be ever more “reasonable” in its tactics and its demands. Some may feel that Narsoo states this case too strongly, but there is no denying that the movement does face some difficult dilemmas. It must establish the fact that it is, indeed, open to the prospect of negotiations even while facing the hard necessity to bring continuing political pressure (including, when appropriate, pressure premised on military means) to bear upon Pretoria. For it is only this kind of pressure (alongside the economic pressure that international sanctions can bring) that will move the apartheid state to enter, eventually, into genuine negotiations about genuine change. The legitimacy of on-going popular struggle must therefore be constantly reaffirmed in the face of attempts by de Klerk (and his international backers) to present the still intransigent and largely unreconstructed South African state as any kind of “honest broker” for meaningful change.

And what of the day when “negotiations” do become a more substantial possibility? Can the ANC resist “reasonableness” (if presented, for example, as some superficially plausible argument in favour of “group rights”) and avoid compromise on the fundamental question of democracy? Equally important, can the ANC—even as it seeks to enlarge the camp of its supporters inside South Africa, to further divide the white community and to win new allies abroad—also ensure the necessary carryover of its democratizing and egalitarian demands into the economic realm? Without the kind of agenda for social transformation implied by such demands no substantial redressing of the centuries-old pattern of racial and class exploitation can be expected in a future South Africa. So much may seem perfectly clear, yet such an agenda, too, can be presented as being “unreasonable.” How important it is then that the fundamental reasonableness of a more—not less—radical agenda for the popular movement be defended and legitimated internationally against those who seek to package progress in South Africa in far more compromised terms.

Certainly the Canadian government has used the (still largely illusory) promise of a South African “glasnost” further to rationalize its own foot-dragging on the question of sanctions. This much is clear from Linda Freeman’s article, just as the flimsiness of Canadian rationalizations in this regard is underscored by Frank Chikane’s trenchant commentary on them, as captured in Gary Kenny’s companion piece, in this issue, on Chikane’s recent visit to Canada. Yet giving the present South African government far more legitimacy than it deserves is only part of the problem. The silences in Canadian government policy are at least equally eloquent.

Certainly the Canadian government has used the (still largely illusory) promise of a South African “glasnost” further to rationalize its own foot-dragging on the question of sanctions. This much is clear from Linda Freeman’s article, just as the flimsiness of Canadian rationalizations in this regard is underscored by Frank Chikane’s trenchant commentary on them, as captured in Gary Kenny’s companion piece, in this issue, on Chikane’s recent visit to Canada. Yet giving the present South African government far more legitimacy than it deserves is only part of the problem. The silences in Canadian government policy are at least equally eloquent.

Certainly the Canadian government has used the (still largely illusory) promise of a South African “glasnost” further to rationalize its own foot-dragging on the question of sanctions. This much is clear from Linda Freeman’s article, just as the flimsiness of Canadian rationalizations in this regard is underscored by Frank Chikane’s trenchant commentary on them, as captured in Gary Kenny’s companion piece, in this issue, on Chikane’s recent visit to Canada. Yet giving the present South African government far more legitimacy than it deserves is only part of the problem. The silences in Canadian government policy are at least equally eloquent.

Certainly the Canadian government has used the (still largely illusory) promise of a South African “glasnost” further to rationalize its own foot-dragging on the question of sanctions. This much is clear from Linda Freeman’s article, just as the flimsiness of Canadian rationalizations in this regard is underscored by Frank Chikane’s trenchant commentary on them, as captured in Gary Kenny’s companion piece, in this issue, on Chikane’s recent visit to Canada. Yet giving the present South African government far more legitimacy than it deserves is only part of the problem. The silences in Canadian government policy are at least equally eloquent.
For how little is being done by the Canadian government to help establish, in the minds of Canadians, the essential legitimacy of the democratic forces that operate on the ground inside South Africa. We have written before, in these pages, of the churlish reception received from Messrs. Mulroney and Clark by ANC President Oliver Tambo when last he visited Canada (SAR, Vol. 3, No. 2, October 1987). Unfortunately, much of this kind of mindset remains in place in official Ottawa, as witness the continuing difficulties faced by Canadian NGOs in obtaining CIDA support for projects they seek to launch with the ANC, for example. Contrast this with the actions of those Scandinavian governments who openly embrace the ANC, provide substantial support and even facilitate the liberation movement’s quasi-diplomatic representation in their capitals.

True, the Canadian Embassy in South Africa does provide some financing for various popularly-based initiatives inside that country and marks its presence at various oppositional public meetings and funerals. Yet how much more important it would be for the Canadian government actually to attempt to lead public opinion regarding the absolute centrality of a full-scale political and socio-economic democratization of South Africa, or regarding the legitimacy of the popular movement’s using any means it deems necessary in order to force the hand of the South African government in the present conjuncture.

Since this is all too unlikely, however, the challenge is thrown back to the anti-apartheid movement to continue its efforts to further deepen public awareness in Canada of the real nature of the struggle in South Africa. Not that this is itself an entirely straightforward matter, as Pierre François’ article in this issue may serve to indicate. Despite considerable accomplishments, François argues, our movement has not fully adjusted to the demands the fresh developments in South Africa are placing upon us. Although acknowledging that a debate has indeed begun in anti-apartheid circles over such questions, he also waxes sceptical about some suggestions that have begun to come forward, not least, and most controversially, regarding the possible development of a new national anti-apartheid organization in Canada that would give formal pride of place, at its core, to the ANC. While accepting that the ANC is indeed central to the struggle inside South Africa François sees dangers in narrowing our support, in this manner and too exclusively, to it alone. On these and other questions we hope the article will serve as a stimulus to further discussion and welcome additional contributions in subsequent issues. Certainly, our own parent committee – TCLSAC – is itself wrestling with these same issues, and we intend to feature some of the fruits of these labours in future issues.

* * *

Other articles in this issue focus on such themes as evolving American policy – yet another case of ostentatiously “waiting for de Klerk,” as it happens – under the Bush administration (this article marking the welcome return to our pages of our American correspondents, Jim Cason and Mike Fleshman). We highlight the illuminating visit to Canada from South Africa by gay and anti-apartheid activist Simon Nkoli and (courtesy of regular contributor, Bruce Kidd) diverse developments on the sports boycott front, both internationally and inside South Africa. And we document the continuing appropriateness of the struggle for financial sanctions, this in spite of the disappointing recent renewal of certain outstanding international loans to South Africa that is chronicled here by Alan Hirsch. Less is said, unfortunately, about the Namibian elections, the results of which are breaking as we go to press. However, Namibia will provide the core theme for our first issue of the new year at which time the focus will be less on the election itself than on an analysis of the broader prospects for that country in the wake of that election. What, we will inquire, of the ongoing structuring of its constitution (and of the continuing negotiation with South Africa about the terms of the transition to formal independence)? And what of the new country’s post-independence struggle for a solid measure of substantive freedom from South African economic hegemony and for internally humane development?

Suffice to signal here that, however flawed the electoral process and however complex and challenging the future, the achievement of a SWAPO-led independence for Namibia will be another forward step of heroic proportions for the southern African region. Of course, many who rejoice at such a victory may simultaneously find some virtue in the fact that SWAPO failed, nonetheless, to gain 67% of the vote, a percentage that would have given it a much freer hand in constitution-making than it will now have. Revelations regarding some of SWAPO’s non-democratic practices in exile (SAR, Vol. 5, No. 2) suggest that SWAPO’s need to accommodate itself more carefully to minority concerns in Namibia may actually augur better for the future of democracy in Namibia. Yet it is equally true that many of those who claim to express the interests of this substantial minority are closely linked to South African designs; the election result thus has the unwelcome result of prolonging South Africa’s ability to destabilize and to distort Namibia’s transition to independence. Such complexities aside, however, the essence of the matter remains clear: anti-apartheid activists everywhere must hail the success of the decades-long struggle for freedom waged by the Namibian people and the prospect of a SWAPO government finally to be established in Windhoek.
Leading from the Rear: Canada and South Africa 1989

BY LINDA FREEMAN

Linda Freeman, who teaches political science at Carleton University, writes regularly in Southern Africa REPORT on Canadian policy.

This past year Canada’s preference for soft options in its policy on South Africa has led to embarrassment and worse. Yet, once again officials insist Canada is playing a leadership role when in fact we lead, if at all, from the rear. Canada’s record on sanctions falls significantly behind that of the United States and the Nordic countries both in terms of the sanctions adopted and in the willingness to do more. By now, Mulroney’s flamboyant promise at the United Nations General Assembly in October 1985 that, barring significant steps towards the dismantling of apartheid, Canada would invoke total diplomatic and economic sanctions has been all but repudiated by those who influence policy.

As Canada’s South Africa policy falls into disarray, the claims for its success grow ever louder. At the recent Commonwealth meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Prime Minister Mulroney not only claimed personal credit for the launching of Commonwealth sanctions in 1985, but also insisted that he had “staked out for my successors the high moral ground” of opposing apartheid unequivocally.

To some extent, Mulroney was rescued from what the Globe and Mail called this “tasteless posturing over the fate of suffering people” (24 October 1989) by an even more outrageous performance from Margaret Thatcher. In her decision to issue a separate statement on Southern Africa without notice and to repudiate one just agreed to by the whole Commonwealth, including Britain, she angered Canada and Australia and encouraged them to slip back into their self-styled role as the new leaders of the Commonwealth.

Their shock at Britain’s reversal and Thatcher’s behaviour was understandable. During the past year, Thatcher has been cultivating Mulroney and Prime Minister Bob Hawke of Australia in an attempt to soften their pro-sanctions positions with some success. One senior civil servant in Canada hinted that Britain was delighted with Clark’s role in delaying the publication of the Sanctions Report, the independent study commissioned by the Commonwealth which hoped to build momentum through the summer for a graduated campaign of stepped-up trade sanctions to complement the more broadly accepted campaign for financial sanctions. Before the most recent Foreign Ministers Committee meeting in Canberra in August, Deputy Secretary General Ekeka Anyaoku flew to Ottawa to plead for the immediate release of the study. Clark refused. Indeed, only vigorous argument by the other members of the Committee and the leaking of the study to the press by non-governmental organizations in Canada and Australia stymied Clark’s effort to suppress the report.

Canadian policy makers are less concerned with the lack of credibility on sanctions than they are preoccupied with seeing that we don’t step out of line with the major Western powers. Canada’s policy is based on a conviction that membership in the G7, the Commonwealth and La Francophonie and a good relationship with the independent black African countries in Southern Africa will earn us the time-honoured role of intermediary. As Clark said to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York in September, Canada believes “that this is a question where we can make a difference.”

The vanity factor

This view is a product of a tradition held dear in Canada about the role which Canada has played in foreign affairs which can only be called the vanity factor. Broadly speaking, the approach focuses less on the issues than on being a player and on assuming that Canada exerts a benevolent influence no matter how nebulous the substance of what we do or the extent of our power. While our trade with South Africa increases and our banks flout voluntary financial sanctions, External Affairs suggests that there is little left to do, that we have very little leverage on South Africa anyway. Of course, had we adopted this logic before, we would never have taken the concrete measures adopted in 1986, let alone staked a claim to “the high ground” to which Mulroney refers.
If you are confused, never mind; these are the treacherous eddies in which Canada's Southern Africa policy drifts, reflecting a series of misjudgements and some wishful thinking about the interests of international capital. To some extent, the Canadian state has been hoist on its own petard. Central to its South Africa policy in 1989 has been a belief in the efficacy of financial rather than trade sanctions.

The difficulty with this approach has been that international banks have recently rescheduled $9 billion of short term loans with South Africa on terms which, while not letting South Africa completely off the hook, fall considerably short of those requested by the Commonwealth Committee. Canadian banks are no less involved; they are part of a consortium lending about $150 million to South Africa. At the least, the rescheduling has eased a debt crunch looming for South Africa in June 1990. Meanwhile, two-way trade between Canada and South Africa in 1988 increased by about 37% over 1987. Although the basis for calculations of Canadian trade have changed to include goods shipped through a third country, the 130% increase in imports of South Africa for the first four months of 1989 at least indicates the general trend.

