Southern Africa REPORT

States of Siege
Mozambique
Angola

Economic Reform in Mozambique
Angola: South Africa's Viet Nam?
Botha Promises - Again
Southern Africa REPORT

is produced 5 times a year by a volunteer collective of the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (TCLSAC),
427 Bloor St. W.
Toronto, M5S 1X7
Tel. (416) 967-5562

Submissions, suggestions and help with production are welcome and invited.

SAR is a member of the Canadian Periodical Publisher's Association.

Subscriptions

Annual TCLSAC membership and Southern Africa Report subscription rates are as follows:

SUBSCRIPTION:
Individual (1 year) $15.00
Individual (2 years) $30.00
Institution $30.00

MEMBERSHIP: (includes subscription)
Regular (Canada) $30.00
Unemployed $15.00
Student $50.00
Senior $300.00

Overseas add $5.00

Contents

Editorial
States of Siege ........................................... 1

Economic Reform in Mozambique: Two Views
I: Strategic Defeat or Tactical Retreat? .......... 3
II: Classes in Formation? ......................... 6

Angola: South Africa's Vietnam? ................. 11

Hard Times/Soft Copy: A Journalist's Notebook 14

"What Has Ruined Our Lives Is the War":
Voices from Nampula ................................ 15

Remembering Samora .................................. 19

Botha Promises ... Again .............................. 21

To Rebuild a Nation: Refugees Return ........... 23

Canada – Mozambique: The Moises Connection .... 25

Southern Africa Notebook .......................... 27

COCAMO – Canada in Mozambique ............... 29

Apartheid's Racquet: Extending the Sports Boycott 31

Letters .................................................... 33

S. A. R. Collective

Betsy Alkenbrack, Jonathan Barker, Margie Bertrand,
Lois Browne, Gene Desfor, David Galbraith, Linda Guebert,
Dave Hartman, Lee Hemingway, Carole Houlihan, Mary MacNutt,
Judith Marshall, Alberto Mourato, Hélène Moussa,
Colleen Omanique, Otto Roesch, John S. Saul,
Joe Vise, Jonathan Vise, Mary Vise

Cover design by Dave Hartman
Cover photo by Alfredo Mueche/AIM

Printed by Union Labour at Action Print
Jean-Jacques Rousseau may have said it first, and most clearly: "No man (sic) can have thought long upon the means of bringing any government to perfection without realizing a host of difficulties and obstacles which flow less from its inherent nature than from its relations with its neighbours"! All too true for the Lusophone states of southern Africa, Angola and Mozambique, both of which have spent the years since winning independence from Portugal under a virtual state of siege. As readers of SAR will know all too well, the siege has indeed been mounted by these countries' most powerful neighbour, South Africa, although it has also come from the wider capitalist world. And it is a siege that remains in place, in one form or another, right up to the present moment.

In this issue, we take our readers to the front lines of the struggles undertaken by both Angola and Mozambique to lift this siege, to fight back militarily, politically, economically. And in Angola, as Victoria Brittain confirms from recent visits there, military gains by the MPLA government and its Cuban allies have been of crucial importance, inflicting the most serious setback upon the South African aggressors since the beating back of Pretoria's march on Luanda in 1975, the first year of Angolan independence. With this victory, Angola has opened up substantial breathing space for itself, as Brittain shows, though how far this can really be consolidated at the bargaining table remains to be seen. For South Africa continues to drag its feet on the question of independence and meaningful elections in Namibia and the Americans bluster about their continuing commitment to the cause of Jonas Savimbi, egregious ward of both South Africa and the United States.

Nor can such a victory even begin to compensate for the high price South Africa and the United States have already exacted from Angola, the latter's independence day hopes now lying in tatters around it. This is a theme we have addressed in other issues of SAR; it is one we detail more vividly with reference to Mozambique in several articles of the present issue. Of course, a South African-sponsored war of aggression - carried out through its agent, Renamo - also grinds on in Mozambique (see our feature on a Nampula refugee family for a particularly graphic reminder of the human cost of this war). Pretoria's siege is, indeed, the single most important determinant of the deep crisis that has come to grip the country. In response, Mozambique has sought
both to fight back and, as Paul Fauvet reports, to gain breathing space of its own via the diplomatic route and a resuscitation of 1984's Nkomati Accord with the South Africans (who, Maputo hopes, may now be ready to honour it). But in seeking to lift the outside world's siege, a weakened Mozambique has also been forced to make a considerable range of concessions, not least in economic terms. The South Africans may have been slow to honour Nkomati but it seems clear that the United States and other western countries took it as a signal that socialist Mozambique, weakened as it was by the South African stick, might now be ready to respond more enthusiastically to global capitalist carrots. Enter a range of western aid agencies and, as John Loxley underscores, in these pages, the IMF and the World Bank with their nostrums regarding the centrality of an unbridled free market to economic recovery. To be sure, Mozambique had its own reasons for altering some of the mistakes made in its economic development programme in the direction of a more "feasible socialism," including more sensitivity to the role of the market, world-wide and local. But so vulnerable had Mozambique become (particularly in terms of balance of payment problems) that many feared tactical defeat was turning into strategic retreat for the country's original socialist and egalitarian hopes.

This is, in fact, the issue broached in the two lead articles, by John Loxley and Otto Roesch respectively, in the current issue. Loxley sketches the economic situation which has given rise to Mozambique's novel entanglements in the international monetary system, and some of the strengths and weaknesses of its attempt to retain its own sense of progressive direction in the face of these entanglements. Roesch's approach is even more sobering than Loxley's, emphasizing the possibility that Mozambique's strong dose of "market socialism" is helping to consolidate new privileged classes there who are developing a strong vested interest in a quite conservative status quo.

Serious issues are at stake here. Needless to say, we must continue to support Mozambique in the teeth of South African aggression, but if Roesch is correct, external supporters must also face up to the fact that the Mozambican state is now, itself, the object of very intense inter-class struggle. In consequence, the international solidarity movement has less reason than ever to operate with an uncritical conception of that Mozambican state, of its being unequivocally "progressive," of its being monolithic in its commitment to revolution and socialism. For too long, perhaps, external supporters of Frelimo, most especially past and present cooperantes, have tended to maintain a conspiracy of silence with respect to abuses of state power and class contradictions within the Mozambican state, all in the name of solidarity with a Frelimo confronted by external destabilization.

The saving grace, as so often in the past, may lie in the fact that Mozambicans themselves seem prepared to engage with some of these contradictions. For example, there was sharp and remarkably open debate - one "without any taboos" in the words of President Joaquim Chissano - at July's Frelimo Party National Conference, a debate which touched upon issues ranging from the downgrading of rural cooperatives to the costs, in terms of price rises and new charges for social services, of the "structural readjustment" package accepted by Mozambique. In response, and in pointing the way forward to the Party's Fifth Congress to be held in July, 1989, Frelimo's Central Committee "reaffirmed its commitment to a socialist path of development for Mozambique." Time alone will tell what content this commitment will have, but readers can expect SAR to monitor carefully the run-up to that Fifth Congress, for it is as likely to be a watershed in Mozambican history as other Congresses have been before it.

Can anything more be said about the role of progressive external organizations towards a Mozambican state that is no longer easily conceived to be a monolithic revolutionary bulwark committed to the defense of people's power? Some such organizations may even begin to think it preferable to increase the political and material support going directly to more autonomous non-governmental organizations (cooperatives and unions, for example) whose leadership might be thought to be more accountable to their constituents than state bureaucrats and party officials are to theirs. We would not presume to judge such issues here, merely to suggest something of the potential significance of an on-going debate about the direction that developments in a besieged Mozambique are taking.

Nor would we wish such nuances to blur the absolutely central point made earlier: that even such negative turns as the development process may have taken in Mozambique are still in the main the by-product of the nature of Mozambique's "relations with its neighbours." There can be no doubt of our responsibility to stand firmly beside Mozambicans in this grim hour. We may, of course, doubt the firmness of the Canadian government's resolve in this regard in light of its willingness, discussed in this issue, to accept a Renamo spokesperson in our midst as a refugee. It is particularly appropriate, therefore, that this issue also contains Judith Marshall's first-hand overview of the most impressive of current initiatives that seek instead to bind Canadians and Mozambicans more closely and directly together in the struggle for a free and humane southern Africa. Can there be any question that Cooperation Canada Mozambique - COCAMO - warrants the hands-on support of all Canadians of good-will? We intend to keep you informed of the progress of this project in future issues of SAR.
Economic Reform in Mozambique: Two Views

For the past four years the government of Mozambique has been undertaking sweeping reforms of its economic system. Since 1987 reform efforts have been intensified under an IMF/World Bank-sponsored Economic Rehabilitation Program. On the surface this appears to be a standard stabilization and structural adjustment program of the type imposed by the international financial institutions on the vast majority of African states since the global crisis in 1982. This has led many observers to conclude that Mozambique is abandoning its policies of socialism and self-reliance, embracing instead export-oriented capitalism. Such an interpretation is, however, premature. The reform program must be placed in the context of the options open to Mozambique which is in the midst of what is, perhaps, the most severe economic crisis in Africa. An understanding of the severity of the economic collapse is required in order to appreciate the limited scope of policy choice open to the government in the short run. The key issue then becomes that of whether the reforms are tactical or strategic in nature; whether short-run expediency to generate economic recovery commits the government to a long-term strategy at odds with Frelimo's socialist policies.

Mozambique's economic problems take the form of a collapse of production resulting in shortages and inflation, acute foreign exchange problems and a government budget which cannot be balanced. Real output has fallen by a staggering 37% between 1981 and 1985. The country continues to experience acute famine, currently affecting no less than four million people, and to suffer such generalized food insecurity that food aid reached over $200

I: Strategic Defeat or Tactical Retreat?

BY JOHN LOXLEY

John Loxley, chairperson of the Department of Economics of the University of Manitoba, has been a consultant to various African governments regarding their dealings with international financial agencies.

Southern Africa REPORT  october 1988
million (U.S.) last year. Mozambique's balance of payments problems are exceptional even in a continent plagued with such problems. Export earnings at $80 million are less than a third their level in 1980 and less than 20% of total imports. At $450 million, imports are themselves only a half of their 1981 level, leading to severe goods shortages. The balance of payments deficit is over $400 million.

The external debt of Mozambique is completely beyond servicing. Total debt is about $3.2 billion of which arrears of debt payment now total $1.4 billion. The annual debt servicing commitment, before recent rescheduling agreements, reached two and a half times the total of export earnings; interest payments alone exceed annual foreign exchange earnings.

The budget deficit is now greater than 50% of government spending and the proportion of the budget devoted to military spending has reached 40%.

There has been a marked deterioration in social services in much of the country. One indication of this is that infant mortality rates are now 325 to 375 per 1000, some three to five times as high as those in other low income sub-Saharan African countries. Mozambicans have suffered massive falls in their standard of living over the past ten years.

Causes of the crisis

Most of the major causes of the crisis have not been of the government's own making. The South-African-backed Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) has destroyed much of the country's infrastructure and productive capacity in its destructive campaign to undermine the Frelimo government. The warfare has been costly in lives, physical resources, finance, foreign exchange and general disruption. In monetary terms it is estimated to have already cost $7 billion. It has also prevented the government from implementing longer term policies of economic and social development, compelling it to focus on short-run survival.

Economic warfare with South Africa has also been costly as the apartheid regime continues to squeeze Mozambique. Cuts in the number of miners allowed into South Africa are estimated to have cost Mozambique $588 million, contributing significantly towards the country's loss of import capability.

Severe and recurring droughts have also played a role in reducing output and diverting imports, as on occasion, have floods.

The global recession has also reduced world prices for Mozambique's exports, but this has been a minor problem relative to that of maintaining — let alone raising — supplies.

Yet as long ago as 1983 the Fourth Congress of Frelimo concluded that faulty domestic economic policies had also played an important role in causing, and in helping to prolong, the economic crisis. The Congress identified poor incentives for farmers and excessive/inefficient state interventions as prime factors. Low producer prices and shortages of incentive/producer goods were said to help explain poor production levels, as were over-regulation of prices, too much state activity and too many inefficient state farms.

Linking up with the IMF

In a bid to deal with the economic crisis — and it must be appreciated that whatever its origin, the Frelimo government had no option but to attempt to deal with it — the State has taken a number of interrelated, often quite controversial initiatives. Since 1984 it has introduced a reform of domestic economic policy, joined the IMF and World Bank, sought closer economic relations with western countries and actively pursued closer economic and military ties with SADCC neighbours.

Domestic economic reform has consisted of a major devaluation of the currency, initially from 40 meticais per dollar to 580 with the ultimate objective of reaching 1500. There has been a liberalization of imports including more discretion given to private importers. A firm limit has been placed on foreign borrowing while outstanding debts have been rescheduled. In June 1987 Mozambique received the most generous Paris Club rescheduling terms ever offered — a twenty-year repayment period with a ten-year grace period — reflecting the intractability of the debt servicing problem. It is to be noted, however, that even after rescheduling, annual interest payments on debt alone still exceed anticipated commodity export earnings.

