South Africa: Beyond Stalemate?

SOUTH AFRICA
BEYOND STALEMATE
CANADA
TARGETTING CANADA
Apartheid's friends on the offensive

MEDIA
THE EDUCATION OF MICHAEL VALPY

DEBATE
MOVING FORWARD ON SANCTIONS
A view from inside South Africa

WOMEN
SEXISM BEWARE!
Faried Esack speaks out

NOT BEHIND BARS

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COVER: University of Cape Town students protest the bannings of 17 anti-apartheid organizations

S. A. R. Collective

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The Terrible Tidings

The recent banning from all meaningful political activity of eighteen centrally important South African anti-apartheid organizations - including the United Democratic Front, the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the National Education Crisis Committee - is a significant event. However, its significance is two-edged. Certainly, it demonstrates the intention of the apartheid state to continue, and indeed to intensify, its programme of repression against any form of real democratic opposition in the black community. Moreover, as our South African Correspondent, Geoffrey Spaulding, has already argued (Southern Africa REPORT, December, 1987) of earlier phases of this repressive strategy, its cumulative impact has meant a serious setback for the emancipatory movement in that country. This is a reality which is further analyzed in this issue’s lead article.

Yet the bannings also signify something else. Some commentators had gone so far as to suggest that the draconian Emergency imposed nation-wide in South Africa in 1986 (and renewed in 1987) had already put paid to the emancipatory movement altogether. The fact that the state has now felt compelled to take one more very dramatic step in the escalation of its repression - this at the cost of, at least momentarily, putting South Africa back on the front pages of the international press - suggests that the Emergency has not had the effect, envisioned by the state, of crushing outright the democratic opposition. In this the 1986-7 Emergency differs from the earlier Emergency, that imposed in the 1960s. Then the opposition was indeed crushed - organizationally and psychologically - for at least a decade. That has not happened this time, for reasons which our lead article explores.

* * * *

Needless to say, we should avoid the temptation to take too much solace from this, however true it may be. Worse, in South Africa as elsewhere, is definitely not better, and in South Africa things have indeed become very much worse. Gone is the euphoria of 1984 and 1985 when the wave of resistance seemed to be increasing and discussion in liberation circles seemed at times to be even more about the lineaments of a post-apartheid South Africa than about how, in fact, to complete the task of overthrowing the apartheid state itself. Not that such projections about the long-term goals of struggle in South Africa (socialism vs. capitalism, genuine egalitarian democracy vs. various forms of "consociational" gimmickry) are irrelevant even now, for they can affect the kinds of social forces the emancipatory movement seeks to mobilize in the present and the terms of any al-

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liances it seeks to form. Nonetheless the grim reality of the state’s repression has brought the true nature of the struggle in South Africa more clearly into focus – at least for those with eyes to see. In the South Africa of the Emergency (in Brecht’s phrases) “a guileless word is an absurdity. A smooth forehead betokens a hard heart. He who laughs has not yet heard the terrible tidings.”

Not that everyone has heard, or wants to hear, “the terrible tidings”, of course. As we know, part of the South African government’s strategy of repression has been to try to suppress such news of its dirty deeds as might otherwise filter out to the wider world. Perhaps Pretoria suffered a day or two’s embarrassment for its crackdown in this sphere, but its action was well judged nonetheless. As images, particularly the visuals of television news, dried up, most forgot the main reason why this was now the case, and the issue of apartheid tended to drift away. True, Joe Clark was moved by the bannings (denounced by him as “pervasive and brutal”) to suggest some revision of his all too comfortable rejection of any violent action taken by those South Africans opposed to apartheid; “they (the bannings) leave nothing else,” he said. Yet a mood of “out of sight, out of mind” must have been principally responsible for the Canadian government’s otherwise increasingly low profile on the issue of South Africa. That, and the fact that such destruction of the democratic movement in South Africa as the apartheid state has managed to achieve has made the need to forestall, by preemptive action, a revolutionary denouement to the anti-apartheid struggle a little less pressing for Prime Minister Mulroney and his ilk.

* * *

The anti-apartheid movement in Canada and other western countries cannot afford to be so sanguine, however. Like the movement inside South Africa itself, whose efforts to regroup on rough terrain and to move forward we discuss in this issue, we too must embrace the terrible tidings. Recently in *Globe and Mail* (March 5, 1988), Michael Valpy (whose own “education” on South African matters is profiled elsewhere in these pages) has also written of the way in which the South African government’s own version of the apartheid story still has resonance in Canada (and elsewhere). It is a version which blurs the extent of repression, magnifies the scope of so-called “reform”, caricatures the democratic movement and manipulates such canards as “black-on-black violence” and “tribalism” the better to “blame the victim” for the grisly situation in South Africa. As another article in this issue, “Targeting Canada: Apartheid’s Friends on the Offensive,” documents, there are also Canadians who will work hand-in-glove with South Africa’s racist regime to put precisely such misinformation across. Self-evidently, a continuing task for *Southern Africa Report* (and others similarly engaged) must be to find ever more effective means to breach both the blackout on genuine information from South Africa and this latter outpouring of lies in order to get the full story across to many more potentially sympathetic Canadians than might otherwise be the case.

Not that this can be done by romanticizing the situation in South Africa. As we noted in our previous issue regarding the situation in the Frontline States, “an anti-apartheid movement built on mere enthusiasm and apolitical moralizing cannot easily survive the cruel vicissitudes inevitable in so difficult a struggle as the one for Southern Africa”. The “intellectual honesty and analytical rigour” we then called for is no less necessary vis-à-vis the “cruel vicissitudes” which characterize the current moment in South Africa. There are strengths on the side of repression and weaknesses on the side of resistance that we must acknowledge. There are splits within the black community in South Africa (often wilfully created and manipulated by the state and its agents, often reflecting the dynamics of class interest and relative privilege within the black community itself but also, sometimes, reflecting failures in the methods of political work employed by the forces of emancipation) which we must seek to understand. And there are debates over the strategy and tactics of anti-apartheid work not only in South Africa but also here at home (cf. our article on the disinvestment question in this issue) which we must facilitate. Such undertakings, we would insist, do not undermine our commitment, they merely strengthen it. It is in this spirit, too, that we renew our invitation to those outside our editorial working group to join in these tasks in these pages. We welcome your comments, criticisms and contributions.

* * *

As we finalize the present issue of *Southern Africa Report*, word comes to us of the horrific maiming of Albie Sachs in Maputo, victim of a South-African planted car bomb. He is a close personal friend of some of us in the SAR Collective who have worked with him in Mozambique, loved for his gentleness, his caring nature, his deep commitment. He is admired by all of us as a lawyer in the service of humanity, as a writer and tireless proponent of the arts, as an ANC militant in the cause of South African freedom. We stand beside him in his present travail, as we seek to stand beside all who continue the struggle against apartheid, however dark the hour. Note too, as a CIDMAA press release published elsewhere in this issue documents, that Albie Sachs has been merely one target among many in the past several weeks as the South African state has sought to direct the same kind of murderous tactics it is refining at home against the ANC-in-exile. Here, then, is another brutal reason why our commitment must indeed be strengthened.
Beyond Stalemate

On February 24, 1988, the South African government banned from all meaningful political activity the most central above-ground anti-apartheid organizations in South Africa. This was an additional turn of the screw in the successive States of Emergency, proclaimed from mid-1985 on, that have already taken a severe toll of such organizations' ability to confront the state and to press for democratic changes.

Particularly severely affected has been the UDF. Already, under the Emergency, its 1985 leaders, "Terror" Lekota and Popo Molefe, were arrested, to be followed by the arrest of their 1986 successors, Mohamed Valli and Murphey Morobe. Regional leaders like Oscar Mpetha, Trevor Manuel and Arnold Stofile have been imprisoned. Indeed, according to the Detainees Parents' Support Committee, more than 75% of the 25,000 people who have been detained since the imposition of the States of Emergency are UDF activists and leaders.

Now, like the other organizations affected by the new regulations, the UDF is prohibited from organizing "any activity whatsoever, except internal administration and bookkeeping," meaning, in effect, that it is banned. The three chief national-level representatives of the UDF out of prison, Albertina Sisulu, Archie Gumede and Azar Cachalia, also are personally banned.

The restrictions against COSATU, South Africa's leading trade union federation (which has come to play an especially important political role), are at least equally damaging. Any kind of "political campaign" by the union is prohibited. Take, as merely one example, the case of funeral observances, often a rallying point for resistance. According to COSATU's lawyer, Halton Cheadle, the "restriction on COSATU commemorating the death of any person is so wide that it would prohibit union members from observing Easter"! Meanwhile, the Federation has also

prevented any organization or individual from receiving money from abroad. Accordingly, organizations like COSATU, the South African Council of Churches or even liberal "think tanks" like the Institute for Race Relations or Van Zyl Slabbert's Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa (IDASA) could be cut off from foreign funding. In short, in this and countless other ways, the space for open and mass political organization is becoming ever more limited, even if, at the local level, organizations are attempting to regroup and consolidate.
The crackdown

Why the crackdown? There is some debate about the reasons for the recent bannings (to which we will return), less about the reasons for choosing the broader repressive strategy exemplified by the successive Emergencies. Of course, repression is nothing new in South Africa. Quite the contrary. But faced with both economic and political crises in the 1970's, the state— in part because of the urging of certain key sectors of capital— did try to strike a finer balance between continuing repression and some measure of "reform."

Yet even the most liberalizing spirits in the corporate sphere had difficulty in conceptualizing a genuine deracialization and democratization of capitalism. And if this was deemed too risky and unpredictable an exercise for them, how much more was this true of the wielders of state power. "Reform" was quickly revealed as being designed to be, at best, cooptative rather than structural: the recognition of independent unions the better to discipline them within a carefully controlled collective bargaining process; the addition of parliamentary chambers for Indians and "Coloureds" the better to incorporate them as junior (and largely powerless) partners in continuing white hegemony; and so on. What soon became clear, however, was that the growing movement for emancipation in South Africa could not be sidetracked in this manner. Thus unions used the space gained by recognition to press their demands and, indeed, to enter more forcefully into the political arena; community organizations targeted new township councils (and puppet African officials) more clearly as the enemy and generated their own political infrastructure; students, parents and teachers first boycotted, then attempted to take back, the schools from the apartheid state. The national level expression of this popular upsurge, brought into focus by an organization like the UDF and often centered on ANC-inspired campaigns and slogans, was to crest dramatically in 1984 and 1985.

The state's perfectly predictable response to this perfectly predictable failure of its half-hearted reform project has been greater repression. This is sometimes presented as being a retreat from higher ground forced upon the National Party government by the rightward pull of significant sectors of the Afrikaner electorate, and indeed that pull is there. But the bottom line is a rather different one, nonetheless. For the truth of the matter is that genuine democracy (or, indeed, any meaningful steps towards it) is not on offer from the powers-that-be in Pretoria, and the black populace demands no less. It is crucial to emphasize, therefore, that the logic of repression springs from within the NP, not from without. Moreover, to the extent that the Emergency has stalled mass mobilization, has forced the resistance, outside the workplaces, into engaging mainly in symbolic activities even in such militant townships as Craddock, Alexandria and Mamelodi, to that extent business, too, has fallen behind the state's aggressive actions. (Thus Gavin Relly of Anglo-American, erstwhile interlocutor with the ANC in Lusaka, now says complacently in defence of the Emergency that "we can't go forward with reforms without peace" while Tony Bloom, an even more reform-minded spokesperson for big business, now chooses to emigrate to England!) This, despite the fact that such government actions don't solve the underlying economic problems, nor legitimate the established order for the longer run.

In fact, legitimation seems very far from being the name of the game. One key to the repression has been the overwhelming presence of the South African Defence Force in the townships and the development of a highly sophisticated National Security Management System, supervised, at the local level, by paramilitary Joint Management Committees. But a second key to repression is at least equally ominous.
In the first round of its response to the rising resistance movement the state still harboured the notion, apparently, that black leaders could be found who would not only accept half a loaf but also act as intermediaries to convince the mass of the black population to accept that too. That having failed, the regime now more ruthlessly seeks, in the urban areas, black councillors, businessmen and professionals who will serve merely as *allies in repression*, as defenders of their (relative) privilege, as partners in crime. Hence the grisly phenomenon of the *vigilante*, working, with police collusion, to terrorize urban populations and to remove physically the leaders of the democratic opposition. (For the portrait of a "super-vigilante," Gatsha Buthelezi, see the following article which focuses on the recent struggles in Pietermaritzburg.)

