Police + Army Out of Townships!

KILL Apartheid, Not Detainees

The Question of VIOLENCE
Southern Africa REPORT

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427 Bloor St. W.
Toronto, M5S 1X7
Tel. (416) 967-5562
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On “Condoning” Violence

Brian Mulroney’s recent trip to Zimbabwe has once again focused Canadian attention on the situation in southern Africa. With television cameras rolling, the leaders of Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana gave Mulroney a dramatic short course on the nature of the conflict in the southern Africa region. In particular, they underscored the point that the African National Congress (ANC), the leading liberation movement in South Africa, has no other choice but to include, among its tactics, the use of violence against the apartheid state.

In response Mulroney went further than any Canadian leader has before him. He acknowledged, for example, that developments in South Africa dictated the “sad conclusion” that “the way of dialogue is not making progress but regressing”. He stated that, under these circumstances, he could “understand” why black leaders believe the resort to force of arms to achieve freedom to be necessary. And he indicated his willingness, subsequently reaffirmed, to meet soon with Oliver Tambo, leader of the ANC. At this point, however, Mulroney stopped short, concluding that Canada cannot “condone” the use of violence to overthrow the racist South African government. Yet this seemed a very limp non sequitur in light of the facts Mulroney himself had acknowledged to be true while in Africa.

What are these facts? On one front, certainly, it is impossible to disagree with the Prime Minister: “The way of dialogue is not making progress but regressing.” Thus, for all its talk of “reform”, the South African state has become more, not less, intransigent in its opposition to a democratic resolution of the
situation there. Always a system premised on the systematic use of state violence to hold down the black population, apartheid South Africa has become even more repressive with its brutal "Emergencies" of the past few years. Indeed, it is in the face of so much state-sponsored violence that activists like Rev. Frank Chikane, whose remarkable recent interview in Toronto we conclude in this issue, have had to rethink their own positions regarding the legitimacy of revolutionary violence in South Africa. Similarly, the reality of the violent acts they are called upon to carry out in the townships has also shaken the consciences of many white recruits to the South African military - as another article in this issue, focussed on the dramatic "End Conscription Campaign", helps to demonstrate.

It bears emphasizing, as well, that such escalation of violence by the apartheid state is not confined to the Republic itself. The death agonies of racial capitalism in South Africa spill over into the entire region - another fact Prime Minister Mulroney began to see for himself on this trip. This is particularly the case of Mozambique, as Judith Marshall, synthesizing the findings of a recent Canadian fact-finding mission to that country, makes clear in her article. In Mozambique, an armed movement (the MNR), recruited, armed and orchestrated by South Africa (along lines chillingly similar to the American manipulation of the contras against Nicaragua), has been set the task, quite literally, of destroying the socioeconomic and political fabric of Mozambican life!

Faced with such realities the editors of Southern Africa REPORT, like Frank Chikane, have felt compelled to take a hard look at the question of "revolutionary violence" in South Africa. It is an examination of this question in all its complexity which we set out in the lead article which follows. What bears noting is that such an analysis carries us ever more firmly to the side of the ANC. The ANC's own historical reluctance to resort to force of arms is well known, of course; moreover, until recently, the movement has restricted itself primarily to acts of sabotage - "armed propaganda", in the ANC's own terminology - and sabotage crafted, by and large, to minimize loss of life. Now, according to ANC pronouncements of the past several years, it seeks to move beyond this stage: it intends to give far more effective military backup to the forces of resistance in the townships in their daily confrontations with the armed might of the state, while also laying the groundwork for a more generalized "armed insurrection" in the course of time. Who would not wish that other scenarios were possible? The fact remains that for all those who wish to see a democratic future for South Africa, it is important that the ANC succeed in such tasks.

Needless to say, an emphasis upon the importance of the ANC's growing military capacity should not imply any underestimation of the great power of the South African state. But neither is it to prophesy a fight to the point of mutual annihilation. If the state's capacity to oppress is challenged with increasing effect, politically and militarily, South Africa's economic crisis will also continue and much deeper splits within the ruling group will occur. Moreover, it is precisely here that international sanctions can be expected to produce a positive outcome. For, as we have often pointed out in these pages, sanctions must not be seen, as Prime Minister Mulroney still prefers to present the case for them, as an alternative to revolutionary violence in South Africa. Rather, they can help to undermine the apartheid state's capacity to use force, indefinitely, to resist "the inevitable" in South Africa.

Thus, in one of the background papers prepared for the historic "Taking Sides" Conference held last month in Montreal (see the article on this conference below), Dan O'Meara, Research Director for that city's Centre d'Information et de Documentation sur le Mozambique et l'Afrique Australe (CIDMAA), demonstrated the considerable vulnerability of South Africa to effective sanctions, given that country's extreme dependence on its foreign trade in primary products and on the importation of technology and machinery for its industrial sector. His conclusion: "The real aim of sanctions is not moral pressure, not to 'punish' the regime, and certainly not - as argued by detractors - to cause economic chaos and unemployment. Sanctions would rather be a positive intervention in the process of change, one which seeks to shift the balance of forces in South Africa by weakening the apartheid regime." Sanctions must be defined, in short, as merely (but importantly) helping to "shorten the day of bloodshed", in Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Chief Lutuli's oft-quoted but entirely apposite phrase.

Condone revolutionary violence in South Africa, then? Brian Mulroney suggested in Africa that, in some vague way, it would be un-Canadian to do so. Yet our government had no such qualms about sanctioning Reagan's Ramboesque adventures in Libya. More positively, when Europeans were faced during World War II with a similar enemy as that which now faces black South Africans, we rightly hailed as freedom fighters the resistance movements which fought the Nazis in Holland and in France. More, we sent troops to help them. We are not likely to send troops to South Africa, and indeed no-one is suggesting that we do so. But why, as a bare minimum, is it so difficult for us to accord to black freedom-fighters the same legitimacy we accorded the Dutch and French? Why can we not, like the Scandinavian governments, offer them, if not arms, at least the kind of "humanitarian" assistance they also require? These are the questions we must continue to ask our government.
The Question of Violence

As the rapidity of change and the intensity of conflict in South Africa become more widely recognized, a new worry gains voice and prominence in statements of political leaders, editorial writers, and commentators. The word which triggers the alarm bells is VIOLENCE. It has become a new excuse for inaction or for distancing Canada from the most active and effective fighters against apartheid. There are real and difficult questions about using armed force to resist apartheid, but before discussing them it will be helpful to clear away several false issues and misconceptions.

The question of violence is commonly a question posed to the ANC. The conversation with Frank Chikane which appears elsewhere in this issue shows how unrealistic it is to see violence in South Africa as an ANC problem. There can be no doubt that by far the greatest perpetrator of acts and threats of violence is the South African state. For more than 25 years the South African state has been a ruthlessly operated war machine with its guns trained on the majority of the population. More than ever it remains so today under the draconian Emergency legislation. In quantitative terms the use of force by those who resist apartheid is a mere fraction of the acts and threats of force employed by the state.

This is not to disguise the fact that among the victims of apartheid armed clashes, physical attacks, and assassinations do occur. But on numerous occasions this “black-on-black violence” has been shown to be induced or encouraged by the government and more generally, the cruelest divisions among black people are as much the result of apartheid as the division between black and white.

In this matrix of coercion and intimidation the word “violence” is most often used in the press to single out for attention and opprobrium one group: the African National Congress. At issue is its decision in 1961 to include in its strategy of resistance to apartheid the use of armed force, at the time restricted to acts of sabotage against state installations where the threat to human life was minimal.

The violence of apartheid

The first set of questions about violence in South Africa has to focus on apartheid itself, the system of stringent control over where black people can live, where they can work, and what they can do to change the oppressive system. From a military standpoint the townships which house most of the black urban population are vast prison camps under military surveillance, today often patrolled by armoured trucks and under observation by nearby military camps. They are often surrounded by high wire fences with guarded entrances and with water and electricity supplies easily cut down. The bantustans are zones of rustication with their own autocratic governments and repressive police. The ending of the pass laws, sometimes claimed as a major reform, has done nothing to reduce the use of employment documents, legal residence documents, and the new bogus bantustan citizenship papers to control the movement of black South Africans.

Over the past decades force has been used routinely by the government to destroy black communities which contravene the Group Areas Act. Crossroads, the defiant shanty community near Capetown, is only the most famous example: a symbol for the millions of black South Africans who, in keeping with the policy of residential separation by race, have been forcibly transported to dumping grounds in the bantustans. Work is scarce in the bantustans and material conditions are so dismal that many people confined to...
them find it preferable to work illegally for a couple of months in town and to spend eight or ten months in prison for violating the influx controls than to try to scratch out a living on stony dry ground.

A further violence of the apartheid state, no less potent for being hidden and silent, is recorded in statistics of high infant mortality, chronic ill health, and minimal or non-existent schooling for the black population of South Africa. The first questions about violence in South Africa must address the issue of what sustains apartheid and how it can be abolished.

Violent defense of white rule

The second set of questions about violence in South Africa looks specifically at the extraordinary use of force by the state to support apartheid. Force is especially visible in the current cycle of repression since the period of continuing challenge to the system which began in 1984. The list of violent intrusions by the state against the normal exercise of civic rights is a long one. It includes the arrest and banning of tens of thousands of leaders of community groups and labour organizations, the suppression of community newspapers by which active citizens kept themselves aware of popular activities and government actions, the armed patrolling of residential townships, the banning of meetings and gatherings, the arrest and intimidation and torture of children, and the prohibition or censoring of national and international reporting of political activities construed as damaging to the state. Another coercive intervention is the conscription of white youth and the recruitment of black youth into military service for the state war machine.

The armed repression by the South African state in defense of apartheid raises an unavoidable question: Is there any way to end or even to mitigate the violence without replacing the government? Governments, businesses, and universities outside South Africa which continue directly or indirectly to support the apartheid regime need to answer for the backing they are giving to a policy of systematic violence against—and the target is deliberately chosen—the exercise of political rights essential to democratic government. Perhaps they accept the view the South African government gives in its own education and propaganda: that advocacy of fundamental reform is an act of treason and subversion. Reformers are therefore defined as dangerous enemies and treated as such.

The ANC—from nonviolence to armed action

Given the inherent violence of apartheid and the particular ferocity of the measures used against the forces of change in the country, there does remain a third set of questions about violence: questions about the methods selected by the anti-apartheid movement. For twenty-six years these methods have included the use of armed force. The ANC leadership in 1961 established Umkhonto we Sizwe, the Spear of the Nation, as a military force to carry out armed attacks against the apartheid state. Armed resistance was not adopted lightly for it broke with 48 years of non-violent protest, twelve of those years opposing the National Party while it was erecting the most elaborate system of white supremacist racist legislation the world has seen.

Non-violence was not a universal commitment, as demonstrated by the people of Pondoland in their rising against the imposition of Bantu Authorities of the 1950s. There were other smaller rebellions. Moreover the pacifism of the ANC was actively debated within the ANC leadership in the late 1950s as it moved from legal action to explicit defiance of racist and politically oppressive legislation.