Mozambique has undertaken to halve the relative size of its budget/parastatal deficits, to limit money supply growth and to significantly reduce the number of commodity groups subject to official price controls, from 40 to 28. It is reviewing the performance of state enterprises with a view to taking remedial measures, has retreated from its state farm policy and is actively seeking foreign private investments.

These reform measures were part of an agreement with the IMF/World Bank which led to Mozambique receiving balance of payments loans of over $100 million per year from these institutions and opened the door for the favourable debt rescheduling. Bilateral donors, including the USA, Scandinavian and European countries, have also pledged assistance. With no less than $6.5 billion being required between 1988 and 1992, assistance from aid donors is considered vital.

When it became obvious that the Soviet Union and its allies were not willing or able to give the level of assistance needed, Mozambique had no alternative but to turn to the West for assistance. Furthermore, there is no question that closer ties with the West were considered vital in strengthening the effective sup-
port, diplomatic, military and economic, for Mozambique in its war against South Africa.

The reform program is best seen as a pragmatic recognition of the vital necessity to restore output. This could not be achieved without a massive inflow of foreign exchange and a rescheduling of Mozambique's huge foreign debt service commitments. An agreement with the IMF and the World Bank was a prerequisite for these. Furthermore, it is clear that the state machinery had not been strong enough to effectively play the role originally envisaged for it by the Party. The growth of the "candonga" (black market) was evidence enough that large volumes of transactions were by-passing state institutions and that the price mechanism was, in any case, informally replacing the mechanism of the state allocation of resources. To some extent, therefore, the reforms represent a formal acknowledgement of what was already a reality. But they go beyond this in recognizing that increased production will, in part, require appropriate financial incentives, through relative price adjustments, to encourage the production of essential commodities; to provide safeguards for "vulnerable groups" through nutrition programs, cheap imported food, public works programs for the unemployed and the provision of land, agricultural inputs and credit to those returning to the rural area. In spite of this, large sections of urban society can expect declining real incomes in the near future until rapid economic growth is restored. Fortunately, the program seems to have already generated an expansion of output. In 1988 both industrial and agricultural production rose for the first time in years. If this can be sustained, it will make adjustment measures easier to absorb politically in the immediate future.

Whether the reforms represent a long-term strategic shift away from socialism and self-reliance or merely a tactical move designed to reverse the chronic economic decline remains to be seen. Certainly the program has generated controversy within Mozambique and there are those who feel that current policies are a betrayal of Frelimo's vision of social and economic transformation. Yet there are indicators that the reforms are seen in tactical terms by the government and that longer-range goals have not necessarily been abandoned. The government has insisted on retaining the rationing system for allocating essential consumer goods. It continues to control prices for and plan production of essential commodities; it raised wages and is planning to introduce school meals to help offset the impact of price increases on poorer sections of the urban community. The state continues to exercise discretion over major allocation decisions. It refused to accept a system of allowing the free importation of goods by those able to generate their own foreign exchange, as happens under many IMF programs, as it fears the closer integration into the South African economy which this might bring. Likewise, key sections of the economy, such as the sugar industry, are protected from unrestrained competition from imports. Finally, Mozambique designs its own reform policies. This is in stark contrast to other African states who passively accept programs produced in Washington by the IMF and the World Bank.

All of this suggests that the government of Mozambique has not abdicated responsibility for shaping the future direction of the economy; nor has it abandoned its concerns for equity. It can expect, of course, to face constant pressure from the international institutions, for many years to come, to conform more closely to their preferred market model of economic management. Predictably, there will be those in Mozambique who share this view and hence one can expect political tension around reform in the coming years. Certainly there can be no guarantee that what may well be tactical moves at the moment will not degenerate into a full-scale acceptance of export-led capitalism further down the road.

But this assumes the political sustainability of current reforms and about this there must be some question. In spite of pay increases retail prices have risen much faster than wages as resources have been shifted to the rural areas. Large declines in real wages will eventually put pressure on the government, especially as they come on the heels of several years of falling living standards. The government does have plans to provide safeguards for "vulnerable groups" through nutrition programs, cheap imported food, public works programs for the unemployed and the provision of land, agricultural inputs and credit to those returning to the rural area. In spite of this, large sections of urban society are likely to experience declining real incomes in the near future until rapid economic growth is restored. Fortunately, the program seems to have already generated an expansion of output. In 1988 both industrial and agricultural production rose for the first time in years. If this can be sustained, it will make adjustment measures easier to absorb politically in the immediate future.

Sustainability of recovery will depend crucially, however, on the extent to which these types of reform can be effective in the context of the war. There are no precedents for attempting reform in such a context elsewhere in Africa. Although the program acknowledges the potential difficulties by aiming at longer term, phased reform, the severity of war destruction and the war-induced insecurity and uncertainty make the prospects of success uncertain to say the least. There can be no denying that in the final analysis the answer to Mozambique's economic crisis will lie in containing the South African-supported military activities of the MNR.
II: Classes in Formation?

BY OTTO ROESCH

Otto Roesch is a member of the SAR Editorial Working Group who lived and worked in Mozambique for two years between 1981 and 1983, and again for four months in 1986. He recently returned from a two-month working visit and prepared the following report.

Returning to Mozambique after a prolonged absence always gives one pause. This most recent visit, after an absence of two years, has left me with a strong feeling of ambivalence about the present course of events in the country: a mixture of hope and disappointment. This ambivalence grows out of a sense that the Mozambican government’s new “Economic Rehabilitation Programme,” or “PRE” (the Portuguese acronym by which it is known in Mozambique), represents an important turning point in the political and economic life of the country. This new IMF-approved structural adjustment programme has, in effect, severed the country’s last links to the radical “voluntarism” of the immediate post-independence period, in which political mobilization was seen as the principal vehicle of social change, and moved the country into a new phase that can perhaps best be characterized as “market socialism,” in which social change is seen much more as a function of market forces. The PRE, in fact, though productive of some significant economic results, is moving Mozambique decidedly in the direction of a market economy, with social and political consequences that will not be easily contained within the parameters of Frelimo’s still avowedly socialist project.

The PRE

The PRE has its roots in the major economic reforms introduced after
the Frelimo Party Fourth Congress of 1983 which sought to correct past errors in the socialist economic policies Frelimo had pursued up until that time. By turning to a more market-oriented economic strategy, Frelimo hoped to be able to put the country's economy on a stronger productive footing, so as to better resist South African aggression and ride out the economic crisis this aggression was precipitating. The rapid escalation of the war after 1983, however, crippled the Mozambican economy and dramatically increased the country's dependence on foreign aid. Mozambique joined the IMF and the World Bank in August 1984 in the hope of obtaining better access to international lines of credit. But with a foreign debt totaling US$3.2 thousand million in 1986, and with the country's export earnings equaling a mere 14.5% of the total service costs on this debt, Mozambique's bargaining position was not very strong. Following protracted negotiations with both organizations during 1985 and 1986, Mozambique's continued access to external lines of credit became conditional upon reaching agreement with the IMF on a package of economic reforms aimed at pulling the country's war-torn economy out of its steady decline. The PRE is the product of this agreement. Though publicly the Mozambican government has always insisted that the PRE is its own programme and not something foisted on it from outside, privately some high-level officials have admitted that they had little choice but to accept the “package” being proposed by the IMF. Whatever the case, there can be little doubt that Mozambique's serious economic crisis has significantly limited the government's economic space for manoeuvre and its ability to pursue an independent domestic economic policy.

The salient features of the PRE have been (1) an opening to market forces, based on a general liberalization of domestic pricing structure and easier access to capital inputs for the private sector, (2) a series of dramatic devaluations of the national currency, (3) a stress on “fiscal responsibility”, and (4) an attempt to stimulate export production (most notably agricultural production). The implementation of these measures has entailed sharp consumer price increases, increased taxation, reductions in public spending (most notably the introduction of unprecedented health care charges), and the privatization of many state enterprises. At the same time, the rescheduling of foreign debts and increased aid from donor countries (especially Western countries) has greatly increased the supply of capital and consumer goods, these being needed to rehabilitate and stimulate the country's economy.

Some initial successes
Despite being implemented in the context of an escalating war, which by 1987 had cost the country's economy over US$5 billion and created an emergency situation affecting the lives of over 4.5 million people, the PRE has succeeded in arresting the steady economic decline which the Mozambican economy had been experiencing since 1981, the year in which South African military destabilization started in earnest. According to the Mozambican government, the country's gross domestic product grew by 4% in 1987, the first increase since 1981. The government's 1988 target is for an 8% growth rate, with the general objective of restoring the country's GDP to its 1981 levels by 1990. Whether such ambitious growth rates can be achieved in the context of the present level of conflict remains to be seen.

For the person on the street, however, the changes have been more tangible (and sometimes more dramatic) than government statistics might suggest. Undoubtedly one of the most evident of these changes has been the sharp increase in the quantity and diversity of food stuffs and consumer goods now available on the domestic market, especially in urban areas. Where only a few years ago market stalls and shop window displays stood virtually empty, these now contain a wide variety of domestic and imported goods.
goods in quantities formerly unobtainable, even on the black market. Whereas the imported goods come from the new lines of credit made available to Mozambique as part of its agreement with the IMF as well as from emergency relief supplies provided by foreign donors, the domestically produced goods come from significant increases in agricultural and craft production by both household and private sector producers, who have responded positively to price increases and increased supplies of tools and raw materials.

Also on the positive side, though not attributable to the liberalism of the PRE alone, is a growing popular political irreverence and critical spirit, especially amongst city dwellers, aimed at the government, the Party and the country as a whole. This changing ideological outlook manifests itself in a variety of ways: in outspoken student criticisms of government policies, in popular jokes about political leaders and policies, in greater cultural freedom for artists and in more formal ways with the emergence of new semi-autonomous publications, the most notable of which is a business magazine which tends to look at the Mozambican economy from a private sector perspective. These developments undoubtedly mark a healthy development in relation to the lack of public debate and the deference to authority of previous years.

Some of the costs and contradictions
The principal institutional victim of the PRE has been the state apparatus, which has found its operating budget deeply cut in real terms because of the large devaluations which have taken place. Social services, in particular, have felt the pinch of sharp price increases in the face of stationary or even reduced budgets. The cuts in health and educational budgets have been especially painful at a time when the country’s educational and health networks have suffered enormous destruction at the hands of Renamo.

Ordinary Mozambican citizens, however, have felt the impact of the PRE most directly on their purses. Increased supply have also meant a significant reduction in purchasing power for those who formerly had access to officially priced goods through the government rationing system and the consumer cooperative network. The situation is especially grim for urban wage workers, with many families now seeking land in the peri-urban agricultural areas of major cities (known as “green zones”) in order to grow the food they can no longer afford to buy. In some cities, such as Maputo (the national capital), the growing land shortage being created by this trend is giving rise to serious ecological and political problems for the government, problems which are being greatly exacerbated by the influx of tens of thousands of displaced people fleeing Renamo terror in the countryside.

Despite the food price increases introduced by the PRE, the purchasing power of the peasantry has been similarly reduced. Though a major purpose of the PRE has been to stimulate agricultural production, especially of export crops, the current official price structure in place throughout the country suggests that the incentives offered peasant producers are inadequate to stimulate sustainable increases in production. Even taking into consideration the limited size of the official marketing system before the PRE and the corresponding important role played by the parallel market, a major imbalance would now appear to exist in the terms of trade between agriculture and manufacturing. Crop price increases simply do not match the high prices for tools and consumer goods. In Nampula Province, for example, peasant producers in 1986 (i.e. before the PRE) had to sell only 10.4 kg of rice to buy one metre of cloth (at official prices), whereas now in 1988 they must sell 33 kg of rice to buy this same metre of cloth. Official government figures show that a similar imbalance in terms of trade applies to other crops as well. This imbalance has also served as a disincen-
tive for capitalist farmers, who have seen the costs of all factors of production (including labour) increase, without commensurate increases in agricultural prices and productivity (tonnes/hectare).

Though recent government figures suggest some modest growth in marketed agricultural production, especially by the peasant family sector, it is hard to imagine how such growth can be sustained under the present price structure. Some government officials I spoke to suggested that the present pricing policy is only an interim measure aimed at reducing peasant cash reserves and the amount of money circulating in the rural economy, to be followed by new policies offering greater incentive to agricultural producers. But in view of the constraints which high prices and low wages are putting on urban demand, and the disincentive which deteriorated terms of trade constitute for sustainable increases in agricultural production, one might expect these new policies to be introduced very soon.

Only the entrepreneurial stratum, which continues to maintain more or less the same official margin of profit as before the PRE, and with the liberalization of the economy can now charge a market price for many goods and services, can be said to be holding its own in terms of standard of living. The private sector, in fact, is undoubtedly one of the principal beneficiaries of the PRE, which has greatly increased not only its economic but also its political space for manoeuvre. The opening to the market entailed by the PRE has been met with an energetic response by the merchant stratum in particular, which has significantly increased its role and control of the country’s economy, largely displacing the state at both the retail and wholesale level. The private sector’s public profile has also increased dramatically in relation to only a few years ago, both in terms of its visible manifestations of new-found affluence and in terms of its increasingly cordial relationship (one might be tempted to say alliance) with state officials at all levels. An indication of this new-found influence of the private sector is evidenced by a recent very large banking scandal in Nampula Province involving high-flying entrepreneurs who bribed enough bank and government officials to carry out a massive false cheque swindle which almost bankrupted the province. The well-connected mastermind of the scheme is now reportedly being held under a very comfortable house arrest.

