



Regional Destabilization in Southern Africa

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Regional Destabilization in Southern Africa

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REGIONAL DESTABILIZATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

DECEMBER 8, 1982

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REGIONAL DESTABILIZATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1982

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2:08 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard Wolpe (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. WOLPE. The subcommittee will come to order.

This afternoon the Subcommittee on Africa is meeting to hear testimony from expert witnesses on regional destabilization in southern Africa. The hearing is designed to explore the origin and process of destabilization in southern Africa and, in particular, will focus on South Africa's pattern of increasing aggression toward its neighboring states of Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe.

Additional matters to be addressed are how South Africa's oppressive racial system of apartheid is, in itself, a source of regional instability; the role the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other Eastern bloc countries play in abetting the destabilization process in southern Africa; and whether or not southern African nations' political support for liberation struggles in Namibia and in South Africa also contribute to a destabilizing pattern of cross-border violence.

The task before the subcommittee today will be to give fuller exposure to a dangerous development of escalating instability in a regional subcontinent of great potential and natural riches, but also to focus attention on how current U.S. southern Africa policy could help to curb or arrest regional destabilization. At the same time, we also seek to continue to help achieve Namibia's independence and to assist broad political change in South Africa itself.

Since the early 1970's, the process of decolonization in southern Africa has naturally led to an increase of instability and violence there as liberation groups turned to armed conflict as a means of accelerating the achievement of independence from more heavily armed white minority regimes.

This was the case in the former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique and in the former British colony of Zimbabwe. Long, arduous, and often violent struggles accompanied political negotiations which ultimately led to self-determination for these countries. But the interim consequences were widespread deprivation among the local populations, the creation of major refugee centers throughout the region, and a spiraling destruction of often

flourishing local economies and infrastructure, especially in the transport sector. It is equally clear that during these years a developing pattern of militarily destabilizing actions by the South Africans and Rhodesians was employed to impede the decolonization process.

What we are witnessing now, however, as these decolonized countries are seeking to secure their hard-won independence by usefully turning to economic reconstruction and development within their borders, is an escalating pattern over the past 2 years of marathon violence and insurgency. Much of this violence has been perpetrated by South Africa and aimed at Angola under the rationale of hot pursuits against SWAPO fighters. The assaults against Angolan territory by South Africa have been constant despite U.N. Security Council Resolutions condemning these actions. Recently, the United States alone chose not to support a U.N. Security Council resolution condemning the South African invasion of Angola, despite the majority vote by other UNSC members, including our close allies. Now the South Africans have created a military buffer zone in southern Angola and have secured it by keeping their forces there, a clear violation of Angola's legitimate sovereignty and an incipient threat of future violence should ever South African and Cuban/FAPLA troops engage each other.

South Africa's continued support to UNITA also poses serious problems for national reconciliation in Angola. Similarly, South Africa's military logistical and command support to the MNR (Mozambique National Resistance) in efforts to weaken and possibly overthrow the Frelimo government of Mozambique has considerably stymied that country's fledgling efforts to reconstruct its economy and exacted a toll on its landlocked neighbors as well.

Last month the Zimbabwe Government announced a rationing of oil supplies to its manufacturing sector due to MNR economic sabotage against the Beira/Umtali pipeline and rail lines. This targeting of attacks on crucially important transport and commodity links appears to be a calculated pattern of economic destabilization practiced by South Africa (and its proxy insurgent groups) to undermine the nine-nation SADCC, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, an organization which is dedicated to reducing and eliminating economic dependency of its members on the South African economy.

These are but a few examples of destabilization that we intend to explore this afternoon through the expert testimony of our witnesses, almost all of whom have spent considerable periods of time in southern Africa and in the respective countries to which they will refer.

I would like to welcome this afternoon Prof. Allen Isaacman of the University of Minnesota, who will offer new evidence of South Africa's involvement in Mozambican insurgency; Prof. Gerald Bender of the University of Southern California, who is widely known for his research on Angola; Dr. Ian Butterfield of the Heritage Foundation, who is a policy analyst on African matters; Mr. William Sutherland, a widely respected consultant to the American Friends Service Committee, who has just recently returned from an extended stay in Zimbabwe; and Dr. Seth Singleton, of Ripon Col-

lege in Wisconsin, who has carried out extensive research on Soviet and Eastern bloc activities in southern Africa.

Given the large slate of witnesses and the length of some of the prepared testimony, we would urge the witnesses to summarize their statements and to try to keep them to no more than 7 to 10 minutes in length. The full text of your written statements will, of course, be submitted, along with any other solicited materials or materials you wish to volunteer for the hearing record.

In closing, I would like to state that political stability and economic progress are the two highest goals of the peoples of southern Africa, along with the overriding quest for racial justice. Of course, this is true of the African Continent as a whole; therefore, we believe that U.S. policy toward that region should reflect an enlightened commitment to assist the promotion and fruition of those goals. We should not be seen as contributing to increased instability in the region.

I should add that an invitation was extended to the administration to appear here today, but because of foreign travel of senior State Department officials responsible for African policy, the administration has declined to testify at this time. It is the subcommittee's intention in early 1983 to ask the administration to give an overall assessment of its policies in southern Africa, at which time it would also address the matter of regional destabilization.

Let me ask my ranking minority member if there are any remarks he would like to make at this point?

Mr. GOODLING. No, thank you.

Mr. WOLPE. If not, we now turn to our witnesses. May I first call upon Dr. Allen Isaacman.

STATEMENT OF ALLEN ISAACMAN, PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

Mr. ISAACMAN. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I appreciate this opportunity to examine the complex issues of destabilization in southern Africa. I will limit my discussion to the situation in Mozambique, a country in which I have lived and worked during the past 15 years and from which I have recently returned.

Although my principal area of research is Mozambican history, I did spend a month this summer interviewing government officials, American expatriots and Western diplomats about the causes and effects of destabilization. During the past several years I have also traveled frequently throughout the country and had an opportunity to speak at length with a large number of Mozambicans.

I would like to include for the public record two articles which Barbara Isaacman and I wrote in the Christian Science Monitor and Africa Report, which treat the subject of destabilization, as well as the complete text of my presentation from which I will excerpt appropriate portions this afternoon.

Because I have to be in The Hague tomorrow, I may have to leave this hearing before it concludes. If that is the case, I would be happy to submit written responses within a week to questions which come up during my absence.

Finally, throughout my testimony I will be quoting from captured Mozambican National Resistance documents, which I will be happy to include in the record if the chairman or members of the subcommittee so wish. Because they are in Portuguese, it will take about a week for me to translate them and submit them.¹

Although international attention has been focused on South Africa's activities in Namibia and Angola since the end of 1979, Pretoria has been waging a largely unnoticed, undeclared war against Mozambique. The January 1981 attack on a suburb of Maputo, the capital, the recent assassination of Ruth First, an outspoken critic of the apartheid regime, at the University of Eduardo Mondlane this August, and the landing of southern African troops in southern Mozambique several days later, are but a few examples of South African aggression. Most ominous is the August warning from South African Defense Minister Magnus Malan that his country might find it necessary to initiate a "Lebanese-type invasion" of Mozambique. As recently as November 24, the Mozambican representative to the United Nations reported a massive buildup of South African troops and military equipment along its border.

At the moment, Pretoria's main weapon in this war is the Mozambique National Resistance which over the past year has intensified its military activity in the southern half of Mozambique, attacking bridges, railroad lines, communal villages, and priority development projects.

Paralyzing key sectors of the rural economy and deestablishing Mozambique, however, are not its only objectives. It also seeks to sabotage SADCC, the integrated regional alliance forged in 1980 to break South Africa's economy hegemony. Thus, assistance to the MNR cannot be separated from South Africa's heightened economic and military pressure against Zimbabwe and its increased attacks on Angola.

But what is the MNR? According to former Rhodesian intelligence chief Ken Flowers, the Rhodesian special branch organized the MNR as an anti-Frelimo fifth column to work inside Mozambique. Gordon Winter, in his book "Inside Boss," which documents his career as a South African spy, claims that the idea came from South African military intelligence.

Whatever the case, from 1976 onward, Rhodesian security officials working with their South African counterparts, recruited Portuguese settlers and mercenaries, black and white secret police agents and former African members of the elite special forces of the Portuguese Colonial Army who had fled to Rhodesia after Mozambican independence. To this initial group were added ex-Frelimo guerrillas who had been expelled for corruption or had left because of unfulfilled personal ambitions. André Matzangaissa and Alfonso Dhlakama, two former Frelimo soldiers, received prominent positions to give the MNR visible black leadership.

From 1976 until the Lancaster House agreement, the Rhodesian Government provided the MNR with arms and bases along the Mozambican border and logistics support. With the signing of Lancaster guaranteeing the end of majority rule in Rhodesia, the Mozam-

¹ The three documents have been translated into English and are included at the end of his prepared statement.

bican Government failed to anticipate that the remnants of the MNR would transfer its base of operations to South Africa, and it underestimated the amount of military and logistic support South Africa would provide.

Whereas the Rhodesian Government used the MNR to collect information on Zimbabwean nationalist operations and to intimidate refugees who had fled to Mozambique, South Africa saw the roving bands as instruments of havoc. At a meeting between Dhlakama, the nominal head of the MNR, and Colonel Van Nierkerk of South African security on October 25, 1980, at a military base in the Transvaal, the latter ordered the MNR, to quote from the captured documents, to interdict rail traffic from Malverne to Gwelo—that's in southern Mozambique—establish bases inside southern Mozambique adjacent to the South African border, open a new military front in Maputo Province, and provoke incidents in the cities of Maputo and Beira.

The South African strategy was clear—the MNR must extend its activity to the strategic southern Provinces, thereby discouraging Zimbabwe and Botswana from exporting its commodities through Maputo. To accomplish these broader objectives, South African officials agreed to provide large supplies of war material, including rockets, mortars, and small arms, as well as instructors “who will not only teach but also participate in attacks.”

Mozambican field commanders with whom I spoke indicated that “Boers” regularly accompanied MNR bands in the central part of the country. When pressed for concrete examples, a young officer who had fought in Manica Province informed me that his battalion discovered several dead European soldiers when it overran an MNR base at Chidogo. South African passports and other documents were captured at other MNR bases. I have provided pictures of those documents for the staff.

Sara Muchalima, a 26-year-old woman who had been kidnaped by the MNR, saw 10 European advisers who, along with Dhlakama, were evacuated by helicopter shortly before the Garagua base fell.

Emphasis, however, is on South Africa training MNR forces at South African military bases in the Transvaal and providing supplies and logistical assistance to the guerrillas inside Mozambique. According to Mozambican field commanders, MNR forces are regularly resupplied at night, and the Government lacks the communications and air support to prevent these airdrops. Mozambique's long coastline is also ideally suited for naval landings which are becoming more frequent. Captured MNR documents suggest that this is the preferred route—it is much cheaper for South Africa and Mozambique's fledgling Navy cannot patrol effectively.

Western diplomats in Maputo estimated the MNR numbers at about 5,000, appreciably lower than Dhlakama's claim of 17,000 armed soldiers. Most MNR recruits seem to have been coerced into joining. John Burlison, a British ecologist held prisoner by the MNR for several months, reported seeing hundreds of forced recruits who were kept under armed guard.

Nevertheless, Mozambique's serious economic problems make MNR recruitment that much easier. Droughts, which the MNR attributes to the alienated ancestors, the Mozambican Government's failure to provide sufficient support for the family farming sector,

and the lack of consumer goods in parts of Manica, Sofala, and Inhambane provide fertile ground for MNR overtures. So does the MNR's manipulation of tribal divisions and appeals to Shona chiefs, spirit mediums, and "traditional" Shona values.

Whatever the initial attraction of these appeals, wide scale plundering and increasing terrorism quickly evaporate support for the MNR and alienate the rural population which, above all else, wants to be left alone. Western missionaries living along the Mozambican-Zimbabwe border reported that in December 1980, the MNR launched a terrorist campaign around Espangabera in Manica "beheading Machel loyalists, abducting girls, and press-ganging young men into service."

Reports filtering in from the bush make it clear that these are not isolated acts by a few disaffected MNR members, but rather reflect the underlying strategy of an organization committed to banditry, marauding, and terrorism. One high-ranking diplomat with whom I spoke admitted that he was initially skeptical, but now finds "reports of widespread MNR barbarism credible."

These tactics, together with the MNR's reliance on narrow tribal appeals, directed exclusively at Shona-speaking people, only one of a dozen ethnic and cultural groups in the country, belie its claim that it is a nationalist movement of freedom fighters disillusioned with the Frelimo's social strategy. Apart from its anti-Communist rhetoric, it lacks any political program and has made no effort to organize the peasants in the areas in which it operates. The American Chargé d'Affaires in Maputo acknowledged that "its political program is flimsy at best" and Western diplomats doubt that the MNR can unseat Frelimo, Mozambique's governing party. All the evidence suggests that it is little more than an arm of South African security.

Nevertheless, the MNR is an important arm and has played a significant role in Pretoria's undeclared economic, political, and psychological war against Mozambique and its SADCC allies. Roving bands repeatedly attack strategic economic targets and key development projects. But South Africa's main target right now appears to be SADCC. At the SADCC organizing conference in 1980, the member nations agreed that strengthening the transportation and communication links, without which all other forms of regional cooperation are impractical, had to receive the highest priority. Preliminary indications suggest that the SADCC transportation network of international commerce is gradually being redirected away from South African ports. Zimbabwe, for example, which was totally dependent on South African ports during the Smith regime, exported 30 million tons through Maputo in 1980 and 203 million tons in 1981, as well as an additional 166 million tons through the adjacent port of Matola.

The importance of the two railroad lines from Zimbabwe to Maputo and Beira to this strategy explains the insistence of South African security officials in their 1980 meeting with Dhlakama that both be regularly sabotaged. In fact, this has occurred repeatedly. The latest major attack on the line from Maputo to Zimbabwe took place in July 1982, cutting service for 50 days.

While disclaiming any explicit links with the MNR, South Africa maintains that its own threats and military actions are necessary

countermeasures against both the African National Congress, which Pretoria claims has bases in Mozambique, and Mozambique's decision to deploy sophisticated weapons on the South African border.

Mr. WOLPE. Could I interrupt just for a moment. You have about another minute to go.

Mr. ISAACMAN. OK, thank you.

Both claims are vigorously denied by high Mozambican officials. Maputo's claims are supported by Western diplomats with whom I spoke who remain skeptical about the South African changes, pointing out that above all else Mozambique wants to avoid a direct confrontation with South Africa, which would have devastating economic consequences.

I would like to conclude my testimony by addressing the question of U.S. foreign policy. To the extent that the Reagan administration chooses to view events in southern Africa through the prism of the cold war, and adopts a pro-South African posture, its policies send a signal to Pretoria, a signal that aggression against South Africa's neighbors is acceptable. The failure of the Reagan administration to condemn South African aggression and the reign of terror which the South African-backed MNR has inflicted on unarmed men, women, and children in Mozambique can only reinforce Pretoria's bellicose posture.

Finally, there are ominous signs that U.S. agencies are or were cooperating with the South African war machine. The most relevant for this discussion is the February 1980 exposure of CIA activities in Mozambique, including documented charges that American agents passed on information which facilitated the South African attack on the Maputo suburbs, charges which, to the best of my knowledge, Washington has never denied or refuted.

To be sure, the Government of Mozambique is pursuing a socialist path of development. But it is also pursuing a nonaligned policy. Witness its autonomous position on Namibia, Zimbabwe, the Sino-Soviet split, its refusal to provide naval bases to the Soviet Union, and its recent military agreement with Portugal. The Reagan administration's increasing ties to Pretoria and its unwillingness to condemn the South African-sponsored aggressions are, however, narrowing Mozambique's international options, which in the long run is in the interest of neither Maputo nor Washington.

Thank you.

[Mr. Isaacman's prepared statement follows:]

evidence that we have from discussions with Western diplomats in Maputo indicated Mozambique played a very important role especially in discussions with ZANU and President Mugabe.

I have less specific evidence immediately at my disposal with reference to the question of Namibia, but I do know that on several occasions President Machel met with the head of SWAPO and encouraged negotiated settlement of the Namibian question. I think that is the general assessment of most Western analysts in Maputo on Mozambique's posture on those two areas.

Mr. SINGLETON. I would like to add one further point to that.

It is my understanding that on his visit to the Soviet Union, in I believe November of 1980, Samora Machel also made great efforts to persuade the Soviets to recognize the legitimacy of the Mugabe government in Zimbabwe, which the Soviets then did.

Mr. WOLPE. I want to turn to another question which is that of Angolan recognition.

Does U.S. nonrecognition of Angola help or hinder Soviet objectives in southern Africa, and help or hinder American objectives in southern Africa? Why don't we begin with Dr. Bender.

Mr. BENDER. Well, I think American nonrecognition can only help the Soviet Union and hurt American interests in Angola and southern Africa. There's no doubt about it. As long as the United States is unwilling to compete with Soviets, Cubans, and others to provide assistance to the Angolans, then the Soviets enjoy a monopoly. The United States is the only Government in the entire world that does not recognize the Angolans, and after 7 years and 1 month of independence, I think the record is quite clear that the United States has had practically zero influence in Angola. That is in large part because we have no presence there.

Mr. WOLPE. Would you care to respond, Dr. Singleton, and then Dr. Butterfield.

Mr. SINGLETON. I would essentially agree with Dr. Bender in the following sense, that nonrecognition clearly does give the Soviets and their Cuban allies more influence there, although I do not think it is a monopoly. I believe the Brazilians, the Portuguese, and the West Europeans have considerable contacts and I don't think we should forget that element of the situation.

I think the Soviet hope—and I say hope rather than intention, because intention implies things you can control—is that. South African intransigence will prevent a Namibian settlement so that the Soviets may continue to deepen their involvements not only with the Angolans but also with SWAPO as part of the general policy of polarization.

I think the United States would be wise to recognize Angola. I think the prior issue is some Namibian settlement. Of course, I am not at all privy to the details of the diplomacy concerning that.

Mr. WOLPE. Dr. Butterfield.

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. I think there's another side to the question in the sense that the long-term aim of U.S. southern Africa policy must be to obtain some sort of political stability in that part of the world. It is in our political interest and in our economic interest. There is not going to be political stability in Angola until the MPLA and UNITA have come to some form of a settlement. I don't see how we're going to facilitate an MPLA/UNITA settlement by

recognizing one-half of the problem as the legitimate government of Angola. It just gives the MPLA less motivation to settle with UNITA, and they're going to have to do it at some stage.

Mr. BENDER. But there is a presumption here, of course, that the United States can somehow trade recognition with Angola for reconciliation between the MPLA and UNITA. I think there is absolutely no evidence to support such an assumption. In fact, I would state it's false. There is no way the United States can convince the MPLA to reconcile with UNITA for in exchange with U.S. recognition. The prize isn't that great.

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. I quite agree, that this isn't something that we can use to directly pressure the movement. It is, however, something which might help us to achieve our end. I am not saying we can simply bargain one for the other. We're just not worth that much.

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Sutherland, would you like to respond to that question?

Mr. SUTHERLAND. No. I think probably—I say “no” and then I speak. But I would just add that I do think there are other factors among the Angolans themselves in regard to the whole question of whether they come to some kind of agreement. I support the position that it isn't a U.S. position which would matter all that much.

Mr. WOLPE. I would have thought that one part of the calculus here would be the ways in which America may put pressure on South Africa. I would have thought that U.S. recognition of Angola would be a very effective tool and the diplomacy vis-a-vis South Africa.

Would any of the panelists care to respond to that proposition?

Mr. BENDER. I totally agree. I have written the same thing myself. I think it would be a very clear and strong message to South Africa that the United States is not only committed to South African strategies in the area, that we have our own strategies as well, that may or may not coincide with South Africa's strategies.

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. There is a slight problem with recognizing the MPLA, since we are dealing with a movement that seized power by force with the assistance of foreign troops and refused to abide by an election procedure to which it had signed its own name just a few months before. This should give us pause, I think, before you want to rush in and recognize such a movement. Granted, we have relations with some other minority regimes around the world, but that is not a cue to recognize one more.

Mr. BENDER. Well, the President just met last week in Central America with a number of leaders who were not exactly elected. This Government, under any administration, doesn't seem to have problems with that.

Mr. WOLPE. Dr. Singleton?

Mr. SINGLETON. If, in fact, our objective for Angola is as I think it should be, a peaceful country, not alined to a great degree with any foreign power, non-African power, it is clear that some resolution of the UNITA problem does have to take place, because otherwise that country itself will not be at peace. It seems that the UNITA issue, the question of Cuban troops in Angola, and U.S. recognition, and also increased investment—I believe Mr. Rockefeller of the Chase Manhattan Bank has been talking about

increased investments in Angola—are all useful subjects for discussion. How one links them is obviously a matter of fine-tuned diplomacy.

Now, I don't believe that nonrecognition is the correct policy, because I think that with recognition the United States will have more ability to engage in a constructive diplomacy involving all of those three issues.

Mr. WOLPE. Judge Crockett.

Mr. BENDER. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. If I may make an observation, there's an assumption in our discussion that the United States has the capability of bringing about reconciliation in Angola. I would suggest that when we look around the continent neither the United States nor any other major power or medium or minor power has the capability of putting together countries in which certain ethnic groups or racial groups are excluded from power. We cannot cut out a position for the Buganda in the Ugandan Government; we can't guarantee the Ndebele are going to be accurately represented in the Mugabe Government; nor can the United States even bring about some black participation in South Africa.

I find it frustrating, whereas everybody always tries to figure out how the United States can bring about reconciliation in Angola but nobody ever asks the question "How can we bring about racial reconciliation in South Africa". When we get to South Africa, it is suggested that the United States lacks the capability or ability to do it. In Angola, nobody suggests that we don't have those capabilities. I would like to put in the record that I don't think we can.

Mr. WOLPE. I would like to yield to my colleague, Judge Crockett.

Mr. CROCKETT. On the question of recognition, I don't think there is any doubt that Angola would like very much to be recognized by the United States, so that does not pose any problem. The reluctance seems to be on the part of our own Government.

But on the whole question, I think what disturbs me most is the coyness of American business. They do big business in Angola. We were over there and we saw evidence of that. The committee has had a luncheon meeting with some of the representatives of business interests in Angola. And yet, we almost never hear of any demand, shall I say, on the part of Gulf Oil or the big banking interests in New York, that the State Department or the Government of the United States should recognize Angola.

Usually it is a situation of trade following the flag. Here we are asking that the flag follow trade. But those who are concerned with that trade do not seem to be interested in that.

Are there any comments on that?

Mr. BENDER. I think the former president of Gulf Oil production and exploration, twice before this committee in 1981, did advocate recognition—or maybe it was once in 1980 and once in 1981. Chase Manhattan Bank, including David Rockefeller, has advocated recognition. I think most of the major companies operating in Angola have at one time or another publicly stated that they favor U.S. recognition.

Mr. CROCKETT. I have no doubt of each of the instances you mention. They do favor. But where is the customary pressure that we get from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, for example, or the Na-

tional Association of Manufacturers, when they really want to bring about a policy change in government?

Mr. SINGLETON. I just wanted to add one comment on the irony of Angola. I believe Professor Bender mentioned Soviet aid to Angola. The fact of the matter is, if one looks at real Soviet aid to Angola, that Gulf Oil and its American consumers have done a tremendous lot more to finance the Angolan revolution than the Soviets or their allies ever did.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. One other point I would like to raise here that in this particular instance Gulf Oil remained in Angola because it recognized the priorities of the Angolan Government and its requirements, and that one of the big problems, as I have stated in my testimony, is to get both government and business within the United States to recognize the fact that it is the people who are living in a country who have the right to determine the direction and priorities.

Mr. WOLPE. Dr. Butterfield.

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. I find the question somewhat curious, in the sense that this administration is often accused of being the slave of big business. I really don't think it is the place of big business to demand that we follow certain political policies which will coincide with their economic interests. It is the place of the elected administration and you, the elected officials. I don't think that Gulf Oil has any business at all in trying to dictate U.S. foreign policy.

Mr. CROCKETT. It may not be their place but they usually do. [Laughter.]

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Well, let's hope in this case we can control them.

Mr. WOLPE. Let me pursue the question of the Soviet role. Why have the Soviets and the Cubans essentially allowed South Africa to continue to occupy Southern Angola, to really move into that country virtually without any effective response? More generally, what has been the Soviet response to South African destabilization efforts in the region?

Mr. SINGLETON. Thank you. I appreciate the question.

The immediate response, which is the correct one up until the present, is that the Soviets are simply too beleaguered on so many other fronts. Their economy, their military competition with the United States, the war in Afghanistan, the counterinsurgency campaigns in Indochina, one could go on and on. They simply do not have the resources to devote to southern Africa, and they will not make any commitments which would put them in the position of having to oppose the formidable South African defense force. They have steadfastly refused to make any such commitments to the Angolans or the Mozambicans. They refuse to make any such commitments to the Syrians and the PLO. In fact, the analogy between the Israeli activities in Lebanon and what the South Africans are doing in southern Africa bears a great deal of useful comparison.

There is, however, a dangerous possibility which should be recognized, that if the South African defense force decides to deliberately engage the Cuban troops in Angola—and I have no idea how likely that is because I am really not an expert on the thinking of the South African Government—the Soviets will have their credi-

bility backed into a very tight corner. If that ever occurs, I would make no predictions as to how they might react.

Mr. WOLPE. Would you differentiate, Dr. Bender, between Mozambique and Angola in their relationships to the Soviet Union and to the Cubans?

Mr. BENDER. Well, the Cuban presence in Mozambique is not that great. I don't know how to differentiate them, frankly.

I do think that because of the military exigencies in Angola there is a larger Soviet presence, although even that isn't so great. I think the total number of Soviet and East German military and civilian personnel is still less than a thousand. Ironically, there are more Soviet technicians in Egypt today, after all the problems between the Soviet Union and Egypt, than there are in Angola.

Mr. WOLPE. It is Soviet technicians you are referring?

Mr. BENDER. Soviet, East German, Bulgarian, Rumanian—

Mr. WOLPE. Exclusive of the Cuban presence?

Mr. BENDER. Yes, not counting the Cubans.

Mr. WOLPE. Dr. Singleton.

Mr. SINGLETON. Numbers on such matters are highly suspect, wherever they come from. Basically, it is absolutely true that the presence in Angola is much larger than that in Mozambique. Mozambique is, in fact, something of a bother to the Soviets. The Mozambicans keep asking for aid, which the Soviets refuse to provide. There is some circumstantial evidence that the Mozambicans asked to become a member of the CMEA or COMECON in 1981 and were refused. CMEA policy is to level the poor members up to the standards of the richer ones, and leveling up Cuba and Vietnam is more than the Soviet economy can sustain these days.

One figure that I did see—and I think it was in the military balance, which I regard as a reasonably reliable source—was that there were something over 2,000 East Germans in Angola, many most involved with the People's Liberation Army of Namibia. But any of these figures can be somewhat suspect.

I think the Soviet and allied stake in Angola is much greater than that in Mozambique. I would not expect the Soviets to take any kind of action, drastic action, even in the event of a South African invasion of Mozambique. But you can never be sure. I think Angola, if the Cubans were engaged, would be a rather different case and a dangerous possibility.

Mr. BENDER. I should note that my figures come from U.S. sources.

Mr. WOLPE. Dr. Singleton, you have indicated, in explaining the reason for Soviet restraint within the region, which is really the general thrust of the observations you have made, that you have referred, in explanation of that restraint, to such factors as the Soviet economic difficulties they're facing, their overextension in much of the world and so on.

To what extent is Soviet policy constrained by the reaction of frontline states, the African states themselves within the region?

Mr. SINGLETON. As I did say, or would have said had I had a bit more time, I think the whole Soviet position in southern Africa depends on being voluntarily accepted by Africans. The Soviets will be and have been highly reluctant to do anything which would brand them as a heavy-handed imperialist within the region. In

fact, the Soviets are extremely sensitive to muted African criticism that they might, indeed, be imperialist. They are refuting it constantly in their statements, which is an indicator that they are, in fact, worried about it. So I would not expect them to do anything that would make them be perceived by the other frontline states as controlling a government—Angola or Mozambique would be the possibilities.

And I would not expect them to engage in any kind of internal destabilization even if the Angolan or Mozambican leaderships decided to change their policy in a significant way. But then, again, one could never be sure. We really just don't know what the close interconnections are between the Cubans, the Soviets, and the various leaders in Angola and Mozambique, at least I certainly don't.

Mr. WOLPE. Reciprocally, from the American standpoint, are there measures we could be taking that we have not been taking that would strengthen our relationships with the frontline states? What would you recommend in that regard, any of the panelists?

Mr. SUTHERLAND. First of all, I believe that if this government could be encouraging to the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference, which is really making a serious effort to promote regional development, that this would be of real value.

I mentioned earlier, of course, that Zimbabwe is one place where the U.S. Government has done some positive things as far as assistance is concerned. I think this is important, since the Zimbabwe approach is one of the most hopeful developments on the continent.

Of course, along with that I have to say that it would be a little bit ridiculous if the United States did give any substantial help to SADCC and at the same time carried out a policy which encouraged the South African government to continue to support movements which were blowing up the bridges and blowing up the railways, et cetera, so it might have to be a two-way policy—discouraging destabilization efforts by South Africa and encouraging the regional SADCC.

Mr. BENDER. One thing that the Congress itself could do to help our government to strengthen our ties with the frontline states is to repeal legislation prohibiting U.S. aid to Angola and Mozambique. I think at some point down the pipeline this administration may regret that it doesn't have that "carrot" to use in negotiating an end to the Namibian problem or even reconciliation in Angola.

Mr. WOLPE. Let me just say in response to that last observation, there is right now no legislative inhibition on aid to either Angola or Mozambique, except for the Clark Amendment, which prohibits covert military assistance to Angola.

The issue has been the administration's reluctance to be very forthcoming, particularly with Mozambique, at this point. My subcommittee has, in fact, repeatedly urged a much larger response to the Mozambicans in particular. We think that would be very helpful in facilitating the current diplomacy.

I want to come back to the issue of Angola in a moment, but I want to raise another broader dimension that I see out there on the horizon.

I don't think there is any question that the intransigence of the South African Government is certain to produce gradually escalating violence. The intensity and frequency of their violence will in-

crease with time. The African National Congress, the ANC and other groups, will be centrally involved in that activity. I think the United States needs to think through very clearly what our response will be and ought to be to the African National Congress and to activity directed at the overthrow of the South African regime and Government.

I would be interested in the response of the panel to that general question.

Dr. Singleton.

Mr. SINGLETON. Maybe I could start by outlining what the Soviets and other African Communists have in mind for South Africa. I say African Communists specifically because there is a very interesting document, "For the Freedom, Independence, National Revival, and Social Progress of the Peoples of Tropical and Southern Africa," published by an unnamed number of African Communist parties, but the language in it seems to indicate a Soviet origin or translation because of the wording. It outlines, and other publications reinforce the outline, a very clear—again I would say hope—for South Africa.

What it outlines is a policy or strategy of long-term polarization. It is the idea of using the guerrilla attacks at the present time to simply get the ball rolling, to increase repression by the South African Government, to have the South African Government eliminate all forces other than the underground ANC movement in South Africa and outside, and at the same time to increase the influence of the South African Communist Party, which exists within the umbrella of the African National Congress. This is a classical united front strategy, very similar to the Chinese Communists in the Komintang in China in the 1920's—in fact, it goes all the way back to that time.

The hope is that the Communists within the ANC, being disciplined and organized, will then emerge within the ANC as the dominant force, so you will end up over a relatively long period of time with an increasingly repressive South African regime on the one side and a single, organized, disciplined Communist-led movement on the other, which then represents the national cause. This is clearly, I would say, hope from the point of view of the Soviets and the unnamed authors of this document, which probably included the South African Communist Party.

Now, I think there are certainly things that can and should be done. Mostly, they have to be done by the South Africans to prevent such an outcome.

Mr. WOLPE. I don't know that that was responsive to my question really, which is, What should American policy be? I mean, we have heard the ANC described as a terrorist organization that is fighting a legitimately formed government in South Africa. Now, should that be our posture? Should it be one of condemnation of all ANC activity as, indeed, constituting terrorism, that is somehow inimical to American values and interests? Aside from the ANC, if terrorist activity develops that is directed to the overthrow of the South African regime, whether or not it is ANC-related, what should be America's response to that?

