CLOSING GROUND?
Frontline in Crisis

MOZAMBIQUE
ON THE ROPES:
Socialism & the 5th Congress

NAMIBIA
NO EASY TRANSITION:
Namibia on the Eve

ANGOLA
THE SAVIMBI SHUFFLE

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Losing Ground?

"It was the best of times, it was the worst of times ... it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair; we had everything before us, we had nothing before us ... " So wrote Charles Dickens of another revolutionary epoch, one long antedating the present struggle to define the future of southern Africa. Yet this latter struggle, too, seems to give off contradictory signals.

Earlier this year, for example, Southern Africa REPORT spoke in an editorial of "hard times in southern Africa," of a movement in South Africa "stalemated, however temporarily, by the State of Emergency," of frontline states "increasingly drained of their progressive promise by destabilization and the crushing embrace of such arms of western capital as the IMF." Now, only a few months later, the picture appears more mixed, bleaker in certain important respects, but also promising in ways that few observers would then have dared to predict.

For hope we can turn to South Africa itself, the very heart of the darkness that enshrouds the southern African region. Effective mass resistance - centred around the assertions of the "Mass Democratic Movement" - has been revitalized in that country. The MDM has once again made the need for change - not mere repression - a crucial issue inside South Africa. In doing so, it has also placed the apartheid question more firmly back on the international agenda.

Repression had not succeeded, in any case, in completely crushing either the spirit of resistance in South Africa or crucial elements of the organizational infrastructure created by the broad popular movement since the mid-1970s. But this year, from the dramatic hunger strikes, through the growing public defiance of apartheid laws, to the massive demonstration against September's racially inequitable elections, the movement built momentum. It thus recaptured much of the initiative it had lost in the past few years.

An even more greatly intensified repression was part of the state's re-
spouse. But with the world watching – not least of all those international bankers whose loans come due next year – it could not be its only response. Moreover, the mass of the South African people had given firm notice that, even in the teeth of the state’s crackdown, they would not passively acquiesce in their continued disenfranchisement.

The upshot, judging by the results of the white election and the subsequent hemming and hawing of new President de Klerk, is far more one of confusion and uncertainty within the white polity rather than any commitment to genuine “negotiations” and democratic change – however much Margaret Thatcher and Joe Clark may wish to persuade us to the contrary. Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that things are once again on the boil in South Africa.

But what does such renewed struggle mean for southern Africa as a whole, developments in other countries of the region being the main focus of our current issue? At one level there is promise. *SAR* has often emphasized that the key variable weighing negatively upon the prospects of South Africa’s neighbours has been Pretoria’s economic and military power and its willingness to use that power brutally in defense of its regional hegemony. Clearly, the full developmental potential of such countries as Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe cannot be realized as long as an untransformed South Africa stands beside the region, club in hand. As the anti-apartheid struggle revives in South Africa, these countries can take some solace from the brighter future that the revitalization of the mass democratic resistance offers.

Yet, unfortunately, this prospect can offer scant solace in the here and now. It is not merely that the liberation of South Africa is still some years away from becoming a fait accompli. Equally important is the fact that so much of the damage South Africa could hope to do to these countries has already been done. Whatever the outcome of the struggle in South Africa, the original promise offered by Mozambique or Angola at the moment of their independence will not be retrievable for years, perhaps even decades. The worst of times? An excuse for despair? These are tempting reactions when confronted by the unenviable situation in which these broken-backed countries find themselves at the moment.

Just a year ago we surveyed such “states of siege” (*SAR*, October, 1988) in a manner that provoked considerable controversy. At that time, we warned aloud as to whether the worthy aim of support for the regional targets of South African aggression might have a more questionable spinoff, perhaps giving rise to a “conspiracy of silence” about contradictions surfacing within the transformed Mozambiques and Angolas that have been produced by Pretoria’s grim policy of destabilization. In seeking to take a hard look at such contradictions, we earned rebuke from a number of other committed activists who tended to question the quality of our solidarity rather than the accuracy of our interpretations.

Yet the problem will not go away, as this issue’s two first-hand articles on Mozambique clearly testify. Last year we wrote of the importance of Frelimo’s up-coming Fifth Congress. We suggested it might be a litmus test for gauging the health of Mozambique’s socialist project and foresaw it as every bit as “likely to be a watershed in Mozambican history as other Congresses before it.”

In the wake of the Congress, Judith Marshall’s account of it does not make for encouraging reading. “Peace” and “national unity” (so much the central themes of the Congress) are worthy goals to be sure. And a measure of self-criticism on the part of the leadership regarding mistakes that Frelimo has undoubtedly made over the years is not unwelcome. Yet what is the substance of the Mozambican society that such a leadership now feels constrained to build? To what extent do its policies reflect an attempt by at least some members of that leadership to accommodate their own vested interest in an emergent neo-capitalism? And are “progressive members” of that leadership now so much on the defensive that there remains too little to differentiate Mozambique from the other neo-colonies that dot the southern African landscape?

Glibly equating Mozambique with countries like Lesotho or Swaziland would still represent much too harsh a judgement. Some significant legacy of a socialist culture remains in place in Mozambique. One can see the signs in the struggle to retain significant remnants of a “popular line” in the health services and to keep alive the possibility of cooperation in the agricultural sphere. Yet how real can hope be under the circumstances that currently prevail?

Unfortunately, the broader regional political process which now frames developments in Mozambique (and in Angola and in Namibia) is itself not an encouraging one. One finds a host of disheartening signs in the retreat of the Soviet Union from a proactive role in southern Africa, in the apparent legitimation of South Africa as a regional actor of respectable standing, and in the aggressive role increasingly played by the United States in redefining regional dynamics.

Victoria Brittain’s discussion of the “peace process” in Angola provides some stark evidence of the possible trajectory of events. Thus the emergence of the egregious Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire as a “peace-maker” in Angola represents as ugly an advance for realpolitik (and for American efforts to displace the frontline states as arbiters of their own fates) as the parallel casting of Kenya’s corrupt Daniel Arap Moi
in the role of intermediary vis-à-vis Mozambique. As we will see below, the state of play in Angola remains complicated and the outcome still unpredictable. Nonetheless, the MPLA regime has certainly lost some room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis various actors who wish it ill.

This is no less true for SWAPO in Namibia. Now that initial euphoria has died down, it is clear that plans for Namibia’s transition to independence – part and parcel of the Angolan peace accords – were flawed in innumerable respects. That is so in no small measure because South Africa – and, behind the arras, the United States – were party to their drafting and SWAPO wasn’t! As Colin Leys points out, this has had a significant negative impact upon the electoral process for a constituent assembly that is currently underway there. Moreover, it may have even greater impact on the process of further bargaining. South Africa and the constituent assembly will have to negotiate the terms and timing of independence after the election (and outside the glare of publicity and U.N. presence that frames the electoral moment itself).

More broadly, what bears emphasizing here (again following Leys’ lead) is just how vulnerable an independent Namibia will be to South African power, even assuming the best possible outcome of the electoral and constitution-making process. It is all too probable that Namibia will prove to be an extreme case of the adage alluded to earlier: that so long as apartheid South Africa remains untransformed, the expectations for the future of its neighbours must remain far too low.

This is not, be it noted, to abandon solidarity with the attempts by peoples and states in the region to find what room for manoeuvre they can. Nor is it to romanticize the struggle inside South Africa and unrealistically to predict or foreshorten the likely timeline of genuine change there. It is, however, to take strength where we can best find it at the moment in southern Africa: from the rejuvenated efforts of the South African people to realize their freedom. In these efforts we can glimpse the heart of the matter, something that is too easily lost sight of in these “worst of times.” It is the best earnest we have that southern Africans do indeed have everything before them!
On the Ropes: Socialism & Frelimo’s 5th Congress

BY JUDITH MARSHALL

Judith Marshall is a member of the SAR editorial working group who has worked for many years in Mozambique. She recently returned from a working visit there.

We are witnessing the putting into operation of a vast plan ... against the people’s government ... a combination of aggression, subversion, economic sabotage and general destabilization ... to affect the living conditions of the masses, create problems of supplies, fundamentally to create discontentment on a broad level.

FRELIMO 1977

[Low Intensity Warfare] is total war at the grassroots level - one that uses all of the weapons of total war, including political, economic and psychological ware, with the military aspect being a distant fourth in many cases.

Col. John D. Waghelstein, former head, U.S. Military Advisory Team, El Salvador

The Fifth Congress of the Frelimo Party in Mozambique gave stunning and sobering glimpses of how much Frelimo’s earlier project of building “people’s power” has come apart. The low intensity warfare to which Mozambique has been subjected has been terribly effective. Dramatic as Renamo’s butchery may be, in the long run we may look back on it as less destructive than the insidious day-to-day pressures of economic destabilization and disinformation campaigns. As analysts of low intensity warfare in Central America have observed, LIW works to penetrate the logic of a revolutionary process, deciphering its internal cohesion and the tactics it employs to meet popular needs. LIW then devises a strategy to warp this logic, to undo the cohesion, to roll back popular gains, in short, to turn the revolution against itself. And the American military personnel tutoring Central American dictatorships have had apt South African trainees in their courses.

During the 1980s, forces in diplomatic, IMF, emergency aid and
church circles have engaged in subtle psychological warfare, casting doubt on the viability of Mozambique's original policy options and political leadership, distancing people from their own political project. Actual Mozambican control of the process has been seriously eroded. With the adoption of an IMF-sponsored structural adjustments programme in 1987, economic policy has shifted to the IMF/World Bank. Social policy finds UNICEF playing a preponderant role. The "emergency" is dominated by a coterie of international organizations; at the time of the Congress, 7.7 million Mozambicans were wholly or partly dependent on food aid. Eighty percent of what Mozambique eats comes from abroad: the US is the largest donor.

The war itself is taking dramatic turns totally outside of Mozambique's control, buffeted as it is by the changing geo-political relations of the Soviet Union and the United States in southern Africa. Over the past six months two of America’s historic allies in Africa, Mobutu of Zaire and Arap Moi of Kenya, have been cast to play leading roles in peace initiatives while the Front Line States manoeuvre to keep their foot in the door.

The Congress itself, held from July 24 to 30, culminated a lengthy preparatory period. Seven draft theses were launched in November 1988. These passed through months of discussions in party cells. District and later provincial conferences were held, each electing delegates to the next level. Finally nine provincial delegations, led by the provincial governors, joined the Maputo province and city delegations for seven days of debates full of formalities and ceremony, songs and presentations.

The quality of pre-Congress debate varied tremendously. If Maputo city delegates were vociferous in criticizing corruption and party inaction, Nampula delegates maintained a dramatic silence. The Nampula government had received an unusually sharp public criticism four months earlier for its passivity to the rising death count in one of its war and drought-stricken districts. No mention was made of the 5,200 who died in Mamba at the pre-Congress meeting.

These debates pointed all too clearly to the prevailing climate of war-weariness and dramatic individual survival schemes. There was little desire to talk about more abstract questions, the proposed shift from Frelimo as "the vanguard of the worker-peasant alliance" to "the vanguard of the Mozambican people," or the change in foreign policy.
priorities from privileging the international working class movement to defending Mozambique’s immediate national interests. Delegates wanted to talk about the war, the economic situation, abuses of power and corruption.

Wages of war

The pre-Congress conferences presented a very troubling picture of ordinary Mozambicans’ experience of the war. Manica delegates condemned the arbitrary recruitment of young people by rounding them up on the streets, a practice they felt better suited deserters. Maputo province delegates noted the failure to provide troops with basics like food, clothing and footwear, even in operational zones, leading inevitably to soldiers’ taking what they needed from the local population. “This damages the image of our army and blurs the distinction between soldiers and bandits,” warned delegate Inussu Noormahomed, a doctor in the provincial health services.