And the war continues ...

The major obstacle to economic rehabilitation, however, remains the war. By disrupting production and transport over wide areas of the country, the war is cutting off large numbers of people from any direct contact with the domestic market and effectively preventing the PRE from operating in many parts of the national territory. Through its terrorist actions the Renamo has driven literally millions of peasants off the land, preventing them from producing, thus crippling the recovery and obliging the government to provide them with emergency assistance. And where peasants have remained on the land, Renamo disruption of rural commercial networks effectively prevents many agricultural producers from commercializing their crops, causing many to give up producing a marketable surplus altogether. In Nampula Province, for example, tens of thousands of tonnes of salt sit stored on the coast cut off from traditional inland markets, both in Mozambique and Malawi, because of Renamo attacks on transportation networks. Similarly, coastal fishermen have been reduced to the level of subsistence producers because of the difficulties of...
transporting their dried fish to inland consumers. Conversely, coastal markets for inland agricultural produce, especially manioc, remain inaccessible to inland producers. And in all areas of the province outside of urban centres, access to consumer goods and tools is sporadic at best.

A large part of what commercial activity does take place in the rural areas does so under the protection of the military by means of slow-moving military convoys and centralized stockpiling of agricultural produce and consumer goods in defensible district capitals, which are nonetheless often attacked and looted. This cumbersome way of organizing commerce, imposed on Mozambique by the war, is clearly a major bottleneck in the commercial development and economic rehabilitation the PRE seeks to foster.

Another side of the war, and in particular of the economic crisis it has fostered, has been the emergence of anarchic banditry, as distinct from the “banditry” of the Renamo, in both rural and urban areas. Not infrequently some of the looting and attacks publicly attributed to the Renamo are actually the work of armed individuals - either hungry and disgruntled militia or renegade Renamo terrorists - who find that a gun serves not only as an instrument of political power, but also as a convenient instrument of personal accumulation.

An even more troublesome concomitant of this tendency to seek personal profit from the war, lies in the tendency of some Mozambican army officers to see the war against Renamo (which absorbs over 40% of the state budget) as a means for personal profit. By appropriating the pay of the troops under their command and by diverting food, fuel, building materials and other resources being channelled into the war effort onto the black market, some sectors of the officer corps of the Mozambican armed forces have come to develop a vested interest in the continuation of the war, rather than in its end through a military defeat of the Renamo. The impact of such practices on the morale and fighting efficacy of the rank-and-file is self-evident. This problem is one which deeply concerns the Mozambican government and is one of the main reasons for the ongoing shake-up the Mozambican armed forces have been experiencing since even before the death of Samora Machel.

Whence the class struggle? The corruption problems of the Mozambican armed forces are not isolated incidents limited to the military, but part of a wider struggle over the class character of the Mozambican state as a whole. In the context of the economic crisis precipitated by the war, the PRE’s severe austerity measures and its legitimation of the pursuit of individual profit have made it very difficult for even the most committed cadres to accept the sacrifice entailed by continuing to live only on their official salaries, without also engaging in parallel economic activities in order to make ends meet. For others less committed to the socialist ideals for which Frelimo still stands, the possibilities and temptations of using public office to further one’s own personal interests are now very great. While lower level district cadres and petty provincial bureaucrats might peddle influence, accept bribes to look the other way, or use public vehicles for private purposes, higher level cadres, bureaucrats and military officers are now in a position to use their political offices to acquire land, build comfortable villas, and purchase expensive imported luxury goods. The PRE has now even made it legal for party members to employ wage labour - a far cry from Frelimo’s traditional commitment to ending the “exploitation of man by man.” A growing public awareness of these trends is reflected in a widespread popular joke which refers to this new policy phase not only as the PRE (Economic Rehabilitation Programme) but also the “PRI,” for “Individual Rehabilitation Programme.”

In noting these developments, I do not wish to suggest that the Mozambican state has become indistinguishable from many other African states, where political office is a means to personal enrichment, but only to point to a growing trend that does not augur well for any ongoing process of socialist transition. There can be little doubt, in fact, that the state has become the central focus of class struggle in Mozambique. What is at issue is whether the state will remain an instrument of popular power, committed to serving the Mozambican people, or whether it will become a vehicle for personal profit by a ruling elite, as has been the case in much of the rest of Africa. In pondering such weighty questions one is reminded of the words of Marcelino dos Santos, elder statesman of Frelimo, who replied as follows to a question put to him during an interview in 1973 (during the period of armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism), as to how Frelimo would seek to ensure the continuing popular character of its revolution after independence:

The main defense [of a genuinely revolutionary denouement to the liberation struggle] must be to popularize the revolutionary aims and to create such a situation that if for one reason or another at some future time some people start trying to change these aims, they will meet with resistance from the masses.

In surveying the political evolution of post-independence Mozambique however, one finds that while Frelimo has indeed done much to popularize the revolutionary aims of the liberation struggle, it has not been as successful in creating the institutional conditions that would enable the Mozambican masses to effectively resist eventual deviations from Frelimo’s original revolutionary aims. For despite the considerable effort put into the creation of mass organizations, “like those for women, youth, workers, etc.” - continued on page 28
Angola: South Africa’s Vietnam?

BY VICTORIA BRITTAIN

Victoria Brittain, editor of the Third World page in the Guardian [UK], is a regular contributor to Southern Africa Report. She has twice visited Angola in recent months.

A new phase in southern Africa’s war has opened with the dramatic series of military defeats inflicted on South Africa by Cuban, Angolan and SWAPO forces in the first six months of this year. The date of November 16, 1987, when the Cuban Central Committee made the decision to reinforce its troops in Angola and force an end to the military stalemate with the South Africans, is likely to be seen in future as a date of equal historic importance to the arrival of the first Cuban contingent in Operation Carlota on October 4, 1975.

The current four-party negotiations on Namibian independence and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola could still be scuttled by Pretoria. But the implementation of U.N. Resolution 435 and the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia is a real possibility for the first time. The change in the military balance of forces is the main factor behind South Africa’s decision to go so far along the negotiating road.

Just how much the regional situation has changed in the last year can be measured against President Fidel Castro’s defiant commitment during the Non-Aligned Summit in Harare in 1986 when he pledged to “remain in Angola until the end of apartheid.”

At that time, morale across the Frontline States was low as Pretoria escalated violence inside and outside South Africa. For instance, Mozambique was living through its most desperate military crisis ever. A huge invasion had been organized by the South African Defence Force through neighbouring Malawi. It aggravated already acute tensions which peaked two months later with the death of President Samora Machel in a plane crash widely-believed to have been engineered by South Africa.

FAPLA (the Angolan armed forces) had not recovered from the serious losses sustained under South African bombing at Mavinga the previous autumn. Three southern African capitals were still reeling from South African aerial bombing sorties launched during the attempt by the Commonwealth Group to negotiate Namibia’s independence. Inside South Africa itself, the State of Emergency was taking an unprecedented toll of anti-apartheid organizations, and Pretoria had unleashed the new weapon of vigilante violence at the Cape township of Crossroads.

For the first time during the post-independence decade, military leaders in the Frontline States were discussing the previously unthinkable possibility that “the inevitable end of apartheid” might be much further off than they publicly predicted. The related question of Namibian independence was off the international agenda, and SWAPO’s prestige low in the region. The leaders’ pessimistic and private consensus was that as long as the white regime in South Africa was in power, Pretoria’s attempts to break its neighbours and the other Frontline States would escalate to the point where Nkomati-like agreements could become the norm.

South Africa would achieve the regional dominance it sought. “We are involved in a war to the death; it’s them or us,” said one senior South African official. In that context, Zimbabwean and Tanzanian troops were fighting in Mozambique, but a Cuban military presence in Angola “until the end of apartheid,” was the only perceived guarantee that Pretoria would not win that life and death struggle. When Fidel flew from Harare to Luanda, he was received...
with quite exceptional warmth and reverence as, literally, the saviour of Angola's independence.

Last November, however, Cuba concluded the time was ripe to aim for a precise objective. The deepening social, military and political crisis within South Africa itself, the fashion for regional detente being set in Moscow and Washington, and the passionate desire of the outgoing Reagan Administration to claim credit for dislodging the Cubans from Angola— all seemed to open up the opportunity for allied forces in Angola to push for implementation of Resolution 435.

It was a high-risk strategy decision, not least because FAPLA was facing grave difficulties in late 1987. The South African offensive, which had started with the improvement of infrastructure in northern Namibia in April 1987, was the most ambitious operation since 1975, according to Angolan military analysts. It aimed at the capture of Cuito Cuanavale and a completely new strategic base for UNITA to attack central Angola. FAPLA was already facing myriad attacks from an estimated 20,000 UNITA rebels. Savimbi's forces, now very well-equipped by South Africa and by U.S. funding, were increasingly well-trained in Morocco and Israeli-aided facilities in Zaire. UNITA attacks in the east and in new target areas in the north of Angola appear to have caught FAPLA ill-prepared. Logistical failures meant some units ran short of food and equipment with obvious repercussions on morale in Luanda.

But the extent of Cuban reinforcement during January rapidly changed the mood among the Angolan military. In the weeks of fighting the South Africans in southern Angola prior to the battle for Cuita Cuanavale in March, Cuban commanders stress the 'heroic' fighting of the FAPLA units alongside Cuban specialists in the area.

"The extent of the South African military crisis is more acute than has been generally understood," said Ronnie Kasrils, a senior ANC military official in a recent interview. "Following the defeat at Cuito and the politically unacceptable loss of so many nineteen-year-old white conscripts, their acknowledged loss of superiority to the Cubans and Angolans in the air, and the outclassing of many of the Armscor weapons, such as the G5 (long-range artillery) which used to be considered unanswerable, the South African generals are in deep trouble - crisis really is the word."

The military crisis was compounded by a social one. The fighting in Angola and Namibia was one of the issues which, earlier this summer, brought the 143 white youths to publicly refuse to do military service. In addition, the revelation that South African intelligence services have used young white women on high-risk attempts to infiltrate the ANC has brought the undeclared war deep into hitherto immune white suburbia.

As the first quadri-partite talks began in London in May, the military situation moved even more definitively against the South Africans. Combined Angolan, Cuban and SWAPO units pushed south to end the de facto no-go situation in Cunene province. As the allies moved towards the Namibian border, there were several heavy engagements with SADF units. The South Africans retreated over the border and Cuban engineering units rapidly installed anti-aircraft weapons to protect new forward airstrips at Cahama and Xanadoongo.

At the same time, the Angolans moved their southern military command into Lubango, unifying the command structures over Cunene and Cuando Cubango provinces. By June, the South African generals knew their forces inside Angola were not only beaten, but trapped. At a bi-lateral meeting with the Angolans in Brazzaville, they brought the highest level negotiating team and tried to woo the Angolans into an "agreement between Africans." Such an accord would have left Namibia out of the picture and swapped an SADF retreat from Angola for a Cuban withdrawal. A demilitarized zone along the Namibian border was proposed and the An-
Angolan/Cuban delegates were asked to leave the Rua dam area under South African occupation. For the first time, the informal proposal surfaced that ANC bases be removed from Angola in return for a cessation of SADF support for UNITA.

But this South African attempt to re-run the 1984 Nkomati scenario founded on the fact that, this time, it was South Africa in military crisis, not the opposing forces as had been the case in Mozambique.

In subsequent talks in Cairo, the South Africans made one more attempt at playing as though they had the upper hand. South Africa demanded a Cuban pullout from Angola over the same seven-month period that U.N. Resolution 435 provides for a South African withdrawal from Namibia. The U.S. delegation, lead by Dr. Chester Crocker, was obliged to rewrite their allies' proposal in order to prevent the collapse of the negotiations.

(Although Crocker's briefings to the mainstream press were adroit but inaccurate. He suggested that compromise was obtained by Soviet pressure on Cuba and Angola. If in fact, Pretoria had to consider the fate of its own forces inside Angola. There seems little doubt that Cuban soldiers could have hit the retreating South Africans much harder than they did, causing much higher casualties.

South Africa was prepared to sabotage the negotiations but couldn't afford to let them fail while SADF units were at the mercy of the Cubans.)

Angolans and Cubans adopted a pattern of exaggerated politeness. "The Cubans calculated that a public humiliation of the South Africans would be too much for Washington to swallow," said one Frontline State official after a briefing from Fidel in Havana. "The right would have been screaming about the communist threat to the region. So they gave Crocker all the public relations points he wanted."

The U.S. was allowed the public relations triumph of being portrayed as a mediator. The vital U.S. role was to work for effective and reasonable withdrawal by the Cubans before the November elections, has made it difficult for the South Africans to draw back from the commitment to begin implementing U.N. Resolution 435.