Mr. BENDER. I think, minimally, this administration or the United States should treat the ANC no less than it treats UNITA. In the case of UNITA, it is considered as a legitimate political

movement that deserves a fair share of the pie. That is the administration's position. Now, they have never said that about the ANC, but the ANC is no more or less terroristic than UNITA. On the contrary, they have been in business for a long time, back to 1912, and for over a half a century they pursued nonviolent policies. They took up violence when it was the only remaining means of obtaining legitimate political representation in their own country. That is the same reason why UNITA took up violence.

Now, the United States understands when the South African white regime uses violence. The United States understands when UNITA uses violence. It does not understand when the ANC uses violence. I think minimally we must accord the ANC political legitimacy.

Mr. WOLPE. Would you go beyond political legitimacy?

Mr. BENDER. If I answer as to my own personal views, I would say yes. If I answer as somebody who is managing policy, I would say it is probably not efficacious in terms of working with South Africa, who we would have to work with, for a solution there. But I'm not sure. I have to think about that some more.

Mr. WOLPE. Dr. Butterfield.

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Presumably we are supposed to be encouraging peaceful change rather than violence change. In Angola, we have a military situation there of foreign troops and the only avenue of expression is military. We still have, however, many large and important groups which are supporting peaceful change.

It seems rather ironic that we are sitting here discussing the ANC, an almost insignificant group compared to Inkata [phonetic]. I think we should be putting much more effort on them getting some sort of U.S. support behind Inkata, a group which I believe is now twice the size the ANC was when it was legal.

Mr. WOLPE. Are you familiar, Dr. Butterfield, with the public opinion polls that have been produced within South Africa quite recently?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. South Africa is not exactly a highly skilled country in terms of polling. It is an exceptionally primitive mechanism. I don't actually accept those, no.

Mr. WOLPE. In other words, you just dismiss that?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. I know most of the pollsters and they don't put a great deal of faith in them, either.

Mr. WOLPE. Dr. Singleton, would you care to respond to the original question?

Mr. SINGLETON. I think that the original question boils down to this: What can the United States do in relation to the Government of South Africa to get it to change its policies so that within that country there will be increasing improvement of the opportunities for political expression, which then would be taken up presumably by many groups, one of which would be the ANC. The ANC may turn out to be the most important.

I do not know what the United States could or should do to persuade the Government of South Africa to allow greater pluralism and political freedom within its own country. I think that is really where the question comes.

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Sutherland.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. I find it rather strange to hear us talking about peaceful change and no violence when we're talking about one of the most structurally violent regimes in history. Over a long period of time I have talked with a wide range of people who have suffered and gone into exile, and the message I get from them all the time is that if this Government and this society stops supporting the structurally violent regime of South Africa, that they wouldn't worry too much about recognition of ANC or anything else. If we could take care of that job, that would be the most important thing that we could do.

Mr. WOLPE. I have simply been struck, over the years I have been immersed in foreign policy issues, with what strikes me as an extraordinarily obvious kind of double standard that we tend to apply. It is not as if the United States is beyond giving military support to destabilizing efforts. We have done so in Latin America. According to newspaper accounts, we are doing so presently with respect to the Nicaraguan regime. We were involved in supplying covert military assistance to factions operating during the Angolan struggle. So it is not as if the United States is beyond providing arms and materiel to movements that are concerned for the struggle for power within one country or another.

But somehow, when it comes to addressing the issue of South Africa itself, suddenly all of the arguments are advanced that suggests the United States should never ever be identified with or be in a position of possibly lending political legitimacy to a movement that is engaged in violence.

I ask this because there have been instances in recent political history, both in Zimbabwe and in Namibia, where America's opposition to the revolutionary movement seeking independence in those countries led to a situation where the movements themselves were forced to turn elsewhere.

I wonder if the panelists would care to simply reflect on why it is that we adopt a different posture in these different situations. Was the United States position enhanced by our historical antipathy toward SWAPO as we look at the Namibia question? Is it being enhanced by our historical opposition and resistance to becoming potentially identified with groups that seek the overthrow of the South African Government? In Latin America, is our position being enhanced by our identification with military regimes and efforts to destabilize the Nicaraguan Government?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. I think it is very important that we don't accept the Soviet standards of behavior and launch our own policy of subversion. If we are trying to subvert states in Central America, then I will be the first to condemn it. We should not be doing that. We have no business in the subversion game. People should have the right to basically choose their own governments.

Similarly, we shouldn't be doing it in South Africa. It is for the South Africans themselves to decide what they wish to do. If the Soviets wish to get involved in subversion movements, ultimately they will do so, to their own detriment. I think in these situations that Africans who take arms from the Soviets are often profoundly suspicious of why the Soviets are giving them arms and usually at the first opportunity they cut their contacts with the Soviet Union.

If we get into that game, we will find ourselves in just the same position that the Soviets do and we should keep well clear of it.

Mr. BENDER. I agree, that I think people in all countries should choose their own governments. But the question is how. How can blacks in South Africa help choose their own government? And when they are not in that position, to exercise this option of their own they turn to others for help. When there is no response from the United States, then I think there are serious problems.

I totally agree with the rhetorical questions that you posed. I would agree in the sense that the United States has not helped itself by opposing these various movements along the way. We have hurt ourselves. Also, I think it is very difficult, however, for us to determine who really is popular or not popular.

Your question I think about the opinion poll was well directed, and I would like to ask Mr. Butterfield why would you be skeptical, for example, of an official opinion poll in South Africa, but then in your testimony you gave us you refer to things like "Savimbi is the most popular leader in Angola, was in 1975 and is today." In other places you have written that he is favored by half the population. How do we know that? There has never been an election. There has never been an opinion poll.

People told us that Muzorewa was the most popular leader in Zimbabwe, until there was a fair election. So I think we have to be somewhat careful in saying that Inkatha is more popular than ANC or ANC is not popular at all, because we really don't know.

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. I quite agree. I have never said that Dr. Savimbi had the support of half of the population of Angola. If you notice in my statement, I said "probably" in terms of Savimbi's popularity, just because there are certain indicators. He was thought to be popular at the time in 1975. He had fought the war from inside the country. The very fact that he has maintained a movement over this period of time, against fairly dedicated opposition indicates a certain amount of popularity, but I am not saying that this can be quantified.

When we look at South African polls, we simply should not presume that these are performed with the sophistication of polls in this country. This is not the Gallop poll; it's not the Harris poll. It is not something we can put a great deal of weight upon.

I had a long talk with Lorrie Schlemmer when I was in——

Mr. WOLPE. That's fine, Dr. Butterfield, but the question is, then, how do you assert that——

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. That's the problem, if you get into the subversion game, who are you going to support, the ANC or——

Mr. WOLPE. No, no, that's not the problem. The problem is, on the one hand you have made an assertion with respect to the popularity enjoyed by one particular movement within South Africa, to which I offered alternative evidence. You say that's irrelevant.

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. As far as Inkatha is concerned, that's——

Mr. WOLPE. What I'm leading up to is a different kind of proposition. What I'm leading up to, isn't it the case that what is fundamentally at issue in terms of our acceptance or rejection of governments, or acceptance or rejection of movements, relates not to necessarily the legitimacy of the independence struggle itself as much as to whether we are comfortable or not with the values espoused

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALLEN ISAACMAN, PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate this opportunity to examine the complex issues of "Destabilization in Southern Africa." I will limit my discussion to the situation in Mozambique, a country in which I have lived and worked during the past fifteen years and from which I have recently returned. Although my principal area of research is Mozambican history, I did spend a month this summer interviewing government officials, American expatriots and Western diplomats about the causes and effects of destabilization. During the past several years, I^{have} also travelled frequently throughout the countryside and had an opportunity to speak at length with a large number of ^{Mozambicans} ~~peasants~~ about the contemporary situation. I would like to include for the public record two articles which Barbara Isaacman and I wrote in The Christian Science Monitor and Africa Report, which treat the subject of destabilization in Mozambique.

Although international attention has been focused on South Africa's activities in Namibia and Angola, since the end of 1979, ^{Pretoria} ~~it~~ has been waging a largely unnoticed undeclared war against Mozambique. The January 1981 attack on a suburb of Maputo, the recent assassination of Ruth First--an outspoken critic of the apartheid regime--at the University of Eduardo Mondlane this August, and the landing of South African troops in Southern Mozambique several days later, are but a few examples of South African aggression. Most ominous is the August warning from South African Defense

by the leaders as we understand those values. So what happens is, we end up projecting our own personal political preferences in terms of whether or not we support a right wing government or a leftwing government, and the basic issue I think gets lost, which I think is the issue of self-determination.

Would that be a fair—

I agree completely with your cogent statement although I wonder if we shouldn't add to your phrase "* * *" as we understand those values" the notion of also "distorting those values"—to make them seem more like ours. This, I think, is done frequently with South Africa. South Africans—and some Americans—often refer to South Africa sharing so many common values with Americans but this is a distortion or myth. We don't really share many values with white South Africans other than a certain anticommunism. Beyond that, however, the practices of the South African regime and the values held and propagated by that regime are not shared or accepted by most Americans.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. I find myself in some difficulty here because when we speak about "we" in the Government, I find oftentimes that I see elements and movements within our society that I can say definitely have these values that we talk about with these other groups. But I don't know, unless there were a Jeffersonian approach, that I would say the Government does. But I don't think we have anything more to comment on it.

Mr. WOLPE. I would like to turn then to Angola again. There has been some reports that a new dissident group, COMIRA, is active in Angola. Can you give us any information on this, Dr. Bender, any external aid that COMIRA may be receiving?

Mr. BENDER. I discussed it with various Angolan leaders before I left the country on August 1 of this year, and it was their opinion at that time that COMIRA, insofar as it operated out of Zaire, did so without President Mobutu's blessings or necessarily knowledge.

Mr. WOLPE. Is that about Congo-based—

Mr. BENDER. It is Congo based. They do operate along the borders. I think they do get some support from certain Zairian generals acting more or less on their own. But COMIRA's activities have not grown that much. Here was one reporter who went through parts of northern Angola with COMIRA for a few weeks, I think if you read that story very carefully you can see that that reporter didn't see very much activity or even numbers of COMIRA people. So I don't think they are very serious and I don't think their activities are particularly bothersome for the Angolan Government.

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. I would like to say an acquaintance of mine actually just returned about 6 months ago from seeing COMIRA in operation. I think we're talking something in the region of 2,000, not a huge force.

I disagree only with the fact that they do seem to have a certain amount of support from Zaire. This particular acquaintance of mine saw members of the Zairian Government who did admit there was a certain amount of under-the-table support, mainly because of corruption rather than because of actual political support. Certain people were being paid to facilitate supplies to COMIRA.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you.

Mr. Bender, would you agree with Mr. Butterfield, that South African aid to Savimbi has been minimal, primarily taking the form of gasoline and medical supplies? Is there any intelligence supplied, military training, military supplies that can be attributed to South African origin?

Mr. BENDER. Well, I think Mr. Savimbi's—by the way, he's not a doctor. I never have figured out why everybody calls him "doctor", unless—

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. I thought he holds a doctorate from the University of Lausanne [phonetic].

Mr. BENDER. No, he has a master's degree.

He himself has indicated that he receives South African support, so I see no reason to question Savimbi's own testimony to that effect. Certainly you could ask our Government witnesses when they show up, but at least people in our Government that I have spoken to seem to have a fair amount of evidence that there is considerable military materiel support for UNITA.

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. I just want to point out that I said he had no significant support before 1979. I think since then the situation may well have changed and he may well have significant military support from South Africa.

Prior to 1979 he was hanging on and beginning to expand his operations, his area of control, he did not. He was then receiving gasoline and medical supplies.

Mr. WOLPE. Outside of support for Savimbi, how would you characterize the general pattern of South African military intervention in Angola? What are its major purposes and is it an effort to simply cause political havoc and problems for the regime, or does it have rather more extensive objectives?

Mr. BENDER. I think that the pattern initially was to hit SWAPO camps, until about 1978-79, that period, when South Africa turned her vengeance on Angola itself, as well as continuing to hit SWAPO.

I believe that the goal is to weaken the Angolan Government's support of SWAPO and to also guarantee that the Angolan Government is economically unable to deliver to people in the rural areas. They have succeeded very well, I think, in part, and I also agree that a good part of Angola's economic problems are her own doing, as Mr. Butterfield suggested, although I wouldn't put it in the same way he did. Their problems are very serious and a lot of it has to do with the Angolans, but the South Africans, whether it is \$10 billion worth of South African caused damage or \$3 billion worth of damage, it is considerable.

Now, I think their goal, however, will not be realized. The Angolans are not going to support SWAPO and endure punishment for 7 years to then suddenly give up the struggle at the last moment when SWAPO is in a position perhaps to win an election. They are not going to kick SWAPO out. They are also not going to reconcile with UNITA because of South African attacks.

I do believe that it does help UNITA's military campaign because the less the MPLA is able to deliver to the rural areas, the more easily UNITA can operate and recruit. There is a direct connection. So in that respect I think South African attacks strictly

against Angola do help, particularly against Angolan economic targets, do indirectly help UNITA's own recruiting.

Mr. WOLPE. Would anyone else care to respond to that?

Mr. SUTHERLAND. I would simply add once more that there is great competition between the South African concept of a constellation of states in the whole southern Africa region, which some people have described as a little more like a solar system, versus the Southern African Development Coordination Conference.

It certainly is true that if there were not all of this conflict, then the problem, let's say, of Zambian copper going out through the Benguela Railway to the Atlantic Ocean would be solved and the whole development of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference could advance. So I think that fear of SADCC is behind what South Africa is doing within the whole area in terms of its attacks.

Mr. WOLPE. I want to thank you all at this point. It has been a long hearing and I think a very useful one.

I remain deeply concerned that our policy at times tends to obscure South Africa's contribution to the destabilization that is taking place in the region. Certainly every African state has internal difficulties. I think that is taken for granted. And even if South Africa were not in the region, a number of these countries would very likely be having difficulties in and of themselves because of the nature of the problems they are confronting. The contributions that were made with respect to what American policy can do to assist in the economic development areas and so on I think are certainly in point and on target.

But the broader question from the American foreign policy standpoint is, how do we posture ourselves to the cross-border activity that is taking place, and how do we posture ourselves with respect to the national liberation movements within the area. Do we adopt the posture of saying, in effect, that the national liberation movements are to be treated in the same fashion as the system of apartheid in terms of America's response, or do we continue to insist on recognizing that it is the system of apartheid in the first instance and South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia in the second instance that are the principal underlying sources of instability.

It was suggested in response to one of my questions earlier, I think by Dr. Butterfield, that the issue is not who is right or wrong but how do we achieve a political settlement. Well, there is an issue of what is, in fact, the historical record. And to the extent that this administration fails to understand the causes of the instability, then the political solution is beyond its reach. I mean, if we continue to insist that all parties are equally responsible for what is happening in that region and fail to direct pressure at the origins of the problem, then I don't think we will ever get at that in any kind of effective way.

More to the point, American interests within the region and throughout the African Continent are going to be seriously jeopardized if African states believe we are, in effect, saying that there is nothing to differentiate the national liberation movement in terms of its moral value or character from the perpetuation of the system

of apartheid or the perpetuation of South Africa's occupation of Namibia. So that is not an unimportant question.

Certain, it is a major foreign policy issue. It is not simply a question of moralizing; it is a question of what is American interests and how do we posture ourselves to the movements, to the cross-border activity, the liberation movements, and in the final instance to South Africa itself.

I think the testimony that each of you has provided this afternoon is very helpful in expanding upon our understanding of the dimensions of that activity that is taking place within the region.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX 1

SOUTH AFRICA'S EFFORTS ECONOMICALLY TO DESTABILIZE THE REGION

(By Prof. Willard R. Johnson and Ms. Catherine Boone)

Introduction

The dependence of the "front-line states" on South Africa's transit infrastructure, on imports from and exports to South Africa, and on the foreign exchange generated through worker migration to South Africa translates into political leverage for South Africa. The South Africans know the strategic value of these trade links. They do not hesitate to show muscle by manipulating trade agreements to secure political concessions. South Africa also sponsors sabotage and physical attacks on its neighbors' economic infrastructure and commercial traffic -- rail lines, roads, and oil pipeline facilities are frequent targets of economic aggression. These attacks not only thwart Southern African Development Coordinating Council (SADCC) efforts to restructure the regional transport system to reduce the dependency of the front-line states on the Republic. They also have deleterious and destabilizing effects on the domestic political economies of the targeted states.

Relations between South Africa and two of its most vulnerable, and most vociferously anti-south African, neighboring states deteriorated markedly in 1981. Mozambique and Zimbabwe were the targets of South African retaliation after UN moves were made to impose economic sanctions against the apartheid state. According to reports from South Africa, a meeting of the South African State Security Council was held in Pretoria during March 1981 to discuss forms of economic retaliation against countries neighboring South Africa that backed the moves on sanctions at the UN. An official was quoted as saying if "certain states" in southern African continued with their insistence on sanctions against the Republic, they would "feel how it was to be cut off economically." The remarks are believed to have been directed particularly at Mozambique and Zimbabwe. (LHR, No. 5-1981, p. 15) In 1981, Zimbabwe was the hardest hit by South

African manipulation of its bilateral transport, labor, and trade agreements. Mozambique bore the brunt of South African-sponsored guerrilla aggression and destruction of economic infrastructure. Zambia, a much more moderate and deferent critic of South Africa, also felt the pressure of South African economic machinations in the region.

Mozambique's Position

With South Africa's attack on an ANC base outside Maputo on January 10, 1981, relations between the two countries entered a new phase. The Mozambique economy bore the impact of deteriorating political relations and increasing activity of the South Africa-backed guerrilla movement, Movement National de Resistance (MNR). South Africa issued threats to boycott trade and embargo the rail traffic of all countries supporting not only the UN moves for economic sanctions, but also ANC activities. Mozambique accused South Africa of using the MNR and economic ties between the two countries as political weapons.

The major aspects of Mozambique's dependence on South Africa are transit traffic and labor migration. Both activities bring much needed foreign exchange into Mozambique and contribute the bulk of Mozambique's invisible balance of payments receipts. Railways play a dominant role in the Mozambique economy. Under normal conditions, Mozambique derives much of its income by playing the middleman role by carrying goods between Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Swaziland, South Africa, and its ports. If transit were re-routed to shut out South Africa and Mozambique migrant laborers were sent home, Mozambique would lose foreign exchange and income in the short run. South Africa's position vis-a-vis Mozambique, however,

would also be weakened, since it would lose two of the political levers its uses against Mozambique.

Zimbabwe's Position

In 1981, Zimbabwe expressed strong support for economic sanctions against South Africa. It gave political and diplomatic support to liberation movements such as the ANC and SWAPO. Zimbabwe also became a leading member of SADC, whose objective is to ease economic ties to South Africa by developing trade links between the independent states in southern Africa. As a consequence of these moves, relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe took a marked turn for the worse. Although South Africa is unwilling to apply economic sanctions, as such, against Zimbabwe in view of the threat this poses to its own economy, it has employed lesser means of retaliation. Over 90% of Zimbabwe's foreign trade goes through South Africa, and throughout 1981, South Africa tried to use its power over Zimbabwe's transport situation to extract political concessions. Transport bottlenecks in Zimbabwe, exacerbated by South African manipulation of the situation, were Zimbabwe's main constraints to increased economic growth and foreign exchange earnings in 1981. During much of the year, Zimbabwe lost an estimated Z\$4.5mn to Z\$6mn a week in export revenue due to deficiencies in its transport system. South Africa kept its thumb on Zimbabwe's transport windpipe and demanded some degree of political recognition and cooperation in exchange for help.

At the same time, South African-sponsored MNR guerrillas were responsible for cutting Zimbabwe's transit links with Mozambique. This ensured Zimbabwe's dependence on and vulnerability to South Africa.

Zambia's Position

Like Zimbabwe, Zambia is landlocked. Zambia's two chief trade routes to the sea are to Beira via Zimbabwe and to the Atlantic via the Benguela Railway. The problems along these trade routes have been exacerbated greatly by South Africa's destabilization of the regional transport system. South Africa supports the UNITA guerrillas, who continue to periodically sabotage the Benguela railway. It also supports the MNR guerrillas, whose primary objective is to sabotage the transit routes through Mozambique. Zambia has responded to growing pressure on its economy and its increasing dependence on South African trade routes by turning directly to South Africa to seek rapprochement.

The MNR

The MNR (also called the RNM or the MAM) is an anti-Frelimo guerrilla group that operates in all but the three northern provinces and the Maputo province of Mozambique. Supported by the Smith regime in Rhodesia from 1976-1979, the MNR now appears to be fully supported by South Africa. Observers estimate that between 6,000 and 16,000 guerrillas are involved. (QER, No. 3-1982, p. 17; QER, 1981 summary.) Considerable evidence indicates that MNR recruits are trained in South Africa, and a radio station in the Transvaal beams the movement's propaganda into Mozambique. (The Guardian, (Brit.) July 12, 1982, p. 67).

1981 and 1982 were a period of steady intensification of the armed conflict between Frelimo and the MNR. There has been a shift over time towards increasingly overt South African involvement and a growing concentration of the MNR on terrorism and economic sabotage. (QER, No. 4-1982, p. 16).

The MNR attacks economic targets inside Mozambique -- roads, railways, bridges, power lines, and road and rail traffic. One purpose of this activity is to disrupt Mozambique. In a 1982 interview with Reuters in Lisbon, Manuel Mhluza of the Executive Committee of the MNR explained attacks on Mozambique's transit system: Mhluza said, "Our objective is to deprive the Machel regime of the revenue he takes in from international transport." (QER, No. 4-1982, p. 18) A prime overall objective is to disrupt SADC's efforts to reduce communication and transport links with South Africa through greater cooperation among the independent southern African states. The transport lines from Mozambique and Zimbabwe and other landlocked countries (Zambia, Malawi) are essential to SADC's plans; consequently, the lines to Maputo and Beira have come in for the heaviest and most frequent MNR attacks. (A. Confidential, July 21, 1982, p. 46) The closing of these main arteries to the sea leaves Zambia and Zimbabwe heavily dependent on South African routes. This gives South Africa leverage it can use to extract political concessions. Mozambique claims that some of the more recent MNR sabotage operations have actually involved South African military personnel. (The Times, (BR) June 24, 1982)

South Africa's Involvement with the MNR

Although South Africa denies its links with the MNR, nearly all observers are convinced of the connection. South Africa's history of involvement with the MNR and its means of support, training, and command of the guerrilla army are fairly well documented and confirmed. See, for example the article by Paul Fauvet and Alves Gomes, "The 'Mozambique National Resistance'", reprinted in the September 1982 issue of the

Association of Concerned African Scholars' Newsletter. Defectors from the MNR have told their stories, as have MNR prisoners captured by the Frelimo army. Former officials of the Rhodesian Special Branch, which set up the MNR in 1976 and acted as its sponsor until Zimbabwe's independence, have now disclosed information about the extent of their involvement with the group. Documents found at MNR bases captured by Frelimo forces in June, 1983 (Sitatonga base) and December, 1981 (Gargua base) give evidence of the MNR's dependence on South Africa for training, supplies, command, tactical support, propaganda, and for rear bases in the Transvaal. Boxes of ammunition and other supplies dropped by parachute into MNR camps in Mozambique are marked in English and Afrikaans, leaving no doubt as to their country of origin.

Recent evidence indicates that South African military "specialists" accompany the MNR to teach the use of heavy weapons and sabotage techniques. These specialists do not simply take a back-seat role -- they travel with the MNR and are based at MNR camps inside Mozambique. Because of the technical sophistication of recent MNR sabotage operations, many observers argue that South African military personnel participate directly in MNR attacks on Mozambique's economic infrastructure.

By 1979, South Africa had taken over Rhodesia's position of the MNR's sponsor. At that time, South Africa began airlifting supplies to the MNR to airstrips on white farms near Chipinga, in Mozambique. (Af. Confidential, July 21, 1982, p. 46) There are numerous incidents that confirm allegations of South Africa's continuing involvement with the MNR. For example, in June 1983 Frelimo forces captured a main guerrilla stronghold at Sitatonga. In the course of that operation, Frelimo found extensive evidence that confirmed wide-spread allegations of South Africa's support for the MNR (QLR, 981 Summary, p. 21) MNR prisoners and release

Minister Magnus Malan that his country might find it necessary to initiate a "Lebanese-type invasion" of Mozambique. As recently as November 24th, the Mozambican representative to the United Nations reported a massive build-up of South African troops and military equipment along its border and new threats of a South African invasion.

At the moment, Pretoria's main weapon in this war is the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) which, over the past year, has intensified its military activity in the southern half of Mozambique, attacking bridges, railroad lines, communal villages and priority development projects. Paralyzing key sectors of the rural economy and de-establishing Mozambique, however, are not its only objectives. It also seeks to sabotage SADCC (Southern African Development Coordinating Conference), the integrated regional alliance of Zimbabwe, Angola, Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania, and Mozambique forged in 1980 to break South Africa's economy hegemony. Thus, assistance to the MNR cannot be separated from South Africa's heightened economic and military pressure against Zimbabwe, its increased attacks on Angola, and its efforts to seduce Swaziland with the Kangwane Bantustan and the Ingwavuma strip. Viewed from this regional perspective, MNR activity, like that of UNITA, is a valuable South African weapon to keep the region divided and in turmoil.

But what is the MNR? According to former Rhodesian intelligence chief Ken Flowers, the Rhodesian special branch organized the MNR as an anti-FRELIMO fifth column to work inside Mozambique.¹ Gordon Winter, in his book *INSIDE BOSS*--which documents his career as a South African spy--claims that the idea came from South African military intelligence.²

prisoners of the MNR said that South Africa supplied the movement with arms, ammunition, food, and other supplies dropped by parachute into the guerrilla camps. According to these prisoners, South African military personnel were in the Sitatonga camp until shortly before the assault by Frelimo forces began. (QER, No. 4-1980, p. 13)

Later, Frelimo captured documents of an October, 1980 meeting in South Africa between the MNR, South African Military Intelligence, and BISS. As the documents make clear, South Africa urges the MNR to attack transport links in Mozambique. South Africa promised at that time to step up supplies transported by both sea and air. These supplies, along with food and uniforms, were to consist of crates of ammunition and weapons, including mines and mortars, an sophisticated communications equipment. (AF. Confidential, July 21, 1982, p. 46).

The Economist Intelligence Unit provided this report:

A defector from the MNR has claimed South Africa is actively supporting it with military supplies which are flown in from a military air base in the Gazaankulu homeland, near the Mozambique border. The allegations, made by an ex-MNR radio operation at a press conference in Maputo, confirm strong evidence of South African support for the MNR which was gathered in the course of the capture by government troops of the MNR base at Sitatonga in June, 1980. (QER, No. 201001, p. 13)

In December 1981, Frelimo forces captured and destroyed another MNR base, this one located in the Mossurize district of Manica province. Along with other evidence of South African involvement, minutes of a meeting of the MNR with South African army official were found. The documents indicate that the difficulties and costs of supplying the MNR by air were discussed at the MNR-South Africa meeting. (QER, No. 1-1982, p. 14)

MNR Acts of Sabotage

Nearly 1,000km of Mozambique's main north-south road is subject to MNR attack, and the two railways to the ports of Maputo and Beira have come under repeated attack since the end of 1980. Traffic between Zimbabwe and Malawi and Mozambique had virtually stopped by July, 1982. (Af Confidential, July 21, 1982, p. 46) Powerlines from Mozambique's Caborra Bassa Dam and the oil pipeline from Beira to Umtali (now Mutare) were frequent MNR targets in 1981. The following list cites some of the most damaging and disruptive MNR operations:

December 6, 1980: The MNR dynamited two pylons, one on each of the twin direct current lines carrying electricity from the Caborra Bassa hydropower scheme to South Africa. Repairs to the line were delayed by over a month, owing to security problem in the area. In the meantime, the company running the scheme, in which the Mozambique government has a 15% holding, lost some \$2,000 a day in export sales revenue. (CER, No. 2-1981, p. 13) The Caborra Bassa scheme is the government's third ranking source of foreign exchange: Mozambique receives around \$27m per year from power sales. The dam is Mozambique's focal point for the development of mineral and agricultural resources of the lower Zambezi.

Early 1981: The MNR twice successfully sabotaged the power transmission lines between Caborra Bassa and South Africa. (CER, Summary 1981, p. 21) The export of energy was halted for another six months. This long disruption led to the suspension of the agreement between Hidroelctrica de Caborra Bassa, the Portuguese company that runs the project, and ESCOM, the South African Electricity Supply Commission. ESCOM is the chief consumer of Caborra Bassa output.

Large 1981: Guerrilla activity centered on the Beira-Umtali corridor,

with bombings of railway and road bridges, the oil pipeline, and buoys at Beira port. These acts appeared to be intended to block Zimbabwe's supply lines and to isolate Beira from the rest of the country.

October 1981: MNR guerrillas were blamed for explosion under the road and rail bridges over the Pungoe River in Sofala Province, 50km from Beira. The road bridge cost \$1.4mn to repair. (QER, No. 1-1982, p. 15) Transport was disrupted for over a month. The Beira-Umtali oil pipeline was damaged in the attack and its reopening was delayed once again.

November 13, 1981: Eight marker buoys in the Beira channel were destroyed. Traffic was disrupted for three days. (QER, No. 1-1982, p. 15)

March, 1982: A train was attacked at Lemego, 80km north of Beira, killing 5 persons and injuring 80 more.

April, 1982: Two trucks of the Zimbabwe National Freightway Company were ambused 6km inside Mozambique's Tete province. (QER, No. 3-1982, p. 16).

April-July, 1982: MNR carried out 7 ambushes, 1 involving the killing of a truck driver, along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique road through Ngamapanda. This forced truckers to use the longer route through Zambia. (Financial Times, August 3, 1982)

May, 1982: Two turbines in the Mavuzi dam were destroyed by the MNR.

May, 1982: A train near Chimoió was attacked. At least 40 passengers were killed.

July 14, 1982: Beira's power lines from the Mavuzi power station, 200km west of Beira near the Zimbabwe border, were cut by MNR guerrillas.

July 26, 1982: The oil pipeline from Beira to Mutare (formerly Umtali) was hit again by MNR guerrillas. The damage was apparently light, and repairs were expected to be completed within a week. The psychological effect was particularly damaging since the pipeline was fully reopened earlier in July after being out of operation for 17 years.

August 10, 1982: Fourteen people died and 50 were wounded in an attack by the MNR on a passenger train on the line linking Malawi and Beira.

September 25, 1982: MNR sabotage to power lines left Beira without electricity. In the same week, four people were killed when the truck they were travelling in, in northern Mozambique, was ambushed by MNR guerrillas. (Rand Daily Mail (SA) September 27, 1982).

Impact of MNR Operations on Mozambique's Economy

The spread of MNR activity through large parts of Mozambique is inhibiting economic growth. Prospects for the economy are becoming even more closely tied to improvements in the security situation. The war is hitting the economy in a number of ways: loss of international transit earnings, direct disruption of agricultural production, and the slowing down of major investment projects. The war also diverts scarce government resources into military spending and inhibits the inflow of foreign

investment. The impact of the war has been felt in a decline in agricultural production and in industrial and commercial activities.

Local economic activity in the central provinces has undoubtedly been disturbed by the increasing level of MNR activity. Interference in internal traffic had a serious negative impact on the marketing of food crops in 1981 and 1982. Reports from Manica suggest that in some areas peasants are afraid to collect the harvest, and that even if crops are harvested, road mines and attacks prevent the marketing of food in the towns. (QER, No. 3-1982, p. 17) In Chimio District, the MNR has captured and held towns, cutting them off from trade with surrounding areas and the provincial capital. (QER, No. 1-1982, p. 14; QER, 1981 Summary, p. 21)

MNR interest in development projects and foreign technicians has isolated or even shut down government-sponsored development schemes. The killing and intimidation of foreign technicians is an aspect of MNR operations that provokes the departure of badly needed foreign technical expertise and assistance from Mozambique.

In the Spring of 1982, MNR leaflets urging people to attack foreign technicians were discovered in Maputo. (QER, No. 4-1982, p. 19) That year, in two separate incidents, two Portuguese technicians were murdered by the MNR and a Spanish zoologist was kidnapped. (QER, No. 2-1982) In July 1982, a UN agricultural research station was destroyed by the MNR. The station, the Muabasa Center for Training and research in Trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), and Tsetse Control, was located in Inhambane province. Resident foreign staff had been pulled out of the centre in 1981 on security grounds, and even visits by foreigners were halted in April 1982. The centre was an important research facility with 700 cattle, laboratories, and a school. (The Guardian, July 27, 1982).