**Why the Bannings?**

Not that the problem of legitimation then disappears. As Stephen Friedman has written in *The Weekly Mail* (March 10), "Even if the Emergency has restored quiet to the townships, it has not won their cooperation. It has not won support for black local authorities, or, indeed, willing ‘moderate’ takers for the National Statutory Council." Even the hardest of hard-liners (Defence Minister Malan, Police Minister van der Merwe and Law and Order Minister de Vlok are usually included in this category) would like, as well, to change that climate of opinion, seeing the municipal elections planned for October as an occasion for establishing the hegemony of the black "moderates," for ensuring the cooperation and not merely the compliance of the townships. However, the substance of their "hard-line" is, as seen, to continue to seek to do this primarily by *crushing* all alternative sets of political actors. Some analysts have identified another group within the ruling party who retain, even now, a more "reformist" approach (Foreign Minister Pik Botha and Constitutional Development Minister Heunis are mentioned). The latter are said to be more preoccupied than others with sweetening the pill of (necessary) repression by pumping increased economic resources into the townships (and indeed certain "pilot projects" like Alexandra have begun to exemplify some of this intention).

Yet the funds for this are severely limited, given the financial crisis of the state and the high costs of defending apartheid by more conventional means, a fact underscored in the government's own recent budget. In any case, it is definitely the most hard-line approach to establishing hegemony that seems to be the most salient.

**Indeed, it has been suggested that it is precisely the clearing of the political decks for the municipal elections which explains why it was felt necessary to now take the further step of banning from political activity organizations whom many had thought to have already been stymied by the Emergency. There has also been speculation that the UDF was moving towards a decision actually to contest those elections itself! If that had indeed happened and the UDF had then been empowered to neutralize such structures from within, the state’s embarrassment would have been considerable. Yet whatever the specific facts of the matter and whatever the specific tactical considerations that moved the state to its most recent outrages, an important positive point does stand clarified by the bannings. These further steps were seen by the state to be necessary because the democratic movement would not be crushed by the Emergency as an earlier popular movement, that of the 1950s, was crushed by an earlier Emergency. Whatever the future costs of these bannings, then, they do serve to dramatize a positive point: the movement lives.**
not only survive, but it must also triumph — and that is a challenge of an altogether different order.

Clearly, the euphoria that accompanied the 1984-1985 great push forward helped obscure from view some of the weaknesses of the movement, and it is such weaknesses that have become more evident as the state’s response has become more ruthless and repressive. For example, the ANC’s promise, at its 1985 Consultative Conference, to move from a policy of “armed propaganda” and exemplary sabotage to one of arming and defending people’s struggles in the townships has been slow to crystallize — even if the current trial in Bethal of ANC activist Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim, with its information regarding the importance of new kinds of township military/police targets, does document the continuing attempt to do so.

And what of efforts to ground national level organizations like the UDF ever more firmly (and democratically) in the community and other organizations for which it came to speak? What of efforts to build much stronger political networks even closer to the ground, at block and local neighbourhood level? The necessity to do this had begun to be emphasized before the Emergency struck, of course. Yet efforts to build at the grass-roots take on an even greater urgency in the present period. And so do attempts to revive and consolidate regional organizations, even as difficulties multiply in keeping alive vibrant national linkages under the severe conditions imposed by the Emergency. What, finally, of the trade unions, even more central to the struggle than previously by virtue of their having a solid shop-floor base? Yet they will place themselves ever more dangerously in the state’s firing line to the extent that they attempt to continue, now in direct defiance of the recent regulations, their important efforts to give that industrial presence broader political resonance.

It is probably too early to speculate, at any great length, as to how the movement will move from merely defending itself against the state’s onslaught to regaining the initiative. Clearly it must move beyond even that level of organization and politicalization achieved in the early 1980s. Yet there are encouraging signs that organizations, at the local level and beyond, are giving much greater emphasis to education and training of fresh cadres (so necessary to fill the leadership ranks tragically depleted by arrest and assassination), to long-term planning, and to the necessity to regroup, consolidate, and lay the basis for a protracted war. Then, too, there is the fact of the continuing rent strikes in Soweto, the fact of the recent massive stayaway, hurled in the very teeth of the political restrictions, to mark Sharpeville Day. These are the straws in the wind that we must continue to heed. Perhaps Stephen Friedman is correct (The Weekly Mail, March 4) in saying that the movement is, at least for the moment, weaker physically than the state even if it is stronger politically. We must face soberly the implications of this fact and continue to monitor, in future issues of SAR, the efforts of South Africans to fight back innovatively against the apartheid state. But, at the same time, there is no reason to think that the recent bannings will be any more successful than the Emergency itself in crushing, absolutely, the popular movement. The people of South Africa have come too far to stop now.

(Both this and the following article draw in part on reports filed directly from South Africa by Pierre François of CIDMAA in Montreal to be published in CIDMAA’s journal, Afrique. We are grateful to CIDMAA for its permission to make our own use of this material.)

Soweto youths took to the streets after the funeral of Detainees’ Parents Support Committee member Sicelo Dlomo. The youths were refused access to the cemetery, so they marched to Sicelo’s home.
Much has been made in the western media in recent months of the bloody clashes which have occurred between black political organizations in the Pietermaritzburg area of Natal. These clashes have pitted the Inkatha organization of the KwaZulu bantustan’s Chief Gatsha Buthelezi against both the United Democratic Front and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). Unfortunately for commentators sympathetic to the South African government, the situation does not easily lend itself to interpretation in terms of “tribal conflict,” that demagogic catch-all used so often to delegitimize African political initiatives. After all, the protagonists on both sides of the Pietermaritzburg conflict are, in the main, Zulu (this fact being itself clear evidence of the falsity of Chief Buthelezi’s claim, too often repeated even in such newspapers as Toronto’s Globe and Mail “to represent six million Zulus”!) But at least it is – isn’t it? – a case of “black-on-black” violence, the implicit subtext of this assertion being, apparently, that the carnage in Pietermaritzburg is merely one further example that, somehow, serves to disqualify African claims to a democratic voice in South Africa as a whole.

How important it is, therefore, to place the Pietermaritzburg events within the context of the workings of the overall apartheid system. For Chief Buthelezi is as prominent an actor as he is in contemporary South Africa in large part because he has availed himself of the resources (jobs and other forms of patronage, links to the structure of quasi-traditional social control in the rural areas, some access to the means of institutionalized violence) available to collaborators within the apartheid state’s bantustan system – the better to consolidate a power base for himself. It is true that Buthelezi has a marginally more independent project than some who rule within the bantustan framework. Thus he has attempted, to some extent, to appeal over Pretoria’s head to capital, seeking to strike a better deal for himself within the schema of inter-elite accommodation and “power-sharing” projected by the Kwa-Natal indaba. He has complemented his organization’s use of brute force to establish its sway in Zululand with a dash of right-wing populist ideology, structured, not least importantly, around a programme of ethnic (Zulu) nationalism. Often presented as a moderate in western circles – chiefly because of his deep commitment to capitalist values and his hostility to sanctions – he is, in reality, as brutal and self-serving a political actor as South Africa has to offer.

It is in this latter fact that there lies the key to the Pietermaritzburg events. For Buthelezi has been far less successful in establishing his political sway in the urban areas than in the rural areas. In the former the traditions of democratic nationalism and working-class self-assertion are far more prominent features of the political scene. Thus, in the townships around Durban, Pietermaritzburg, Pinetown, the UDF is strong, as it is among the Asian community. (Characteristically, Buthelezi does not miss this opportunity to attack the UDF for being “Indian dominated”!) The UDF is also strong among the township youth, through its affiliates SAYCO and SABSCO. For its part COSATU has become well entrenched amongst metal, textile and retail workers. Its core group is composed of the old FOSATU unions, first organized in Natal in the early 1970s, and these have maintained a strong tradition of democratic shop-floor structures.

Not surprisingly, therefore, the UDF and COSATU have come to be seen as the primary enemy by Buthelezi, seriously qualifying, for example, his claim to present himself within the Kwa-Natal indaba as the more or less exclusive spokesperson for the African population in the province. Smash them he feels he must, a goal which meshes neatly with that of the South African state. The state has returned the favour (as we will see below) by hounding only UDF/COSATU during the Pietermaritzburg in-fighting, hindering them at every turn (especially when, as has tended to happen, the political tide has come to run in their favour) while hindering Inkatha not at all. As a re-
sult, under an umbrella of quasi-legality, Buthelezi has emerged as a kind of “super-vigilante” within the state’s overall strategy of containment of the popular movement outlined in the previous article, doing the state’s work for it while pursuing his own interests.

Poverty in Pietermaritzburg

It bears emphasizing that these political processes have been played out against a background of real economic crisis in Pietermaritzburg, a background, both sides of the conflict agree, which has given an additional, rather desperate, edge to the confrontation. More than 400,000 people live around this second biggest urban centre of Natal, in five main townships. According to the Development Studies Research Group of Natal University, more than 31% of these Africans are unemployed. In Edendale, the rate is more than 39%, and 50% of these unemployed are youth of less than 25 years. In the townships living conditions are appalling. More than 70% of the population live in mud and daub houses, with only a sprinkling of block and brick houses. In Edendale and Vulindlela, where 70% of the Africans are concentrated, there is neither electricity nor water, the latter being only available through communal taps, some located two kilometres or more from many houses, and sewage facilities are extremely primitive.

One could continue such an itemization of the features of Pietermaritzburg’s massive poverty. Yet, in the end, one must return to Buthelezi’s strategy in order to comprehend events. When the war there first began to surface in August, 1985, its spark was Inkatha’s stated intention to “clean up” the townships. At the time, youth identified with the UDF were conducting a commercial boycott and did, at times, use some heavy-handed tactics to win the entire population’s support. Inkatha apparently thought the resentment of some township dwellers might prove fertile ground for their own organizing, and its members went into the townships to “recruit.” But their methods proved to be particularly brutal ones: people refusing to join Inkatha were threatened, harassed, beaten.

An even better opportunity was at hand for Inkatha, however. With the imposition of the State of Emergency, the UDF at a national level was badly weakened. Inkatha now intensified its attacks on UDF cadres and clashes multiplied around Pietermaritzburg. The UDF itself bent over backwards to make peace, appealing to the local Chamber of Commerce to intervene, for example. Local and national church leaders also attempted to intervene, asking Inkatha to negotiate. But on October 29, 1987, Buthelezi harshly denounced Bishop Tutu for his “pro-ANC stance.” Nevertheless, on November 1, churches and the UDF held a peaceful meeting in Edendale’s church, all spokespersons reaffirming that the source of the problem in Natal was apartheid and not Inkatha. The Natal president of the UDF, Archie Gumede, asked personally to meet with Buthelezi. But all such diplomatic niceties were lost on the latter who, bent on victory, now loosed Inkatha thugs on COSATU as well, most notably on the militant bus drivers of Sizanami Mazulu Transport Company.

Violence increases

In December, 1987, more than 90 people were killed in the Pietermaritzburg area. In January of this year the number reached 111, with killings often preceded by horrible mutilation and torture. And Buthelezi continued to stall. Thus, when a meeting between the two sides at last had been arranged shortly before Christmas, Buthelezi scuttled it by denouncing the UDF and the ANC. He publicized a document published by the “ANC’s Marxist Workers’ Tendency,” a small and politically irrelevant group that had been expelled from the ANC long before. Its document criticized the ANC and the UDF for being “too soft” on Inkatha. Buthelezi explained that the clashes in Pietermaritzburg were caused by such “radical elements” within the ANC and the UDF, an odd accusation quickly rebuffed by the UDF who explained that they had nothing to do with either the document or the group!

Meanwhile, on the ground, the townships were becoming real war zones, with distinct areas controlled by one group or the other busily organizing commando units.
and strategizing urban warfare. Nonetheless it soon became obvious that the "comrades" associated with the UDF were in fact winning. True, some UDF leaders were forced out of the townships, but groups of youth showed immense courage and determination, with the support, by and large, of their communities.

Significantly, it is only when Inkatha has appeared to be losing that the state has intervened. Thus more than 800 people have been arrested by the police and army in Pietermaritzburg since the declaration of the State of Emergency. Not one of these has been identified. "It is open to question," understates Gumede, "whether the security police and the government are interested in restoring normal life to the area!"

Not coincidentally, until the implementation of these latest repressive measures the tide was turning in favour of the UDF-COSATU alliance. On the ground, Inkatha "imps" were retreating. In the battle of ideas such court injunctions against the warlords as had been won were also having an impact. According to COSATU's Alec Irwin, "The court procedures were attempts to break down the wall of prejudice against our organizations and a wall of prejudice in favour of Inkatha..." Even within traditional communities, the brutal tactics used by Inkatha were beginning to turn people against it.

Yet, in the latter case, three of the complainants have already been assassinated. And the state thinks nothing of sending 300 "kitskonstabels" – erstwhile vigilantes loosely legalized in para-police units – into the trouble zones, many of whom are clearly identified with Inkatha (Weseni Awetha, one very prominent "kitskonstabel," is the son of a senior member of that organization). Events occur like the gathering of hundreds of Inkatha supporters in Edendale on January 31 to hear their leaders call them to war; dozens of houses are subsequently burned down. Small wonder churches can estimate that more than 60,000 people have been displaced since the beginning of the conflict. And the conflict spreads, to Clermont, near Pinetown, for instance, where three persons identified with the UDF were killed early in March.