The hard bargaining on issues implied but not spelled out in the fourteen points which emerged from the New York meeting could still come to nothing. The most serious sticking point for the South Africans is ending their aid to Savimbi, especially as U.S. support for UNITA is not guaranteed without a Republican victory in 1988. For South African generals to give up their most useful, if expensive, regional policy tool would be as serious a defeat as the retreat from Namibia.

There are many who think that the quid pro quo of closing ANC bases in Angola would be a cheap price for Angola and its allies to pay. The South African government would try to replay Nkomati with the undertone of defeat for the ANC, but that would only confirm its own constituency. One Frontline State official expressed a popular view when he said "the ANC can train their people in at least four African countries which would be in some ways easier to work in than Angola."

If Namibian independence is won by a combination of some of these compromises, the new political era will affect the internal political situation of Angola and South Africa as dramatically as Namibia itself. No one in the region will soon forget that Cuba's military actions and readiness for sacrifice won for Namibians what years of western diplomacy could not. The democratic movement within South Africa is ending their aid to Savimbi, especially as U.S. support for UNITA is not guaranteed without a Republican victory in 1988. For South African generals to give up their most useful, if expensive, regional policy tool would be as serious a defeat as the retreat from Namibia.

There are many who think that the quid pro quo of closing ANC bases in Angola would be a cheap price for Angola and its allies to pay. The South African government would try to replay Nkomati with the undertone of defeat for the ANC, but that would only confirm its own constituency. One Frontline State official expressed a popular view when he said "the ANC can train their people in at least four African countries which would be in some ways easier to work in than Angola."
Africa has displayed remarkable patience with western negotiators in recent years, but the Cuban actions, especially those of the past six months, have indelibly influenced attitudes in South African townships. Similarly in Angola, those who have spoken in recent years in favour of ending the war with compromises, have been proven wrong. They will carry little weight next to this second generation of military men who have fought and won battles as decisive as those of the liberation war against Portuguese fascism.

**Hard Times/Soft Copy: A Journalist’s Notebook**

**BY VICTORIA BRITTAIN**

Hysteria was already rife in the protocol departure room at Lubango airport, when the combined forces of the BBC, Financial Times, VisNews and a half dozen U.N. officials found their party short of three passports and four boarding passes to get back to Luanda. But it was the cool and impeccable New York Times man who seized the protocol officer by the throat and shook him, to the accompaniment of a vivid stream of Hemingway-style language.

"Don’t you just love travelling in Africa?" said one of the more even-tempered U.N. men watching with interest as a tiny figure—the correspondent for the French daily paper Liberation—wrenched the American away from the astonished Angolan.

All the legendary stories about the horrors of dealing with western journalists, told with relish as doors slam against them in Information Ministries across Africa, are equally matched by the journalists’ stories of the horrors of dealing with impenetrable African bureaucracies. The two sides co-exist in a state of undeclared war.

But behind all the desperate jokes and the explosions of bad temper lies the serious issue of the deteriorating quality of media coverage of Africa. The scene at Lubango one day last summer illustrated a disturbing trend in African reporting over the last four years—the extent to which the United Nations has had to take responsibility for smoothing over the mutual antipathy and incomprehension between African governments and western journalists. It’s been essential for keeping African issues in the media.

All the journalists at Lubango, for instance, were on a trip organized by the U.N. High Commission for Refugees to highlight the normally invisible problem of Africa’s hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing war and starvation to countries with no resources to cope with them.

In Angola, timed neatly with a donors’ conference in Geneva called by U.N. Secretary General Pérez de Cuellar to raise $105 million for the country, the U.N. had organized visas, press credentials and logistics, plus interviews and briefings not only from international experts working in Angola but even from Angola’s President, Eduardo dos Santos.

Far ahead of editors and news desks, U.N. agencies awoke in 1983/84 to the link between Africa’s economic crisis and the collapse of the normal mechanisms of reporting. Capitals whose administrations and communication systems are flickering on the perpetual verge of breakdown can not function in tune with the world of laptop computers and instant communications.

In Angola, however, a journalist can keep a foothold in that world with the U.N. to open doors and with an editor who wants Angolan stories badly enough to pay $100 a night for bed and breakfast at the Hotel Presidente. There it is possible to get a phone call to New York or London in about four hours.

While most of Luanda was blacked out by a UNITA sabotage of electricity for a week last May, the Hotel Presidente’s generators ensured a working telex, lifts and air-conditioning. The hotel’s very name aptly reflects the standard the BBC, the New York Times or the Financial Times demands in Angola.

Sudden, unexpected contact with a lower standard (as at Lubango airport) is unwelcome, perhaps because back at the news desk the old expectations of instant ‘news’ still prevail.

Only the free-lance journalist can afford to try and report a country like Angola on its own terms. If you live in a flat on the 13th floor with no fridge and no lift periodically, and no chance of telephoning your news editor, his priorities swiftly drop from your consciousness. Getting going in the morning is slow because you must do things like clear the night’s haul of corpses from the mouse traps, boil the water for 20 minutes to clean your teeth, and sterilize the bread over the gas flame because of the cholera epidemic.

The day must then be organized round the tactful timing of visits to friends who have stocks of bottled water, those who have a generator and are keeping your cheese from the mould, and boil the water for you by burning chocolate bars at the dollar shop, and their delivery before they melt in the car.

Where provincial capitals can be out of communication with Luanda for days on end and district capitals remain unvisited for weeks, reliable information on anything from diplomacy to military engagements is available only from the first-hand testimony of those engaged in it. Journalists have to choose between waiting for it or pretending to know.
"What Has Ruined Our Lives Is the War": Voices from Nampula

AS RECORDED BY JUDITH MARSHALL

I first met Mario Tarupe in the English Club at Nampula Secondary School where he is a Grade 9 student, one of many from refugee families. He and two other students came to visit me the next day, shy and excited to speak English. When I explained my hopes of tracing the experiences of one refugee family, Mario willingly volunteered his story.

"My father had his dreams, his projects" – Mario’s story

When the war began we didn’t know what it was about. In a country at war, there are always people who take advantage. At first we thought they were just thieves.

The bandits really arrived in our area in 1985. Alto Ligonha [Zambezia] is 50 kilometers from the district capital, Gile, and has a mine nearby which had lots of soldiers and many workers in quite a big settlement. It was too strong for the armed bandits to attack. They concentrated first on Gile, the district capital.

In the first attack, 18 bandits were killed. Some people fled to Nampula even at that time. Over the next few months, the whole district came under attack. The mine was destroyed.

I came to do seventh grade here in Nampula in 1985. During the long vacation from November to February, my brother and I went back to Alto Ligonha. The war was everywhere. We couldn’t sleep in the house. Like everybody else, we hid in the bush.

At the end of the vacation, we were returning to Nampula in the military convoy, there was an accident. I don’t think we were attacked. Maybe one of the drivers thought he saw something and swerved. Anyway, there was a bad accident. Seven people died. We had to wait for four hours for first aid.

So many things happened on the way. Booby traps were laid for the convoy. The soldiers went to check out a blockade of trees and found two explosives. Then when we were just 25 kilometers away from Nampula, we came across a burning car...

When we got back, I was very ill for two months. It was a funny illness. Maybe it was caused by the war. We had had no food, no clothing while we lived there in the bush. I was just fourteen at the time.

School had already started. They said we were too late to register, so we helped my sister on her farm all year. In 1987 I went back to eighth grade. We soon heard that our locality had been taken by bandits.

My mother became ill because of the attacks. She arrived in Nampula in August 1987 with my sister Lucinda. My father took longer to get here because he still had a lot of food to deal with. There was no way to bring it to Nampula. My father grew a lot of things in Alto Ligonha—cassava, oranges, bananas, sugar cane, coconuts, cashews, pineapples, avocados, millet, peanuts, beans, both red and sugar, and peas. He started farming after independence in 1975. Before that he worked in Nampula. He had three people working for him in Zambezia. Cars from Nampula used to come to buy up the produce.

We also had houses with plenty of space in Zambezia, made with clay walls and thatch roofs. We had houses near our fields, with rooms for storing food and sleeping.

My father had his dreams, his projects. He wanted to buy a sewing machine for one thing. But he also
wanted to buy his own transport, so he could bring his produce directly to the market in Nampula and get a better price.

Next day Mario took me to visit his sisters, Luciana and Antonieta. For many years, Luciana has lived in Mutuanha, a crowded shanty town, where new refugee houses are springing up all around. Antonieta and her teacher husband Jorge Alberto live with a cousin in the Mutuanha resettlement area - rows of newly constructed houses, tiny kitchen gardens and a half-built school. We sat and talked in the shade of Antonieta's cousin's house, across from the parents' bamboo and mud frame, still roofless.

"The chalk gave me away" - Jorge Alberto's story

When the bandits came, they burned our school. Each time they passed by the village, they stole things from my house. The teachers used to build their houses near the school. When the bandits began to target teachers, we moved farther away. The villagers protected us, not revealing which houses belonged to teachers. The bandits discovered my house by accident because they found a box of chalk in it. The chalk gave me away.

I sent my wife and children to Nampula earlier in 1987. They came in September; I arrived in December. I don't have a house here yet. When I got here, they assigned me to a school 45 kilometers away. I haven't received my salary since January, so I don't have any money for a house. My wife and four children stay with her cousin.

"We were given a hoe ... but it is not enough" - Antonieta's story

I have a farm near the Monapo River with peanuts, millet and cassava. Seeds are expensive at the market. I usually spend a week on the farm and a week in the city. The older children stay with Luciana when I'm away. With the baby on my back and food on my head, it takes me seven hours to walk from the farm to Nampula.

We were given a hoe by DPCCN [natural disasters agency] but it is not enough. We really need more tools to work our farms.

The clothes we own are the clothes on our backs. When we go to sleep, they become our bedclothes. When we go to church, they are the clothes for entering God's house. We all have just one piece from the used clothing distribution. If people manage to get two pieces, they sell one in exchange for cassava.

We are all full of diseases. It's because of our poor diet. Yesterday we ate maize porridge and a sauce of cassava leaves. Today we had thin porridge for breakfast and nothing for lunch. Our diseases and sores come from not eating properly.

A few days later Mario and I returned to the Mutuanha resettlement. We found Mario's father and mother beside their roofless house, both very old and weary, his mother resting on a mat. Mario suggested we talk inside, open sky above us, surrounded by all his parents' worldly possessions - two sweaters and an old coat hung over the beams, two clay pots, a pan and a plastic plate.
What has ruined our lives is the war” — Mario’s father’s story

After independence, I farmed. I had fields of maize, cassava, beans and millet—and also a lot of orange trees, enough to send a truck to collect my oranges alone for market. I had a person working for me.

The bandits arrived in 1985. They came at five in the morning. Chickens—I had a lot of chickens there—they killed them all. They destroyed everything—suitcases, plates and cups, food, the lot. They killed three people and kidnapped more than 30—not just young people, but children and old people too.

We were there with four children, afraid we were going to die. We fled into the bush and stayed there for three days. Our house did not get burned that time.

The second attack came in 1987. Once again we fled into the bush and stayed hidden for four days. They killed our animals and kidnapped people again. The third attack came later in 1987—and after that, we fled for good. We spent two months in the bush, along with about 200 others from our village. We slept there, leaving our hiding places only to “rob” cassava from our own farms.

Mama left first for Nampula. I stayed for another month, thinking that it was going to end. But it didn’t. So I also came to the city.

They distributed land near the Monapo River—very far from here. You leave at five and only get there at nine. When I go, I stay for a week. I grow millet, peanuts and cassava there, but I don’t have a hoe. I borrow one. Mama also works on the farm when she’s well enough. But many days, she’s so weak she spends the day sleeping.

The peanuts have already been harvested—and eaten. All that’s left is seed for the next season. It’s the same with the millet. That leaves cassava. Now the only thing is weeding, waiting until December when it will be time to plant.

What has ruined our lives is the war.

A tired Mario arrived late the next afternoon to take me to meet another sister, Lucinda and her teacher husband, Balanca. He explained that he had been working very hard. I had been wondering how to thank Mario’s family and had decided to give Mario money for his parents house the day before. He had already bought plastic to cover the bamboo beams and spent the morning working with his father.

We met Lucinda in a sturdy house of bamboo and thatch. She went to call Balanca who appeared in a long coat with muddy hands and feet, carrying a bucket and tools. He had been working on their new house. Later Lucinda invited us to supper, so we stayed on into the night, talking under the stars about their lives in the village.

“The farm here is a mere plaything” — Lucinda’s story

I brought my sick mother to hospital last July. She had been living in the bush for months and she is an old lady. They said she had severe anaemia, gave her pills and told her she had to eat well. But how could she eat well, with no “machamba” (field) to grow food and the high prices in the market.

At first we stayed in Vasco’s
apartment. He’s the eldest son. But it was too much for him and his family in a small apartment. They already look after Mario and his brother while they’re at secondary school.

When Balanca arrived, we were able to buy this house with his back pay. But I haven’t been very well since we arrived. They can’t tell me at the hospital what the problem is.