Other large projects have been hit by the intimidation of expatriate

workers by MNR terrorism: Portuguese workers on the Revue dam project requested to be repatriated in March 1982 because of the deteriorating security situation. In May 1982, 40 Swedish construction workers are reported to have fled to Zimbabwe after 2 of their workmates were killed. (QER, No. 3-1982, p. 17)

On August 21, 1982, there was a MNR commando raid on the border town of Namaacha. A Portuguese technical assistant was killed. According to the Mozambique official news agency, a 40 strong commando unit led by 4 whites was dropped by helicopter near the town. The killing of the technician was seen as consistent with MNR tactics of murdering and kidnapping foreigners. (QER, No. 4-1982, p. 16)

Impact of MNR Operations on Zimbabwe

With rail, road, and oil connections to the sea through Mozambique, Zimbabwe is directly affected by the escalation of MNR attacks. The continuing activity of the MNR disrupts Zimbabwe's rail lines with Beira and Maputo and threatens Zimbabwe's hopes of ever enjoying cheaper fuel from the direct pipeline to Mutare, cheaper transit costs for all commodities, and reduced congestion along its transit lines. Keeping the Harare-Mozambique lines closed down imposes considerable premiums on Zimbabwean exporters and importers. The distance from Harare to Beira is 592km compared with 2,521 to Cape Town. Interference with the transit lines also exacerbates transit bottlenecks by forcing Zimbabwe to move oil by rail and by cutting off potential access routes to the sea. Some Zimbabwean exporters and importers do use the lines through Mozambique, although they are reluctant to do this since MNR attacks close the line to

Maputo for days at a time. In some areas, trains can only run in daylight because of MNR activity. Full use of these transit routes and the pipeline is essential if Zimbabwe is to reduce its dependence on South Africa. Under normal conditions, Mozambique could handle all of Zimbabwe's overseas trade. (QER, 1981 Summary, p. 16) For South Africa, the MNR has proved a useful vehicle for preventing Zimbabwe's re-orientation toward Mozambique and thereby for maintaining economic pressure on Zimbabwe for its political gain.

MNR activity exacerbates one of Zimbabwe's most severe economic problem -- transport bottlenecks and inefficiencies. Foreign trade with Zimbabwe was greatly reduced in 1981 due to transport difficulties; on one estimate, Zimbabwe only moved two-thirds of the volume of its trade that year. The transport situation worsened steadily throughout 1981, creating domestic shortages, blocking exports, and causing long delays. The most serious consequences were the effects on fuel imports and maize exports.

Widespread shortages of both diesel and petrol in September 1981 affected all sectors of the economy. Agriculture was particularly vulnerable at that time because of the need for diesel at the beginning of the planting seasons. (QER, No. 4-1981, p. 14) Delays in the arrival of 70,000 tons of fertilizer reduced the 1982 agricultural output. According to reports in The Times, quotas were placed on exports in March of 1981: out of 10mn kg of tobacco, only 7mn kg were moved. The record maize crop was the chief casualty. It was estimated that less than half of the 1mn tons maize surplus left Zimbabwe in 1981, despite the desperate need for maize in neighboring countries. To meet the demand from Zaire, Zimbabwe needed to send between 80-90 wagons of maize a week instead of the 50 that it was able to send. Also cut back were 1,000 tons due for Malawi and 75,000 tons for Mozambique. Zimbabwe's neighbors turned to South Africa to

make up their own maize shortfall, and Zimbabwe lost millions of dollars in export revenue.

Shortages of raw materials due to transport delays and foreign exchange difficulties also lowered the ceiling of industrial production and pushed up costs and therefore inflation. Inflation for 1981 was predicted mid-year to be around 20%. (QER, No. 3-1981, p. 3)

The re-opening of the Lonrho-owned oil pipeline between Mutare and Beira was delayed repeatedly by MNR sabotage. The re-opening of the 800-mile line would have two major results; it would make Zimbabwe independent of South Africa as a source of fuel and will ease the strain on railways. Zimbabwe stands to realize considerable cost savings by the cutting of the South Africa link. Fuel from South Africa is expensive, partly because South Africa is subject to an oil boycott by most oil producing states. Furthermore, transport costs by pipeline will be considerably cheaper. It costs about £100 a ton to move oil products from South Africa by rail, but Lonrho is to charge between Z\$20 and Z\$25 a ton for pumping. (QER, No. 4-1982, p. 15) Zimbabwe stands to gain an estimated Z\$36m a year in foreign exchange once the pipeline is in operation. (Financial Times, August 4, 1982)

The biggest question hanging over the successful operation of the pipeline is the ability of the Frelimo army to protect it from sabotage attacks by MNR. Zimbabwe officials say the line can be repaired within 24-48 hours, given adequate military protection for technicians. A greater threat would come from attacks against the pumping stations, but they are all close to Frelimo camps. It is now clear that Frelimo control in Manica province and the elimination of MNR strongholds near the route between Beira and Mutare are a critical preconditions to the reopening of the oil

pipeline. (QER, No. 3-1982, p. 17)

More Overt South African Military Aggression

Four white South African Defense Force commandos were killed 25 miles inside Zimbabwe by the Zimbabwean military on August 18, 1982. This was one of several events in the Spring of 1982 that pointed to an intensification of overt military confrontation between Zimbabwe and Mozambique on one hand and South Africa on the other. In the August 18 incident, the Zimbabwe military recovered documents from the bodies indicating that the group planned to sabotage the railway line running through Gona-ReZhou National Park to Maputo harbor. This track is carrying an increasing amount of Zimbabwe's imports and exports according to the Sunday Mail, Zimbabwe's national newspaper. (Africa News, September 13, 1982) Mugabe claimed that the infiltrators were part of a South African effort to mount an extensive destabilization campaign. Although Pretoria initially dismissed the charges, revelations about the incident in following weeks suggested that South Africa is indeed heavily involved in covert activities in the region. In late August, South Africa admitted that the four slain men were members of its armed forces. Later, several disaffected SADF soldiers involved in similar operations in Zimbabwe and Mozambique confirmed allegations of high-level South African involvement in the economic destabilization campaigns. (Africa News, September 13, 1982)

South African Railways

South African Railways withdrew 24 locomotives on hire to Zimbabwe in

July, 1982. This action lent strength to the belief expressed by Makoni, Zimbabwe's Minister of Energy, that "there is a deliberate effort on the part of the South Africans to disrupt the flow of traffic. (QER, No. 4-1981, p. 14) The return of the 24 locomotives exacerbated Zimbabwe's acute shortage of traction. According to the Zimbabwe Minister of Transport, in May 1981 there were only 120 locomotives in service out of 223 needed.

In September 1981 South Africa offered to lend Zimbabwe locomotives if South Africa were approached at the ministerial level. In other words, the price of economic help would be some degree of political recognition. Zimbabwe refused the offer.

In early 1982, the congestion of Zimbabwe's transit system was eased somewhat by the loan of locomotives from neighboring countries. South Africa agreed to provide 26 locomotives. By mid-1982, Zimbabwe had rebuilt its fleet to the point where the 32 locomotives on hire from South Africa Mozambique, and Malawi could be returned. Sixty new ones were purchased from General Motors.

South African Railways' tie to Mozambique has also been manipulated, to Mozambique's disadvantage. In mid-1981 there were signs that the South African authorities were diverting the most lucrative high value traffic away from Maputo to South African ports. (QER, No. 3-1981, p. 15) In March 1981, South African Railways imposed a temporary total embargo on all rail traffic between South Africa and Maputo. The embargo lasted for almost 2 weeks. According to a South African Railways spokesman, the reason for the embargo was that South African trucks were not being returned fast enough. The Mozambique government accused South Africa of using the rail embargo as a political weapon, and most observers agreed that the timing of the embargo was intended to demonstrate Mozambique's vulnerability to

Whatever the case, from 1976 onward, Rhodesian security officials working with their South African counterparts, recruited Portuguese settlers and mercenaries, black and white secret police agents and former African members of the elite special forces of the colonial army (GE) who had fled to Rhodesia after Mozambican independence. Two former agents of the Portuguese Police (PIDG) figured prominently in the formation of the MNR. Evo Fernandes, who infiltrated the anti-fascist student movement in Lisbon during the 1950s and subsequently rose to influential position within the PIDE hierarchy in Mozambique became MNR spokesperson in Europe. Casimiro Monteiro, a professional assassin implicated in the 1965 murder of Portuguese opposition leader Humberto Delgado and probably was involved in the murder of FRELIMO's first president Eduardo Mondlane took over as liaison with South African security. To this initial group were added ex-FRELIMO guerrillas who had been expelled for corruption or had left because of unfulfilled personal ambitions. Andre Matzangaiza and Alfonso Dhlakama, two former FRELIMO soldiers, received prominent positions to give the MNR visible black leadership.³

From 1975 the Rhodesian government provided the MNR with arms and bases along the Mozambican border and logistics support. In retaliation for Mozambique's imposition of U.N.-backed sanctions against Rhodesia, it sent MNR bands repeatedly into Mozambique to burn villages, plunder agricultural cooperatives, attack railroad lines and road traffic, disrupt commerce and raid re-education camps, from which they recruited additional members. They also collected valuable intelligence data on ZANU forces in Mozambique and intimidated Zimbabwean refugees.

In return for its assistance, Rhodesian security demanded MNR

sanctions by South Africa. (QER, No. 3-1981, p. 22)

Labor Migration

South Africa has used Zimbabwe's and Mozambique's dependence for jobs as a political weapon. Mozambique is particularly dependent on the foreign exchange it earns from the employment of Mozambicans in South African mines. Before 1976, approximately 100,000 Mozambican mineworkers went to the South African mines. After 1978, South Africa has recruited only 30-20,000 Mozambicans a year. South Africa's decision to employ fewer Mozambicans in its mines had reduced Mozambique's earnings from this source greatly. (QER, 1981 Summary, p. 33)

Mozambique's earnings have also been eroded by South Africa's unilateral revision of the wage payment system it had established in agreement with the Portuguese government in 1961. This system continued to operate between Mozambique's independence and 1978. During that time, South African Mines paid only 40% of the Mozambican's wages in rands; the rest was paid to the Mozambican government in gold. The gold was sold on the world market at the going rate. The workers received their deferred wages when they arrived home in Mozambique and the Mozambique government kept the foreign exchange and the premium it earned on the gold. In 1976, Mozambique is thought to have entered \$150mn in foreign exchange from these gold sales. As a result of falling gold prices and the decline in the number of Mozambicans working in the mines, the 1977 foreign exchange earning was estimated at \$100mn. Since 1978-79, none of the Mozambican mineworkers wages has been paid to the Mozambique government in gold. In 1978-79, Mozambique's income from labor migration to South Africa was only

\$30mn. (QER, Summary 1981, p. 33)

In Spring, 1982, South Africa declared its intention to expell the 17,000 Mozambican migrant agricultural workers in the East Transvaal by the end of the year. The move was justified as an attempt to render more difficult the infiltration of ANC guerrillas from Mozambique. Unemployment problems in Mozambique will be seriously aggravated by the repatriation of these workers together with the reduction of employment opportunities in the South African mines.

In July 1981, shortly after South African agents were blamed for the assassination of an ANC official in Harare, South Africa announced that employment contracts for Zimbabweans working in South Africa would not be renewed. According to official Zimbabwe records, some 23,000 individuals are affected. The action was seen as part of the political-economic campaign being directed against Zimbabwe by South Africa. (QER, No. 4-1981, p. 16) The loss of income repatriated by Zimbabwe mine workers from South Africa is estimated to be almost \$6mn a year. (Chr. Science Monitor, April 14, 1982)

The Preferential Trade Agreement

The ending of the Preferential Trade Agreement signed between Rhodesia and South Africa was announced by South Africa in 1981. This action came shortly after Mugabe stated Zimbabwe's support for the principle of trade sanctions against South Africa. South Africa's move had obvious political overtones and was accompanied by allegations that Zimbabwe gives active support to ANC guerrillas.

Zimbabwe would suffer considerably from the loss of a 25% preference

on its exports to South Africa, which was to become effective as of March 1982. The Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries estimated that the ending of the Preferential Trade Agreement with South Africa could cost Zimbabwe Z\$50mn in foreign exchange a year and 7,000 jobs in the manufacturing sector. A CZI report said a lapsing of the trade pact would effectively add a 7.5% surcharge on exports to South Africa and "in many instances...Zimbabwean exporters are likely to be priced out of the market." (QER, No., 1-1982, p. 15)

In a reversal of its earlier statement, South Africa extended its Preferential Trade Agreement with Zimbabwe in January 1982, one month before the agreement was to expire. Tariff adjustments were to be negotiated between various affected parties.

It is clear that South Africa has adopted a policy of disrupting the economies and societies of its neighboring countries. Sometimes it has resorted to direct military action. Often, its methods are covert and indirect. In either case, part of the responsibility rests with the international community, especially its major investment and trading partners in the United States and Europe, who, by failing to respond even to the overt military aggression with determined and effective pressures, allows South Africa to "feel free to carry out such attacks" on its neighbors.

APPENDIX 2

ZIMBABWE AND SOUTH AFRICA: DEPENDENCY, DESTABILIZATION, AND LIBERATION

(By Larry W. Bowan, Michael Bratton, and Rukudzo Murapa)

The independence of Zimbabwe in April 1980 occurred within a context of mounting regional and international tensions over the politics of racial domination in South Africa. Our purpose in this chapter is to briefly review the legacy of Zimbabwe-South African relations as a backdrop to a more extensive analysis of the interaction between the two states in the contemporary period. This is an interesting case study because the histories of Zimbabwe and South Africa have been intimately associated especially since the founding of a settler state in Southern Rhodesia in 1890¹. For the next ninety years relations between the two states were generally friendly. This is not to say that the respective ruling elites did not have their differences, but the fact that each country was dominated by a small white minority provided an affinity of purpose and a similarity of governmental style that has long been recognized.² Ties of trade, finance and investment, as well as transport and labor migration routes led from Zimbabwe to South Africa and grew into a complex network of structural dependence. For the former white leaders of Rhodesia dependency relations were generally viewed benignly--as some combination of lifeline and security blanket.

Since April 1980, this has not been the case. The accession to power of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU (PF)) marked a sharp break with the past. For the new leadership, structural dependence on capitalist South Africa

represented an awesome and humiliating set of constraints on their hard-won independence. Overnight, integration with South Africa institutions became a threat to be met rather than a security to be treasured. For Pretoria too, the leadership change in Zimbabwe meant new concerns and problems. Far from having been irrevocably committed to the increasingly fragile and endangered rule of Ian Smith, South Africa would have nonetheless preferred a different African leader to Robert Mugabe. An independent Zimbabwe liberated by armed force and led by a socialist was precisely the outcome that South Africa had sought to prevent. A primary object of this chapter is to evaluate the initial reactions of the ruling elites of Zimbabwe and South Africa to the uncomfortable contiguity and confrontation into which they have been thrust.

This case is interesting too on theoretical grounds. To begin with, it offers a chance to probe the opportunities as well as the limitations encountered in situations of structural dependence. The various dimensions of dependence - economic, political, military, cultural - are too often regarded as expressions of a single basic relationship. The implication is that escape from subordination is all but impossible because dependency is a web of mutually reinforcing ties. Yet if the concept is disassembled into component parts, then movement is seen to be possible. Some aspects of dependence may be more easily changed than others. The case of Zimbabwe and South Africa suggests that disengagement can probably be effected relatively quickly in the political and military spheres, compared with the economic. The issue for the long term is whether prevailing economic structures will undermine a drive for political autonomy, or whether political initiatives can insert the thin end of the wedge of eventual structural change in the economic sphere. The first analytic

task, however, is simply to distinguish the alterable relationships from those that are more obstinate.

A further proposition emerges from the contemporary material on Zimbabwe and South Africa. Where regional power is ordered into relations of dominance and dependence, the policy choices available to all the governments involved is profoundly affected. Even dominant governments do not enjoy an uninhibited facility to achieve foreign policy objectives. To the extent that dominance results from economic or military coercion, the legitimacy of a powerful state is undermined and opposition to it mobilized. Indeed, a regional power may find itself in a restricted position if dependent neighbors and their allies withhold political recognition or deny normal diplomatic intercourse. In these circumstances, the only policy options left open are the more coercive ones. The exercise of economic force or military might, however, is self-damaging to the extent that it leads a dominant power into deepening political isolation.

The present strengths of the South African regime are a vast productive capacity and a geographic position astride regional transport routes. Dependent countries in Southern Africa, including Zimbabwe, are forced to adjust their political programs to take account of these, largely economic, realities. An advantage held by Zimbabwe and the other Frontline States compared with South Africa, however, lies in the political legitimacy enjoyed from domestic populations, the rest of Africa, and the international community. In the highly internationalized end-game of decolonization in Africa, the odium of apartheid has left Pretoria with few allies willing to express open political support.

Within this context, each actor in Zimbabwe-South Africa relations uses its accumulated strengths to endeavor to overcome its endemic

weaknesses. The overriding objective of the South African government is political, namely to guarantee the security of the state. To this end Pretoria has shown itself willing to disrupt economies and governments to the north where liberation movements have found political representation or military sanctuary. A related though sometimes contradictory objective is to win acceptance for apartheid and Bantustans, both within the region and in the wider Western world. Although South Africa seeks to project its power and prevent its adversaries from consolidating their own, it is also constrained by a general need for regional stability and international approval. South Africa's direct economic ties to the Southern Africa region, while considerable, are not vital to the survival of the state. They are useful principally to the extent that leverage is gained over weaker neighbors. In the event that Zimbabwe and other members of the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) are able to win larger shares in the regional market, however, economic considerations may become salient in South Africa's calculus of regional relations.

By contrast, Zimbabwe's immediate interests vis-a-vis South Africa are heavily economic. The need to deliver the fruits of independence to the people of Zimbabwe has compelled the Mugabe government to be selective in political confrontation with apartheid. In foreign as in domestic policy, the choice has been made to modify gradually existing structures. In the first two years of independence top government priority was given to the consolidation of state power, reconstruction and reconciliation in the aftermath of war, and the launching of a redistributive development strategy³. The restoration of growth to the economy involved the expansion of international economic transactions, one effect of which was to reinforce existing trade and transport ties through and with South

Africa. From the outset the leaders of Zimbabwe experienced a sharp disjunction between foreign policy preferences and external dependence. The quest for peace, national unity and an development at home argued against sudden disengagement and confrontation. At the same time, however, Zimbabwe's position as the newest of the Frontline States imposed obligations and strengthened commitments to carry forward the last phase of the struggle for national liberation in Southern Africa. Leaders spoke out about the inequities of apartheid. The Zimbabwe government also began the arduous process of reorienting economic relations towards SADC countries and of building alternative routes to world markets. Only if and when the economic dependence of Zimbabwe is reduced, however, is the exertion of political pressure on South Africa likely to become more militant.

Historical Ties and the Roots of Dependency

In the nineteenth century, both African and European peoples made their way northward from South Africa to the land that is now Zimbabwe. The Ndebele people, Zimbabwe's second largest ethnic and linguistic group, fled northward to escape the consolidation of the Zulu nation during the early part of the century. Later they were followed by white missionaries, prospectors, hunters and other adventurers. Cecil Rhodes hoped that gold and other minerals would be found in sufficient quantity to tip the economic center of gravity away from the Afrikaner Transvaal in favor of a British territory to the north. Finally, in 1890, with the push northward of the Pioneer Column, and the establishment of Southern Rhodesia, the modern history of the country began.

Zimbabwe was initially administered (1890-1923) by the aptly named British South Africa Company which invested heavily in railways and other infrastructure to link the frontier economy to export routes to the south. When the new white settlers ran into trouble, as with Shona and Ndebele rebellions in the 1890s, reinforcements from South Africa rescued them and helped subdue the Africans. Along with soldiers and arms came racial attitudes, and the defense of white privilege became as second nature in the administration of Southern Rhodesia as it already was in South Africa. For a moment in 1922 it was even possible that Southern Rhodesia would join South Africa as a fifth province. This course of action was supported by both the British and South African governments but the opportunity passed when a referendum on the matter was rejected by a majority of Southern Rhodesia's white settlers. But for under 1,500 white votes at that time, South Africa's northern border today would be with Tanzania instead of at the Limpopo and there would be no story of the changing character of Zimbabwe-South Africa relations for us to report.

With the rejection of incorporation into South Africa, the white settlers of Southern Rhodesia embarked on a constitutional path unique in the British Empire. Responsible self-government gave the white elite wide domestic powers to construct a state without serious restraint from British colonial authority, represented in Salisbury by the sole figure of the Governor. The settlers were not inhibited by Britain from developing a broad set of institutional arrangements that were primarily copied from South Africa. The major legislation governing the segregated division of land (the Land Apportionment Act of 1930), the administration of Africans (the Native Affairs Act of 1927), and the protection of white workers (the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934) were all heavily influenced, by

similar legislation promulgated in Pretoria. Moreover, links with the outside world for investment, banking and wholesale trade primarily flowed to and through the South. The absence of political integration did not impede a large measure of economic integration.

The electoral victory of the National Party and the Afrikaners in South Africa in 1948 came as something of a surprise to the English-speaking white settlers of Southern Rhodesia. They skilfully manipulated British fear of the spread of Afrikaner influence to establish their own ill-fated Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland from 1953-1963. Little need be said about this political effort except that it was ironic that an experiment, ostensibly born out of a fear of a Afrikaner-dominated South Africa, would itself die for its inability to convince the African people of the three constituent territories that it was anything more than a barely disguised version of the same thing. By the end, even Britain was forced to admit that there was insufficient difference between South Africa and the Federation to warrant the latter's survival.⁵ The inflow of foreign investment during the Federal period was concentrated in Southern Rhodesia and remains today as an important source of the country's economic structure⁶. The expansion of the mining industry and the birth of manufacturing was based on capital imports from South Africa and Britain.

Just as the whites drew heavily on South Africa for their institutions, attitudes and resources, so too did the Africans of Zimbabwe. With secondary education sparse and college education for Africans nonexistent in Southern Rhodesia until the 1950s, Zimbabwe Africans made their way southward for education, as well as for work. There they encountered the African National Congress of South Africa and returned home to build upon

subservience--as is clear from MNR documents found stuffed down a latrine when the Mozambican army captured the Garagua base. In the words of Matzangaiza's successor, Dhlakama,

We were oppressed by the Rhodesians and the leaders of our movement were not allowed to make any of the decisions. . . . We worked for the English, neither I nor the deceased Andre could plan any military operations. It was the English who determined the areas to attack and where to recruit . . .⁴

With the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement, guaranteeing the end of minority rule in Rhodesia, the Mozambican government, feeling confident that it had the situation firmly under control, began to turn its energy toward national reconstruction after nearly five years of war. It was during this period that SADCC programs were crystallized, and several important economic agreements with Western nations were signed. The popular militias were also disbanded in many frontier regions. Machel's government failed to anticipate, however, that the remnants of the MNR would transfer its base of operations to South Africa, and it underestimated the amount of military and logistic support South Africa would provide.

Whereas the Rhodesian government used the MNR to collect information on Zimbabwean nationalist operations and to intimidate refugees who had fled to Mozambique, South Africa saw the roving bands as instruments of havoc. At a meeting between Dhlakama and Colonel Van Nierok of South African security on October 25, 1980, at Zabostad, a military base in the Transvaal, the MNR Supreme Commander unveiled plans to reestablish bases in Sofala and Manica, and to attack both the railroad lines between Beira and Umtali and road traffic on the north-south highway. Van Nierok insisted that this was not sufficient. By the end of 1981 he

the nationalist consciousness that had begun with the 1947-48 rail strike. When African nationalism emerged in Southern Rhodesia in the 1950s, their organization would use the same name and strategy as the ANC in South Africa.

In Zimbabwe, the whites regrouped after the failure of Federation. Their desire was for independence, but an independence like that of South Africa, under white rule. This was not to be forthcoming for the simple reason that the 1960s were not like 1910 or 1922 and Britain did not wish to formally abandon Zimbabwe to the control of under five percent of its population. And so the settlers seized independence, or claimed it at any rate, with their quixotic Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in November 1965.

UDI and the Consolidation of South African Dominance

The UDI was a cavalier jump into the unknown which led to the legal excommunication of Rhodesia from the international community. No member state of the United Nations granted formal diplomatic recognition to the Ian Smith regime and mandatory economic sanctions were imposed in 1968. In the first decade of UDI (1966-1975) only Portugal and South Africa were willing to engage in open economic relations with Rhodesia. Later (1975-1979), following the military coup in Lisbon and the hasty withdrawal of Portugal from Mozambique, the FRELIMO government sealed the border to its west. With this step South Africa, which had long provided the major loophole for the evasion of sanctions, gained almost total control over the economic and strategic survival of the Rhodesian government.

The ways in which South African domination was consolidated into a largely unanticipated and almost unparalleled dependence of one state and economy on another will be analyzed under five categories: financial, trade, transport, military and diplomatic relations. The South African government at first supported the settler rebellion and later shifted ground to promote conservative African politicians in an "internal settlement."

1. Finance. The close economic relationship between the two countries is forged at root by flows of capital and by shared ownership of productive assets. South Africa's private investment stake in Zimbabwe is larger than in any other economy in the Southern Africa region. Over the last thirty years, and particularly under sanctions which worked to the relative disadvantage of British firms, South African capital came to constitute a rising share of the total capital stock. Most investment in Rhodesia between 1965 and 1979 was from funds "locked up" behind the sanctions wall, but a substantial proportion of the fresh capital from external sources originated from south of the Limpopo.⁷ In addition, the Rhodesian private sector received up to US \$40 million a year in credit loans from South African banks during the 1970s. As for capital flows out of Rhodesia, the transfer of dividends to Western Europe and North America was blocked, but no such restriction was imposed on the payment of investment income to South Africa.

By 1976 about one-half of the estimated foreign investment stock could be called "British" and about one-third "South African"⁸. Such designations are necessarily imprecise given the difficulty of specifying national origins for companies with diverse directors and shareholders and

given that South Africa serves as regional subcenter for international capital. At the time of UDI, South African firms were most prominent in agricultural sector but subsequent investments were also directed into mining ventures. By 1970 five out of ten of the largest manufacturing companies were wholly or partly South African-controlled.⁹ By 1980 South African interests were entrenched in the sugar, citrus, timber, paper, food processing, fertilizer, copper, nickel and coal industries and had important holdings in most other sectors including the press and financial institutions.¹⁰ Rhodesia served as an outlet for investment surpluses which the low wage economy and restricted market of South Africa could not absorb. From a South African perspective, investment ties with the Southern Africa region were always more important than trade ties. The presence of investment capital gave South Africa a direct material stake in the outcome of the struggle over political power in Rhodesia.

The pressures of guerrilla war and economic recession combined by the late 1970s to put the settler rebellion under extreme stress. During this period infusions of capital were secured from South Africa to directly supplement the public budgets of the Smith and Muzorewa administrations. From 1977 to 1979 loans were negotiated with commercial banks in South Africa up to a total of perhaps \$200 million as a means of financing an escalating budget deficit.¹¹ As a consequence, approximately three-quarters of the international public debt inherited by the government of independent Zimbabwe was payable to South Africa. In addition to private loans for public expenditure, direct subsidies were provided by the South Africans on a government-to-government basis. A member of the Rhodesian Cabinet estimated as early as 1976 that the Pretoria government was

financing fifty percent of the war effort in the form of material assistance.¹²

Finally, the state in Rhodesia took an increasingly interventionist role in the economy during the UDI years. It is not unreasonable to assume that the Smith regime drew inspiration in economic policy, as it did in race relations policy, from the post-1948 South African model. Advisors on economic planning from the Republic were hired by the Rhodesian government and a policy of industrialization decentralization, which failed in both countries, was adopted.¹³ The impulse to consolidate capitalism through state intervention in infrastructure and productive industry was one more aspect of the general process of the "South Africanization" of the Rhodesian economy.¹⁴

2. Trade. In 1965 Rhodesia had an open economy marked by a heavy reliance on foreign trade and, therefore, a supposed vulnerability to sanctions¹⁵. Exports accounted for 45 percent and imports 34 percent of gross domestic product on the eve of UDI. The export trade was concentrated in a narrow range of unprocessed products, mainly tobacco, but also beef and minerals. Rhodesia's principal international economic role was to serve Britain as a reliable source of primary commodities within the sterling area. In 1965 trade with Britain accounted for 27 percent of exports, including the bulk of the tobacco, and 30 percent of imports.

With the advent of UDI, South Africa led the way in assisting the rebel government to alter the composition and direction of trade. For example, South African consumers, along with the Swiss, absorbed the beef exports that had previously been directed to London's Smithfield Market. By also accepting cotton, tea and coffee at secured high prices, South

African traders helped underpin the Rhodesian government program to diversify export agriculture away from tobacco. South Africa had begun to challenge Britain as the main supplier of imports before UDI and, as other sources of capital and intermediate goods became unavailable, South African suppliers moved to fill the gap.

A preferential trade agreement was signed between the two governments in 1964, and renewed annually throughout the UDI period, which permitted manufactured goods from Rhodesia to enter South Africa with minimal import duty. The capacity of the Rhodesian economy to produce consumer manufactures like textiles, clothing, footwear, furniture and electronics was boosted, not only by the need for import substitution under sanctions, but by export demand from a friendly neighbor. The Vorster government allowed access to Rhodesian goods even in the face of opposition from South African manufacturers, in part to counterbalance the trade deficit which Rhodesia amassed as import sources were switched to South African suppliers. The trade balance came to stand at approximately two to one by value in South Africa's favor. By 1981 South Africa accounted for 21 percent of Rhodesia's exports and 19 percent of imports and had long displaced Britain as Zimbabwe's principal trading partner.¹⁶

As well as serving as the principal source and destination of trade goods, institutions in South Africa acted as "go-betweens" for economic relations with the rest of the world. Private companies based in the Republic re-exported Rhodesian goods, particularly minerals, under South African markings or with false certificates of origin. Other companies used South Africa as a conduit for imports into Rhodesia and concealed the ultimate destination by means of a "paper chase" of intermediate

transactions. South African entrepreneurs reaped extra profits from their captive customers to the north, by buying from Rhodesia at a discount and selling at a premium. Financial services for international trade were provided by the South African Reserve Bank and by commercial banks with regional headquarters in Johannesburg. The Rhodesian government and private companies had in any event transferred financial reserves from London to Zurich and Johannesburg in anticipation of a British freeze on funds after UDI. A pattern emerged whereby the acquisition of foreign exchange and payments for imports were no longer conducted directly or through Britain, but almost exclusively through banks in South Africa.¹⁷

3. Transport. As a landlocked country without oil resources Rhodesia was critically dependent upon reliable transport linkages both within the country and to the sea.¹⁸ From UDI onwards and increasingly during the war years (1972-79) the supply of petroleum products and maintenance of efficient railroad services became policy matters of top strategic importance.

One of the first casualties of the settler rebellion was the fuel pipeline from Beira, Mozambique to Untali, Rhodesia, opened in April 1965 but closed barely six months later under the sanctions blockade. Fuel shortages and rationing became a standard aspect of economic life under UDI. Immediate needs for petroleum products were met by road transport from South Africa through Beitbridge including private donations from South African citizens sympathetic with Rhodesian kith and kin. Over time, however, a cheaper and more systematic method was devised. South African-based subsidiaries of multinational oil companies, notably Mobil,

Caltex and Shell-BP, established a covert chain of transactions to supply Genta, the Rhodesian government purchasing agency.¹⁹ SASOL, the South African government-owned energy corporation served as one of the key intermediaries, as did Freight Services, a subsidiary of the South African-controlled Anglo-American Corporation, the largest single business conglomerate in both South Africa and Rhodesia.

The fuel route most commonly used involved trans-shipment from Durban, South Africa to Lourenco Marques, Mozambique, and thereafter by rail to Salisbury. Until 1974 almost all petroleum imports and about 80 per cent of all other imports and exports arrived in Rhodesia by routes through Portuguese-controlled territory.²⁰

By 1974 the reliability of the Beira railroad route was called into question due to guerrilla attacks by FRELIMO. Mozambican independence in 1975 led to the closure of the Mozambique-Rhodesia border in March 1976 in accordance with United Nations sanctions. Rhodesia had little option but to redirect all trade through South Africa. A rail link from Rutenga directly to the Northern Transvaal was hastily constructed to supplement the only existing line through Botswana. The reorientation of transport routes was costly, not simply in terms of the capital investment required. It led to a dramatic increase in conveyance charges, to delays in the arrival of imports, and to a loss of export markets. Rhodesia's exports of tobacco and minerals were particularly bulky and could not be guaranteed loading priority. The South African rail and port network was congested, particularly at peak periods when agricultural harvests and winter coal supplies were being moved. South Africa was never the most

profitable or efficient entrepot for Rhodesian trade, but for the last five years of the settler rebellion it was the only one available.