Allegations of corruption in military logistics were common, a theme taken up strongly by the 150 delegates to the armed forces party conference. Lt. Patricio Gimo from the border troops stationed on the Beira Corridor harshly condemned senior leaders. “Many high-level officers are busy with private business deals and this goes against the principles laid down in the statutes and the party programme. ... How can an officer who spends his time inspecting fish in the market have any time for leading his troops?”

There were complaints about long delays in notifying families of soldiers killed in action and the absence of jobs, medical treatment and schooling for veterans. A Maputo conference delegate complained, “Those who massacred the people receive support, but those who have lost limbs in defending the people do not.”

Talks with Renamo were an important issue. President Chissano had visited many provinces in the months preceding the Congress where conversations with the crowds during mass rallies gave a resounding “no” to dialogue. A month before the Congress, however, this position began to change, a fact not unrelated to the emerging peace plan in Angola. Niassa conference delegates in mid-June spoke strongly for negotiations, arguing that people were “tired of the war.” There were complaints that the one-year amnesty granted in December 1987 had been extended without any consultation with party rank and file. Delegates argued that only an amnesty combined with strong military action forcing the bandits to surrender would be effective. Since the amnesty, however, the military situation had deteriorated further.

Economic recovery programme – for whom?

The IMF/World Bank-sponsored economic recovery programme came under severe scrutiny, particularly in Maputo city where its negative impact on the urban poor is most sharply felt. The report distributed to the Maputo conference spoke of sharply increased unemployment, crime, juvenile delinquency and prostitution. The texture of social relations has hardened to “looking out for number one,” with people using whatever means come to hand, legal or otherwise, to fight for individual and family survival.

State vehicles are used for private transport deals, state goods are sold on the black market. Nampula teachers exact chickens or money from peasants in return for primary school enrollment. Teachers survive by private tutoring or selling exams, yet they go months without receiving salaries and an entire month’s pay barely buys shoes and a shirt.

Maputo delegates criticized illegal road-side vendors, a feature of contemporary urban life, selling everything from drugs not available in the health posts to clothing meant for emergency relief. In Maputo they are called “dumba nengues,” meaning “run for your life.” Their owners have definitely developed street smarts— and insider contacts— for outwitting all attempts at control. In Nampula, within 12 hours of a provincial government decision to investigate vendors selling beans from the emergency programme, not one stall selling these beans could be found in the Central Market.

Rank and file at the Maputo city conference were not satisfied with descriptions of the problems, how-
ever, and demanded to know what actions party leadership had taken in response to state policies causing such hardships. They queried the Party's role in the government wage and price commission, for example, where price increases were all immediate, while the few wage increases took months to come into effect. A factory worker asked pointedly: "When they put the prices up on May Day, are they inciting workers to strike?"

The theme of high-level corruption reappeared, this time focussed on the state apparatus. A delegate to the Maputo conference, Gabriel Simbine, got loud applause when he urged that the findings of recent commissions of inquiry into theft and misuse of emergency goods be published, with the trail of corruption being followed even up to the Frelimo Political Bureau if necessary.

The Congress - from "idealism" to "realism"

The frankness of pre-Congress questioning and the active role of the media in publicizing these critical debates seemed to augur well for the Congress. The critical debate was not sustained during the Congress itself, however, which became a one-issue congress focussed on peace. On July 17, President Chissano broadcast nationally confirming that religious leaders had been contacting Renamo leaders over several months, sifting out those with some control over fighting forces inside Mozambique from those whose main presence was in foreign capitals. These church representatives were currently awaiting internal Renamo leaders in Nairobi.

The pre-Congress focus on war, economy and corruption shifted to endorsement, however qualified, of these newly-announced peace initiatives. The crafting of the resolution on peace and unity required an all-night session at the end. The resulting text underscores the difficulties in dialogue with a surrogate force with Renamo's savage track record and speaks of "a peace that does not constitute a prize for terrorism."

In the end, the Congress adopted far-reaching policy changes which mark considerable shifts from earlier positions, all with little debate even though privately some party militants voiced strong critiques. Jorge Rebelo, Secretary for Ideology, presented the new Draft Programme to the Congress. On accepting it, President Chissano suggested it put the problems facing the country in "a real framework, not an ideal one."

The main features of this new "realism" distinguish it markedly from the commitment to "people's power" of an earlier era. There is no longer any reference to a "leading role of the working class." Party membership is opened to property-owners, provided they are "citizens of exemplary conduct, respected by the community," and religious believers, provided they share a commitment to building socialism. Restrictions on membership for polygamists are softened. The restrictions limiting party members involved in agriculture to three labourers were lifted, with the argument that party members should lead the drive for food production.

Skepticism was voiced outside the Congress about these measures but virtually no voices queried from within. Some questioned whether the new criteria simply provided justification for party members now owning big farms or construction companies, and cited the strong critique launched by President Celina Cossa of the General Union of Cooperatives in Maputo in March. She tackled City Council and agriculture officials about coop land being handed over to private farmers, because these farmers would "bring tractors and increase production." The coop movement argues that these are not "farmers" who bring agricultural "know-how" but bureaucrats and traders with the "know-who" to manipulate land titles.

Strikingly absent in the Congress documents was any reference to Marxism-Leninism. Senior party leaders indicated off the record that they had made a strategic error in declaring themselves a Marxist-Leninist party "without the necessary pre-conditions being in place." Given Frelimo's difficulties over the years in going beyond slogans and set formulas to creative ways of interpreting Marxism-Leninism in Mozambican circumstances, its disappearance may not be altogether negative. More troubling is the vagueness of the socialism being espoused. "In socialism we express our desire for a true and profound social transformation, based on a scientific analysis of reality, on defining the social base of the revolution and on the need to guarantee that the interests of the broad masses of the people prevail."

The content of this socialism is presumably to be found in the actual policies and programmes adopted by the Congress. These, however, seem to indicate policy shifts that legitimize already privileged social groups in further consolidating their positions, a more egalitarian socialism defending the "broad masses" being put on hold while the economy and society are rebuilt from the ravages of war.

The structural adjustment programme has dramatically speeded up the process of social stratification. A highly visible privileged group is benefiting while the great majority sink back into poverty, their monthly salaries forcing them to scrounge or outright theft just to feed their children. One prominent trader with commercial enterprises in three provinces and business connections into South Africa and Swaziland told me proudly that he had made more money in the two years of the structural adjustments programme than in the entire previous decade.

The Congress made official the re-introduction of private education,
private tutoring and community schools. It seems hard to interpret these as anything except measures that will allow those with money to resolve the problems of quality schooling for their children while the poor are relegated to sub-standard government schools. Provincial education officials assumed that the churches would resume the role they had had in operating schools prior to their 1976 nationalization. If the main problems that have plagued the rapidly expanding state system have been the lack of qualified teachers, school administrators and sufficient budget allocations for school buildings and teachers' salaries, it is hard to imagine the churches having the means to resolve these problems beyond operating a handful of model schools funded and staffed by foreigners, accessible to a tiny privileged minority of the faithful.

Similarly the new housing policies adopted seemed to leave far behind the old commitment to making housing accessible to all and to preventing profiteering from people's housing needs. There is no denying past incompetence and corruption in the state housing authority, APIE, created in 1976 when rentable property was nationalized. It seems likely, however, that the specialized public or joint-venture companies now being promoted herald an era of much up-graded housing stock in the "cement city," both old and new, while the already over-crowded shanty towns deteriorate still further.

Health seems to be the area where the old commitment to popular needs held out despite pressures for privatization and growing instances of medical personnel giving treatment and dispensing drugs privately within state institutions. The Central Committee report tackles the argument frontally, insisting that privatization "will not resolve the problems of most health workers, nor will it raise the general quality of care... Our state and our people are subjected to the robbery and abuse of medicines and equipment, and the illicit use of installations." It further suggests that privatization "would make the efforts and sacrifices of many cadres and doctors useless."

The loophole left open was that of "special services" in "urban centres." Already in Maputo there is a clinic tucked away in a wing of the Central Hospital for patients who pay in dollars. The Mozambican health personnel in attendance offer efficient and courteous treatment in immaculately clean and bright surroundings with availability of drugs and good nursing care for those admitted, all hard to come by in other health facilities. Diplomatic personnel have received a registry of Mozambican doctors available for house calls also payable in dollars. Clearly it is a fraught issue - the need to hold on to highly skilled professionals, the pressures to provide quality health services for a large foreign community, yet at the same time the logic of a tiered health service in which the sick who also happen to be poor get inferior services.

If there seem to be genuine struggles over health policies, the agricultural policies from the Fifth Congress were more ambivalent, some of the tensions being played out on the Congress floor itself. The Congress stressed that post-war rehabilitation requires the "active participation of various property regimes - state-owned, cooperative, and peasant family property, and private or joint-venture forms of property." A surprising amount of attention however, went to cooperatives, perhaps not unrelated to the strong message from the cooperatives immediately preceding the discussion of the Economic and Social Directives. President Celina Cossa surrounded by singing coop members, mainly women, offering produce from their farms, referred to the "double war" fought by coop members. They face Renamo bandits and also "opportunists" wanting to take their land, leaving them "condemned to lose their fields, to have no access to technical or financial assistance, because they are accused of being illiterate and ignorant."

The amended Economic and Social Directives prioritize peasant family farms and cooperatives. The final document suggests more detailed programmes to support peasant cooperatives including specialized bodies at district level, while reiterating the need to avoid any attempts to direct the cooperatives from outside, by party, state or other organizations.

In the end, then, the Congress marked a return to a broad nationalist front strategy to end the war and reconstruct the economy and society. Despite the strong criticisms of corruption in high places and the call to "learn from Zimbabwe" where top-level government officials have recently been purged for car deals, there were few changes. The stress was all on unity, in keeping with the theme of the Central Committee report, "For a National Consensus to Normalize Society."

Privately some senior Frelimo leaders explain this nationalist front phase as a necessary short-term strategy with a sufficiently strong socialist core guiding it to withstand its perils. They anticipate a return to more egalitarian policies once the war is over and the economy moving. What seems to be forgotten is low intensity warfare's effectiveness in human terms. For countless Mozambicans, LIW has served to create weariness, demobilization, killing the dream of "people's power." For others, however, LIW has provided the space to fight openly for private privilege once again. Just as colonialism had little purchase on people's lives until it moved beyond crude foreign domination to having its African intermediaries, so these contemporary forms of domination need their local allies.

Given that there is no clear signalling of the current strategy as a strategic retreat, no political education either inside or outside of
the party to analyze ways to work to maintain a socialist core, it becomes increasingly difficult to identify whether and where the struggle actually does continue. If there should be a point in future when a socialist core wants to reassert its earlier policies of people's power, it seems fair to assume that some of its greatest foes will be those who have used the present opening to amass personal wealth and power – and that many of them will be firmly entrenched in both the state apparatus and the Frelimo Party itself.

**Mozambique – The Quest for a “Dignified Peace”**

The uneasiness of Fifth Congress delegates about the peace process provoked a marathon final session, ending at six a.m., to hammer out the resolution on peace and national unity. The peace process has lurched forward uncertainly since the Congress. Four Mozambican religious leaders met with a six-person Renamo delegation led by Afonso Dhlakama in Nairobi on August 8. Presidents Arap Moi of Kenya and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe in a communiqué issued a day earlier stressed that this meeting would take place within the framework of Mozambique’s 12 point set of principles. These principles stress that the destabilization confronting the Mozambican people “should not be confused with a struggle between two political parties.” They make the “stopping of all acts of terrorism and banditry” a first step for establishing the conditions to normalize conditions so that “all may participate in political, economic, social and cultural life.”

Renamo for its part advanced a 16-page document in which it presents itself as an active political force in Mozambique that “stands for the people uncompromisingly... against any action which violates the people's physical and moral integrity, as is the case with massacres, looting...” Renamo also states that the “presence of foreign troops brought in by Frelimo has not brought peace and well-being” and claims this is an obstacle to peace and constitutes a loss of national sovereignty.