Paradoxically, the retreat in Canadian policy to maintaining rather than increasing sanctions has been defended as a way of keeping the pressure on South Africa. Logically, the refusal to step up pressure sends the contrary message to the new South African President F. W. de Klerk that the West is satisfied with the status quo; it certainly grants him a breathing space. Significantly, Frank Chikane of the South African Council of Churches and Thabo Mbeki of the African National Congress have urged the international community to keep the pressure on by increasing sanctions. However, at this conjuncture, only the United States Congress seems prepared to move forward. It has served notice that barring certain changes in conditions in South Africa by February 1990, much harsher sanctions will be imposed. In Canadian thinking, however, the carrot has replaced the stick; we are but one step away from constructive engagement.

Reforms or Sanctions?

What Canada, Britain and others of a similar mind are banking on is that de Klerk will produce significant reforms and thus ease the necessity for more sanctions. Part of the hope for change is also based on evidence of intense diplomatic activity to reach a settlement both within South Africa with Nelson Mandela and in the international sphere coordinated up to Kuala Lumpur by Margaret Thatcher. However, while the situation in South Africa is comparatively fluid at the moment,
there are solid historical reasons for caution. In the past, South African governments have promised far more than they have intended to deliver, banking on Western gullibility. No South African government has been prepared to accept the crucial principle of a universal franchise, the cardinal point for a democratic resolution to the crisis, and the de Klerk government is no exception. Instead, there is talk about group rights which means basically that the white community is not yet prepared to relinquish power to the black majority. In addition, de Klerk's reputation is that of a verkrampte or conservative, and his brief record in office is mixed.

Yet, believing that a new South African President will make all the difference has been a time-honoured tradition in Canada. In the mid 1970s, Canadian Ambassadors responded enthusiastically to President Vorster's appeal to "just give him six months." Again in 1978, Canadian officials greeted the arrival of P. W. Botha by sideline the slight initiatives adopted a year earlier, resuming its approach of opposing apartheid while increasing trade. In the mid 1980s during the height of black resistance in the townships, Canadian officials argued for stalling Canadian sanctions, portraying P. W. Botha as a comparative liberal against the more conservative elements within the South African state. Once again, giving a new South African President "the benefit of the doubt" is in season.

Canada has also utilized the Namibian independence process to mute its approach towards South Africa and to distance itself from Namibia's main political party SWAPO. This general approach repeats the stance which Canada took during its participation in the Contact Group which unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate Namibia's independence from South Africa from 1977 to about 1983. At the time, William Barton, Canada's principal representative on the Group, said that membership was used by all five Western countries "as a stalking horse to conceal their unwillingness to act against South Africa ..." Now in 1989, Canada's contribution to peacekeeping in Namibia during the election process allowed officials to opt for a spurious neutrality towards South Africa. An official of External Affairs explained that a desire not to upset the final stages of independence was involved in the calculation: "It's not an ideal time to disturb the weaning mother," he said.

At the same time, accountability to the people of South Africa and their mass organizations falls fairly low in Canada's official priorities, and the relationship to the African National Congress continues to be lukewarm and patronizing. While Sweden provides $10 million and Norway $6 million annually to help the ANC develop the political and economic structures that will prepare them for a takeover of government, CIDA stalls on anything more than support for a day-care centre at the princely sum of $65,000 a year for three years. In a recent speech in New York, Clark praised the ANC for its moderation but added that "Active dialogue requires an acceptance of the legitimacy of each party by the other!" Given past government statements on the illegitimacy of the white minority regime in South Africa, one wonders just how far Canadian policy will regress, and whether, as one unofficial adviser to External Affairs hinted recently, group rights are also on Canada's agenda.

Canada's position softens
In fact, the collapse of Canadian policy had begun as long ago as June 1987 at the G7 meeting in Venice when Mulroney realized his advocacy of sanctions was winning him ridicule rather than approval from the great powers. At that meeting he was not even able to have the issue of South Africa included in the communiqué. Since then, Canada's position has steadily softened in every way but rhetorically, especially in the past year at meetings of the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers Committee chaired by Joe Clark. Clark's stonewalling on more trade sanctions in favour of a strategy to counter South African propaganda and censorship had come into sharp relief by the Toronto meeting in August 1988, and by the Harare meeting in February 1989, Canada's sincerity was openly questioned. The Zimbabwian Foreign Minister, Nathan Shamuyarira suggested that the $1 million which Canada was spending on its anti-propaganda strategy was "peanuts," equivalent to what Zimbabwe spent daily to counter South African destabilization. He also attacked Canada for breaking the military embargo and softened the accusation only when Clark threatened to walk out of the meeting.

Other transgressions were not so easy to avoid. Shortly before Clark left for Harare, Canadian trade figures for eleven months in 1988 showed that imports from South Africa had increased 44% and exports 68%. Even worse, Canada's credibility was shredded with the news that the Bank of Nova Scotia had provided a $600 million loan for an Anglo American subsidiary MINORCO in its ultimately unsuccessful takeover bid of a British mining company, Consolidated Gold Fields. The provison of this loan is consistent with the past links between Canadian banks and South African capital. In the early 1980s, the President of the Bank of Nova Scotia Cedric Ritchie was a member of MINORCO's board. Moreover, Clark's response - to point out the voluntary nature of financial sanctions; to argue that, as the company's headquarters were in Luxembourg, MINORCO wasn't strictly a South African company; and to call in Ritchie for friendly persuasion - was hardly reassuring. This has not been a good year for Canadian policy on Southern Africa, whatever face Clark and Mulroney put on it.
Policy stalemate

Factors internal to Canada have also helped to stalemate policy. These have come from sectors beyond the Canadian state and Canadian capital, and have been aided and abetted by the South African embassy. South African Ambassador Johannes de Klerk regularly visits service clubs and this year has managed to find ways to return to university campuses. In addition, a network of Canadians, managed and supported by the South African embassy, has launched a pro-South African campaign, targeting constituencies of Conservative M.P.s, particularly in Western Canada.

Not surprisingly, dissent has emerged from members of the Conservative Cabinet, Caucus and party, many of whom have only just been able to give Mulroney the benefit of the doubt on this issue. In particular, the government was embarrassed by the defiance of sanctions on tourism represented in the summer holiday in South Africa of Felix Altom, the Conservative chair of the House of Commons Committee on Communications and Culture.

In addition, the private sector in Canada has seen to it that the government will ask little more from it in terms of economic sanctions, even where Canada actually has leverage. According to Professor Don Ray of the University of Calgary, Canada now supplies 99% of South Africa's imported sulphur, and South Africa relies on imports for 30 to 40% of its total needs, primarily in the fertilizer industry. South Africa would be hard put to find other reliable low cost suppliers if Canadian suppliers refused to do business with them, whereas Canadian hardship would be minimal. Sales to South Africa account for only about 8% of Canada's total sulphur exports and world demand is high. Canadian producers could support sanctions without eliminating jobs, but neither South Africa nor Canadian suppliers have had to look for alternatives.

Canada's exports of sulphur to South Africa doubled from 1987 to 1988, and sulphur continues to constitute a major proportion (about 40% in 1988) of total Canadian exports to South Africa. While the federal government stopped the crown corporation, Petro Canada, from selling sulphur to South Africa in 1988, it is unprepared to interfere with other producers. As an executive of Cansulex, the cooperative which markets a major part of Canada's sulphur, put it, South Africans are excellent customers. He said, "They pay the world price, they pay on time, and they pay in cash…. I say let's keep the business connection."

Keeping the business connection

Import companies have been equally successful in "keeping the business connection." In the case of specialty steel suppliers, increased purchase prices and strong demand in Canada for South African ferrochromium, ferromanganese and ferrovanadium, crucial ingredients for the production of specialty steel, were largely responsible for the dramatic increase in the value of Canadian imports in early 1989. The main producers of specialty steel in Canada - Atlas Steel, Stelco, and Rio Algom - insist that there are no alternative high quality, price competitive, reliable suppliers in a period of high world demand, and have lobbied hard to ensure that these commodities stay
off the sanctions list. Accordingly, ferro alloys now constitute about 27% of total Canadian imports from South Africa. It does not take great imagination to understand that the price competitive factor is based on South Africa’s super-exploited migrant black labour force.

A second major Canadian import from South Africa involves a “coal to Newcastle” situation whereby companies in Ontario and Quebec import large quantities of dissolving wood pulp, an ingredient in the production of textiles, particularly viscose fibre. This anomaly is partly a result of the corporate holdings of Courtaulds, a British transnational which, until July 1988, owned the world’s largest and lowest cost dissolving pulp mill in Natal. Industry sources believe that South African pulp is sold to Courtaulds’ Canadian subsidiary in Cornwall Ontario for less than the open market price, and the Cornwall firm maintained a long-term supply contract with the South African firm even after its sale by the transnational.

South Africa can provide dissolving wood pulp at less than market price because of cheap labour, the fast-growing eucalyptus tree and lower construction costs. Thus Courtaulds Canada buys two-thirds of its dissolving pulp from South Africa and only one third from Canadian suppliers. World demand for the pulp is strong, and the industry in Canada argues that it would be difficult for Courtaulds to find another supplier.

This gap between promise (to wit Mulroney’s impassioned pleas for trade sanctions in 1985 and 1986) and Canada’s actual performance has not gone unnoticed. The effect on Canada’s international reputation has been savage. On a trip to Canada early in 1989, Mohammed Valli of the United Democratic Front talked about his disappointment and the expectations which Mulroney had created and then failed. At the Harare conference of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers, Shamuyarira of Zimbabwe and Ben Mkapa of Tanzania expressed dismay and frustration at Canada’s increased trade and its voluntary partial sanctions.

Asleep at the wheel

This reaction has been echoed within Canada. Earlier in the year, a Globe editorial (24 February 1989) entitled “Asleep at the Wheel” asked, “Does Joe Clark need a vacation? Or is he taking one?” A spate of press commentary has suggested that Mulroney was “trashing Canada’s foreign affairs legacy” (The Toronto Star, 7 April 1989). Veteran political columnist Richard Gwyn went so far as to argue that “no nation can preach to others when its own foreign policy is so obviously dishonest,” and, shortly before Kuala Lumpur, editors in the Ottawa Citizen, the Toronto Star and The Globe and Mail called on Mulroney to buttress Canada’s credibility by toughening sanctions and deepening and tightening those in place. An Angus Reid poll in March echoed these sentiments: a majority of Canadians thought economic sanctions against South Africa should be strengthened. Two thirds of those surveyed said they believed voluntary guidelines for the Canadian private sector should be replaced by clear rules and regulations on trade with South Africa.

Instead, the option which the Canadian state has taken has been to eschew a stronger approach to sanctions and to soften the reaction through growing programmes of assistance, primarily to education, in South Africa and broader programmes of development and security assistance in the region. This summer, Clark announced a second allocation of $14.7 million for Canada’s education programme to South Africa to add to an initial $8.2 million. Canada is also spending another $6.6 million on bilateral assistance and support for dialogue within South Africa.

Even here, however this assistance must be put into perspective. On a visit to Canada in October, Frank Chikane expressed a growing concern that aid might dampen criticism of Western involvement in South Africa. The talk about scholarships in exchange for sanctions, he felt, “was an insult.” “Educating us,” he said, “just makes us educated oppressed blacks.” He added, “We do need education, but that you’ve educated us doesn’t make us free... We need funding for getting rid of the system. That’s the key, not funding for survival within the system.

For the region, the West’s refusal to toughen its opposition to South Africa has grimmer implications. A recent study published by the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa pointed out that South Africa’s military aggression and destabilization of its neighbours had cost the region over $60 billion and 1.5 million lives since 1980. The cost of the apartheid system in blighted opportunities and destroyed lives in South Africa is impossible to calculate. Ranged against these realities, Western assistance must be seen as a puny alternative to comprehensive mandatory sanctions, the excuse for not doing more.

In late 1989, Canada’s preference for soft options remains in place, and it seems unlikely that this policy of giving Pretoria a breathing space will support a new dawn. Canada remains with voluntary financial sanctions, limited trade sanctions and only the vaguest indication of a timetable for action. Its support for the organizations representing the black majority is barely token. To call this moral leadership and to make grandiose claims for its success may serve the delusions of our politicians and civil servants; but the broader world, particularly the people still suffering in Southern Africa, know better.
In a Lull: Canada’s Anti-Apartheid Movement

BY PIERRE FRANÇOIS

Pierre François, who writes here in his personal capacity, is a long-time Québécois anti-apartheid activist.