4. Military. As African opposition to UDI hardened into armed struggle so South Africa and Rhodesia were driven into a de facto military alliance. At first, South African military strategists evidently saw opportunities in the Rhodesian dispute to keep armed conflict away from their homeland or, at minimum, to gain experience in guerrilla warfare.

A long-standing arrangement to pool military intelligence information had existed between the two countries at least since the early 1960s.²¹ Prior to UDI an agreement was quietly concluded between South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal for the common defense of the entire region against "communism and nationalism."²² The war activated those commitments. Contingents of South African Police performed border duties on the Zambezi and saw action elsewhere in Rhodesia between 1968 and 1975. Liaison officers from the South African Defense Force (SADF) were attached to the Rhodesian Army at brigade level and helicopter pilots and technicians were seconded to the Air Force. South African soldiers on leaves of absence were recruited into existing army units and wore Rhodesian uniforms, or, as in the case of heavy artillery support, were incorporated as whole units.

The Rhodesians were at first well supplied with armaments, having gained with British acquiescence the lion's share of the equipment of the armed forces of the defunct Federation.²³ As the war intensified, however, supplies of arms, ammunition, artillery, helicopters, planes and spare parts were obtained with South African assistance or directly from the burgeoning South African arms industry. As part of the subsidy to the

war effort, used military vehicles were "written off" early by the SADF and transferred northward. The armaments trade was probably more diversified than other aspects of Rhodesia's trade given the fact that South Africa was itself technically subject to an international arms embargo. Indeed, on occasion, the Rhodesians were probably able to provide a quid pro quo by acquiring military material that the South Africans could not get for themselves.²⁴

The liberation war demonstrated that South Africa had the capacity to intervene militarily in Zimbabwe. A key issue during the independence negotiations of late 1979 and the interlude of British rule in early 1980 was the disposition of South African troops. The fact that South Africa was slow to withdraw its troops from Rhodesia, provided refuge for military personnel from the Rhodesian Security Forces and Muzorewa's private army, and concentrated a large force in the Northern Transvaal, cast a shadow over the events leading up to Zimbabwe independence.²⁵

In the end South Africa did not intervene to overturn an election result which it did not favor. Direct military linkages were instead severed and personnel and equipment withdrawn across the border. The remnants of intelligence ties, however, probably lingered. It would be surprising if South Africa did not use its ready access to leave behind agents in the Zimbabwe Republic Police, the Zimbabwe National Army, and elsewhere.

5. Diplomatic. The South African decision to stop short of total military commitment to Rhodesia must be seen in diplomatic context. The rash act of UDI was never fully embraced by the South African ruling elite. The 1962 election in Southern Rhodesia brought to power a

government influenced by Afrikaners and advocating a program resembling separate development. Nonetheless, Ian Smith won no advance encouragement from South African Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd to proceed in a break with Britain. Indeed South Africa probably preferred the retention of British legal responsibility for Rhodesia as a deterrent to the escalation of violence and outside intervention in the region. South Africa's support for UDI can be largely explained as tactical response to a fait accompli. It is notable that South Africa never gave full recognition to Rhodesia's trade and diplomatic representatives in Pretoria. The frequent informal contacts between political leaders of the two countries were used as much to try to exact political concessions from the Smith government as to confirm South Africa's political support.

That South Africa favored a negotiated settlement to the Rhodesian impasse became evident by 1974 in the wake of FRELIMO advances in Mozambique. As part of the conditions of the "detente" arranged between Prime Minister Vorster and President Kaunda of Zambia, the South Africans forced Smith to release the Zimbabwe nationalist leaders from detention and to begin the tortuous series of talks that led, over five years later, to Lancaster House. By 1976, with trade routes reduced, the Rhodesian government became extremely vulnerable to the exertion of economic pressure for political ends. South Africa, itself under international censure for the suppression of the Soweto uprising, sought to ease relations with the West and Africa by wresting substantive concessions from Smith. The South African government took advantage of an already congested rail and port system to delay Rhodesian imports and exports in transit and thereby to squeeze foreign exchange, fuel and ammunition reserves. Imports of Rhodesian beef were cut back during this period and so one

ordered them to "interdict rail traffic from Malverne-Gwelo [southern Mozambique], establish bases inside Mozambique adjacent to the South African border, open a new military front in Maputo province, and provoke incidents in Maputo and Beira."⁵ The South African strategy was clear--the MNR must extend its activity to the strategic southern provinces, thereby discouraging Zimbabwe and Botswana from exporting its commodities through Maputo. Ten days later Orlando Cristina, a former Portuguese secret police official working with South African security, urged Dhlakama to "destroy power lines with transport energy from Cahorra Bassa Dam to South Africa in order to deflect charges that South Africa was aiding the MNR."⁶ To accomplish these broader objectives, South African officials agreed to provide large supplies of war material, including rockets, mortars and small arms as well as instructors "who will not only teach but also participate in attacks."⁷

Mozambican field commanders with whom ^Iwe spoke indicated that "Boers" regularly accompanied MNR bands in the central part of the country. When pressed for concrete examples, a young officer who had fought in Manica province informed ^{me}us that his battalion discovered several dead European soldiers when it overran an MNR base at Chidogo. South African passports and other documents were captured at other MNR bases. Sara Muchalima, a twenty-six year old woman who had been kidnapped by the MNR, saw ten European advisors who, along with Dhlakama, were evacuated by helicopter shortly before Garagua fell.

Emphasis, however, is on South Africa training MNR forces at military bases in the Transvaal and providing supplies and logistical assistance to the guerrillas inside Mozambique. According to Mozambican

occasion the commencement of the tobacco auctions in Salisbury were delayed while South African financial institutions withheld credit. Police and helicopters on loan to the Rhodesian government were withdrawn and a training program for Rhodesian pilots in Pretoria abruptly cancelled.

Smith's belated and reluctant response was to publicly accept the principle of majority rule. In 1977, having helped the Geneva constitutional conference to fail, he launched an initiative for an internal settlement with Muzorewa and others. These commitments failed to convince the guerrillas or the world that a genuine transfer of power was underway, but were apparently enough to induce a renewal of South African support for the government of the day.

That the "Zimbabwe-Rhodesia" experiment (1978-1980) survived as long as it did is not explicable without reference to South African backing. Bishop Abel Muzorewa's first international trip as Prime Minister was to Pretoria. Direct budgetary assistance from the South African government reached a peak during his tenure. Muzorewa permitted heavy armed attacks into the Frontline States and spoke openly about the need for a formal military alliance between his country and South Africa. In the campaigns for the 1979 and 1980 elections his UANC party and auxiliary forces were lavished with South African funds, vehicles and advisors. Support for Muzorewa, however, was a serious miscalculation on the part of South Africa. Their acquiescence to the Lancaster House agreement on Zimbabwe independence was due not only to Western pressure but to the incorrect assumption that Muzorewa could command a sizeable electoral following. The UANC ultimately won only three National Assembly seats in 1980. This was testimony to the difficulty that South Africa has in obtaining reliable intelligence and securing credible allies in black Africa.

An analysis of bilateral relations between South Africa and Rhodesia during UDI shows that the economies of the two countries became umbilically connected. South Africa, mindful of its own pariah status, had an interest in demonstrating that economic sanctions could not work as a weapon in international relations. Hence Rhodesia's economic growth up to 1974 was nurtured by capital flows and trade transactions mediated by South African institutions. So complete was the dependence that Rhodesia's prospects ultimately became subsumed beneath the broader international conflict over apartheid. The South African government consistently treated its own security as the top priority. Until the mid-1970's that interest was best served by rescuing the white minority from its self-imposed isolation and bolstering Rhodesia as a buffer state against guerrilla armies. Thereafter, with the collapse of its Portuguese ally and the deterioration of the military and economic situation in Rhodesia, South Africa applied its now enhanced leverage to press for the transition least disruptive to the status quo. South Africa had the economic and military power to prolong the conflict in Rhodesia, but decided instead to retreat to more defensible borders and to preserve that power to fight another day.

The New Setting of Regional Relations

The emergence of Zimbabwe as an independent country under Mugabe necessarily meant that relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe would be altered. Given sharp political and ideological differences, there could be little doubt that a redefinition of the close relations of the past ninety years was at hand. For independent Zimbabwe, existing structures imposed a heavy legacy on freedom of action; for Pretoria, the past provided the potential leverage to inhibit demands for change.

In the period April 1980 to April 1982, both sides staked out basic positions by means of rhetoric and action. Zimbabwe took steps to sever ties that could be interpreted as an endorsement of apartheid, and South Africa made it clear that it would brook no armed intervention from a neighboring revolutionary state. Beyond this, other aspects of the relationship were laid open to redefinition in practice. Zimbabwe had little indication of the precise conditions under which South Africa would unleash its economic and military capacity for destabilization. Similarly, the South Africans were uncertain of the direction a Mugabe government would pursue in domestic and foreign policy. As a consequence the two protagonists began their relationship by probing each others' reactions. In so doing, each used the resources at its disposal. In the case of Zimbabwe these resources were largely political and, in the case of South Africa, largely economic.

The view from Zimbabwe from the outset was that relations between the two countries could not simply continue along previous lines.

Coexistence, as before, would imply assent to apartheid and that was intolerable. The new leaders saw the dissolution of race domination in South Africa as an extension of the struggle they had fought themselves. On the other hand, Zimbabwe's economic dependence on South Africa made a break in trade and transport ties difficult without sustaining crippling costs. The immediate solution to this dilemma was to try to separate political from economic considerations. Within three months of independence the Zimbabwe government took the bold step of breaking off diplomatic relations with South Africa. At the same time, however, it confirmed that trade relations would be maintained, at least temporarily, until such time as alternative arrangements could be made.

The most difficult question for Zimbabwe concerned its attitude towards liberation movements, particularly the African National Congress of South Africa. Mozambique and Zambia had each paid a high price to support the Zimbabwe guerrillas in terms of weathering economic sanctions and military raids. Could Zimbabwe be expected to do anything less for South African brothers and sisters? The OAU and the domestic supporters of ZANU(PF) assumed that Zimbabwe would demonstrate solidarity and leadership on the liberation issue. The new leaders of Zimbabwe restated clearly their commitment to South African liberation but acknowledged that there were limits to what they could do. Zimbabwe could not afford to participate in economic sanctions against South Africa, nor could it offer military bases to the ANC.

In sum, Zimbabwe sought to define a position of political support for liberation without jeopardizing itself either economically or militarily. The government took actions to intensify the diplomatic isolation of South Africa and to strengthen trade and transport ties with other neighbors.

Above all, Zimbabwe sought to develop its own people and resources in a manner that expressed a moral reproach and viable alternative to the segregation and exploitation of apartheid.

How did Pretoria look at the new Zimbabwe government? What kind of neighbor did it prefer? One key question was whether the interests of South Africa were served by a stable and prosperous African nation on its frontier. The answer from Pretoria was, at best, ambiguous. South Africa's foreign policy in the region has oscillated between two poles. On the one hand an "outward-looking" posture has been adopted according to which economic ties are promoted throughout the region without regard to the domestic policies of individual states.²⁶ The most recent incarnation of this policy was P.W. Botha's proposal for ^{an} economic constellation of Southern African states (CONSAS) with South Africa at the center.²⁷ On the other hand South Africa has periodically embarked on campaigns to harass states that harbor or support guerrillas. In the extreme, this policy has included the use of large-scale punitive military force, as witnessed in Angola in 1976 and early 1981.

In the early 1980s the policy of political and military confrontation gained ascendancy over the policy of economic integration. With the defeat of Muzorewa and the victory of Mugabe the idea of a constellation of states was severely set back, the SADCC countries arguing that CONSAS was simply "apartheid as foreign policy."²⁸ Not only were Mugabe and ZNAU-PF far less sympathetic to South Africa's regional visions than Smith and Muzorewa, but an independent Zimbabwe, as the linchpin of SADCC, had the potential to compete with South Africa as a regional supplier of food and manufactured goods. As a result, South Africa appeared to come to the conclusion that its own interests were best served by provoking political and economic uncertainty among its neighbors, including Zimbabwe.

In the process it hoped to demonstrate to the world that African states could not run themselves competently and prosperously and, thereby, gain indirect credibility for apartheid.

There were at least three reasons why South Africa would wish to perpetuate dependence and engage in destabilization in Zimbabwe: to make Zimbabwe pay for its verbal commitments to liberation; to insure that Zimbabwe did not become a staging area for guerrillas; and to stifle at birth any economic union of black states centered on Zimbabwe rather than South Africa.²⁹

Zimbabwe and South Africa: Pressures and Conflicts

The narrative of events in the early years of the new South Africa-Zimbabwe relationship can best be unfolded with reference to the various elements of dependence. South Africa used its dominance of trade and transport networks to remind Zimbabwe of its economic vulnerability. In the same vein, the Zimbabwe government began deliberately to tackle the question of the ownership of South African assets within its borders. On the political front, each side engaged in vituperative rhetoric against the other. South Africa, however, was aggressive in adventuring into acts of insurgency and sabotage, particularly against Zimbabwe's neighbors.

In general, the relationship between the two countries deteriorated badly, reaching a low point in late 1981 and recovering slightly in early 1982. An attempt will be made not only to describe the ups and downs of the relationship, but also to illustrate how actions by one side gave rise to reactions by the other.

1. Diplomatic. Zimbabwe took its strongest stand against South Africa on the diplomatic and political fronts. Even before independence, Prime Minister-elect Mugabe made it plain that his government had strong objections

to apartheid and that South Africa must learn, in light of Zimbabwe's bitter struggle, to make changes in its policies.³⁰ He emphasized that "people cannot stand too long any apartheid nonsense."³¹

In international forums the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and at home the Ministry of Information, were given clearance to enunciate a clear public "commitment to the emancipation of Namibia and South Africa."³²

At the same time, moral and political commitments were tempered in the light of prevailing circumstances. Said Mugabe, "we must accept that South Africa is a geographical reality and, as such, we must have some minimum relationship with it."³³ His carefully balanced position was "to maintain trade relations with South Africa....We would hope that South Africa would reciprocate and not resort unduly to hostile acts against us. We are pledged to peaceful coexistence with it. We are opposed to the politics of South Africa, but we do not regard the people of South Africa as our enemies at all."³⁴ The tightrope walked by the Zimbabwe government is well illustrated with reference to proposals for United Nations economic sanctions against South Africa. Mugabe stated that, while Zimbabwe would not stand in the way of the international community imposing sanctions, his government was "not in a position to implement (them) to the full because of our present dependence on South Africa."³⁵

In July 1980, against protests from Pretoria, the Zimbabwe government closed the South African diplomatic mission in Salisbury and withdrew its own representative from Pretoria. The reason given was that South African envoys were engaged in recruiting mercenaries for subversive activities in Zimbabwe. Early portents for this move were the discontinuation by Zimbabwe of sporting links and of rebroadcasts of South African news bulletins. Trade commissioners were not affected by the severance of diplomatic links, save that the South African representative could no longer have official

contacts with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Consular services for the 35,000 South African nationals resident in Zimbabwe and the 150,000 tourists per year from the Republic were also retained. The South African government retaliated by requiring visas of all Zimbabwean visitors to their country. Moreover, the war of words across the Limpopo intensified. The South African Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, stated that Mugabe had made the "mistake of his life if he thinks that South Africa will sit back and accept his provocative remarks."³⁶ A South African business representative argued that trade would be difficult without diplomatic ties, warning further that "Zimbabwe would immediately have problems with oil...and export industry would be severely restricted without access to the sea."³⁷

The cross pressures under which Zimbabwe's foreign policy was made were clearly observable in the case of relationships with freedom fighters. The Zimbabwe Foreign Minister, Witness Mangwende, affirmed that Zimbabwe had pledged "full support as a front-line state" to liberation movements in Southern Africa and would "give every assistance possible within the context of the OAU."³⁸ The president of SWAPO, Sam Nujoma, was invited to attend Zimbabwe-Namibia solidarity celebrations and Zimbabwe publicly praised the role played by the Cubans in Angola during a visit of the Cuban Foreign Minister. Zimbabwe became actively involved in negotiations over Namibia and acted as a center of diplomatic pressure on South Africa. The South African military charged that Zimbabwe was supplying arms and foodstuffs to SWAPO guerrillas operating out of southern Angola.³⁹

Towards the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, however, the Zimbabwe government was circumspect. Mugabe said on the one hand that "we stand firmly behind the liberation movements of South Africa...in their revolutionary endeavor to bring democracy."⁴⁰ On the other hand he regretted, "we are simply not strong enough to give bases as such since there would be

reprisals from South Africa."⁴¹ The South African Prime Minister, P.W. Botha, attempting to tie Zimbabwe down yet tighter, stated in public and private messages that the opening of an ANC office would be regarded as a prelude to military action and would not pass unmolested. The July 1981 assassination in Salisbury of Joe Gqabi, a prominent ANC official, followed closely on the heels of an unannounced decision by the Zimbabwe Cabinet to permit the opening of an ANC office. Since that time, liberation movement representatives and refugee groups from South Africa have been forced to operate underground in Zimbabwe.

2. Finance. One thrust of the economic policy of the Mugabe government was to urge foreign and domestic capital to contribute to redistributive development. In an effort to maintain the confidence of the international business and financial communities, assurances were given that profits could be repatriated and that public debt obligations, even to South Africa, would be honored. This pragmatic stance helped to stem impulses towards a flight of capital and to create conditions under which national participation in the economy could be brought about at measured pace. The government made it clear that the state would intervene in strategic sectors and that wages and working conditions would be improved throughout the economy.

In general, the pattern of ownership and control of capital in Zimbabwe was left intact, but the first minor adjustments, made as much for political as economic reasons, were aimed at reducing South African influence. With a grant from Nigeria, the Zimbabwe government purchased a controlling interest in the country's only newspaper chain from the Argus group of Johannesburg. A similar acquisition was made of Rhobank (renamed Zimbank) the third largest commercial bank in the country and previously owned by

the Netherlands Bank of South Africa. Legislation was initiated to make possible the removal of mineral marketing from mining companies and to confer responsibility on the Zimbabwe government. Some multinational companies changed their modus operandi after independence, in voluntary response to government distaste for ties with South Africa. The Amax corporation and the Dickinson Robinson group, for example, transferred operations in Zimbabwe from the control of the South African subsidiaries to parent companies overseas. The two largest banks, Standard and Barclays, also reversed their UDI procedures by reorienting transactions away from offices in South Africa and back to headquarters in Britain.

Nonetheless, ties of capital ownership remained. The stake of some South African-controlled conglomerates loomed so large in Zimbabwe's asset base that it was difficult to foresee rapid change. Within three weeks of independence, Prime Minister Mugabe met with Harry Oppenheimer, chief executive of the Anglo-American Corporation to outline government policy.⁴² Anglo-American, along with other foreign companies, pressed in return for investment guidelines and asserted that state participation would be welcomed.⁴³ What little new investment occurred after independence appeared to come from Western Europe rather than South Africa. South African firms, perhaps more leery than most of Mugabe's long-term intentions, engaged instead in takeovers of existing enterprises. The Anglo-American purchase of Hulett's, South Africa, for example, made for a highly concentrated pattern of ownership and control of the sugar and ethanol industries. Local capital began to explore investments outside Zimbabwe, particularly in Botswana, as its own way of diversifying portfolio and spreading risk.

The leakage of capital through white emigration was not significant, due largely to the tight currency restrictions inherited and reinforced by

field commanders in Tete and Manica provinces, MNR forces are regularly resupplied at night, and FRELIMO forces lack the communications and air support to prevent these air-drops. Mozambique's long coastline is also ideally suited for naval landings which are becoming more frequent. Captured MNR documents suggest that this is the preferred route--it is much cheaper for South Africa, and Mozambique's fledgling navy cannot patrol effectively. In addition to the small arms, mortars, mines and anti-aircraft weaponry, Mozambican officials acknowledge that the MNR receives communications equipment which is far more sophisticated than that available to their own forces. This enables MNR bands to maintain contact with South Africa, whose reconnaissance planes flying inside Mozambique provide valuable information on Mozambican troop movements.

Western diplomats in Maputo estimate the MNR numbers at about 5,000--appreciably lower than Ohlákama claimed of 17,000 armed soldiers. Most MNR recruits seem to have been coerced into joining. According to Sara Muchalima, "The bandits came to my house and told my parents I had to go with them. My father refused, but they beat him up, tied my hands, and with a gun to my head took me to their base at Garangua."⁸ John Burleson, British ecologist held prisoner by the MNR for several months, reported seeing hundreds of forced recruits who were kept under armed guard.⁹

Nevertheless, Mozambique's serious economic problems make MNR recruitment that much easier. Droughts, which the MNR attribute to the alienated ancestors, the Mozambican government's failure to provide sufficient support for the family farming sector, and the lack of consumer goods in parts of Manica, Sofala and Inhambane provide fertile ground for

the Mugabe government. The more serious loss was that of skills needed to maintain production and services in Zimbabwe.⁴⁴ The majority of emigrants, 62 percent since independence, went to South Africa.⁴⁵ Along with about 250,000 former Portuguese colonists, the 45,000 Rhodesians who went to South Africa from 1977 to 1981 created heavy employment demands on the South African economy. As a dissatisfied and vocal minority, these groups helped to reinforce racial prejudice in South Africa and fan opposition to black governments. As for skilled blacks, Zimbabwe will derive some benefit from the 20,000 contract workers to be withdrawn in 1982 from South Africa due to the Zimbabwe government closure of the Wenela labor recruitment agency. The main question was whether the Zimbabwe economy, particularly mining, could expand fast enough to absorb them. Ironically, this depended in part on new investments in a sector where South African capital held a substantial share and where the Zimbabwe government had spearheaded ^{already} state intervention.

3. Trade. At independence, trade between the two countries was of greater economic importance to Zimbabwe than to South Africa. Zimbabwe had 19 percent of its total trade with South Africa, whereas South Africa had just 6 percent with the whole of Africa.⁴⁶ The first two years generally showed the inertia of trade relationships. Zimbabwe was able to increase exports of primary commodities, principally to Western Europe as a result of entry into the Lomé trade pact in November 1980. Indeed, the reestablishment of pre-UDI patterns began before independence with the relaxation of sanctions and the resumption of direct trade contacts in late 1979. With the reduction of costs involved in conducting international business in secret, Zimbabwe's terms of trade began to improve.⁴⁷ Exports boomed. But the reorientation of trade to SADCC or other Third World or non-Western

countries was a structural task that was barely begun by 1982.

The main bone of contention over trade between Zimbabwe and South Africa was the renewal of the preferential trade agreement (PTA). Just as the PTA was at first used by South Africa to express political support for Smith, so it was applied in an effort to exact political concessions from Mugabe. In March 1981, the South African delegation to the PTA renewal talks in Salisbury unexpectedly declared an intention to revoke the agreement. The Zimbabweans were nevertheless assured that renegotiation was possible within the twelve-month period remaining before the PTA actually lapsed. The South Africans wanted a Cabinet Minister to represent the Zimbabwe government at renegotiation talks in Pretoria. The Zimbabweans refused on the grounds that such a visit would violate the suspension of diplomatic relations and constitute tacit recognition of South Africa. In daring Muhammed to come to the mountain, the South Africans were testing the resolve of the Zimbabwean government to stand by its declared diplomatic position.⁴⁸

There is little doubt that the loss of preferential access to South African markets would be serious to Zimbabwe. In 1980, 41 percent of all manufactured exports went to South Africa and 60 percent of these were covered by the PTA. Without the PTA, manufactured goods would be subject to higher tariffs and surcharges, an end to quotas, and the need for new import permits. Under these conditions, Zimbabwe producers would likely be priced out of the South African market. The estimated direct impact in Zimbabwe would be an annual loss of Z\$50 million in foreign exchange and a permanent loss of 6500 manufacturing jobs.⁴⁹ In any case Zimbabwe appeared to be losing its competitive edge due to a drop in industrial productivity after independence and a decline in the exchange rate of the Zimbabwe

dollar in relation to the South African Rand.⁵⁰ A temporary continuation of the PTA would at least provide an opportunity for export production and trade diversification to be pursued with vigor.

The signal given by South Africa was that initiatives for trade disengagement could come from both sides. The onus was imposed all the more heavily on Zimbabwe to build new markets. Yet the first two years of independence did not provide much cause for optimism. The EEC and Lomé cosignatories showed little interest in manufactured goods from Zimbabwe, though some openings for textiles and footwear seemed possible in Eastern Europe. Nor were the SADCC countries well positioned to take up the slack. Although Botswana imported goods from South Africa that Zimbabwe produced, it was restrained from switching its source of supply by commitments under the South African Customs Union. Zambia and Malawi lacked the foreign exchange to purchase Zimbabwean manufactured goods and continued to turn to suppliers like South Africa that could offer generous credit terms. Greater potential for expanded trade seemed to exist with Mozambique, provided Zimbabwe could use exports in kind to pay for import transit costs.

The one success that Zimbabwe registered as a regional supplier was with maize, following the bumper harvest of 1981. With a potential export capacity of at least half a million tonnes per annum, Zimbabwe promised to undercut South Africa's state-subsidised maize price and to replace the Republic as key regional supplier. Zimbabwe's advantage was particularly marked with regard to countries in the immediate vicinity such as Zambia, Zaire and Mozambique.⁵¹

4. Transport. Due to transport realignment after 1976, Zimbabwe inherited a situation where 80 to 90 percent of trade, including oil imports, passed through South Africa. In this light, the partial switch back to Mozambican routes between 1980 and 1982, particularly for strategic fuels, was a significant achievement by the Zimbabwean government.

This is not to say that all transport bottlenecks were broken. By 1980 Zimbabwe had passed through the early stages of import substitution and possessed a sophisticated set of productive industries which required substantial infusions of inputs from the outside world.⁵² Economic growth in the industrial and manufacturing sectors was critically tied to the generation of foreign exchange to purchase capital and intermediate inputs. Foreign exchange could only be earned if Zimbabwean exports got to market. In the second year of independence transportation delays impeded trade and contributed to chronic shortages of foreign exchange. South Africa continued to intercede in the movement of essential commodities across its own territory and, in a departure in relations with Zimbabwe, was implicated in disruptions of transportation in adjacent countries.

The ^{first} pressure point was a familiar one. South African Railways, claiming that demand for rail transport was up by 130 percent in the first eight months of Zimbabwe independence, began to extend the time taken to return railroad wagons. Loadings per day, particularly of diesel fuel tankers, were reduced. In April 1981 South Africa withdrew 25 railroad locomotives loaned to the previous government. This, coupled with the exodus of skilled artisans from the National Railways, which impaired maintenance capabilities, meant that in 1981 Zimbabwe could call upon fewer than half of its 275-strong fleet.⁵³ By September, the transport system was in crisis. The national supply of diesel fuel dipped to a three-day reserve at the height of demand for road and rail transport to move the maize crop. Zimbabwe was forced to turn down export orders, some from African countries, and to stockpile maize, steel and sugar.⁵⁴ Losses in export earnings amounted to almost Z\$7 million a week.

In response to these unfolding events, Zimbabwe pushed ahead with a realignment of trade and fuel supply routes. By the end of 1981, 27 percent

of general trade and about 35 percent of petroleum products, mostly gasoline, came through Mozambique. The principal route was again the railroad from Maputo. Due to an increase in domestic demand for fuels in Zimbabwe, as well as inefficiencies and derailments in Mozambique, however, shortages of diesel and gasoline persisted. A permanent solution was meanwhile sought in the rehabilitation of the Beira-Umtali pipeline. Even though the re-opening of the pipeline was technically feasible by the end of 1981, two political events intervened. First, a bridge over the Pungwe River carrying the road, rail and pipeline links to Beira was blown up in November 1981. Although quickly repaired, the damage demonstrated the vulnerability of alternative lifelines. Second, the Zimbabwe and Mozambican governments had difficulty in agreeing on a pipeline tariff. At issue was whether the royalty to be charged should include compensation to Mozambique for freight charges to be lost on the Maputo rail line. Despite the fact that Mozambican routes had previously been by far the cheapest, the final pipeline agreement pegged charges at a level roughly equivalent to oil imports through South Africa.⁵⁵

Despite setbacks, there were indications in 1982 that Zimbabwe's transport quandaries were easing rather than worsening. The arrival of replacement locomotives from the United States and Canada and railroad technicians from India improved internal operations. Plans for railroad electrification promised an alternative to reliance on diesel fuels. The pipeline, once fully operational, should permit Zimbabwe to dispense entirely with fuel shipments through South Africa. Along with some other SADC countries, Zimbabwe pledged to end all import and export traffic with that country within ten years. Much will depend on whether Mozambican ports can be made larger and more efficient with aid from donors to SADC.

From the outset the Zimbabwe government tried to persuade businessmen use alternatives to trade routes and supply sources in South Africa. But structural linkages die hard. That the business community in Zimbabwe did not respond favorably to appeals to build east-west economic linkages across the subcontinent began to emerge as a problem for both the Zimbabwe and Mozambique governments.

5. Military. At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in Canberra, Australia in October 1981 Mugabe stated that "South Africa is not engaged in a game of sport with us; it is creating havoc, destroying our economy and destabilizing our position."⁵⁶ At meetings of the Front-line States in Lusaka and Blantyre in 1981, South Africa was condemned for attacks on neighboring countries and for training dissident political exiles from several countries.⁵⁷ Mugabe interpreted South Africa's military strategy in regional terms: to assert hegemonic control across the southern subcontinent from the Atlantic to Indian Oceans.⁵⁸

In the first two years of independence Zimbabwe was affected by military actions and incidents of sabotage beyond her borders. The raid on the ANC complex at Matola, Mozambique in January 1981 in which a former Selous Scout was killed, indicated that trained Rhodesians with an intimate knowledge of the terrain of Zimbabwe were operating within the South African Defence Force. The demolition of navigation buoys in Beira harbor in October 1981 was conducted by a seaborne commando unit, widely presumed to be South African. The Pungwe bridge explosion and derailments on the Maputo line were blamed by the Machel government on the Mozambique Resistance Movement (MRM). This group was first cosponsored by the Rhodesian and South African military intelligence services to undermine the FRELIMO government, though since 1980 logistical support and technical personnel came exclusively via South Africa. The MRM appeared to be able to move back and forth across the Mozambique-Zimbabwe frontier and was one of the main reasons that the two countries reached agreement on mutual defense. With respect to dissidents

from Zimbabwe, Mugabe made frequent accusations that South Africa was training several thousand UANC supporters at a base east of Messina in the northern Transvaal for insurgency and destabilization within Zimbabwe.⁵⁹

While difficult to verify in all cases, the popular perception in Zimbabwe was that South Africa was to blame for all anti-government incidents. Official analyses implied a South African role in the following events: a plot to assassinate leaders and dignitaries at the Zimbabwe independence celebrations; a major arms theft from Cranborne barracks and the sabotage of an ammunition depot at Inkomo barracks; the assassination of the ANC's Joe Qqabi; the escape of a white army officer accused of spying for South Africa; and the explosion which severely damaged the ZANU(PF) party headquarters in Salisbury in December 1981.

The heightening of international hostilities had the unfortunate domestic effect in Zimbabwe of undermining the government's policy of racial and political reconciliation. Zimbabwe's first two years passed under state of emergency legislation. Doubt was cast upon the loyalty of Zimbabwean nationals, particularly whites, who might harbor sympathies for the apartheid regime. Mugabe publicly warned Ian Smith of arrest if he tried "to collaborate" with South Africa.⁶⁰ One Republican Front M.P., described as having "one foot in Zimbabwe and one foot elsewhere," was charged along with three other whites with seeking support from ZIPRA to overthrow the government.⁶¹ Joshua Nkomo was tarred with the same brush when he was dismissed from the government of national unity in February 1982. Allegations were made that he had twice approached South Africa to support a coup attempt.⁶²

Nonetheless, Mugabe was insistent that the door of reconciliation remain open to other parties and people, black and white, willing to work

with ZANU(PF). Not only was it sensible to try to avoid creating disaffected minorities which South Africa could exploit to its own advantage, but, more important, one of the chief assets Zimbabwe could deploy against South Africa was an image of a popular, unified, and multiracial democracy.

Conclusion: Dependence and Riposte

The first two years of the new South Africa-Zimbabwe relationship was a time of testing. In April 1980 both sides could have benefited from a breathing space. Zimbabwe in particular needed to find its feet after a debilitating civil war. South Africa was preoccupied with decolonizing Namibia on favorable terms and managing tensions at home engendered by proposals of apartheid reform. Yet no respite was forthcoming. Simply by adhering to their minimum positions, Zimbabwe and South Africa were drawn into confrontation. Mutual concessions were necessary to prevent relations deteriorating beyond control.