The school has given all the teachers a plot of land near the school. I go there when I can but I’ve been quite sick since I lost the baby last year. Our machamba here is nothing. Compared to what we had in Zambezia, the farm here is a mere plaything.

“We all want to live” – Balanca’s story

The very first attack in our area came on November 28, 1983. The bandits were not successful, but they did steal produce from the villagers. After the Nkomati Accord was signed in September 1984, the troops assigned to our locality were taken out. We were left with the militia, working with old-fashioned arms, those rifles they call Mausers.

In November 1984, the bandits attacked again, this time organized into three groups. One attacked the militia troops guarding the bridge. Another set fire to the houses. A third stole all our possessions. Sixty-seven houses were robbed, with everything stolen, including the teachers’ houses. We lost a lot – clothes, dishes, food items. But they didn’t burn the school, the Frelimo Party office or the agricultural marketing warehouse.

The whole zone became very active. It was easy for the bandits to know what was going on in a village. Once, a second grade student of ours told them. They came one night, knocking at his grandfather’s door, saying “Open up, papa.” They asked about the village but the old man couldn’t speak Portuguese so he called his grandson. The old man and the child didn’t want to talk, but they were afraid for their lives. So they told the bandits what they wanted to know, – who lived where, how many soldiers were guarding the bridge, lots of things about the village. Afterwards, the bandits burned everybody else’s houses, stole their goats and chickens, carried off their clothing, pots and pans and food. Only the old man’s house was left.

The villagers knew there had to be a reason. They interrogated the old man and he confessed. Some wanted to punish him. But then we decided not to. It wasn’t his fault – or his grandson’s. They didn’t choose to be the ones questioned. With armed men threatening, which one of us wouldn’t have talked?

People had to flee into the bush, seeking to hide from the bandits as best they could, coming into the village only by day. They were very isolated, each one making a shack under the trees for minimum protection from the rain and the sun and from the bandits who continued to appear. The parents preferred to keep their children with them, just in case of another attack, but we made efforts to keep the school going. Everything changed. We started later and ended earlier. If anybody got wind of strangers about the area, we sent the children back to their parents immediately.

But the numbers of children fell off. Many fled with their parents to Nampula. My class of fifty children dwindled to ten or fifteen. Our salaries were not paid, month after month. We didn’t get school books or school materials. Finally we stopped trying to teach and also fled to Nampula.

Now I teach first grade at a school in Muegani just outside Nampula. When my back pay from Zambezia arrived, we bought this house. I had eighteen months pay owing to me. The house was very expensive. Everybody blames it on the PRE [structural adjustments programme]. I don’t know. Anyway, it was very expensive. Now I’m building a new house for us. The school break has been good for me. I’ve managed to make mud bricks and put up walls. It has four rooms. If I could just get my back pay for the last six months, I could make a good roof. I’ve already got the bamboo cut!
October 18, 1988, marks the second anniversary of the fatal air crash over South African territory that took the life of Mozambique's first president, Samora Machel. Machel was returning from a meeting with other leaders of the Frontline States in Zambia, as always playing a key leadership role in the regional struggles to survive South Africa's aggression and destabilization. Two years later many factors still remain without explanation. Most Mozambicans, and others throughout southern Africa and the world, are convinced that Machel was murdered by the South African military. Whatever new evidence may appear about the crash itself, Samora Machel will go down in history as a tireless fighter to build a just, peaceful and non-racist southern Africa. To mark the anniversary of his death and to underscore the inter-relatedness of the various struggles for freedom in southern Africa, we have chosen to reproduce here an exchange of letters between Graça Machel, Samora's widow, and Nelson and Winnie Mandela. The letters are extracted from Iain Christie's recent biography, Machel of Africa.

As Christie writes:

"The Mandelas, Nelson from his cell at Pollsmoor prison and Winnie from her Soweto home, asked for permission to leave South Africa temporarily to attend Machel's funeral. The South African authorities refused, but the couple sent a telex message to Maputo and it was handed to Machel's widow, Graça."

The message read:

Never before have we made application to leave South Africa. Today we believed that our place was to be with you physically.

Each one of us is imprisoned in different jails. We were prevented from being present with you today to share your sorrow, to weep with you, to lighten your grief, to hold you very close.

Our grief for Comrade Samora is so deep that it tears away at the heart. Throughout the night we have kept vigil with you. Throughout today we shall mourn with you for a mighty soldier, a courageous son, a noble statesman.

We must believe that his death will strengthen both your and our resolve to be finally free. For you, victory over immoral surrogate bandits. For us, victory over oppression. Our struggle has always been linked and we shall be victorious together.

A caring world is with you. It cannot and will not fail you. With their support and the legendary re-
solve of the people of Mozambique you can only emerge as victors.

Graça Machel responded as follows:

My dear sister Winnie Mandela,
My dear brother Nelson Mandela,

In a garden there is always one flower more beautiful than the others. Your letter is that flower in the great garden of messages of comfort I have received.

On behalf of my children and my whole family I would like to thank you for your letter, which was, to me, a comradely embrace to soothe my aching heart.

How can I express my admiration for you both? Your own suffering has been long and terrible but still you took the trouble to console me in my time of grief. From within your vast prison you brought a ray of light in my hour of darkness.

To you, in particular, Winnie, I express my sincere admiration. My husband was murdered in just one day, in just one fateful moment. Your husband is being murdered every day, every hour. My sister, thank you for having the strength to console me.

One day we shall meet, either along the path of struggle or on the magnificent road to freedom, and then, looking into your eyes, I shall be able to express my full gratitude.

Dear Winnie,
Dear Nelson,

Samora, your brother, fell on the battlefield. The world will never see Mandela and Samora in triumphant embrace on that glorious day when the flag of freedom is hoisted in South Africa.

Your brother has left us on his last great journey, a journey that began in Mbuzini. Who would have believed it? Who would even have guessed that little village would become the focus of unity between the peoples of our two countries?

Every day, so many men and women die for freedom in South Africa. Now Samora's blood is mixed with the blood of those heroes. He gave his mind and his action to the freedom of South Africa. Who would have imagined that he would also give his life?

He did not complete his mission. But we will.

With his sweat, courage, intelligence and solidarity he made a decisive contribution to the unity of the people of southern Africa. There are millions of us. In South Africa alone we are 23 million men and women in struggle. It is inevitable that the star of freedom will shine down on us so that Samora's blood will not have been shed in vain. This blood is the mortar that cements the indestructible unity of our peoples.

The free flag of peace shall fly in the place where Samora fell. His blood will be avenged by the fighters of Umkhonto we Sizwe, whose heroic sacrifices will bring freedom to the people of South Africa.

Samora no longer belonged only to the people of Mozambique. Samora and Mandela have the same stature, the same destiny; they are noble sons of Africa and of all mankind. That is why South African mothers wept along with Mozambican mothers over the physical disappearance of Samora. They felt they had lost their own son. We mothers know it hurts to lose a beloved son. It is as though the womb that generates life has been emptied.

But when we lose a son in struggle we at least have the consolation of knowing that he died for a just cause.

We, Mozambican mothers, offer Samora to the South Africa people so that the guerrilla that he was, the victorious commander that he was, will live on in every Umkhonto we Sizwe fighter and hasten the coming of the day of jubilation.

The end of apartheid will be the greatest tribute to the memory of Samora.

Dear Winnie,

My husband's death has left me with a great emptiness. The solitude I feel is immense. Only by continuing the struggle, contributing to the completion of his work, will my life have meaning.

I was still only a child, Winnie, when you first raised your fist against apartheid. Since then you have never wavered. I wish I had your strength and courage. In this painful hour I look for inspiration from your example.

Those who have locked up your husband are the same who killed mine. They think that by cutting down the tallest trees they can destroy the forest. But history will never forget the names of Samora Machel and Nelson Mandela. The just cause of these two men will triumph, for the greater glory of Africa and the dignity of mankind.

The paths of freedom are long and tortuous. But victory will come one day. It is for this victory that Nelson Mandela is making his sacrifice. For this victory Samora Machel gave his life.

Here I end. Fighters never say goodbye.

AMANDLA!
A LUTA CONTINUA!
Botha Promises...

BY PAUL FAUVET

Paul Fauvet is a British journalist who has worked for many years in Mozambique.

A breakthrough or just another false dawn? That is the question Mozambicans are asking of the meeting between President Joaquim Chissano and South African head of state, P. W. Botha, that took place in the northern Mozambican town of Songo on 12 September.

The meeting was the culmination of a peace initiative by President Chissano, designed to end South African support for the rebels of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR), and to revive the Nkomati non-aggression accord, signed between the two countries in March 1984.

At a press conference immediately following the meeting, Chissano said that “South Africa has given us guarantees” that it would no longer support the MNR. Botha even announced his approval for Mozambique’s amnesty law, under which any rebel who lays down his gun and surrenders to the authorities is pardoned and reintegrated into Mozambican society.

The problem is: How much are P. W. Botha’s promises worth? And even if Botha is sincere, can he carry the hardliners with him? For the moment, the Mozambicans appear to have adopted a wait and see attitude.

The Nkomati Accord never worked, because the South African military simply ignored it. They just went on ferrying arms supplies to the MNR, and training the rebels in rear bases in the Transvaal. For the South African generals, Nkomati was just the first stage in a plan designed to force the Mozambican government into a coalition with the MNR. Once they had their own puppets installed in Maputo, they would be able to reduce Mozambique to the status of a bantustan.

In August 1985, the Mozambican and Zimbabwean armed forces overran the MNR headquarters, known as Casa Blanca, in the central district of Gorongosa. Here they discovered diaries and notebooks which provided damning evidence of continued South African aid to the rebels. Confronted with the documents, apartheid foreign minister Roelof Pik Botha was forced to admit their authenticity.

The then President of Mozambique, Samora Machel, suspended the Joint Security Commission established under the Nkomati Accord, and relations with South Africa went into a deep freeze.

They reached their lowest point after the death of Samora Machel in a plane crash on South African soil in October 1986. The South Africans claimed, of course, that it was an accident and blamed it on the allegedly incompetent Soviet crew. Most Mozambicans believe their President was murdered by the South African military. President Chissano has described the crash as murder, but has not publicly pointed the finger at Pretoria (though the number two in the Frelimo hierarchy, Marcellino dos Santos, has done so).

But this year Chissano reopened a dialogue with Pretoria. On 27 April he sent Cooperation Minister Jacinto Veloso to South Africa with a message for P. W. Botha, expressing Mozambique’s desire to see the Nkomati Accord implemented.

The following month at a meeting of the Liaison Committee between the two countries, it was formally announced that the long-suspended Joint Security Commission would resume its work.

On 7 July the Commission met, for the first time in three years, in Pretoria.

Meanwhile, lengthy negotiations over the future of the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric scheme terminated in
Lisbon on 22 June with the signing of a new agreement between Mozambique, South Africa and Portugal.

The Cabora Bassa dam, the largest in Africa, was built in the last years of colonial rule on the Zambesi River in Mozambique’s Tete province specifically in order to supply cheap electricity to South Africa. Portugal remains the largest shareholder in the dam.

But no power has flowed southwards for the past four years due to MNR sabotage of the transmission lines - 524 pylons have been blown up. There is disagreement inside the South African establishment over Cabora Bassa. While business sectors are interested in the cheap power (which could supply about nine per cent of South Africa’s needs), the military has been more interested in denying Mozambique revenue and the possibility of using Cabora Bassa power for its own needs.

The new agreement commits Mozambique and South Africa to rebuilding the sabotaged power lines. The substantial sums of money that Pretoria has agreed to put into reviving Cabora Bassa provides a strong motive for, at the very least, ensuring that the MNR does not blow up any more pylons.

Mozambican officials are optimistic that the South African government can be persuaded to abandon the MNR altogether. They argue that the prestige and influence of the military is on the wane because of the major setbacks the South African army suffered in Angola earlier this year.

Internationally, the MNR, unlike Unita in Angola, has no credibility, especially after the US State Department report in April which, drawing on refugee testimony, detailed MNR atrocities and accused the rebels of responsibility for the deaths of at least 100,000 Mozambican civilians over the past five years. The MNR has thus become much more of a liability than an asset for Pretoria.

Mozambicans hope that the South African business community, realizing that it has nothing to gain from destabilization of its neighbours, will now exert pressure on Botha to rein in the military, end further adventurism, and cut off the aid to the MNR once and for all.

Optimism should, however, always be tempered with a severe dose of realism. The unpleasant fact is that the most powerful body in South Africa remains the State Security Council, dominated by the military. Despite the fiasco in Angola, the hawkish faction around Defence Minister General Magnus Malan is still extremely powerful. Malan is considered as among the front-runners to succeed Botha as head of the ruling National Party.

The current head of the army, General A. J. Kat Liebenberg, and head of military intelligence, General Van Tonder, have both been closely associated with the MNR. Will they really be prepared to drop their protégés?