1. The current situation appears as a huge paradox.

First point: in South and southern Africa, major changes are under way, not only in terms of the relation of forces between the South African State, Western imperialism and the popular organizations, but also within the popular camp. One should notice, en passant, how the rethink is reshaping a new political culture in South Africa; or notice, as well, the unfolding of events in Angola and Mozambique, where the socialist project is really being challenged. Perestroika southern Africa style.

Second point: here we are in Canada, after years of solidarity work, in a lull. At one level, this lull does not appear to be very dramatic: after all, just read What’s The Word to see how many initiatives are underway all over the country. On the other hand, the fact that the decline does not take the form of a collapse creates a sort of illusion. It is a screen preventing us from seeing our important limitations, and more broadly speaking, hiding the decline. However, our defeat on the debt question, one we shared with the world-wide anti-apartheid movement, should send us a signal.

The first question to ask ourselves is, again using the perestroika allusion, are we up for a real debate? Are we ready for a demystification? Can we look at ourselves in a non-deforming mirror, “glasnosting” our anti-apartheid movement?

2. For years, Southern Africa solidarity work was a kind of political football, stuck between those two left families that are so good at fighting each other: the Communist Party affiliates of all kinds on the one hand and the “new left” on the other. Being part of the second gang myself, I still feel we were always right! BUT, now that a lot
more water has passed under the bridge, we have to look at our limitations. In many ways, we served as political “scouts,” a kind of “advanced party” exploring terrain for action not previously touched upon. What we basically failed to do, however, was to build a strategy – the starting point of politics, in fact. Identifying short and long term battlefronts, isolating enemies, winning new friends, changing the political culture, in brief waging the “war of position,” as our Italian comrade Gramsci says, “the exhausting and patient task of building hegemony.”

Then, between 1985 and 1988, important gains were made. Networking became more strategic, bringing groups together around common issues, targeting more carefully, building agendas that were able to become national themes. Moreover, we came in from the margins, bringing the southern Africa issue out of the cuddly ghetto in which it had been marginalized. There were many reasons, of course, for this shift, of which the most important probably was the uprising in South Africa, the interest it created in the world, and the wishy washy sanctions it evoked from Canada and the other Western powers.

Nevertheless, we can also take some credit for ourselves, although when we say “ourselves” we must be careful. For during this period there were a lot of “new faces.” In fact, many of these newcomers, coming mostly from the NGOs, labour, the churches, brought not only a fresher perspective but also the kind of strategic approach that had been lacking before. What emerged was a mix, a compromise, between ourselves, the “old guard,” and the new organizations and networks. In many ways, this new terrain surfaced publicly at the Montreal “Taking Sides” Conference and at the Parallel Commonwealth Conference in Vancouver.

This shift was not supported by everyone. There was opposition from some quarters of the old guard, suspicion even, perhaps out of fear of losing “control” – as if South Africa, Mozambique or Angola were the property of someone or another. Moreover, at least implicitly, the ANC office in Canada did not wholeheartedly welcome this move out of the ghetto. There was fear that the new level of activity would also involve the widening of relations and support links in South Africa, that these might by-pass the efforts of the ANC to streamline anti-apartheid politics and rally practical support behind itself. Eventually, though, some degree of consensus was reached. After all, widening support, making South and southern Africa a national issue on the agendas of “mainstream” Canada, could not but benefit the most important political organisation in South Africa even if it could also mean Canadians coming to know more and even possibly coming to support a more diverse range of South African resistance organizations. There is a sort of statistical lock at work: if there is an increase in support to South Africa generally, it must necessarily mean an increase in support to the ANC, in more or less the same proportions.

Other important breakthroughs were achieved on Mozambique and Angola. Again the same pattern was used: widening alliances, linking up support in the field with education-information work in Canada, keeping a careful balance between basing the government for its inaction and demanding and obtaining a more substantial level of support. However, as often happened during these years of advance, some successes were turned into setbacks. The government’s apparently progressive move on sanctions became the rationale for many organizations to become lazy on the issue. Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) money flooding into our multiple “projects” sometimes merely increased our bureaucratization. Some tensions developed between the “centre” (Toronto-Ottawa-Montreal) and the “periphery.”

All of this became cumulative and eventually created the conditions for the present lull which is, as I stated earlier, not a dramatic decline, but rather a relative erosion of our capacity to act strongly and to win on some of the most important issues that are surfacing at the present crucial moment. In no way should this be read as an across-the-board negative assessment. After all, as I’ve noted, there is a tremendous amount of work being done. We should also take note of the fact that, thanks to the strong effort and good strategizing of some of our comrades, we have established Namibia as major policy and aid issue. In terms of linking our efforts and following through on things, progress is still noticeable in many areas, one of which is the “Backing the Frontline” campaign. To take another example, Development and Peace this fall has organized a very powerful campaign around sanctions.

3. Because of the common feeling that something more must be done, however, we appear ready once again to take the initiative. And there are some proposals on the table in this regard, one of which is a discussion paper put forward by the Canadian office of the ANC this past summer. Basically, this proposes a “co-ordinated, systematic network,” in explicit support of the Freedom Charter and of the “liberation forces, the ANC, SACTU, COSATU and the UDP.” It also proposes, as a common criterion for membership, willingness to fight for the removal of the Canadian Embassy in South Africa and for “comprehensive and mandatory sanctions.” The ANC proposal goes on to outline the structure of such a network, calling for the election of a national committee which would be “the political voice of the network.” Parallel to this, there is also a Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC) initia-
tive to “take stock” of the anti-apartheid network, seeking to build, through regional and sectoral consultations, a common basis upon which to establish a strategic consensus.

Both these proposals share the common view that networking is crucial to our development. The big difference, however, lies in the process they each envisage, in the method proposed to achieve a more effective network. The ANC proposal is a new version of earlier attempts to build a centralized and exclusively pro-ANC anti-apartheid movement. It can be approved if we want to go back to our “glorious” past. Such an initiative would probably create an important division between those in this kind of pro-ANC network and others, who are not necessarily either against the ANC or for something else but who feel that there should not be this kind of exclusivity of support. After all, despite the fact that the Congress movement in South Africa is the most important one, there is a widening recognition, even within the ANC itself, that resistance politics in South Africa are not the sole property of the ANC, and consequently, that there is a need for broad alliances such as those envisaged by the various anti-apartheid unity conferences that are currently being planned inside South Africa.

For there is a difference between supporting the ANC, which is a very important, even crucial, political task, and according it the status of the “sole and authentic representative” of the people. Surely it is significant that this latter concept is now being dropped, in one way or another, by all the different perestroikas that are going on in the world!

Moreover, such a line would be politically destructive in the Canadian context. For one thing, if we want to get out of the ghetto and get “mainstream” Canada to act in solidarity with South Africa, it is not by projecting this kind of image of the coming “one-party” state that we will achieve it. There are simply too many Canadian organizations who now know a great deal about South Africa and who have established partnerships with a wide variety of groups there, not only with the ANC and its immediate allies, but with a broad resistance movement which is not exclusively Congress-oriented but which also represents a wide spectrum of political and social views, either to the left or to the right of the ANC.

4. Such polemics aside, it nonetheless remains clear that the objective of creating a network should remain central. But it must be a much more open network, one focussing on common issues and themes, but leaving room for the political diversity and creativity exemplified by the many groups involved. In other words, it must be the kind of network which we envisioned in 1985-1987.

Yet even this, in itself, will not be enough. Networking can only make sense if there are some strategic proposals to unite us, strategies which can win. We must confront, for example:

- the necessity to deepen our roots in established and organised constituencies in Canada, especially

continued on page 33
BY GARY KENNY

Gary Kenny, who is a staff member with the Inter-Church Coalition on Africa, accompanied Frank Chikane during his recent Canadian visit.

When I last saw Rev. Frank Chikane, in 1986, I was convinced that I might never see him alive again. He had just reached an agonizing decision to end several months of exile to return to South Africa where, he was convinced, detention, torture and possibly even death awaited him. He explained the thinking behind his decision to an audience of church and secular people in Toronto. His remarks, framed in a profound interpretation of the “gospel of the Cross,” challenged the standard crucifixion theology of those church people present.

“It has become clear to me that Jesus did not want to go to the Cross,” he said. “No one really wants to go the way of the Cross. But I no longer believe that we can achieve our liberation in South Africa without going through the Cross. And therefore, he continued, “I have made my decision. I cannot explain what I am doing except that, against the wishes of my closest friends and colleagues, I am going home to be present with my people, whether in life or in death.”

Had he not been elected to the high-profile position of General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches (SACC) soon after his return to South Africa in 1986, it is quite possible that Chikane, arguably the most radically prophetic church leader in South Africa today, would indeed have been killed by the regime or its agents. As it is he has had to contend with a number of life-threatening situations, including grenades in his mail box and the toxic effects of a nerve-inhibiting poison surreptitiously planted in his luggage during a trip to the United States. But here he was in Canada again, very much alive and eager to participate in a series of solidarity events sponsored by the Canadian Council of Churches and the Inter-Church Coalition on Africa. I joined him on a connecting flight from Toronto to Ottawa and accompanied him personally throughout several days of intense media interviews and church and NGO consultations.

By coincidence Chikane literally had come straight from an historic meeting between himself, Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Rev. Allan Boesak and South African President F. W. de Klerk. No sooner had we exchanged greetings when he began telling me about that experience. He said that initially he, Tutu and Boesak were reluctant to accept de Klerk's invitation to meet. "We feared that a meeting with him might lead others to believe that we were granting the regime some form of legitimacy," he said. So they went with their own proposals and strategy. They asked de Klerk to use his executive power as President to rescind all repressive measures established by decree, and to begin parliamentary procedures immediately to repeal all apartheid laws. Chikane said that the trio’s thinking was that, if de Klerk would agree to eliminate the state of emergency, then the anti-apartheid movement might consent to a six-month suspension of sanctions, during which time negotiations between the regime and the legitimate representatives of the people could begin. If the regime continued to demonstrate good faith, then sanctions could be called off altogether.

But de Klerk flatly rejected the proposals, Chikane said. "He kept referring to his own programme for change and saying, 'You have to trust me. I am promising you a new future.' " Nor would he reveal the content of his own programme for reform or commit himself to a timetable for change, Chikane added. "He just kept saying, 'You have to trust me.' "
Said Chikane, "I looked at him and I said, 'Mr. de Klerk, I am 39 years old. I couldn't vote in elections in my country September 6, elections which took place under your leadership. Why should I trust you now? What reason have you given me to do so?'"

It was soon clear that de Klerk was not the enlightened president that he and others had said he was, Chikane said. It was obvious that his much-heralded proposals for reform were, in following with the National Party's Five Year Plan announced last June, based on the preservation of "group rights" and the safeguarding of white privilege. I believe de Klerk has "neither the will nor the capacity to effect fundamental change," Chikane added.

Nevertheless, Chikane said he did not leave the meeting feeling that the situation was hopeless. He described de Klerk's desperation during the marathon three-hour meeting as "palpable." He said he believes that mounting popular resistance within South Africa and the impact of international sanctions have combined to place de Klerk under enormous pressure, and are forcing him to make concessions against his will.

It has become obvious that de Klerk "is no longer in control of events" in the country, Chikane said. The defiance campaign completely dominated the September elections, rendering them a non-issue. And the pace for the release of political prisoners such as Walter Sisulu is being determined by Nelson Mandela, not de Klerk. These developments show conclusively that the regime has lost its legitimacy and has entered "a period of no-return ... The release of the prisoners, the demonstrations that are illegal under state of emergency regulations - these are concessions de Klerk has had to make in response to the pressure."

But paradoxically, Chikane added, de Klerk has set in motion an inexorable process which can only end in the downfall of his government. If he turns back now then the country would almost certainly erupt into a catastrophe of violence and chaos. Therefore it is important for countries like Canada to increase the pressure on de Klerk in order to help create the conditions that will force him to continue the process of making concessions, Chikane said. And the best way to increase the pressure, he said, is by imposing stronger sanctions.