By late 1981 the relationship had reverted to a well-worn pattern in which South Africa held the Zimbabwe economy hostage. Mugabe's thoughtful vision of political noninterference and economic coexistence was replaced by accusations against South Africa as "a rabid racist regime gone wild in our neighbourhood and constituting a serious danger."⁶³ By early 1982, both sides had pulled back from the brink and relations began to improve. Zimbabwe toned down invective against apartheid in the official media, quietly secured the resignation of the Zimbabwean Foreign Minister from the chairmanship of the OAU Liberation Committee, and took the initiative to reopen negotiations on trade and transport. Concessions from South Africa included the return of locomotives, more expeditious delivery of fuels, and abandonment of the requirement that the PTA and railroad negotiations be conducted at Ministerial level. Both sides agreed to a temporary ^{continuation of the} ~~agreement~~.

preferential trade agreement in March 1982.

But *momentary* reconciliation does not mean that basic issues of structural dependence were settled. Conflict will build and recur. Even as trade negotiations started up again, Zimbabwe reiterated firm support for liberation at a SADCC meeting in Maputo attended by ANC President Oliver Tambo. Meanwhile South Africa ^{continued to prepare for a siege by} announcing increases in military service requirements for white males. The consistent theme in South Africa's performance in the region was the use of economic and military superiority to reduce political pressures from neighbors to the north. Conversely, Zimbabwe combined with other Frontline States to extend the momentum of political liberation southward and to drive towards independent economic development.

The case of Zimbabwe-South Africa relations raises two refinements to conventional assertions about dependency. First, situations of structural dependence are not entirely intractable. Small states can use their political independence to carve out an arena *for a modicum of* freedom of action. In two years, Zimbabwe was able to move towards its objective of political disengagement in the context of economic ties. It was even able to begin to build alternative *infrastructural* linkages. The option was also *taken* to combine with others into a regional and international front in the quest for the political isolation of South Africa. While political solidarity is clearly not a sufficient condition for economic disengagement and collective self-reliance, it is surely a necessary one.

Second, dominant states cannot always fully achieve their foreign policy objectives. Despite holding the strongest economic and military cards, South Africa was unable to obtain a quick end to the white settler rebellion in Rhodesia or to install its chosen black candidate as leader in Zimbabwe. Similarly, South African destabilization is not guaranteed

to weaken the commitment of Zimbabwe to liberation support. Indeed, the opposite outcome could result and levels of confrontation and violence could easily rise.

In short, the dependency framework does constitute a useful set of general assumptions that set the stage for analyzing relations between strong and weak states. The Zimbabwe-South Africa case requires no retreat from the position that economic dependence ^{particularly if such efforts are seen to apply to all parties involved.} constrains policy choice. ^{But} a complete analysis of relations between particular states also requires that the various dimensions of dependency be analyzed separately and that room be left for autonomous political riposte.

Postscript: Future Relations

The bilateral connection between Zimbabwe and South Africa will become increasingly *influenced* by wider international considerations. The opportunities and constraints on foreign policy makers will be shaped not only by domestic political developments, but by the exertion of other interests from the region and the world. By way of conclusion, a few thoughts are offered on the factors likely to determine future Zimbabwe-South Africa relations.

1. Big Powers. The West has a considerable stake in the economic resources and political stability of Southern Africa. Western influence is exerted simultaneously on South Africa and the Frontline States to resolve differences peaceably. The ^aRegan policy of "constructive engagement" and the U.S. refusal to condemn South Africa in the U.N. for raids into Angola have been a shot in the arm for Pretoria and the cause of anger and suspicion throughout black Africa. On the other hand, Western

MNR overtures. So does the MNR's manipulation of tribal divisions and appeals to Shona chiefs, spirit mediums and "traditional" Shona values.

Whatever the initial attraction of these appeals, widescale plundering and increasing terrorism quickly evaporate support for the MNR and alienate the rural population which, above all else, wants to be left alone. Western missionaries living along the Mozambican-Zimbabwe border reported that in December 1980, the MNR launched a terrorist campaign around Espangabera in Manica "beheading Machel loyalists, abducting girls, and press-gangng young men into service."⁹ Peasants from Gaza who fled to Zimbabwe also spoke of repeated MNR atrocities. "At Madura, they came and demanded money and food. They accused some people of being informers for government forces and cut off the nose, lips and ears of a number of people. Then they told them to go and report to FRELIMO."¹⁰

Reports filtering in from the bush make it clear that these are not isolated acts by a few disaffected MNR members, but rather reflect the underlying strategy of an organization committed to banditry, marauding and terrorism. A captured bandit, Raque, admitted that he and his compatriots were ordered to rob and terrorize the population in order to discredit the government. "We cut off many people's ears," he said. "We sent them off and said, 'Now go to FRELIMO and say that we've been here.'"¹¹ One high-ranking Western diplomat, who admitted that he was initially skeptical, now finds "reports of widespread MNR barbarism credible." In one of its bloodiest actions, this August terrorists stopped a packed train fifty miles north of Beira and raked it with machine gun fire killing fourteen and wounding fifty others.¹²

These tactics, together with the MNR's reliance on narrow tribal

donors have made substantial financial contributions to Zimbabwe's effort at growth with equity and economic liberation. This is an expression both of genuine support for Mugabe's policies and of the wish to keep Zimbabwe involved with ties to the West.

Western pressure on both sides is likely to be used in the search for a political settlement in South Africa, as it was before in Zimbabwe. For example, Kissinger intervened in 1976 to get Vorster and Nyerere to deliver Smith and the Zimbabwean nationalists to the negotiating table. Similarly in 1981, the Western contact group appeared to have played an important part in urging Botha and Mugabe to reduce tensions.⁶⁴ Much will therefore depend in Zimbabwe-South African relations on reactions from the West to destabilization activities by South Africa. The more overt and dramatic South African intervention becomes, the more likely that the Western powers, particularly the United States, will urge South Africa to lower the level of conflict. Zimbabwe is seen by the West as a center of stability in the region, not only as a potential growth pole, but as an important transport conduit for strategic minerals from Zambia and Zaire. Western objections are therefore likely to be stronger to incursions into Zimbabwe than to similar actions directed at Angola and Mozambique.

One likely consequence of South African-initiated instability in Zimbabwe and throughout the region will be to keep the superpowers involved there. South Africa might even prefer this inasmuch as Soviet activity provides South Africa with a rationale for continuing to meddle in other countries. The ironic thing here is that access to Southern Africa by Cuba, North Korea, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is made more certain by the very instability that South Africa is promoting. This suggests that South Africa's real concern is not Soviet activity in the region. Instead

it uses Soviet activity as a point of leverage against the West, as an excuse for regional interventions, and as a pretext for domestic suppression. In this way Southern Africa may come to resemble the Middle East where one major power dominates its neighbors in military terms, but is incapable of stabilizing the situation.⁶⁵ For Zimbabwe and South Africa then, much will depend on whose version of the causes of regional instability comes to be more broadly accepted, and acted upon, by the big powers.

2. SADCC. A second crucial determinant in the future course of Zimbabwe-South African relations has to do with regional developments. The most important of these is the progress made by the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and its related organs such as the Southern African Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC) in reducing dependency upon South Africa. SADCC was formed in July 1979 at a meeting in Arusha, Tanzania. It marked an effort by the Frontline States to agree upon a program of action for development cooperation in Southern Africa. At the SADCC summit held in Lusaka, Zambia, on April 1, 1980, a formal declaration, "Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation," was signed by the nine majority-rule states of Southern Africa. In it they announced their commitment to work together for economic liberation and integrated development and to strive to reduce their economic dependence on external states, particularly South Africa. Since these organizational meetings, literally dozens of bilateral and multilateral talks have been held throughout Southern Africa to pursue SADCC initiatives. All observers have been impressed by the speed with which SADCC has been organized and the seriousness with which it is pursuing its goals.⁶⁶

Although SADCC aims at the considerable restructuring of regional economic life, its major focus so far has been on the complex issue of transport and communication. This is the area in which SADCC countries are most exposed to South African pressure and this is of particular importance to the landlocked countries. For Zimbabwe, the key transport and communication projects have to do with Mozambique, for it is Mozambican ports which alone offer the hope for ultimate release from the South African transport vise. Mozambique's needs are great, however. Its ports have to be upgraded, rail beds improved, equipment added, people trained and much more. Moreover, as recent sabotage of bridges, roads, pipeline and harbor have shown, Zimbabwe's exit routes through Mozambique remain precarious.

Zimbabwe has one other special responsibility. It has been asked to coordinate all issues of food security for the SADCC countries. Zimbabwe's rich agricultural sector makes it an obvious choice for this task, but its ability to lead the way toward SADCC food security without recourse to South Africa will depend upon Zimbabwe's ability to develop reliable transport and sustain domestic production. Neither is a certainty. In addition, Zimbabwe's role as a regional supplier of manufactured goods will only be realized if other SADCC countries are willing and able to generate demand and make payment. The success of all SADCC initiatives depends upon a healthy rate of economic development in the member countries.

The SADCC vision of a future Southern Africa with economic dependency upon South Africa reduced or eliminated is a compelling one. But how realistic is it? The weakness of the SADCC idea lies in its extreme susceptibility to South African machinations. Whether through the direct application of military force or the more subtle manipulation of aid,

credits, food supplies and transport access, South Africa for the moment holds the region in its grip. Just as South Africa seems to have a stake in keeping the Soviet Union and other communist states active in the region, so it has a stake in SADCC's failure. This being the case, Zimbabwe and the other SADCC countries face the formidable task of holding South Africa in check while moving toward economic liberation. Their ability to do so must remain, for now, an open question.

3. Domestic Developments. Future relations will be determined also by the evolution of domestic power and policy struggles within Zimbabwe and South Africa. As ZANU(PF) completes the transition to power so Robert Mugabe is placed under growing demands to meet the expectations of his followers. To date he has resisted admonitions from within the party for a rapid and radical redistribution of economic assets, including those owned from South Africa. He is not likely to move precipitously, either to close the border or to confiscate South African property, for as long as Zimbabwe depends on southern trade routes and Western development finance. He may nonetheless be propelled into continued verbal antipathy with South Africa ^{, largely as a response to genuine cases of outside interference, but also} to provide blame for shortages of imports ^{to divert attention from} or political divisions at home.

As black resistance swells in South Africa, so the Zimbabwe leadership will be drawn further into the gathering conflict. Their view is that economic liberation for Zimbabwe and political liberation for South Africa are two sides of the same coin. Each will be central in determining the development prospects of Zimbabwe in the years ahead.

Nor is South Africa unconstrained in taking initiatives or selecting responses in its relations with countries to the north. The government there does not wish to incur the displeasure of the West by engaging,

particularly in Zimbabwe, in forms of destabilization that are too blatant or damaging. The risk is also present of inadvertently triggering a larger military involvement by the Eastern bloc than South Africa can easily contain. Hence South Africa is likely to restrict its activities so as to maintain only low levels of instability. It will seek to weaken and undermine African governments but, especially in the case of Zimbabwe, will probably stop short of trying to overthrow them. The possibility always exists that carefully calibrated policies have unintended consequences or that shifts in domestic politics bring changes of policy emphasis. South Africa's approach to countries like Zimbabwe so far has combined the carrot (CONSAS) with the stick (SADF). Each aspect of this dual policy has its domestic constituency. On one hand, the South African Foreign Ministry, the industrial and financial communities, and verligte opinion favor pragmatic economic relations with neighbors. On the other hand, the political right wing, the small manufacturers, and elements within the SADF will continue to regard economic ties as strengthening South Africa's enemies and to be predisposed to favor military actions. If past performance is any guide, South Africa's orientation will depend centrally on leadership perception of state security, on both the domestic and international fronts. If unchallenged, South Africa's leaders can live with any kind of stable regime on their borders; if threatened, they will lash out.

Our prognosis then is necessarily sobering. Two proud and resolute countries, deeply linked by history, find themselves sharply divided on nearly every crucial question of future regional relations, both economic and political. Though each country has pragmatic and instrumental reasons for holding its hostility in check, we would have to be naive to suggest that lasting amity is around the corner. Until a single vision of the future of Southern Africa and its people can be shared throughout the region, a future of stress and incipient conflict seems inevitable.

FOOTNOTES

1. The name Zimbabwe will be used to designate the country for the period from April 1980 onwards. Otherwise, nomenclature is as follows: Southern Rhodesia from 1890-1964; Rhodesia from 1964-1978; and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia from 1978-1980.
2. Larry W. Bowman, Politics in Rhodesia: White Power in an African State. (Cambridge, Ma., Harvard University Press, 1973).
3. Michael Bratton, "Development in Zimbabwe: Strategy and Tactics," Journal of Modern African Studies, 19, 3, 1981, pp. 447-475.
4. Bowman, ibid., p. 7.
5. In an interesting essay, Colin Vale argues that Federation was imperialism's last stand against apartheid and represented British (and British-settler) anger at apartheid for giving racial exclusiveness a bad name. Adding further insult to injury, he concludes that Federation helped South Africa far more economically than it did Britain. See Colin Vale, "South Africa and Zimbabwe: Too Close for Comfort," South Africa International 12, 2, October 1981, pp. 357-374.
6. Arthur Hazlewood, "The Economics of Federation and Dissolution in Central Africa," in Arthur Hazlewood (ed.) African Integration and Disintegration (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1967) pp. 185-250.
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9. John Sprack, Rhodesia: South Africa's Sixth Province (London, International Defence and Aid Fund, 1974) p. 56.
10. Duncan Clarke, Foreign Companies and International Investment in Zimbabwe, (London, Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1980), pp. 50-97.
11. Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Quarterly Economic and Statistical Review 2, 4, December 1981, p. 47. Other estimates put the South African share at independence at the higher levels of 25 percent of exports and 30 to 40 percent of imports: Financial Times, (London), July 17, 1980.
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21. Gordon Winter, Inside BOSS: South Africa's Secret Police (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1981), p. 347.
22. R.W. Johnson, How Long Will South Africa Survive? (New York, Oxford University Press, 1977) p. 113.
23. Arthur Gavshon, Crisis in Africa: Battleground of East and West (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1981) p. 213.
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53. African Economic Digest, April 17, 1981.
54. Ibid., October 9, 1981.
55. Interview, senior official, Ministry of Trade and Commerce, Government of Zimbabwe, February 1981.
56. "New Zealand Premier is Critical of Mugabe," New York Times, October 4, 1981.
57. Sadex 3, 2 (March-April 1981), p. 24.
58. Zimbabwe, Ministry of Information and Tourism, Press Statement 77/81/RH, January 31, 1981. Also see Lewis, "Mugabe's American Hopes," op. cit.
59. Herald, May 30, 1980; October 5, 1980; October 27, 1981.
60. Ibid., October 22, 1981.
61. Ibid., December 11, 1981.
62. Ibid., February 18, 1982.
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66. "Bilateral and Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: A Preliminary Chronology of Meetings and Conferences, July 1979 to August 1981," Sadex 3, 4 (July-August 1981), pp. 4-18. Also see Carol B. Thompson, "SADCC: Toward the Economic Liberation of Southern Africa," (unpublished paper presented to the African Studies Association meeting, Bloomington, Indiana, 24 October 1981.).

appeals directed exclusively at Shona-speaking peoples, only one of a dozen ethnic and cultural groups in the country, belie its claim that it is a nationalist movement of freedom fighters disillusioned with the FRELIMO Party's Marxist strategy. Apart from its anti-communist rhetoric, it lacks any political program and has made no effort to organize the peasants in the areas in which it operates. The American Charge d'Affaires acknowledged that "its political program is flimsy at best" and Western diplomats in Maputo doubt that the MNR can unseat FRELIMO, Mozambique's governing party. All the evidence suggests that it is little more than an arm of South African security.

Nevertheless, the MNR is an important arm and has played a significant role in Pretoria's undeclared economic, political, and psychological war against Mozambique and its SADCC allies. Roving bands repeatedly attack strategic economic targets, cutting railroad lines, mining roads and bridges, interdicting traffic, and plundering communal villages, state farms and shops. In many parts of Sofala, Manica and Inhambane their actions have paralyzed the already fragile rural economy. MNR forces have also disrupted key development projects. In May 1982 Sweden evacuated fifty technicians working on a major reforestation project in Manica which is to supply a multi-million dollar wood processing and paper industry. Mineral prospecting and geological surveys in Sofala, Zambesia, and Manica were also disrupted earlier this year.

But South Africa's main target right now appears to be SADCC. At the SADCC organizing conference in 1980 the member nations agreed that strengthening the transportation and communications links, without which all other forms of regional cooperation are impractical, had to

receive the highest priority. About \$600 million was pledged by foreign donors for transportation projects, including upgrading Mozambican railroad lines and increasing the port capacities of Beira and Maputo so that land-locked Swaziland, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Zambia could divert their traffic from South African ports. Preliminary indications suggest that ^{through} the SADCC transportation network international commerce is gradually being redirected away from South African ports. Zimbabwe, for example, which was totally dependent on South African ports during the Smith regime, exported 30 million tons through Maputo in 1980 and 203 million tons in 1981, as well as an additional 166 million tons through the adjacent port of Matola.

The importance of the two railroad lines from Zimbabwe to Maputo and Beira to this strategy explains the insistence of South African security officials in their 1980 meeting with Dhlakama that both be regularly sabotaged. In fact, this has occurred repeatedly. The latest attack on the line from Maputo to Zimbabwe took place in July 1982, cutting service for fifty days. Although it is now open, many Zimbabwean companies have decided to continue relying on Durban despite the appreciably lower cost of shipping through Maputo and the ten-day shorter turnaround time there, when all runs well. The port of Beira, historically Zimbabwe's major international outlet, has suffered the most. Last year Zimbabwe exported only 55,000 tons through Beira, a mere fraction of pre-sanctions trade. Mozambican officials acknowledge that MNR attacks "have created a profound sense of insecurity and discredited the port in the eyes of many Zimbabwean firms."

Early this year the Mozambican leadership turned its attention to

combatting the escalating MNR threat. A number of miscalculations, including the replacement of guerrillas with a conventional army, and the disbanding of many rural militia units when the Rhodesian government fell, left the country unprepared for the MNR's resurgence in late 1980. To regain the confidence and support of peasants living in the war zones, in May 1982, FRELIMO reactivated more than 1,500 former guerrillas, many of whom are organized in counterinsurgency forces, whose job it is to harass the MNR deep in the bush. It also strengthened the rural militia. As of August 1982, about 40 percent of the adult rural population in Sofala was armed, and in the capital the newly-formed militia boasted upwards of 30,000 men and women. Moreover, since January more than 770 MNR bandits have been killed and another 200 captured.

Nevertheless, Mozambican authorities acknowledge that combatting the MNR is just the first skirmish in a lengthy struggle with the MNR's backer--the apartheid regime of South Africa. That regime has invested a great deal, and is likely to invest even more, to ensure that the SADCC nations remain in a perpetual state of economic dependency.

While disclaiming any ^{explicit} links with the MNR, South Africa maintains that its ^{own} threats and military actions are necessary countermeasures against both the ANC, which Pretoria claims has bases in Mozambique, and Mozambique's decision to deploy sophisticated weapons on the South African border. Both claims are vigorously denied by high Mozambican officials, including President Machel, who have explicitly and publicly limited the official ANC presence in Southern Mozambique to a handful of offices. Moreover, it is hard to imagine how that country's antiquated tanks, the handful of MIG-17 jets and \$150 million military budget could pose a

a threat to South Africa whose arsenal includes some of the most advanced weapon systems in the world financed by a 1981-82 budget estimated at \$2.75 billion.¹³ Western diplomats with whom I spoke share my skepticism pointing out that above all else Mozambique wants to avoid a direct confrontation with South Africa which would have devastating economic consequences. Several, however, have suggested that the substantial escalation of ANC military operations in the Transvaal and other areas adjacent to Mozambique suggests that the Mozambican government is unable to patrol the long unmarked frontiers through which the guerrillas seem to pass.

I would like to conclude my testimony by addressing the question of U.S. foreign policy. To the extent that the Reagan administration chooses to view events in Southern Africa through the prism of the Cold War and adopts a pro-South African posture, its policies send a signal to Pretoria-- a signal that aggression against South Africa's neighbors is acceptable. The failure of the Reagan administration to condemn South African aggression and the reign of terror which the South African-backed MNR has inflicted on unarmed men, women, and children in Mozambique can only reinforce Pretoria's bellicose attitude. Finally, there are ominous signs that U.S. agencies are or were cooperating with the South African war-machine. The most relevant for this discussion is the February 1980 exposure of CIA activities in Mozambique, including documented charges that American agents passed on information which facilitated the South African attack on the Maputo suburbs,¹⁴ charges which, to the best of my knowledge, Washington has never denied or refuted.

Clearly, the U.S. policy toward Southern Africa must be reversed. The major cause of regional instability is the system of racial oppression in South Africa. Until the apartheid regime is dismantled, peace and stability will be impossible. The United States government must be unequivocal on this point. More specifically, to avoid any misunderstanding or misreading of "signals," the Reagan administration should condemn South African attacks on Mozambique and the other Front-Line States as well as the atrocities committed by Southern African-backed guerrillas. The time has also come to appoint an ambassador to Mozambique and to remove Mozambique from the economic blacklist.

To be sure, the government of Mozambique is pursuing a socialist path of development. But it is also pursuing a non-aligned policy. Witness its autonomous position on Zimbabwe, Namibia, the Sino-Soviet split, its refusal to provide ^{NAVAL}~~military~~ bases to the Soviet Union, and its recent military agreement with Portugal. The Reagan administration's increasing ties to Pretoria and its unwillingness, along with most other NATO nations, to condemn South African-sponsored aggression are, however, narrowing Mozambique's international options.

NOTES

- ¹ Africa Confidential, 23 (July 21, 1981): 1.
- ² Gordon Winter, Inside Boss (New York, 1981), 545.
- ³ Ibid.; Africa Confidential, op. cit.; The Sunday Times, January 26, 1975; Domingo, January 10, 1982.
- ⁴ Resistencia Nacional de Mocambique (R.N.M.), "Commando Geral," Afonso Macacho Maresta Dhlakama, Supreme Commander, November 28, 1980.
- ⁵ R.N.M., "Relatório Referente a Sessão de Trabalho de R.N.M. do Representativo do Governo Sul Africano," ^{ORIG} "Afonso Macacho Maresta Dhlakama, ^{Raul Manuel Domingos, Jose Domingos and} October 25, 1980.
- ⁶ R.N.M., Untitled summary of conversations with Orlando Cristina, Raul Manuel Domingos, Zoabostado, November 4, 1980.
- ⁷ R.N.M., "Relatório Referente a Sessão de Trabalho de R.N.M. do Representativo do Governo Sul Africano," ^{ORIG} "Afonso Macacho Maresta Dhlakama, ^{Raul Manuel Domingos, Jose Domingos and} October 25, 1980.
- ⁸ Quoted in Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, "South Africa's Hidden War," African Report (November-December, 1982), 6.
- ⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰ Quoted in Africa News, August 9, 1982.
- ¹¹ Quoted in Isaacman and Isaacman, "South Africa's Hidden War," 6.
- ¹² The Guardian, August 14, 1982.
- ¹³ The New York Times, August 13, 1981.
- ¹⁴ For the Mozambican version see Abel Mutemba, Como Uma Rede da CIA foi Desmantelada em Mocambique (Maputo, 1981).
- ^{9a} The Guardian, December 16, 1980.

DOCUMENT No. 1

Introduction: This report refers to a work session between the delegation of the M.N.R. and the representatives of the South African government indicated in early contacts.

Subject: Resupply, political situation of M.N.R., and suggestions for assistance.

The work began about 8:45 a.m.

After having welcomed the delegation to the M.N.R. represented by His Excellency the Supreme Chief,¹ Colonel Van Nikerk,² representative of the South African government, began by referring to the ways in which South African aid would assist our struggle. He stated that they had finished the first phase of training soldiers evacuated from Zimbabwe, and they were being moved to the interior. Also reached were the objectives discussed at the previous meeting concerning work in the interior. With regard to this, he noted the opening of fronts in Gaza and Inhambane,³ and the interruption of rail traffic on the Beira-Umtali line,⁴ and of road traffic on the Inchope-Villa Franca Save road.⁵

As a means of enlarging our struggle, the South Africans ordered: interrupting rail traffic from Malvernia to Gwelo (Zimbabwe); maintaining bases near to the South African border; opening a front in the province of Maputo; provoking urban incidents in the cities of Maputo and Beira. These tasks will be launched between now and December of 1981.

The South African representative expressed his wish to resupply our forces monthly, but raised the problem with the parachutes, criticizing the attitude of our soldiers who damage them, by cutting the cords. He added that we must remember that each parachute costs 500 rands.

His Excellency the Supreme Commander, thanked the South Africans for the assistance given and the way in which decisions made at the previous meeting were carried out. He spoke of the need to acquire more arms. We presently have many recruits who are not armed and we also need a lot of ammunition which is used up quickly and is essential for the advance of our struggle. Material urgently needed include A. K. arms and ammunition, R.P.G.7 and rockets, and 60 mm mortars and howitzers.

The South African representative then suggested that future resupplying would be through the Indian Ocean, i.e. by sea, which would be very easy for the South Africans. In the meantime, they are waiting for more detailed study on this question . . .

M.N.R. Military Training Camp at Zoebastad, 25th of October of 1980.

THE SECRETARY GENERAL,
RAUL MANUEL DOMINGOS,
Chief Secretary.
JOSE DOMINGOS,
Second Secretary.

Afonso Macacho Marceta Jacame [sic],

Seen, The Supreme Chief of the National Resistance of Mozambique.

DOCUMENT No. 2

MOZAMBICAN NATIONAL RESISTANCE

GENERAL COMMAND

Important notes from a meeting between the Mozambican National Resistance delegation and representatives of the South African government.

¹ The Supreme Chief or Supreme Commander of the Mozambican National Resistance is Afonso Macacho Marceta Dhlakama, who assumed this position in June 1980. He is also referred to as the President of the M.N.R.

² Colonel Van Nikerk referred to in other documents as "Charlie" or "Colonel Charlie" is a member of South African Military Intelligence.

³ Gaza and Inhambane are Provinces in southern Mozambique. The M.N.R. has been particularly active in the latter.

⁴ The beira-Umtali line historically was the principal railroad connection linking Mozambique to Zimbabwe (Rhodesia). It has been repeatedly attacked by the M.N.R.

⁵ This is the major north-south highway in the country linking the capital Maputo with Beira, the country's second largest city.

Colonel Charlie¹ affirmed that during the recent meeting between Samora Machel and Robert Mugabe, the second cannot aid the first for having internal problems.

His Excellency, speaking of enemy activities, informed us that in the frontier area of Espungabera,² this attack across the Zimbabwe border was pushed back with guerrillas.

Colonel Charlie spoke of the existence of a book written by Christina³ that will be at the disposal of His Excellence the Supreme Commander⁴ whose publication would be in the interests of the guerrillas if its contents are approved.

At one point, His Excellency⁵ said, you South Africans, my fathers, will need to help me choose Portuguese men who can work with the M.N.R., because I only know Marques and Christina from the time in Rhodesia.

The South African working in journalism spoke of Charles' bad behavior in asking His Excellency the Supreme Commander's wife for money. Actions are being taken so that this will not recur in the future.

His Excellency, the Supreme Commander, thanks the South Africans for having evacuated his wife from Zimbabwe to South Africa.

Zoabostad, 25th of October 1980.

THE GENERAL SECRETARIAT,
RAUL MANUEL DOMINGOS,

Chief Secretary,

JOSE DOMINGOS,

Second Secretary.

Afonso Macacho Marceta Dhlakama,

The Commander in Chief of the Mozambican National Resistance.

¹ Colonel Charlie has been identified as Colonel Van Nijkerk of South African Military Intelligence.

² Espungabera is a town located in Mozambique on the border with Zimbabwe. It was the scene of a major M.N.R. attack in 1980 in which a number of civilians were killed and tortured.

³ Christina refers to Orlando Christina, the Secretary General of the M.N.R. Of Portuguese nationality, during the colonial period he was reported to have been an official of the Portuguese secret police (PIDE). In 1976 after Mozambique became independent, he fled to Rhodesia bringing with him secret police files of Mozambicans who had collaborated with the Portuguese colonial regime, many of whom had also fled to Rhodesia. From this group he helped to organize the first M.N.R. bands in 1976. After the death of Andre Matzangaissa, the nominal black leader of the M.N.R. in October 1979, Christina was instrumental in promoting the successful candidacy of Dhlakama as his successor.

⁴ The Supreme Commander refers to Afonso Macacho Marceta Dhlakama who assumed this position in June 1980.

⁵ This is also a reference to Dhlakama.

DOCUMENT No. 3

MOZAMBICAN NATIONAL RESISTANCE

GENERAL COMMAND

Introduction: This report refers to a dinner meeting at the 'Black House'¹ between a delegation of the Mozambican National Resistance and Commander Charlie² and his staff.

Subject: Current situation of the guerrillas, successes of the trip to Europe, future aid from African countries.

On the night of November 28, 1980, a delegation of the Mozambican National Resistance was at the 'Black House' at a special dinner prepared by the staff of the Black House in South Africa.

At the outset, Commander Charlie introduced those present, beginning with his chief brigadier and commander of the radio, Voice of Free Africa,³ a South African.

¹ Although not specifically identified, the 'Black House' was probably located in the Transvaal in northern South Africa where the M.N.R. has had its principal military and training base since the independence of Zimbabwe.

² Commander Charlie has been identified as Colonel Van Nijkerk of South African Military Intelligence.

³ The Voice of Free Africa was opened by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization in July 1976. Prior to the independence of Rhodesia, it broadcast anti-FRELIMO propaganda from stations in Gwelo, Fort Victoria and Umtali. In June 1980, after the fall of the Smith regime, it began to broadcast from South Africa in the area of the northern Transvaal.

The Brigadier told us of the plans to enlarge the Voice's installations so that it can beam to all African countries and Europe. The brigadier also said that he was very happy with the Voice which, although not picked up well in the rural areas, is heard very well in the cities, principally in Maputo.

Then he spoke of the move of our base to that of the Voice, so that there will be a direct connection of the Supreme Commander ⁴ and Radio Voice of Free Africa. He also was very interested in the current activities of the guerrillas.

The brigadier chief spoke of the difficulties of resupplying, because the planes cannot carry many things, and he noted the problem of parachutes which are not easy to arrange. He asked us to arrange other means for more easily reestablishing our bases.

The Supreme Commander and President of the Mozambican National Resistance then said that, at the moment, everything depended on them and that they were like our parents. We therefore hope that their help will be better and stronger, because the struggle today that we wage in our country is for the well-being of our two peoples.

Adding to these statements of our leader, the brigadier chief said that they are also helping us because they are interested in the future of Mozambique and that peace in Mozambique will mean peace for their people. He added that we must understand the African ways of life. Then he said that European education does not interest him, which is to say that it is not of great importance, and thus we must have recourse to African education and precisely the system of education of southern Africa, seeing that they came from and have an idea of what is happening in countries such as Lebowa, Bophutatswana, Venda and others. They have had the opportunity to see the local people govern themselves and develop based on such education.

Commander Charlie reminded his chief brigadier of the need to have technical specialists and instructors giving our soldiers instruction in heavy arms and principally in sabotage. He reiterated the great importance at this time of sabotage. He added that the instructors who go to the interior will not only be instructors but also will participate in the general activities of the bases as well as contracts and attacks.

Concerning basic security, His Excellency the Supreme Chief said that security is high at our base and especially at Chicare.

They asked for two locations at which they could next resupply us because it is not good always to do it at the same location.

The brigadier responsible for Radio Voice of Free Africa asked His Excellency to send messages to be read on the Radio because the Radio should transmit what His Excellency wants the people to hear and not what the Voice wants the people to hear. The Voice of Free Africa, said the brigadier, shall become dependent on the Commander in Chief of the Mozambican National Resistance.

He also spoke of the indiscipline that had reigned at the broadcasting station before the appearance of His Excellency but that at this moment they are proceeding well, because the Supreme Commander is present. They are now willing to work closely with the Supreme Commander in Chief to improve the Voice of Free Africa.

During this dinner much of the discussion focused on our guerrillas and they concluded they would have to send us specialized instructors when Chicaro was next resupplied.

At the end of this meeting, they offered to train military and administrative personnel. They also promised to finance programs and publish information so that our leader, His Excellency the Supreme Commander, would come to be known as a citizen of honor in their country.