There are also strong economic motives for keeping Mozambique off balance. The ports and railways of Mozambique provide the landlocked countries of the region with natural outlets to the sea. If those rail corridors can be knocked out, then countries such as Zambia and Zimbabwe have little choice but to direct their trade via South African ports. This is highly profitable for South Africa, and also turns the landlocked states into hostages.

Mozambique is certainly not relying exclusively on a meeting with Botha to end the war. Since early 1987 military offensives by the Mozambican army (FPLM) and its Zimbabwean and Tanzanian allies, have recovered much of the territory seized by the MNR in its massive 1986 incursions from Malawi.

Despite the gruesome massacres carried out by the MNR in the south of the country against civilian convoys and lightly defended towns, the army currently holds the initiative in most of the country. Nothing illustrates this better than the confidence with which Mozambican railway officials are treating the upgrading of the Limpopo line, the railway from Zimbabwe through southern Mozambique to the port of Maputo.

This line has been closed to international traffic since 1984, partly due to the poor conditions of large stretches of track, and partly to repeated MNR sabotage. However, National Railways of Zimbabwe have now relaid the worst part of the line, and a donors conference held in Maputo in July pledged a further 60 million dollars for upgrading the line. Among the main donors are Canada, Britain, the USA and West Germany.

Zimbabwean troops have moved in to help safeguard the line (President Robert Mugabe once said that, if necessary, he would station a soldier on every yard of track). Earlier this year, they struck at three MNR bases in Gaza province near the railway, killing over 400 rebels.

Two Mozambican companies trained by British instructors inside Zimbabwe and considered as among the best units in the FPLM, have also been placed along the line.

Inspection trains have made the entire trip from the Zimbabwean border to Maputo, and railway officials are confident that the line will reopen to international traffic later this year.
To Rebuild a Nation: Refugees Return

BY SAM BARNES

Sam Barnes works for the UNDP Emergency Programme in Mozambique. The views in the article do not necessarily express those of the agency.

The plight of one million Mozambicans who are living as refugees to escape the violence of the South African backed Renamo rebels was recently the focus of an international conference held in Oslo. Co-sponsored by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, “Southern Africa Conference on Refugees and Displaced” (SARRED) stressed that the main cause of these problems in southern Africa is apartheid’s destabilization war throughout the region and until apartheid is eliminated, a complete solution is not possible.

Now many who fled to neighbouring countries are beginning to come back home. According to W. R. Urasa, the Representative of the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) in Mozambique who is responsible for the Returnees Programme, 70,000 have returned since January 1987.

Though the number appears small in relation to the one million who have fled the country, the trend is important and the returnees are on the frontline of rebuilding.

The 1988 Mozambique Emergency Appeal included $7.7 million for the UNHCR program for returnees. At the Oslo conference, Dr. Pascoal Mucumbi, the Mozambique Minister of Foreign Affairs, argued that “the Mozambique experience showed that the most correct solution for the problems of displaced people, including those who have taken refuge in neighbouring states, is to create normal living conditions for them in their own countries.”

Recent arrival in Inhambinga fleeing from the MNR
However, the importance of supporting the returnees was not shared by all at the SARRED conference. There is a tendency within the aid community to treat "displaced persons" and "refugees" as two completely separate phenomena. Yet those one million Mozambicans who are "refugees" or externally displaced ended up in neighbouring countries by geographic happenstance. Two million others are "displaced" because they fled to nearby districts or provinces. All went to the closest areas to escape the destabilization war.

Those who advocate this division support the creation of good living conditions and infrastructures in the countries of exile, rather than the countries of origin. This, according to Mozambican officials, could perpetuate the problem. It could also create difficult situations for the countries of exile. Swaziland told conference delegates that its available land, infrastructures and other resources are extremely limited.

So far the international donor community has committed only US$4 million for the returnees program. Canada has given CAN $500,000. The focus of the program is support for those returning over an-18 month period, with food, basic relief items, health and education services, and seeds and agricultural tools to promote food self-sufficiency.

"I Returned Because I Wanted Land" Returnees from Malawi to Tete

“I returned because I wanted land,” explained Donata Emiliano from Nkata village in Angonia district in Tete. Donata fled to Malawi with her husband and four children in 1987 after her son, a local school teacher, was killed by Renamo.

In the Angonia district in Tete Province, half of the 180,000 inhabitants fled to neighbouring Malawi between 1985 and 1987. Starting in September 1987 people spontaneously began to return in small groups. They came on foot, hitching rides on truck convoys, using any means to return to their homeland. Now there are close to 12,000 returnees.

Alberto Zacarias, the local administrator for Angonia, is hoping that the returnees will receive seeds and tools so that they can plant in September.

Angonia district is one of the most fertile in Mozambique. Zacarias explained that in 1983 there were over 100,000 hectares in production. The district was the key to food security for the province, and also sold its surplus throughout central Mozambique. The large state farms became targets for Renamo forces. Machinery was destroyed, fields and storage silos burned, and workers and their families assassinated. Production came to a standstill.

Now less than 2000 hectares are under cultivation by family farmers. With the rich soil in Angonia, in one year many families could be near self-sufficiency. If the area remains secure, the larger agricultural enterprises could start up as well - but they will need significant new investment.

Augusto Arichi returned in April with his family. He is now living at Fonte Boa Center on the outskirts of the district capital.

"I left Mozambique because of the war. The ‘Matsangas’ [local name for Renamo] arrived in our village taking cattle, robbing food, burning houses and killing some of the villagers. They stole all my cattle. I fled to Malawi with my wife and seven children. I was in the refugee center of Biri Biri. But the conditions were too difficult. I could not come back last year. But this year the security situation is more stable. We want to return to our land."

Fonte Boa Center was an agricultural training school. But it closed down after an attack in 1985, and the students were transferred to another site. Opened as a returnee center in April 1988, by July there were already 3000 people newly arrived.

“They fled war; they left everything behind. They took nothing. They come back with nothing. They come without clothing. They don’t have hoes. They need social and economic support,” says Alberto Zacarias.

UNHCR is organizing that support and working with the local authorities to guarantee that it arrives when needed. Food and relief items come from UNHCR warehouses in Malawi. Clothing has been airlifted from Maputo in southern Mozambique to Tete city and then transported by truck to returnee settlements.

Many of those at Fonte Boa have already visited their land in nearby localities. They are preparing to plant in September. With some small inputs of seeds and tools, these families at Fonte Boa hope that they will have a good harvest in 1989, and can permanently move back to their land.
Canada—Mozambique: The Moises Connection

BY MARY MACNUTT

This June, the Canadian newspaper, The Globe and Mail, broke the story of Francisco Nota Moises, an information secretary for the Mozambique National Resistance who has been granted refugee status by Canadian Immigration officials. The story grabbed front page headlines as opposition members demanded an explanation: why had immigration officials granted asylum to a member of an organization responsible for the killing more than 100,000 people? But now, four months later, the story almost has dropped out of sight. And as Southern Africa REPORT goes to press, the federal government has still not launched a formal enquiry or even apologized for this action. This compromises all the government’s expressions of support for Mozambique in its struggle against South Africa.

Senior Canadian officials have demonstrated a lack of interest as well as a lack of action. The only senior Canadian official who has expressed any kind of public concern about the situation is Canadian Ambassador to Mozambique Roger Bull. On learning the news he said he was “deeply distressed” and has since continued to question the wisdom of Canadian government action on this issue.

External Affairs Minister Joe Clark and Immigration Department officials in Ottawa have only responded with vague promises to investigate. In August, during the meeting of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa, when Southern Africa REPORT approached Immigration Minister Barbara McDougall with questions about the case at a government reception for members of the Southern Africa solidarity network McDougall replied, “I won’t discuss that here,” and turned on her heel.

Gerry Maffre, an Immigration Department information officer, contacted several times over the summer, reports that the Canadian Employment and Immigration Commission is still reviewing the case and exploring whether a formal deportation enquiry can be launched. Apparently, no deadline has been set for the commission to report.

The story of how Nota Moises came to Canada combines the tangles of Mozambique’s politics with the mysteries of Canadian and international refugee policy. Nota Moises applied to come to Canada in the spring of 1986 from Kenya, where he had been living on and off for sixteen years. In 1969, as a member of Frelimo, Nota Moises fled Portuguese colonial rule and settled in Tanzania. However, he soon broke with Frelimo and moved to Kenya. In 1976, after Frelimo won the battle for Mozambican independence, the Kenyan government revoked his official refugee status and told him to go home. But Nota Moises stayed on in Kenya in a kind of legal limbo until 1980 when he married a Kenyan woman, entitling him to legal status.

In 1983 Nota Moises moved to Swaziland where he worked for first the BBC and then for the U.S. embassy in Mbabane where he was employed as a broadcast monitor. Shortly after his return to Nairobi in 1986 Nota Moises applied to move to Canada as a landed immigrant with refugee status. His application was sponsored by the St. Andrew’s Catholic Church Refugee Association in Victoria, British Columbia, and Domingos Adgira, a childhood friend of Nota Moises, who had also left Mozambique in 1969, broken with Frelimo and then moved to Canada in 1984.

During the time leading up to his arrival in Canada, Nota Moises played an important role in the MNR’s propaganda network. Documents first obtained by The Globe and Mail reveal that in June 1987, two months before he arrived in Canada, Nota Moises wrote a letter to the Premier of Bavaria and the leader of West Germany’s Christian Social Union (CSU) seeking West German support for the MNR. Two weeks later a CSU official replied, addressing the letter to Francisco Nota Moises, Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, P.O. Box 146554, Nairobi, Kenya.

Did Canadian officials in Nairobi know about Nota Moises’ involvement with the MNR when he applied to Canada? Did Nota Moises reveal his involvement? In press interviews after his story broke, Nota Moises said that during his application interview in Nairobi he did reveal his work for the MNR and that the immigration official doing the questioning had asked for MNR literature. Nota Moises even said the official suggested he would be able to continue his work in Canada.

In Ottawa Department of Immigration officials will not say what they knew when they decided to give refugee status to Nota Moises. Spokesperson Gerry Maffre says his department cannot divulge what was said in a refugee application. Gerry Cummings, information officer at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, which carries out security checks on refugee applicants, will only say after his agency’s investigation, “The clearance our officer gave stood.” It is important to note that no Canadian official has denied knowledge of Nota Moises’ MNR activities at the time of his refugee application.
When he arrived in Victoria last August, Moises continued with his work producing and distributing MNR propaganda. The June edition of the MNR bulletin provides clear evidence: a lengthy article challenging a U.S. State Department report on MNR atrocities. Paulo Oliveira, a former MNR official who defected from the organization, has also identified Nota Moises as a key fundraiser for the organization who channels money from the United States to the MNR.

Nota Moises' MNR activities got him into trouble in Victoria. According to Robert Boyd, a member of the refugee committee which co-sponsored his refugee application, Nota Moises lost a job when he first came to Canada because he neglected work to travel to West Germany on MNR business. Nota Moises has admitted publicly that he has visited MNR-held territory in Mozambique since settling in Canada.

Nota Moises' work for the MNR while living in Canada has of course drawn attention to those people who helped bring him here. Domingos Adgira, a childhood friend from Mozambique, first suggested to Nota Moises that he immigrate to Canada and co-sponsored his application. Adgira says he and other Mozambican families living in Victoria knew about Nota Moises' MNR activities in Nairobi but believed he was only doing the work for money. Adgira told Southern Africa REPORT he had hoped Nota Moises would give up all MNR work when he got settled in Canada. Adgira, who describes himself as an opponent of both Frelimo and the MNR, now calls Nota Moises "a sell-out" for continuing support for the MNR. He is also afraid publicity surrounding the case will damage the chances of other Mozambicans still in Kenya who want to come to Canada.

Robert Boyd, former chairperson of the St. Andrew's Catholic Church refugee committee, says that at the time of Nota Moises' application his group "didn't know what Renamo was." A few days following The Globe and Mail story, Mr. Boyd wrote in a local Catholic newspaper, "Any refugee sponsorship group in Canada could find themselves in our position. We are all dependent on government departments and agencies to determine whether or not a given person falls within the accepted definition of 'refugee' and whether or not their involvement in any political organization disqualifies them from that status."

Boyd's frustration leads back to the question of what, if anything, the Canadian government will do now that the story is out in the open. A few days after the story broke the Mozambican government issued a formal request to Ottawa for an explanation of why Nota Moises was granted political asylum. There is still no word on the status of that request. Gerry Maffre at the Immigration Department says there has been no action on a deportation hearing because government lawyers "don't have the case."

Nota Moises' story bears some resemblance to that of Mahmoud Mohammad Issa Mohammad, another controversial refugee and member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Last spring, when the story broke that Mohammad had been convicted for a 1968 hijacking, the government immediately launched a deportation hearing which is still continuing amidst much publicity.

Toronto refugee lawyer Lorne Waldman, a member of the Coalition for a Just Immigration and Refugee Policy, describes lack of action on the Nota Moises case as part of an "incredible double standard. You get someone like Mr. Mohammad who carried out one action twenty years ago and the government starts instantaneous action to secure his deportation... and then you have Mr. Moises who is part of an organization that carries out war crimes every day. His case has been stalled for months."