It was this message that Chikane conveyed to officials from the Canadian government and Department of External Affairs in meetings in Ottawa. He cautioned against falling for de Klerk's reform trickery. "It may be true that De Klerk has changed his strategy," he said, "but he has not changed his heart. The regime on its own does not have the capacity to change." He said Canada should not underestimate the value of unilaterally imposing comprehensive and mandatory sanctions. Such action could motivate other countries to do the same, he said. Even Great Britain, under enormous pressure of isolation, could eventually be forced into moving from its current intransigence.

Following the meetings Chikane noted with disappointment that the officials hadn't readily accepted his profile of de Klerk as a president no longer in complete control of events. He expressed regret that they seemed to have been swayed by de Klerk's crafty sales pitch for reform. "If Canada goes to (the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in) Kuala Lumpur and fails to push for stronger sanctions, if Canada backs off on sanctions, that would be a disaster for us," he said. "It could close the chapter on the once glorious Commonwealth assault on apartheid."

At a church-led rally on Parliament Hill Chikane picked up on that same theme. Canada must not limit its influence by relying on moral suasion alone, he said. "It is not moral persuasions that are going to make South Africa change. Change will be the result of our efforts together, in the country, outside the country ..." Added Chikane, the international community can play an important role by continuing to help create the conditions necessary for fundamental change.

---

**Boesak Misquoted on Sanctions**

Confusion erupted during the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Kuala Lumpur in October when Rev. Allan Boesak reportedly called for a six-month moratorium on sanctions. In a subsequent letter to prominent South African anti-apartheid leaders, including Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Rev. Frank Chikane, Walter Sisulu and Jay Naidoo, Boesak denied making the statement and dismissed the report as "the media's desire ... to create mischief and division."

In answer to a reporter’s question, Boesak wrote, "I said that should Mr. de Klerk, on the eve of the Commonwealth meeting, come up with an announcement meeting the short term demands of our people, then, and only then should the Commonwealth consider not calling for new sanctions." However, recognizing that de Klerk can only repeal apartheid laws after deliberation in Parliament, he suggested to the CHOGM that it consider assessing the president's progress after six months. At that time, Boesak wrote, "I said that 'should there be no progress' - and I used the words 'irreversible' and 'fundamental,' then the Commonwealth should renew its call for mandatory sanctions. At no stage have I called for a 'moratorium' on sanctions ... It would be a serious mistake to let up on the pressure on the government at this stage."
Monty Narsoo is a South African activist and researcher who recently worked at CIDMAA in Montreal.

Events in South Africa are moving at a dizzying pace. The television images of people legally marching and doing the toyi-toyi in the streets of Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban have puzzled many people abroad. When the African National Congress can hold a public rally near Soweto, attended by 70,000 people and addressed by recently released members of the movement's high command, this seems to indicate the de facto unbanning of the ANC and a fundamental change in the South African situation. All the more so when such an event happens in the wake of peace negotiations in Angola and the unfolding of the independence process in Namibia. But has the situation really changed all that fundamentally?

South Africa's “glasnost”?

In most important respects the answer must be “no.” Not all political prisoners and detainees have been released; the state of emergency is still in place; organizations and individuals have not been unbanned; the troops remain in the townships. Nor have the really crucial questions - the dismantling of the pillars of apartheid and the political representation of the black people of South Africa - been even remotely addressed.

It would be a mistake to underestimate the new mood and the fresh political climate, that the releases and the marches have precipitated. Legal marches and large numbers of ANC flags in the major cities are phenomena unknown to the present generation of activists. Not surprisingly, the scent of an end to the present impasse is strong and very heady. Intangible rather than substantive? Certainly the rocky road to a post-apartheid society still disappears over the horizon. Yet the positive impact of recent developments on the morale of resistance or
organizations is important too. Why, then, have key governmental actors in South Africa taken the initiatives they have? What has begun to change the South African state?

The Nats

The Nationalist Party government has been central to the peace process in Angola and to the Namibian independence negotiations. It has also been responsible for introducing its own brand of "glasnost" into South Africa. Yet the government is not shifting ground out of the goodness of its heart. It is responding to pressures and to its own political imperatives. Three factors, in particular, explain the novel dimensions that now mark its policies.

First, there is the problem of a declining economy. A weakening currency has spelled disaster for an economy that relies decisively on the import of expensive technology, petroleum and machinery. There are numerous reasons for the decline. A reliance on mineral exports to finance other sectors of the economy has run into problems as minerals have become less important on world markets; the government's import substitution strategy has failed to industrialize the economy; apartheid policy has raised the costs of reproducing skilled labour. Moreover, there can be no doubt that this negative situation has been further exacerbated by an international sanctions campaign that has made it more expensive to get the strategic imports that fuel the economy.

It is in this situation that intensified pressure from the regime's closest western ally, the United States, has been placed on the agenda. According to some congressional sources, Pretoria has been told that it must deliver substantial changes — the better to diffuse tensions in South Africa — by early 1990. This ultimatum is being taken seriously by the new state president, F. W. de Klerk. If the regime does not move, the U.S. seems willing to impose even more punitive sanctions.

Margaret Thatcher, too, will be expecting a quid pro quo for going out on a limb to defend the South African government at the Commonwealth conference in Kuala Lumpur. Clearly, the need to lessen international pressure and to stave off further sanctions has played a major role in deciding the government to embark on a course of internal and external policy adjustments.

Second, there are the regional realities. South Africa's role in the southern African region has been characterized by its military and economic bullying of its neighbours. It has destabilized Mozambique by funding "contra" forces there and it has occupied southern Angola, alongside its UNITA allies; more generally, it has applied economic pressure throughout the region when it saw fit to do so. More recently, its ability to continue its military adventures has been severely constrained by a shift in the regional military balance of power.

In the past, South Africans have boasted they could march easily from the Cape to Cairo. This myth was shattered by the defeat they suffered in the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, in southern Angola. There, South Africa lost air superiority as its aging French Mirage jets could not cope with the Angolans' newer and more mobile Soviet MIG jets. In this respect the arms embargo had worked. And the costs, in terms of personnel and materiel as well as in morale, were becoming too high for the South Africans. This was a key factor in its entering into negotiations with the Cubans and the Angolans.

The Home Front

Finally, there was the domestic political situation. Inside South African ruling circles, it was generally understood that security forces had defeated the attempted insurrection of the mid-1980s. Thousands of activists were detained or went into hiding and their organizational networks were disrupted. Yet what the security forces had achieved was only a momentary and sullen acquiescence. The internal movement had not demobilized politically and, at the first opportunity, was able to re-mobilize its forces.

There were two reasons for the government's inability to permanently smash opposition. However successfully it might use repression, its strategy did not provide the kind of credible political programme that could win over significant black constituencies. Equally important, and despite the initial disarray of the resistance movement in the face of escalating repression, enough of a tradition of resistance had been built up to provide continuing political coherence to the opposition forces. This tradition was lent substance on the ground by the resilient trade union movement that continued to struggle despite fierce harassment. In short, the South African authorities could not deliver, by means of the security forces-led "total strategy," a political settlement sufficiently stable and credible to keep international pressure at bay. It began to seem that such authorities had to go further than ever before. They had to deal, in one way or another, with the ANC and the other forces of resistance.

However, the South African state is not about to roll over and die. It may not have a clear and coherent strategy, but it still has a strong security system. Its repressive tactics, brutal and sophisticated though they are, can still be extended to the extreme forms known in some Latin American countries. In the region South Africa remains an economic and military superpower. This is a state that has a great deal of experience in the world of realpolitik and, despite the military setback of Cuito Cuanavale, has accomplished much of what it wanted to in the region. The success of destabilization in Mozambique and Angola means that these countries will now be primarily concerned with rebuilding their shattered economies and
not with confronting South Africa over its internal policies. Similarly hamstrung are the other Frontline states which remain vulnerable to economic and other more overtly coercive acts directed against them from South Africa. As for Namibia, no matter who is in power there, the country is so dependent upon South Africa that it will have little room to manoeuvre.

South Africa’s continuing strength in the region has meant problems for the ANC. Its military bases have had to be relocated to Ethiopia and Tanzania from Angola, for example. Other Frontline states have also begun to scale down the ANC presence in their countries, marking a return to the regional situation that existed at the time of the Rhodesian rebel colony and colonial presence of the Portuguese. These realities have helped shape South Africa’s new, apparently more flexible, policies in the region. But what are the implications domestically? What of the role of the ANC, weakened with respect to its rear bases, but now so prominent an actor inside South Africa?

Has the ANC changed?
Key players must deal with the ANC. Its current domestic profile demonstrates, once again, that it represents the dominant political tradition within South Africa and that there can be no legitimate political resolution of South Africa’s crisis without it. Yet, faced with a changing terrain, the ANC has also chosen to take a number of policy decisions that have made it easier for the South African government, other white South African constituencies and western countries to deal with it.

Thus one of the ANC’s major policy planks, as signalled in the Freedom Charter, was the nationalization of the commanding heights of the economy. In recent years, however, it has said that nationalization will not be on the agenda for at least a generation. Similarly, at its 1985 consultative conference held in Zambia at the height of South Africa’s insurrectionary phase, the ANC decided to intensify the people’s war so as to make South Africa ungovernable. It pledged itself to avoid all contact with the South African government until the State President was prepared to discuss the total elimination of apartheid.

Now, although the ANC has not renounced violence, its armed attacks have declined considerably in the past year. Some militants have even become uneasy with calls by the recently-released Walter Sisulu for restraint and discipline so as not to jeopardize the release of Nelson Mandela. An emphasis upon non-
violent protest has also been echoed by other leading members of the Mass Democratic Movement. Moreover, in the latter’s call for the normalization of the political terrain so that all political parties can operate in an unfettered manner, there is no specific call for the dismantling of apartheid as a precondition for negotiations on the country’s future.

If there is a change in the ANC’s orientation towards the politics of negotiation, what has produced it? The most crucial pressure has come from the ANC’s long-time ally, the Soviet Union. In the era of perestroika and glasnost, Soviet foreign policy has been one of unprecedented cooperation with the west in the interests of de-escalating regional conflicts. The Soviet Union seeks to persuade the ANC to place less reliance on the armed struggle and more on the strategy of negotiation. Of course, the new image of the Soviet Union makes it difficult for South Africa to call up the usual communist bogey to mobilize whites and draw western support.

The west also seems a little more inclined to step forward and embrace a “reasonable” ANC — provided the movement further cleans up its image. As the ANC steps up its international offensive, it may be finding greater reason than ever to conform to such pressures.

South Africa’s pacts of “peace” and “non-aggression” it has signed throughout southern Africa, have forced Frontline states to scale down the presence of ANC military and other personnel in their territory. This makes it all the more difficult for the ANC to continue an effective guerilla war while also predisposing the Frontline states to accept a negotiated settlement with South Africa.

To be fair, the South African state’s curbing of the insurrectionary phase by means of its successive states of emergency also underscored the difficulties of achieving national liberation through armed struggle, at least in the short term. It may also have convinced some sectors within the ANC that hoping to force some absolutely straightforward transfer of power was out of the question. That would have strengthened the hand of those in the movement committed to a more measured strategy of diplomacy and negotiation. Time alone will tell if this is indeed the case, and whether such a strategy can bear fruit.

It bears emphasizing that the ANC enters this phase of the ongoing South African struggle holding the political and moral high-ground and with a vast measure of popular support, particularly in the black community.

Quo vadis?
The coalescence of all these factors has meant that both the ANC and the South African government have had to modify their agendas. Yet despite that, there remain major questions to be resolved before anything remotely like a solution to the South African question can be realized.

For its part, the South African government remains committed to group rights. Nor is the notion of “group rights” to be understood as merely signifying the desire by whites, particularly the Afrikaners, to retain their cultural and linguistic identities. In the three centuries of white domination of the subcontinent, there has been a considerable accumulation of wealth and privilege in the white community. Any constitution premised on group rights (and juxtaposed, as it so often is, with the bogeyman of “majority — read black — tyranny”) would be intended to safeguard privilege by hamstringing any subsequent majority-rule government.