THE SECRETARIAT,
RAUL MANUEL DOMINGOS,
Chief Secretary,
JOSE DOMINGOS,
Adjunct Secretary.
Afonso Macacho Marceta Dhlakama,

Seen: The Commander in Chief of the Mozambican National Resistance.

Black House, November 28, 1980.

⁴ The Supreme Commander of the Mozambican National Resistance is Afonso Macacho Marceta Dhlakama, who assumed this position in June 1980. He is also referred to as the President of the M.N.R.

SOUTH AFRICA'S HIDDEN WAR

(By Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman)

South Africa is waging an undeclared war in Mozambique. Its main weapon at the moment is the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). Over the past year the MNR has intensified its military activity in Manica, Sofala, and Inhambane, and extended its operations to four other provinces including Gaza, long considered a Frelimo stronghold. Attacks on bridges, roads, the railroad lines leading to Zimbabwe, country stores, and communal villages have created havoc in the countryside, threatened to paralyze key sectors of the rural economy, and disrupted internal and international road and rail traffic.

Conversations with several ministers and senior military officers in August and September underscored the gravity of the situation. As one high-ranking official noted, "We are in a decisive battle in which the real enemy is South Africa." The recent warning from South African Defense Minister Magnus Malan that his country might find it necessary to initiate a "Lebanese-type invasion" reinforced this concern.

South Africa's threats and support of the MNR have two interrelated objectives: to destabilize Mozambique and to sabotage the SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference), the integrated regional alliance of Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Angola, Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania, forged to break Pretoria's economic hegemony. Thus, its assistance to the MNR cannot be separated from its heightened economic and military pressure against Zimbabwe, its increased attacks on Angola, and its efforts to seduce Swaziland with the KaNgwane Bantustan and the Ingwavuma strip. Viewed from this regional perspective, MNR activity, like that of UNITA in Angola, is a valuable South African weapon to keep the region divided and in turmoil.

But what is the MNR? According to former Rhodesian intelligence chief Ken Flowers, the Rhodesian special branch organized the MNR as an anti-Frelimo fifth column to work inside Mozambique. Gordon Winter, in his book *Inside Boss*, which documents his career as a South African spy, claims that the idea came from South African military intelligence. Whatever the case, from 1976 onward, Rhodesian security officials, working with their South African counterparts, recruited Portuguese settlers and mercenaries, black and white, secret police agents, and former African members of the elite special forces of the colonial army (GE) who had fled to Rhodesia after Mozambican independence. To this initial group were added ex-Frelimo guerrillas who had been expelled for corruption or had left because of unfulfilled personal ambitions.

Andre Matzangaiza and Alfonso Dhlakama, two former Frelimo soldiers, received prominent positions to give the MNR nationalistic credentials. Although depicted by Rhodesian and South African propaganda as long-time freedom fighters who had become alienated by Frelimo's Marxist orientation, both had been members of the liberation movement for relatively short periods before being removed for corruption. The MNR also sought to legitimize its position in the West by adopting anti-communist cold war rhetoric. Domingos Arouca, one of its initial spokespersons, proclaimed, "Support for the Soviet Union and its imperialistic ambitions now comes solely from tyrants like Uganda's Amin, and Ethiopia's Mengistu, from failures like Guinea's Sékou Touré or from fumbling incompetents like Frelimo." Aided by South African intelligence, the MNR was able to plant a number of stores in *To the Point* and *The Citizen*, parts of which were reproduced uncritically in the Western press.

In 1976 the Rhodesian government provided the MNR with arms, a military base at Bindura, and extensive military training. From there MNR bands crossed into Mozambique to burn villages, plunder agricultural cooperatives, attack railroad lines and road traffic, disrupt commerce, and raid re-education camps, from which they recruited additional members. They also collected valuable intelligence data on ZANU forces in Mozambique and intimidated Zimbabwean refugees. By 1979, Rhodesia had established two more training centers and was regularly resupplying by air guerrilla military bases in the mountains along the Mozambican-Rhodesian border and the Gorongosa mountains farther inland.

In return for its assistance, Rhodesian security demanded MNR subservience—as is clear from MNR documents found stuffed down a latrine when the Mozambican army captured the Garagua base. In the words of Matzangaiza's successor, Dhlakaha: "We were oppressed by the Rhodesians and the leaders of our movement were not allowed to make any of the decisions. . . . We worked for the English, neither I nor the deceased Andre could plan any military operations. It was the English who determined the areas to attack and where to recruit."

In 1979, however, the tide turned against the MNR. In October, Frelimo forces overran its main bases in the Gorongosa mountains, and Andre Matzangaiza was killed. The Lancaster House Agreement, guaranteeing the end of minority rule in Rhodesia, forced the MNR to abandon its Rhodesian sanctuaries and bases. In June 1980, Mozambican troops destroyed the large base at Sitatonga and claimed to have killed or captured almost 600 guerrillas. At the same time many guerrillas were killed during the power struggle in which Dhlakama eventually prevailed. According to captured MNR documents, "this was a disastrous period in which many soldiers and leaders were killed."

By the middle of 1980 the Mozambican government, feeling confident that it had the situation firmly under control, began to turn its energy toward national reconstruction after nearly five years of war. It was during this period that SADCC programs were crystallized, contacts with multinational corporations were intensified, and several important economic agreements were signed. The popular militia was also disbanded in many frontier regions.

Machel's government failed to anticipate, however, that the remnants of the MNR would seek protection from South Africa which, since 1979, had been providing direct logistic and military assistance. Even after it became aware of this new alliance, it underestimated the amount of support South Africa would provide and the rural disaffection to which the MNR could appeal.

At a meeting between Dhlakama and Colonel Van Nierok of South African security on October 25, 1980, at Zabostad, a military base in the Transvaal, the MNR supreme commander unveiled plans to reestablish bases in Sofala and Manica, and to attack both the railroad lines between Beira and Umtali and road traffic on the north-south highway. Van Nierok insisted that this was not sufficient. By the end of 1981 he ordered them to "interdict rail traffic from Malverne-Gwelo [southern Mozambique], establish bases inside Mozambique adjacent to the South African border, open a new military front in Maputo province, and provoke incidents in Maputo and Beira." The South African strategy was clear—the MNR must extend its activity to the strategic southern provinces, thereby discouraging Zimbabwe from exporting its commodities through Maputo, which had replaced Beira as the major Mozambican outlet for Zimbabwean products and was drawing substantial traffic away from South African ports. Ten days later, Orlando Cristina, a former Portuguese secret police official working with South African security, urged Dhlakama to "destroy power lines that transport energy from Cabora Bassa Dam to South Africa in order to deflect charges that South Africa was aiding the MNR." To accomplish these broader objectives, South African officials agreed to provide large supplies of war material, including rockets, mortars, and small arms as well as instructors "who will not only teach but also participate in attacks."

Although it is difficult to determine the number of South African soldiers actually participating in MNR actions, there is no doubt that they are present. Mozambican field commanders with whom we spoke indicated that they had encountered "Boers" in a number of actions in the central part of the country. When pressed for concrete examples, a young officer who had fought in Manica province informed us that his battalion discovered several dead European soldiers when they overran an MNR base at Chidogo. Mozambican military officers also have photographs of South African passports and other documents captured at MNR bases at Chimanemane and Garagua. Sara Muchalima, a 26-year-old woman who had been kidnapped by the MNR, saw 10 European advisors who, along with Dhlakama, were evacuated by helicopter shortly before Garagua fell. The white man blown up last October in the process of mining the Beira-Umtali railway was probably another of the "instructors," as were three South African soldiers killed by Zimbabwean security forces near the Mozambican border this August.

Principally, however, South Africa trains MNR forces at military bases in the Transvaal and provides supplies and logistical assistance to the guerrillas inside Mozambique. According to Mozambican field commanders in Tete and Manica provinces, MNR forces are regularly resupplied between 8:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m., both by C-47 transports and by helicopters, and Frelimo forces lack the communication and air support needed to prevent these air-drops. Mozambique's long coastline is also ideally suited for naval landings. Captured MNR documents suggest that this is the preferred route—it is much cheaper for South Africa, and Mozambique's fledgling navy cannot patrol effectively. In addition to the small arms, mortars, mines, and antiaircraft weaponry, Mozambican officials acknowledge that the MNR receives communications equipment that is far more sophisticated than that available to their own forces. This enables MNR bands to maintain contact with South Africa, whose reconnaissance planes flying inside Mozambique provide valuable information on Mozambican troop movements.

South African support breathed new life into the MNR whose numbers increased substantially. John Bursleson, a British ecologist held captive by the MNR for several months, was told in early 1982 that it had between 15,000 and 17,000 troops. Most observers place its strength at no more than one-third this figure which, nevertheless, represents a sizable guerrilla force for Mozambique's 25,000-person army to try to contain.

Most MNR recruits seem to have been coerced into joining. According to Sara Muchalima, "The bandits came to my house and told my parents I had to go with them. My father refused, but they beat him up, tied my hands, and with a gun to my head took me to their base at Garangua." Bursleson observed that those forcibly recruited were kept under armed surveillance until they participated in their first raids, whereupon they were warned that if they fled and were captured by government troops, they would be killed as terrorists. Fearing retribution, most feel that they have no choice but to stay and participate in future MNR activities, although a number have managed to escape.

The MNR has also skillfully manipulated tribal divisions and appealed to "traditional" Shona values to gain support. Like the Portuguese colonial regime, MNR propaganda claims that Frelimo is dominated by southerners and that it has systematically discriminated against groups living in Manica and Sofala provinces, especially the Shona-speaking Ndaou and Manica. That the MNR military commanders tend to come from these two groups adds credibility to the claim that when Mozambique is liberated the situation will be reversed. The MNR embraces the chiefs and spirit mediums and seeks to enshrine itself in the Shona past in order to enhance its legitimacy. These positions appeal to the region's "traditionalists" who are dissatisfied with the government's attacks on such practices as bride-price, polygamy, and ancestor worship, which are considered to be reactionary and exploitative.

Finally, the economic problems plaguing Mozambique make MNR recruitment that much easier. Droughts, which the MNR attribute to the alienated ancestors, the Mozambican government's failure to provide sufficient support for the family farming sector, and the lack of consumer goods in parts of Manica, Sofala, and Inhambane provide fertile ground for MNR overtures.

Whatever the initial attraction of MNR appeals to economic dissatisfaction and tradition, wide-scale plundering and increasing terrorism quickly evaporate its support and alienate the rural population which, above all else, wants to be left alone. Peasants from Gaza who fled to Zimbabwe to avoid the MNR spoke of repeated MNR atrocities. "At Madura, they came and demanded money and food. They accused some people of being informers for government forces and cut off the nose, lips, and ears of a number of people. Then they told them to go and report to Frelimo." Another refugee added: "They raped girls, using sticks, and left them to die. In some cases, they cut off men's private parts and hung them on a tree." Reports filtering in from the bush make it clear that these are not isolated acts by a few disaffected MNR members but rather reflect the underlying strategy of an organization committed to banditry, marauding, and terrorism. A captured bandit, Raque, admitted that he and his compatriots were ordered to rob and terrorize the population in order to discredit the government. "We cut off many people's ears," he said. "We sent them off and said, 'Now go to Frelimo and say that we've been here.'" A young officer told us how MNR guerrillas had attacked unarmed peasants living in communal villages in Sofala. "Those whom they did not initially kill were locked in their houses, which were set afire." According to accounts from Inhambane, the MNR murdered people and stuffed them in wells in order to poison the water, and in one of its most violent actions, terrorists stopped a packed train on August 9 and raked it with machine-gun fire, killing 14 and wounding 50 others. One high-ranking Western diplomat, who admitted that he was initially skeptical, now finds "reports of widespread MNR barbarism credible."

The MNR's intensified reign of terror and its reliance on narrow tribal appeals directed exclusively at Shona-speaking peoples, only one of a dozen ethnic and cultural groups in the country, belie its claim that it is a nationalist movement of freedom fighters disillusioned with the Marxist strategy of the present government. Apart from its anticommunist rhetoric, it lacks any political program and has made no effort to organize the peasants in the areas in which it operates. All the evidence suggests that it is little more than an arm of South African security.

Nevertheless, the MNR is an important arm and has played a significant role in Pretoria's undeclared economic, political, and psychological war against Mozambique and its SADCC allies. Roving bands repeatedly attack strategic economic targets, cutting railroad lines, mining roads, and bridges, interdicting traffic, and plundering communal villages, state farms, and shops. In many parts of Sofala, Manica, and Inhambane their actions have paralyzed the already fragile rural economy.

MNR forces have also disrupted key development projects. In May 1982, Sweden evacuated 50 technicians working on a major reforestation project in Manica that is to supply a multimillion dollar wood processing and paper industry. Mineral prospecting and geological surveys in Scfala, Zambezia, and Manica were also disrupted earlier this year.

But South Africa's main target right now appears to be SADCC. At the SADCC organizing conference in 1980, the member nations agreed that strengthening the transportation and communication links, without which all other forms of regional cooperation are impractical, had to receive the highest priority. About \$600 million was pledged by foreign donors for transportation projects, including upgrading Mozambican railroad lines and increasing the port capacities of Beira and Maputo so that land-locked Swaziland, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Zambia could divert their traffic from South African ports.

The importance of the two railroad lines from Zimbabwe to Maputo and Beira to this strategy explains the insistence of South African security officials in their 1980 meeting with Dhlakama that both be regularly sabotaged. In fact, this has occurred repeatedly. The latest attack on the line from Maputo to Zimbabwe took place in July 1982, cutting service for 50 days. Although it is now open, many Zimbabwean companies have decided to continue relying on Durban despite the appreciably lower cost of shipping through Maputo and the 10-day shorter turnaround time there, when all runs well. The port of Beira, historically Zimbabwe's major international outlet, has suffered the most. Last year Zimbabwe exported only 12,000 tons through Beira, a mere fraction of presanctions trade. Mozambican officials acknowledge that MNR attacks "have created a profound sense of insecurity and discredited the port in the eyes of many Zimbabwean firms."

Early this year the Mozambican leadership turned its attention to combating the escalating MNR threat. It quickly acknowledged the need for a new military and political strategy, one that would incorporate aspects of guerrilla warfare and peasant mobilization that Frelimo had previously used successfully.

Shortly after independence, in the face of impending attacks from the Smith regime, the government had disbanded most guerrilla units and begun to organize a conventional army composed of draftees, believing that tanks, artillery, and jets—however antiquated—would be an effective deterrent. Then, in late 1979, euphoric about Zimbabwean independence, Mozambique disbanded many rural militia units thinking that MNR activity would cease. As a result, it was unprepared for the MNR's resurgence in late 1980. Frelimo, which during the armed struggle had been so effective as a guerrilla movement, found itself trying to contain guerrillas—who had sophisticated logistical support from Pretoria—with a relatively inexperienced, poorly equipped conventional army. To remedy this situation the government, in May 1982, activated more than 1,500 former freedom fighters, many of whom are organized into counterinsurgency forces whose job is to harass the terrorists deep in the bush. Others, working under newly appointed provincial military commanders, all with substantial experience in the armed struggle, have assumed responsibility for revitalizing the civilian militias in the war zones. As of August 1982, about 40 percent of the adult rural population in Sofala was armed, and in the capital the newly formed militia boasted upward of 30,000 men and women. Although the quality and performance of the militia are varied, they have blunted several MNR attacks in Inhambane and Sofala.

Revitalizing the militia is part of a broader strategy of regaining the confidence and support of peasants living in the war zones. This is not an easy task. For more than five years, many in the affected areas have been subjected to periodic attacks, first from Rhodesian forces and then from the MNR, from which the FPLM (the Mozambican army) could not protect them. As one close advisor to President Machel acknowledge, "Frelimo used up a lot of its political capital during the Zimbabwean war" by assuring peasants that peace in Zimbabwe would bring prosperity to Mozambique. That the peasants have legitimate grievances that the government must now address was also stressed by Armando Gabueza, ranking member of Frelimo's Central Committee, and resident minister of war-torn Sofala: "We cannot stand idly by but must attack the economic and social problems, especially the lack of material goods."

There is evidence that this is already taking place. According to a knowledgeable Western journalist based in Maputo, "The army is helping to rebuild villages, dig wells, and so on, as it did in the liberation war." And despite acute shortages of capital, the Frelimo party made the political decision to provide state support for the family sector that it had ignored in its campaign to promote communal villages and state farms. Thus, this year for the first time agricultural implements, seeds,

and basic consumer goods, such as cloth and oil, may be available to peasants living in the war zones.

About the long-term effects of these new policies, senior Mozambican officials are cautiously optimistic. Since May 1982, government forces have become more active and have captured a number of MNR bases. The oil pipeline to Zimbabwe has been functioning since June, and the railway between Maputo and Zimbabwe reopened in August.

Nevertheless, Mozambican authorities emphasize that these are just the first skirmishes in a long-term struggle with the MNR's backer—the apartheid regime of South Africa. That regime has invested a great deal, and is likely to invest even more, to ensure that the SADCC nations remain in a perpetual state of economic dependency. Of equal importance is Pretoria's need to prevent the emergence in Mozambique of a prosperous, nonracial society that could serve as a beacon of hope for South Africa's oppressed millions.

MOZAMBIQUE REBELS: DO THEIR GUNS, MONEY COME FROM SOUTH AFRICA?

(By Allen and Barbara Isaacman)

MAPUTO, MOZAMBIQUE.—“We are in a decisive battle in which the real enemy is South Africa,” a senior Mozambican government minister says.

South Africa, many top officials here allege, is craftily making it appear as though increasingly bold attacks on towns, power lines, and bridges in this nation's border regions are staged by Mozambican rebels who are ideologically opposed to the country's leftist leaders.

But in fact, these officials say, South Africa is the driving force behind the rebel strikes. The guerrillas, they assert, are but proxies with no political vision—many of them mercenaries—in a South African maneuver to dislodge Mozambique's leftist-leaning government.

South Africa's main weapon in this drive, say high-level military and civilian officials, is the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR), which they describe as a disparate band of guerrillas organized by ex-Portuguese secret police agents and Rhodesian security agents in 1976. This story is corroborated by former Rhodesian Intelligence Chief Ken Flowers, who was intimately associated with the project.

South Africa's ties to the MNR date from its formation, although it was not until late in 1979, when the Rhodesian government was shifting to black control, that South Africa took charge of the group, the officials say.

The South African parental link to the MNR appears to be corroborated in an MNR document captured by the Mozambican Army and seen by the writers of this story. Minutes of a meeting between MNR Supreme Commander Alfonso Dhlakama and Rhodesian and South African security men, quote Mr. Dhlakama as saying, “You South Africans are like my parents. . . . Everything depends on you.” Dhlakama is said to have been handpicked to lead the group by the Rhodesians and South Africans.

Over the past few years, with Pretoria's backing, the MNR has intensified its military activity in the southern half of Mozambique, attacking bridges, railroad lines, and communal villages—apparently in an effort to paralyze Mozambique's economy.

South Africa's overriding objective, however, is said by Mozambican officials to be to sabotage the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference, the regional alliance of Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Angola, Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, Malawi, Zambia and Tanzania forged to break South Africa's economic domination of the region.

Another captured MNR document, seen by the writers, describes a meeting between Dhlakama and Col. Van Nierok of South African security on Oct. 25, 1980, in which Van Nierok ordered the MNR to “interdict rail traffic [in southern Mozambique], establish bases inside Mozambique adjacent to the South African border, open a new military front in Maputo Province.”

These activities, according to the captured documents, were intended to discourage Zimbabwe from exporting its commodities through Maputo, Mozambique's capital, which was drawing substantial traffic away from South African ports.

South Africa promised to supply rebels with large amounts of war material in exchange for specific acts of sabotage, according to the documents. The war material included rockets, mortars and small arms, and advisers “who will not teach but also participate in attacks,” according to the documents.

Mozambican Army commanders interviewed by the writers indicated that the Army had encountered “Boers” in battles against the rebels in central Mozambique. When pressed to explain what they meant, a young officer who fought in the north-

ern province of Manica said that his battalion discovered the bodies of several European soldiers when they overran an MNR base at Chidogo. South African passports and other documents were captured at other MNR bases, he said.

The Mozambican military and civilian officials say South Africa is training MNR forces at military bases in the Transvaal Province bordering Mozambique. They say it is providing supplies and logistical assistance to the guerrillas inside Mozambique.

According to Mozambican field commanders in Manica and Tete provinces, MNR forces are regularly supplied at night. They say the Mozambique government forces lack the communications and air support to prevent such air drops. And the country's long Indian Ocean coastline is ideally suited for delivering armaments by sea.

Western diplomats here estimate the MNR's numbers at about 5,000. Many, if not most, of the rebel recruits seem to be coerced into joining.

A Mozambican woman, Sara Muchalima, says: "The bandits came to my house and told my parents I had to go with them. My father refused, but they beat him up, tied my hands, and with a gun to my head took me to their base at Garangua."

Further corroboration comes from John Bursleson, a British ecologist held prisoner by the MNR for several months, who reports seeing hundreds of forced recruits kept under armed guard.

But Mozambique has serious economic problems and this, too, is a factor contributing to guerrilla recruitment, observers say. Droughts, failure of the family farming sector, and lack of consumer goods in some areas provide fertile ground for MNR recruitment. The MNR also appears to play on tribal values against the leftist ideology.

But as quickly as the support builds for the MNR, it fades. Looting and terrorism in the areas in which the MNR is active are alienating the rural population. A growing number of peasants have fled to Zimbabwe.

In Inhambane Province, refugees said the MNR murdered people and stuffed them into wells. Refugees said an MNR band stopped a train on Aug. 9 and raked it with machine-gun fire; 14 persons were reported killed and 50 wounded.

One top Western diplomat, who admitted that he was initially skeptical of such reports about the MNR, now says he finds "reports of widespread MNR barbarism credible."

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much.

Dr. Isaacman, I would like to ask, if you could, to supply the committee with the documentary materials to which you referred, and the timeframe that you indicated would be perfectly acceptable.

Let me just say, again, I apologize for the time stringencies under which I have asked you all to operate, given the number of witnesses and the number of questions that I know I and others would like to put to you. We would ask you to hold to those timeframes and to summarize your remarks, if you don't mind. I don't mean to be rude, but that warning is to try to assist you in coming to a conclusion.

Dr. Bender.

STATEMENT OF GERALD J. BENDER, SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Mr. BENDER. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I want to compliment you on your wisdom of holding hearings on the urgent problem of destabilization in southern Africa during this lameduck session. It is reassuring to know that at least some Members of Congress are aware of the dangers facing the United States and southern Africa. As I am sure these hearings will reveal, the Republic of South Africa's destabilization campaign threatens not only her neighbors but American regional and global interests as well.

I appreciate the opportunity you have provided me to share some of my views. I have been conducting research in Africa for exactly

two decades—the last 15 years focused exclusively on southern Africa. During the last decade and a half I have made eight separate trips to Angola and other countries in the area, including Mozambique and South Africa. I have lived in Angola for almost a year during the late 1960's when it was still a Portuguese colony, and have spent over a year in the country since independence on seven separate trips during which my wife and I traveled to most parts of the country.

I have published a book on Angola and almost 50 articles in academic journals and major newspapers on southern Africa and American policy toward this important region. I have always tried to be scrupulously objective, and I believe that, with few exceptions, my analyses and predictions have stood the test of time.

There are few mysteries surrounding South Africa's policies toward her neighbors in southern Africa. One does not require secret briefings by the CIA, DIA, NSA, or any other agency to see that South Africa's strategy toward African states in the region incorporates four types of violent activities:

One, to attack camps in neighboring states which harbor armed or civilian nationalists, such as SWAPO and ANC, who are hostile to Pretoria;

Two, to arm, finance, and logistically assist dissident movements, such as UNITA and MNR, in waging armed insurrection against established governments in the region;

Three, to carry out sabotage against economic targets, such as the refinery in Angola, bridges in Angola, oil pipelines in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and powerlines in Mozambique;

And, finally, to bomb, militarily invade, and occupy important parts of the sovereign territory of her neighbors, for example, in southern Angola.

While these four components of South Africa's policy in the region are well known, less clear are the motivations, intentions, and goals which underlie this policy. For example, are South Africa's direct and indirect military operations against Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and others designed to topple the existing governments, or only to soften them up to be more compliant with South African demands and strategies? Are South African military operations inside Angola intended to destroy SWAPO or only weaken the movement to lessen its chances of winning an election?

Answers to these questions are necessary and urgent before we determine if Pretoria is, indeed, serious in her negotiations with the United States and other members of the contact group. Thus far, the Reagan administration has chosen to accept the most optimistic interpretation of South Africa's violent policy. This has enabled them to sustain their hope and optimism that it is possible to negotiate an internationally acceptable solution to the Namibian problem.

I have expressed my pessimism over the administration's optimism elsewhere, which I would like to append to my testimony with your permission, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLPE. Without objection.

Mr. BENDER. In addition, a recent opinion poll published by the South African Institute of International Affairs shows that 60 percent of the white population—including both English and Afrikaan-

speaking peoples—oppose direct negotiations with SWAPO and a majority of these whites believe that a military victory over SWAPO is possible. If the South African Government is responsive to its own white electorate, it is difficult to make anything but the most ominous interpretations of Pretoria's violent policies in southern Africa.

Yet, while the Congress, media, and academic community debate South Africa's true intentions, people are dying every day as a result of Pretoria's violent policies in the region.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, too often we forget during our debates over policies and strategies that there are real victims out there who suffer more each day as a result of the nasty and invidious policies of South Africa. Hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of Africans eat a little less, hurt a little more, and die each day as a consequence of Pretoria's direct and indirect use of violence in southern Africa. The fact is that each day Namibian independence is postponed, large numbers of Africans in many countries will pay a price in suffering.

I have had the sad opportunity to witness firsthand the Namibian and Angolan victims of this policy of aggression. I have seen not only the malnourished, starving children, but villagers in the Cunene Province in southern Angola traumatized by the incessant bombing and overflights from South African aircraft. The depth of this trauma was brought home to me 2 years ago in the Cunene Province when some peasants I encountered became almost catatonic with fear when they mistook me for the South African pilot who had been shot down in his helicopter the previous day.

The magnitude of damage which South Africa has directly and indirectly inflicted on Angola is impossible to calculate fully. Moreover, one does not even know how to factor in such intangibles as psychological traumas and nutritional deficiencies. The International Red Cross considers the problem of nutrition in Angola to be among the most acute in the world today. In a speech commemorating the seventh anniversary of Angolan independence on November 11, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos calculated that South Africa has caused over \$10 billion worth of material damage in Angola since 1975.

It is not possible to know how accurate the Angolan President's estimate is because he provides no breakdowns of that damage. Does the figure include the more than \$200 million worth of arms that South Africa seized during a major operation in Angola last year, and does it include all UNITA attacks or only those in conjunction with South African military operations? I asked several Western diplomats in Luanda this summer if they found the MPLA claims of damage against them were greatly exaggerated, and all of them said that they were, as far as they could verify, which has been my own experience actually. I will leave, however, the exact extent of the material damage to those more expert.

It is sufficient to say that the destruction which South Africa has perpetrated against the Angolan infrastructure—from sabotaging the oil refinery and major bridges, to bombing trucks loaded with food—is immense. While the direct costs of South African aggression can be measured in dollars and bodies, the indirect costs are even greater but not easily measurable. A large number of skilled

Angolans are diverted to the military effort, leaving voids in civilian bureaucracies which are often filled with expensive foreign technicians. More importantly, however, is the fact that continued South African attacks against Angola postpone not only Namibian independence but reconciliation within Angola. South Africa represents the greatest barrier today to that reconciliation, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, in your own opening remarks.

This assertion is, of course, directly contrary to the conventional wisdom, held by many in this administration, which maintains that South African attacks actually promote Angolan reconciliation because the cessation of these attacks can be bargained with the MPLA as the price for reconciling with UNITA.

For reasons I will develop in a moment, this belief, like so much of the conventional wisdom about Angola over the past decade, is wrong. Not only wrong, but dangerous, because it encourages some, including Pretoria, to add a second linkage demanded of Angola for a settlement of Namibia: The MPLA is supposed to first expel the Cuban troops, and second, to reconcile with UNITA. If either or both of these links are demanded of the MPLA government, I am certain that there will be no settlement of the Namibian question during the Reagan administration. Moreover, if the United States is perceived by the international community as the cause of the linkages, it is Washington which will be correctly blamed for the failure in Namibia.

There is a corollary to this conventional wisdom which should also be noted and dismissed. It holds that the longer the South African pressure continues against Angola, the more dissension it causes the infamous so-called "factions" within the MPLA.

Ultimately, it is argued, the so-called "moderate faction," which allegedly favors immediate reconciliation with UNITA, will see that the only hope for peace is to overthrow the so-called "Hardliners" and thus the moderates will carry out a coup. Such a view represents a total misreading of the factions within the MPLA. There are fluid factions in the MPLA over many issues, but on one issue there is almost total consensus: reconciliation is an issue which will be dealt with after South African support for UNITA greatly attenuates or ceases, not before. This does not mean that I personally endorse this timetable. In fact, I personally believe that reconciliation should have occurred yesterday and should not be put off until tomorrow. But my view here merely represents my understanding of the views of the MPLA leadership, both the so-called hardliners and so-called moderates.

This conclusion should not surprise anybody familiar with negotiations. The MPLA is no more anxious to negotiate with UNITA while she carries her South African baggage to the table than UNITA is interested in negotiating with the MPLA and its Cuban baggage. Since the UNITA-South African link serves as a barrier to reconciliation, the question which all are prompted to ask at this point is, what is the extent of South African assistance to UNITA and what are the ramifications on reconciliation?

I have already written extensively on this question and intend to devote further effort to it in the near future and, therefore, I do not want to take the time today to discuss it unless you want to bring it up in our question period. For now, suffice it to say that

the support is extensive, although not so great as to "occasion the collapse of UNITA," as W. Scott Thompson, Deputy Director of USIA, recently speculated might occur if SWAPO took over Namibia "given the intricately intertwined relationship of UNITA and its (South African) backers. * * *" Many in the MPLA, incorrectly perceive UNITA to be a South African puppet or totally beholden to Pretoria. For them, the "UNITA problem" will disappear once South Africa withdraws from Namibia. For others, UNITA is seen as a tribalist movement, because of the strong support that it has traditionally attracted from the Ovimbundu peoples—who represent about a third of the Angolan population. Still others hold both views of UNITA. Unfortunately for the MPLA, the so-called UNITA problem will not disappear with the cessation of South African support for the movement, nor can there ever be meaningful economic development in the country until reconciliation occurs. But it appears that these lessons will not be understood nor can they be dealt with until after the independence of Namibia is a reality.

Thus, it would be futile for the United States to demand or link reconciliation in the negotiations presently underway. There are ways in which the United States might usefully promote the cause of reconciliation in Angola, but these could only work after the Namibian problem has been resolved and diplomatic relations established between Washington and Luanda.

Mr. WOLPE. Would you conclude the statement, please.

Mr. BENDER. At present, however, any American policy which either encourages South African aggression or reacts to it with "benign silence" merely undermines the prospects for that reconciliation. The most important contribution the Reagan administration could make in this respect would be to convince South Africa to stop its violent policies in Angola.

The Reagan administration has claimed that its policy of constructive engagement would produce independence in Namibia and peace in southern Africa. Is the administration prepared to acknowledge that it has not produced the promised results? Will it devise a new policy capable of producing results? Or will it stick with the present, ineffective policy, showing the world that producing results was not the intention in the first place?

The Congress must press the administration for clarity, action, intent, and, most of all, results.

Thank you very much.

[Mr. Bender's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GERALD J. BENDER, SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I want to compliment you for your wisdom in holding hearings on the urgent problem of "Destabilization in Southern Africa" during this lame duck session. It is reassuring to know that at least some members of Congress are aware of dangers facing the United States in southern Africa. As I am certain these hearings will reveal, the Republic of South Africa's destabilization campaign threatens not only her neighbors but American regional and global interests as well.

I appreciate the opportunity you have provided me to share some of my views. I have been conducting research in Africa for exactly two decades -- the last fifteen years focused exclusively on southern Africa. During the last decade and a half I have made eight separate trips to Angola and other countries in the area (e.g., Mozambique, South Africa). I lived in Angola for almost a year during the late 1960's, when it was still a Portuguese colony, and have spent over a year in the country since independence on seven trips during which my wife and I travelled to most parts of the country. I have published a book on Angola and almost fifty articles in academic journals and major newspapers on southern Africa and American policy towards this important region. I have always tried to be scrupulously objective, and I believe that with few exceptions, my analyses and predictions have stood the test of time.