Nevertheless, 1960 marked a turning point. Sixty-nine peaceful protestors were shot dead at Sharpeville, almost all of them hit from behind. Widespread protest marches, pass burnings, and worker stay-at-homes were met by the police with teargas, shootings, and assaults on workers in their homes. In wide sweeps made all the easier by the relatively open organization of the anti-apartheid movement, the police detained thousands of political organizers and local leaders. In the shadow of these events the ANC leadership took the decision to engage in armed resistance. By then the National Party had already put in place the major elements of a harsh and truculent police state.
Many would argue that for opponents of apartheid not to include armed resistance in their range of actions would under the circumstances be a dereliction of duty. Oliver Tambo made the point to an American audience during his visit to Washington in January: "Apartheid is inherently a practice of violence. We choose not to submit, but to fight back, arms in hand. We have no alternative but to intensify our armed resistance because, as your Declaration of Independence says, in the face of systematic tyranny, it becomes a duty and a right to take up arms."

In addition to rights and duties we need to ask about consequences and effectiveness. Some have asked whether a willingness and capacity to use arms during that vast political reawakening of 1960 might have forced reforms much earlier and much less painfully than can be the case today. Of course that moment is long past, but the question gives pause. Under conditions such as those in South Africa, can an armed rising carried through with forethought in fact reduce suffering and advance freedom?

In its early years Umkhonto we Sizwe had little opportunity to test the new tactic. Its leadership was captured at Rivonia in 1963. At his trial Nelson Mandela explained how he finally, reluctantly accepted the necessity of armed resistance. He noted that violent resistance was inevitable, in fact it had already begun; it was not something to be chosen or rejected by a few leaders. There were serious dangers: race war on one hand and civil strife amongst blacks on the other. The questions were how to make violent resistance effective, how to minimize the amount of violence and how to control its effects. Mandela and Umkhonto wanted at that time to direct armed attacks against the material symbols and bastions of apartheid - power pylons and police stations- and to guard carefully against injuring people.

The scope of targets

Although the focus of attack has remained military and economic installations and killing civilians has not been an objective, the leadership since then has widened the scope of the targets it regards as legitimate. In an interview last December, Joe Slovo, a member of the executive committee of the ANC, explained that the combat units of the ANC were "less and less inhibited" in their selection of targets by possible injury to innocent civilians. The goal, he stated, was to "maintain the black ghettos as virtual no-go areas for isolated policemen and collaborators" and to make combat "more visible in the white areas" so that people who have been the backbone of support for the regime and who have been living in relative security and safety in South Africa should now begin to fear what the future holds for them, as a result of action on our part in the white areas." He rejected assassination as a viable tactic, but noted that the way in which the people themselves in black areas were "dealing with policemen and collaborators" was "in the interests of the just struggle in which we are engaged."

The ANC is not engaging in a campaign to terrorize supporters of apartheid. Rather it wants to demonstrate to the government and to its supporters the military vulnerability of the apparatus of repression and to show that the victims of apartheid are far from helpless. The spectacular bombing of the SASOL oil-from-coal plant only 90 km from Johannesburg in June 1980 and the explosion at the air force headquarters in Pretoria in May 1983 killing 19 and injuring ten times that many seem to reflect the new emphasis. Slovo feels that the "armed blows ... had an enormous inspirational impact on the people, particularly the young people" and played a vital part in the escalating and continuing political mobilization and action. Other less partisan observers make the same point. Nonetheless, vital issues remain.

Arms and the construction of a politics for liberation

Controlled and directed force used to resist a violent and oppressive state is still force. Even under circumstances which resemble in certain ways those in South Africa, a strong case has been made for non-violent resistance. In Poland, while rising against an autocratic state, the Solidarity movement rejected the use of force and threat of force on the grounds that the only effective way to reconstruct politics in Poland to be more open and democratic was to put those principles into practice even at the risk of jail. However, the Polish context, in contrast to the South African situation, set important limits on the degree and kind of repression available to the Polish military government. Neither the Polish government nor the Soviet Union wanted a direct Soviet intervention and a popular uprising would trigger such an intervention. Moreover, the power of the Catholic Church constrained the repressive power of the state. Therefore Solidarity could be relatively confident that a repression of the scale and intensity of the repression undertaken by the Pinochet government in Chile or the Botha government in South Africa was not likely as long as there was not a serious breakdown of public order.

The economic and military allies of South Africa do not ex-
ert similar constraint on the South African government. Savage, totalitarian repression earns only verbal rebuke and mild sanctions from a few social and economic partners. Yet, in South Africa there is still a strong current of principled commitment to nonviolence as both the means and the end of a reconstruction of politics. The deadly oppressive power of weapons and the extremely destructive kinds of conflicts in the world today make every resort to arms (by governments and by anti-governments) dangerous for any kind of democratic future. Yet the absolute minimum condition to begin some kind of political process toward the elimination of apartheid is the existence of a dialogue. The main opponents of apartheid cannot simply be shut out of the discussion. The ANC leadership sees the resort to arms as the only option when all avenues of dialogue are blockaded.

Thabo Mbeki, Director of Information of the ANC, made the point clear in discussion with Peter Gzowski on CBC’s “Morningside” in March of this year: “It would be a very good thing if we could resolve South African problems by debate and discussion. . . . if we could enter into a discussion that changes people’s minds and changes the situation as a consequence. The problem of course is that’s not possible. That kind of debate is not allowed. The regime . . . holds onto power by force of arms. There are 25 thousand people who are detained now, not because they took up arms, but because they engaged in open political struggle, boycotting shops, organizing strikes, organizing demonstrations at schools. They are not left with much of a choice. If open political debate and the possibility of changing the situation by discussion are not there, we cannot submit to oppression. Therefore we are obliged to take up arms.”

Roman Catholic Archbishop Denis Hurley, while opposing the resort to arms, raised the same issue recently in Toronto. He explained how the church was caught off guard by the surge of resistance to apartheid which began in September 1984: “We can only regret that we were so far behind in the matter of a good Christian theory and powerful practice of non-violence. When people ask the church leaders what alternative there is to violence, we say ‘non-violence.’ They say ‘Well, show it to us.’ And we cannot show it to them.” He went on to say that the Catholic Church cannot condone the adoption of armed resistance by the ANC, although the Church does “admit that the main violence comes from the political organization of South Africa . . . from the police and the security forces.”

Indeed, as Bishop Hurley comes close to admitting, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the adoption of armed resistance is the only reasonable option for a committed democrat in South Africa. Certainly support for armed resistance is the option that very many supporters of democracy in South Africa have chosen and within South Africa those supporters of democracy who remain committed to non-violence understand that non-violence is but one current in the torrent of opposition to apartheid. Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu reflected such an understanding when he spoke to reporters last March 22nd after his meeting with the ANC leaders in Lusaka. Although he, along with his church, “differs with the ANC over its use of violence,” he sees the ANC leaders as “people who love South Africa passionately and who want a new dispensation in their country. . . . These people belong here, they want to come home, but come home with honour.”

Still, far from exhausting the questions, the decision to adopt armed resistance raises further urgent issues.

The political context

One question is whether the ANC has the capacity to control the use of force against apartheid and above all to make it effective. What the
forces of opposition need is evidence of movement, direction, and impact. After the ANC leadership in Lusaka put forth the goal of “making the townships ungovernable,” it had to backtrack as it saw the way vigilantes working for Chief Gatsha Buthelezi’s Inkatha clashed with the young comrades of the UDF. There is no doubt that in some cases the government assisted the vigilantes and helped set up the clashes, but there is plenty of fuel for conflict among blacks. Inkatha and the UDF have very different political goals and methods. And there are other conflictual divisions: Migrant workers have different needs from township dwellers. Pretoria cultivates and legalizes divisions among ethnic or bantustan groups. Workers and unemployed find themselves at odds with members of the small middle class which the government has allowed to emerge and sometimes has fostered. The older people who grew up with non-violence and with hope for orderly reform may clash with the youth who have been weaned on direct action and who often have grown up under the tutelage of peers more than the direction of parents. Throwing arms into this mix might seem like setting spark to tinder, but the way beyond these conflicts is not to renounce the use of arms: it is to give form and discipline to their use, to give them a political context.

Necklacing is a case in point. Who does not recoil in horror at news and photographs of people killing people by burning gasoline soaked rubber tires around their necks? Understandably, this image has aroused the fervent moralism of Canadian editorial writers. Less understandable is why the reaction to similarly horrific and now commonplace police actions is not nearly so fervent. Police regularly explode teargas grenades in prison cells overcrowded with detainees from the black townships. They also torture children as well as youths and adults. The frequent deaths of prisoners in custody are certainly savage murders. Of course such acts, shocking as they are, pale in comparison with the systematic, grinding, dehumanizing coercion of apartheid itself. Necklacing reflects the anger induced by relentless oppression. No doubt it is chosen to shock and to disturb; it has certainly succeeded in distressing opponents as well as supporters of apartheid.

Less noticed is the fact that many of the necklace killings are genuine executions in which locally organized popular courts have tried and sentenced collaborators with apartheid and informers to oppression. Reflecting efforts, undoubtedly imperfect and provisional, to put into practice a form of popular justice, these trials and executions indicate a capacity for self-organization and a rejection of external domination rather than a slide into anarchy. Yet the fear that local leadership will turn in a destructive direction and the danger of politically purposeless and morally distressing bloodshed cannot be discounted. Necklacing and fighting in the townships raise hard questions.

Violence among the disenfranchised is clearly a difficult issue for the ANC. The muted approval of necklacing collaborators, informers, and police in the townships expressed by Joe Slovo in the statement already cited, and the more enthusiastic endorsement by Winnie Mandela indicate approval after the fact rather than a controlled and organized policy. Thabo Mbeki, speaking in Toronto, pointed out that “nobody has ever called for
neclacing, least of all the African National Congress. Oliver Tambo (President of the ANC) has a number of times said that we don’t like this necklacing. It is not in our traditions.

In those areas within South Africa where the democratic movement has been strongest, then you have a cessation in the use of the necklace.

Mbeki went on to make the crucial point that political organization makes all the difference in the resort to popular violence: “In those areas within South Africa where the democratic movement has been strongest, then you have a cessation in the use of the necklace. Once the democratic leadership says, ‘you have heard what the President (of the ANC) has said, you must stop,’ it stops.” In this light the consequences of the policies of the government in South Africa are clear. Through its systematic detention of thousands of local organizers and through its suppression of community newspapers and information gatherings the government is doing all it can to prevent effective self-organization by blacks. Instead it promotes the anarchy its publicists loudly deplore. We can hope that the capacity for political organization and leadership continues to guide armed as well as unarmed resistance to apartheid. The task is a demanding one.

A complicating factor is the multiplication of groups with some organized military capacity. In the shadow of the state police and the South African Defense Force are the police of the bantustans, the gangs organized by Inkatha, and other groups of migrant workers. Politically the hegemony of the ANC and the UDF, along with the trade unions, remains quite firm. The Freedom Charter and the symbols of unity of the ANC and Nelson Mandela are very widely and enthusiastically supported. They provide a powerful pole attracting the forces of opposition and giving a potential framework for working through the enormous practical issues which a restructuring of power will bring.