The latest bannings tilt the balance towards Buthelezi ever more firmly. As a result of them, even the most tentative moves towards negotiations – the so-called "peace talks" – are now stalled in Pietermaritzburg. Certainly, with the UDF paralyzed both nationally and locally, that organization has great difficulty in intervening positively. Thus, the two major UDF leaders in the region, Archie Gumede and A.S. Chetty, are now banned and, more recently, three very important local activists have been put in detention.

Victim of the vigilantes

with Inkatha, despite clear evidence of the participation in various outrages of the most well-known of the Inkatha "warlords." True, there are several trials in the courts presently in which parents of murdered youths are accusing Inkatha members and the KwaZulu police. One complains of the killing of MAWU shop stewards Phineas Sibuya and Simon Ngubane, while in another 19 residents of Ashdown have asked for a court restricting order against identified Inkatha members and leaders.

But the state could not allow this to happen. With the new restrictions – against the UDF and COSATU, but not, needless to say, against Inkatha – the situation may well be reversing itself again. In this respect, Pietermaritzburg provides one very dramatic example of the challenge which now faces the popular movement: to find new ways to confront the novel forms of repression being minted by the apartheid system in the present conjuncture.
Targeting Canada:
Apartheid’s Friends on the Offensive

BY DAVID GALBRAITH

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A video tape distributed to all Canadian MPs; a full page ad in a Calgary newspaper during the Olympics; a series of small public meetings in the Maritimes. Each, by itself might be merely another in the seemingly endless barrage of pro-apartheid propaganda which the solidarity movement has been confronting for years. But cumulatively a more sinister pattern can be discerned: we seem to be in the midst of a much more coherent initiative to influence key sectors of Canadian public opinion by the South African government and its local supporters than we have witnessed for some time.

If we in the solidarity movement are to respond with maximum effect, it may be useful to examine the sources of this material, and some of its specific political strategies. For if it’s true that, on one level, these materials merely repeat the racist apollogias we’ve come to expect over the years, it’s nonetheless also the case that the new wave of pro-apartheid materials sometimes displays a new and potentially dangerous sophistication in presentation and in the identification of its audiences.

Journalistic sleaze from Washington to Worthington

The centrepiece of the new order of apartheid apologias is the video “The ANC Method: Violence,” allegedly written and directed by the well-known right-wing press hack and sometime Tory candidate Peter Worthington. Its timing could hardly have been more carefully contrived. The day before Oliver Tambo’s long awaited visit to Ottawa, copies of the tape, and an accompanying booklet, were delivered to all federal MPs. Moreover, its release also coincided with a major series of newspaper ads run by the South African embassy, which were explicitly directed against the Tambo visit (see, e.g., Globe and Mail, Aug. 28, 1987).

Tambo’s reception in Ottawa suggests that this campaign was not entirely ineffective. Many observers were caught off-guard by the chilly climate of his discussions with Clark and Mulroney (see Southern Africa REPORT, III, 2). Mulroney’s earlier visit to the Frontline States had, after all, led some to expect that Tambo would receive a rather sympathetic hearing. Instead, he was subjected to a series of tired homilies on “violence” and “communism.”

That these are precisely the themes of the video is obviously more than coincidental. The video attempts, with single-minded, almost obsessive insistence, to assimilate the ANC to the twin spectres of “international communism,” and its correlative, “terrorism.” Thus, the ANC is inserted within the predictable list of “the PLO, IRA… Red Brigades, Baader-Meinhof Gang,” etc., just as images from South Africa are juxtaposed to footage of the Rome Airport massacre and the Achille Lauro. We are warned at the beginning that “the following video contains mate-

Dependants’ Conference

Excerpt from faked Dependants’ Conference pamphlet sent to anti-apartheid groups in Canada.

- Educational assistance: children and comrades of our grantees are assisted with their educational expenses. University Bursaries are provided for children of prisoners or detainees, or under special circumstances, ex detainees who wish to further their studies, at the MAHLANGU COLLEGE in Morogoro, Tanzania.
- Emergency grants: A Tambo fund helps with emergencies - e.g. victims of police aggression, bombed homes of comrades and families, medical expenses for “AIDS”, funeral grants for fallen comrades etc.
- Personal allowances for Comrades: A large amount of pocket money for purchasing petrol bombs, tyres for necklaces, sjamboks for Peoples’ Courts, condoms for AIDS etc. is paid to comrades and persons who are not in the position to buy it.
- Projects: Dependants’ Conference’s policy is to prevent independance. Therefore certain groups and comrades are given a small block grant in order to establish Peoples’ Courts. Where possible, the Dependants’ Conference also assist these comrades to set up the projects.
- Released prisoners’ grants: Upon release from prison, a large grant is provided to help the comrades to continue the struggle and for those comrades who wish to take up refuge in Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Zambia.
a defence of the most shocking violence.

But what of the South African state and its violence, its terror, its denial of the most elementary human rights to its citizens? All of this remains literally invisible, if only because, for Worthington and his backers, apartheid itself no longer exists. “Nothing can justify the inhumanities of apartheid, as it existed, before the process of dismantling it began, or in fact justify the few remaining semblances of it in South African society today,” the package piously announces. Instead, using Gatsha Buthelezi (as usual, “the paramount leader of the six million strong Zulu nation”) and Craig Williamson (modestly identified only as a “former member ANC/SA Communist Party,” rather than more correctly as one of Pretoria’s most successful and dangerous intelligence agents) as its spokespersons, the video continually strives to counterpoise the claimed reformist initiatives of the South African state and its collaborators to the alleged commitment to “terror disguised as liberation” on the part of the opposition. Apartheid, we’re repeatedly assured, has been transformed: to continue to demand sanctions or to call for the release of detainees is merely to be duped by a conspiracy to bring an otherwise peaceful and progressive society under the control of “communism.”

But it would be overstating the case to argue that the video was, by itself, responsible for the rather frosty tone of Tambo’s reception in Ottawa. The ground had been prepared well in advance. Michael Valpy commented recently on the relative success of the South African initiative to delegitimize the ANC among some sections of the Canadian public (Globe and Mail, March 5, 1988). Although the “Worthington video” corresponds quite closely to the usual editorial line of the Sun, its putative creator’s earlier employer, some commentators have expressed cynicism about its authorship. Hugh Winsor, writing in the Globe (Nov. 16, 1987), displayed no hesitation in labelling the video “South African propaganda.” Many observers noted, at the time, the close resemblance between its claims (and, indeed, even its use of image and quotation) and the officially acknowledged ads placed by the South African Embassy. And the circumstances of its production are, to say the least, murky. Officially, it is attributed to Feluca Holdings, a small company controlled by Worthington. But certainly the project re-

* The latter point is underlined by the video’s dedication “in memory of Bartholomew Hlapane who devoted his life to fighting apartheid and social injustice.” Moreover, Hlapane’s alleged murder offers a reference point to which the tape continually returns, implying that he was merely an “honest nationalist,” callously murdered by the ANC for revealing its ties to “international communism.” The truth is, not surprisingly, more sinister. Hlapane had been a relatively prominent member of the ANC in the fifties and early sixties. Subsequently, however, he betrayed the movement, appearing as the star witness for the prosecution in the 1966 trial which sentenced Bram Fischer to life imprisonment. Later, in 1981, he testified before the American Congressional Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, an early Reaganite attempt to revive the golden days of the House Un-American Activities Committee quickly abandoned as insufficiently credible even by the far right’s usual standards of plausibility. In light of his long and enthusiastic record as a traitor and collaborator, it would not be surprising if, indeed, he had been executed.

Joe Clark facing reporters after being heckled at Montreal anti-apartheid conference, February 1987

though welcome, Valpy’s concerns emerged a bit late in the game, particularly in light of the Globe’s earlier editorial enthusiasm for Gatsha Buthelezi as “the best hope, if not the only hope, for the emergence of a moderate black leadership from the ashes of apartheid” (in a Dec. 11, 1986 editorial headed “For Chief Buthelezi!”). As for the Tory right wing, to whom Mulroney and Clark were, in no small measure, responding, they had been primed by even less sophisticated appeals to visceral anti-communism from commentators such as the Toronto Sun’s noxious Bob MacDonald, who sometimes seemed simply to insert his own picture atop South African embassy press releases.

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cluded, at minimum, the active support and collaboration of the authorities, if only in light of current Emergency regulations. Ultimately, of course, it doesn’t matter very much whether Worthington financed the project himself or actually played the role attributed to him in the credits: the video corresponds so precisely to Pretoria’s agenda that these questions are fundamentally irrelevant.

Nonetheless, the South African government itself has always gone to quite extraordinary lengths to present a positive face abroad. Anyone who questions this should review the history of the late seventies “Muldergate” scandal. The core of this conspiracy was the attempt by Pretoria’s security services to control or at least influence media coverage of South African events by acquiring newspapers both at home and abroad. This initiative extended so far as an attempt to purchase the then-sinking Washington Star from its financially strapped right-wing owners. In addition, the South African propagandists enjoyed a close working relationship with such unsavory stars of the Reagan era as Brian Crozier, and Robert Moss, who had been connected with the CIA-funded World Forum Features, and Arnaud de Borchgrave, first of Newsweek and later editor of the Moonie-owned Washington Times, who collectively became the “terrorism experts” behind such fantasies as the alleged KGB conspiracy to assassinate the Pope.

Other recent Canadian propaganda initiatives can be more directly tied to the South African government. During the Calgary Olympics, for example, a full page ad appeared in the Calgary Herald (Feb. 20, 1988) over the name of the London-based “Freedom in Sport,” calling for the reinstatement of South Africa in the Olympics and petulantly whining, “How much longer must world class South African athletes remain pawns of politicians?”

Gordon Legge, an enterprising Herald journalist, was able to demonstrate that the ad had, in fact, been placed by an employee of the South Africa Press Office, whose claims to be acting on his own initiative were lame, even by the usual standards of arms length deniability (see Calgary Herald, Feb. 21 and 23, 1988).

This episode suggests an almost comic level of incompetence. But more sinister, particularly in light of recent events, was the false pamphlet recently mailed to a number of Canadian solidarity groups and subsequently exposed by the Inter-Church Coalition on Africa. This document purports to emanate from the Dependants’ Conference of the South African Council of Churches, and, indeed, closely resembles in appearance legitimate materials issued by that body. However, this forgery endorses violence and “necklace” killings, and goes so far as to suggest that donations to the Conference might provide “pocket money for purchasing petrol bombs, tyres for necklaces, [and] sjamboks for People’s Courts.” In light of recent attempts by the South African state to delegitimize the churches as centres of opposition to the regime, and to paint them as surrogates for the armed resistance movement, this document may well prefigure a new and dangerous direction in the propaganda offensive. In any event, its timely exposure by the Inter-Church Coalition minimized any potential damage.

“They’re back”: Pretoria’s Maple Leafs

What is new in this campaign is the evident importance which the regime attaches to Canada in its propaganda war. In the past, we had been relatively marginal; the real action was going on in London and in Washington. In both of these capitals, South Africa dealt with governments which it could assume would be relatively sympathetic to its agendas. In addition, it had a well-organized network of lobbyists and friends in place, through its carefully orchestrated contacts with the extreme, but nonetheless influential, right. Even there, however, it was careful to nuance its appeals according to local conditions: in Washington, its lobbyists stressed the “Cuban threat” in Angola and the charms of Jonas Savimbi; in London, they preferred quieter appeals to economic self-interest. In the heady early years of Reagan and Thatcher, Canada got somewhat lost in the shuffle.

In hindsight, the appointment of Glenn Babb as ambassador underlined the heightened importance of Canada in Pretoria’s calculations. Babb adopted an aggressively high profile strategy. In the 1985 - early ’86 period, with daily images of the Vaal uprising on the TV news, this consisted in the main of maudlin appeals to “free speech,” in the interests of hearing “all points of view.” But with the relative success of the Emergency in removing South Africa from network visibility, greater opportunities became available to contest the political terrain. It was in this context that the themes of “black-on-black violence,” “terrorism” and its corollary, “communism,” and the promise of “reform” were pushed into the foreground.
Babb himself became probably the most prominent foreign diplomat in the country, especially around his visit to the Peguis Indian Reserve in Manitoba. Although the Canadian impact of this gesture was blunted by the effective response of the Assembly of First Nations and other native spokespeople, it received massive publicity, both in Canada and in South Africa itself. But within Canada, the embassy was less successful in recruiting local selves of Babb’s ability. They were forced to fall back on a series of older contacts, whose marginality from the political mainstream reflected, in no small measure, the absence of a highly organized right-wing infrastructure in Canada. True, the Toronto Sun could be counted on to rise to the occasion out of genuine ideological enthusiasm, but its political weight is less than that of its American or British counterparts. Instead, the embassy was forced to rely, if only pending more sophisticated initiatives, on the existing networks of the far right.