There are few mysteries surrounding South Africa's policies towards her neighbors in southern Africa. One does not require secret briefings by the CIA, DIA, NSA, or any other agency to see that South Africa's strategy towards African states in the region incorporates four types of violent activities:

- To attack camps in neighboring states which harbor armed or civilian nationalists (e.g., SWAPO and ANC) hostile to Pretoria;
- To arm, finance and logistically assist dissident movements (e.g., UNITA, MNR) waging armed insurrection against established governments;
- To carry out sabotage against economic targets (e.g., refinery in Angola, oil pipeline in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and powerlines in Mozambique);
- To bomb, militarily invade, and occupy important parts of the sovereign territory of her neighbors (e.g., southern Angola)

While these four components of South Africa's policy in the region are well known, less clear are the motivations, intentions and goals which underlie this policy. For example, are South Africa's direct and indirect military operations against Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and others designed to topple the existing governments or "only" to soften them up to be more compliant with South African demands and strategies? Are South African military operations inside Angola intended to destroy SWAPO or "only" weaken the movement to lessen its chance of winning an election? Answers to these questions are necessary and urgent before we can determine if Pretoria is indeed serious in her negotiations with the United States and other members of the Contact Group. Thus far, the Reagan Administration has chosen to accept the most optimistic interpretation of South Africa's violent policy. This has enabled them to sustain their hope and optimism that it is possible to negotiate an internationally acceptable solution of the Namibian problem.

I have expressed my pessimism over the Administration's optimism elsewhere, which I would like to append to my testimony with your permission, Mr. Chairman. In addition, a recent opinion poll published by the South African Institute of International Affairs shows that 60 percent of the white population (including both English- and Afrikaans-speaking peoples) oppose direct negotiations with SWAPO and a majority believe that a military victory over SWAPO is possible. If the South African Government is responsive to its own white electorate, it is difficult to make anything but the most ominous interpretations of Pretoria's violent policies in southern Africa.

Yet, while the Congress, media and academic community debate South Africa's true intentions, people are dying every day as a result of Pretoria's violent policies in the region. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, too often we forget during our debates over policies and strategies that there are real victims out there who suffer more each day as a result of the nasty and invidious policies of South Africa. Hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of Africans eat a little less, hurt a bit more and even die each day as a consequence of Pretoria's direct and indirect use of violence in southern Africa. The fact is that each day Namibian independence is postponed, large numbers of Africans in many countries will pay a price in suffering.

I have had the sad opportunity to witness first-hand the Namibian and Angolan victims of this policy of aggression. I have seen not only the malnourished, starving children but villagers in the Cunene Province

traumatized by the incessant bombings and overflights from South African aircraft. The depth of this trauma was brought home to me two years ago in the Cunene Province when some peasants I encountered became almost catatonic with fear when they mistook me for the South African pilot who had been shot down in his helicopter the previous day.

The magnitude of the damage which South Africa has directly and indirectly inflicted on Angola is impossible to calculate fully. Moreover, one does not even know how to factor in such intangibles as psychological traumas and nutritional deficiencies. The International Red Cross considers the problem of nutrition in Angola to be among the most acute in the world today. In a speech commemorating the seventh anniversary of Angolan independence on November 11, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos calculated that South Africa has caused over \$10 billion worth of "material damage" in Angola since 1975.

It is not possible to know how accurate the Angolan President's estimate is because he provides no breakdowns of that damage. Does the figure include the more than \$20 million worth of arms that South Africa seized during a major operation in Angola last year, and does it include all UNITA attacks or only those in conjunction with South African military operations? I asked several Western diplomats in Luanda this summer if they found the MPLA greatly exaggerated their losses and all said that they generally found them to be accurate, insofar as the claims could be verified. This has also been my own experience. But even if we assume that dos Santos exaggerated by a factor of three, the amount of material damage is still several billions of dollars!

I will leave the exact extent of the material damage to those more expert. It is sufficient to say that the destruction which South Africa has perpetrated against the Angolan infrastructure -- from sabotaging the oil refinery and major bridges to bombing trucks loaded with food -- is immense! While the direct costs of South African aggression can be measured in dollars and bodies, the indirect costs are even greater but not easily measurable. A large number of skilled Angolans are diverted to the military effort, leaving voids in civilian bureaucracies which are often filled by expensive foreign technicians. More importantly, however, is the fact that continued South African attacks against Angola postpone not only Namibian independence but reconciliation within Angola. South Africa represents the greatest barrier today to that reconciliation.

This assertion is, of course, directly contrary to the conventional wisdom -- held by many in this Administration -- which maintains that South African attacks actually promote Angolan reconciliation because their cessation can be bargained with the MPLA as the price for reconciling with UNITA. For reasons I will develop in a moment, this belief, like so much of the conventional wisdom about Angola over the past decade, is wrong! Not only wrong but dangerous because it encourages some (including Pretoria) to add a second linkage demanded of Luanda for a settlement of Namibia: (1) Expel the Cuban combat troops and (2) Reconcile with UNITA. If either or both of these links are demanded of the Angolan Government, I am certain that there will be no settlement of the Namibian question during the Reagan Administration.

Moreover, if the U.S. is perceived by the international community as the cause of the linkages, it is Washington which will be, correctly, blamed for the failure in Namibia.

There is a corollary to this conventional wisdom which should also be noted and dismissed. It holds that the longer the South African pressure continues against Angola, the more dissension it causes the infamous "factions" within the MPLA. Ultimately, it is argued, the so-called moderate faction which allegedly favors immediate reconciliation with UNITA will see that the only hope for peace is to overthrow the so-called "hardliners" and thus they will carry out a coup. Such a view represents a total misreading of the factions within the MPLA. There are fluid factions in the MPLA over many issues but on one issue there is almost total consensus: Reconciliation is an issue which will be dealt with after South African support for UNITA greatly attenuates or ceases, not before. This does not mean that I endorse this timetable (personally I think reconciliation should have occurred yesterday and not put off until tomorrow) but merely represents my understanding of the views of the MPLA leadership after long discussions with many members of the Central Committee (both so-called moderates and hardliners).

This conclusion should not surprise anybody familiar with negotiating. The MPLA is no more anxious to negotiate with UNITA while she carries her South African baggage to the table than UNITA is interested in negotiating with the MPLA and its Cuban baggage. Since the UNITA-South African link serves as a barrier to reconciliation, the question which all are prompted to

ask at this point is: What is the extent of South African assistance to UNITA and what are the ramifications on reconciliation?

I have already written extensively on this question and intend to devote further effort to it in the near future, and, therefore, I do not want to take the time to examine the relationship in detail here. (We could, perhaps, return to this during the question period if you are interested.) For now, suffice it to say that the support is extensive, although not so great as to "occasion the collapse of UNITA," as W. Scott Thompson, Deputy Director of USIA, recently speculated might occur if SWAPO took over Namibia "given the intricately intertwined relationship of UNITA and its [South African] backers...." Many in the MPLA, incorrectly perceive UNITA to be a South African puppet or totally beholden to Pretoria. For them, the "UNITA problem" will disappear once South Africa withdraws from Namibia. For others, UNITA is seen as a tribalist movement, because of the strong support that it has traditionally attracted from the Ovimbundu peoples -- who represent about a third of the Angolan population. Still others hold both views of UNITA. Unfortunately for the MPLA, the so-called UNITA problem will not disappear with the cessation of South African support for the movement, nor can there ever be meaningful economic development in the country until reconciliation occurs. But it appears that these lessons will not be understood nor can they be dealt with until after the independence of Namibia is a reality.

Thus, it would be futile for the United States to demand or link reconciliation in the negotiations presently under way. There are ways in which the U.S. might usefully promote the cause of reconciliation in Angola

but these could only work after the Namibian problem has been resolved and diplomatic relations established between Washington and Luanda. At present, however, any American policy which either encourages South African aggression or reacts to it with "benign silence" merely undermines the prospects for reconciliation. The most important contribution the Reagan Administration could make in this respect would be to convince South Africa to stop its violent policies in Angola.

Finally, while none of the countries in southern Africa has escaped Pretoria's vengeance and destabilization, Angola has been especially victimized. It has suffered tens of thousands of human casualties and billions of dollars of material damage. Moreover, South Africa's destabilization of Angola represents the greatest barrier to national reconciliation. Ultimately, Pretoria will exit Namibia and cease its attacks against Angola leaving in its wake massive destruction and death. All for the cynical goal of "gaining a little more time" against the inevitable.

The Reagan Administration has claimed that its policy of constructive engagement would produce independence in Namibia and peace in southern Africa. Is the Administration prepared to acknowledge that it has not produced the promised results? Will it devise a new policy capable of producing results? Or will it stick with the present, ineffective policy, showing the world that producing results was not the intention in the first place?

The Congress must press the Administration for clarity, action, intent, and, most of all, results!

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Dr. Bender.
Mr. William Sutherland.

**STATEMENT OF WILLIAM SUTHERLAND, CONSULTANT,
AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE**

Mr. SUTHERLAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My name is William Sutherland. I am a consultant on African and African-American Affairs and I reside in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, East Africa. At present I am on special assignment with the American Friends Service Committee, but from 1974 through 1981 I was on the staff of AFSC as southern Africa representative. During that time I have traveled constantly throughout the frontline states which are concerned with helping the people of southern Africa attain liberation and throughout the United States interpreting to people here events in that part of the world.

I have been based in Africa since December 1953, primarily in Ghana and Tanzania. For 30 years my main interest and involvement has been with African liberation movements, although I have also worked for the Governments of both Ghana and Tanzania.

Today my paper discusses in some detail the destabilization attempts in two countries—the Seychelle Islands and Zimbabwe. The Seychelles have had a very close relationship with Tanzania where I reside. In Zimbabwe, I have known the leaders of the Zimbabwe movement for over 20 years, although I first visited Zimbabwe as part of an unofficial observer team of the 1980 preindependence elections. Since that time I have made several more visits, in 1981 and 1982, and most recently in September of this year.

Now, I am not going to attempt to go into detail. My paper is there before you. I just want to state that the South African Government's support of an attempted coup in the Seychelles is an almost classic case of international terrorism which we would not have known about had not the coup failed and had not there been two trials, one in the Seychelles and one in Pietermaritzburg in South Africa.

At the time of those trials, the proof of South African involvement was so clear that the South African Defense Minister, Gen. Magnus Malan, called for certain evidence not to be heard because it would be dangerous to the security of the state.

Now, it is always hard, of course, to get evidence about destabilization and that is true to some extent with what has gone on in Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, on August 18, when there was an incursion into Zimbabwe and three former Rhodesian soldiers were killed, the colleagues of these soldiers were angry and revealed a great deal about South African activity against neighboring states. They contradicted the official version of unauthorized missions and declared that the South African Government had a policy of invading neighboring countries and a destabilization center in Pretoria.

The investigating committee of the EEC, which met with the ACP in February in Salisbury, as it was called then, did receive complaints from several of the countries about South Africa's destabilization activities and in July of this year all the leaders of the nine nations of the Southern African Development Coordinating

Conference condemned unequivocally South Africa's acts of aggression.

I think we have gone enough into the patterns of aggression, but just to reemphasize two patterns of aggression that we have seen: One, in which there is an arrogant violation of all borders, where hit squads and secret agents infiltrate and assassinate opponents of apartheid, and the other, where there is support of dissident forces who are trying to prevent, through destruction, regional development under the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference.

Now, on the whole question of the military and political effects, certainly we need to emphasize once more how new countries with scarce resources have had to use those resources for military defense, for rebuilding their damaged infrastructures, and for caring for refugees. While the citizens of those new countries have looked forward, after hard long struggles, to independence and development, that has not happened, and the plans for regional development have been set back. It is possible that through these attempts at destabilization some potential investors in the area have been discouraged because of "some kind of instability."

With regard to the U.S. policy, and the question of whether the U.S. policy curbs or arrests destabilization, we can say it not only fails to curb or arrest destabilization by the South African regime, but it actually promotes destabilization. The United States has provided South Africa with an excuse to continue its illegal occupation of Namibia, as Professor Bender has very well said, and the long-standing collusion between the intelligence services of the United States and South Africa lays the United States open to the charge that it often has precise previous knowledge of South African military operations against its neighbors, if it is not actually involved.

However, I should recommend that the U.S. Government try to build on some of the positive aspects of the administration's program. Certainly in Zimbabwe, the United States was the first country to establish an embassy. It has made some contribution to the rehabilitation of that country.

All of the countries of the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference want desperately to use their resources for development. They have indicated a willingness to go into partnership with the Western World in this development, even some of the so-called Marxist governments. I think that the United States should actively encourage such participation, rather than to adopt policies which push these countries and liberation movements to look elsewhere for help.

It is important that the United States not demand client status in its relations with Third World nations. I think one of the problems that we have is not that there is a question really of the countries of southern Africa becoming puppets of any other force, say the Soviet Union, but that we do not seem to know how to deal with countries, ourselves, unless they agree to become vassals or puppets of the United States. So, if there is a genuine policy of partnership, and if the cooperation is offered on that basis, I think it would prove mutually beneficial. The United States could improve its image which is now becoming more and more hated because it seems as though the United States is doing everything to

encourage a country which the African Continent regards in the same way that the Europeans regarded Nazi Germany during the thirties and the forties.

Thank you.

[Mr. Sutherland's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BILL SUTHERLAND, CONSULTANT, AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE

My name is Bill Sutherland. I am a consultant on African and African American Affairs residing in Dar es Salaam Tanzania East Africa. At present I am on special assignment with the American Friends Service Committee, but from 1974 through 1981 I was on staff of AFSC as Southern Africa Representative. During that time I traveled constantly throughout the frontline states which are concerned with helping the people of southern Africa attain liberation and throughout the United States interpreting to people here events in that part of the world. I have been based in Africa since December 1953, primarily in Ghana and Tanzania where I have known many of the principal figures of Eastern Central and Southern Africa, among them President Kaunda of Zambia, President Nyerere of Tanzania, Prime Minister Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Sam Nujoma of Namibia as well as many of the members of the liberation movements of South Africa itself. For thirty years my main interest and involvement has been with African liberation movements, although I have also worked for the governments of both Ghana and Tanzania.

Today I shall discuss in some detail destabilization attempts in two countries: The Seychelles Island and Zimbabwe. The Seychelles have a very close relationship with Tanzania where I reside, although they are about 1,000 miles east of mainland Tanzania. Zimbabwe I first visited as part of an unofficial observer team of the 1980 pre-independence elections. Since that time I have made

several more visits, most recently in September of this year.

My longest stay in Africa this year was in Tanzania, essentially from April through August. During that time, a subject of much discussion was the attempted coup in the Seychelles Islands and the subsequent trials held in Victoria, the Seychelles capital and ⁱⁿ Pietermaritzburg South Africa. The attempted coup has proved to be one of the clearest examples of South African involvement in destabilization attempts. According to Claudia Wright, Washington correspondent for the New Statesman, on November 25, 1981, 53 mercenaries led by Colonel Mike Hoare, who has a long history of mercenary activity in the former Congo and other African states, were involved in a gun fight at the Seychelles airport after weapons they were bringing into the country for their attack were inadvertently discovered. Hoare and most of his men escaped by hijacking an air India aircraft to South Africa. Seven persons were arrested in the Seychelles, among them Martin Dolinschek, an agent of the National Intelligence Service of South Africa. In testimony before a three man commission of Inquiry established by the UN Security Council and later during his trial in Victoria, Dolinschek testified that both military intelligence and National Intelligence Services were aware of and gave tacit approval to the plans to overthrow the Seychelles government. At the trial in South Africa, Hoare testified that the South African Defense Force had supplied the Russian AK-47 rifles plus hand grenades rocket launchers and walkie-talkies for the landing after a meeting with 2 senior officers, Brigadier Hamman and Brigadier Knoetze in Pretoria in October 1981. Hoare further stated that he was informed by Claasen, second in command of the National Intelligence Service, that the South African cabinet had given their approval to the plan. Later on at the trial the Judge agreed to a request by the South African Defense Minister General Magnus Malan that some evidence not be heard because the evidence from some defendants and witnesses about their

involvement in army activities could "prejudice state security". Hoare further maintained that the US CIA had been aware of the attempted coup but the agency had been too "timid" to back him. The Seychelles officials actually accused the US government of being in on the plan and providing covert assistance.

In both trials the defendants were found guilty, but most of the defendants in South Africa were freed after 4 months in prison.

Why did the government of South Africa support such a blatant act of international terrorism in a country so far away? Newspapers have speculated on wild theories like capturing the Russian embassy plus secrets of the KGB! It was more likely seen to be a possible base for action against Tanzania, a long-time host to South African exiles; or part of the "total war strategy" set up years ago in which any country south of the equator could be marked for military action.

Destabilization in Southern Africa:

Zimbabwe

To put the question of destabilization in Zimbabwe in perspective, two observations should be made:

1. The South African and former Rhodesian government have had the closest cooperation in military and intelligence operations for many years.
2. Zimbabwe has been the key country in the formation of the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference which challenges South Africa's continued economic domination of the region.

Destabilization by South Africa was also a major topic during my visit to Zimbabwe this past September. On August 18th, there had been a clash between South African soldiers and Zimbabwean military forces several miles inside the Zimbabwean border in the region of Sengwa. Three white South African soldiers, formerly Rhodesians, had been killed, and the black South Africans fled, leaving behind an array of Soviet bloc weapons and supplies identified as being from South Africa and Ireland. Chief of South African Military Forces, General Constand Wiljoen at first denied knowledge of the South African troops but later confirmed that they came from a base in South Africa and they were on an "unauthorized mission."

Several South African Defense Force members declared that the official version was a lie and that they are regularly deployed in raids on neighboring black states, including Zimbabwe. The SADF members were angry because the official version of an "unauthorized mission" would make the families of the dead white officers ineligible for insurance or pension benefits. The disaffected soldiers went on to say that there is a destabilization center inside defense headquarters in Pretoria working to weaken neighboring black states.

Earlier, on July 24th, approximately one-fourth of the Zimbabwe air force was put out of commission by limpet mines expertly attached to the 13 planes selected. Five planes were destroyed, including 4 new Hawk jets from Britain worth 35 million dollars, and eight others were damaged.

Between March and September of this year, the oil pipeline between the Mozambican port of Beira and Zimbabwe had been sabotaged twice and the railway cut for 17 days. The road between Malawi and Zimbabwe has suffered six ambushes during the same period. These acts have been attributed to the

Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR), a group supplied and advised by the South African government. The MNR has also been responsible for thousands of refugees who have fled to Zimbabwe from Mozambique after brutal treatment, including the cutting off of ears and noses. These refugees constitute an extra burden for the Zimbabwe government which has assumed responsibility for their welfare, including accepting their children into the overcrowded Zimbabwe school system.

Last year, in August 1981, 50 to 60 million dollars worth of ammunition was blown up at Inkomo barracks, home of the former Selous Scouts, composed of black and white Rhodesians and mercenaries. Then followed the theft of a sizeable amount of weapons from Granbourne Barracks and the arrest of Captain Patrick Gericke as an alleged South African spy. Captain Gericke escaped with the help of Detective Inspector Fred Varkevisser to South Africa. Other white Rhodesians were arrested in late 1981 and early 1982, some for being spies within the Prime Minister's office, while others were charged with having caches of weapons and trying to involve Africans in plans for secession.

Economic pressures by South Africa on Zimbabwe have been combined with the military in making life difficult. Not long after Zimbabwe's independence, South Africa withdrew the locomotives it had loaned to the former government as well as the railway technicians. Although the locomotives were later returned, this act was done at a time when transport for maize was crucial not only for Zimbabwe but also for its neighbors. The ending of the preferential trade agreement between South Africa and Zimbabwe and the manner in which black Zimbabweans have been repatriated from South Africa has also caused great hardship.

Prime Minister Mugabe, along with top officials from other black states bordering on South Africa, has been trying to call the world's attention to

South Africa's destabilization activities for several years. In February of 1982, Zimbabwean, Angolan and Zambian complaints to a European Economic Community [EEC] fact-finding mission were presented to the African, Caribbean and Pacific [ACP]-EEC consultative assembly. Prime Minister Mugabe repeated the charges he has been making since before Zimbabwean independence that between 5,000 and 6,000 mercenaries, many of them former members of Rhodesian security forces such as the Selous Scouts or former supporters of opposition politician Bishop Muzorewa, are being trained by South Africa for infiltration into Zimbabwe. Elsewhere the place for training has been located at Palaborwa near Kruger National Park in the northeastern part of South Africa. Zambia also claims that South Africa is training Zambian dissidents known as the "Machala" gang. Angolan and Mozambican claims will be presented to this committee in other papers. Violations of the airspace of neighboring states by South African planes plus infiltration by South African hit squads and secret agents have been so numerous over the past few years that an accurate count is almost impossible.

In July of this year, nine leaders of the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) condemned South Africa for its policy of destabilization "aimed at SADCC member states." The nine said bandits supported by South Africa were disrupting SADCC transport routes through Mozambique and Angola. The Namibian war had unsettled the entire region, while Zimbabwe, Botswana and Lesotho saw South Africa connections to unrest within their borders. "The object of this destabilization is to undermine the security of the SADCC member states and to sabotage SADCC efforts to achieve economic liberation", according to the final communique.

What rationale can the South African government give for its activities against Zimbabwe? In a speech reported in the Harare Herald of September 11th, 1982 to the Zimbabwean People's Militia, Prime Minister Mugabe challenged

South Africa to state what act of destabilization Zimbabwe had planned against her. Former Minister of Home Affairs Richard Hove in an earlier statement in the Rand Daily Mail of May 11, 1981, said that:

Zimbabwe remains committed...to receive and care for refugees fleeing from inhumane, repressive and racist policies...and to give political and other support through the United Nations, the OAU and other internal agencies to the people of South Africa who are struggling to liberate their country.

On the other hand, Mr. Hove denied that there were bases of the banned African National Congress of South Africa in Zimbabwe, noting that "Zimbabwe had given South Africa not the slightest pretext for hostile acts." Nevertheless, South Africa's Minister of Police, Mr. Louis Le Grange made it clear that the mere presence of a member of the ANC was enough and on July 31st, Joe Gqabi, former political prisoner on Robben Island, was shot and killed in Harare. The question of how many of the charges made against the South African government are true and to what extent internal crises and dissidents are responsible for destabilization in Zimbabwe is difficult, first because the dissident Rhodesians and the South African government have worked together for so many years that the Rhodesians often appear to act as a somewhat independent arm of South African intelligence in business for themselves.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Sutherland.
Dr. Butterfield.

**STATEMENT OF R. IAN BUTTERFIELD, FOREIGN POLICY
ANALYST, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION**

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a great pleasure to be here today to share with you my views on destabilization in southern Africa. In my capacity as foreign policy analyst for African affairs at the Heritage Foundation, a nonprofit research organization based in Washington, D.C., I am obliged to devote considerable attention to political developments in southern Africa. My work in the area has led me to formulate decided views as to the root causes of political instability in that area.

The very phrase "destabilization in southern Africa" evokes controversy. The black-ruled states of southern Africa frequently accuse the South African Government of destabilizing, that is to say, subverting, their respective national governments. In reply, South Africa reverses the charge, alleging that its neighbors are doubly guilty, since they harbor terrorist members of the Africa National Congress and they facilitate the entry of foreign troops into southern Africa, troops whose ultimate target is the Republic itself.

Most of these charges and countercharges simply cannot be verified here in the United States. Only the files of South African military intelligence truly can reveal the existence and the extent of South African interference in the affairs of the Republic's neighbors. Similarly, it is difficult to discern whether South Africa's neighbors are knowingly sheltering the guerrilla wing of the ANC.

The absence of conclusive evidence as to the guilt or innocence of the various involved parties, however, is not a signal to abandon the investigation so much as to change its course. Within the context of southern Africa, a search for heroes and villains, victims and perpetrators, usually distorts the complex realities of the situation.

Moreover, within the context of this discussion, the quest for a destabilizing power blinds us to one fundamental fact; namely, that southern Africa is an exceptionally unstable area and that instability is the product not of external interference but of domestic economic and political policies pursued by South Africa's neighbors within their own borders. In other words, political instability does not presuppose an outside destabilizing force.

If South Africa is supplying arms to dissident groups in Angola or Mozambique, it is capitalizing upon an extant situation. It is not creating that situation. So long as most of the black-ruled states of southern Africa persist in their pursuit of one-party politics, suppressing political opinion and opposition, they will continue to encounter serious domestic unrest.

The unpopularity of these one-party systems in southern Africa is exacerbated by their general tendency to implement vastly impractical economic policies based upon the dictates of "scientific socialism" rather than economic realities. If the people of a country are denied the ability to change these irrational policies and to

remove the personnel which supports them by use of the franchise, they ultimately will resort to force and popular rebellion to accomplish the necessary change.

Today we must be particularly concerned with the serious civil wars in Angola and Mozambique. In both these countries, anti-Government guerrillas have scored major successes, expanding their spheres of control and operations. We must remember that guerrilla movements require broad rural support, that no guerrilla movement has achieved such notable successes, let alone final victory, without first capturing the so-called "hearts and minds" of the people. Guerrilla movements cannot be manufactured. South Africa may or may not supply arms to dissident groups, but domestic revolts on the scale of those now in progress in Angola and Mozambique presuppose the presence of much more than arms; they presuppose the existence of a broadly disaffected and frustrated population which is willing to pick up those arms and use them. The source of this disaffection and frustration lies not within South Africa, but within the frontline states themselves.

Mozambique provides an excellent example of the case in point. In April 1974, a group of Portuguese Army officers overthrew the autocratic government of Sylvester Caetano and announced their intention of decolonizing Portugal's Africa possessions. Presumably such news would be welcome to the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, Frelimo, which had been fighting for Mozambican independence for over a decade. Frelimo did not, however, perceive this announcement as an unmitigated blessing, because the coup leaders also voiced their determination to allow the Mozambican people to select their own independent government in free national elections.

Frelimo presumably doubted its capacity to win such elections. Not only did the movement refuse to observe a cease-fire after the announcement of decolonization, its leader, Samora Machel, actually announced his intention to escalate the fighting, most of which, incidentally, was directed against Mozambican civilian targets. Subsequent talks between Portugal and Frelimo in Lusaka and Mogadishu broke down over the movement's categorical refusal to countenance a one-man, one-vote election in Mozambique, a somewhat ironic stipulation in the light of the movement's repeated demands for the holding of such elections in South Africa.

After several months of continued fighting, the Portuguese will to fight for a country which, ultimately, it intended to abandon crumbled. Army mutinies and desertions compelled Lisbon to give way to Frelimo and to sign an agreement in 1974, handing over the Mozambican Government intact to Frelimo, without elections or plebiscites.

Having come to power by force and refusing to face up to a popular test, Frelimo inevitably alienated a large segment of the Mozambican population. This problem has been exacerbated since 1974 by the illogical policies which Frelimo has followed. Apparently, Frelimo was aware of its own unpopularity at a relatively early stage, for one of its first acts upon coming to power was to establish the National Service for People's Security, a secret police force trained by East German experts.

Frelimo's illogical agricultural policies have proved uniformly disastrous. Shortly after independence, the party declared all cultivated land to be the property of the state. Within 1 year, FAO technicians estimated that Mozambique was growing only 50 percent of its food needs. Nevertheless, Frelimo refused to abandon its ideological course. On the contrary, the Minister of Agriculture was dismissed from both the Government and the party in 1978 for refusing to press on wholeheartedly with "scientific socialist" agricultural policies.

Granted, Samora Machel, on occasions, has acknowledged the failure of these ideologically oriented policies, but he has done nothing to alter them and in March 1981, strict food rationing was introduced into Maputo.

Frelimo's social policies demonstrate an acute sense of insecurity. Mozambican journalists have been placed under Government control through the agency of the National Journalists' Organization. Free trade unions formed prior to independence have been abolished and even such innocent bodies as the African Association Club, the Chinese Club, and the Muslim Recreative Association have been abolished as a result of the party's determination to control every aspect of social life.

An article which appeared in the *Washington Post* in 1977 alleged serious human rights abuses in Mozambique. Captives in Machava Prison had had their hands mutilated by knives. Others had had their heads held over spikes while soldiers danced on their shoulders.

Under such circumstances, we need not look to South Africa for the root cause of Mozambique's civil war. Any government which comes to power by force and holds on to power by force, while pursuing policies which both repress and impoverish its own people, inevitably embroils itself in domestic rebellion sooner or later.

In short, should the current Mozambican Government fall, Samora Machel and his colleagues have been the architects of their own downfall. On the other hand, if they alter their policies and allow the people of Mozambique to select their own leaders, and the style of government under which they wish to live, they need have nothing to fear from South Africa or from internal parties. The very existence of a civil war presupposes the presence of a motive and a will to fight; remove the motive and the will disappears. However, if Frelimo persists in its suicidal, one-party course, it can expect the war to continue and to escalate, with or without South African interference.

A similar situation to that in Mozambique now prevails in Angola. When the Lisbon coup signaled the decolonization of Portugal's African possessions, three groups were fighting for Angolan independence—the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, the FNLA; the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA; and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, the MPLA. I list the groups in this order deliberately because, according to newspaper and diplomatic reports at that time, the FNLA probably was the largest of the three groups, while Dr. Jonas Savimbi of UNITA was the country's single-most popular figure, probably because he had fought the war from within Angola while his rivals had directed their campaigns from the safety of

exile. The MPLA generally was viewed as the weakest of the groups, being heavily dependent upon the country's few urban areas and middle-class figures of mixed racial descent.

The three groups fought with each other for some time, but in January of 1975 signed the Alvor Agreement, by which all agreed to join together into an interim government with a view to holding national elections. The cease-fire broke down several times, with fighting between the FNLA and MPLA largely because the latter's importation of large supplies of Soviet weaponry into Luanda, rendering the FNLA suspicious of MPLA intentions.

Ultimately, the MPLA used those Soviet arms and imported Cuban troops to seize the capital, virtually annihilate the FNLA, and declare itself the legitimate Government of Angola. Henceforth, Angola would be directed by a minority government which would refuse to hold the free elections which it had promised to abide by in the Alvor Agreement. Instead, it staked its survival on the protection afforded by foreign troops, an inherently unstable situation, regardless of South Africa conduct.

The Cubans, who had proved so successful against the FNLA, proved useless, however, when faced with UNITA forces in the south. In this region, Dr. Savimbi enjoys the support of Angola's largest tribal group, in a part of the world where tribal loyalties count for a great deal. Consequently, between 1975 and 1977, he was able to hang on to his stronghold in Cuando Cubango Province and, since 1977, has been expanding his sphere of influence. This fact, in itself, is ample testimony to the popularity of his cause, and points up the fact that Angola's current instability is rooted in the MPLA's refusal to share power with other Angolan groups, not in the policies of the South African military.

Critics of Dr. Savimbi have alleged that he owes his success to South Africa. However, if dependence upon South Africa is a yardstick against which southern African movements and governments must be judged, Samora Machel, Robert Mugabe and Kenneth Kaunda all would have to be pronounced equally guilty as Dr. Savimbi.

The proposed Cuban withdrawal from Angola has been discussed almost entirely within the context of the proposed Namibia settlement, as a quid pro quo for South African withdrawal. It should be stressed, however, that a Cuban withdrawal represents Angola's own best opportunity to escape that condition of chronic instability which has characterized it since 1975. Deprived of its shield of foreign troops, the MPLA will be obliged to come to terms with UNITA, either with a view to power sharing or the holding of national elections. Anyone with the long-term interests of Angola at heart must support this essential reconciliation. Without it, Angola never will enjoy political stability or economic development, regardless of developments in Namibia or South Africa.

The Governments of Zimbabwe and Botswana have not made such blatant attempts to silence their political opposition and, not surprisingly, their allegations of South African destabilization are concomitantly milder and fewer. This summer, English-speaking South African newspapers carried stories of South African troops boarding helicopters in Namibia, crossing the border, and killing big game animals in Botswana. These incidents appear to have

been substantially proved and must be stopped. However, allegations that they comprise part of a long-term destabilization plan seem somewhat far-fetched. The incidents appear more typical of universal drunken soldiery than of a calculated military plan.

Mr. WOLPE. Could you conclude your statement, please?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Certainly.

South Africa's apartheid system, understandably, is extremely repugnant to U.S. opinion, and it must be reformed on both moral and practical grounds. However, our distaste for South Africa's domestic policies must not lead us to distort southern Africa realities in order to paint the Republic as the chief villain in every situation; nor should it blind us to the faults and shortcomings of South Africa's neighbors. Southern Africa currently is going through a period of crisis. The United States can assist the area through its troubles, but only if it adopts a fair and balanced approach to all of the countries of the region.