Waldman admits there are significant legal differences between the two cases. "But I think the most important difference is one in attitude - not just for the government but in Canadian public opinion as well."

Without seeing the evidence, he says, it is difficult to judge how strong a legal case could be built against Nota Moises. But Waldman thinks a case might be made around new provisions in the Immigration Act concerning war crimes and that the public should press for a formal deportation enquiry.

Waldman acknowledges that because of the way the Conservative government has been using the immigration system to institute draconian policies against many other refugee groups, people concerned about the Nota Moises case should be careful in the way they present their protest. But this should not stop people concerned from pressing for a court procedure. "The government should subject him (Nota Moises) to the due process of court procedure, not a kangaroo court, but a court to determine whether the Immigration Act has been violated."
Southern Africa Notebook

John S. Saul, a member of the SAR Editorial Working Group and author of Socialist Ideology and the Struggle for Southern Africa, to be published this fall by Between the Lines Press in Toronto, filed the following report on his recent trip to South Africa; a more extended version will appear in the November issue of This Magazine.

I had not been to South Africa for almost a decade, unable to obtain a visa. I decided that, this year, I must try to go anyway, and so I did. It wasn't the first time I had crossed a frontier without benefit of proper papers. But in 1972 when I visited the liberated areas of Mozambique during the war against the Portuguese I had been accompanied by a column of Frelimo guerrillas. This time I was on my own.

And there were a few moments of tension, something I had thought decades of reading thrillers would better have prepared me for, although that wasn't quite the case. Not that the details of exit and entry really matter: small beer compared to the dangers South African activists must confront daily in seeking new ways to beat back the brutal repression of South Africa's current Emergency. More important was the opportunity a month of hectic travel and intense, virtually non-stop discussion gave me to witness at close hand the current situation there. Bearing in mind that presently not even the Globe and Mail nor the CBC are allowed into South Africa there seems some point in providing here certain preliminary impressions from my trip while it is still fresh in my mind.

* * *

The most obvious points are often the most easily overlooked. Certainly there are more blacks on the downtown streets of a city like Johannesburg at all hours and in a variety of settings (many restaurants and theatres, for example) than was the case ten years ago. Yet the pervasive racism remains very close to the surface. An article in a Johannesburg newspaper on the "world's fastest sprinter" — a local policeman not named Ben Johnson or Carl Lewis — requires a second reading before one realizes that we are talking about the world's fastest white sprinter. A golden-haired girl smiling out from another front-page article is described as being "all dolled up for the matric dance — a big event in every girl's life"!

The ironies here are almost too obvious to bear commenting upon. Unfortunately other aspects of the "common-sense" of an untransformed South Africa are less laughable, much more grim. I had many long and sophisticated debates with activist friends about the best possible tactics to be adopted for reorganizing the democratic movement in the black townships. So often, however, we had to remind ourselves of just how many of those who might be expected to implement such tactics in this or that township have been killed, arrested or driven very deep underground in the past several years! After all, the active pursuit of full democratic rights, however peacefully it is carried out, is still among the most serious of crimes in South Africa, and it is precisely this "crime" that the Emergency regulations, with their more full-blown militarization of South African society, have been designed to curb. As a result, I realized, the movement for genuine change in South Africa has had to retreat some considerable distance from the euphoric mood — with all the then current talk regarding the likely nature of a post-apartheid South Africa! — of 1984-85s near insurrection.

The record of state action is a cruel one, militarization and police violence as mentioned but also attempts to set elements in the black community against each other. Mounting such a "scorched earth" approach is one way in which the apartheid state has sought to adapt for use in the townships the aggressive tactics it has employed, with some success, in destabilizing and controlling such neighbouring states as Mozambique and Angola. Thus in Durban and Capetown I was to hear at first hand of the state's finding common interest in the repression of the democratic movement with privileged strata in the black community — with the brutal Chief Buthelezi and his Inkatha movement for example, and with certain "warlords" in Crossroads.

And the state is also rediscovering its allies in the business community. There was a moment, in the mid-1980s, when some businessmen became more reform-minded, counselling change — deracialization — in order to preempt the possibility of the resistance movement's becoming ever more revolutionary (socialism). Now, however, I found at least one such business reformer expressing deep frustration at how quickly his colleagues had fallen in behind the state's repressive strategy once that strategy had been seen to "work", at least in the short-run, in forestalling resistance. It was also useful to have such a person confirm my own strongest impression from my trip: that it is not so much the pull of any political parties to its right (the very visible Conservative Party, the neo-fascist AWB) that constrains the National Party's reform programme as it is that party's own intransigent stand against any real and substantive transformation of the South African situation.

What remains of the democratic movement, then? As I talked with a wide range of trade union and community activists I found the movement to be bloodied certainly, but unbowed. This is not the 1980s when an earlier Emergency was able...
to smash the resistance movement, physically and psychologically, for a decade. For example, actions like the successful mass stayaway in June of this year (with an estimated seven and a half million people off work over a three-day period) have shown the flag of resistance and visibly reinvigorated people's spirits, while also forcing government and business to begin to rethink some of the more draconian aspects of their newly proposed labour relations legislation.

Of course, the movement, broadly defined, has now had to extend its time horizon for building the kind of popular pressure that will be necessary, ultimately, to shake the South African power structure. Unfortunately, it is more clear than ever that there will be no short-cuts to freedom. But the mood among South African democratic activists with whom I talked seemed conducive to conceiving fresh initiatives, especially new, more systematic methods of grass-roots organization relevant to the new terrain of struggle created by the state's recalcitrance. This positive, potentially creative mood was also something I discovered in talking with African National Congress leaders in Lusaka, Zambia, where I stopped on my return trip to Canada. On the ANC's part there will be no easy lapse into mere random terrorism in order to match the apartheid regime's own terror tactics; rather there is a continuing search for the most effective melding of political and armed activities. The "inevitable" democratic transformation of South Africa will take rather longer than had been hoped, perhaps, but one came away from southern Africa with the sense that the struggle to realize such a transformation is in good hands.

Classes in Formation?

organizations which were to serve as forums for public debate and as a popular constraint on government power - such organizations have in practice lacked any real autonomy from the state, serving largely as official mouthpieces and instruments of social control, rather than as genuine expressions of popular power. A genuinely dialectical relationship between mass action and political leadership never succeeded in establishing itself through these institutions. They were organizations for the masses, but not of the masses or by the masses. Not surprisingly, popular interest and participation in these organizations has always been weak.

In making such hard criticisms, I do not wish to suggest that Frelimo's revolutionary programme was a failure or misguided from the outset. To the contrary, its efforts at popularization of the revolutionary aims of the armed struggle, in schools, factories and the countryside - its anti-colonial, anti-exploitation, anti-tribal, anti-racist, anti-sexist, egalitarian and democratic messages - found great resonance amongst the Mozambican people. What proved far more difficult, however, was to find the institutional forms for channeling this resonance into effective popular political power.

Frelimo's difficulty in fostering the development of genuinely popular mass organizations with real political power can be attributed to a variety of factors, but certainly one of the most important of these has been the virtual state of siege in which Mozambique has found itself since independence. The intense external military and economic pressures to which Mozambique has been subject have made the centralization of political power in the hands of the state and the Party an essential condition for the survival of the revolution. But while this centralization of power has succeeded in guaranteeing the survival of the revolutionary state, it has also had a noxious effect on the development of effective grass-roots institutions of popular political power. The centralization of political power has stifled the open public debate and popular initiatives that are the sine qua non for the empowerment of the masses that dos Santos saw as necessary to safeguarding the popular character of the post-independence state. Without such a process of popular empowerment, the many "political and organizational offensives" launched by Frelimo against corruption and incompetence in the state apparatus since independence have not proved effective in preventing the growth of elitist and anti-popular tendencies of the sort that have now begun to emerge in Mozambique. Indeed, the tendency to use political office as a vehicle for personal accumulation is now reaching the highest levels of state power.

On the other hand, the fact that Frelimo's revolutionary message did have great popular resonance is what now gives one hope that there will be popular resistance to these troublesome trends. Encouraging signs in this regard have already come from the Frelimo Party National Conference held in Maputo this past July, where many rank-and-file cadres voiced open concerns and criticisms about the armed forces, the recent high price increases, the practice of state officials to favour private farmers over cooperatives, the gaps between producer prices and consumer prices, and various other aspects of the PRE. The Frelimo Party Central Committee, which met immediately after the National Conference, also echoed some of these concerns, reaf- firming Frelimo's commitment to a socialist path of development and to "gradually eliminating relations of inequality and exploitation." What significance should be attached to these developments remains unclear and will obviously depend on the denouement of the class struggle around the state, about whose direction and outcome the Frelimo Party Fifth Congress scheduled for next year should give us some hints.
COCAMO—Canada in Mozambique

BY JUDITH MARSHALL

How can Canadians respond to Mozambique, and the agonies of what Globe and Mail correspondent Oakland Ross has recently described as “among this planet’s most vicious and least intelligible campaigns of terror, slaughter and mayhem”? The newest effort is COCAMO, Cooperation Canada Mozambique, a consortium of 19 Canadian NGOs. COCAMO emerged after a Canadian government/NGO delegation visited Mozambique in February 1987 seeking more adequate ways to work within the continuing crisis. Mozambique requested that Canadian NGOs coordinate their efforts rather than having many new NGOs open programmes in Mozambique and that they concentrate on one geographic area rather than fund many dispersed projects. After further deliberations, both with Mozambican authorities and CIDA, a CAN$7 million multi-sector programme took shape. It is concentrated in the northern province of Nampula, where there is already a substantial Canadian government commitment to the Nacala railway line. For those of us on the design team which spent June and July in Nampula working to flesh out the previously defined areas of relief, agriculture, health, education and training, water supply and small industries into discrete projects with inputs, budgets and flow charts, the reality was daunting.

Any vision of intrepid aid workers dramatically risking life and limb in a war zone should be laid to rest immediately. Life in the Hotel Nampula with lap top computers and lots of food, light, water and even beer was no hardship. And life in the middle of Nampula city, the old Portuguese military capital with its lovely tree-lined streets and six to ten story buildings feels very secure. What was daunting was the knowledge that this cocoon of security and availability of supplies and infrastructure in the Hotel Nampula was a reality experienced by us and a very small, albeit highly visible, group of business people and senior government officials only. Even in the “cement” city, most other areas had irregular supplies of water and power. In the surrounding shanty-town suburbs, swollen by the influx of refugees fleeing Renamo terror in Nampula’s 21 districts or neighbouring Zambezia province, there had never been electricity. Today, water supplies, like education, health and all other services, are hopelessly inadequate.

The design team could count on three solid meals a day without stretching our $35 per diem and still indulge in the very fine Makonde ebony carvings so famous in Nampula. Most residents in Nampula, however, faced hunger as a daily reality, with no money for firewood let alone carvings. Monthly salaries of urban workers and the income from sales of peanuts, beans, millet or maize are hopelessly inadequate for the current prices of goods. The IMF recipe has resulted in full shops once again and Nampula now boasts an abundance of everything – hoes, kerosene lamps, sewing machines, shoes, track suits and at least 25 different patterns of “capulanas” (African cloth). The problem was buying power.

The reality of the rural districts was even more stark, tenuously linked to the flow of goods and services by irregular military convoys. In the last weeks of July, the reality beyond the city was constantly brought to mind by the intense helicopter traffic. Nampula’s airport was the base for combined Mozambican and Tanzanian military operations to regain control of Gile, the last district in Zambezia still in Renamo hands. At the same time, important Renamo bases were cleaned out in adjoining Nampula districts.

This very complex reality was the one in which the four-person design team had to work to define the shape of COCAMO’s inputs. We talked endlessly, with doctors, peasants, provincial government officials, co-op leaders, other aid workers and the provincial governor. We made innumerable visits to schools, farms, health centers, cooperatives, water supply systems, trying to get a better sense of the reality on the ground. Gradually a programme began to take shape.

The idea is to focus the emergency component of the programme on building up the logistics support unit in the DPPCN (natural disaster agency) for more effective distribution and monitoring of relief supplies. A Canadian cooperant has begun to work in Nampula.
dition, trucks, seeds, medicines and building materials for classrooms are to be supplied.

The main area of concentration will be the Green Zones of Nampula city, peri-urban areas with much agricultural potential. There is already a small cooperative movement with 40 co-ops mainly producing vegetables. In addition, there is a big family sector, grown larger with the war. These peasant producers have been the backbone of agricultural production over the years but neither the co-ops nor the family sector has enjoyed sufficient support.

The first step in strengthening these co-ops and promoting peasant associations was to send nine cooperative leaders to a course in Maputo run by the General Union of Peasant Cooperatives. A strong cooperative movement has emerged in Maputo over the past decade. It now boasts 11,500 members in 210 co-ops. Along with its diversifying production activities, the co-ops have organized a thriving social programme including day care, literacy, health education and leadership training. The General Union is now playing an important role in strengthening other peasant co-ops with a view to a national union of peasant cooperatives down the road.