Enter, stage right, the usual suspects. From under the rocks they crawled, the Canadian affiliates of the “World Anti-Communist League,” the Unification Church, the aging bands of anti-semites, racists, fundamentalists and red-baiters who collectively comprise the crackpot right-wing fringe on the margins of Canadian political life (see Stanley R. Barrett, Is God a Racist? The Right Wing in Canada, Toronto, 1987). At the University of Toronto, the Worthington video was sponsored by the Moonies; at York University by the “Liberty Coalition.” In addition, it was distributed by “Citizens for Foreign Aid Reform” (sic), founded and led by Paul Fromm, previously known as the leader of the Edmund Burke Society (which mutated, in turn, into the overtly fascist Western Guard), and a participant in World Anti-Communist League conferences. Elsewhere, particularly in Western Canada, the Canadian League of Rights, and its publication, the anti-semitic Canadian Intelligence Service, has played an active role in mobilizing support for apartheid, often without even the veneer of “reformist” rhetoric which surrounds the official government statements.

This points to a serious underlying contradiction which the South Africans have yet to resolve, and which the current wave of propaganda seeks to redress. As earlier attempts to build support for the Smith regime in Rhodesia suggested, the constituencies which can be mobilized in overt support for racist regimes are relatively marginal to the mainstream of Canadian political life, moving not much closer to the political centre than the hard right of the Tories. More sophisticated spokespersons are required and more “nuanced” themes demanded. And it’s here that the absence of a well-organized and funded right wing has created serious problems for the South African government. True, their embassy has, for years, attempted to recruit more “legitimate” friends from within the business community, the academy and the Tory caucus, who could be persuaded to accept the free “fact finding” jaunts which the business-funded South Africa Foundation has, for years, laid on.

But even here, the embassy’s success has been relatively limited. Bob Coates, who had accepted such offers while President of the Tories, and before his ill-fated tenure as Minister of National Defence, was probably their most prominent success in this respect, but even he carried little weight within the dominant circles of the Conservative Party. And their initiatives within the business community, although both less widely publicized and more successful, were in some measure checked by the aggressive pro-sanctions campaigns of the mid-eighties.

Why us?
But why should the South Africans suddenly be so concerned about Canada? The answer probably lies in the increasingly prominent role which Canada has assumed in recent years in international debate around apartheid. Within the Commonwealth, Canada has emerged as the principal “Western” advocate of limited sanctions against Pretoria. Although we in the solidarity movement have frequently criticized the limitations and the contradictions in the Canadian government’s policies on this issue (and will, doubtless, have occasion to do so in the future), it remains nonetheless clear that Pretoria regards even these limited responses with concern, particularly when they are compared to the more friendly winds blowing from London and Washington. While it’s unlikely that the South African government believes it possible to reverse completely these measures, it clearly believes that a more aggressive propaganda campaign can both inhibit their further expansion, and undermine any possible Canadian movement towards support or recognition of the ANC. What Pretoria obviously fears is that Canada might begin to move towards the position of the Scandinavian countries.

In order to achieve these goals, specific constituencies have been targeted for attention. Within the business community, the South Africans will probably attempt to undermine the effect of the sanctions campaign by working in cooperation with such right wing organizations as the Fraser Institute to promote the view that sanctions are both ineffective and harmful, and that they inhibit the already existing “reform” policies of the state. Here, we can expect to see much more of Buthelezi, and a motley assortment of local collaborators. Already, this campaign is relatively well advanced, as Buthelezi’s speech to a joint meeting of the Fraser Institute and the Canadian Club demonstrates (see Globe and Mail, Dec. 9

In this context, one of the more interesting aspects of the recent South African jaunt by a cabal of “Canadian native leaders” (sic) was their travelling companions: Donovan Carter of the Western Canadian Society for Southern Africa, John Templehoff of the Canadian Friends of South Africa Society and Eileen Pressler of the British Columbia Free Speech League (see Globe and Mail, Aug. 24, 1987). This implies an agenda somewhat broader than an attempt merely to embarrass Joe Clark in the aftermath of his Southern Africa tour: it suggests a more coherently elaborated plan to link Pretoria’s long-time Canadian friends with an emerging, albeit relatively marginal, right wing within the native business community (see Canadian Dimension, Jan. 1988).

As if to underline the point, Glenn Babb’s final speaking engagement in Canada was to have been in Sept Isles, the centre of Mulroney’s own constituency, a ploy blocked only by the vigorous response of local trade unionists. Some aspects of this orientation could well change, however, depending on the outcome of the anticipated federal election campaign.

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In the more public spheres of Canadian political life, the regime and its supporters will emphasize its “reform” initiatives, and attempt to link any opposition, be it from the ANC or the churches, to the twin shibboleths of “terrorism” and “communism.” Here, for the moment, they are likely to target the Conservative Party itself, and its political constituencies, in order to keep up pressure on Mulroney and Clark. This apparent targeting of opinion leaders in smaller communities with substantial Tory support is the most probable explanation for the recent upsurge in pro-apartheid meetings and submissions to local newspapers in the Maritimes (see What’s the Word!, Feb., 1988).

As if in anticipation of its long-term need to reach constituencies beyond the Toi’s and their immediate supporters, the South African embassy has apparently decided to focus its attention on the media in smaller communities. Thus, it recently provided a disinformation package to French language newspapers in Quebec, outside the major urban centres, doubtless hoping that any use of such materials in these papers might be more likely to pass unnoticed than they would in mass circulation publications.

Other groups with consistent anti-apartheid records, such as Canadian churches, may well find themselves on the receiving end of propaganda campaigns of varying sophistication, as augured by the forged South African Council of Churches pamphlet. We shouldn’t rule out the possibility that apartheid’s defenders will strive to exploit to their own advantage already existing divisions within the churches over a wide spectrum of questions concerning social policy.

What should be clear is that the apartheid regime believes that the State of Emergency has opened up a window of opportunity for it to begin to influence the terrain on which discussion takes place and policy is formed. Clearly, it will not simply seek to “defend” apartheid. That option was written off long ago, except in relation to the most marginal constituencies. Instead, it will continually stress its commitment to “reform.” How far it will succeed in this object will depend on a series of factors. Although the solidarity movement cannot directly influence the course of events within South Africa, which is, of course, ultimately where these questions will be answered, we can and should be prepared to respond more aggressively and with greater sophistication to what is, in certain respects, a new situation.

A CORRECTION
The sentence at the bottom of column two on page 6 of Linda Freeman’s article in Southern Africa REPORT, Vol. 3, No. 3 (December 1987) should have read: “Denmark, Norway and Finland had unilaterally imposed a total trade ban on South Africa.” We apologize for the error in typesetting which altered the meaning.
The Education of Michael Valpy

BY OWEN TURNER

This material is taken from Owen Turner's M.A. essay, "Changing Perspectives: Canadian Views of South Africa — An Analysis of Reporting in the Montreal Gazette and the Toronto Globe and Mail 1983 – 1986"

As Oakland Ross takes up his post as the Globe and Mail's African correspondent, it is an appropriate time to review how the Globe, and its previous correspondent, Michael Valpy, presented South Africa to Canadians. Between 1983 and 1986 the Globe carried 2,041 articles, editorials, political cartoons, reports and news briefs dealing primarily or secondarily with South Africa. The first of Valpy's 260 South African-related reports appeared on February 28, 1984.

The quality of the Globe's coverage of South Africa is significant, since for many Canadians, this newspaper must have constituted their main exposure to South African issues. By depending on this particular source of information, one would have gained a distorted image of South Africa, at least up until September 1984. From January 1983 to September 1984, 19.2% of the Globe's references to South Africa were presented in its small, filler-sized “Around the World” news column. Many of these reports dealt with such issues as “toilet collapses, man bleeds to death” or “monkeys attack house.” Other reports covered acts of violence by black South Africans such as burning to death women accused of witchcraft. On the whole these superficial and often sensational reports could only result in distortion. The distorted foundation laid by these images would come to be reinforced by Valpy's early reports and the opinions of the Globe's editorial writers.

Certain trends in the Globe's news coverage of South African issues are identifiable. These trends, fairly broad in nature, were directly related to internal South African events and the worldwide reaction to them. From January 1983 to September 1984, the two issues that dominated news coverage were Namibian independence and the new Constitution. From September 1984, with the beginnings of violent resistance, to July 1985, the two most dominant issues of coverage were reports of unrest and the debate on whether the use of sanctions was a legitimate method to pressure Pretoria to reform its policies. From July 1985, when Pretoria declared a state of emergency, to the end of 1986, coverage of un-
rest was superseded by that of the international movement towards divestment, disinvestment and implementing sanctions.

Misled and misleading
Michael Valpy arrived in Africa with little knowledge of South African politics. His early reports on South Africa issues tended towards the superficial, laced with a certain element of naïveté. An example appears in Valpy’s report on the signing of the Nkomati Accord. Taking the role of a society reporter, Valpy stated that “most wonderful was the inspection of the troops by the two leaders” (17 March 84). Uninformed opinions seemingly based on out-of-date textbook material presented Globe readers with a distorted image of the historical reality of South Africa. Valpy’s lack of basic historical knowledge led him into controversial statements, such as “White South Africans are a tribe of Africa and have lived there three centuries, longer than the Bantu” (18 Feb 85).

At the height of unrest in August 1985, Valpy offered his analysis of blacks under apartheid. Valpy stated that majority rule would result in violence and chaos. This was so, as the black majority was largely a “peasant class, scantily educated and tribally factioned.” He accused African states of economic mismanagement, claiming they were a “shambles of corruption, ineptitude and failed policies” (17 Aug 85). Four days later a Globe editorial agreed that one person one vote would mean political instability and economic chaos. The editorial contained Valpy’s analysis of the development of blacks in South Africa and belittled their future as nation builders. It suggested that a parliamentary chamber be created for blacks as an experience in political education. This editorial and Valpy’s opinions were labelled racist by some observers. Clearly, Valpy had some influence in forming editorial opinion, but clear differences remained between Valpy and editorialists over such issues as the South African Constitution, sanctions and Buthelezi. These differences grew with the passage of time and were reinforced by a certain evolution in Valpy’s interpretations.

Conservative outlook
During 1983 the Globe’s basic conservatism was evident in its editorial view of South Africa as a legitimate state with legitimate security concerns. This conservative perception, expressed in relation to the Namibian issue, was extended throughout the whole spectrum of the South African debate. Editorial debate over the Constitution was focused on white opinion. The potential split in the Afrikaner community was seen to be more important than black opinion. Valpy’s first Constitutional article reflected this conservative analysis. To him, accepting “coloured” and Asians into parliament represented altered perceptions by whites. Focusing on the rise of a new black middle class, Valpy suggested that increased political power always followed increased economic power, and when the black middle class rose above a seemingly magical 8%, white perceptions would alter further (4 Apr 84). Valpy continued in the same vein in the following issue of the Globe. He believed that Afrikaners were shedding their stereotyped images of non-whites because middle class Afrikaners saw their destiny as Africans, and therefore recognized the need for change and accommodation. Most of Valpy’s article was spent highlighting the views of an Afrikaner member of parliament. Valpy spoke positively of this man and his views, but did not comment when his informant said that a transfer of power from whites to blacks was not up for discussion in his framework. If simple discussion was not even possible, one wonders then the cause of Valpy’s optimism.

Valpy’s optimism was founded in a disregard of the organizational potential of blacks in South Africa, and a belief that the Constitution represented an evolution in white perceptions. By late August 1984, the UDF had organized a successful boycott of elections for the new parliament. This factor, combined with further exposure to non-white anti-apartheid activity, seemed to encourage Valpy to rethink his position. At this point he dropped his earlier belief in the liberalization of the Afrikaner middle class and stated that the Constitution was dangerous and further entrenched racism (25, 27 Aug 84). Nevertheless, in a post-election editorial, which disagreed with Valpy’s stance, the Globe suggested that the new parliament should not be totally dismissed as it was probably the only hope for eventual political equality. Evolution rather than revolution was seen as the only feasible option (30 Aug 84). It is clear that only when the black majority asserted itself would the press find it necessary to seriously question the status quo in South Africa. This is most evident in the debate over sanctions.

Violence erupted in South Africa as the Constitution took effect. In attempting to explain widespread riots, observers generally blamed such issues as black discontent with pay, rent and education. The constitutional issue was taken as a secondary aspect of black dissatisfaction, not the immediate cause of unrest. Only from late 1985 onwards did the press identify the constitutional issue as an important factor in widespread unrest. The intensification of violence resulted in increased television exposure and a heightening of the sanctions debate. The debate was further fueled by pressures from church organizations and anti-apartheid interest groups.