Despite the widely disparate opening positions, the period since has seen further direct contacts and a flurry of behind the scenes shuttling. Military operations have also continued. At Armed Forces Day on September 25th in Mozambique, President Chissano spoke of significant victories by combined Mozambican and Zimbabwean forces just prior to the Congress, actions in which the main MNR headquarters in Maringue, Sofala were destroyed, thus creating (in Chissano’s words) “irreversible conditions for peace.” Nonetheless, Renamo atrocities have continued throughout the country. And Renamo members who have availed themselves of the amnesty in recent weeks report that there is continued support from South Africa!

The Congress resolution on peace stresses that behind Renamo actions “lie the designs of those who make use of banditry in order to force us to renounce our struggle for a society without discrimination, a society of equals.” For southern Africa solidarity activists, it is clearly a moment to mount campaigns putting maximum pressure on South Africa to end its support for Renamo.

**Nampula: What’s Left?**

**BY OTTO ROESCH**

Otto Roesch is a member of the SAR Editorial Working Group who lived and worked in Mozambique for two years between 1981 and 1983, and again for four months in 1986. He recently returned from a two-month working visit and prepared the following report.

The Frelimo Party Fifth Congress held this past July suggests that Mozambique has reached a major turning point in its post-independence history. Congress decisions to abandon Marxism-Leninism as Frelimo’s official ideology, to open up party membership to “property-owning Mozambicans,” to allow party members to employ waged labour over and above the previous limit of three workers, to introduce private schools, and possibly a tiered health system geared to one’s ability to pay, all constitute a marked departure from the earlier popular and egalitarian thrust of Frelimo’s policies. These changes are very much in keeping with the liberalization of the country’s economy under the IMF-approved Economic Recovery Programme (or PRE) introduced in January of 1987. They appear to reflect a significant ideological and class realignment within the Mozambican state. It’s a realignment that promises to move Mozambique increasingly in the direction of a market economy and steadily away from its earlier socialist agenda. The policy changes officially introduced by the Congress are an indication of the transformation which Frelimo has undergone. These are the concessions it has been forced to make both as a result of policy failures and the concerted war of destabilization waged against it by South Africa. In the disarray and growing external dependency that resulted from policy errors and the havoc of war, the pressures to embrace market solutions – despite the attendant inequalities – have grown considerably.
As the crisis of Mozambique's socialist project has deepened, it has become possible for anti-popular class forces to coalesce around the state, and for inherited colonial and pre-colonial ideologies and social practices to assert themselves, in ways and to a degree that would have been impossible only a few years ago. The northern province of Nampula, which I had occasion to revisit this past June and July, provides an instructive example of this process and of the contradictions which it is generating.

War and rural transformation
In Nampula province, Frelimo's socialist project has suffered its most serious reversals in rural development. South African destabilization and government errors in agricultural policy, especially the resettlement policies of the communal village programme, have served to shatter the process of rural transformation Frelimo had set in motion during the first years of independence. As in other areas of Mozambique, rural development in Nampula after independence centred on a policy of voluntary collectivization, the resettling of the traditionally dispersed rural population into communal villages that would have either cooperatives and/or state farms as their productive base. Communal villages were seen as the easiest way of integrating the rural population into national economic and political life, and of delivering health and educational services to the countryside.

Launched during the heady days of post-independence euphoria, this strategy of rural collectivization initially met with a certain measure of positive popular response. But as the country's post-independence economic crisis deepened, popular enthusiasm began to wane and the rate of communal village formation began to slow. In many areas of Nampula province, peasants from different traditional political and kinship groupings often refused to join together into single communal villages, since resettlement in the territory of another group had historically meant economic and political subordination. At the same time, in contrast to other areas officials to simply dismiss them as irrelevant to the task of national reconstruction often lost Frelimo the support and cooperation of a large part of the peasant population.

In the face of these cultural difficulties in resettlement, and under increasing pressure to meet their resettlement quotas following the introduction of a Ten Year Plan in 1980, local officials increasingly opted for change by decree, rather than through the established processes of consultation and discussion. With the dramatic escalation of Renamo actions in Nampula province after 1984, forced resettlement into communal villages came to be justified on security grounds, and was rapidly extended and accelerated in all areas of the province.

Not surprisingly, forced resettlement quickly undermined popular support for Frelimo and fueled a growing tide of passive resistance to government policies. Increasingly, peasants began to resist resettlement by either pretending to live in the communal villages (while actually residing in their former homes), or by simply refusing to move at all.

Renamo, for its part, has consciously sought to gain propaganda advantage from peasant opposition to the communal village programme, by proclaiming its own "policy" of opposition to communal villages. It has met with some success in using traditional political and religious structures to set up small bases of logistical support for itself in various parts of the province. That support provides them not only with sources of food and recruits, but also with avenues of penetration into new areas of the province, through the traditional networks of political alliances which link traditional authorities to each other. In this regard, Renamo appears to be using much the same channels of "infiltration" which Frelimo used in Nampula during the anti-colonial struggle. The system was exhaustively documented by the colonial state in the late 1960s (see the work of José
Branquinho). If this is indeed the case, one may well wonder the extent to which the South African military is making use of anthropologists—or at least the anthropological research of the Portuguese colonial state—to plan its operations in Nampula and elsewhere in Mozambique.

The extent to which Renamo has been successful in winning over traditional political and religious authorities in Nampula, however, remains unclear and should not be overstated. On the basis of the information I was able to gather, it would seem that only a few traditional political or religious leaders are willing to ally themselves with Renamo because of the terror and senseless destruction the rebels visit upon the people and the country. Despite recent attempts by Renamo military commanders in Nampula to develop a more coherent political strategy (e.g. refraining from attacking the agricultural marketing network until after peasants have sold their crops), their past and present record militates against them. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that a certain amount of disenchantment has set in amongst some of those traditional authorities who have supported Renamo, as the essentially destructive and predatory nature of Renamo has revealed itself.

But though Renamo does not possess much of a social base in any conventional guerrilla warfare sense, it does enjoy the widespread neutrality of most of the population. The bulk of the rural population of Nampula simply refuses to cooperate with either side: embittered with Frelimo but horrified at and fearful of Renamo, peasants are simply pursuing a survival strategy of non-involvement.

At the present time, many of the province’s communal villages are virtually deserted, having been abandoned either in opposition to government resettlement policies or out of fear of Renamo attacks. The bulk of the rural population has either fled to the relative safety of towns and cities or scattered into what is essentially a no-man’s-land out in the bush. In the latter case, peasants have largely passed out of effective state control and reverted to organizing their lives as best they can on the basis of traditional institutions and beliefs.

With the abandonment of communal villages and the collapse of other Frelimo-created institutions in the countryside, relatively little now remains of the far-reaching agrarian transformation Frelimo sought to effect in Nampula province before the escalation of the war.

Nampula Faces Its Mistakes

Much of this unfortunate history was openly and critically discussed at a provincial government confer-
ence on socialization of the countryside this past June in Nampula.

At the conference, provincial government and party officials sought to chart new directions for agricultural development in the province.

The central proposal to emerge from the conference was that of concentrating scarce government agricultural investments in four priority districts. The investments would target peasant family production to promote the socialization of peasant agriculture, presumably through gradual voluntary villagization, cooperativization and (in some cases) state farm agriculture. In all other districts in the province, agricultural development would be left to foreign aid agencies, the private sector and the play of market forces. How this proposal will actually be implemented in practice, particularly with regard to communal villages, and with what results, remains to be seen.

The power of money under the PRE

The economy of Nampula province, like that of the country as a whole, continues to show signs of steady, if modest, growth under the PRE. The hundreds of millions of dollars of capital and consumer goods made available through concessionary financing from the international (mostly western) community are having a significant stimulative impact on the country’s war-ravaged economy. Food and consumer goods are abundant in urban centres although for the bulk of the urban population, the PRE has meant new hardships. Price increases have generally outstripped any wage increases. For the vast majority of the province’s rural people, the stimulus which the PRE has been supposed to provide to agricultural production has yet to make itself felt. The province’s economy, in fact, continues to face enormous problems.

Though marketed agricultural output in Nampula province increased sharply for this year relative to last, actual production levels remain very low and only at a fraction of the province’s productive potential. The principal reason for this, of course, is the war. Peasants are reluctant to expand production for fear of having their harvests stolen by Renamo or having to abandon their fields and homes in the face of Renamo attacks. On the other hand, as the recent tragic events of Membra District illustrate – where more than 5,000 people starved to death earlier this year – the productive capacity of the peasant sector is worn down. It is little above subsistence level and highly vulnerable to recurrent ecological crises, such as drought. Peasant production also continues to be constrained by a lack of tools, seeds, transport, and consumer goods. These things are relatively abundant in urban areas, but rural stores remain largely empty and rural commercial networks continue to work erratically.

During the last season, most of the agricultural marketing in rural areas was being done by the state agricultural marketing agency, AGRICOM. Private merchants were simply refusing to market peasant crops for fear of losing all their inventory and vehicles to Renamo attacks. Merchants that did buy peasant crops sought to resell them to district AGRICOM warehouses as quickly as possible, so that any losses from attacks would be borne by the state. However, due to serious shortages of sacks and transport in the province, AGRICOM was experiencing enormous difficulties in transporting harvested crops to the safety of its warehouses. The result of the consequent delays in transporting stock-piled crops out of district capitals was, in fact, to have the crops destroyed or stolen in Renamo attacks, an event which has occurred with some frequency over the past year.

Tribal leaders on the payroll

An indication of the difficulty which the state is having in resuscitating peasant surplus production through market liberalization under the PRE, is evident in government attempts to establish highly structured block-farming schemes for peasant cash-crop production. They bear an unnerving resemblance to old colonial forms of peasant cashcropping.

The Portuguese firm of João Ferreira dos Santos, for example, which has operated in Nampula province since colonial times, is currently trying to establish a block-farming scheme, assigning peasant plots for cash-crop production. The firm is
using traditional chiefs and their assistants as production overseers, all with the blessing of provincial and district government authorities. Under this scheme, which is currently being introduced in Memba and Namapa districts, the chiefs are simply being re-labelled “production chiefs” and paid a salary of 18,000 mt per month by João Ferreira dos Santos to co-ordinate and supervise peasant cash-cropping. The degree to which peasants are free to refuse to participate in such schemes is unclear. This development reflects a significant policy shift for Frelimo, not only because it shows a willingness to experiment with forms of production that are uncomfortably similar to colonial cash-cropping schemes, but because it recognizes the de facto power and authority which traditional chiefs continue to exercise in the countryside of Nampula province.

Public money, private investment

If Nampula province is anything to go by, the domestic capitalist stratum remains firmly wedded to commercial and not productive enterprises. Though there is undoubtedly a pressing need to reactivate the country’s commercial network, there is an equally urgent need to increase productive output in manufacturing and agriculture. To date, however, the private sector of Nampula has shown relatively little interest in productive investments.

The low risks and high profits of commerce make productive undertakings unattractive. Moreover, much of the commercial activity of the large merchant houses of Nampula is being financed not by their own capital (which in some cases is very sizeable indeed), but through loans from Mozambican banks. Although, in keeping with the current tight money policies of the PRE, it is very difficult for small merchants to obtain bank loans, the big merchant houses seem to have no difficulty in reaching “understandings” with local bank managers. One such “understanding” has reportedly enabled a large merchant house to borrow upwards of 800,000,000 mt (approximately equivalent to US$1.1 million) from a local Mozambican bank, with no clear indication of the merchant house’s ability (or intentions) of paying it back. With loans such as these, the large commercial capitalists of the province have large sums with which to play the flourishing foreign currency black market (now reportedly involving diplomatic missions and international organizations), while using much smaller sums of their own money to actually engage in official commercial operations. A recent article in the Mozambican magazine Tempo, for example, estimated that upwards of 70 million rands of illegal imports enter Mozambique through Maputo every year.