With this kind of bottom-line to its bargaining position, the South African government may want to stay in the negotiation mode for a considerable period. It was able to delay the independence of Namibia for a very long time indeed. There is, of course, no guarantee that such a government won’t revert to even more brutal forms of repression. All the more reason to use the carrot of “negotiations” in order to buy time for the attempt to mend its ailing economy.

For its part, the ANC — after nearly a century of struggles — badly wants a resolution to the political impasse. It cannot afford to compromise too much on the group rights issue. White privilege would remain, an outcome unlikely to be acceptable to the vast majority of black people who envisage a society more equal both politically and economically.

What is the ANC to do? The South African state has not been defeated and still retains considerable strength: the negotiation process (still very much at the stage of negotiations about negotiations, in any case) is not yet one between equal participants. Moreover, the international pressure seems to have been rather more on the ANC than on the South African government to reach an agreement. Yet if the ANC is forced to concede too much, it will not be able to sell the agreement to its own constituency.

A recipe for disaster, perhaps. Yet is there indeed another way open to the ANC in the present juncture? There are proposals, coming in particular from the trade union movement, regarding the question of negotiations. To avoid a deal that is not, in fact, acceptable to the majority of Africans, some trade unions are proposing a greater role for the Mass Democratic Movement.

The argument for giving priority to the strengthening of the mass movement is based on two premises. Firstly, it will underpin more effective resistance and thus force the state into further compromises. Secondly, it will facilitate a process of consultation with the base of the mass movement and with the many mass organizations that exist on the ground in South Africa. In consequence, both the ANC and the South African government will be constrained to listen carefully to what the South African people have to say.
Rescheduling Apartheid

BY ALAN HIRSCH


The news in October that the South African government had come to an agreement with its creditors to reschedule short-term debts came as a severe blow to many in the international anti-apartheid movement. Once more it seemed South Africa had outmanoeuvred the forces against it - and just in time to avoid the brunt of financial sanctions campaigns planned by the Commonwealth and the African National Congress. Trevor Huddleston, president of the British Anti-Apartheid movement, called the agreement "tragic news."

However the picture is not as good for South Africa or as bad for the anti-apartheid movement as it might seem. South Africa is undoubtedly in a stronger position than it would have been without a rescheduling agreement. However it is also clear that future financial sanctions remain a powerful tool for pressure. The rescheduling battle may be lost but new credits can still be cut off causing severe disruption to the beleaguered South African economy. As we shall see, South Africa is still extremely vulnerable to interruption to its supply of capital from abroad.

The debt crisis

The South African state likes to boast that it has "the strongest economy on the continent," but like its African neighbours the apartheid regime is weighed down by a serious debt crisis. The crisis hit in 1985 and created a turning point for the South African economy. In the past, when the economy slipped, South Africa could rely on inflows of capital once the economy rebounded. But in 1985 three years of minimal growth followed hard upon a major political upheaval, the township revolt of 1984. The result was a qualitative shift in the attitude of both foreign bankers and investors, as well as of local capitalists. There would be no major influx of foreign capital until the South African economy began to improve - and until the government proved it had a longer term solution to the political crisis. Anti-apartheid activists recognized the political potential of the debt crisis early on.

"Anything that could force big businessmen like Gavin Relly [head of Anglo-American] to rush off to Lusaka and speak with the ANC," noted Archbishop Tutu "had to be powerful."

As early as October 1985, Tutu, with fellow churchmen Alan Boesak and Bayers Naudé, wrote a letter to all the creditor banks asking them not to reschedule South African debts until there had been a democratic transfer of power. Tutu has since acknowledged that the demand was idealistic. But it was a critical intervention in that it politicized the debt crisis. The banks were forced to ask the South African government for some political concessions before they were able to sign a debt-rescheduling agreement in March of 1986.

The South African government and the banks made a deal to reschedule payment of about $14 billion short-term debt - the immediate cause of the crisis. Trade credits and debt incurred for longer than one year were not included in the agreements. The South African government agreed to abolish the pass laws and end the state of emergency - temporarily, as it turned out. No further repayments on the short-term debt would be required till the end of June 1987.

When South Africa's debt crisis struck many local economists believed that the cause was mismanagement by the South African Reserve Bank. They claimed that the Bank was not adequately supervising foreign exchange transactions. Private banks were blamed for excessive foreign borrowing. The rand had also declined dramatically in value. But it was expected that after a few years of strict balance of payments management the economy would return to normal - the capital account (the long- and short-term flows of capital in and out of the country in the form of loans and investments) would balance off current account deficits (payments for merchandise trade as well as the flow of payments for interest, travel, royalty and management fees, etc).

Yet these hopes have been dashed: four years after the 1985 debt standstill, the South African economy continues to hemorrhage capital, preventing adequate economic expansion.

When the time came to negotiate a second rescheduling package in 1987, the repressive actions of the South African government against opposition groups and the press had moved South Africa from the centre stage of world politics. With South Africa off the front pages, loan institutions could offer more lenient rescheduling terms. The second agreement allowed the repayment of a maximum of eight percent of the debt over a three year period, plus interest.

Had new foreign capital begun to enter South Africa at this point, the second agreement might have been the basis for the stabilization of South Africa's position in international financial markets. Instead little new capital came in and South African capital fled. Some people took their money out legally
as foreign investments or through sanctions-busting arrangements but at least as much as fifteen percent abandoned the country illegally through foreign exchange fraud.

In all, South Africa has lost more than R25 billion in the four years since the debt crisis, and there is no sign yet that the money drain is slowing.

In an effort to balance its capital account problems the government has been forced to cut imports and slow down domestic spending. This is accomplished through restrictive monetary policies, export promotion and use of the low rand. This has brought about declining living standards for white South Africans who now worry about the ability of apartheid to hold the economy together.

The financial sanctions campaign

Anti-apartheid organizations saw the potential in South Africa’s economic dilemma. European anti-apartheid organizations like the British-based “End Loans to Apartheid” and the German “Kein Geld fur Apartheid” made the debt crisis the focus of their campaigns, targeting domestic lenders to South Africa for popular action. In the United States, a powerful student/church/pressure group alliance (the Free South Africa Movement) spurred city and county governments to withdraw accounts from banks that loaned money to South Africa. Campaigns were backed up by unusually thorough research, notably by church-funded CANNICOR Research in San Francisco.

Governments also took up the campaign for financial sanctions. Following South Africa’s rejection of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group initiative, the Commonwealth stuck with the idea of negotiating with the apartheid regime. But, with the notable exception of Britain, member countries also decided to apply pressure on South Africa through sanctions. The biennial Commonwealth Heads of Government held in Vancouver in 1987 gave special attention to the use of financial sanctions, setting up an expert committee to investigate strategies, and a special nine-member committee of foreign ministers to look at ways of resolving the South Africa problem.

In August 1988 the Commonwealth foreign ministers endorsed a report on financial sanctions that was then revised by Tony Cole and Keith Ovenden. The report called for the imposition of stringent conditions by the banks in upcoming rescheduling negotiations. It also demanded a consolidation of the ban on medium to long-term loans, the establishment of an expert agency to monitor lending to South Africa. Governments were to encourage financial institutions to withhold insurance cover for trade credits and to limit those credits to 90 days. There was a recognition that the scope for pressuring South Africa through the rescheduling negotiations was limited; in the last instance, the banks would act in their own interests and that meant getting their money back. They would not drive South Africa to default.

The Cole report was to be taken up at the mid-1989 meeting of the foreign ministers and was to receive
final study at the October meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government in Kuala Lumpur. South Africa had been watching the Commonwealth process carefully, and with the second rescheduling agreement due to expire in June 1990, was feeling the pressure. On the eve of the Kuala Lumpur conference eight and a half months before the current agreement lapsed, South Africa announced to the world that an agreement had been reached. Short-term debts had been rescheduled with relatively lenient interest rates until the end of 1993.

For those who may have believed that blocking the rescheduling was feasible and could bring down the government, the agreement is a bitter blow. But the thrust of many financial sanctioners was not to block the agreement but to cut off new credits. The Commonwealth had in any case planned to emphasize other measures proposed by Cole and Ovenden – to focus on trade credits and to establish an “independent agency to review and report on South Africa’s international link…”

The foreign ministers will meet again in April 1990 with a view to exerting further pressure on South Africa.

The new rescheduling agreement

In addition to the possibility of new financial sanctions there are other reasons not to see the latest rescheduling agreement as too serious a setback. The agreement does looks generous to South Africa, but in the context of a continuing capital drain, repayment remains a heavy burden for the South African economy. Like the first two agreements, only South Africa’s short-term debts, excluding trade credits, are rescheduled. Long term debt remains a problem and one which is getting worse. Ever since 1985 a declining proportion of South Africa’s debt has been subject to rescheduling options.

A very serious debt crunch will come next year when term debts worth at least $2 billion fall due. Of that, about $900 million consists of bearer bonds which are impossible to rollover without the provision of new credit. If all the debt now due next year is repaid, South Africa will need, in the absence of capital inflows, a balance of payments surplus of about R6.7 billion. Achieving a R4 billion surplus in 1989 has meant real economic pain in the form of very high interest rates, yet even worse medicine will be needed next year.

In the years ahead, similar burdens will weigh on the South African economy, if not as heavily. In the worst case scenario (i.e. no new trade credits) presented by the South African Minister of Finance, South Africa would have to repay $8 billion over the next four years.

The finance ministry is certainly far from complacent. It has opened three new offices abroad, most recently an office in Hong Kong this past August. Even more recently the propaganda war entered a new plane when the ministry confirmed that it had hired a prominent liberal opposition journalist, Bruce Cameron, political correspondent of the Daily News, “to inform people of the situation in South Africa, dealing mainly with the financial media in Europe.”

If South Africa manages to roll over some of its longer term debts, or obtain new trade credits, the burden will be lightened. However, in the absence of significant new capital inflows, the only way South Africa will pay the debt is through constraining domestic consumption and growth – which would put the apartheid regime in severe political danger.

Next step forward

The power of the financial sanctions initiative was dramatically underlined recently by the partial easing of security measures and the release of eight very senior political prisoners. However the October rescheduling agreement clearly points to the conclusion that in its efforts to bring economic pressure to bear on South Africa, the international anti-apartheid movement can never pin too much hope on the banks. Banks are motivated by commercial, not political concerns.

Nevertheless there is reason for optimism. As long as South Africa faces the worst-case scenario sketched by the Finance Minister, economic life in South Africa will be uncomfortable, and the economic sector will be a source of pressures for change. Anti-apartheid activists can still work to stop new credit entering South Africa. But the campaign seems more likely to succeed if we focus on obtaining governmental measures at national and local levels rather than try to directly influence individual banks.
Beating Around the Bush

BY JIM CASON & MICHAEL FLESHMAN

During a talk at the State Department last June, Secretary of State James Baker was asked to identify policy failures under former President Ronald Reagan's tenure: "Central America and southern Africa" he is reported to have said without a pause.

For Baker, defeat in Central America and southern Africa came when Congress forced a reluctant Reagan administration to cut back on aid to the Nicaraguan contras and overrode President Reagan's veto of limited sanctions in 1986. James Baker set out to make sure that Congress and the President would not find themselves at odds again.

In the first nine months of the Bush administration Baker and his Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Herman "Hank" Cohen spent long hours on Capitol Hill meeting with the Congressional Black Caucus, House and Senate Liberals and their conservative allies. This strategy seems to have paid off.

Although a strong comprehensive sanctions bill was introduced in the Congress in March, many of the bill's sponsors talked more of giving Bush a chance and not upsetting the Namibian independence process than of moving ahead with their own legislation.

For its part, the administration instituted a major review of South Africa policy and George Bush met with Desmond Tutu, Allan Boesak and Beyers Naudé as well as with a delegation from the United Democratic Front led by Albertina Sisulu. Bush also contemplated a meeting with then National Party leader F. W. de Klerk, but it was cancelled because of Congressional opposition.