Editorialists & columnist at odds
The sanctions debate had lain dormant in the Globe throughout 1983, with a total of seven references centering mainly on Namibia. This situation continued up until September 1984 with a further seven references. Before the start of renewed unrest, Valpy had rejected disin-
vestment as counterproductive. As post-constitutional unrest spread, a Globe editorial suggested that it was doubtful whether sanctions were useful, as opposed to emotionally satisfying. Taking up the view Valpy had expressed earlier, the editorial stated that black political advancement would go hand in hand with the development of the South African industrial sector. Disinvestment would be an ally of apartheid, since the best hope for the future was the creation of a prosperous black urban class demanding rights. The Globe suggested that Ottawa should require company reports on compliance with the Canadian code of conduct and called this process “Canada’s version of constructive engagement” (25 Sept 84).

Awarding the Nobel Prize to Bishop Tutu became a factor in the subsequent increased debate over sanctions. Globe editorialists rejected Tutu's implicit acceptance of sanctions and disinvestment and cited Chief Buthelezi as a black nationalist opposed to them. From January 1985 onwards, the Globe’s editorial policy supported Buthelezi and his goals.

Debate continued in January and February with reports of possible U.S. sanctions and pressures by anti-apartheid groups on corporations and government agencies. Visits to Canada by South African activists were covered thoroughly by the Globe. On February 15 the Globe carried a Valpy report which claimed that the Canadian-owned Bata shoe company contravened the code of conduct due to its practices in the KwaZulu homeland. Valpy’s article was influential and lent strong force to those who supported disinvestment. However, editorialists did not comment directly on the Bata controversy at this time.

The March 1985 killings at Uitenhage prompted Globe editorialists to reject the status-quo in South Africa and equate the performance of Canadian firms with the foreign policy and moral standards of Cana-

dians. Sanctions and disinvestment were rejected in support of strengthening the code of conduct.

Valpy viewed the growing disinvestment movement as grounded more in transatlantic propaganda than in economics. He believed the impact on the South African economy would be negligible (1 July 85). On July 8, 1985, Canada imposed very weak, largely symbolic sanctions. In response, and with an evident sense of relief, the Globe praised the wisdom of arguing against disinvestment and condemned church groups and the New Democratic Party for being prepared “to battle apartheid to the last black worker” (10 July 85). The Globe would praise sanctions as long as they were weak and largely symbolic.

Pretoria’s imposition of a state of emergency on July 21 initiated events which catapulted South Africa into the dominant news story for the following three months. The two major catalysts for this increased coverage were a speech by President Botha on August 15, dashing hopes for reforms, and the Commonwealth Conference in October. Of the 285 South African-related articles which appeared in the August-October period, more than 40% dealt with sanctions. Neither Valpy nor Globe editorialists significantly altered their opposition to important sanctions and disinvestment during 1985.

The Globe’s editorial policy rejecting significant sanctions modified somewhat in 1986. Only sanctions aimed at whites became acceptable. This stance clearly defended the Globe’s continuing rejection of disinvestment. Disinvestment was seen as harming the economic prospects of blacks.

Sanctions turmoil
From January to mid-May 1986, there was weak coverage of the sanctions debate, and South African-related issues in general. It took
a further dramatic incident before the debate would renew. On May 19, 1986, with the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group in South Africa for talks, Pretoria launched air raids against Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana. Like the Botha speech of the previous year, this act triggered a sanctions debate in the Globe of unprecedented intensity.

A Globe editorial responded to the raids by acknowledging that sanctions were inevitable. Once again it raised Buthelezi as an example of black South Africans who rejected sanctions and disinvestment, but recognized that selective sanctions such as diplomatic measures and a carefully selected boycott were acceptable. The Globe claimed that sanctions should show moral displeasure while not causing material deprivation (5 June 86).

The debate intensified further with threats by African nations to pull out of the Commonwealth unless sanctions were imposed, combined with a nationwide state of emergency in South Africa. The Globe now found it necessary to support sanctions as a compromise to preserve the Commonwealth, while downplaying their effectiveness against South Africa.

Then came a further change. On June 30, 1986, the Globe presented the first of a five-part series entitled “Sanctions.” The series, presented by Globe columnists including Valpy, was decidedly anti-sanctions in nature. Valpy stated that sanctions would harm blacks and result in increased violence. Citing Botswana as an example of an African nation which did not support sanctions, he concluded that sanctions would result in devastating retaliation by South Africa on African states. However, Valpy would take only five days to change his stance. He returned from a trip to Botswana and Zimbabwe in support of sanctions. Noting the Zambian threat to leave the Commonwealth, he stated that the ANC had tried talks for fifty years and sanctions were the only policy left open to try (10 July 86).

High and low points

July 1986 marked a highpoint in South African coverage. The Globe carried 153 articles of which over 60% dealt with the issue of sanctions. The issue was of such intensity that even a Globe sports writer offered his opinions. In late July the Globe acknowledged that some action was necessary and insisted that any sanctions be aimed at whites to prevent the economic destabilization of black Africa (31 July 86).

The Globe gave front-page coverage to the conclusion of the Commonwealth summit. Although the summit was widely thought of as a failure, the Globe viewed it as a “muted triumph for realism.” The sanctions agreed upon were superficial, yet Globe editorialists found this “eminently worthy” as they showed contempt, but did little damage (6 Aug 86).

After the end of the summit South African coverage lost its dominant position in the press. Moreover, although the Globe had recognized the need for sanctions before the summit, it saw fit to publish an advertisement by the South African Tourist Bureau on September 4, 1986. Publishing this advertisement clearly broke the voluntary ban on tourism promotion agreed to at the summit. Plainly, the Globe’s earlier view of the ban on promotion as “eminently worthy” was a statement of relief not of conviction.

Closely tied to the Globe’s rejection of disinvestment was its support for Chief Buthelezi. This support extended throughout the sanctions debate to December 1986, when the Globe claimed that Buthelezi and his Indaba plan was the best, if not the only, hope for the emergence of a moderate black leadership in post-apartheid South Africa (2, 11 Dec 86). Conversely, Valpy openly questioned Buthelezi’s moderation, and declared Inkatha to be “a terror group.” Buthelezi remained a moderate to Globe editorialists and news service reporters, contrary to local reporters and correspondents, who questioned his legitimacy and moderation.

Only in 1985, as the South African situation deteriorated, did the search for representative black leaders commence. In February 1985 Valpy declared the ANC to be South Africa’s most authentic black leaders. In general a definite metamorphosis took place in regard to opinion on the ANC with Valpy showing the clearest change. Viewed as a terrorist organization in 1983-84, by 1985-86 the ANC was perceived as a legitimate force. Valpy’s view of the ANC as a moderate force increased in direct proportion as Pretoria was seen less as an agent for change. However, Globe editorialists, having identified Buthelezi as South Africa’s saviour, rejected the ANC, dubbing its members violent Marxists.

Summing Up

Valpy’s opinions were transformed by his experiences in South Africa. In April of 1986, Valpy rejected his earlier belief that majority rule would create violence and chaos. He condemned Afrikaners for stating the myth that black rule would destroy South Africa economically and politically (23 Apr 86). Needless to say, he failed to mention that he was once a proponent of this myth. Valpy came to believe that mob rule by youths, in the townships, was the result of a history of “capitalist exploitation of black labour” (4 Dec 85). He later equated “class” with being black and described apartheid as economic class repression (16 Apr 86). This interpretation was obviously light years from any that Globe editorialists would care to express.

There are clear disadvantages in placing correspondents in situations for which they are not adequately prepared. Inconsistency and unformed opinions are the most obvious. To his credit, Valpy’s opinions evolved, but one must wonder what effect his earlier opinions had on Globe readers and their perceptions of South Africa.
Valpy on Valpy

BY MICHAEL VALPY

Michael Valpy is the former Africa and Middle East Bureau chief of the Globe and Mail.

I'll start with a small kick at Owen Turner and then write smoothly under the rubric of constructive discussion. I am bothered by his timeframe: the four years of 1983 to 1986. By including 1983, he can contrast the Globe and Mail's South African coverage before and after it had a resident correspondent on the continent. But the termination date of his inquiry – December 1986 – does not, as he implies, demarcate the end of my time in The Globe's Africa bureau. It falls eight and a half months short of when Oakland Ross replaced me. Turner thus omits, inter alia, The Globe's coverage (mine) and editorial page assessment of Brian Mulroney's early 1987 visit to the Front Line States and its major implications for Canada's South Africa policy, an event upon which students of the Canadian press and its behaviour might be expected to eagerly fall.

More important, he omits The Globe's coverage (mine, with others) and editorial interpretation of last October's Commonwealth Conference – which really is too bad. Because in it he would find the affirmation of his essay's main thesis: that "there are clear disadvantages in placing correspondents in situations for which they are not adequately prepared ..." and very clear advantages when the correspondents are prepared.

The Globe's coverage of the Vancouver summit was unmatched by other Canadian or foreign news media and should be labelled in part (It was in fact superb teamwork involving Ottawa bureau chief Jeff Sallot, Vancouver correspondent John Cruickshank and The Globe's national desk) a product of my tenure as Africa correspondent.

All of which is prologue.

If the Canadian press too seldom holds up a mirror to the world and Canada's role in it, even more seldom is a mirror held up to the work done out in the world by the Canadian press. Turner's essay well merits publication. He is hard on me but I find little in his research and analysis of my work with which to disagree – apart from bits of nasty phrasing.

In Sept. 1984 rent protests in the Vaal area erupted into mass uprisings throughout South Africa

In January, 1984, I arrived in Harare, Zimbabwe, to re-open The Globe's Africa bureau after a 16 year hiatus. We were unsure what working conditions were going to be like, very unsure at the time of Zimbabwe (It was agreed I would not buy furniture for the bureau in the event that a hurried withdrawal from the country became required), and unsure what was going to be the focus of our coverage.

My mandate was never exclusively South Africa or even the planet's greatest moral issue of the decade. At that time, the African story – especially in the British press – was Zimbabwe, with lurid tales of how blacks were destroying once-orderly Rhodesia. There were, as well, other stories, in particular the other story ... of sub-Saharan Africa sinking into terminal debt, of the shining hope of post-colonial development gone terribly wrong, of the reality to black Africa's human journey that lay behind the dilettante chats of North-South in Cancun and the United Nations plaza. Soon
after my arrival in Harare, I met the southern Africa correspondent of The Washington Post. He told me that, prior to his posting, he was sent off on a six-month postgraduate course at Georgetown University on the politics and economies of the southern continent. My posting was announced three and a half months before I left Canada. For all but a month, I continued to write a daily Ottawa column. A great deal of my time was spent setting up bureau logistics and trying (bootlessly at that point, speaking of harbingers) to obtain a South African work visa.

My knowledge of Africa was grounded in a child's romance with pink swaths on the map and an undergraduate's infatuation with Julius Nyerere. I doubt if my adult knowledge exceeded that of the ordinary adult Canadian who reads newspapers. I arranged some briefings - sessions here, sessions there, with CIDA, External, a couple of African diplomats, a few academics. All very thin. There should have been more reading done. There wasn't.

What did The Globe's editors, in late 1983, expect from their Africa bureau? I think they saw a "writer's assignment" which is why they sent a "writer," someone capable of presenting a Canadian audience with emotive word-snapshots of a continent that would have meaning to the Canadian experience. If I had been a senior Globe editor in late 1983, I think I would have given me the assignment. A year and a half later? I don't know. South Africa had become the story it is now, with all its ramifications throughout the world and, in particular, the southern continent... a story requiring harder journalistic analysis than I am easily capable of.

The dancer cannot be separated from the dance. I am a liberal. I have enormous difficulty ascribing evil to anyone. Keith Davey, in his autobiography, described me as "gentle." I am a journalist who has to discover things for himself, however slow the process.

I was seduced until maybe early 1985 - as was the Canadian Government: and reading Turner's essay, I realize for the first time that my view of South Africa changed precisely as the view held by the Canadian Embassy in South Africa changed - by the National Party's carefully crafted reform rhetoric. I was seduced for three reasons: I knew too little history, reform was so unquestionably logical, and I mistook South African whites, especially those with the same class background as mine, to be Euro-westerners out of my own cultural experience.

"I was seduced until maybe early 1985 by the National Party's carefully crafted reform rhetoric"

I recall pieces I wrote that outraged people at home, outrage which I tended to set aside as ideological gridlock. I was determined in my early days in South Africa to present white South Africans as people willing to devolve power but frightened of what that might mean. I looked for those striving to find "middle ground." I grasped for thin reeds of Canadian parallels such as "forced removals" of Amerindian communities earlier in this century. I talked mainly to South African whites because I believed - as I still in some measure believe - that power was theirs to surrender and not something that could ever be taken from them. I believed, as I still believe but now less innocently, that South Africa is a complicated story transcending slogans and easy journalistic exposition.