As capacity to govern and to take initiative slips away from the regime in Pretoria the maneuvering, jockeying, bargaining, and fighting for position in the new political order is bound to intensify. Armed power may be a tempting counter, especially perhaps for leaders and factions with limited popular appeal. As the most widely-supported and consistently present political movement for freedom in South Africa the ANC needs the military means to give orderly space for the complicated political process of the revolution against apartheid.

An important force strengthening the political dimension of revolutionary change in South Africa is trade union action and organization. Trade union politics oppose apartheid from a standpoint grounded in the day-to-day struggles of black workers over wages, health, safety, jobs, job security, working conditions. Facing these practical issues in an organized way has given the labour movement real political sophistication within its sphere of action. The organized workers also have, in the strike, a potent non-violent weapon. Community groups also have organized power which has been tested and honed in the boycott of white shops, the rejection of participation in sham elections, the persistent organization of large demonstrations, the creation of parallel governments in the townships, and the establishment of parallel schools teaching about the history and society of South Africa from a black perspective.

Legal organization and non-violent protest are vital to the struggle. But under the repression orchestrated behind the Emergency restrictions on the press, the government uses detention, intimidation, and banning to break the political capacity of the popular movement against apartheid. Arming and using force to defend the movement is essential.

What Canadians can do

The question of violence is not at all one of whether we in Canada “condone” a choice made 26 years ago. Those in South Africa still weighing the issues of armed resistance are doing so with the same seriousness that the leadership of the last generation demonstrated. But they consider the issue in full knowledge that the decision is made: armed resistance is an established reality and it has very strong justification.

The question of violence is not at all one of whether we in Canada “condone” a choice made 26 years ago.

The first question is how to weaken and contain the appalling, crushing destruction by the apartheid juggernaut. Publicity, exposure, opposition, and sanctions are all parts of the answer, although the political discipline and, in some measure, the armed power of the movement against apartheid are the crucial forces at play.

The second question is how the armed resistance can gain the strength and direction it needs to defend the politics of liberation during a conflict-ridden transition where opposition makes full use of the police, army, and armed thugs. The third question is how the political direction towards a democratic transformation can be maintained. Although this is a matter where those fighting back against apartheid are in charge, supporters and solidarity groups far from the front lines can be aware of the issues and give material and moral support to the continued strengthening of the political process of the struggle, in part an armed struggle, against apartheid.
The Impossibility of Non-violence
A Conversation with Rev. Frank Chikane

PART 2
In the last issue of Southern Africa REPORT, we printed the first part of an extended conversation with Rev. Frank Chikane, former UDF Vice-President. In this concluding section, Chikane takes up the issue of violence from a number of angles - his personal dilemma, the “black-on-black” charge and state violence. He also touches on some of the international dimensions of the liberation struggle, and the irreversibility of popular resistance.

The crisis in South Africa has worsened. When the state of emergency was declared, people went into prison in the thousands. Thousands also went into hiding. I’m one of those people who had to go into hiding. I spent more than three months in hiding, trying to work on non-violent activity, planning a non-violent activity underground! We used to make jokes, planning those things and saying, what are we really doing, planning to produce an ordinary document like the Kairos document [a manifesto of South African churches] underground.

These are the contradictions we have to deal with. I cannot go to church anymore. I haven’t been able to go to church since June 12. I can’t go to my family. I couldn’t go to that funeral. I had to be smuggled into Soweto and have a base and operate from there during the funeral in August. And when they banned the meetings, I couldn’t intervene the way I used to intervene. I have reached a crisis, I call it a cul-de-sac. This is the situation. It is the end of the road.

I wrote an article some time ago when I got released from the treason trial on “the cul-de-sac along the road of non-violence.” People said, “Why are you writing that article?” Somebody had captured my expressions in graphic form - you know, strikes, protests, pass meetings, etc. And the road ended up with an explosion. In the article, I was trying to show how, under a fascist regime, it becomes completely impossible to act otherwise. This is the crisis I am facing. Those people who talk about non-violence - and I’ve talked about it - can only do so if they’ve got space to talk about it. It’s a created space. The white community...
needs an army to protect it, to make noise about non-violence. They need somebody to do the violence on their behalf. So that when they are comfortable, they can say, “You must be non-violent.”

You need to talk about non-violence in church conferences where it is comfortable, in a centre somewhere else, where you eat three meals a day. There you can talk about non-violence and debate it.

When I came back after the treason trial, we were released on bail under restrictions. We were released on Friday; I arrived back home on Saturday because we were coming from Durban. I slept only two peaceful nights — no, actually I didn’t sleep even two peaceful nights. I slept one peaceful night at home. The following night the house was attacked with petrol bombs and set on fire. The community came and cleaned the house and said, “We are going to be here during the night. Nobody is going to attack you again.” So eight people appeared every day, and they said, “We don’t want beds, blankets, nothing. We’re going to keep awake so that you can sleep.”

Afterwards, I discovered that these people were armed. And then the contradictions began to emerge. I began to ask myself the question: How do I maintain a position of non-violence when I am protected by violent people? What justification do I have? Why should I talk about non-violence when other people are doing it on my behalf? So I said to these people, “Please — you can’t come with weapons in my house.” And they said, “Well, how can we protect you then? We must go away.” I started writing the article on the basis of that experience. I said that a non-violent option is a principled, individualistic, idealistic position which is fantastic if you can adopt it. People will think you are fantastic. But it doesn’t solve the problem. The reality of the matter is that the South African regime is a fascist regime. It simply makes any possibility of non-violence impossible. And this is the crisis I personally have reached.

This is the crisis that I have to deal with. This is the crisis I feel throws people into a situation where they have no option. I want to give people an option of non-violence. But the crisis is that everybody else in those townships is talking about where do we get guns.

The so-called black-on-black violence
It’s a big question — which actually relates to the propaganda strategy of the system at home and for the western countries. What they’re trying to do is project the struggle at home as one of black-on-black violence. This is not true. In the first place, you’ve got the system against the people and the people against the system. It does happen that on the other side you have black faces as well. And in a war situation, you have casualties on both sides. If they happen to be black, it is not because they were attacked as blacks. It is because they were on the other side.

There is also the type of violence that happens between organizations. This type of violence gets generated by the system itself. To make it happen, it’s easy to sit in hotel rooms and make plans for that violence to happen. You just need certain strategies of disinformation. The Weekly Mail [liberal South African newspaper] recently exposed that type of disinformation process. For example AZAPO/UDF relations are often portrayed as violent. Even at that level, the system comes and attacks you and says AZAPO did it and goes and attacks an AZAPO person and says UDF did it. The regime actually carries out the attack, even eliminating the leadership in the cloud of that type of happening, so that they are able to tell the international community that blacks are fighting blacks. In the end, we also get drawn in and go about fighting among ourselves — and genuinely fighting because we think we are fighting against each other. But somebody else actually plans the conflict.

When my house was attacked at two o’clock, the police came. The first thing the police said was, “So AZAPO has attacked your house.” So I said, “I will be happy if you can produce that AZAPO person and take that person to court. I want to see that person. If you’ve got that person, please bring that person here. Don’t tell me AZAPO has done it.”

We had to hold an emergency meeting at seven o’clock with UDF leadership and issue a statement that this could not have been AZAPO. All of those people are my
friends. We were at university together. I said that it couldn't happen. And the AZAPO people came at two o'clock the next day to make a statement in my yard, to say this could not be.

I'm trying to show you how the system plays games with us. They create a climate in which a lot of young people begin to say, "If the pastor has been attacked, I'm going to do something." On that occasion, we had to work to inform everybody else that that story by the police was not correct, to avoid that type of violence. There are many different levels of the issue. The system, of course, has vigilantes. They have hit squads. They have what we call "balaclava men," men who put on balaclavas and come and kidnap people during the night. They have units which are heavily armed, which have come and attacked us. And then the system organizes campaigns of disinformation, calling all of these things black-on-black violence.

The system is bigger than we thought

The international community has been and is collaborating with that system. We need to face that reality. I've talked of a theological conception of a primary sin and a secondary sin. The church deals with the secondary sin and leaves the primary sin. The church goes to the people who respond violently to the system. It leaves untouched the violence of the "dignified," "civilized" types of people who sit in hotel rooms here in the west, planning the deaths of millions. They are paid by taxes in the west, to plan chaos in Mozambique, to plan chaos in Nicaragua, to plan chaos in the Third World. Those people who stay in the first world benefit from the chaos that is created. When an arms research project is set up, it pays you a salary. When those arms are sold, it pays you a salary. It brings up your standard of living. And everybody else benefits from that machinery that is functioning within that system. Therefore, everybody becomes part and parcel of a whole system.

We have discovered in South Africa that this system is bigger than what we thought. We thought we were dealing with South Africa as a pure racist state. We have discovered this thing is more than serious. We are dealing with a bigger system, a more international type of system that is carefully planned. While the anti-apartheid movement talked about sanctions and called for sanctions to actually hit at the system, those who plan the chaos sat down and said, "When the time comes, we know how we are going to withdraw. We will withdraw in such a way that we leave the system intact." And they planned it. Whilst we were making noises about sanctions, they were sitting in hotels and other places planning how they were going to withdraw from South Africa and still leave their capital, make profit and support that system. They will make resolutions which actually leave the system intact.

I could have talked about the southern region of Africa. When I met the Nicaragua people last week, I was trying to show how internationalized the issue is. You can see the similarities of the struggles and the pain our peoples are going through. They are interlinked. That is why I say that that system is bigger than we thought. It is becoming clear that there is a bigger system we are dealing with than just the people we are facing at home. Not that they are not the problem. They are the nearest target. But the problem is broader than we ever thought.

The regime on the defensive

Maybe one should start from the senselessness of what the regime is doing in that country. I think Bishop Tutu put it nicely when he said, "Apartheid can't go to the negotiating table. It is so unreasonable that you can't even negotiate it." The crisis has reached such a level that the state is forced to act irrationally. For instance, it is not clear why P.W. Botha sent the Eminent Persons Group home. It defies reason. If I had been in his place, I would have kept them busy for two years. But he didn't even try that. He sent them home. It is also not clear why, when Geoffrey Howe, Foreign Minister from Thatcher's government, came there against all odds, P.W. Botha sent the delegation home. There's no logic in the process. The whole system has lost a sense of logic. They were actually scared. They've lost the ideological battle in the country. The whole propaganda strategy has collapsed. Since I've been in Europe and here, I've discovered that there
is more propaganda in the international community than at home. At home, they are not attempting propaganda for blacks any more. They do it for whites. If you look at the TV, you can see it's meant for whites. It's not meant for blacks any more.