Soweto Day anti-apartheid demonstration, Washington, D.C., June 1989
This policy contrasts sharply with the first nine months of Ronald Reagan's administration, in which the President managed to defend South Africa's white leadership by rhetorically asking "How can we abandon our old friends, who have stood beside us in two world wars," his UN Ambassador met with senior South African intelligence officials, and his Chief Africa Policy official declared that "in South Africa ... it is not our task to choose between black and white."

The style is certainly different, but what of the basis of the policy? The situation in southern Africa in 1989 has changed dramatically from that of 1981 (and the impact of these changes has been well chronicled for readers of SAR), but how does this administration approach policy toward South Africa?

The first formal presentation of the administration's South Africa policy came in a report to Congress this October that is part of the requirements of the 1985 Anti-Apartheid Act.

"Despite recent positive signs," states the report, "we are unable to report tangible progress towards the end of apartheid." And although the report notes "reasons for hope" as a result of the election of de Klerk, it goes on to state "There is no indication thus far that the South African government is considering ... fundamental change."

Perhaps most surprising, the administration stated that "sanctions have played a role in stimulating new thinking within the white power structure."

The administration then goes on to tell Congress "that further sanctions are not needed at this time and would be counterproductive in view of steps beginning to be taken within South Africa and the region to bring about change through peaceful means."

The policy that is needed, according to the administration, at points sounds suspiciously like Constructive Engagement: "U.S. willingness to stay involved in South Africa and to facilitate dialogue among South Africans is the best approach to helping South Africans peacefully resolve their country's profound political problems at the present time."

The principles underlying this policy are outlined in the report as follows:

- A commitment to end apartheid and to fundamental political change, leading to a non-racial, democratic South Africa.
- Assistance to black South Africans active U.S. diplomacy to resolve conflicts and support economic development in southern Africa.
- Consultation with our allies.
- Working with Congress to develop a bipartisan approach toward southern Africa.

The only new item on this list is working with Congress. Otherwise these principles have been the basis for U.S. policy for some years. Ronald Reagan himself outlined essentially the same principles in a 1986 speech to the World Affairs Council.

In fact the similarities can sometimes be quite startling. One State Department official, asked this August about prospects for change in South Africa, told us "Our best hope lies with de Klerk. I know you don't want to hear this, but really our best hope for change lies with F. W." Not a much different analysis from then Ambassador Herman Nickel's 1983 analysis that "Whites will determine the pace of change until the year 2000."

The U.S. government still believes that the initiative for change should lie, must lie, with the South African government itself and that, although sanctions may have helped push the government this far, new sanctions would be counterproductive. Assistant Secretary Cohen told a Senate Committee this October: "I believe the newly elected political leaders of the white minority understand fully the necessity for a political settlement, and are developing a strategy for negotiations. It would be appropriate therefore to allow that leadership reasonable time to demonstrate - mindful of outside expectations but without increased outside pressure at the present time - the will, the capability, and the courage to launch the dismantling of apartheid on an inevitable course."

Perhaps the most interesting articulation of this new policy comes from what Secretary Baker said to Pik Botha during their meeting in Rome last May. Baker told the South African Foreign Minister: "It's very important that after you have your elections and your new administration is put into place that you move quickly to implement your party platform that you are running on - which is the dismantling of apartheid. You must do it quickly, because if you don't pressures will build for more sanctions in the Congress and among the people of the United States and indeed other countries of the world."

Secretary Baker, and many others in the U.S. government, believe that the National Party's Five Year Plan (released last June) is a blueprint for change and a program for abolishing apartheid. By accepting this plan as a basis, the U.S. government is accepting a program that still embodies the notion of "group rights." The ANC's Thabo Mbeki has noted that the Five Year Plan uses the term "group rights" 39 times. "They are saying," says Mbeki, "any change ought to proceed from the notion of groups or group rights, which is simply a restatement of an old apartheid position."

Equally important for Secretary Baker is the analysis that without significant change the administration may face pressure for new sanctions from Congress. (Some elements in the U.S. government also believe that it was the South African government's inability to institute significant reforms that helped fuel the uprisings in 1985/86.) For these
reasons, Baker is pressing hard for some concessions from Pretoria.

In some ways the Bush strategy is a consolidation of policy shifts that began back in 1986 when government policymakers became aware, with the dramatic rise of black resistance, that the pace of change was not being determined by the white government alone. True, such policymakers never abandoned their underlying premise regarding the necessary priority to be attached to the role of the white government within South Africa’s policy-making process. But faced with some kind of revolutionary threat they did become more pressingly aware of the urgent need for further change—albeit change that should be introduced in a very controlled way—the better to preempt an escalating and unpredictable confrontation. It was then that U.S. policy analysts began talking of negotiations. This shift was enunciated by a bipartisan policy commission, established by then Secretary of State George Shultz, which in a 1987 report declared that constructive engagement had “failed to achieve its objective.” The report recommended that the U.S. government’s first priority should be to facilitate “good faith” negotiations between the South African government and “representative leaders of the black majority.”

The cornerstone of the Bush administration’s policy is seizing the initiative for negotiations. As part of this strategy the administration recognizes that part of the pressure building on South Africa comes from the government’s intransigence. Thus the U.S. is demanding that F. W. de Klerk make some initial moves to establish good faith conditions for negotiations. In October, Assistant Secretary Cohen told Congress that the administration supported certain minimum conditions to establish a climate for negotiations:

- The release of all political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu and the return of political exiles;
- Lifting the state of emergency and associated restrictions on political activity and freedom of association for the black opposition;
- The unbanning of all political organizations, including the ANC, and an end to violence from all sources.

These conditions are similar to the guidelines established by the ANC and endorsed by the OAU in August. (One difference is the administration’s insertion of the call for an end to violence as a precondition for the beginning of negotiations.)

Thus the goal of U.S. policy in the next period is “meaningful negotiations.” The Bush administration is prepared to publicly press P. W. de Klerk to make concessions so these negotiations can begin. At the same time, the administration is also working hard to press the African National Congress to sit down at the negotiation table. “The ANC has to be careful not to be left behind in this process,” one high-ranking policy maker told us.

By defining the goal of U.S. policy as the beginning of meaningful negotiations the administration has shifted the frame of reference from
ending apartheid to beginning negotiations.

Less clear is exactly what timetable the administration proposes for this process. "I hate to set deadlines for very complex situations," says Cohen who has argued at different times for a timetable of anywhere from six months to two years. He has suggested that by the time the next South Africa parliamentary session ends – about June 1990 – he would hope that significant progress would have been made. And not surprisingly Cohen has adamantly refused to discuss possible further sanctions saying such action would be inappropriate at this time.

What the administration has been eager to suggest is possible "carrots" that might be offered even before "meaningful negotiations" begin, perhaps once the state of emergency is lifted and political prisoners are released.

Most troubling for anti-apartheid activists, are recent reports in Business Day that at least some elements in Congress have accepted the administration's argument that if "meaningful negotiations" begin then all sanctions should be lifted. Thus negotiations are established as an end goal.

When Congress adjourned for the year in late November, a powerful group of House Democrats and Republicans had already drafted a new proposal that incorporates many of Cohen's arguments.

According to the article in Business Day, the Congressional strategy does set some deadlines by which de Klerk must meet certain demands. Thus if de Klerk releases all political prisoners, removes restrictions on political activity and ends the state of emergency, then Congress proposes that the U.S. lift the ban on direct air flights to South Africa and Bush invite de Klerk to visit the White House.

If Pretoria also begins "meaningful negotiations ... in the context of a suspension of violence by the government and the military or paramilitary arms of opposition political movements," Congress would lift all the sanctions contained in the 1986 Anti-Apartheid Act.

The Congressional plan also suggests that if de Klerk doesn't take at least some of these actions by February 1990, then Congress might consider applying new sanctions such as imposing further restrictions on financial transactions. Specifically ruled out from the new package of sanctions are any legislation demanding disinvestment or oil sanctions.

For the U.S. anti-apartheid movement the administration's ability to sell Congress on a bipartisan strategy that gives de Klerk time could pose serious problems. The strength of the movement in this country is not in back room negotiations in Washington, but rather in the network of grassroots activists around the country that have been able to generate local pressure that translates into national action. At the same time the administration's responsiveness to Congressional pressure means the movement could impact policy through pressure on Congress, as it did in 1986.

Anti-apartheid activists are waging strong local campaigns for divestment actions in cities that range from Austin, Texas and Madison, Wisconsin to Miami, Florida and Seattle, Washington. Some groups have been pressing for financial sanctions and the comprehensive sanctions bill, introduced by California Rep. Ron Dellums, is still pending before Congress. But at this time there isn't strong, coordinated national pressure for sanctions.

Domestic pressure for new Congressional action was partly stalled this year by the unfolding Namibian independence process, but in part the lack of national pressure is a carry over of the generally lower levels of national anti-apartheid activity since 1986 that have been much discussed in S.A.R.

What is clear is that building pressure for national sanctions requires sustained campaigns built up over long periods of time. Talk of postponing sanctions or "giving de Klerk time" can serve to undermine efforts building pressure for sanctions. This leaves the initiative almost entirely in Washington circles, where anti-apartheid activists have little direct leverage.

It was perhaps partly a recognition of this danger that led some church and labor leaders in South Africa to issue a statement in late October calling for "effective and comprehensive sanctions." Foreseeing a stampede away from sanctions if de Klerk initiates so-called reforms or negotiations, they went a significant step further, calling for intensified sanctions until certain goals have been achieved including "the drawing up and adopting of a new constitution by a democratically elected constituent assembly."

The Bush administration's new policy initiatives present both new challenges and new opportunities for anti-apartheid activists. The administration's overtures to the democratic movement could help to open political space inside South Africa, a fact that was exploited by the UDF when the delegation that met Bush last June included a number of prominent activists that had been forced to operate clandestinely for the last few years. Activists in the United States need to publicize the strategies and gains of the democratic movement in South Africa, building an educated U.S. movement that can help to further support the southern Africa movement and open up more political space.

But at least, at this point in time, pressure through sanctions remains one of the strongest weapons available to international activists. The Bush administration's new version of engaging with the white minority government will test the U.S. movement's ability to build strong grassroots pressure.
When we became a South African company we could have just changed our name.

A Ruse By Any Other Name

BY JOHN PICKLES & JEFF WOODS

John Pickles and Jeff Woods teach and research in the Department of Geology and Geography, Regional Research Institute, West Virginia University.

The divestment of American companies from South Africa has occurred rapidly since 1985. In January 1985, 300 U.S. companies operated in South Africa, but by May 1989 only 130 remained. While the anti-apartheid movement and disinvestment campaigns in North America and elsewhere were vital in pushing many companies to withdraw from South Africa, by the mid-1980s the economic conditions in South Africa had deteriorated to such an extent that companies were already looking for ways of stepping back from their South African commitments. However, few companies have been willing to forego their market entirely.

Many companies simply reorganized their business relationships, withdrawing from local production in favour of South African owned companies, but maintaining marketing and technical agreements to ensure their positions in the South African market and protecting their potential re-entry into South Africa under more favourable economic circumstances. Other companies have been less complete in their withdrawal. Many have switched operations to a local affiliate and at the same time have obtained a great deal of publicity for their moral stance in withdrawing.

Often withdrawal was not the most straightforward matter portrayed in the South African and Western press. The most graphic recent example of these ambiguous “withdrawal scenarios” is the case of Control Data Corporation. The American Chamber of Commerce in South Africa lists companies that have disinvested from South Africa. In October 1988 Control Data was listed as a company that had disinvested. The headlines of a two page advertisement in The Financial Mail, shortly after, puts one aspect of this “disinvestment mirage” into perspective and challenges anew the international disinvestment campaign to be vigilant in its attempt to foster more responsible corporate investment policies, and to continue to link disinvestment with international sanctions.
Zimbabwe celebrates its tenth anniversary of independence in April 1990. Following hard on the heels of an event that is traditionally one of national stock-taking, Zimbabweans will go to the polls in their second post-independence general election. All of a sudden, the people—their concerns and their votes—have become important again. Opinion-makers are scrambling to catch up with, and cash in on, popular sentiment. How do people feel about their leaders? What model of economic development do they believe is best for them?

The country is in serious economic crisis. This crisis, moreover, is the result of the development strategy pursued by the Zanu(PF) government of Robert Mugabe since independence.