My great failure is that I did not recognize until much later the significance of what happened in the Vaal Triangle on September 3 and 4, 1984 - the beginning of the present cycle of black revolution. And having failed to understand at the time what was happening, I don't feel I ever caught up with the story. Without the events of the Vaal, I might have continued my on-job education, advancing me and The Globe readers on a slow, careful excursion toward enlightenment, the journalism I'm most comfortable with. Slow excursions in South Africa ended in September, 1984.

I do know what changed my thinking:

The mindless violence of the South African police in confronting any display of dissent. The South African Defence Force's simultaneous attacks on Gaberone, Lusaka, and Harare at the very moment when the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group was to meet with Pretoria ministers. Glenn Babb's ridiculous lies in the advertisement he published in The Globe and Mail. The Bureau for Information's ridiculous lies to the foreign press following the imposition of the first state of emergency. The lies told to Canadian visitors to South Africa on Glenn Babb's conceived "fact-finding tour."

And I began paying attention to the treason trial of the Delmas-22, the most important political prosecution since the Rivonia trial of Nelson Mandela. At Delmas, I saw the South African state display its brute clumsiness in trying to construct a legal case of subversive conspiracy against ordinary black South Africans who had been moved finally to violence against an intolerable system. Thus the deflowering of one liberal Canadian journalist.

The Globe has been barred in South Africa since my departure. Pretoria refuses to state why. It could be me, it could be Mulroney's policy, it could be The Globe's editorial policy, it could be they don't like Ross.
Why Is South Africa Getting Away with Murder?

The following is adapted from a press statement by CIDMAA, (Centre d'Information et de Documentation sur le Mozambique et l'Afrique Australe) in Montreal, April 10/88.

On April 7, a car bomb in Mozambique's capital, Maputo, almost killed Albie Sachs, the internationally-renowned South African jurist, author and anti-apartheid activist. The bomb flung the car three metres off the road, injuring a passing motorist and a child, and shattering most windows in Sachs' nine-story apartment block. Latest reports say that Sachs has lost his right arm, possibly an eye, and suffered extensive internal injuries.

Pretoria has of course targeted many ANC members. One was Sachs' close friend, Prof. Ruth First, murdered by a parcel bomb at the university in Maputo in August 1982.

A War of Assassinations

The attempt on Sachs highlights two new elements in Pretoria's programme of assassination. One is the shift to Europe and possibly North America.

The other is its scale. The attack on Sachs was the fifth murderous attack on ANC members outside South Africa in just ten days. Six people have died.

- March 27, Brussels: 17 kg bomb defused outside apartment of Godfrey Motsepe, ANC representative (second attempt in two months)
- March 28, Gabarone: four people killed and burned by South African commandos
- March 29, Paris: ANC representative, Dulcie September, shot dead outside her apartment
- March 29, Maseru: ANC guerrilla, Mazizi Mafeqaza, shot dead in his hospital bed, while recuperating from an earlier attempt
- On April 5, the FBI officially warns the ANC Observer Mission to the UN of the presence of a "hit squad" planning actions against the ANC. Meanwhile Agence-France-Presse writes confidently of the presence within South African Security of a "Z-squad" whose modus operandi is precisely cold-blooded murder. And in Canada, Yusuf Saloojee, the ANC's chief representative, asks the authorities for protection against possible attacks.

Three urgent questions arise:

1. Why has Pretoria expanded its programme of assassinations?
2. Why is it getting away with murder?
3. What is the Canadian government response?

Assassination is South African Strategy

Since its May 1986 raids on three neighbouring countries, and the imposition of a nation-wide emergency the next month, Pretoria has decided to deal with its domestic crisis almost exclusively by strong-arm methods. As Minister of Law and Order, Adrian Vlok, has put it, the aim in the South African region is...
to “bomb the enemy in its bases.” Inside the country, there is an unprecedented campaign of violence against members of the democratic organizations by the security forces and police-backed vigilante groups, claiming hundreds of lives. Finally, Pretoria has unleashed a massive programme of attacks against anyone who it believes to be linked to or sympathetic to the ANC. The regime is now quite simply trying to stop the ANC from operating anywhere – inside South Africa, in the Frontline States, and even in Europe or North America.

Getting Away With Murder

The South African Government is extremely sensitive to international reaction, listening very closely to the “messages” behind the actions of other countries, especially Western governments. These actions, rather than eloquent resolutions and speeches condemning apartheid, become the yardstick for its decisions.

A case in point is the use of hit squads. Over the past 18 months, the ANC has warned the governments of the US, France, West Germany, Italy, Sweden and Australia that Pretoria was planning to use hit squads in their capital cities. In late 1986, British police charged two former Rhodesians with planning to kidnap ANC members in London. When the trial began to reveal British intelligence links in South Africa, Thatcher’s government withdrew the charges. Despite an outcry, there was no public explanation.

The message here was reinforced by the purely symbolic response of most Western governments to the Feb. 24 bannings. Moreover, Britain and USA vetoed a UN Security Council motion for further sanctions against South Africa. Japan, France and West Germany abstained. In other words, Botha heard that he was free to pursue the strategy underlying the bannings.

Where is Canada’s Bottom Line?

In October 1985, Prime Minister Mulroney promised the UN that unless there were progress towards dismantling apartheid, his government would impose “total sanctions” against South Africa and break off all relations with Pretoria.

Since this promise, the following have occurred in South Africa:

- untold thousands have died in South African aggression against its neighbours
- virtual total censorship has been imposed on South Africa
- virtually all legal organizations of the democratic opposition have been banned
- there have been no further moves to “reform” apartheid

Canada imposed its last round of limited sanctions against South Africa in August 1986. Then, just before two critical Commonwealth Conferences in 1987 and 1988, Secretary of State Joe Clark spoke of a general “sanctions fatigue,” adding that Canada was not contemplating further measures. In other words, not even Canada would impose sanctions. Barely days later, the seventeen organizations were banned.

Although Canada’s Ambassador MacLean in Pretoria says his government believes financial sanctions would be important, Canada is sending quite different signals in other ways. From May 9 to 28, for instance, Canada’s Department of Justice will host a “diplomatic conference” in Ottawa, dealing with international financial leasing and international factoring, organized by UNIDROIT, based in Rome. An External Affairs spokesman announced that the Government was sidestepping its own rules by admitting South African representatives, because “South Africa is a valuable member of an organization which works on the principle of universality.”

In the same month, the US-based Inter-nation Water Association is organizing an international conference in Ottawa, to include six South African delegates.

What Does the Anti-Apartheid Movement Want?

In this new climate of assassination, we demand three things from the Canadian Government:

1. Withdrawing the invitation to South Africa to attend the UNIDROIT Conference, and refusing visas to South African officials from the Water Conference
2. Acting on Mulroney’s promise of “total sanctions,” in the face of the recent bannings and media controls
3. Inquiring urgently into the possibility of violent acts against ANC members in Canada and Canadians in the anti-apartheid network, especially in the light of death threats to the ANC representative, Yusuf Saloojee.
Moving Forward on Sanctions: A View from Inside South Africa

BY GEOFFREY SPAULDING

Geoffrey Spaulding is Southern Africa REPORT’s South Africa special correspondent.

The article by New York based anti-apartheid activists Jim Cason and Mike Fleshman (C/F) in the December 1987 issue of Southern Africa REPORT (Vol. 3, No. 3, pg. 19, “The State of Apartheid: Assessing Sanctions at Year One”) describes very succinctly the present dilemma of the US anti-apartheid movement: having stitched together during 1985/86 a fairly broad-based coalition which succeeded in pushing through the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) in October 1986, it is now proving difficult to hold this alliance together to press for extensions and reinforcement of the legislation.

As the SAR editors note, the article also raises some important issues concerning the relationship of certain actors internal to SA - trade unions and intellectuals - to the sanctions campaigns. But it is hard - from inside South Africa - to take very seriously Cason and Fleshman’s discussion of these issues. To summarise their argument briefly, they suggest that COSATU’s position on sanctions [involving support for comprehensive mandatory sanctions but with expressed misgivings about certain forms of “selective sanctions” whose negative effects may be borne primarily by the working class. - Ed.], a position which C/F label “ambiguous,” must bear substantial responsibility for the decline of American interest in sanctions. Further, it is “manipulative white (!) workerist intellectuals” who are the dominant influence behind the federation’s position, and - worse! - are now spreading their malevolent ideas via their “privileged access to the West,” and the US in particular.

It is these “intellectuals” who are clearly the real target for C/F, the butt of their obvious frustration at the failure of their own work in the US to sustain its momentum. No longer riding the crest of the wave, they are angry and upset, and looking for a scapegoat. This is obvious from the tone and language of the article which is jarring, to put it mildly, and singularly unhelpful to serious debate on the sanctions question.

It was rather surprising to find such an article in SAR, which in the past has always tried to intervene in antagonistic situations in a constructive fashion. One can only wonder, for example, at the relevance of the racial labels used to the question at hand. It also is a little strange for two New York-based writers to question the accountability of people based inside South Africa, while mounting an attack on a resolution taken at a trade union congress attended by 1,500 ac-
credited delegates. One might be excused for thinking this just a little arrogant.

One could respond point by point to the various excesses in this article, as well as to the similar views expressed by many anti-apartheid activists in the West. It seems more useful, however, to recognise the importance of location and context in these debates. In other words, whether one is based inside or outside South Africa makes a big difference to one’s perspective on the whole issue of international economic pressure. It is only to be expected that activists in the Western countries will place more emphasis on international actions than do South Africans themselves - sanctions and boycotts are more or less western activists’ only card, the one way they can contribute to apartheid’s elimination. South Africans, on the other hand, have a far more diverse range of strategies available to them (and therefore, it should be noted, a far more complex problem). So sanctions are relatively less important.

In addition, however, the factors which need to be taken into consideration in weighing up support for sanctions line up differently inside South Africa than they do outside. Sanctions advocates in the US, Canada or anywhere else do not have to live with their effects – negative as well as positive – and this can make their calculations distinct from those of people in South Africa who do have to make the adjustments. Of course, this point is frequently made by the opponents of sanctions. Of course, movement leaders have said that South Africans are prepared to accept the cost. Neither of these facts make the point – that context affects perspectives on sanctions – less valid. And the very success of the sanctions and divestment campaigns – the legislative measures passed, the corporate withdrawals, real or sham – imposes even greater divergence between the two strategic calculations.

If Cason and Fleshman had recognised this difference as a contradiction inherent in the strategy of international economic pressure, they could, I think, have understood the COSATU resolution or the NUMSA response to Ford/Samcor [The union received 24% of Ford’s divested South African shares and insisted that Ford sustain licensing, sales and transfer agreement with its South African successor firm – Ed.] as reflecting something other than ambivalence and a softening of support.

Bearing this mind, I turn to the central difficulty of the C/F article, which is that its simplistic arguments completely divert attention from any effort to come to grips with the real issues involved in the impasse which the American anti-apartheid campaign has reached. Instead of examining the obstacles and constraints which have emerged, Cason/Fleshman put forward an “analysis” which amounts, in effect, to arguing that the fleas (the evil intellectuals) on the tail (COSATU) are wagging the entire dog (the US Administration??!!). This may slightly caricature their argument, but does clearly demonstrate its absurdity.

The underlying problem, I think, is that C/F appear to approach sanctions campaigns as moral crusades, rather than political processes. This is indicated by their references to a “clear moral imperative” (now diluted by the passing of the CAAA) and the need “to revive public outrage.” Their strategic thinking vis-à-vis their potential constituency in the US is limited to the problem of evoking an emotional response. While one would not want to suggest that there should be no moral element in politics, a politics that is limited to this is unlikely to sustain itself. It may well succeed in the short-term in creating a massive groundswell of concern, but as has been demonstrated over the past two years (in South Africa as much as in the US), such movements tend to evaporate even more quickly than they emerge.

From any such moralistic standpoint, it becomes impossible to consider many of the very real difficulties imposed on anti-apartheid work by the nature of American politics: the necessary compromises required to build national coalitions, for example, or the “flavour of the month” nature of Americans’ concern with foreign policy issues. This latter factor is fostered precisely by TV, the absence of whose images C/F lament so much, as contributing to the subsiding of “public outrage.” (It can be mentioned in passing that while South African censorship may have stopped the images initially, for many months now it is SA security force action which has ended the reality behind the news images. Censorship is only infrequently needed in early 1988.)

What is equally serious is the failure – consequent upon an approach based solely on moralizing – to confront the opponents of sanctions on their own terrain. In the Cason/Fleshman piece, this is reflected in their rarely considering the question at the centre of the Reagan report: “Are sanctions working?” This is, of course, the question in which sanctions opponents have tried to define the debate since late 1986, when various official unilateral and multilateral measures were implemented. Arguing that the South African government’s increasing control indicates clearly that sanctions are not working, sanctions opponents conclude, of course, that there should be a return to the discredited policy of “constructive engagement.”