The propaganda battle for blacks has been lost. When they say the UDF is equal to the ANC, people, you know, clap hands. So it doesn't help. When they say you are a communist, people get excited. These are the contradictions. They can't handle that type of situation. During the UDF trial, they suddenly came up with the story that we were an underground network, that twelve of us among the sixteen were in the underground structure. They thought this would discredit us. But when I went back to Soweto, people congratulated me. They said "We haven't been knowing, man. You've been doing a fantastic job." So I think the regime has lost the propaganda battle.

The way things were developing in the townships, and this may not be known to you, is that after the call for a people's war, all-out war, in 1986, youngsters really took it up. At all the meetings, the youngsters would stand up and say, "We're going to maul the system." As Soweto Day approached on June 16, with plans for a three-day stay-away along the lines of the highly successful one-day stay-away on May Day, the momentum became so threatening that they [the apartheid regime] had to do stupid things.

I think this indicates the kind of crisis faced by the regime. The people are dictating the direction of events more than the system. In the past we responded to them; this time they are responding to the people. When they change the strategy, it is because people are advancing and they have to try to catch up with them and try to contain them. Even now people are in control of that struggle basically. They are taking certain directions and the system has to counter. So it is going to be more and more unreasonable. It is going to ignore all reason. Ordinary business people feel that P.W. [Botha] is messing around with their lives - the sophisticated ones, that is. That's what they've expressed. I doubt even the CIA is happy about what P.W. is doing. And I think there are going to be more and more foolish things done, because the Afrikaner, in particular, feels threatened that power is going.

Look at the army. The people were told that the army was fantastic, it was sophisticated, it had sophisticated arms. They told whites in that country, "You can sleep and relax." And suddenly they sent the army into the townships and it didn't make any difference. I think there's a crisis in terms of morale. Even whites are beginning to doubt whether there is really a strong army, because they can't contain the townships. The only way you can contain those people is to bomb them in the streets of Soweto. But when you send the army in there, it doesn't make any difference to the resistance of the people. When they send in two heavy military vehicles to evict people, the people all gather around it. The vehicles have to dash off - or shoot hundreds of people. It's a real crisis for the system. They've lost that ideological onslaught and I'm not sure they will survive. Because you can't operate on purely armed, naked repression in trying to govern people.
“War Is No Solution”: The End Conscription Campaign

BY OUR JOHANNESBURG CORRESPONDENT

Hey white boy get off the floor
The Lord gave you legs to march to war
Your leaders want you in a sporting affair
So put on your boots and cut your hair
Don't talk back or stop to think
When you're in Angola you can have a drink
Obey obey they know the way
From here you go to SWA*
Where they don't dance when facing such hostility
They don't dance 'Cos the SADF's* there to see
that we all enjoy democracy
'Cos the SAP* are there to see that we all enjoy democracy
[from "Don't Dance," by the Kalahari Surfers, from the album Forces Favourites.]

Forces Favourites, every Saturday afternoon from 2 to 3, is one of the most popular programmes on the radio network of the state-controlled SA Broadcasting Corporation. A typically staid and old-fashioned example of white South African culture, it both symbolizes and reinforces the myth of a happy and contented army. For at least twenty years Pat Kerr, the show's Aunt Agatha-like hostess, has read messages to "the boys on the border" and other "troopers" in military camps across the country, from girlfriends, families and friends, interspersing the greetings with hoary old pop songs. Top of the hit parade is probably Elvis's "Forty Days," played over and over when a group of conscripts has only six weeks left to serve.

In late 1985, Forces Favourites was given a new meaning — an album of that title was released, including eleven anti-apartheid, anti-civil war songs, with titles such as "National Madness," "Don't Believe," and "Shot Down in the Streets." Aunty Pat will never again sound the same. The album was a benefit for the End Conscription Campaign (ECC), SA's anti-draft organization. Its main aim was to use the music of some of SA's best "counter-culture" rock musicians to spread the ECC's "stop the call-up" message amongst white youth.

Although music and song are a familiar feature of black political life in SA, most particularly at rallies and funerals, the new Forces Favourites was possibly the first time music had been recorded with an explicit intent to mobilize. The album and its mischievous title were a typical ECC initiative — original, fun and a disrespectful challenge to widely-accepted ideas which bolster the status quo. Since its founding in 1983, the ECC's implicit approach, as suggested by their "dancing man" symbol, has been "we're doing important political work, but we're going to enjoy ourselves at the same time." With most of their activities directed at white youth in the first instance, they have developed close working relationships with many musicians, artists and others involved in SA's growing counter- (i.e. anti-apartheid, anti-racist) culture. In this way the ECC message has reached thousands of young whites in a form and through a medium easily accessible to them, in a similar fashion perhaps to the way rock music helped to popularize the anti-war movement in North America during the late 1960s.

But the ECC is much more than simply a political style — its focus is a critical and highly sensitive section of apartheid's armour: the unquestioning willingness of the white population to take up arms to defend its privileges. Any crack in the automatic support of whites on this issue is a potential Achilles heel which the government and the military cannot countenance, especially in the face of their growing perception that they are under siege.

Conscription was initially introduced twenty years ago, at a time when the economy was booming and white living standards were surging upwards. Apartheid was under little threat, the resistance of the 1950s having been crushed by the early 1960s. There was no serious opposition amongst whites to the replacement of the previous draft lottery system: individual conscripts may have been unhappy, but only a few Jehovah's Witnesses and other religious pacifists actually defied their call-up, choosing (military) prison instead.

Yet as early as 1974, when black opposition inside SA was beginning to regenerate itself and other countries in southern Africa were in transition away from colonialism, a debate was initiated on conscription as an anti-apartheid issue. A SA Council of Churches conference resolution noted that the SADF was defending a "fundamentally unjust society," and urged church members to consider conscientious objection. The state's response was to introduce a six-year prison sentence for encouragement of such a view.

The years after Soweto in 1976 saw a tiny but growing trickle of
objectors which led to the formation in 1980 of the Conscientious Objectors’ Support Group (COSG). Much larger numbers of conscripts left the country rather than become a part of apartheid’s military machine, and groups of draft-resisters in exile were formed in the UK, the US and Holland. In 1983 the government attempted to diffuse the issue by broadening the definition of “religious objector” to include those whose objections were specific to SA conditions. Subject to approval by a Board for Religious Objection, conscripts could opt for community service (in a government department) instead of military training. The prison term for other objectors was trebled to six years.

As with so many other “reforms” since 1979, the unintended effect of the community service option for objectors was to open space for and facilitate organization and resistance around the conscription issue. With increasingly vocal support from the churches and the Black Sash, and in the context of a highly political atmosphere in the country (the tri-cameral constitution and the founding of the UDF), the 1983 COSG conference launched a national anti-conscription campaign – the ECC – to coordinate and give direction to resistance to conscription.

From the outset, the ECC developed a coalition structure involving student and youth, human rights, church and political organizations. By limiting its focus to a single issue, the campaign was able to stitch together a variety of ideologies over and above a common anti-apartheid, anti-draft perspective, from socialist and feminist to Christian and secular liberal views. Even substantial elements amongst the youth wing of the parliamentary opposition Progressive Federal Party joined the ECC, forming a widely publicized debate within the party, with its hawkish right wing having to fight to stop ECC ideas from becoming official party policy. Although critics on the left have accused ECC of watering down its politics to create and maintain this broad alliance, this strategy, with its popular style, has meant that large segments of the white population have heard and taken seriously the basic anti-conscription message.

ECC activities have occurred at two levels. First, there has been continuous activity running conscription advice bureaus in most of the major cities, as well as attempts to penetrate the white education system to reach high school students directly. Second, there have been a series of high-profile campaigns intended to widen the debate over the role of the SADF in South African society. The content of these campaigns has been transformed in response to the changing political situation in the country.

During 1984 the slogan was “stop the call-up.” The link was drawn between conscription and the defence of apartheid, and the demand was for recognition of the right to freedom of conscience in relation to military service. The ECC Declaration called for “a just peace in the land” in opposition to the government’s aim of “securing peace by preparing for war.”

The issuing of the ECC Declaration coincided with the movement from August 1984 of large numbers of SADF personnel into the black townships. The deepening civil war – “national madness, national suicide,” as the song on Forces Favourites called it – led to a major shift of focus and the ECC “Troops Out” campaign during 1985. The demand now was for the right of troops to refuse township duty. Instead of simply opposing conscription and thereby implicitly attacking those conscripts for whom jail or exile were unacceptable choices, there was now a recognition by the ECC of the need to try to draw those al-
initial services is reported to be only 40-60 percent. (These troops are also used to police the townships.) About 7,000 SA war resisters are thought to be in Europe and the US. However, it is impossible to calculate the effect of conscription on emigration from SA which is anyway growing at a phenomenal rate.

A central factor accounting for these figures is the extension of the role of the SADF itself, as political resistance has evolved into civil war. Military service has never been very attractive for many young white men and at best seen by most of them as a waste of their time. But many of those who might previously have accepted the justification of “border duty” – i.e. the occupation of Namibia and the invasion of neighbouring states in terms of an “external threat” to SA – have found it impossible to extend the argument to serving in the townships. Case studies of soldiers who have performed township duty have found in them aggressive tendencies similar to those amongst “the boys on the border,” but also “an acute sense of alienation and meaninglessness.”

The direct impact of ECC’s work on the extent of draft evasion cannot be determined. But it is certainly true that the organization has contributed significantly to making evasion and conscientious objection real and viable options. The high
profile campaigns have led at the least to a widespread questioning within the white population of the notion of patriotism implied in the SADF/government view that military service is a “patriotic duty.”

Their work has had even wider implications. As the military began to move into a more active political role within the states ten years ago, the concept of “total strategy” in the face of a perceived “total onslaught” against “South Africa,” a “total response” going beyond purely military concerns was required. Cultural and ideological struggle – a war for “hearts and minds” – was seen to be more important than the use of physical force in relation to the black population.

The need to keep a grip on the “hearts and minds” of whites was equally vital, their unity and morale being crucial to their support of government policy and the SADF. The work of the ECC has been central in undermining government success in this regard by popularizing alternative interpretations of the nature of the conflict and paths to its resolution.

It is possibly more because of this broader ideological effect than the actual increase in draft evasion that the ECC has been characterized by the state as “the enemy within” and been the target of considerable harassment. Government and SADF representations have repeatedly accused it of breaking the law, though neither the organization nor any of its members have yet been charged for its activities. It has been branded as linked to the banned ANC and as assisting “terrorism.” New conscripts are warned against it during basic training in the military, and right-wing groups and media regularly attack it as “Moscow-inspired” and as having “a hidden agenda.”

Activists have been assaulted, their houses raided by security police and publications and specific meetings banned. In some areas ECC has been barred from white schools. As was the case more generally in the society, repression against the ECC was stepped up markedly with the declaration of the second State of Emergency in June 1986. Sixty ECC members have been detained for varying periods and others forced to go into hiding to avoid the same fate. Ninety homes have been raided and a few of them firebombed. One section of the Emergency regulations specifically prohibits “subversive statements” that “undermine or discredit the systems of compulsory military service.”