Much of the capital generated in the commercial sector (whether legal or illegal) is being used to finance increasingly affluent lifestyles for some, to corrupt local officials, and to cement alliances with state officials at increasingly higher levels. Commercial profits, in other words, are effectively serving to push the country further in the direction of a market economy and transform the class character of the Mozambican state.

In this context, the Fifth Congress’s recent call for more sacrifices from the Mozambican people – through deferred consumption, harder work and more production – would be easier to accept if there were signs that the hardships of economic rehabilitation were being distributed more equitably. Given the life style of many high level government and party officials in the province, there is little evidence that they are sharing in the belt-tightening that they are asking of the people they represent. And to judge by the increasing number of expensive imported cars circulating in the streets of Nampula, and from the ostentatious affluence of some sectors of local society, the Mozambican private sector has profited enormously since the introduction of the PRE, as have numerous state and party officials.

Though there continue to be voices from within the state and at the base critical of these trends, they would appear to be a minority and very much on the defensive. The General Union of Agricultural Cooperatives of the Green Zones of Nampula city, for example, seems prepared to resist the arbitrary seizures of cooperative lands by state officials and their friends in the private sector. Organizationally, however, the Union is too weak at the moment to pose any effective resistance to the current anti-popular alliance taking shape around the Mozambican state. Similarly, though criticisms of official corruption, the iniquities of the PRE, and excessive support for the private sector at the expense of cooperatives were heard regularly at official levels in the lead up to the Fifth Congress, the final decisions taken by the Congress suggest that these criticisms were coming from only a minority of party members. Their capacity to resist the current political drift away from socialism would accordingly appear to be limited.
The Savimbi Shuffle

BY VICTORIA BRITTAIN

Victoria Brittain is editor of the Third World page of the Guardian [UK] and is a regular contributor to SAR.

In June, Angola’s José Eduardo Dos Santos and the Unita leader, Jonas Savimbi, met in Gbadolite, Zaire, during a summit meeting of regional leaders. They met unexpectedly but the meeting was, nonetheless, no accident. For, as Victoria Brittain argues below, the fact that Zaire’s President Mobutu Seso Seko had been able to insert himself so centrally into the “peace-making” process in Angola demonstrates just how effective South Africa’s strategy of destabilization has been in weakening the Angolan government’s bargaining position. Moreover, like the emergence of the equally suspect Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya as an “honest-broker” of peace in Mozambique, the role Mobutu has apparently been nominated to play evidences the attempt by the United States to displace the centre of gravity of effective policy-making in the southern African region away from the less malleable Frontline States and towards its own more reliable African client-leaders.

Of course, the purpose of the Gbadolite adventure was also to give greater visibility and respectability to the man whom Britain labels “South Africa’s most successful proxy,” Unita leader Jonas Savimbi. In the event Gbadolite failed to usher in the era of peace its investigators touted. Although Dos Santos announced a ceasefire, it was broken within days by Unita ambushes and killings and less than a month later Unita forces had shot down a civilian aircraft killing all 42 people on board. Savimbi himself publicly recanted on some of the terms of the further negotiation process apparently agreed at Gbadolite and, most seriously of all, the United States announced that its military aid to Unita would continue. However, as some indication, for future reference, of the shifting balance of forces in southern Africa, the events at Gbadolite bear noting.

The Angolan government had been under heavy pressure, both regional and international, since late 1988 to agree to a summit of pro-Unita leaders from Zaire, Congo, Gabon and Ivory Coast to discuss peace prospects in Angola. There was also a wider agenda – to include South Africa in the heads of state meeting.

Angola, however, was preoccupied with the quadrupartite meetings that were to lead to Namibian independence and the withdrawal of Cuban troops. It refused the summit, believing that Unita was a problem that could be solved once the peace pact with South Africa was signed. The Front Line States supported Angola, and that must have contributed to Washington’s determination to move regional decision-making in southern Africa into other hands.

Washington has been increasingly worried about the National Party’s fumbling loss of control and by the rise of militant anti-apartheid organizations in South Africa. In response, the U. S. had developed a new regional priority to break South Africa’s international isolation and shift the ANC towards negotiations with Pretoria. For this, the Front Line States would have to be persuaded to put pressure on the ANC. Pretoria’s international isolation was to be broken first by those countries closest to it.

Once the New York accords were signed in December 1988, the U. S. Secretary of State at the time, George Schultz, told Angola’s foreign minister that his government still would not open normal diplomatic relations with Luanda. That would only happen, he said, when “the process of national reconciliation was complete.” That not-too-subtle reference to political reconciliation with Unita violated the terms of the earlier New York and Geneva protocols (on joint Cuban/South African disengagement from the Angola/Namibia situation) that promised South Africa would cease military support for Unita. Schultz’ message now made it clear the U. S. would not allow Savimbi to be a casualty of the regional peace agreement.

In the early months of 1989, mixed signals on Savimbi came from the U. S. and South Africa. The Angolan military reported that Pretoria was continuing to supply Unita in Angola, as was the U. S. through Zaire. Sources in Namibia reported the beginning of an apparent campaign to use Unita personnel as a destabilizing force within Namibia during the independence process. But on March 1, President Dos Santos outlined a seven-point peace plan and in May presented it to a Front Line States summit in Luanda.

Fundamental to it was the “voluntary and temporary departure of Jonas Savimbi,” which Dos Santos said the Unita leader had promised. It was an open secret that Savimbi’s long-standing friends – from the King of Morocco to the President of Ivory Coast – had in 1988 offered him a home and temporary asylum while an Angolan peace process got under way. What no-one knew was Savimbi’s real reaction to the proposal.

The Zairean intermediaries setting up the Gbadolite meeting seem to have persuaded themselves that Savimbi had made such a commitment and meant to stick to it. But
within days Savimbi himself flatly denied it. President Dos Santos made Savimbi’s departure the cornerstone of his June 21 speech to all Angolan ambassadors just before the Gbadolite summit, but linked it to Unita ceasing military action and hostile propaganda.

In setting up the summit on Angola, Zaire’s President Mobutu Sese Seko was also setting up his own forthcoming visit to the U.S. as the first African leader to be received by President George Bush. Mobutu’s involvement with U.S. actions in Angola pre-dated even Bush’s years as Director of the CIA. But despite Zaire’s cooperation in supplying U.S. covert aid to Savimbi during the Reagan administration, Mobutu had increasing problems with some U.S. Congress members critical of his human rights record and the kleptocratic tendencies that marked his regime. The need to impress in Washington may have been Mobutu’s reason for staging the Gbadolite coup de théâtre in which he produced Savimbi himself, to the stupefaction of almost everyone else, including the Angolan delegation. Only 24 hours before, two of the most senior of Dos Santos’ cabinet colleagues, Loy and Mbunda, publicly denied in Maputo and Lusaka that a meeting with Savimbi was imminent. President Dos Santos was reportedly on the verge of cancelling his flight to Kinshasa when told that Savimbi was to be present on the fringe of the summit.

But the involvement of so many heads of state made such a last minute gesture impossible. Washington got the summit it had wanted for nine months—a group that would not be dominated by the Front Line States and which contained some long time friends of Savimbi.

Gbadolite gathered together with President Dos Santos the presidents of Mali, Zambia, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Zimbabwe. Morocco and Tanzania also sent delegations. The mood, according to one participant, was that peace must be the priority—at any price. The massive decade-long destruction in Angola and in the region as a whole could no longer be tolerated.

There were other pressures behind the wary bid for peace at Gbadolite. In parallel with the lengthy negotiations in 1988 over Cuba’s withdrawal, Angola applied for IMF membership in July 1989, opposed only by the U.S. The Angolan program of economic reform, known by its Portuguese acronym SEF, involved dismantling nearly moribund state enterprises and liberalizing the economy. A new law guaranteed the export of capital abroad. Portuguese and Brazilian firms were interested in getting in on the ground floor of what they perceived to be a crippled but promising economy, if peace was established.

The wariness seems to have been on both sides. Sources at the summit said that both Dos Santos and Savimbi flatly refused to embrace for the cameras and the atmosphere when they were in the same room was far from cordial. Savimbi tried unsuccessfully to get the word ‘participation’ on Unita’s future with the MPLA into the agreement, instead of Angola’s preferred ‘integration’, which implies that Unita will be swallowed by the MPLA. But that effort seems to be the last moment when he took the agreement seriously.

In the aftermath of the June summit, as Savimbi clarified his position on the integration of Unita into MPLA military and civilian structures, his spokespeople emphasized that their goal was a ‘plural democracy’. Any such dramatic constitutional alteration remained far from the agreement made at Gbadolite and unthinkable in terms of the MPLA’s cardinal principles.

Early optimism about Gbadolite soured in the following weeks of inconclusive meetings between the two sides which failed to put in place a convincing ceasefire, or the monitoring mechanisms for it. Conflicting and still somewhat opaque agendas remained in the way of such an outcome. Nevertheless Gbadolite had posed important questions, questions about the real price Angola will eventually have to pay for U.S. diplomatic recognition, about Savimbi’s intentions and about the ability of the MPLA to withstand a new wave of pressure from African countries to nullify the history of the last decade and give power to South Africa’s most successful proxy.
No Easy Transition: Namibia on the Eve

BY COLIN LEYS

Colin Leys is professor in the Department of Political Studies at Queens University. He recently returned from a study tour in Namibia.

On September 22nd this year the registration of voters in Namibia closed, with the total standing at almost 700,000, slightly more than the estimated eligible population. There were some puzzling anomalies in these figures. The figures for Ovamboland (235,000) were some 46,000 lower than expected — but then the original estimates, based on aerial photographs of the kraals in the north, were guesses in the first place. And on the other hand, the figures in the south, east and north-east (Caprivi) were respectively 12,000, 3,000 and 5,000 above the estimated potential totals, due, probably, to the registration of voters from South Africa, Botswana, Zambia and Angola — who may all the same have been eligible, based on their parents’ birth in Namibia, or previous residence there. Although SWAPO officials in the north were justifiably critical of the South African appointed Administrator-Generals’s original registration arrangements, there seems little doubt that the UNTAG “sweep teams” that later combed the region effectively picked up most of those who were previously denied the chance to register.

On September 12th eleven political parties registered (two of them only provisionally, pending their being able to show the required signatures of 2,000 registered voters by the end of the month. But for most practical purposes there are only two main contestants — SWAPO and the DTA (Democratic Turnhalle Alliance). The DTA is led by a white farmer, Dirk Mudge, who broke away from the Nationalist Party and formed a coalition of groups prepared to form an internal government (under South African control) in 1970. Other ethnic or regional groupings like the white right-wing National Christian Action and the Rehoboth-based Federal Council of Namibia, will win some of the 72 seats in the Constituent Assembly. (For this election there are no constituencies; parties will get one seat for every 3/2 of the total votes cast — i.e. perhaps around 8,000 votes, assuming a high turnout). But for most people the issue is simple — to vote for SWAPO, the one party committed to getting rid of South African domination, or the DTA, the broadest based (and best financed) party, committed to the economic status quo. As you travel round the country you see the flags and posters of other parties here and there, but the one constant is SWAPO and DTA flags everywhere.

When the registration of voters closed, the arrangements for the election itself had still to be finalized — the Administrator-General’s original draft proclamation gave so many grounds for lack of confidence that the UN Secretary General sent a senior lawyer, Mr. Szasz, to ensure that a credible revision was achieved — but it seems likely that the final arrangements will ensure that the voting, though complicated (especially for the 60-70% of the voters thought to be illiterate), will in fact be secret and seen to be so — as well as honestly counted.