The point actually at issue in this debate is the interpretation to be placed on the notion of “working.” It is obviously convenient for opponents of sanctions to take the view that sanctions “working” would involve the apartheid state visibly crumbling as a result. In response to such a line of argument, however, it is not quite adequate for sanctions advocates simply to point to the limited nature of the sanctions imposed, and call for more, as C/F
do. Such a response implies acceptance of the terms of the discussion—that sanctions could indeed end apartheid.

It is true that some in South Africa, most notably church leaders, have on occasion presented sanctions in this way—as an alternative to other forms of political struggle. But this is not common, and indeed most North American anti-apartheid activists would, if asked, endorse the sentiment expressed last year by Richard Trumka, United Mine Workers of America president and US Shell Boycott chair: “Sanctions alone cannot eradicate apartheid; that task is ultimately left to the people of South Africa themselves. Economic pressure ... can [only] hasten the day.”

Nevertheless, one sometimes has the sense, from US activists, that this is little more than a ritual nod to self-determination for South Africans. Hidden behind this is the notion that what is really needed to do the trick is American power. A shared view of the omnipotence and justice of American foreign policy in sorting out other countries’ conflicts is found amongst many Americans who differ only over which side of the conflict should be the lucky beneficiary. In the anti-apartheid arena, this is reflected in the prioritising of US sanctions/disinvestment campaigns over the strategic needs and choices of South African organizations. Hence C/F’s attack on the trade unions, in effect for failing to adapt their sanctions policy to the needs of the US campaigns. They complain, for example, that “COSATU’s increasingly ambivalent attitude towards corporate withdrawal...[is] undermining the divestment movement—by far the most important and successful anti-apartheid campaign in the US.”

This is simply not acceptable as a general approach. But in addition, in the case of South Africa, it fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the state, the target of sanctions. The South African state is not the Iranian or Philippine state: it will take more than US pressure, even in the form of comprehensive sanctions, to bring it down. To break with this approach—to redefine the meaning of sanctions “working”—requires locating sanctions very explicitly within the context of the wider liberation struggle. This means understanding sanctions in relation to the existing balance of forces, and the overall direction of strategy. What is crucial here is that these latter variables are always shifting.

It is significant that despite their title—“The State of Apartheid”—C/F do not include in their assessment of “sanctions at year one” any serious consideration of the implications of the changing political scene inside South Africa. For them, this apparently has little bearing on the relevance or thrust of either the various sanctions campaigns or particular sanctions measures. Starting from a view of sanctions as a moral issue—“we must do something and what we can do is impose sanctions”—leads naturally to a very limited analysis of the links between developments in the wider liberation struggle and the sanctions issue—“everything we can do—every new sanction, each divestment—will help.” In other words, the relationship between sanctions and other aspects of the struggle is static and stable and unproblematic.

It should be obvious that the latter could only be true if the overall struggle were simply a linear process, involving a steady increase in the strength of the opposition until it was more powerful than the state and liberation was achieved. This is patent nonsense, yet it is implicit in much of the strategic thinking on sanctions. A more appropriate perspective is, of course, one which views the overall struggle is an uneven process, with “ebb” and “flow” phases reflecting such realities as the fluctuations of mass mobilization and active opposition, the level of overt state repression, and the nature of state/ruling class efforts to develop new means through which to maintain their broad authority and domination.

The balance of these forces is constantly shifting, of course. Nonetheless, certain key “moments” when such shifts are more fundamental are identifiable. One such “moment,” for example, was the banning of the ANC and other movements in March 1960. This signalled that the level of mass organization was now moving into an “ebb” phase. One characteristic of any period of such more fundamental shift is that it usually involves the emergence of a new “theory of transition,” of a new broad strategic perspective designed to identify the primary means of transforming the state. In 1960, this was reflected in the adoption of armed struggle by the liberation movements, ending the “passive resistance” campaigns of the ’50s. In other words, a basic shift occurring in the balance of forces provokes a reassessment of overall strategy. Such a reassessment is essential: in general, fundamental shifts in the balance of forces are the result of a new ruling class strategy, adopted in response to growing mass opposition. The liberation movement needs in turn to adapt its own strategy to the changing circumstances.

In sum, it is by making this kind of nuanced understanding of the specific conjuncture in South Africa the starting point of strategising on sanctions that it is possible to develop a much more satisfactory approach to sanctions than that taken by Cason and Fleshman. Such an approach would locate sanctions as one aspect of the wider struggle, emphasising particularly the links between shifts in the latter and sanctions. It is precisely this kind of approach to the question of sanctions that I will seek to exemplify in a subsequent article.
Sexism Beware!:
Faried Esack Speaks Out

"There is no question of postponing the liberation of women until after freedom, because the oppression that women experience is not necessarily a consequence of apartheid..." As far as we are concerned, the struggle for women, as is important as the struggle for national liberation, because we feel that we could end up in a country where "the people governing" means "men governing."

An unlikely but staunch and articulate defender of anti-sexism within South Africa's liberation struggle is Maulana Faried Esack, leader of the UDF-affiliated Call of Islam. Esack, who was recently in Toronto, is also a leading figure in OPAS (meaning Beware! in Afrikaans), the Organisation of People Against Sexism, a small (twenty-odd), non-racial and female-dominated activist group based in Cape Town. He devoted considerable time in his various meetings with church and solidarity organizations, to expounding his views on women's oppression and talking about the objectives of OPAS.

OPAS is "committed to exposing the marriage between apartheid and male dominance and ensuring that in a new South Africa, women will occupy their rightful place." This means working "to make women's struggle against sexism an integral part of the movement for freedom in South Africa." The tactics include picketing schools where cases of sexual harassment have occurred, and organizing to get the issue of women's oppression raised within every possible forum of the progressive movement.

The views of Esack and OPAS clearly represent a departure from the "official" position on gender issues within the broad democratic movement in South Africa. This holds that women's liberation is subsumed by national liberation (or, for some, socialist transformation), and that the struggle against women's oppression is subordinate to the struggle against apartheid. But Faried was well-rehearsed in responding to the arguments that prop up this position, and to the well-worn objections and resistances invariably raised in anti-apartheid meetings (internally and internationally) when women (and very occasionally men) claim attention for gender issues.

Radical responses

On the oft-heard line that feminism is a western and bourgeois phenomenon, and therefore not appropriate to the South African liberation struggle...?

Well, for that matter socialism as it is being debated within South Africa is a Western phenomenon too. ("Marx was not exactly a black working class person.") "For us it is not the origins of the ideas that is important, but their relevance to people inside South Africa. And the oppression of women is real..."  

On the argument that it is apartheid that oppresses women, and women will be free once apartheid is gone...?

"It is true that the essential oppression of women is under apartheid. But it is also true that women are being oppressed as women. Women are being oppressed by men and the apartheid system has got nothing to do with it. It accentuates, it intensifies that oppression, but we have no guarantee that that kind of oppression will not continue in a post-apartheid society. And so we have to work towards securing those guarantees now.

"[The oppression of women] is often an extension of religious values, whether it is Christianity, or Islam, or Hinduism, and it has often been an extension of cultural values, whether it is African traditional society, or the Khoi-Khoi and the Khoi-San traditions that some of the Coloured communities may be living out. And this has preceded the coming to South Africa of white people."

Esack gave some examples of some of the contemporary sexist practices that OPAS is drawing attention to. Many of the males in the student and youth organizations were extremely sexist in their behaviours and relationships. There was a phenomenon of "boycott babies", the result of sexual encounters that occurred during the school boycotts amongst students with minimal sex education. It was the women, not the men involved, who were having to carry the full burden of parenting. He also referred to the macho culture evidenced in the Natal conflict between Inkatha and UDF supporters, where, on both sides, men were branding and punishing women who refused to sleep with them as being "of the enemy."

The question of priorities.

The question of priorities of struggle, and where women's liberation fits in, is always a hard one. "When the exigencies of anti-apartheid struggle are so pressing," Esack was asked, "where is there time and energy to devote to the struggle against sexism?" His response was complex and qualified, and took a number of angles. Appropriately so, given that he was talking from a real context of struggle, not as an abstract exercise.

First, Esack charged, the argument about women's issues not being a priority at this point in the struggle is often used as a smokescreen -- "a smokescreen [for men] to continue their own oppression of women both in their individual lives and in their organizational structures." Referring to the "rubbish-
ings” which OPAS tends to receive from the community organizations, he maintained that people are very threatened by challenges to their ideological and practical positions on gender relations.

Secondly, a point about the general context of the struggle and how this influences — “impoverishes” in his words — the vision of that struggle. "Apartheid has brutalized our people in such a blatant and vicious manner, that in many ways our people have become blinded to any issues other than the purely political pressures that they experience on a day-to-day basis, the assaults on their dignity as human beings. So there is hardly the time and energy to pay attention to some of the more universal issues” ... such as gender oppression, survival of species (human and animal). "But the truth is that all these problems are intertwined. And if in principle you are opposed to injustice, you can’t address those problems without also addressing injustice to women.” ("... and saving the whales”, he added with a glint of mischievousness that acknowledged his maverick position.)

The conception of “political” and its implications for women’s struggle was a theme Faried returned to frequently. When it is argued that “women’s struggle is tied to the political struggle”, it often implies the narrower sense, that is, the struggle against the white government. “But it must be remembered that the political struggle [in this sense] is a male-dominated struggle.” It is fundamentally unjust to tie the women’s struggle to the “political struggle.” But if we hold a broader (“purer”) view of “political” to mean the struggle for complete liberation, then there is no question that women’s issues are inherently part of that.

On his personal practice and allocation of energies? Well, he realised that he gave priority to the political liberation of the people ... “although sometimes I experience a bit of doubt in my own mind about whether they [women’s issues] are not equally important.” He acknowledged that it was extremely problematic to raise women’s oppression amongst people fighting for their very survival. Take the case of the woman in the rural areas whose husband is away from her for 11 months and 1 week. "So how do you now talk to women in the rural areas and say that when your husband is home for those three weeks, make sure that you are not oppressed as a person.” So better not to argue abstractly about the level of priority to accord women’s struggle, just “place it firmly on the agenda in the liberation movement.”

The Maulana is quick to acknowledge that his views are not widely appreciated by the community organizations and even the women’s organizations. His prominence in OPAS is a bit of an enigma and embarrassment to many in the community. But this is clearly not inhibiting his commitment to keeping the issue of women’s oppression within public purview. During the Culture for Another South Africa (CASA) festival in Amsterdam in December last year for example, Faried was insistent on the validity of dealing with gender issues.

The "gender question" has become an inevitable moment of any international anti-apartheid forum — whether raised by spokespersons for the liberation movement or democratic organizations within South Africa, or by women working within solidarity movements and attempting to reconcile their own feminism and gender struggles within their respective organizational contexts with their understanding of the issues of gender oppression in Southern Africa. Faried Esack and OPAS’s strong stance on the place of anti-sexist struggle within the liberation struggle introduces a provocative and challenging contribution to the debate, one quite different from the one that we generally encounter here in North America.
As the South African state tightens the screws of repression, the detention and mistreatment of women as political prisoners has become an increasingly visible issue around which to organize previously under-organized segments of society, both in South Africa itself and in the international community.

The starkness and horror of a system that will imprison and torture even children tears through liberal white reluctance to take a stand and has forced many South African whites of conscience to join groups which have sprung up to defend detainees.

Two of these groups, the Detainees Parents' Support Committee (DPSC) and the Detainees Support Committee (DESCOM), were recently banned. They were in the midst of a campaign which had designated the month of February to focus on the difficulties faced by women detainees.

According to the DPSC 1987 annual review, women make up about ten per cent of the detainee population. They have been held under virtually every section of the security legislation. Of the 25,000 detained in the year before June 1987, 3,000 were women. A 56 year old woman, Elda Bani, was one of six people who died in prison or under police custody during the same one year period. (In 1987 five people were executed for “political crimes” and at present there are 50 people on death row.) Women detainees face particular difficulties specific to their gender, from the discomfort and humiliation of going without sanitary towels to the violence of rape. Pregnant women have frequently reported they were beaten with intent to harm their unborn children and sometimes suffered miscarriages as a result.

At one of the DPSC's last pub-
Public meetings held to commemorate women in detention, a former detainee who spent most of her pregnancy in solitary confinement told the audience about her fears of the effects of the inadequate diet on her unborn child. She described how a fellow detainee and leader of the Federation of Transvaal Women (FEDTRAW), Sister Bernard Ncube, managed to smuggle her extra food. Sister Bernard, as a detainee under Section 29, was entitled to food parcels from outside.