Like many other organizations the ECC was virtually at a standstill for several weeks at the beginning of the Emergency. When it re-emerged it was very much on the defensive, arguing simply for its right to be heard and for the release from detention of its members. It is now slowly re-establishing its public presence in a context in which the Emergency has become generally accepted as the “normal” state of affairs and is less restrictive.

A campaign is currently being launched to coincide with the whites-only general election, under the slogan “War is not compulsory – let’s choose peace.” The hope is to highlight the limited choice amongst the political positions faced by the electorate and especially the fact that no party, not even the PFP, offers any option on the conscription issue. As one leading ECC activist put it, “The problem with the election is that whomever we vote for, we’re electing the same set of generals.” If the generals ever get their just desserts, the ECC’s work will have played no mean part.
Mozambique: Apartheid's Second Front

BY JUDITH MARSHALL

Judith Marshall, one of the founding members of TCLSAC, worked in the Ministry of Education in Mozambique from 1978-1984. She was part of a Canadian fact-finding mission to Mozambique in mid-February.

Fourteen Canadians have just spent eight days on a fact-finding mission in Mozambique, trying to understand and respond to Mozambique's present agony. The delegation included Tory MP Walter McLean and NDP strategist Gerry Caplan, both long committed to African issues. It also included Pauline Julien, cultural worker from Quebec, prairie community activist Carol Sigurdson, representatives from Oxfam, CUSO/SUCO, World Vision and a variety of journalists. "How does this compare with when you first came in 1976?" It was a question posed to me frequently. Frankly I was staggered by the contrast between the hope and promise a decade ago when I first visited as Oxfam's programme development officer and the devastation today.

We found a situation in which almost four of the fourteen million children and women and men populating Mozambique are in imminent danger of starvation - a tragedy of Ethiopian proportions. We found more than 42% of the population on the move, forced to abandon fields and homes by the massive bandit activities throughout the rural areas. In every province, the provincial and district capitals were swollen with refugees. More than 250,000 have fled to neighbouring countries. More than 250,000 have fled to neighbouring countries. The under five mortality rate which had decreased by 20% between 1975 and 1980, thanks to the solid health programmes of the new Frelimo government, has actually increased from 270 per thousand in 1980 to 375 per thousand in 1987. One in every three children now dies before the age of five. Forty-two percent (484) of the total health posts have been destroyed since 1982.

"The root cause is the apartheid regime. Only when apartheid is fully dismantled will things be different in Mozambique." This we were told on countless occasions during our visit. South Africa's role in destabilizing Mozambique is now being publicly named - a contrast with my last trips to Mozambique in 1984 and the impact of historic underdevelopment, drought, the international economic crisis or policy errors in causing this situation, all of these pale into insignificance against the systematic destruction and terror being perpetrated by the apartheid regime.

A week of grim realities

We arrived on a Saturday and plunged immediately into a hectic pace of briefings and visits. With barely time to check in to our hotel, we proceeded to the Rural Training Centre. There Minister of Agriculture Joao Ferreira treated us to cashews and passion fruit juice as he outlined strategies for agricultural development. He also gave us an enthusiastic tour through the training center with its maps and charts and manipulable table models for problem-solving exercises related to everything from crop rotation and nutrition to village level physical planning and irrigation schemes.

If Joao Ferreira gave little prominence to the war - perhaps anticipating the need to reassure for-

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eign delegations that development projects had not totally ground to a halt – the words of welcome that followed from Minister of Co-operation, Jacinto Veloso, struck a more sombre note. He expressed Mozambique's desire for a cooperation agreement with Canada at government level, one that could respond both to the emergency situation and to rehabilitation and development programmes for the family and peasant sectors. He also referred to the economic rehabilitation programme just introduced and the anticipation of a final round of talks with the IMF team in late February. With regard to sanctions, he indicated that it is not at this moment in Mozambique's national interest to impose sanctions on South Africa. The sanctions that South Africa has imposed on Mozambique over the past ten years have resulted in losses equal to more than double Mozambique's external debt.

Sunday's briefing with former Minister of Information José Luís Cabaço brought us face to face with the war on apartheid's second front. Cabaço recounted with sobering detail the events of September/October when the spectre of a Mozambique cut into two and apartheid on Tanzania's doorstep seemed a real possibility. September brought a massive influx of people from Malawi, with some 8,000 MNR forces flooded into Zambezia and Tete, arriving in trucks and cars. They included Mozambicans taken into Malawi and trained, plus others flown from South Africa for infiltration into Mozambique. There were very big military operations, some including white commanders, and a series of district capitals fell. Quelimane, the capital of Zambezia was the target, and the invading forces came very close to reaching their goal.

The counter-attack by the Mozambican forces was strengthened by the addition of troops from both Zimbabwe and Tanzania. There were major battles, far different from the war in other areas, and there were important military victories for Mozambique. The areas that were occupied militarily are now being taken back, with the Tanzanian troops continuing to play an important role in securing the area.

We queried why stronger measures were not taken against Malawi. Cabaço replied that Mozambique saw the provocations from Malawi as a deliberate trap being set by South Africa, trying to draw Mozambique into a war with one of its neighbours. If this were to happen, the issue would cease to be a conflict between apartheid and freedom, and become simply a war between two African countries. With such a war, the African continent would be divided, and the question of apartheid reduced to an East-West conflict. For Mozambique, the strategy is to avoid such a war at all costs, and maintain the focus of attention on apartheid as the main enemy.

It is within this context that we must see the desperate famine that has drawn current international attention to Mozambique. Zambezia province, with the highest concentration of population in the country, has seen its rich farmlands abandoned. People have fled to the coast, many in barkcloth, totally bereft of possessions and any means of livelihood. "War-induced famine" – this is the grim reality.

Day three found the delegation divided into groups which were deposited by our chartered plane into three provinces. One group went to Inhambane, scene of another of now well-documented war-induced famine in 1983/84. The Inhambane famine was actually caused by drought but the MNR systematically thwarted relief efforts, attacking supply depots and transport vehicles, even burning grain, as 100,000 people starved to death. The Inhambane visit was spent in the districts, which until 1985 were inaccessible. The first evening was in Massinga, with General Fondo telling anecdotes late into the night of how they took Inhambane back from the bandidos. Day four was in Homoine, with a chance to visit a village of people liberated from the bandits and another of ex-MNR forces who had availed themselves of the amnesty. There were also visits to production cooperatives, notable for the dynamic women involved in them.

The others went to the two provinces that make up the Beira corridor, Sofala and Manica. The Sofala group saw the Beira port, so vital as a lifeline for land-locked Zimbabwe and Zambia in breaking their dependence on South Africa. They heard of regular power supplies functioning for only 182 days in 1986. For the rest, it is rationed electricity, with Canadian electrical...
engineer Jean Menard playing a key role in the emergency procedures that guarantee at least minimal flows to the port, the hospital and vitally important centres of industry.

Our group went to Manica. For me it was a second visit, the first having been made for Oxfam in 1977. Then I was in quest of ways to support Zimbabwean refugees fleeing Ian Smith’s terror. A decade later, Manica was still a scene of people in flight, this time Mozambicans fleeing from MNR atrocities into the relative safety of the Beira corridor. Zimbabwean troops were visible on all sides; we were later told that Zimbabwe is spending $300,000 a week to protect its own and the region’s rail, road and pipelines through Mozambique.

Our stay in Manica included a visit to the “village” of Chinhambudzi – another face of the war. Its 6,000 inhabitants used to live in scattered settlements of 500-700, working Manica’s rich agricultural land, sending surplus to the more industrialized Sofala. Now they are concentrated in the Beira corridor for protection from the war. The little land near the settlement does not begin to cover the needs of its 6,000 inhabitants. In addition, drought conditions prevail in some parts of Manica. The hard work to organize seeds and hoes, and to mobilize the newly resettled inhabitants to plant was seemingly going to give few results. The most recently resettled section of the village was entirely dependent on food aid.

The people we talked to spoke of having fled two and three times from bandit attacks. One woman we met had fled with her children into Zimbabwe and back again. The security of the corridor makes it possible for these people to escape from the war. The large human settlements which result, however, create daunting problems in organizing new forms of production, marketing, health and education.

Day five in Manica saw us whisked through a variety of projects, each, it seemed, missing at least one vital component required to make it work. We saw a dairy operation with too much milk for its processing and distribution capacity. The mini-processing unit had sterilizing equipment and milk cans for only 500 litres a day. It was receiving 1200 – and running with the same milk cans from the dairy farm to the hospitals and schools that received the milk. The refrigeration unit was not working; there was no proper yogurt culture to make the yogurt. As the chief veterinary officer accompanying us said, with a sad smile, “It’s improvisation all the way.” Yet between risking illness from hunger and illness from less than totally hygienic milk or yogurt – who was prepared to say it should close down?

This lack of one vital component seemed common. We saw a piggery and duck farm with pens and feed trays ingeniously constructed from local materials. Here the missing link was animal feed. The milling complex that supplies it is located in Beira, and functioning at far below capacity for lack of power. Local peasants who might have excess grain to sell to the project are not interested in monetary payments. They want consumer goods – sugar, oil, cloth or hoes. We found ourselves referring back time and time again to Manica Provincial Governor Maguni’s words: “Canadian involvement in Mozambique will have to find a way to respond to the three inseparable strands of our current reality – the war, the struggle for rehabilitation and development and our deep structural dependency.”

Days six and seven found the delegation back together in Maputo. The final two days included briefings with officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Health, Information and Transport, plus visits to the port and to the major food processing complex for southern Mozambique, CIM. They also brought us fully face to face with yet another grim reality, one already referred to by Minister Veloso on the first day. As if the systematic destruction of Mozambique at the hands of an ever more desperate apartheid regime were not enough, Mozambique is also being subjected to the International Monetary Fund formula for Third World Development. Just ten days before our arrival a massive devaluation had taken place with the ex-
change rate shifting from 40 meticais to the dollar to 200 meticais to the dollar. While urban wages increased 50%, prices had quadrupled or quintupled. Fees for medical services were being introduced and the progressive housing policies that had kept rents pegged to salaries were to shift to a policy establishing rents in relation to property values. While we were there, there was a moment of pause, without clear indications of what impact this would have on the by now well-established parallel market. All anticipated, however, that at least in the short run, the “economic recovery programme” would have a negative impact on a number of sectors, urban workers among them.

Minister of Cooperation Veloso gave a sober assessment of the situation, indicating that Mozambique was left with no choice but to carry out these measures. Various western governments had made clear that unless this package recommended by the IMF were accepted, they would freeze all flow of credits to Mozambique. Such measures are not unique to Mozambique; indeed the special UN session on Africa included pressure from the IMF/World Bank for a particular approach to African economic development and commitments were undertaken by those African countries who participated to a “Priority Programme for Economic Recovery”, including a series of economic measures, particularly concerning rural pricing and marketing policies. Measures to increase prices for rural producers and make more consumer and producer goods available throughout the rural areas were already taken on by Mozambique after its discussions on agricultural policy during the Fourth Congress in 1983. The total package, however, including such a massive devaluation and the cuts in social programmes can only exacerbate an already desperate struggle for survival. With the example of food riots in neighbouring Zambia after similar measures were imposed, we were left astounded that Mozambique, already ground down with war, had this too imposed upon it.