In the 1980s the economy expanded through boom-bust cycles, exacerbated by periods of severe drought. Because of the productive capacity of the relatively well-integrated local industrial infrastructure, Zimbabwe has so far been able to afford some celebrated advances in the provision of social services. Primary education is universal and “free” (uniforms, books, and so on are not provided).

The country still spends more on educating its youth than on any other single budget item, including the defence funds which support a war against Renamo in Mozambique, with perhaps 15,000 troops and its air force committed to duty. In addition, the government has made huge steps since 1980 in the provision of health, agricultural and other essential services to the people.

Inflationary impact
But inflationary pressures have also had a serious impact on the real incomes and living standards for ordinary workers and small-scale farmers. These have declined over the decade, to levels below those of the late 1970s. As Zimbabwe's debt servicing payments hover around 30 percent, public funds have been diverted to paying off the foreign loans accrued at independence in the name of initial reconstruction and development schemes. A severe shortage of available foreign exchange has meant the deterioration of a whole range of facilities directly impacting on the ordinary person, like mass transit and public housing schemes. Utilized capacity in industry has also been dropping, with shortages of spares and inputs requiring hard cash purchase.

Nonetheless, particularly in comparison to its neighbours, the Zimbabwean economy is fairly well developed, internally integrated and distinctly market-based. Where there has been state intervention, it has been in ways that would be quite at home in Canada and other western countries. The state has assumed control of businesses or public services without transforming the logic of their operation in the process. There has been no large scale expropriation or nationalization of industry and agriculture.

This refusal to pursue a “radical” economic policy reflects decisions made very early by the Zanu(PF) leadership in the transition to independence. From the beginning, Zanu(PF) compromised with the “economic reality” of the old order, not only because of ideological weakness but also because independent Zimbabwe was plagued by skills shortages, nervous white investment capital, and South African destabilization. Apartheid alone is estimated to have cost the country US $1.4 billion in its first six years.

The result is that most Zimbabwean capital, particularly in the big foreign exchange earning areas
of mining and commercial farming, has remained in the hands of a small white (with now, a smattering of black) elite, and foreign corporate interests. In an effort to develop the economic infrastructure, Zanu(PF) has tended to emphasize the importance of foreign investment in the country.

Globally uncompetitive

Yet it has also maintained the Rhodesian-imposed restrictions on investments (remittance of earnings, price controls, etc.) and so Zimbabwe is still an uncompetitive candidate in the global investment sweepstakes. Not surprisingly, there has been very little significant foreign investment in the country since 1980, the most notable exception being the Heinz vegetable and canning operations, and virtually nothing since 1986.

Nonetheless, the government continues to pin hopes for the nation's development on an influx of investment. Practically, the whole thrust of self-reliance and production at the local level has become more of a side-show, while the main emphasis has been placed on larger manufacturing, mining and farming concerns. It is these sources which provide the government with the foreign exchange it desperately and increasingly needs to pay off its rising debt overseas.

At the same time the state has mounted pressure on wage labourers in particular and common consumers in general, in a bid to cover government's local accounts and keep domestic commercial enterprise afloat. Restrictive regulations governing trade-unions, steep levels of income tax (among the world's highest), tight reins on convertibility, price and wage controls and other measures have been among the schemes adopted to keep the public and private sectors running. In addition, the government has dealt harshly with a series of public-sector strikes.

Previous failure hasn't deterred the government from continuing to court foreign investors as one key to the "self-reliant" future. The most compelling recent evidence of this came on April 18, Independence Day, when President Mugabe announced that new moves would be made to loosen controls on foreign investment regulations in order to attract capital and get the economy moving again. In this light, he added, some rethinking would have to be undertaken on the project of national development. Not coincidentally, it was also his first Independence Day speech since 1980 in which there was no mention of the oft-heralded transition to socialism, and the crucial national political struggles of the peasants and workers.

The popular response

These decisions have not been without political cost. It had been expected that the December 22, 1987 Unity Pact between the two old rivals, Zanu(PF) and (PF)Zapu, which brought the domestic problems of dissident banditry to an end and denied South Africa a certain

Women's training programme, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, 1986
leverage for destabilization, would lead to the foreclosure of most political debate and the erection of a one-party state. Remarkably, quite the opposite has happened, as the continued deterioration of living standards and attacks by the state on progressive forces, especially trade-unionists, has made people think twice about the consequences of a future one-party Zanu(PF) state.

Public questioning of the government’s direction has been facilitated by revelations of widespread corruption in the upper levels of the party and state. The April 1990 celebrations of the tenth anniversary of independence will take place exactly one year after a government commission of inquiry condemned and forced the resignation of several senior members of the government and Zanu(PF) for corruption and gross abuse of privilege.

Nor have demonstrations by students, broken up by riot police, detentions of lecturers, harassment of opposition party officials, and the closure of the University of Zimbabwe (dubbed by officials as a nest of political “hooligans”) added to the government’s popularity.

Revelations of corruption in 1988 and this year have only been the catalyst for intensified popular scrutiny of the President and his government. But the roots of the political crisis lie more deeply, in the fundamental contradiction between state rhetoric and policy. Zanu(PF) is officially a Marxist-Leninist party, guided by the principles of “scientific socialism” and dedicated to nurturing a society of “growth with equity.” In reality, of course, there is little, aside from the rhetoric, which is socialist about either the ruling party or the Zimbabwean state under its control.

Hundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans suffered during the eight-year war of independence, and as many as 30,000 died, in the belief that the benefits of land redistribution and economic rights would accrue to Africans. For the most part the war-time promises made on such issues by the liberation movements, particularly Zanu(PF), have not been met. Zimbabwe’s British-brokered constitution protects private land rights on “willing seller, willing buyer” terms until 1990, and has similar clauses relating to private capital ownership.

Development plans challenged 1990 is no longer that far away, and the old issues of land and wealth redistribution have surfaced with a vengeance as different groups have raised a challenge to the government’s development plans. This has created a significant political opening and has provided considerable manoeuvring space for the independent grass roots-based organizations that have sprouted since independence across the country.

Outside of South Africa, Zimbabwe must have one of the most thoroughly organised civil societies in Africa. It features a range of co-ops, self-help groups, school-building committees, local development councils, women’s organizations ... the list goes on and on. Much of this infrastructure sprung from the political energies unleashed by the struggle for independence.

These groups are the most committed to the ideas of national development through self-reliance and mass participation, even though important elements such as the network of collective co-operatives have teetered on the verge of financial and organizational collapse from time to time. But at the end of the first decade of independence, the groups formed around such initiatives are distant from the centres of power. At times they seem to have been pushed closer to the edge by a government that would prefer to see social capital and energy invested in extensions of the tried-and-tested

Coca-Cola in independence parade, Harare, 1985

Bruce Paton
successes of the economic "status quo."

Most of these community organizations have been severely under-funded and under-assisted by the state. As a result they rely on NGOs for support and sustenance. The overall record has not been promising. Shortages of long-term investment capital, adequate skills training and government succour have seen many community based organizations reduced to institutional shells, quite unable to participate strongly in social mobilization for development.

Political debate returns

Recent political events, however, have breathed a new political dynamism into these movements. Increasingly, and not without costs, trade unionists, collective co-operators, students and others have forced meaningful political debate back to centre stage, especially on a number of crucial issues such as land and wealth redistribution. Their emerging strategy is to question the ruling party's current claim to the mantle of Zimbabwean socialism's vanguard.

Climbing aboard the bandwagon of this loose populist convergence, one whose bottom line is widespread disgust with government corruption, is the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM). This is the vehicle of former Zanu(PF) Minister and Secretary-General, Edgar Tekere, who just a year ago was expelled from the party after mounting an unyielding attack on ministerial avarice. According to Tekere, the party leadership has "hijacked the revolution." Founded in April this year, the fledgling ZUM's other leaders remain unknown, although there is suspicion of involvement by members of Ian Smith's former Rhodesian Front Party.

The group is far from being progressive or mass oriented. In so far as it has any political programme at all, it is a hodge-podge of conservative appeals for the liberalization of the economy and rejection of "foreign ideologies." Where ZUM seems to have intellectual support (especially among students) is in the attack on the Zanu(PF) aim of establishing a one-party state.

Although it may lack either a coherent programme or a significant organized base, ZUM has raised key issues of popular interest, from the current crisis in mass-transport and urban housing to land resettlement, while pointing to the slipping, contradictory performance of the current government.

Towards the Elections

In a bid to recoup some of its losses, Zanu(PF) has once again raised the long-buried issue of land redistribution. The party has promised to correct its lack of progress on the issue when the clauses of the Constitution protecting ownership rights expire next year.

A rush order of Hungarian buses was put through, in a bid to make a dent in the gnawing mass-transport problem. Simultaneously, the government has let prices rise in a relaxation of price controls, and re-emphasized its new foreign investment code. In September Zimbabwe acceded, with considerable local fanfare, to the World Bank's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. But given the hostile reaction of trade-unionists, university students and others, the political impact of these latter moves is questionable.

As economist Colin Stone-man has recently argued, if Zimbabwe's government is to carry on like a pared-down welfare state in the context of uneven economic growth and spiralling unemployment, it is obvious that soon something somewhere will have to give. This round of political activity may well decide what that will be.

The shortage of investment capital and locally available hard currency is the main stumbling block to a range of progressive government projects touching on the lives of the people. If considerable amounts of investment capital were made available, popular pressure might compel the state to divert a part to programmes benefitting the poorer sections of Zimbabwean society. But experience makes it clear that such reliance on foreign aid will just draw Zimbabwe more tightly into the grip of international capital.

In the meantime, political tensions in the country are intensifying with the unfolding of every new chapter in the state's voluminous fiscal crisis. If the face of Zimbabwean "socialism" has been disfigured during the country's first decade, it seems clear that the contended countenance of Zimbabwean "capitalism" will be reshaped in the course of the second.
The Commonwealth is sputtering on the sports boycott as well. In Malaysia, the prime ministers made no effort to address the continuing violations of the 1977 Gleneagles Agreement, by which Commonwealth governments are committed to stop all sporting contacts with South Africa. For the first time in 24 years, the Commonwealth Games will open (in Auckland in January) without a single measure being taken to restrict further contacts. Previous Games have provided the occasion for significantly extending the isolation of apartheid sport. (See "This Budd’s Not for You," SAR, June 1986).

It’s not that further sanctions are unnecessary. In August, an international rugby tour, made up of British, Australian, and French players and officials, helped the white South African rugby board celebrate its “centennial of racist rugby.” In January, a British cricket side will tour South Africa. Just as in the economic arena, the major offender — and obstacle to further sanctions — is Britain. Despite Gleneagles, there is a constant two-way flow of British and South African athletes and officials. The Thatcher Government refuses to take any action to prevent it, on the grounds that it would be “fundamentally objectionable in a free society.” These scruples did not prevent it from threatening with dismissal those civil servants who wanted to compete in the 1980 Moscow Olympics.

During the summer, African sports leaders sought to have British and Australian athletes barred from the Auckland Games, but were stymied by the cumbersome rules governing suspension. (They were also insulted by unrepentant British sports officials, who told them that “without the motherland they cannot be called the Commonwealth Games.”) While most, if not all, of the developing countries will compete in Auckland (in part to show solidarity with the New Zealand Government and anti-apartheid movement, which have stopped virtually all New Zealand sporting exchanges with South Africa), they will do so with mounting anger over the Commonwealth’s failure to stop the continuing contacts, particularly those with the UK.

The Mulroney Government’s response to the rugby tour is just one more indication of how timid it has become on the question of sanctions. Instead of condemning the tour and addressing the ongoing Gleneagles violations, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark tried to divert attention from the issue with an ambitious plan to provide “sports aid” to the developing Commonwealth and a more representative administrative structure for the Games. He presented it to the Commonwealth Foreign Minister’s meeting in Canberra on the eve of the tour, and when provisionally accepted, claimed he had averted a walkout of the Auckland Games.