Despite the bannings, National Detainees Day, March 12, was still commemorated, and other previously planned activities of the campaign were still carried out, although not under the usual sponsorship of the DPSC. Instead it was women under the banner of FEDTRAW who took to the streets in protest. (A few days earlier they had used the opportunity of International Women’s Day to challenge the Chamber of Mines and the British Consulate to take a stand against the new Labour Relations Amendment Bill and the bannings). Perhaps as a result of her participation in these actions, Jesse Duarte of FEDTRAW, well known to many Canadians through her 1986 tour, has joined the ranks of the detained.

A concert, Bend the Bars, originally sponsored by DPSC, was also hastily taken up by FEDTRAW, as was the publication of a book on women in detention, A Women’s Place Is in the Struggle, Not Behind Bars.

The issue of women political prisoners in South Africa has also served as a mobilizing theme for a successful solidarity initiative amongst women based in Toronto.

In 1987, the South African Women’s Day Committee of Toronto chose Theresa Ramashamola as a symbol of their August 9th event. Theresa is presently on death row along with five others, collectively known as the Sharpeville Six. She is the first woman to be sentenced to death for a politically related charge.

The committee drew in women from the churches, labour, black organizations, and Native and feminist solidarity groups. To extend the campaign nationally, education materials and petitions were distributed to solidarity groups across the country. The campaign gathered national momentum at the Vancouver Parallel Commonwealth Conference where a women’s sectoral workshop was attended by a member of the DPSC.

Some success can be measured in the response to the petitions, a hearing from Joe Clark, followed by the raising of the issue in the meeting between Clark and P.W. Botha and a promise by External Affairs to monitor the case.

When the South African state announced the imminent hanging of the Sharpeville Six, solidarity groups in Toronto renewed their energies around the issue of political prisoners amongst others. A Friday evening anti-apartheid demonstration at one of the city’s busiest intersections is establishing itself as a regular event.

Hopefully these efforts, as well as those in other countries, are only the beginnings of increasing international public action in support of South African political prisoners, men, women and children.
THE PLAIN TRUTH?

If you doubt the breadth of South Africa’s propaganda reach, pick up your April copy of The Plain Truth, available free, courtesy of the Worldwide Church of God.

The magazine, which claims a circulation of seven million and is distributed throughout North America by both subscription and street boxes, features a cover article entitled “South Africa’s Future: Healing the Wounds.”

The article uses the arguments that have served the South African state for years: that South Africa’s problems are far too complicated for outsiders to judge; that South African’s white politicians are introducing reforms as fast as they can without straining the society; that blacks are better off than before; and the article implies that the government stands as a bulwark between order and “inter-tribal strife.”

To complete the picture, the article points out that the United States gets a significant percentage of strategic metals from South Africa and raises the spectre of Soviet interests in the region. For most of the article the writer uses the technique of reporting opinions while appearing to take the stance of wanting to understand. This is a typical sentence: “South Africans wonder why many in the West would want to force South Africa into a Marxist dictatorship, which the former assume as inevitable if the black activists in the African National Congress gain control.”

The free distribution of a glossy magazine requires a hefty bank account and the publishers of The Plain Truth seem to have all they need. The Worldwide Church of God was founded by Herbert W. Armstrong who died in 1986 leaving an organization which had annual revenues of $140 million in 1985. By 1987 annual revenues had risen to $163 million and its baptised membership was reported up 7,000 to 87,000 in congregations spread out through 56 countries. As well as the magazine, the church beams out its “World of Tomorrow” telecast on about 340 stations and five cable networks, including 16 outlets outside North America.

But take heart: circulation of The Plain Truth is reported to have dropped by one million since 1985.
Mozambique: The Video

BY LARRY KUEHN

Larry Kuehn is a teacher/educator, and part of the editorial collective of New Directions. He is presently working for CUSO.


How best could a filmmaker convince an audience of skeptics that the MNR—the bandidos in Mozambique—are in the service of South Africa and trained and supplied by South Africa?

What more powerful evidence could be provided than the head of intelligence from Ian Smith's Rhodesian regime telling the story of how they created the MNR (Renamo) in the mid-70's, and turned it over to South Africa when Robert Mugabe took over and Rhodesia became Zimbabwe?

Just such testimony from Ken Flower, former head of the Rhodesian intelligence service, is woven throughout Mozambique—the Struggle for Survival. It provides the clinching evidence, should any be needed, that achieving peace and development in Mozambique requires an end to the apartheid system in South Africa.

Flower describes how the Rhodesians built a secret army, emphasizing that “at no time did the movement (the MNR) have its own political program.” Rather, what the Rhodesians, and later the South Africans, offered was a “way of life.”

Much of the video describes that way of life—robbing, killing, destroying and mutilating.

One of the Renamo defectors interviewed tells about an operation in which he took part. The bandidos he was with went in and destroyed a village, rounding up the villagers, taking their clothing and food, and selecting out the teachers, leaders and Frelimo people to kill.

A mutilated victim— with ears and nose cut off—recounts her experience, describing the terror of the terrible violence directed against her and many others.

And shot after shot shows torn up rail lines, bombed bridges and refugees barely able to find food, clothing and shelter.

The video pictures a country facing war, a wrecked economy, millions of internal refugees, famine—and children who have less chance of surviving to adulthood than in any other country.

Yet, strangely enough, this is not a statement of despair. It is, as the title says, about struggle, about not giving up, about working to rebuild.

The shots of destruction are balanced by views of the beauty of the country—its beaches, its countryside, its people.

And it tells about the recent opening of the market system and improvements in food supplies in the cities.

Efforts to reform the army are detailed, including the training of middle rank officers in Zimbabwe by the British army.

Gains are being made in control of the country by Frelimo, with the army winning back some areas, and troops from Zimbabwe and Tanzania helping to protect the vital rail corridors so that transportation can be restored.

Mozambique—the Struggle for Survival has sufficient breadth, balance and detail to provide a good introduction to audiences of that vast number of Canadians who know virtually nothing about Mozambique, often mistaking it for that island off the east coast of Africa, Madagascar.

This is a long video—57 minutes—so coherently structured that it would be very difficult to select out a portion to show for situations that require a shorter presentation. That coherence is also one of its real strengths as an educational experience.

The film works, then, on two vitally interconnected levels. Mozambique, as a country, is presented sympathetically in its efforts to survive the ruthless onslaught of South Africa. But Mozambique is Mozambicans. The cruel fact is that, for the individual peasants whose lives are shown in the video, their hope each day is that the war’s reach will be escaped another night.
Lina

BY JO LEE

Lina Magaia was in Toronto in February for a brief visit as part of a tour promoting the English publication of her book Dumba Nengue: Run for Your Life. Of the book, William Minter has written: “A powerful and moving firsthand account. Mozambican writer Lina Magaia tells the stories of her neighbours and friends in rural Gaza province, the human targets of apartheid’s proxy terror campaign. This book is a unique resource for communicating the lived reality of Mozambique’s struggle for survival.” Lina Magaia spoke about the incidents described in Dumba Nengue, as well as about some of her experiences in the US, to a small group of TCLSAC members.

Lina Magaia warmly greets those of us she’s never met before. Old friends she hugs, shares reminiscence, jokes. We move to the living room, a small group of us gathered against the cold Canadian winter to hear her news of Mozambique. It doesn’t matter how many times I hear it, read it—the shock and power of lives such as hers force an immediacy of response. This strong woman’s dark eyes flash as she straightforwardly recounts her life and those with whom she works in Manhica. Her story comes alive, as a grim reality, one I shudder against. As she continues, I hear echoes of another voice, images of another short, stocky woman in whose similar soft, round face dark eyes glitter with humour and pain. It’s my Salvadorean friend Febe, months after the torture, one eye still half closed from the beatings. But the smile, the dark, flashing eyes. Febe, Lina Magaia. How can they speak so calmly of the horrors that shape their lives?

Lina recounts tales of “the bandits” and the worsening terror of their tactics. At first, young men in their late teens and early twenties were captured and forced to join Renamo. But such young men run away fast. Young children can’t. So now boys eleven, twelve, thirteen caught in bandit attacks, their parents, brothers, sisters tortured, raped and killed in front of them, are forced to leave their villages and join the bandits. Terrorized daily, often heavily drugged the young boys become, in the words of the people “other-than-human.”

Lina continues, “How I miss Samora. Samora said these young men are our brothers, our sons, our family. We must welcome them back. For the older ones, help them find wives, give them land.

But it is so hard. Like in my family. A young boy was taken away by the bandits. Renamo feeds on these children’s fears and superstitions. They tell them that they will be invincible to bullets and death if they drink the blood of those they kill. Then these young boys are sent back to their own villages to kill those of their families who still remain. This young boy, my relative. He killed all the children, his cousins and then their mother ... he killed her too.

It’s hard then to remember these are our sons, our brothers. The people cannot believe human beings can do these things. So believing these boys to be other than human, when they catch them, they deal with them in ways so brutal you cannot understand. But you must understand. For the people, these boys are not human. If they catch one of these boys they burn him alive in an oil drum — how else can you kill something that is not human? What will happen to these young men? What can we do about the damage, the psychological damage, the physical damage? What will we do with them when the war is over?”

Her voice is calm, so soft, I strain to hear.

Lina Magaia works in Manhica province where she is responsible for agricultural and rural development projects. The results of her work fuel in her a sustaining optimism. Optimism in the midst of brutality and nightmares as peasant farmers grow surpluses in the war-ravaged land, exchanging their surplus for more seeds and tools. She gauges their successes and needs by assessing their demands for goods. “I can tell what they do and what they could do as they tell me what equipment, tools and seeds they want. Now I exchange goods for their crops but I am going to experiment by paying with money. When I see what they buy with money I’ll know
a lot about what we can achieve." Another gauge of the success of her projects is the threats against her life. Frequently her work is the target of bandit attacks and crude messages promising her death have become commonplace. Again the grin, the dark eyes dance, "But I've got my boys to protect me," young militia who help guard the projects, the people and Lina.

Her optimism is buoyed too by the recent restructuring in the armed forces. She speaks of her respect and pride in the man now in charge of the armed forces in her district. For Lina, he is someone who "knows how to deal with the bandits." A return to popularly based military tactics honed in the war of liberation against the Portuguese with less reliance on conventional armed forces.

The talk shifts to her trip to the US where her book, aptly subtitled Peasant Tales of Tragedy in Mozambique, has recently been published. This amazing woman, one of two educated in Lisbon before independence, trained as an economist, tells of how she sent copies of her book to the wives of the most powerful men in the US. Lina is absolutely convinced that if people only knew what was going on, they would help to stop it. She's not naive. She lives with the apartheid regime's destruction of Mozambique. I find it hard to believe she can have so much faith in this reaching out to Nancy Reagan, Betty Ford, Maureen Reagan, Rockefellers. But... she does. And, if anyone could convince the Nancy Reagans or the Rockefellers, it would be Lina Magaia. South Africa's destabilizing intervention must be defeated and she does whatever she can, whatever is in her power to hasten its end.

The images, the brutal reality she brings so close, stay with me. Lina Magaia, Febe, it is such women who have moved us to chose the side we have chosen, who inspire us to do what we can.

Readers' Forum . . . .

SAR EDUCATION ISSUE
11 April 1988

I am a black South African studying at Stanford University and was overwhelmed to read the insightful issue of Southern Africa REPORT, Vol. 3 No. 1 on "Education and Transformation."

My research (towards Ph.D.) focuses on curriculum policy in post-apartheid South Africa, drawing on lessons from Zimbabwe....

Sincerely,
Jonathan D. Jansen
Stanford, CA, USA

ZIMBABWE CO-OP EXHIBIT

April 1988

As one of your regular readers while working in Southern Africa and now here in Canada I was disturbed to note your mere fleeting reference to Zimbabwe's collective cooperatives within your otherwise informative issue on the Frontline States. (Especially as your Zimbabwe photographs were actually "lifted" without permission from the photographer or from the collectives' own organization, OCCZIM, although they portray five of these 800 worker initiated enterprises.) The growth and survival of this popular movement, the determination and vitality of the 25,000 members who have come together in self-managed, owned and operated worker co-ops, is internationally unprecedented. It perhaps would have merited at least a side bar next to your Zimbabwe article.

Sincerely,
Steve Seaborn
Ottawa

Ed. Note: We have also been contacted by Bruce Paton regarding the use of his photographs in our last issue without prior consultation. We have since apologized to him. He expressed the concern that the reproductions should more fairly represent his work by being shot from his originals rather than from the posters. He also felt that OCCZIM was not properly credited. We feel that Bruce's photographs greatly enhanced our previous issue and look forward to being able to use his work in the future.

SAR BANNED
15 Feb. 1988

Congratulations. Feb. 5 Weekly Mail, page 4, reports that SAR Volume 3, Number 3, was banned in South Africa. We must be doing something right - or left perhaps. Alert the masses. Also the funders. Regards to all in the frozen wastes.

Jim and Mike
[Cason & Fleshman]
New York
Domination
Résistance
Libération

in the development of
African societies, cultures and states
dans le développement des
sociétés, cultures et États africains

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