The last day found us rushing to finalize a declaration and to visit various cooperatives in the city in which Canadian cooperants have been extensively involved. These included an impressive league of building cooperatives engaged in housing construction and producing improved latrines. They also included women’s agricultural cooperatives in the Green Zones around Maputo. In the midst of the broader picture of destitution and agony, here was a small corner of vitality and hope. The Green Zone cooperatives have emerged since 1980 in the peri-urban areas of Maputo; they are supplying urgently needed produce for the city. I had visited them earlier and knew the members to be feisty women, with a real sense of power and pride in what they were accomplishing. And, as I had expected, they had made significant advances in production since my last visit. They have also recently established community schools both for themselves and their children, many of whom don’t have places in the official schools in a city now swollen with refugees from the war. The women entertained us with songs about literacy, about Mama chefe of a co-op apologizing to her members for keeping them waiting for a meeting. Clearly the real issues of their lives, from schooling to ways of exercising power by co-op leaders were taking cultural forms. It was a little sign of continued vibrancy, of that hope and promise that was so characteristic of the Mozambique I knew ten years ago. It was nice, on our side, to have a gesture of solidarity to offer in response. Teachers in Ontario and Quebec had sent school materials with us. These went to the teachers of the community schools in the Green Zones, hard pressed to organize their classes for lack of pens and pencils and paper.

“What hope is there for Mozambique? South Africa is such a formidable adversary - doesn’t it have infinite capacity to hold on?” We posed these doubts during our conversation with José Cabaço. In reply, he said:

I myself have now lived through two experiences that shape my thinking about time frames. In Mozambique in March of 1974, I would have predicted ten more years of armed struggle. One year later we were independent.

In 1980, Rhodesia was attacking close to Xinavane (less than two hours away from Maputo.) Six months later, I visited Harare in an independent Zimbabwe. Many psy-
The Battle for Trade Unions in Namibia

BY BRIAN WOOD

This partial summary of the ins and outs of union activities in Namibia was sent us by Brian Wood of the Namibia Support Committee of London, England in response to a Southern Africa REPORT article “Namibian Workers: Intensifying the Struggle” (Vol. 2, No. 1, June 1986, pg. 22) which mentioned the Namibian National Trade Union (NNTU).

At the time that Southern Africa REPORT’s original article was written it was felt to be too early to assess the program of the NNTU. In a letter, dated 24 Nov. 1986, accompanying his article, Wood informs us that SWAPO contacts in Namibia have told him the NNTU is a puppet union of the South African colonial government.

In other developments, his letter told us that shortly after he wrote the article, the SWAPO backed National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW) helped found the Mineworkers Union of Namibia (MUN) at a congress in Windhoek. The congress was attended by delegations from every mine in Namibia except two small ones in the south.

His briefing, which has been edited by SAR, is based on SWAPO sources and press clippings.

There are huge obstacles in Namibia to forming genuine trade unions capable of improving wages and working conditions, not the least of which are the efforts of anti-SWAPo forces to create counter-unions which are either tame or simply fictitious.

The creation of anti-SWAPo political forces is frequently based on playing up tribal differences using black collaborators such as the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) and the Multi Party Conference (MPC). Manufacturing pup-
pat unions is another tactic. Recently such “unions” have received backing from the AFL-CIO through its African-American Labour Centre (AALC) using U.S. government funds and with help from the allied Israeli Histradut. One aim of these tactics is to try to persuade the Brussels-based International Congress of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) to adopt policies against SWAPO and the National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW). Many elected western union officials have either been too ignorant or politically unsympathetic to openly challenge such practices.

The obstacles to the growth of unions in Namibia are formidable. The combination of high unemployment and absolute poverty provides a huge pool of desperate job-seekers. High illiteracy rates, a multiplicity of languages and almost no access to the outside world create fragmented and relatively small, isolated concentrations of black workers. As well, the intensive and repressive policing of workers’ compounds, the militarization of the countryside, the denial of effective legal rights to strike or bargain collectively and the lack of open and democratic organizations make effective organizing almost impossible.

SWAPO established a Labour Department in 1969. It is not a trade union, but helps train Namibian trade unionists, mostly abroad in such places as the Nduuva Nangola Trade Union Centre in Angola. The Labour Department also facilitates vocational training, worker brigades in exiled settlements as well as providing research, planning and representation at the ILO, etc., much like an embryonic “Ministry of Labour.”

With these points in mind here is a summary of trade union developments in Namibia:

- In 1977/78 SWAPO helped establish the National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW) which was publically launched in Namibia as a general industrial union with branches in all the main towns and mines. The South African regime at first tried to counter NUNW’s growing influence by passing, in July 1978, an amendment to the Wage and Industrial Conciliation Ordinance of 1952 which denies registration. Thus unions deemed “not representative” of all grades of employees and burdened with “political affiliations” – in other words pro-SWAPO – were stripped of legal negotiating rights, including the right to strike. This protected the old white, settler employee associations; six being in the South West African Confederation of Labour (SWACOL). All of these are basically white-collar, except for the South West Africa Mineworkers Union (SWAMU) which had white manual workers at the Tsumeb mines. Subsequently SWAMU did manage to recruit some higher-paid black workers at Tsumeb (they claimed 6% of the total black mine workforce), but the union remained white-dominated and restricted to Tsumeb. Attempts by other staff associations to recruit blacks were also small-scale, slow and token; they too remained white controlled. NUNW, however, continued to grow rapidly and in 1978, following a series of strikes at major mines, the regime arrested NUNW leadership, confiscated its funds and vehicles, and closed its office in Windhoek. Nevertheless, a strong identification with NUNW remained and was to resurface dramatically in 1986.

- With increased U.S. involvement by the Reagan administration after 1981, some black Namibians – including Andreas Shipanga and Solomon Muftima who were expelled from SWAPO for their collaboration with South Africa – set up a “Namibia Trade Union” Council in 1982 with AFL-CIO/AALC backing. Some Namibians were sent to the U.S. for trade union training. In 1983, after training in Israel, one Kambode set up a “Namibia Federation of Trade Unions” based in Oshakati. They tried to unite to replace SWAPO at the ILO. This failed, and both bodies are today defunct.

- In June 1985, a faction of the Herero-based South West Africa National Union (SWANU) broke off under the leadership of Moses Katjuiongua and joined the puppet “government” Katjuiongua later became labour “minister”. Two of his supporters, Kangueehi and Ngaujake, set up the “Namibia National Trade Union” (NNTU) in December 1985 declaring that it “recognized the U.N. Council for Namibia” and that they would “seek the understanding of employers and government”. Meanwhile Katjuiongua and Ben Schoeman, SWACOL general secretary, went to Western Europe to get ILO and ICFTU support. SWACOL had announced in 1983 that it would apply for ICFTU membership “at the right moment” and it also applied to join the International Metal Workers Federation in Geneva. In September 1983, SWACOL claimed to have received recognition from one French union federation – reportedly the Christian Labour Confederation, CTFC – but was rebuffed when trying to approach various British trade unions. Both Katjuiongua and Schoeman were refused a meeting by ILO officials in November 1985. Katjuiongua also went to Israel in June 1986 to get help for his newly-created “National Labour Council” – a state monitoring board dominated by whites. Meanwhile the NNTU claimed to...
have registered a “Namibian Retail Workers Union” with Katjuongua’s department in April 1986. Another unconfirmed report that same year was that the AFL-CIO’s AALC had set up an office in Windhoek, but in any case, it could operate from its Gaborone office. An even stronger anti-NUNW front could be created through the unification of SWACOL and NNTU, but their lack of significant black worker support makes them crucially dependent on slick public relations work and outside assistance for continued existence.

The majority of SWANU refused to join Pretoria’s client regime. Their leader, Vekuii Rukoro, helped to set up the Legal Aid and Community Advice Bureau (LACAB) in August 1985, with the help of Ottie Abrahams and the Khomasdal Residents Association. Rukoro is director of LACAB which is based in the “coloured” township of Khomasdal, Windhoek. LACAB reported dealing with numerous employment grievances of black workers in 1986, but at the time of writing, LACAB was reported defunct.

Although SWAPO’s Secretary for Labour inside Namibia, Jason Angula, has been under virtual house arrest since 1979, this has not stopped SWAPO sympathizers in Namibia from re-establishing NUNW, during 1986, as an open union federation. SWAPO’s visible public mobilizing activities during 1986 have included some of the largest rallies seen in Namibia, including rallies at Rössing and Tsumeb mines. SWAPO president, Sam Njoma, in an August 1986 message to a large “Namibia Day” rally in Katutura, Windhoek, threatened to call a general strike if the Pretoria government does not implement the U.N. plan for Namibia’s decolonization. As part of this general mobilization, and inspired by the successes of COSATU in South Africa, a series of workers’ committees affiliated to NUNW have been set up at all the major mines and at numerous workplaces throughout Namibia. NUNW’s National Organizer, Ben Ululenge – who was recently released from Robbin Island – has been leading these efforts. It is intended that these workers’ committees will amalgamate into national industrial unions; in September 1986, NUNW launched the Namibian Food and Allied Union (NAFAU) led by Alfonso “John” Pandeni – also of the Robbin Island club – claiming 6,000 members in 27 firms. In the following two weeks NAFAU won two disputes – one at a Luderitz chemical factory, and another at the Okahandja abattoir. Both involved strikes fully supported by black employees. Further, the Okahandja strike was supported by NAFAU members in sympathy strike at the Windhoek abattoir.

Following the efforts during 1985 by National Union of Mineworkers (South Africa) (NUM(SA)) to unionize the 3,000 black Namibian workers at the Consolidated Diamond Mines (CDM) in Oranjemund, and discussions with some of the 2,500 Rössing Uranium mine workers at Arandis, the regime attempted to bring in new laws to stop ‘foreign’ trade union activity in Namibia. In April 1986, the regime introduced the “Regulation of Residence of Certain Persons in South West Africa Act” which allows for the banning or deportation of “aliens”. Nevertheless, the establishment of workers’ committees by NUNW on these and other mines in anticipation of setting up a Namibian mineworkers’ union has gone ahead. An indication of the solidarity and political consciousness of black workers at these mines was demonstrated in October 1986 by the massive black workers’ stayaway for one week during CDM’s fiftieth anniversary “celebrations”. A “Rössing Mine Workers Union” was announced in April 1986 and attempted to register under the restrictive Trade Union law; however, it increasingly appears that this initiative will be subsumed by NUNW. A key battle will be to what extent the employers and white workers can maintain the SWACOL union at the Tsumeb mines in the face of the NUNW challenge.

NUNW in exile is also stepping up training and is reportedly opening an office in Lusaka. However, there are reports of AFL-CIO inspired efforts to stop ICFTU affiliated Western trade unions from offering assistance to NUNW. This is coupled with AFL-CIO efforts to support the “labour wings” of both UNITA and the MNR, the former occurring for several years now, and the latter a new move. To obtain such a policy in the ICFTU, the AFL-CIO will need to have the backing of the Canadian CLC, the British TUC, the German DGB, plus others. Clearly the Namibian trade union situation needs careful monitoring, and support for NUNW and SWAPO must be even further intensified.