Does this mean that the election will be “free and fair,” as Mr. Alitisaari, the Secretary General’s Special Representative, must certify? In the words of UNTAG’s Civilian Director for the Northern Region, Mr. Rwambuya, “there is a long way to go before one could say that up here, the requirements for a free and fair election are satisfied.” This is primarily because in the north, above all in Ovamboland, the legacy of the war is still a major political factor. The huge military bases at Oshakati and Ondangwa no longer contain South African or SWATF (Namibian conscript) troops but many of the latter still parade at Ondangwa every month for their pay, having been kept on pay — though officially demobilized — until November 1st. A high proportion of them, if not all, are thought to have been issued with licences to own firearms, and in fact have them. At Oshakati, since September 1st, 1,200 members of the hated Koevoet (Crowbar), the counter-insurgency unit responsible for most of the ruthless war against PLAN infiltrators, have been “confined to base” — from 7:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. What this means in practice is that many of them are transported to their homes along the main road, in their Casspirs (heavily armed armoured personnel carriers), and according to UNTAG personnel in the region — with their weapons.

Moreover once this “confinement to base” began, on September 1st, these members of Koevoet, who had previously been officially absorbed into the regular police, reappeared in their Koevoet uniforms and were clearly once again a paramilitary force, and as such, the responsibility of UNTAG’s military component. However, confining them to base, especially on these terms, clearly does not involve “demobilizing” them and “dismantling” their command structure, as provided for in the Transition Plan agreements, so the UNTAG military component declined to take responsibility. While “high-level” and “urgent” talks about this situation proceed, no one is monitoring Koevoet, who are not only out and about in Ovamboland from 4:00 p.m. to 7:30 a.m., but at other times...
too. I saw numerous Casspirs with Koevoet men in them on the road during daytime hours in the second week of September.

Besides the widespread feeling that nothing has really changed, which these tactics on the part of the South African administration have created, there is also a blurred line separating the DTA from all these forces and ex-forces of the regime. Church monitoring bodies, visiting parliamentarians and aid agency personnel, and UNTAG itself, have accumulated lists of incidents in which armed men in DTA shirts, or in vehicles with DTA flags, have assaulted people—commonly, groups of schoolchildren, wearing SWAPO or NANSO (Student Organization) shirts and singing SWAPO songs. Those assaulted have also been threatened with reprisals if they continue supporting SWAPO. (DTA have also reported incidents of harassment by SWAPO supporters in the north).

The list of ways in which the atmosphere is not yet "free" or "fair" could be extended—but the fact remains that it has not prevented SWAPO supporters from registering, and will not prevent them from voting for SWAPO—provided they feel confidence in the secrecy of the ballot. The presence of UNTAG, especially its police monitors, has definitely helped; but perhaps more important, there seems to have been a groundswell of feeling among the people that a new era was really beginning, as the months passed following the disaster of April 1st (when the SADF, SWATF and Koevoet, remobilized to fight the PLAN troops who had entered the country on the eve of the cease-fire, killed 311 guerrillas in a series of massacres). When the curfew was lifted again early in May, "overnight everyone was wearing a SWAPO tee-shirt," one UNTAG official commented: "I couldn't imagine where they had all come from"—and travelling in the north in September, as one by one the SWAPO leaders returned from abroad, one was struck by the spirit of delight and determination everywhere: even though people were nervous, deeply resenting the continued existence of the repressive apparatus, and the feebleness of the UNTAG mandate ("while these people are beating us, the UNTAG are monitoring it—they are watching it happen and writing it down!"), they were no longer afraid to express their feelings and hopes.

Voter registration at Eenhana, northern Namibia, August 1989

What sort of vote SWAPO will get remains nonetheless hard to predict. The issue of the "SWAPO detainees"—those suspected of being spies for the South Africans, who were held and tortured and in many cases disappeared in camps in southern Angola—is being used to maximum effect by SWAPO's opponents and will cost it some votes, though few in Ovamboland. There
are also inevitable limitations in SWAPO’s organizational and campaigning methods, which are aggravated by the hostility of most of the press and the bias of a good deal of the SWABC’s radio and TV coverage. Yet SWAPO has stayed on the offensive, putting forward messages of reconciliation and reconstruction, assuring the whites that they are welcome and needed, committing itself to a “mixed economy,” focussing on the need for peace and justice — including economic justice, land reform and educational and health reform. The SWAPO election Director in Otjiwarongo, Dr. Tjiten-dero, put it this way: “Whatever happens, SWAPO must be part of the independent government — this we know.” This is far from claiming that SWAPO will sweep 99% of the votes, or even the 67% that would be needed to allow SWAPO to write the new constitution without cooperation from other parties in the Constituent Assembly.

It is also eminently realistic. Anything less than a clear SWAPO majority would indeed raise doubts about the fairness of the election; yet the truth is that an overwhelming SWAPO win, while not excluded, is not only unlikely but would belie the realities of power in Namibia. The DTA, though probably weak in votes, or even the 67% that would be needed to allow SWAPO to write the new constitution without cooperation from other parties in the Constituent Assembly.

A second constraint could be the constitution itself. SWAPO has accepted the requirements imposed by the “Contact Group” (of which Canada was a member) which call for a charter of rights enforceable by the courts, no expropriation of private property, and so on; but more fundamental constraints could well arise from the way the civil service is reconstructed and state resources redistributed, following the abolition of the eleven so-called “second-tier” administrations — the quasi-Bantustan “statelets” for whites, for Coloureds, for Rehoboth, for Ovamboland, and so on. The new government’s ability to deliver on its promises to the grossly neglected African majority, especially in the north, depends on two critical factors: what happens to the civil servants in these apparatuses — only some of whom are competent and capable of working for a government bent on radical change, and how radical the “integration” of the crucial educational and health resources is, under the new dispensation. This is because the initial scope for improving the health, education and housing of the black majority will have to come largely from ending the duplication of facilities involved in segregated schools, hospitals and clinics, and the gradual diversion of freed-up resources to the underprivileged regions. The revenue resources of the incoming government are likely to be tightly limited. This year’s budget is in deficit to the tune of R80 million, even after major cutbacks due to the reduction of the previous year’s subsidy from South Africa of R380 million. While overseas aid will be available, it will not plug the gap left by the withdrawal of the South African war machine to the Republic and Walvis Bay. In Ovamboland, in particular, there will be a major problem: it is essentially a “labour reserve” with a subsistence economy, alleviated by a consumer sector of vast supermarkets and literally hundreds of “bottle stores” along the main road from Onipa to Oshakati, that have flourished on the spending of the 70,000-plus troops that were either stationed or operating in that area over the last 20 years. It is hard not to fear that the region is due for a severe crisis of unemployment and poverty which the temporary injection of UNTAG spending cannot long delay. It is also in Ovamboland that most of the 40,000 returning exiles have been absorbed with skills and energy, but no jobs to look forward to.

It is these internal economic, social and political constraints that seem likely to dominate SWAPO’s thinking and freedom of action in its early phase of power. Any new government would find it difficult to achieve much in the face of these problems, not least one whose leading cadres have experience primarily of diplomatic and military policy-making, and who are still supported within their own movement by only a thin layer of experienced and reliable professionals.
such as economists, lawyers, engineers, doctors, etc.

In addition, there is the economy’s basic fragility – its dependence on multinational mining operations and extremely capital-intensive and delicate white ranching – plus its integration into the economy of South Africa – not to mention South Africa’s continued possession of Walvis Bay, giving it a potential stranglehold over Namibia’s external trade, and the fact of South African ownership of so much of the private sector. In general, it is clear that in the long run real development in Namibia will depend on the liberation of South Africa and an end to the war in Angola, releasing resources from defence and permitting the development of rational trade and other links throughout the whole region.

Yet when all these constraints and problems are listed (and it is important to resist unrealistic expectations, overseas as well as in Namibia), the November elections lose nothing of their historic significance for the struggle against racism both in the sub-continent and world-wide. Canadians have a continuing part to play in helping to ensure that the democratic process in Namibia that has been so painfully achieved is allowed to continue unimpeded, and in seeing to it that the Canadian government is generous and sustained in its aid after independence.

**The Detainees Issue in Namibia**

In Namibia controversy is still raging around the issue of the “SWAPO detainees” – the young men and women who were suspected by SWAPO of being spies for South Africa, who were detained, beaten and then held in detention camps in Angola, in often atrocious conditions, and sometimes for years. There is some controversy regarding numbers; 170 ex-detainees have returned to Namibia and SWAPO denies there are any more, while a Parents Committee (of the detainee families) claims a further 98 died in detention and as many as 518 are still unaccounted for. There can be no doubt, however, that ugly deeds were perpetrated. In a recent short text on the subject which we further synthesize here Colin Leys, author of our lead article on Namibia in this issue, and Monte Narsoo have asked how this could happen.

South Africa did recruit spies who infiltrated SWAPO and there is evidence to suggest that South Africa’s military intelligence and its brutal counter-revolutionary activities were based partly on information from spies within PLAN (SWAPO’s army). SWAPO leaders suspected this to have been true, for example, of the 1978 attack on a SWAPO refugee camp at Kassinga in southern Angola in which 612 people were massacred, including 157 women and 298 children. It is within this context that what was to become an obsession with South African spies must be understood, Leys and Narsoo argue.

The problem was that SWAPO security personnel seem then to have beaten people mercilessly until they confessed to what their interrogators suggested. There is also evidence to suggest that the “spy crisis” pulled into it all SWAPO’s army, in fact, that the older generation of SWAPO activists coming out of Angola, releasing resources from defence and permitting the development of rational trade and other links throughout the whole region. Was this simply an aberration, a “dark chapter” in a savage war (as some SWAPO leaders are certainly willing to acknowledge)? Or does it point to a deeper problem of a lack of a democratic culture within the movement?

Certainly SWAPO is much more than its security service, or even its leadership. It remains the one movement that has consistently fought for national liberation; tens of thousands of Namibians have dedicated their lives to it. Many of the ex-detainees are not anti-SWAPO (and some, like Ben Boois, have even rejoined the movement); for them, as Johannes Gaomab put it, “it is not a question of destroying SWAPO, it is a question of ridding ourselves of pollution.”

Leys and Narsoo conclude that abuses on both sides should be investigated (and those responsible at least excluded from public life), constitutional mechanisms already agreed to for the protection of human rights firmed up and the development of strong and autonomous civil institutions (such as the press) facilitated. Ultimately, they argue, the democratization of Namibian society as a whole is the firmest guarantee of justice.
Lesotho: Of Coups and Commoners

BY ELIZABETH ELDREDGE
Elizabeth Eldredge is a professor of African history at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro.

(The author travelled most recently to Lesotho in June-July 1988 and May-June 1989 to do historical research. The following article is not related to formal interviews conducted on these trips which were solely historical in content, and informants are in no way responsible for the information contained in the article.)

On May 26, 1989, Joel Moitse, a Lecturer at the University of Lesotho, was arrested and detained without charge under the provisions of the Internal Security/General Amendment Order of 1986. His arrest followed an undercurrent of political protest in which numerous activists, including Moitse, had been trying to pressure the military government of General Justinus Lekhanya to allow free political activities, political parties, and full and fair elections. During a meeting on the first of June the University congregation of academic and administrative staff unanimously resolved "to condemn the practice and principle of detention without trial; and to demand the immediate release or charge of Mr. J. R. Moitse." Shortly thereafter Moitse was released.

What happened? Why was Moitse arrested, and why was he subsequently released? In fact, this case reveals much about what is going on in Lesotho. Although Moitse was not the only person detained, he was the only one who had connections with the University. There was a strong sense in the academic community that his arrest was intended as a message to the University staff that they were not to meddle in politics. The government demanded that the University dismiss Moitse from his academic position, although five other political leaders who had joined him in signing a declaration challenging the government were not even questioned.

Having witnessed the fear which prevented such open expressions of opposition under the previous regime of Leabua Jonathan, I was amazed at the degree to which people now feel more free to speak. The arrest of Moitse and others indicated the limits to this freedom, but the presence of open dissent was encouraging. Moitse gained his freedom when his lawyer challenged his detention in the High Court, even before a complete hearing was held. In addition, Amnesty International had brought pressure to bear, notifying numerous human rights organizations across the world and threatening to declare Moitse a "prisoner of conscience." This is just the kind of adverse publicity which the government had been trying to avoid, and no doubt it played an important part in securing Moitse's release. Moitse was immediately served with a restriction order similar to those common in South Africa, but nevertheless was back on campus within a day to show his continuing defiance of military rule.