These actions take on greater importance given the growing forces in Mozambique opting openly for large-scale private farms over peasant producers. We felt these pulls during our visit. Various Nampula agricultural officials urged us to include more support to private farmers from COCAMO. Yet at a national meeting in preparation for the Fifth Congress, President Chissano himself supported peasant leaders who made angry interventions about lack of support for cooperatives.

COCAMO's work in the Green Zones intends to go beyond agriculture. In the shanty town areas in which the family sector and co-op members live, there are plans to construct health posts, wells and additional school classrooms. Adult education and social communications staff are being drawn into the programme to organize peasant training centres where everything from community meetings and literacy to agricultural extension training courses and video programmes will take place. Three cooperants are being sought to work in this area.

In the health sector, there are plans to rehabilitate two rural health centres, in addition to supplying drugs for health posts throughout the province. Two doctors are being sought to work in the health posts and to contribute towards strengthening all of the community health programmes run from them.

The education programme will include cement and roofing sheets for 40 new classrooms to be built by local communities, school renovations, support for a teacher training centre attacked three times by Renamo and school supplies for refugee children. In addition, financial support will be given for a seminar for district primary teachers working with war-traumatized children. The seminar is part of a national programme and those held in other provinces have had an impact far beyond what was expected. The objective of the seminars was to sensitize teachers to recognize and work with kids traumatized by the war. But the teachers themselves have also suffered attacks, seen family members brutally killed, lost all their possessions. In creating a space for the teachers to speak about their own lives, the seminars have sparked a renewal of pedagogical debate. How do the teachers get the children to talk about their lives? Exit teachers as experts, those with the answers and a fixed curriculum. Enter discussion, drama, stories, art, links with the community. For some I talked to, it was the most exciting work in education since the old days of the armed struggle.

An information programme directed towards Canada is also part of the COCAMO programme including an excellent kit of educational materials, a photo display featuring one of Mozambique's most talented photographers, Kok Nam, a film on Nampula, visits to Canada by Mozambicans and a report back from Bruce Cockburn who is in Mozambique as SAR goes to press. Through all of this, Canadian NGOs are seeking better ways to make their support and solidarity tangible for those in Mozambique who are bearing the brunt of the struggle to dismantle apartheid.
Apartheid's Racquet: Extending the Sports Boycott

BY GENE DESFOR

Gene Desfor teaches in the Faculty of Environmental Studies at York University.

"SOUTH AFRICAN ATHLETES BANNED" proclaimed the front page headline in the Toronto Star on July 30, 1988. The Canadian government declared that it was prepared to deny visas, effective immediately, to all South Africans applying to participate in all sporting events in this country. Even though the government has not yet decided whether it will permit Canadians to compete with South Africans travelling on passports of convenience, the announced policy change was, nevertheless, an achievement for the anti-apartheid movement. As a result of the new policy, three South Africans who had expected to enter the Player's Challenge International Tennis Tournament were no longer welcome at the National Tennis Centre on York University's campus in Toronto.

Preventing South African participation in the Player's Challenge had been the immediate aim of a concerted public campaign initiated in the early spring of 1988 by members of York University and the Jane-Finch community, the second largest black neighbourhood in Canada and the area in which the university is located. Those of us who organized the campaign reacted strongly against the possibility of a South African flag flying above centre court. Such granting of legitimacy to the apartheid regime would have profoundly offended community sensibilities and contradicted much of what the university represents.

The campaign focused public attention on the government policy, announced in July 1985, that had created the so-called "Mulroney loophole". This policy had established and legitimized the distinction between 'representative' and 'non-representative' athletes. Teams or individuals representing the South African government were barred from entry into Canada, but the loophole allowed sportspeople who claim not to 'represent' that regime to participate in Canadian sporting events. This distinction allowed for the remarkable possibility that an individual South African athlete can somehow not represent his/her country. Although the government proclaimed that its policy discouraged sporting contacts between the two countries, the loophole had the opposite effect of increasing South African participation in Canada. Bruce Kidd, of the International Campaign Against Apartheid Sport, has calculated that the policy had resulted in more South Africans competing "in Canada in the last three years than in any other period since 1975, when the first steps to isolate apartheid sport were taken."

Canadian policy, the government claimed, corresponded to the Commonwealth Gleneagles Agreement of June 1977 which "recognized racial prejudice and discrimination as a dangerous sickness and an unmitigated evil," and urged all Commonwealth countries to take "every practical step to discourage contact or competition by their nationals with sporting organizations, teams or sportsmen from South Africa." A distinction between representative and non-representative athletes does not exist in the Gleneagles Agreement; rather it was created by the Mulroney government's policy.
The timing of the anti-apartheid sports campaign was superb, benefiting substantially from a fortuitous convergence of anti-apartheid events. Most prominent among these events was a meeting of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa to be held in Toronto on August 2nd and 3rd only days before the tennis tournament would begin. To cover its retreat from many of its more progressive policy promises, the government attempted to have the meeting focus its attention on a program for countering South African censorship and propaganda. Canada's fading image as a leader among the anti-apartheid forces needed and stood to be brightened by the meeting. It was no accident that Joe Clark, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, announced the government's new policy banning South African athletes only days before the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers' meeting. A potentially ugly demonstration at Canada's premier tennis event while the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers were in town, and while Canada was proclaiming its anti-apartheid leadership position, would have been thoroughly embarrassing to the government.

Our campaign to ban South African participation in the Player's Challenge was sparked by an article in *Southern Africa REPORT* by Bruce Kidd. He reviewed the history of professional tennis and how it defied attempts to isolate apartheid sports. He also pointed out that South Africans were scheduled to participate in the Player's Challenge at York University. A number of York University faculty members decided to do something about that!

Our action began by having the faculty union, the York University Faculty Association, establish an anti-apartheid committee. Obtaining union support would give us greater power in negotiating with the university administration and outside organizations. Initially, we hoped the university's president, Harry Arthurs, could use the university's rights as landlord of the Player's Challenge to influence the tournament's management policy. President Arthurs informed us that despite the lease the university had no such powers.

By this time it was already the end of June, classes had ended and many of the faculty had dispersed for the summer. The possibility of organizing university faculty members for any campaign had dropped dramatically. Undaunted, we met with President Arthurs and asked him to write to Tennis Canada, the national tennis federation that runs the tournament, and related governments. President Arthurs enthusiastically agreed to our suggestion, and wrote immediately to Tennis Canada urging them to "provide us with early and definitive assurances that South African players will not be allowed to participate in the Player's International".

The media quickly obtained copies of Arthur's letter to Tennis Canada and news stories appeared about the South Africans who were apparently going to play on York University's campus. Reactions to the news stories from the Jane-Finch community were immediate, loud and clear: South African athletes coming to the community would not be tolerated. A group of community leaders convened a meeting to formulate plans to stop the South Africans. At this meeting in early July the Jane-Finch Anti-Apartheid Coalition was formed. During the next few weeks the Coalition expanded its membership with representatives from a wide range of community groups. The coalition's strategy was to organize a series of events, each one bringing added pressure on the government to change its policy.

Over the next six or seven weeks Coalition members expended enormous efforts implementing their strategy. Members created a network of support through established political, labour, university and community-based groups. The Liberal Member of Parliament for the Jane-Finch area, Bob Kaplan, was anxious to be involved in our plans. On a number of occasions he raised questions in Parliament about the South African tennis players and probed existing government policy. Howard McCurdy, a New Democratic Party member of Parliament was also similarly supportive. North York Controller Howard Moscoe (the Jane-Finch community and York University are in the municipality of North York) raised a motion in the North York Council urging residents of the municipality to boycott the tournament if South Africans were allowed to play. Although the motion was not adopted, it did, nevertheless, gain media attention and raised awareness of the issue.

Meanwhile, in Ottawa, the government was having some difficulty in presenting a credible defense of its 1985 policy: yes, Canada did sign the Gleneagles Agreement, and yes, government policy was intended to be in accord with that Agreement. And yes, the government is aware that York University does not want South Africans playing on campus. Moreover, apartheid is abhorrent to all of us . . . Spokespeople from External Affairs did concede that the government policy needed review. Although an inter-Ministerial committee was currently considering the matter and although the policy review had been underway for about a year nothing seemed to have been resolved. Tennis Canada lobbied for maintaining the existing government policy. It was worried that a disruption of the tournament could jeopardize sponsorship and might result in a fine being levied on the event's organizers.

Back in Toronto, the Coalition's strategy, based on the organization of three demonstrations, was beginning to take shape. Two demonstrations were scheduled to occur before the tournament began, while the third was to be held on the
day the finals were played. For the first demonstration (and as it turned out, the only one actually held) a few of us distributed information to broadcasters and reporters attending a Media Day feted by Tennis Canada on July 25th. Our small group had access to a good number of media people, making them aware of the opposition to South Africans playing in the tournament. Equally important, we demonstrated to the government and Tennis Canada that unless the South Africans were barred from playing there would be confrontations and disruptions to the tournament.

The second demonstration, scheduled for August 3rd, coincided with the final day of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers’ meeting. A press conference was organized for that morning both to publicize our event and to draw attention to the hypocrisy of the Canadian position at the Commonwealth meeting. External Affairs had brought in a number of prominent black South Africans (such as Dr. Nthato Motlana, Head of the Soweto Civic Association and Dr. Achmat Dangor, Executive Member of the Anti-Censorship Action Group) to participate in a series of public events associated with the Commonwealth meeting. We had planned to have these South Africans, Canadian politicians, representatives of the ANC as well as members of the African Commonwealth countries’ delegations attend our press conference. By late July news of our plans for the press conference had reached officials in External Affairs. They were angered to hear that such a gathering would be taking place only blocks away from the Commonwealth meeting where Joe Clark would be leading the assembled in finalizing plans to counter South African censorship and propaganda. Only a few days after that news reached External Affairs, Joe Clark rose in the House of Commons in response to a question from Bob Kaplan, the Liberal member from York Central, to announce that the government had decided that all South African athletes would be banned from participating in sporting events in Canada.

After Joe Clark’s announcement, some people argued that the new policy enabled the government to avoid taking more significant steps toward comprehensive and mandatory economic sanctions. The long-run effect of the new policy, however, is just the opposite. Sports boycotts have been particularly effective statements by the international community that the South African regime must be isolated. Their ability to bring the anti-apartheid struggle and the intolerable conditions in South Africa to a mass audience leads to greater pressure on governments to undertake additional measures to help destroy the racist regime.

Readers’ Forum....

TRADE UNION ARTICLES

May 19, 1988

Congratulations on publishing Geoffrey Spaulding’s excellent article on sanctions (SAR, May 1988). SAR readers are well served by this kind of realistic writing from people in touch with the complexities inside South Africa, especially with respect to the trade union movement.

Please keep finding pieces like this. As a loyal SAR reader, I would like to be spared the exasperation from Brian Woods’ uninformed and inaccurate Namibian trade union article and John Saul’s ivory tower musings on the connections between the South African and Canadian trade union movements.

Fraternally,
Paul Puritt
Ottawa

SAR RESPONSE

July 7, 1988

Dear Paul,

We are pleased by your praise for Spaulding’s article (“Moving Forward on Sanctions: A View from Inside South Africa,” SAR, May 1988). We aim to provide a forum for debate on significant issues in the fraught politics of southern Africa.

Another article you allude to (“South African Trade Unions: The Canadian Connection,” SAR, June 1986), published two years ago, was unsigned because it reflected the work and the considered views of the entire editorial collective. It is a mistake, therefore, to attribute it to one member of the collective.

We are happy to get commentary, even if it is mischievous, on the contents of any SAR issues from 1985 to the present. More importantly, however, we especially invite all our readers to send us substantive and timely contributions to significant debates.

In solidarity,
The SAR collective
MOZAMBIQUE: APARTHEID'S SECOND FRONT is an in-depth resource kit designed to increase public understanding of events in Mozambique, especially South African aggression in the country. Available in English and French, the kit focuses on the enormous strides made by the government of Mozambique during the early years of independence and how those improvements are now under attack from South Africa.

The kit has been developed and written by researchers and educators with expertise and experience in Mozambique. It is attractively designed, colourful, and easily accessible to the general public.

MOZAMBIQUE: APARTHEID'S SECOND FRONT was produced by TCLSAC and CIDMAA for Cooperation Canada Mozambique (COCAMO). COCAMO is a consortium of nineteen Canadian NGO's working together to implement a recovery and development programme in Nampula province in Mozambique, and education programmes in Canada.

Price: $10 - individuals
$20 - institutions
Brochures also available in bulk.
Rates on request.

To order write: COCAMO c/o CCIC,
1 Nicholas Street, Ottawa, Ontario K1N 7B7
Phone: (613) 236-6037

Included are

Illustrated Background Papers and Brochures on these topics:
✓ Mozambique at a Glance
✓ The War in Mozambique
✓ Mozambique and the Region
✓ The Economy of Mozambique
✓ Health in Mozambique
✓ Education in Mozambique
✓ Women in Mozambique
✓ Culture in Mozambique
✓ Canadian Cooperation

Special Features
✓ Full-color poster reproduction of Mozambican artwork
✓ Map of Mozambique
✓ User's Guide and Resource List