The plan itself is excellent, but it’s hardly an alternative to effective enforcement of Gleneagles and it had nothing to do with the decision by most African, Asian and Caribbean countries to compete in Auckland. Its timing has been widely resented. “Just before the Canberra meeting, External Affairs sent me a copy (of Clark’s proposal) and someone phoned me the next day for an endorsement,” one African sports leader said. “I had to tell her I was so incensed about the tour that I hadn’t even read it.” Others describe it as “guilt money” (to compensate for Victoria’s selection over India for the 1994 Games) and “insurance” (for the success of those Games).

What most disappoints third-world leaders is that Clark did not put forward the most recent Canadian policy initiative on sports contacts — the denial of entry to all South African athletes — as the basis of Commonwealth policy. If South African athletes were barred...
from British and Australian competitions (such as Wimbledon and the Australian Open, in tennis, for example), it would end most of the Australian Open, in tennis, for petitions (such as Wimbledon and from British and Australian com

South African contacts, One doubts campaign to isolate those British sure is building for an international the remaining contacts. The pres

or the non-racial sport. In concert with the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (which leads the international campaign) and the ANC, they hold out the possibility of renewed international contacts for South African sport under the banner of the anti-apartheid movement, while the isolation of the pro-apartheid sports bodies is maintained and extended.

These activities are now being conducted under the leadership of a new central federation, the National Sports Congress (NSC). Its efforts have flowered during the last six months. The NSC now enjoys the support of the largest non-racial sports bodies in the country – in soccer, cricket, and rugby – and the United Democratic Front (UDF) and Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu). In July, 475 people – not only from sports bodies, but the constituent political groups and trade unions, women’s groups, teachers’ organizations, and the churches – attended the NSC’s first national conference and hammered out policies on a wide range of issues.

During the rugby tour, the NSC mounted the most effective protest against an international team ever seen in South Africa, demonstrating against games and local branches of the sponsoring National Bank, and even confronting the players and their manager in their hotel, all with considerable publicity. In September, it started a campaign to undermine the forthcoming cricket tour, exposing as wild exaggeration the white body’s claim that touring players did some coaching in the townships. Given the NSC’s powerful international friends, neither the white bodies eager to return to international competition nor the media can afford to ignore it. It has captured much of the high ground in the public debate in a very short time.

Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, the anti-apartheid forces in sport are not completely united. To date, the NSC has not been able to negotiate a working agreement with the the South African Council on Sport (SACOS), the non-racial federation which carried the banner of the anti-apartheid campaign for many years. The differences are both ideological and strategic. Many in the SACOS leadership refuse to support the NSC’s unashamed association with the MDM and the ANC, some having strong alliances with the worker Unity Movement, others with the black consciousness Azanian People’s Organization. At the same time, they feel it premature to negotiate with the white councils and organizations and to think about international competition. They retain the slogan, “No normal sport in an abnormal society.” These very positions spurred the creation of the NSC, as many felt that they effectively blocked SACOS from any future growth, especially in the townships.

These differences will be very difficult, if not impossible to resolve. At the moment, it’s unclear whether a formal split will occur. Some SACOS affiliates have begun to discipline individual members active in the NSC, while others, including the largest, have joined the new congress as entire bodies and are pressing for renewed negotiations. It’s clear that the NSC has seized the initiative in exciting new ways, but if the two federations go their separate ways, we hope that they will remain in some form of contact and refrain from reprisals. Throughout the long struggle, there must always be room for debate and the pursuit of democratic differences.
Coming Out Against Apartheid: Gay Activist Speaks in Toronto

BY CHRIS CAVANAGH

While the Mass Democratic Movement’s Defiance Campaign was dominating the South African headlines and stealing thunder from the minority regime’s September elections, Simon Nkoli, gay black anti-apartheid activist, was spreading some of that thunder of resistance abroad. Nkoli was one of the “Delmas 22” treason trialists. In September 1984, he and 21 other UDF activists were detained and charged under the Terrorism Act for organizing resistance to rent hikes in the black townships around Johannesburg.

Acquitted of all charges one year ago, Nkoli prepared for a North American tour which took place this past summer. It concluded in Toronto where he spoke to an overflow crowd at the Eulcid Theatre on September 28. In soft-spoken and humble tone of voice, Nkoli recounted much of his experience. Though he was clearly weary from a strenuous tour, his commitment to recounting his story held him up and earned him a standing ovation.

Though Nkoli and seven others were acquitted, 11 were found guilty of terrorism and could possibly be sentenced to death. The Delmas Treason trial, the longest in South African history, was focussed on the state’s intention to prove that the UDF was a revolutionary organization which incited violence in black townships aimed at making South Africa ungovernable.

“I am shattered by the verdict,” said Archbishop Desmond Tutu. “If any of these people are sent to prison, I will not rest until I get them out. If this is treason, then I am guilty of treason.” The verdicts on the remaining trialists are currently undergoing appeal.

During his time in detention, Nkoli inspired lesbians and gay men around the world, some of whom formed support groups. These include Toronto’s Simon Nkoli Anti-Apartheid Committee (SNAAC, formed in 1986), Boston’s Gay Community News, Men of All Colors Together/NY Simon Nkoli Support Committee, the Scotland Homosexual Rights Group, the Greens in Australia and more.

Nkoli first suspected that he was gay as a teenager. When he became lovers with a twenty-two year-old white man both families were shocked. They were sent to see a psychiatrist who turned out to be sympathetic and supportive, helping both Simon and his lover accept their gayness. Nkoli joined the Gay Association of South Africa (GASA) where he had to struggle against the conservative and racist nature of that group. In an interview with Now Magazine Nkoli said: “GASA was more a social organization than a political organization. It’s not that I’m opposed to social functions. But in a society like South Africa, where people are oppressed as gay as well as for being blacks, to see an organization not doing anything made me sick.”

Since his release, Nkoli has helped to found the non-racial Gay and Lesbian Organization of Witwatersrand (GLOW), and Soweto’s first gay bar Flowing Mhlanga Rocks. Nkoli is also active in promoting education about AIDS. A goal of the tour was to raise funds for the Zulu AIDS Project which aims to produce AIDS education and prevention materials in three or more of the major languages spoken by black South Africans. Currently there is very little information on AIDS available to black South Africans. Nkoli explained that the stigma around AIDS also results in little education and publicity about AIDS amongst whites as well. The Zulu AIDS Project works with GLOW to create brochures, flyers, posters, buttons and other educational materials about AIDS for distribution within black townships.

Nkoli is a strong advocate of making the struggle against oppression of lesbians and gays as a visible part of the struggle against apartheid. “I really don’t believe in singing out issues. Everything in our country should be viewed in a political way, because gay and lesbian people are also oppressed and need to be liberated. The danger is that people in democratic or progressive (anti-apartheid) organizations are not going to accept us, because they will say to us, ‘You are fighting for gay rights.’ At the end, they will ask us where we have been, and if we say we were afraid to come out of the closet in our own (anti-apartheid) organizations, they can say, ‘Did you ask us? Did you ask our opinion?’ ”

Tim McCaskell, a member of SNAAC, says that the most important thing about Nkoli’s tour is that it has broadened the frame of anti-apartheid work to include gay and lesbian issues and people. Nkoli’s tour has demonstrated that there is a significant amount of support for anti-apartheid politics in the lesbian and gay community. “It should demonstrate to the solidarity movement here that the lesbian and gay community is an important constituency,” McCaskell said. And the tour has served to “undermine the heterosexist assumption that the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa is straight.”

Nkoli is back home in Johannesburg working with GLOW and the UDF and looking for work. SNAAC continues its work here in Toronto and can be contacted at: Box 65, Station F, Toronto, Ontario M4Y 2L4.
Readers’ Forum….
Loud Presence of World Bank in Mozambique
15 November 1989
Judith Marshall’s article “On the Ropes” (SAR, Vol. 5 No. 2) painted a bleak but, in my judgment, very accurate picture of Mozambique’s growing dependency. It tallies with my present perceptions after more than a decade linked to international cooperation in Mozambique. The loss of Mozambican control over the process creates real difficulties for those of us committed to actions of genuine solidarity. Not only does the war situation and the economic crisis make it difficult, but now that the Mozambicans are so squeezed, their own line on important issues is no longer guided by clear policy decisions. Worst of all, and related to all above, is the role of the World Bank, now not only determining and conditioning the macro-economy of Mozambique but also intervening in all sectors with a flow of papers on the situation and what should be done, followed by credit money and dollar “incentives” for key staff to prepare World Bank projects. Project Units are further set up by the World Bank within each ministry as separate structures with dollars paid to Mozambican personnel. Donor coordination conferences will increasingly find the World Bank loudly present in their proceedings.

Name withheld on request

Frontline States Issue
November 17, 1989
A personal note of thanks for the recent SAR issue on Mozambique and the Frontline states. It was thoughtful and honest. While the reality of southern Africa is painful to accept, we cannot and should not compromise our solidarity by glossing over the contradictions, problems and obstacles.

So well done! In solidarity
Stephen Allen
OXFAM, Ontario

Canada’s Anti-Apartheid Movement
continued from page 11
those who are not currently very much involved: the women’s movement, the health and education sectors, etc. Why not agree to initiate major projects and programmes with these sectors in the coming year?

• the importance of developing direct links with southern African organizations (a principle that was formulated at the creation of PAC and largely forgotten afterwards), of having active partners who represent the wide spectrum of popular organizations in the field. These should not merely remain “project recipients” or the source of “public speakers” to bring in for our various events, but real partner organizations participating in, but not imposing their views upon, the formulation of strategies and programmes. Why not agree to build a stronger network of links with South Africa along the lines of the “Backing the Front Line States” campaign, for example?

• the necessity to target sanctions.

We need to end the dialogue des sourds between advocates of “comprehensive and mandatory sanctions” and advocates of “selective sanctions.” We have to concentrate on targets, not on the basis of principle but for practical reasons, a point once again demonstrated by our failure over the debt question. Why not agree, all of us, to hit the banks hard in the next year? Why not concentrate our efforts against Shell?

• the importance of helping the ANC to gain a more prominent role in Canada. The presence of the Canadian office should be strengthened especially where it is more crucial, at the level of contacts and talks with the Canadian government.

• the need to look critically at the level and the substance of Canadian official aid to southern Africa. We could profit from some hard-hitting but well documented analysis on Canadian aid (similar to the kind of research recently done by Joe Hanlon on Western aid to Mozambique, for example).

5. There are many vehicles to facilitate discussion of these ideas and to realize our goal of regaining the initiative. The best and most readily available is still CCIC and its Inter Agency Working Group on Southern Africa. This should, of course, be improved in terms of representation and its operations.

In addition, there is now a plan for a process of consultations and discussions – the “Taking Stock” initiative – that should start early next year. It is crucially important that this process develop in such a way as to bring together the main regional networks, without excluding anyone, helping them to build their own consensus and to propose areas of discussion and strategy.

In order to do so, we will need to recognize that what is uniting all of us is more important than what is dividing us on this question of southern Africa. We will need to recognize that our diversity and even our relative fragmentation can be positive factors – as long as we are able to build a strategic consensus regarding certain common objectives around which we can group this broad movement.
Despite the dramatic advances made in southern Africa over the past decade and a half—the overthrow of the Portuguese empire, the fall of Smith's Rhodesia, the revival of the resistance movement inside South Africa itself—difficult times continue there. The reasons are many, but most important among them is the role of the apartheid state: active in the aggressive and barbaric destabilization of its neighbours, relentless in the repression, under the terms of its country-wide Emergency regulations, of those seeking democratic advance inside South Africa. This book will help the reader further to understand the struggle for southern Africa, identifying forces for positive change and those that resist such change, examining in depth such key countries as Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa itself.

John Saul also takes seriously the broader terms in which many of those battling against racial oppression in southern Africa have cast their efforts. Such activists understand racial oppression to be tightly intertwined with the structure of capitalist exploitation; in consequence, they see the realization of socialist goals as the necessary underpinning for a genuine transformation of the semi-colonial and racial-capitalist systems that afflict the region. Situating this aspiration within the broader debate about the nature of socialism and its relevance to Africa, John Saul seeks to determine the actual socialist content of the struggle for southern Africa. In doing so, he provides a hard and helpful look at both the theoretical underpinnings and the concrete practices of governing parties and liberation movements there.