The army comes to power
In order to understand, more generally, attitudes towards the current military regime, it is important to have some sense of the context in which the 1986 coup occurred. Lesotho politics cannot be understood solely with reference to internal political factors, given the country's obvious dependence on the tolerance, if not good will, of South Africa. But to attribute internal politics solely to South African manipulation and maneuvering does not give adequate recognition to the various political forces which lie behind developments in the country.

The coup resulted from a complex interplay of internal and external factors. As other writers have pointed out (SAR April 1986) Lesotho had suffered from increasingly divisive and violent conflicts in the period leading up to the military coup of January 1986 which brought General Lekhanya to power. Jonathan, once a client of the South Africans, had increasingly become a thorn in their side as he became defiant and sought international legitimacy. South Africa took advantage of the deep splits within Jonathan's own government and exerted pressure through a border blockade; it was no surprise that the government was deposed within three weeks.

But domestic responses to the coup were shaped, in large measure, by considerations of internal politics. Long riddled with corruption, Jonathan's government was evolving into a reign of terror. The ruling Basutoland National Party had allowed the BNP Youth League ("Bacha") to gain increasing power and autonomy from the Police Military Unit (PMU). Some of these youths were trained by North Koreans, and many were armed. They had been terrorizing the country for over a year before the coup.

When the coup occurred, it was staged by the Police Military Unit against the Youth League, which was under the influence of two of Jonathan's ministers. Jonathan, himself influenced by these ministers, had refused to curb the activities of the armed BNP Youth, and the power of the PMU was distinctly threatened. The timing of the coup on January 19 is said to have been in response to knowledge that the BNP Youth League were themselves planning a coup for the following day. If so, the PMU pre-empted this coup. Certainly general opinion was that the PMU had saved the coun-
try from the increasing terrorism of the Youth League. After the coup huge sums of money were reported to have been found in the homes of the ministers who controlled the Youth, indicating that they may well have been on the verge of launching a Youth League coup.

The downfall of the Jonathan regime was therefore regretted by few. But the new regime of Lekhanya also quickly lost credibility and support. A high degree of collaboration with South Africa was immediately made evident when the ANC was thrown out of the country. Moreover, the South African offer to build a military hospital at the main base outside Maseru provided the pretext for SADF personnel to flood the country, in the guise of "advisors."

Military rule
The track record of the military regime has been mixed. In November 1986 the two ministers who had overseen the rise of the BNP Youth League under Jonathan were abducted with their wives and two others and murdered. Yet at the same time the military government allowed another former minister to challenge the legality of the present government in Lesotho's High Court. Although the Court upheld the legality of the military government, it subsequently ruled that the state of emergency was invalid. The government refused to recognize the Court's jurisdiction in this matter, however, and the state of emergency continues, with all political activities and political parties banned.

The military government has succeeded in re-establishing a certain stability: people can sleep at night, and are not afraid to open their doors after dark, as they were in the last years of Jonathan's rule. Moreover, the government has shown a greater tolerance of dissent than did the Jonathan regime. Arrest and expulsion may not reflect democratic freedoms of expression, but while he was in detention Joel Moite had access to legal help and visitors of all kinds, and in some measure to due process of law in the courts.

Local papers regularly publish articles which are critical of the government. But they are not allowed to go too far. After the Mirror, a weekly paper known for its critical stance, published an article exposing the corrupt activities of the powerful finance minister, its editor, Johnny Maseko, was expelled from the country. It is said that this minister, who has retained ministerial posts through both the Jonathan and military regimes, was able to keep his job only because Pik Botha intervened from across the border to insist that he be protected at any expense.

Most people in Lesotho appear to want the soldiers to "go back to their tents." The government has attempted to meet this challenge in several ways. It is attempting to elaborate an ideological justification for its rule. The Minister of Information and Broadcasting, V. M. Malebo, recently put forth the government position, asserting that past politicians were responsible for suspending the constitution and destroying the country's peace, whereas the current government "has embarked on a programme to achieve peace, reconciliation and development" (Lesotho Today, 6 April 1989). The military position is that a return to a democratic party system would bring a return to violence.

Faced with escalating demands for a return to democratic processes, the Lekhanya government has followed the lead of its prominent neighbor by holding elections.
for local councils with the promise that eventually, when the country is “ready,” elections at the national level will be held. This approach falls far short of meeting popular demands for a government responsible to the people. Various political leaders from the past have continued to issue statements through the international press rejecting the formation of local councils and the Maseru Town Council as inadequate; they instead have insisted on the restoration of the 1966 Lesotho Independence Constitution and free Parliamentary elections.

It is not clear to what extent Lekhanya’s government has faced more serious challenges to its position. Rumours of coups abound, but exactly when, where and how coups have been attempted is hard to confirm. The more convincing reports suggest that there may have been a palace coup last year, which was nearly successful. According to unconfirmed reports Lekhanya was sent home to the mountains for a brief “vacation” until a couple of South African helicopters circled around to make their point clear. Since that time it has been generally accepted that Lekhanya’s position is almost entirely dependent on South African support.

Living with South Africa

Lesotho’s relationship to South Africa raises complex questions. Any Lesotho government has to calculate very carefully the extent of its cooperation or resistance to its powerful neighbor. While Lekhanya personally seems dependent on South African support, other important members of the Council of Ministers and the Military Council support a “realpolitik” approach which they define as complete cooperation. There appear to be deep divisions within the government over this issue. Some forces aligned with the government in development efforts see themselves as resistant to South Africa’s efforts to control the country.

The Highlands Water Project, still in the early stages of development, is at the heart of this debate. Its most controversial aspect is the extent of South African control over the project and the water. It has been estimated that the Vaal River area of South Africa, which produces 59 percent of its GDP and contains 42 percent of the country’s urban population, will be short of water for industry and drinking by the year 2000. There are rumours that in December 1985 the Jonathan regime was ready to reject the Highlands Water Project treaty which grants South Africa access to Lesotho’s water resources. This in turn may have played a key role in the timing of South Africa’s January 1986 actions against the country which contributed to the coup. Certainly, in contrast to Jonathan, the military government willingly signed the Lesotho Highlands Water Project treaty in 1986. Many people feel that the military sold out the country by compromising its sovereignty. Furthermore, many are distressed that while South African companies and workers are getting the contracts and jobs, an estimated 20,000 people will lose their land and livelihood as large areas are flooded. Finally, there are no guarantees that funds generated by the project will ever benefit the people of Lesotho as a whole.

In the long run the stability of the regime will depend both on the support it receives from South Africa and on Lekhanya’s ability to play off competing forces within the country. At least two other high ranking military officers command significant personal followings and loyalty within the rank and file of the military. This has served as a counterbalance to Lekhanya’s personal power. Rumours circulate freely about the vacillating loyalties of various officers, suggesting there may be deep splits within the military council itself that have yet to surface publicly.

The role of King Moshoeshoe II is also ambiguous. At the time of the coup he was made executive head of the government, and in this capacity he still presides over the regular joint meetings between the government Council of Ministers and the Military Council. This initially lent considerable legitimacy to the military government as the king has always enjoyed widespread public support and served as a popular rallying point during the Jonathan years, part of which he spent in exile. His subsequent association with the military government has raised grave doubts about his role in the minds of many people. In spite of this ambiguous role, however, the king has continued to elaborate an ideology of development for the country which espouses social justice as well as economic advancement.

Admittedly, the military government walks a thin line. Given the country’s vulnerability vis-à-vis South Africa, it is unavoidably under severe constraints, and can exercise little choice with regard to political positions it can take on the international scene, even if its leaders were inclined to be uncooperative. It is unlikely, for instance, that the ANC will be allowed to return to Lesotho. The 1986 coup demonstrated decisively that South Africa will not hesitate to intervene in Lesotho’s internal affairs, with force if necessary, although providing support for local collaborators is certainly the cheapest and simplest method of obtaining cooperation. In the meantime, however, the current government has thus far allowed more internal dissent than did Jonathan’s regime, and has provided some space in which opposition and resistance groups focussing on regional problems can operate. Basotho support for South Africa’s democratic movement is critical, for until democratic forces prevail in South Africa, the people of Lesotho will continue to face both external and internal constraints to their political freedom.
Concerned observers (including the contributors to the present issue of *SAR*) have every right to agonize over the errors — past and present — committed by the leaderships of Angola and Mozambique. However, we must remain fully aware of the sinister conspiracy — global as well as regional — whose destructive intentions have magnified those errors and succeeded in giving them much more negative resonance than they might otherwise have had. A recent article by Prexy Nesbitt (“Terminators, Crusaders and Gladiators: Western (Private and Public) Support for Nambo and Unita”) in the *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 43 (1988) makes useful reading in this regard.

As Nesbitt reminds us, President George Bush has called liberation movements “the war in the shadows” and labelled that shadow war “our most active threat for the remainder of this century.” Along similar lines, Ray Cline, now a member of the World Anti-Communist League but formerly Deputy Director and Operations Chief of the CIA, asserted at the outset of the Reagan administration’s second term that “the most urgent task of all for the United States in the troubled world of the 1980s is to find the way and the will to stop wars of national liberation.” Cline, a close friend of the South African Defence Force, went on to say that the South Africans had shown the way; with a strong government and lots of economic resources, “they (the South Africans) had really pinned back the ears of the ‘liberation movement’ down there”!

Nesbitt also reminds us of how this perception of the world has come to underwrite the global American strategy of “low intensity conflict” — and that strategy’s application to southern Africa. Thus, at least $30 million in U.S. covert aid went to South African-backed Unita during the period 1986-87 and it is likely that millions more went via private contractors during the 1976-86 period when official U.S. involvement was legally prohibited by the U.S. Senate’s Clark amendment. According to John Stockwell, former CIA Task Force Chief in Angola, in all probability hundreds of millions went to Unita not only in CIA covert funds but also from arms sales to Iran and from money raised in Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Brunei.

After identifying some of the key right-wingers who form Savimbi’s European support network and public relations team, Nesbitt again focuses on the U.S. In 1986 Unita hired the Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly PR firm to arrange visits to Unita camps inside Angola and to create a positive public image for the movement; one of the associates of this firm was Lee Atwater, later to head the Bush presidential campaign and now chief of the Republican National Committee. One of the firm’s key targets has been the American black community, as it has teamed up with some conservative black organizations and individual publicists and personalities to saturate the black community — especially in the churches — to present Savimbi as the true black Angolan leader.

With only mixed success, fortunately. Take Savimbi’s 1988 tour of the south-eastern United States, for example. A highlight of the trip was Savimbi’s being awarded the Medgar Evers Humanitarian Award by Charles Evers, mayor of Fayette, Mississippi, and former associate of Dr. Martin Luther King. However, Medgar’s widow, Myrlie, led an outcry against Savimbi, stating that her husband would never have approved the selection of Savimbi for the award. Following this statement, wherever Savimbi went to speak protestors were prominent and vocal in publicizing Savimbi’s links to South Africa.

Yet Savimbi’s supporters have continued to win important legislative gains in the U.S. Besides the 1985 repeal of the Clark amendment, for example, there have been the Proxmire-McCollum Amendment (HR 5548) prohibiting the U.S. Export-Import Bank from new lending to the MPLA government, the DeConcini Resolution (S. Res 381) requesting the President to block business transactions that conflict with U.S. security interests in Angola, and others.