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U.S. Policy: After Sanctions, What?

BY MIKE FLESHMAN & JIM CASON

Six months after Congress repudiated "constructive engagement" and imposed limited economic sanctions against South Africa over a Presidential veto, U.S. policy toward embattled southern Africa remains contradictory and confused. The bedrock of U.S. policy toward the region, the assumption that "in South Africa the whites are here to stay" has been shaken by nearly three years of bloody black insurrection in the townships.

Shaken too is conservative hegemony over the policymaking process. The administration, in the person of Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker, largely set the agenda on U.S. policy toward South and southern Africa until September 1985, when the administration imposed its own limited sanctions to head off stronger Congressional measures. But with pressure mounting at home during the election year and fueled by the increasing repression in South Africa, Congress finally revolted - passing its own limited sanctions package last October.

But if the White House is no longer making policy, neither is Congress. The old political consensus behind constructive engagement has not been replaced by a new one. Instead, a badly divided U.S. ruling class has scrambled to fill the vacuum with a hodgepodge of contradictory and confusing policy initiatives and statements - all intended, somehow, to preserve U.S. interests in the region and maintain Western political and economic control of the southern half of Africa.

* A number of Reagan administration policy makers have paraphrased this statement, but the quote is from a 1984 interview with then U.S. Ambassador to South Africa Herman Nickel.

Shultz commission report

Nowhere are the divisions in the establishment more visible than in the Presidential commission's report on U.S. policy towards South Africa submitted in January. The commission was established by Secretary of State George Shultz at the end of 1985 as part of the administration's efforts to fend off congressional action and rebuild a "bipartisan" badly battered by public outrage over Washington's "tilt" toward apartheid.

The starting point for this effort at a new consensus was the assertion that "the Administration's strategy of constructive engagement has failed." They note that "the development of a coherent, sustainable, bipartisan policy toward South Africa has been hampered by disagreements in the United States over strategy and tactics."

Most of the commission members concede the need for sanctions - "strong signals of the United States' rejection of apartheid" - and even call on the president to enlist Europe and Japan in a "multilateral" program of sanctions similar to the Congressional package. Should Pretoria still refuse to negotiate with the black opposition the commission can even contemplate a full trade embargo - including sanctions on gold.

The commission also has things to say about U.S. policy toward the region, noting that "efforts to build positive relations with black leaders in South Africa have been significantly damaged by the failure to deliver a long promised settlement in Namibia and the decision to provide military support for Jonas Savimbi's UNITA in Angola." But they stop short of recommending a cut off in aid to Savimbi, urging only that "the President take note of the complications for U.S. policy in South Africa created by U.S. military assistance to UNITA."

Although the commission was explicitly charged with reaching a "bipartisan consensus on U.S. policy," they proved unable to agree amongst themselves. Three of the twelve commissioners, former Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, General Motors Chairman Roger Smith and John R. Dellenback, dissented from the majority on the question of sanctions. "Intensified sanctions, whether unilateral or multilateral, cannot serve as the cornerstone" of a new U.S. policy they argue. "Indeed, the evidence suggests that it is in the context of a growing economy that South Africa has the greatest likelihood of resolving its basic problems." They urged that the United States "turn away from what we are convinced would be a wasteful and counterproductive continued concentration on sanctions."

Implementing sanctions

Far from settling the debate on sanctions, the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 has only deepened divisions within the ruling establishment. Within weeks of the bill's passage, the administration began to sabotage the sanctions by writing loopholes into the enforcement regulations. To give just one example, although the legislation explicitly bans uranium imports from South Africa and Namibia the administration has decided that uranium destined for re-export is exempt.

In March the President vetoed a United Nations Security Council sanctions package patterned after the U.S. law. The veto drew an angry condemnation from Republican Senator Richard Lugar, a key strategist of last year's successful efforts to water down the strong sanctions passed by the Democratic controlled House of Representatives. The veto, Lugar pointed out, was in direct opposition to a clause in the act re-
quiring the President to coordinate international sanctions against Pretoria. It also contradicted a key recommendation of the administration’s own commission report.

In lieu of concrete steps to distance the U.S. from Pretoria, the administration seems to have fallen back on the traditional device of rhetorical condemnation of apartheid. Earlier this year in Geneva the State Department launched an unprecedented attack on the Botha government’s human rights record. On April 2, the State Department issued a report, required under the Congressional sanctions passed last year, that was highly critical of Israeli violations of the international arms embargo against South Africa. Washington has always previously looked the other way while Jerusalem provided nuclear weapons, aviation and missile technology to the Botha government.

But if the State Department hopes to avoid slapping Pretoria by scolding them they are not getting much help from the right. In recent months, conservative activists have bitterly attacked such State Department initiatives as Shultz’s meeting with ANC president Oliver Tambo and aid to Mozambique, and accused Crocker of seeking to block military aid to Savimbi. In February right-wing activists jeered a Republican Presidential hopeful who supported sanctions against Pretoria, and vowed to make support for the South African government a litmus test of conservative orthodoxy.

Confusion in congress

The situation to the left of the administration is no less confused. With further action on sanctions unlikely until after the first anniversary of the sanctions bill this fall, Congress has focused most of its attention on the Front Line States. In the Democratic controlled House, for example, bills to provide economic aid to the Front Line States were slashed 50 percent. Congress has failed to lift the ban on aid to Zimbabwe and the public sector in socialist Mozambique, and may well pass legislation imposing comprehensive economic sanctions against Angola.

Indeed, overthrow of the Angolan government may be the one southern African objective that U.S. policymakers can agree on. In late March, the powerful chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Democrat Dan Rostenkowski, tried to pass an Angola sanctions amendment through his committee. Congressional liberals were slow to react and only after some quick pressure was mobilized did Black Caucus member Charles Rangel persuade Rostenkowski to drop the measures. Chances of passage of anti-MPLA measures are good in a Congress that last year refused to debate the merits of Reagan’s covert military aid program to the South African-backed Angolan rebels. This year there are already two anti-MPLA bills before Congress. There is even a proposal to expand and modernize an airstrip in southwestern Zaire that is already being used by the CIA to provide weapons to Savimbi.

Reagan himself cited U.S. aid to Savimbi in defense of his global counterrevolutionary strategy during his crucial March 19 press conference on the Iran/Contra affair. The 1975 Congressional cut-off of aid to Savimbi, Reagan said, was “the most recent example perhaps where the Congress has turned on the President.” And as a result “they have a communist government now.”

In short there’s both good news and bad news about U.S. policy toward South and southern Africa. The good news is that the strength of popular resistance in South Africa has shattered the Reagan alliance with Pretoria and pushed U.S. policy slightly to the left. In the wreckage of the old policy there are opportunities for further changes.

The bad news is that U.S. policy is still being debated without reference to the right of political and economic self-determination that belongs to the South African majority. The debate among the powers that be is not over a new definition of U.S. interests in southern Africa but how best to protect those interests in the current crisis.

Profound changes in U.S. policy toward southern Africa will probably have to await a change in those powers that be.
More than 5 months have passed since the plane carrying President Samora Machel of Mozambique crashed into a South African hillside close to the Mozambican border killing the president and most of those on board the aircraft. The international commission of inquiry established to investigate the crash - composed of representatives of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Mozambique (as the owner of the plane), the Soviet Union (as the manufacturer of the plane) and South Africa (as the country in which the crash occurred) - is still continuing its work and to date has released only a “factual report”, containing technical data about the flight, the plane and the crash site. A final report from the commission is still awaited.

The most important finding to emerge from the interim “factual report”, signed and accepted by the South African government representatives on the commission, is the conclusion that the presidential plane was following the signal of a radio beacon which was not that of Maputo, and that it was this radio beacon that caused the plane to turn away from its scheduled flight path and led it on to its fatal descent into the 2,000 ft high hills along the Mozambique-South African border. The key question for the commission of inquiry, and for the international community, therefore, is to discover what radio beacon the plane was following and whether this beacon was genuine or a decoy.

Not surprisingly, South Africa’s own independent commission of inquiry into the crash has sought to identify this alternate radio beacon as one of the existing beacons in the area of the crash, and has suggested that the plane locked into one of these and eventually crashed as a result of a series of pilot errors. While there is evidence to suggest that the crew of the presidential aircraft did fail to follow correct emergency procedures during the last minutes of the flight once they had reason to believe they might be off course, the available evidence apparently also shows that none of the existing radio beacons in the area could have possibly been mistaken for the Maputo beacon by the aircraft’s crew. The radio beacon of the small South African border town of Nelspruit was initially identified by the South Africans as the beacon which might have diverted the presidential plane. This suggestion, however, was promptly dropped after it was pointed out that the beacons of Maputo and Nelspruit operated at different frequencies. The subsequent attempt by South Africa’s commission of inquiry to identify the radio beacon of the nearby Swazi town of Matsapa as the origin of the signals which diverted the presidential plane has apparently also been disproved as a result of a technical analysis carried out by Mr. Bernard Caiger, the Canadian member of the ICAO delegation participating in the international commission of inquiry. But if none of the existing radio beacons in the area was the source of the signals which diverted the presidential plane, where did these signals come from?

Clearly, the temptation to point the finger at South Africa is great. The actions, and lack thereof, taken by the South African government in dealing with the whole incident serve only to raise suspicion. Why did the South African authorities, who had been tracking the presidential plane by radar, not inform the pilots that the plane was off course and about to enter militarily restricted South African air space? (The response that the plane fell below the “horizon” of the South African radar is untenable given the sophistication of the radar system the South African military has in place.) Why did it take the South African government 9 hours to inform the Mozambican authorities of the crash? Why did the South African authorities first state that they had not touched any of the personal documents and papers of the President that were scattered about the site, and then produce documentation alleged to have been taken from the crash site purportedly showing a Mozambican-Zimbabwean conspiracy against Malawi? Why did the South African government launch a disinformation campaign centred on the supposed technical obsolescence of the plane and on the alleged consumption of alcohol by the crew - all allegations subsequently refuted by the international commission of inquiry? Why did the South African government take so long to turn the airplane’s “black boxes” over to the international commission of inquiry?

One of the most intriguing unanswered questions concerns a mysterious camp site located a short distance from the wreckage, said by local residents to have housed a large tent occupied by South African soldiers for up to a week before the crash. The existence of this camp site, which the South African military claims not to be theirs, has led to suggestions that this might have been the location of the decoy radio beacon which diverted the president’s plane. In this regard, one scenario now being discussed in journalistic circles postulates that the South African military was indeed responsible for the signals which diverted the plane, but that the intention of the exercise had been simply to intimidate the Mozambican government rather than to kill Samora Machel. The consequent crash of the plane was the result of an exercise in intimidation which went wrong.
Our South African correspondent writes on "the elections"

There are few parodies so obscene as white South Africa going to the polls. Election meetings, grandiose manifests, candidates' wives, re-sounding speeches—all very familiar to anyone, anywhere who has witnessed a parliamentary election. All that's missing are the citizens, the vast majority of whom are prohibited from voting.