The public relations and legislative initiatives, coupled with overt and covert assistance and diplomatic manoeuvring constituted a powerful made-in-the-USA war machine for Savimbi. Claimed Lt. General Colin Powell, President Reagan’s National Security Advisor, “it was only after the United States began military aid to the Unita freedom fighters in 1986 that the Angolan regime started to take seriously the idea of a negotiated settlement.” Yet the United States could still present itself — with some apparent success, judging by media response — as a disinterested moderator in recent Angolan peace talks!
Nesbitt documents similar networks, in Europe and the United States, at work on behalf of Renamo’s war against Mozambique, and includes reference to two different, even competing, U.S. government-sponsored government operations in support of Renamo — this in spite of the well-publicized State Department’s Gersony Report exposing the barbarities of Renamo tactics. If, as seems likely to be the case, there is more to know about these and other matters we must hope that American activists like Nesbitt will continue to investigate them and keep us informed.

**Renamo (Canada)**

Canada has its own Renamo story, of course. Many Canadians were appalled to learn, just over a year ago, that our government had granted refugee status to Francisco Nota Moises, Information Secretary (read propagandist and fund-raiser) for Renamo. When questioned, External Affairs and Immigration could not pass the buck fast enough. They blamed each other and, when pressed, said Moises could not be ousted from Canada since he had broken no Canadian law.

With the controversy afoot regarding his presence in our midst, Moises had the sense to keep his head down here. Any inquiries at his government-subsidized house in Victoria were answered with a steady “he’s out of the country.” In fact, there have been news reports putting him at Renamo meetings in Europe and in Mozambique during the time he has been resident in Canada.

However, his most recent trip cannot have been the fun-filled journey he expected. A recent Reuters news report says that Moises has been replaced by a new information secretary, Vicente Ululu.

We don’t have any word as to Ululu’s whereabouts. But Renamo already knows with what a fond eye our government views it. Canadians might see that name again some time soon — much closer to home.

**Mozambique—Canada**

Judith Marshall, whose sobering account of Mozambique’s Fifth Congress — its substance and the context that defined it — appears elsewhere in this issue, adds here a more personal note, directly relevant to those who seek more positive links between Canadians and Mozambicans than those exemplified in the sordid tale of Nota Moises.

“As a long-time solidarity activist, it feels strange to bring back from my recent trip to Mozambique both a sobering analysis of the larger conjuncture and, at the same time, a report of a fascinating experience with the growing cooperative sector. Mozambique’s Nampula province this summer provided the setting for a participatory research process in the Nampula Green Zones Cooperatives, where I worked with a team of Mozambican agricultural extension agents, adult educators and cultural researchers. As part of a bottom-up planning process, itself designed to facilitate more effective development work within the

![Participatory research process in a Nampula cooperative](image)

**image**

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**s.a. notebook**

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COCAMO (Cooperation Canada-Mozambique) project, the research team collaborated closely with the General Union, the umbrella organization linking together the 40 cooperatives in the Nampula Green Zones. Peasant leaders in the GU worked with us to define what information they most needed in order to service the cooperatives that make up the union.

"After a week-long hands-on training workshop that opened up discussion of the coops in Nampula (and the researchers' own experience in working in them), the role of NGOs, basic notions of community development, and participatory research methodology, the 24 person team collected data in 11 cooperatives, interviewing 181 coop families. After preliminary processing of the data we returned to the coops, presenting our findings through dramatizations, panel discussions, brochures and posters. Another tool used on our return to the coops was fill-in charts depicting the resources, needs and problems indicated to us by the members themselves. A large blank space was left at the end of the chart for local plans of action to emerge from the collective analysis of the results.

"For the NGOs and solidarity groups long active in Mozambique, it is certainly not the moment to pack up shop. As my Nampula trip underscored for me, there certainly remains interesting terrain for Mozambican action at the local level and for NGO support of it, working alongside the very people who have borne the brunt of South Africa's brutalities over the years."

Another Kind of Visit

Judith Marshall has not been the only recent visitor to southern Africa. Word is out via Private Eye, the British muckrakers, that Mark Thatcher, Mrs. T's only begotten, paid a top secret visit to Pretoria in June (Private Eye, Aug. 18, 1989).

Ostensible purpose of the trip? According to PE, Houston-resident Mark was acting on behalf of business associate Oscar Wyatt, a Texas oil man who owns Coastal Corporation. What with new opportunities for foreign investors apparently on the horizon in Angola (see Victoria Brittain in this issue of SAR), Mark wanted to meet with Unita reps, with whom Wyatt has been associated.

But the plot thickens when it is learned that General Malan, South Africa's Defence Minister, personally arranged the hush-hush security for the trip. And Mark himself made it clear, says PE, "that he was there with the full knowledge and support of his mother, who was eager to see Savimbi play a significant role in the post-peace settlement Angola." What gives? Perhaps the British wish to avoid further rows in the Commonwealth by keeping their diplomacy in the family. Or perhaps it's just congenital. After all, Maggie's hubby Denis is himself no stranger to the clammy embrace of apartheid capital.
Eyuphuro

"You like? You like this music?" These were about the only English words which singer Gimo Remane of the Mozambican group Eyuphuro could say. But when he shouted them out at a concert, the audience always responded with a resounding "Yes!" Wherever the band played, the audiences clapped and cheered and sometimes danced, and more often than not gave them a standing ovation.

Eyuphuro came to Canada through the initiative of TCLSAC and with financial assistance from Partnership Africa Canada. (CUSO, OXFAM and COCAMO played facilitating roles.) With the recommendation of Bruce Cockburn, who had heard the band when he visited Mozambique last October, and an impressive tape recorded in Europe several years ago, there was no difficulty in arranging performance dates on the Canadian summer folk festival circuit. The group played at the three big festivals - Mapirosa, Winnipeg and Vancouver - and at several smaller Ontario festivals, as well as performing special gigs in Nelson and Victoria, B.C., Seattle, Washington, and several other cities. Eyuphuro's participation at the World of Music, Art and Dance (WOMAD) Festival in Toronto proved especially fruitful, with plans in the works for Real World Records (Peter Gabriel's label) to pick up Eyuphuro's new tape, which was recorded in Toronto during the summer. A WOMAD tour in 1990 which will likely bring them back to Canada is also planned.

Eyuphuro means "whirlpool" in Makua, one of the languages of Nampula province in northern Mozambique, where the group comes from. "In the same way that a whirlpool draws everything to its centre, we take in the music we hear around us," explained Gimo, referring to the unique blend of African, Arabic and European influences evident in the group's music. And like a whirlpool, Eyuphuro's music conveys energy and motion, particularly with the charismatic performance of lead female vocalist Zena Bakar, who Canadians may remember from the Alter Cine/NFB film "Mozambique: Riding Out the Storm." Zena and Gimo between them write all of the group's contemporary pieces. Other members of the group include the very talented guitarist Chico Ventura, an "awesome" percussionist by the name of Musa Abdul, Belarmino Godeiros also on percussion and Mario Fernandes on bass. Travelling with the group was CUSO cooperator Bruce Burron, who served as translator and tour manager.

Eyuphuro presented to Canadians the cultural side of Mozambique - vibrant and creative - a sharp contrast with the usual African images of war and famine, of distended bellies and excruciating poverty. Those who heard Eyuphuro play, no matter what else they hear or learn about Mozambique, will never be able to think of Mozambicans simply as helpless victims. Eyuphuro's tour demonstrated the value of cultural solidarity by allowing Canadians to see the resilience and vitality of the Mozambican people and their remarkable ability to create even in the face of extreme hardship and adversity.
Making Contact: The Education Tour—Mozambique

This July three teachers and three high school students from Ontario participated in a three-and-a-half week education solidarity tour to Nampula, Mozambique. The tour was coordinated by TCLSAC member Helen Wooldridge as part of the programme of the “Backing the Frontline Against Apartheid” project.

The objectives of the tour were to enable Canadian teachers and students to make direct contact with their counterparts in Mozambique and to provide an opportunity for Canadians and Mozambicans to explore the possibilities of future work together. The tour group was able to visit a variety of education and community structures, including secondary schools, teacher training colleges, hospitals, cooperatives and refugee communities. They met with provincial and city education officials and administrators and with members of the National Teachers’ Organization (ONP).

In contacts with Mozambican teachers and students the Canadian group was able to gain some idea of the day-to-day realities of living, teaching and learning in the face of terror, devastation, deprivation, bureaucratic chaos and growing corruption in Mozambique. What follows are their reflections, together with some comments from their Mozambican colleagues.

No amount of reading, discussion with returned co-operants, or experiences working in another southern African country could have prepared me for the working conditions of teachers in Nampula province... The image of a struggling education system became much clearer on arrival in Nampula, a small, northern city surrounded by pockets of armed bandits and suffering the effects of the Economic Recovery Program... But many positive signs were in evidence too. One model teacher, Obert Chizacale, who used student-centred methodology and organized an English Club on Saturdays, inspired us in so many ways... He even taught second language adult education classes in the evening. How we admired this shining light in the frontline of education!...

Canadian teacher Brenda Dolling

You know, the people here are so strong and defiant. The MNR will destroy and they [the people] rebuild, destroy and rebuild just to be demolished again. What I saw today cannot be expressed in words. It was expressed in the eyes of the women when they watched their children sing for us or when we praised the lunch prepared for us. Mozambicans have pride, but a much different pride than I have ever encountered. Or do they? Some of them do. I was wrong. I have seen this pride before. It is among all humans. I just noticed their pride and joy because when they smile, their entire faces light up...

Canadian student Tiffany Jarva

I’m really happy to know new phrases and friends from other countries. So that I know they know the problems of my country and can help me to solve them. It is surprising to me that some of the problems of Canadian students and Mozambican students are the same...

Mozambican student Mario Tarupe

On one of the Sundays, the English Club students of Nampula Secondary School decided to take us on a walk a student from Nampula makes every day to school. We headed out optimistic and convinced that this would be a great learning experience... Once our walk was finished (two and a half hours of walking only one way) we were hot, frustrated and tired. How does a student do this every day and then start right into their studies at school?...

Canadian student Jennifer Ferrari
These are not people to be pitied, so save your pity. These are people to be admired...

Tiffany Jarva

I feel deeply involved in developing this program for war-traumatized children in the district of Malema. It is important to involve other teachers. There are many displaced children and orphans who are suffering. They need freedom from stress and to feel self-confident again. In my pedagogical position during assessments and monitoring, I train the other teachers to do what we are learning during this workshop. That way we are all empowered...

Enrique James Adique,
education officer
for Malema district

Solidarity is sharing - experience, materials, stories. Discussions and work with Mozambican teachers constantly reinforced for me what teaching really is. I return with a clearer global vision of justice for all children, as well as enormous respect and gratitude for their teachers' efforts.

Canadian teacher Linda Slavin

If there's one thing I brought back with me, it was the many faces of the Mozambican students. Those faces put meaning to the struggles against poverty, violence, injustices, and especially the struggle against white South Africa's policy of apartheid and its powerful control of southern Africa.

Jennifer Ferrari

I was surprised at the amount of laughing I did. The Mozambicans are still living to the best of their ability. There is nothing more beautiful than children singing in harmony, women dancing from within their souls, and proud fathers and husbands watching...

A solitary tear,
Fallen,
Not of pain,
Nor of grief.
But for the fortunate
Which I have become.

Tiffany Jarva

It is clear to me that, as a Canadian teacher, I must tell our counterparts' stories here in Canada. I am obligated through the bonds of friendship and shared hopes for Mozambican teachers to find ways to make connections between Mozambique and Canada and between politics and education. It is my responsibility now to help Canadian teachers see the connections between social justice in Mozambique and in Canada and strengthen this fledgling network.

Brenda Dolling

For more information about the tour or the "Backing the Frontline" project, contact TCLSAC.
No Life of My Own:
Chikane’s Autobiography

BY HAROLD WELLS

Harold Wells is associate professor of Systematic Theology at Emmanuel College, Toronto School of Theology.


South African whites annually celebrate their victory over the Zulus at the battle of Blood River. These are some of the pressing questions that faced a thoughtful black South African school boy on one such “day of the covenant”:

Are whites richer and do they dominate us because God loves them better than us? Did they defeat our forefathers, and mothers, because God was on their side? Is God with us or with the oppressors? If God is on the side of the oppressor, can the oppressed worship that God and pray to that God to save them from the merciless oppressor?

Much of this story of Frank Chikane’s life is about his struggle to maintain his warm, impassioned evangelical faith in the face of critical attacks upon Christianity made by fellow students and political activists.

Successor to Desmond Tutu and Beyers Naudé as General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches (and former General Secretary of the Institute for Contextual Theology), Chikane is now a major figure in the Christian resistance to apartheid. We now know that he poses a strong enough threat to the Pretoria regime that Chikane suffered a sustained attempt to poison him during a recent visit he made to the United States.

This account of his early life (for he is still only thirty-eight years of age) reveals much to the reader about the nature of the South African reality. He describes and analyzes the apartheid system through telling the stories of his life, and the result is far more dramatic and powerful than if he had merely explained it all in prosaic form. A moving chapter written by his wife helps us to empathize with the pain, complexity and sheer terrifying danger of raising black children in South Africa, and of having for a husband an outspoken, remarkably courageous black leader.

Unlike most of the Christian political opposition in South Africa, Chikane is from one of the pentecostal churches, the Apostolic Faith Mission. He is critical of the church in which he was raised and of which he is an ordained minister. He is aware of an “overemphasis on the spiritual-vertical relationship with God—over and above the social—horizontal dimension.” As a pastor he has had to struggle with the leaders of his own church (especially, but not only, white missionary leaders) in order to be engaged in local social and political action on behalf of his people. When he was arrested for solidarity action in opposition to the operations of apartheid in his community, his church suspended him, and ejected his family from the manse. Being taken unceremoniously from his house in the night, he was continually assaulted, imprisoned for months without charge or trial, and brutally tortured, in an
effort to obtain information, and a confession of treason. His experience of imprisonment and torture led him to a deep "theology of the cross":

I felt it was a matter of life and death for me to suffer for the sake of others, the weak in our society, the brutalized, for the sake of Christ's body, that is the Church. I felt more empowered to say to my torturers during my fifty-four hour ordeal, men who had told me I was going to die "slowly but sure" that FOR ME TO LIVE IS CHRIST, AND TO DIE IS GAIN (Phil. 1:21) ... I said to them: "If I die now I will be with the Lord. This is gain for me and even for the kingdom." But if they let me live I would still have to live for Christ, and it would mean continuing to challenge the evil apartheid system in South Africa.

Chikane remains warmly loyal to his church, and most of the ordinary members of his church were loyal and supportive of him in his time of trouble. He notes how large and strong the pentecostal and indigenous forms of Christianity are amongst the poorest and most oppressed of South African blacks. Well aware of the Marxist charge that religion is the opiate of the masses, he sees that these churches are in many ways close to traditional African spirituality in which God and faith are an integral part of everyday life. He knows that his church fails to be holistic in its lack of a systemic analysis of social and political structures, and constantly challenges his church and others to take up this aspect of Christian mission. The questioning school boy, despite a very conservative theological education, gradually struggled toward what we would call a black liberationist theology, yet seems to have combined this (in a way reminiscent of the American black theologian James Cone) with a deeply emotional, personal evangelical faith, which is perhaps often lacking in the "ecumenical," mainstream churches. A substantial section of appendices, including a number of letters, official statements and legal documents completes this very moving and valuable book.

And Still They Dance
Women, War and the Struggle for Change in Mozambique

BY MEG LUXTON

Meg Luxton teaches Women's Studies at York University and has traveled and researched in southern Africa.


Stephanie Urdang has chosen a good title, for it captures the main theme of her book: despite extraordinary odds, women in Mozambique continue to struggle for their own liberation in a newly-founded socialist society. Despite the devastation, they celebrate their courage and strength, and they dance. The project that produced this book began as an investigation of what happened to women in Mozambique after independence from Portugal in June 1975. It became a record of "the violent attempt to destroy this nation and what the women had tried to achieve."

Such a project is a complex task that requires untangling the various and intertwined effects of the sexism of pre-colonial societies, the impact of colonialism with its own brand of European sexism, the liberation struggle, the policies of the Frelimo government officially committed to women's liberation, the activities of Mozambican women and the war of destabilization waged by South Africa. The task is made more formidable by the horror of the current war in Mozambique, a horror so profound it is often hard to grasp from the comfort and security of contemporary Canada.

And while the book is a tribute to the strength and courage of Mozambican women, it was written as part of the effort of solidarity organizations in Europe and North America "to spread the information as widely as possible" about attempts to build a socialist society in which women are fully involved and the regime in South Africa that is determined to smash those efforts. Urdang's account challenges us to know what is going on, to understand it, and implicitly, to take an active stand in solidarity with Mozambicans. In particular, by showing what happens when gender struggle is not dealt with, it challenges socialists - be they government leaders, solidarity activists or Marxist theorists - to take seriously the politics of gender.

Between 1980 and 1987, Urdang visited Mozambique four times for lengthy periods. Much of the book...
is framed by Urdang describing her travels inside Mozambique, using her own experiences to discuss the political, economic and social life she observed. The book’s core, and its strength, is found largely in her interviews. Urdang captures encounters vividly and the people she meets have personality and vivaciousness. Their stories are compelling and Urdang gives their voices space. The pictures which begin each chapter are wonderful. But the interviews are also used to develop Urdang’s analysis; each woman’s story, while unique, represents the kinds of stories which make up Mozambique’s recent history.

Overshadowing the whole country and all its efforts at economic, social and political transformation to socialism is the war. If there are still people who believe South Africa’s propaganda that this is really a civil war, Urdang’s book will disillusion them. She documents the policies of destabilization: deliberately induced famine, obliteration of whole villages, massive ideological propaganda attacks, and brutal torture and slaughter. Fertile land lies unfarmed, transportation routes are impassable except by military convoy. The emotional damage suffered by so many has generated enormous social problems. With so much energy going to the war and so many people in refugee camps, the first priority is survival.

The reason for the war lies in the type of society Mozambicans are struggling to build out of the earlier devastation of a particularly brutal European colonialism. The revolutionary government had a vision of an African socialism which included the liberation of women. President Samora Machel argued:

The liberation of women is a fundamental necessity for the revolution, the guarantee of its continuity and the pre-condition for its victory.

Central to Frelimo’s programme for women’s liberation was the full integration of women in production. Urdang documents various impressive efforts made to facilitate this integration. Paid literacy classes, affirmative action hiring policies, special training programmes on the state farms where a few women now have well-paid jobs, for example, as tractor drivers. However, she notes that there are serious problems with Frelimo’s policies and their implementation.

There is enormous resistance from men: “Men were furious that women were promoted, over their heads, to higher wage categories.” Male resistance frightens women and constrains their options. One woman decided to stop going to literacy classes because when she did, her husband was left to get his own food and water (the provision of which is ‘women’s work’) and so: “He could decide to get another woman, saying ‘This woman is prepared to cook for me. You don’t want to.’” As Urdang notes: “Patriarchal attitudes are alive and well in Mozambique.”

Furthermore, Frelimo’s understanding of women’s liberation is shaped by Marxist theory, which is largely gender blind. Machel’s speeches reiterate socialist ideas that women’s liberation depends on socialist transformation; but there is no sense that women’s liberation is necessary for socialism. While it is understood that traditional attitudes and practices keep women subordinate, there is no realization that gender struggle exists. More problematically, official policy discourages discussion about gender conflict, denying that women and men have conflicting interests, and urging women to take care of their families.

Urdang gives many examples of the way this thinking has shaped government practices and acted to constrain women. The Organization of Mozambican Women (OMM) is not an autonomous women’s movement; it is closely tied to the Frelimo party. “Empowerment, where it exists, is still something bestowed on women by men.” Urdang notes the economic implications of this sexism. In developing agricultural policies, no provision was made to include women, who are the majority of family farmers, in the planning process. “As a result, national policy has focussed much more directly on cash cropping and surplus than on ensuring food for daily consumption.”

By equating women’s liberation with involvement of women in production, official policies and practices have mainly left untouched the sexual division of labour in the household. To be sure, day care is understood as a priority and provided wherever possible, but it is available so that women can participate in production. There is, however, no challenge to the idea that child care and domestic labour are women’s responsibilities. As a result, women work far longer hours at more arduous work with fewer social supports than men do. It is much harder for women to get involved in their unions, cooperative committees or in politics. The Mozambican experience indicates that despite real improvements in the opportunities for women after independence, the failure to politicize the sexual
division of labour, and to politicize the relationship between heterosexual couples, are major blocks to the full realization of socialism. As Urdang asks, can any society succeed in changing women’s lives without recognizing and confronting directly gender struggle and the way all men are united in their continuing exploitative practices? For her, the lesson from Mozambique is clearly no.

I was very moved by this book. Urdang’s descriptions are incredibly powerful and there were passages of the book which made me cry. I’ve passed it around to lots of people because I think it will persuade those who haven’t thought much about the struggles in southern Africa to pay more attention and to involve themselves in solidarity work. For that alone it is important. My one regret with the book is that although Urdang’s analysis assumes premises of socialist feminist politics and shows the problems inherent in a Marxist social theory which fails to theorize and politicize gender, she doesn’t really develop that analysis or argue her point. I’m afraid that the book will end up confirming the analysis of those already convinced of the centrality of gender struggle, without persuading those committed to a gender-blind socialist politics to rethink their analysis and change their practice. Until the socialist movement internationally fully understands the centrality of gender, we will continue to repeat our mistakes and the struggle for socialism will be that much harder.

Readers’ Forum....

SHELL ON COAL

29th June, 1989

We object most strongly to the passage in your article entitled “Sneaking Around Sanctions” (May 1989) which alleges that Shell is involved in a scheme to import South African coal to Europe, thereby circumventing the oil embargoes of Britain and France.

Not only has the author erroneously suggested that coal and oil embargoes are the same thing, but he ignores the fact that there are no British, French or European Community sanctions on the import of South African coal. Shell companies are therefore fully entitled to trade South African coal into Europe and have never sought to hide their involvement in this business.

Nor do they ever pretend that South African coal is anything but South African coal as the author implies. The documents accompanying Shell sales of coal, whether to end users, traders or to other Shell operating companies, always clearly indicate the country of origin of the coal. Furthermore, Shell companies do not knowingly sell South African coal to any customers who indicate that they do not want or who are not allowed to use South African coal.

As is well known, no Shell company is supplying oil to South Africa, and has not done so for a number of years so there is no question of violating any oil embargoes either.

We totally reject and abhor apartheid and although we do not share the view of those who believe that sanctions will help to speed up the process of change that we all wish to see in South Africa, we do not of course deny their right to express their view. They should do so however on the basis of fact, and not by using deliberately misleading and false information.

Yours truly,
for: Shell International Petroleum Co. Ltd.
M. Le Q. Herbert

SAR REPLY

Just in case we thought nobody was listening...

We’re happy to have the difference between coal and oil brought to our attention. And on one point Herbert is right: there are no EEC sanctions on South African coal, in large measure because British PM Thatcher scuttled any moves in this direction. We’re not quite sure why Herbert wants to crow about this.

And anyway, we do think that he protests a bit too much. Shell did, after all, obtain the right to export coal from SA by promising to maintain oil supplies, according to a 1979 statement by SA’s Minister of Economic Affairs. They say they don’t do it anymore...

We assume that Shell is feeling the heat from the international Shell campaign, in Canada involving the newly formed Alberta Anti-Apartheid Coalition, as well as various other groups. SAR readers are invited to contact the AAAC, P.O. Box 3085, Station B, Calgary, Alberta T2M 4C6 for further information. And we’re thankful to Mr. I. Herbert for providing us with the opportunity to remind our readers of this campaign.
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