And yet disenfranchised South Africa is always the most potent presence at the polls. Other issues—ranging from local constituency issues to US interference in our internal affairs—may be raised, but when the rhetoric is stripped away, white South Africa is always voting about black South Africa. Way back it was called "the native problem". Nowadays it's called "reform".

My very ancient great-aunt has seen it all, that's why she's got her terminology a bit confused, her metaphors a trifle mixed. She tells me that "they should give the natives the vote. Not in parliament. They'd swamp us. But in their own locations—they'd be happy with that." That's reform. I notice also that, sometime during the past year, she has installed metal gates over her doors and an elaborate alarm system. I guess that's in case "they're" not happy.

But grotesque though they are, the elections do provide a window on the angst of the white political establishment. And here's what I saw through the window:

Firstly, the ultra right in the Conservative Party and the HNP (Herstigte Nasionale Party) are a chilling bunch of thugs whose list of candidates is liberally and purposefully sprinkled with recently retired generals and police officers, but they have a minimal influence on the terms of the white political debate. Such has been the strength of the pressure from below, that the broad mass of white South Africa—including my great-aunt—is pre-occupied with varying interpretations of "reform".

Secondly, the ruling National Party (NP) have little light to throw on the reform debate. In fact, they're now talking about "independent city state" status for the black townships!! That's why some prominent "Nats" have started jumping ship. Most prominent are a number of public representatives (Denis Worrall, until recently Ambassador to London, and Wynand Malan, a Member of Parliament) and a large group of Afrikaner professors from Stellenbosch University, grandiloquently described as the "intellectual backbone of the Afrikaner nation" (sic).

Thirdly, the liberal Progressive Federal Party (PFP) also don't have much on offer. They want "meaningful reform" and have a "vision of the future" Nothing more concrete. But anyone who even claims a "vision of the future" has one up on the Nats so that the PFP vision is becoming something of a reference point for a constituency of Afrikaner businessmen (one only hears about the "men") and professionals, who are, in effect encamping with their English-speaking counterparts.

What the PFP does with this constituency is the interesting question. Will it draw the white political establishment into a broad based acceptance of majority rule, and hence an eventual ANC government? Or will it be the springboard for another attempt at reconstituting minority rule, almost certainly in collaboration with Inkatha's Buthelezi?

I put this to a PFP candidate. He said, "We'll try and bring them together." I pointed out that last week in a Natal township 4 local youth activists were murdered in what is becoming a torrent of assassinations of youth, UDF, and trade union activists. A prominent Inkatha leader has also been assassinated. So it seems that the PFP are not going to be able to avoid a hard choice if their new realignment is going to have any resonance in the black communities.

It is pressure from the factories, the townships and the international community that has generated this new fluidity in white politics. What it all amounts to, where the "reformist" rump of the white establishment eventually places itself will depend on how much additional pressure is imposed on it. That's the challenge.

Rest assured, they'll move slowly. Never forget that the leaders of these reformers all have high sounding titles like "Chairman of Barclays Bank" and "Professor of Economics". They're being pushed by the people who sweep their floors; by people who are prevented from attending Stellenbosch University. That's another challenge.

The Outcasts:

| I CAN'T BELIEVE THAT BUTHA IS ACTING THE WAY HE IS IN SOUTH AFRICA |
| OKAY—WHAT IF HE AGREED TO ONE MAN ONE VOTE THEN WHAT? |
| IT WOULD AT LEAST BE DEMOCRATIC AND FAIR |
| I'M NOT DISCUSSING ETHICS—I'M TALKING POLITICS |

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Montreal. February 27th to March 1st. “Taking Sides in Southern Africa”. A “National Conference on Canada’s Role in International Action to End Apartheid and to Support SADCC”, sponsored by the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC). Some 445 delegates from every province in Canada and representing 197 organizations: trade unions, women’s groups, churches, non-governmental organizations and support groups, educational institutions and youth and community organizations. In short, the most representative meeting on southern Africa ever held in Canada, as close as we have come to a “Congress of the People” on that subject – to borrow a term from the South African tradition of struggle.

The delegates worked hard for three days to synthesize their views. But it was clear that they did so with confidence that their constituency stretched far beyond the halls of Montreal’s Palais de Congres, taking heart, no doubt, from the recent Gallup poll which indicated that over 70% of Canadians felt not merely distaste towards apartheid – an even greater number may feel that – but actually support the black people of South Africa in their struggle for freedom. And this was the same poll which found fully 59% of Canadians feeling that the situation cannot be resolved without the use of violence – a point to which we will return.

What soon became clear as being the general direction of the Conference was perhaps best summed up in the speech by Mozambican Information Minister Teodato Hunguana, who opened the conference by saying that the theme “Taking Sides in Southern Africa” means to:

1. “Support the Front Line States and SADCC in every possible way in their defence of their independence and sovereignty, and in guaranteeing conditions for the free and independent development of their economies!”
2. “It means being with the ANC and with the UDF in South Africa!”
3. “It means being with SWAPO in Namibia!”
4. “It means being with Angola, Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe!”
5. “It means being with Mozambique!”

Other keynote speakers reinforced these points. Thus a moving description of conditions and political possibilities inside South Africa by Dr. Alan Boesak struck at the heart of all the delegates’ concerns, particularly his assertion that “We do not want the South African government improved, we want it removed!” Speaking for the ANC, Thabo Mbeki said selective sanctions against South Africa have allowed P.W. Botha’s government to “buy time”, and called on Canada to impose total sanctions and sever diplomatic links with Pretoria “without waiting for thousands more to die”. Dan O’Meara of Montreal’s CIDMAA gave a detailed analysis of the economic and political impact of sanctions in speeding up the dismantling of apartheid. And Tory MP Walter McLean spoke eloquently of the high costs of the cruel war inflicted by South Africa upon Mozambique, a country he had recently visited as a member of a “fact-finding team”.

Significantly, the other keynote speaker was Secretary of State for...
External Affairs, Joe Clark, sufficiently aware, it seemed, of the growing weight and importance of the anti-apartheid movement in Canada to see the Conference as an appropriate forum for a major government statement on southern Africa. Clark did announce Canada's commitment to provide $400 million assistance to southern African countries over five years. But he was cagey about how much further Canada might go with sanctions. Cagey too about the African National Congress, flashing a cold war card or two ('Soviet influence') and emphasizing the necessity, simultaneous with any prospective opening towards the ANC, to keep Canadian "lines open" to the likes of Botha and Buthelezi.

In this connection Clark also stuck firmly to Prime Minister Mulroney's position (as outlined in our editorial to this issue of Southern Africa REPORT) that even if the need South African blacks may feel to resort to violence - given the prior violence of the regime which oppresses them - is understandable, it cannot be "condoned" by Canada. Ironically, on a subsequent panel, Donald Johnston, Liberal foreign affairs critic, staked out ground well to the right of the Tories, sharply criticizing Mulroney and Clark for even deigning to "understand" such violence instead of condemning it out of hand. Johnston's own panacea was a call for global sanctions instead. Yet this position seemed somehow disingenuous in light of Clark's (undoubtedly correct) perception, as noted in his speech, that: "it seems to us that a policy based solely on sanctions would not mount the pressure we need. For one thing we see little likelihood of the governments of the major economies applying sanctions on the scale that would be required to force Pretoria to change. That result may come in time, and certainly Canada will use our influence to build the weight of sanctions, but it is not realistic to expect an impenetrable wall to be set up suddenly, or even quickly". Yet as several critics pointed out from the floor Clark was being disingenuous in his turn. For where would the other "pressure we need" come from if not from more effective resistance from below (including armed resistance) inside South Africa?

A series of workshops for the delegates followed the plenaries and here clearer answers were forthcoming, as well as a remarkable degree of unanimity. Five key areas of agreement emerged:

- The primary demand of the Conference was that Canada should impose comprehensive, mandatory economic sanctions and do so now. Delegates also concluded that there was no contradiction between the "central and urgent" demand, and the need to act tactically against particular targets. It was also agreed that while pressuring all levels of government for action, there was no need to wait for the government, and that groups would press forward with popular sanctions based in grassroots and local activities (such as the Shell Boycott).

- Secondly, it was very strongly felt that there is no way to dismantle apartheid without some form of constraint on the regime's capacity for violence. This means that the right to self defence of the people of Southern Africa should be acknowledged by Canada. In the words of the President of the Canadian Catholic Bishops Conference, Bishop Hubert, force can legitimately be used to help end apartheid if lives can be saved and other peaceful means of forcing change have failed.

- Thirdly, delegates were unanimous that Canada should sharply increase assistance to the Front Line States, and particularly Mozambique, to help them maintain their independence in the face of Pretoria's growing aggression.

- All groups agreed that Canada should acknowledge the political reality in South Africa. This involves on the one hand upgrading government contacts with the ANC, moving toward official recognition of the ANC, whilst on the other hand, downgrading diplomatic links with Pretoria as a step towards a severance of all diplomatic links with the apartheid regime.

- Finally, delegates felt that the desperate situation in southern Africa demanded a renewed zeal from the broad constituencies represented at the conference. In order both to maximize the impact of our demands on the various levels of government, and to make popular sanctions more effective, sharply improved networking - and where possible improved coordination - between groups and regions is essential.

Organizers report that feedback since the end of the conference has been highly positive. Not surprisingly, virtually everyone in attendance had found it exciting and useful - even inspiring. No formal follow-up to the Conference was decided upon but it is hoped and expected that the unanimous demand, recorded above, for improved networking and coordination will be realized by all groups. Certainly, it was agreed, the Conference had consolidated ground for the anti-apartheid movement in Canada and pushed the campaign forward, providing an important platform for our further efforts.
MOZAMBIQUE:

A Special Appeal For The Hungry, Homeless And The Victims Of Terror

Sometimes drought causes famine. In Mozambique, it's caused by war.

The southern African country of Mozambique is now in a crisis situation. War is the cause of misery and hunger affecting millions of people.

Food crops, health centres, villages and vital rail lines are being systematically destroyed by South African-backed forces.

The results:

• 250,000 Mozambicans have already died from war-induced famine, and the United Nations estimates 5 million are now at risk of starvation.

• Nearly 1 million people have become refugees in their own country, out of a population of 14 million.

• 1 out of every 3 children under the age of 5 dies from lack of health care. (In Canada the infant mortality rate is 1 in 100.)

Oxfam-Canada is providing emergency aid to help overcome this disaster.

Oxfam is supporting food production, water and community health projects which give Mozambicans increased long-term self-reliance.

Oxfam is actively involved in one of the hardest hit areas, Zambezia province, providing the seeds and tools desperately needed for farmers to plant and harvest new crops.

These emergency projects and Oxfam’s ongoing long-term development program mean immediate results and greater self-sufficiency for Mozambicans.

The people of Mozambique need your immediate support.

Every dollar you can send will help.

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