[Mr. Butterfield's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. R. IAN BUTTERFIELD, FOREIGN POLICY ANALYST, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Mr. Chairman, members of the House Foreign Relations subcommittee on African Affairs, it is an honor and a pleasure to be here today to share with you my views on destabilization in southern Africa. In my capacity as foreign policy analyst for African affairs at The Heritage Foundation, a non-profit research organization based in Washington, D.C., I am obliged to devote considerable attention to political developments in southern Africa. My work in the area has led me to formulate decided views as to the root causes of political instability in southern Africa.

The very phrase "destabilization in southern Africa" evokes controversy. The black-ruled states of southern Africa: Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia and Angola frequently accuse the South African government of destabilizing, that is to say subverting, their respective national governments. In reply, South Africa reverses the charge, alleging that its neighbors are doubly guilty, since they harbor terrorist members of the Africa National Congress and they facilitate the entry of foreign troops into Southern Africa, troops whose ultimate target is the Republic itself.

Most of these charges and counter-charges simply cannot be verified here in the U.S. Only the files of South African military intelligence truly can reveal the existence and the extent of South African interference in the affairs of the Republic's neighbors. Certain prevailing signs and circumstances may enable analysts to make a tentative judgment one way or the other, but hard evidence is lacking. Similarly, it is difficult to discern whether South Africa's neighbors are knowingly sheltering the guerrilla wing of the ANC. Presumably, if they are doing so, they are aware that they may have to pay a high price for their actions, as was evidenced by the South African raid on Matola.

The absence of conclusive evidence as to the guilt or innocence of the various involved parties, however, is not a signal to abandon the investigation so much as to change its course. Within the context of southern Africa, a search for heroes and villains, victims and perpetrators usually distorts the complex realities of the situation. Moreover, within the context of this discussion, the quest for a destabilizing power blinds us to one fundamental fact; namely, that southern Africa is an exceptionally unstable area and that instability is the product not of external interference, but of domestic economic and political policies pursued by South Africa's neighbors within their own borders. In other words, political instability does not presuppose an outside, destabilizing force. If South Africa is supplying arms to dissident groups in Angola or Mozambique, it is capitalizing upon an extant situation, it is not creating that situation. So long as most of the black-ruled states of southern Africa persist in their pursuit of one-party politics, suppressing political opinion and opposition, they will continue to encounter serious domestic unrest. This scenario applies equally to friends of the U.S., such as Kenya, as well as to those states with which Washington has cooler relations, such as Mozambique and Zambia.

The one party state is, to all intents and purposes, equatable with the suppression of political expression and the entrenchment of self-sustaining oligarchies. The unpopularity of these one-party systems in southern Africa is exacerbated by their general tendency to implement vastly impractical economic policies based upon the dictates of "scientific socialism" rather than economic realities. If the people of a country are denied the ability to change these irrational policies and to remove the personnel which supports them by the use of the franchise, they ultimately will resort to force, popular rebellion, to accomplish the necessary change.

Today, we must be particularly concerned with the serious civil wars in Angola and Mozambique. In both these countries, anti-government guerrillas have scored major successes, expanding their spheres of control and operations. We must remember that guerrilla movements require broad rural support, that no guerrilla movement has achieved such notable successes, let alone final victory, without first capturing the "hearts and minds" of the population. South Africa may or may not supply arms to dissident groups but domestic revolts on the scale of those now in progress in Angola and Mozambique presuppose the presence of much more than arms; they presuppose the existence of a broadly disaffected and frustrated populace which is willing to pick up those arms and use them. The source of this disaffection and frustration lies not within South Africa, but the front-line states themselves.

Mozambique provides an excellent example of the case in point. In April, 1974, a group of Portuguese army officers overthrew the autocratic government of Sylvester Caetano and announced their intention of decolonizing Portugal's Africa possessions: Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde. Presumably, such news would be welcome to the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which had been fighting for Mozambican independence for a decade. Frelimo did not perceive the announcement as an unmitigated blessing, however, because the coup leaders had voiced their determination to allow the Mozambican people to select their own independent government in free national elections. Frelimo, presumably, doubted its capacity to win such an election. Not only did the movement refuse to observe a ceasefire after the announcement of decolonization, its leader, Samora Machel, actually announced the escalation of the fighting, most of which, incidentally, was directed against civilian targets.¹ Subsequent talks between Portugal and Frelimo in Lusaka and Mogadishu broke down over the movement's categorical refusal to countenance a one man, one vote election in Mozambique, a somewhat ironic stipulation, in the light of the movement's repeated demands for the holding of such elections in neighboring South Africa. Apparently, Frelimo believed that, having fought the war, it had the right to dictate the peace and to enjoy exclusive control of Mozambique's governmental infrastructure for the

¹ AFRICA, Agence France Presse, No. 2068, 2076.

foreseeable future. This is a dubious assumption to say the least; if anyone had a right to choose Mozambique's form of government, it was the people of that country, not a minority group whose support, effectively, had been restricted to the northern and central provinces.

After several months of fighting, the Portuguese will to fight for a country which, ultimately, it intended to abandon, crumbled. Army mutinies and desertions compelled Lisbon to give way to Frelimo and to sign an agreement on September 7th, 1974, handing over the Mozambican government, intact, to Frelimo, without elections or plebiscites.²

Having come to power by force and refused to face up to a popular test, Frelimo, inevitably, had alienated a large segment of the Mozambican people. This problem has been exacerbated by the policies which it has followed since 1974. Apparently, Frelimo was aware of its own unpopularity at a relatively early stage, for one of its first acts upon coming to power was to establish the National Service for People's Security, a secret police force trained by East German experts.³

Frelimo's illogical agricultural policies have proved uniformly disastrous. Shortly after independence, the party declared all cultivated land to be the property of the people, that is to say, the state. Within one year, FAO technicians estimated that Mozambique was growing only 50 percent of its food needs. Nevertheless, Frelimo refused to abandon its ideological course. On the contrary, the Minister of Agriculture was dismissed from both the government and the party in 1978 for refusing to press on wholeheartedly with "scientific socialist" agricultural policies.⁴

Granted, the movement's leader, Samora Machel, on occasions, has acknowledged the failure of these ideologically-oriented policies, but he has done nothing to alter them and in March, 1981 strict food rationing was introduced in the capital Maputo.⁵

Frelimo's social policies demonstrate an acute sense of insecurity. Mozambican journalists have been placed under government control through the agency of the National Journalists' Organization. Free trade unions formed prior to independence have been abolished and even such innocent bodies as the African Association Club, the Chinese Club and the Muslim Recreative Association have been abolished as a result of the party's determination to control

² Ibid., No. 2090, 2091, 2101.

³ Christian Science Monitor, June 13, 1975.

⁴ Time, May 3, 1976, pp. 25-26, The Washington Post, April 19, 1976, The Wall Street Journal, December 20, 1980, The Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 15, No. 4, p. 4812 A, Ibid., Vol. 15, No. 8, p. 4954 C.

⁵ The Wall Street Journal, December 30, 1982, Agencia de Informacao de Mocambique: Bulletin No. 57.

every aspect of social life. An article which appeared in The Washington Post in 1977 alleged serious human rights abuses in Mozambique. Captives in Machava Prison had had their hands mutilated by knives. Others had had their heads held over spikes which soldiers danced on their shoulders.⁶

Under such circumstances, we need not look to South Africa for the root cause of Mozambique's civil war. Any government which comes to power by force and holds on to power by force while pursuing policies which both repress and impoverish its own people, inevitably, imbroils itself in domestic rebellion sooner or later.

Moreover, given the geographical situation of Mozambique, such a domestic movement, in all likelihood, will enjoy considerable success. Mozambique is a large country with long, unpoliceable borders. In large areas, vegetation covering facilitates guerrilla operations. The country is heavily dependent upon the earnings of its rail transit system, which supplies vital import-export routes to Malawi, Zimbabwe, South Africa and, to a lesser extent, Zambia. This dependence enables even a small band of railway saboteurs armed with crude explosives, to exercise a disproportionate impact upon the national economy. These factors worked in favor of Frelimo when it was a guerrilla movement but militate against it now that it holds the government.

In short, should the current Mozambican government fall, Samora Machel and his colleagues have been the architects of their own downfall. On the other hand, if they alter their policies, and allow the people of Mozambique to select their own leaders and the style of government under which they wish to live, they need have nothing to fear from South Africa or from internal parties. The very existence of a civil war presupposes the presence of a motive and a will to fight; remove the motive and the will disappears. Any groups which persisted in fighting a duly elected government would perish through lack of popular support. However, if Frelimo persists in its suicidal, one-party course, it can expect the war to continue and to escalate, with or without South African interference.

A similar situation to that in Mozambique now prevails in Angola. When the Lisbon coup signalled the decolonization of Portugal's African possessions, three groups were fighting for Angolan independence: the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). I list the groups in this order deliberately because, according to newspaper and diplomatic reports at that time, the FNLA probably was the largest of the three groups while Dr. Jonas Savimbi of UNITA was the country's most popular single

⁶ Africa Research Bullentin, Vol. 15, No. 6, p. 4907B, Ibid., Vol. 13, p. 3964C, The Washington Post, August 14, 1977.

political figure, probably because he had fought his war from within Angola, while his rivals had directed their campaigns from the safety of exile. The MPLA generally was viewed as the weakest of the groups, being heavily dependent upon the country's few urban areas and middle class figures of mixed racial descent.⁷

The three groups fought with each other for some time but in January 1975, signed the Alvor Agreement, by which all three agreed to join together into an interim government with a view to holding national elections. The ceasefire broke down several times, with fighting between the FNLA and MPLA largely because the latter's importation of large supplies of Soviet weaponry into the capital, Luanda, rendered the FNLA suspicious of MPLA intentions.⁸ Ultimately, the MPLA used those Soviet arms and imported Cuban troops to seize the capital, virtually annihilate the FNLA and declare itself the legitimate government of Angola. Henceforth, Angola would be directed by a minority government which would refuse to hold the free elections which it had promised to abide by in the Alvor Agreement. Instead, it staked its survival on the protection afforded by foreign troops, an inherently unstable situation, regardless of South Africa conduct.

The Cubans who had proved so successful against the FNLA proved useless, however, when faced with UNITA forces in the south. In this region, Dr. Savimbi enjoys the support of Angola's largest tribal group, in a part of the world where tribal loyalties count for a great deal. Consequently, between 1975 and 1977 he was able to hang on to his stronghold in Cuando Cubango province and, since 1977, he has been expanding his sphere of influence. Analysts disagree over whether he now controls $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{3}$, or $\frac{1}{2}$ of Angola. These debates are, most likely, futile, since the term "control" is misleading within the context of the Angolan struggle. The country is extremely large and sparsely populated and, outside UNITA and MPLA strongholds, should be regarded as disputed no-man's land. The point remains, however, that, faced with an onslaught of a Soviet-equipped MPLA army and what was once estimated as 40,000 Cuban troops, Dr. Savimbi has not only survived, he has thrived. This fact, in itself, is ample testimony to the popularity of his cause, and points up the fact that Angola's current instability is rooted in the MPLA's refusal to share power with other Angolan groups, not in the policies of the South African military.

Critics of Dr. Savimbi have alleged that he owes his success to South Africa. However, two years ago a respected investigation team reported that his dependence upon South Africa was minimal, being limited largely to gasoline and medical supplies.⁹ Of

⁷ See The Washington Post, July 7, 1976, September 14, 1975, The New York Times, June 28, 1975, The San Diego Union, July 12, 1975, and U.S. News and World Report, December 29, 1975, p. 19.

⁸ Economist, January 18, 1975, Intelligence Digest, February 14, 1979, p. 8750.

⁹ Confidential publication, sold commercially but not available for public quotation.

course, the situation may have changed in the meantime. However, if dependence upon South Africa is a yardstick against which southern African movements and governments must be judged, Samora Machel, Robert Mugabe and Kenneth Kaunda all would have to be pronounced equally guilty as Dr. Savimbi.

The proposed Cuban withdrawal from Angola has been discussed almost entirely within the context of the proposed Namibia settlement, as a quid pro quo for South African withdrawal from the territory. It should be stressed, however, that a Cuban withdrawal represents Angola's own best opportunity to escape that condition of chronic instability which has characterized it since 1975. Deprived of its shield of foreign troops, the MPLA will be obliged to come to terms with UNITA, either with a view to power-sharing or the holding of national elections. Anyone with the long term interests of Angola at heart must support this essential reconciliation. Without it, Angola never will enjoy political stability or economic development, regardless of developments in Namibia or South Africa.

The governments of Zimbabwe and Botswana have not made such blatant attempts to silence their political opposition and, not surprisingly, their allegations of South African destabilization are milder and fewer. This summer, English-speaking South African newspapers carried stories of South African troops boarding helicopters in Namibia, crossing the border and killing big game animals in Botswana. These incidents appear to have been substantially proved and must be stopped.¹⁰ However, allegations that they comprise part of a long term destabilization plan seem somewhat far-fetched. The incidents appear more typical of universal drunken soldiery than of a calculated military plan. Certainly, the shooting of big game animals would appear to be an exceptionally tortuous route towards destabilizing the government of Botswana.

I was in Zimbabwe during the recent incident when three former members of the Rhodesian army were killed on an incursion from South Africa into south-eastern Zimbabwe. I had the good fortune to speak with several senior figures in the Ministry for Security, a few days after the incident. Interestingly, while they did assert that the raiders had had official permission to conduct their operation, they did not claim that the infiltrators were directing their efforts against the Zimbabwean government itself. On the contrary, the prevailing analysis at that time was that the operation had been aimed at the railway sidings at Nayala, a service and supply center for the Mozambican railroad system just inside the Zimbabwean border. Throughout Prime Minister Mugabe's recent troubles with Mr. Joshua Nkomo and his Patriotic Front/Ndebele supporters, no evidence has been brought forward of South African involvement with the opposition movement. Indeed,

¹⁰ Johannesburg Star, August 17, 1982.

why should there be? What would South Africa have to gain from ousting a relatively pragmatic Mr. Mugabe when the only foreseeable alternative would be a minority Ndebele government heavily dependent upon the Soviet Union and East Germany, with the ominous possibility of a direct Cuban military presence?

One disturbing fact did, however, alight from the incident in southeastern Zimbabwe. Master Sargeant Wessels and his two companions had left a training camp in South Africa with a party of at least twelve men. I know of no military facility in a relatively advanced country where a mere sargeant can take a party of twelve men off a post without permission and not be missed. The mission must have been authorized at a higher level; the question is, how high? My own conversation with the Foreign Ministry in Pretoria has convinced me that the mission could not have received political authorization. Zimbabwe already is economically dependent upon South Africa, and the ministry apparently feels no need to humiliate Zimbabwe militarily. If the mission was authorized solely by military men, without political permission, then we must turn to two critical questions: at how high a level within the military was the mission authorized, and, to what extent does the South African military machine function free from political restraint? These questions are disturbing, but should not be allowed to distract our attention from the central fact that the rising tide of discontent in parts of Zimbabwe springs not from South African subversion but from the pronouncements of Prime Minister Mugabe and the conduct of his more extreme Cabinet members. If the Prime Minister acknowledges that Mr. Nkomo and the Ndebele minority are facts of Zimbabwean political life which must be dealt with through compromise, he will achieve political stability. If he insists upon pressing forward with his demands for a one party state, Mr. Nkomo and his followers almost certainly will resort to violence to secure what they regard as their political survival.

South Africa's apartheid system, understandably, is extremely repugnant to U.S. opinion, and it must be reformed, on both moral and practical grounds. However, our distaste for South Africa's domestic policies must not lead us to distort southern Africa realities in order to paint the Republic as the chief villain in every situation; nor should it blind us to the faults and shortcomings of South Africa's neighbors. Southern Africa currently is going through a period of crisis. The U.S. can assist the area through its troubles, but only if it adopts a fair and balanced approach to all of the countries of the region.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you, Dr. Butterfield.
I would like to call now on Dr. Seth Singleton.

**STATEMENT OF SETH SINGLETON, PROFESSOR OF POLITICS AND
GOVERNMENT, RIPON COLLEGE**

Mr. SINGLETON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I greatly appreciate the opportunity to testify today.

I am professor of politics and government at Ripon College in Wisconsin, a scholar trained in both Soviet and African studies. I have lived in Tanzania and traveled elsewhere in Africa and also in the Soviet Union. For the past 5 years I have pursued research on Soviet foreign policy in the Third World, particularly in Africa and southern Africa. That has included summer research at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies at the Wilson Center here in Washington, at the Harvard Russian Research Center.

Of the questions posed by the subcommittee, I am able to speak to those concerning the objectives and activities of the Soviet Union and its allies. I will try to explain what the Soviets are doing in southern Africa and why and how U.S. policy might take account of that.

I think it would be a mistake, however, to view southern Africa only as a zone of East-West competition. The United States has concerns for human rights and democratic majority rule, for trade and access to resources, and for peace. What I will argue is that intelligent policies to reduce Soviet and allied influence run parallel to, not against, intelligent policies to further these other objectives.

The purpose of Soviet policy in southern Africa is to win influence and control at the expense of the United States and the West. The Soviets see southern Africa as a political and psychological battleground, with African nations and regimes as the objects of the struggle. This basic Soviet perception and purpose is highly unfortunate, but it is quite real. Their interests are counter to ours, since one of their major purposes is to weaken and injure the United States. Southern Africa is a perfect opportunity because the Soviets can take advantage of the underlying conflict between Africans and South Africa.

Encouraging Africans to fight South Africa isn't enough, however. The basic Soviet aim is to polarize southern Africa, with all Africans on one side and with the United States as the ally of South Africa on the other. At that point they become the true natural ally of African interests.

I cannot emphasize enough that the Soviet Union and South Africa share an interest in conflict and destabilization, which neither shares with the United States. Above all, the Soviets and the South Africans share an overwhelming interest in driving or provoking the United States to join South Africa's camp. The Soviets have invested 65 years of policy and propaganda in the idea that the West wants only to dominate and exploit Third World peoples. Elsewhere in the world—for example, on the Horn of Africa, where they switched sides in a quarrel among Africans and, most obviously, in the brutal suppression of the people of Afghanistan—the Soviets have become and are seen as self-interested expansionists.

Southern Africa is politically important. It is the one crucial place where they can maintain a righteous image. It is also a fine opportunity to expand their network of allies and create more Communist countries. Southern Africa is not important at all to Soviet security or to the security of the Soviet-Eurasian Empire, which always comes first in Soviet priorities. The Eurasian Empire is in trouble. This means that the Soviets will put few resources into southern Africa—money, food, oil, anything that ultimately costs them hard cash.

Further, it means that the Soviets will take few risks. They cannot risk getting drawn into a war with South Africa, which in southern Africa they would probably lose. They have tried to leave as few “tripwires” as possible, and they have made no pronouncements of the irreversibility of anything. The Cubans stay out of sight, and the East Germans and Soviets, too, when the South Africans cross the Angolan border.

Soviet power in southern Africa is limited. They cannot command anyone. Their influence depends on how much they are needed. How much they are needed depends on whether Africans need weapons and military training and internal security and external protection. These are all the Soviets and their allies can offer. The Soviets, thus, have an interest in instability, as long as it does not become too threatening.

In the world as a whole, Soviet power is now overextended. The Soviets are supporting four or five counterinsurgency wars. They have a stumbling and troubled economy, and they are worried about the growth of American military power to which they must devote their resources to match. At the moment in southern Africa the Soviets are holding on, hoping that in Angola and Mozambique they can keep enough political influence to keep their influence and presence against the temptation of those countries to turn to the West for economic development. But if they can promote a Cuban-style political future for Angola or for Mozambique, they will be in an excellent position to take advantage of what they might call the next “upsurge of revolutionary activity.” In the meantime, they will continue training and arming the Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia and training and arming guerrillas of the African National Congress for raids into South Africa.

The Soviets also hope to see the United States make the mistake of becoming South Africa’s ally. Then, when the world situation changes, when at some future time the United States becomes less aggressive, the Soviets will already have established that we, along with South Africa, are the natural enemy.

One widespread view explains Soviet activities as an effort to gain naval and other military facilities in order to threaten and eventually to control the oil and strategic minerals essential to the West. This isn’t wrong, but it puts the cart before the horse. Soviet policy is fundamentally political, not military. They’re Leninists, not the heirs of Admiral Mahan. If expansion of political influence provides the opportunity for naval, air, or communications or intelligence facilities, the Soviets will certainly take advantage of it. The same is true for control over natural resources. But this is not their basic motivation.

To take the Zimbabwe example, Soviet and allied weapons and training to the Patriotic Front was not a policy to get Zimbabwe's chromite. It was an attempt to implant Soviet influence in a liberated Zimbabwe. The use of that influence at some future time to corner the world chromite market would have been a happy extra result.

At present, the Soviets have four objectives in southern Africa, along with their general objective of polarization: First, to deepen what they call Socialist orientation in Angola and Mozambique, and eventually make these countries fully Communist allies; second, to extend their influence in other frontline States; third, to make the leadership of SWAPO and the African National Congress of South Africa loyal to a Soviet connection, to eventually install their influence in those countries; and finally, continually to harass and embarrass the United States.

Let me say a word about socialist orientation. It is actually a new Soviet policy developed in the late seventies. It is designed to take countries where the Soviets have been invited in and try to turn them basically into more Cubas. The model for the policy is what happened in Cuba in the sixties.

The elements of this policy include several things. First, a friendship treaty which allows Soviet or allied intervention if both the Soviets and the other country, Angola or Mozambique, agree. Second, party-to-party agreements between the MPLA and Frelimo on the one hand, the Soviet Communist Party on the other, for ideological and organizational training and coordination of propaganda. Third, military supply and training of the army, including its political loyalty. There are joint economic ventures and, finally and necessarily, formal public commitment by the ruling political party that they are Marxist-Leninists and seek to build communism and welcome "unbreakable" friendship with the Soviet Union.

The question then becomes whether all this will work to make a Soviet connection permanent. Whether it will work depends on what others do, particularly South Africa and the United States. To the extent that Angola and Mozambique are threatened by internal insurgency and external threat, the Soviet, Cuban, and East German efforts to build a strong, centralized state, and an army and internal security police, become more needed. If they are not threatened and turn to their economic development, Soviet and allied security and state-building is less needed, and the West becomes the natural ally. The best case for the Soviets is one of constant but low-level threat.

Now, I do not believe that the leaderships of Angola and Mozambique are so committed to Marxism-Leninism and the Soviet connection—and it is the Soviet connection that is important, not the internal policies of the regime—that they will, in fact, join the Soviet bloc no matter what we do. All of the evidence indicates they are pragmatists and nationalists as well as Marxists. Both countries need economic help. They get it from the West and they have turned to the West, including the Portuguese.

Mr. WOLPE. Could you conclude the statement, please?

Mr. SINGLETON. Yes, sir, I will conclude the statement.

The conclusion of the statement is this. The United States should promote, by any means possible, conditions of peace and stability which allow the frontline states and a Namibia under majority democratic rule to turn to their economic development needs. The United States must avoid the trap of being provoked into support for South African destabilization, which is what would make the Soviet Union the natural ally and the protector of African interests.

[Mr. Singleton's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SETH SINGLETON, PROFESSOR OF POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT,
RIPON COLLEGE

Mr. Chairman: I greatly appreciate this opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on Africa at an important juncture in United States relations with the countries of southern Africa. For the last several years I have been studying Soviet policy in the Third World, particularly Southern Africa. This statement will consider the objectives of the Soviet Union and its allies in that region, their strategies and activities, and effective United States responses. Simply, what are the Soviets up to in southern Africa and what should we do about it? I am fully aware that the Soviet-American competition is only part, not the whole, of United States concern in southern Africa, and I believe that it would be a major mistake to formulate policy considering only East-West conflict. But, as I will try to explain, intelligent United States policy toward reducing Soviet and allied influence in southern Africa runs parallel to, not against, intelligent policy to advance human rights, to develop legitimate economic interests, and to promote peace.

The Basis for Soviet Policy

The Soviets see much of the Third World, and southern Africa in particular, as a zone of conflict between "socialism" and "imperialism," or between the Soviet-led communist bloc and the United States and the West. African nations and their leaders are the political and psychological battleground over which the contest is waged. This basic Soviet perception may be highly unfortunate, but it is the bedrock of Soviet policy.

For the key Soviet planners in the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat, and also in the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, the KGB, and the Africa Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, the question then becomes: Looking at the situation in southern Africa in the most objective and realistic way, what combination

of political, diplomatic, military, economic, and propaganda activities will most effectively further the influence and control of the Soviet Union and its allies, and most effectively reduce the influence and control of the West, particularly the United States? The use of particular instruments of policy will shift in response to circumstance, but always with the basic objective in mind. The Soviets are also realists about resources and priorities. Some places in the world are more important than others, and different places are important in different ways. The security of the Soviet Union and of the contiguous Soviet empire has always been most important. Only when that is assured will resources be spared for expansion, and then only in ways which do not risk "gains of socialism" already won.

This is not to argue that the Soviets never make mistakes. Often they miscalculate badly, as in Afghanistan. And often their intentions are frustrated by circumstances and the actions of others which they cannot control. Soviet influence has been thrown out of China, Egypt, and many other countries, and in southern Africa Soviet efforts to implant influence in a liberated Zimbabwe did not succeed. I would like to return later to the important question of how much power the Soviets really have in southern Africa.

The Importance of Southern Africa

Southern Africa is made to order for Soviet policy. Here, to pursue expansion and weakening of the West, the Soviets really can be a natural ally of Africans seeking majority rule and an end to economic and racial exploitation. The Soviet Union has invested sixty-five years of policy and propaganda in the idea that the West is the natural enemy of Third World peoples, and wants only to dominate and exploit them in pursuit of profit. But while Soviet objectives and rhetoric have changed very little over two generations, the world has evolved out from underneath them. Asian and

African nations increasingly control their own economies and natural resources, and now compete with--and sometimes make war on--each other. On the Horn of Africa, everyone understands that the Soviets sought to gain advantage by exploiting a quarrel among Africans. Being branded as imperialists undercuts the whole edifice and rationale of Soviet policy. But in southern Africa they may become the armorers and protectors of a cause considered righteous by all Africans and the world as a whole. As Soviet policy elsewhere becomes obviously self-interested--in Indochina, on the Horn, and in the brutal suppression of the people of Afghanistan--the importance of those few situations where they can maintain a righteous image and use it increases.

The Soviets understand perfectly that while southern Africa is not important to them, it is important to the West, and that the United States is caught between moral opposition to apartheid and the economic benefits of the status quo. In present world circumstances when the Soviet Union is on the military and economic defensive, it seeks to focus attention of the United States on "the bulwark of militarism and reaction." Southern Africa is highly useful for that if the United States cooperates.

Southern Africa is not important to Soviet security in any way. The Soviets have a free hand because they have no security interests to protect. By the same token, southern Africa is not worth much risk or cost in spite of its usefulness. Taking risks in far-off places which might endanger Soviet security is "adventurism," a Leninist sin. Nikita Khrushchev's ill-fated adventure in support of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo is one African case which Soviet policy makers remember well. So risks and costs will be kept low. Aid policies are tight-fisted, even to such poor countries as Mozambique, because other uses of resources are important to Soviet security. The cost of fifteen or twenty thousand Cuban soldiers in Angola, of providing Soviet and Cuban and East German technical and military advisors, of

equipping and training a few thousand SWAPO guerrillas and handfuls of African National Congress commandos, are minimal. Weapons deliveries to the Angolan and Mozambican armies have been moderate, and the size of those forces has not increased much. I assume the Angolans pay for their equipment in hard cash earned by oil exports to the United States. The whole political-military operation probably costs less than two of the Soviet Army's 173 divisions. As for risk, the Soviets have tried to leave no trip-wires which might force intervention to save their reputation. When the South Africans invade Angola, the Cubans stay well out of sight. Nor are the Soviets likely to do anything which would anger and inflame African or West European opinion, or force a direct confrontation with the United States.

If major cost or risk can be avoided, southern Africa is an almost perfect opportunity for skillful Soviet policy. The built-in conflict between the Frontline States and South Africa provides the setting. To complete the picture, what the Soviets must do is provoke the United States into association with South Africa, at which point they really become the natural ally of Africans against South Africa supported by the United States. This is the situation the Soviets want. It is also the situation the South Africans want. The great irony is that the real natural allies are the Soviet Union and South Africa, which share an overwhelming interest in driving the United States into South Africa's camp.

Recent and Present Activities

After the Cuban-Soviet intervention in Angola in late 1975 the Soviets developed a new policy framework for Africa. Part of it was as old as the Soviet Union--the Soviet Union as "natural ally" of liberation. To this was added the claim that only by relying on Soviet "might" could true liberation be achieved. The Soviets boasted that they had the military reach to protect friends anywhere in the world, and they apparently assumed

a permanent decline of United States power and opposition.

Established in Angola, the Soviets and Cubans and East Germans proceeded to train and equip ten thousand or more soldiers of ZIPRA, the army of the ZAPU wing of the Patriotic Front, for war against the Rhodesians, and also two or three thousand guerrillas of PLAN, SWAPO's military organization, to fight in Namibia. After the Soweto uprising, training of South African ANC guerrillas began in Angolan camps, where it continues. Some training and equipment also reached ZANU forces in Mozambique. Cubans and East Germans helped manage propaganda for both wings of the Patriotic Front.

All this offensive military activity was only one part of the policy. The other was internal involvement to make real communists out of regimes which accepted Soviet and allied connections. In the past, economic and military aid and diplomatic support had made no permanent allies. Egypt, Algeria, and Guinea are African examples. What had worked, in Cuba, was acceptance of Marxism-Leninism as official ideology, Soviet involvement not only in technical assistance and military training but also in party-building, propaganda, and internal security, and reliance on Soviet "might" for external protection against the nearby enemy. These conditions, with Cuba as the model, became the new concept and policy of "socialist orientation," first tried out in Angola and Mozambique. Soviet assistance and protection would now be extended only to countries which accepted these conditions, and then the Soviets would do everything possible to make countries "of socialist orientation" fully communist and integrated into the Soviet bloc.

Soviet writers now maintain that African countries must choose between capitalist and socialist orientation. The continent is being divided. African socialism is denounced as fuzzy-headed nonsense, and countries such as Tanzania, Zambia, or Zimbabwe must either move on to a Leninist internal

system and a Soviet connection or slip back under the control of "imperialism" and its exploitation.

Emphasis has shifted since all the offensive activity of 1976-79. After the Lancaster House Zimbabwe settlement the Soviets and their allies have undertaken no major initiatives, although military support to SWAPO and the ANC continues. The earlier Soviet hope was that Zimbabwe would become another "socialist orientation" country. That would have created an entire zone under Soviet guidance and thus shifted the whole meaning of the Frontline States from an African to an international communist framework. This was why the Zimbabwe outcome was so important. The Soviets found they had no power to ensure the result they wanted. Worldwide, Afghanistan, turmoil in Poland, Chinese-American rapprochement, the deepening crisis of the Soviet economy, and United States military programs all impelled a shift from expansion to a cautious policy and concentration on Soviet national security.

Soviet power projection is not some mindless, constant force. The Soviets are Clausewitzians (who love to quote Lenin paraphrasing Clausewitz). When expansion based on military might reaches its limits the proper course is to defend existing positions, to avoid risk, to build up power, and to go over to the offensive in the battle for hearts and minds while waiting for future opportunities. Much less is heard these days about Soviet "might" and "the changing correlation of forces," and much more about United States policies of "militarism" and "aggression." In southern Africa the most important present tasks are to defend gains of socialism in Angola and Mozambique, to maintain influence with SWAPO and the other Frontline States in the hope of establishing socialist orientation elsewhere, and to establish that the United States is South Africa's patron and ally and therefore Africa's enemy. These aims are interconnected, and all of them depend on

provoking the United States and the West to oppose African interests.

Destabilization

Do the Soviets and their allies pursue destabilization? Yes and no. Against those governments considered part of "imperialism"--now only South Africa and Namibia under South African administration--destabilization is exactly the policy, but not in ways that might incur unacceptable costs or risks. In Angola and Mozambique, the Soviets and their allies want just the opposite--security against South African destabilization--as long as these countries maintain their cooperation with and connections to the Soviet bloc. Elsewhere, in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana and within SWAPO and the ANC, the Soviets will do whatever they can to gain influence, but not in ways which would scare their present friends or alienate Africans generally. For example, destabilizing the Zimbabwe government would be counterproductive given its internal support and support from the Frontline States. If the Mugabe government were to become internally unpopular or fall out of line with the Frontline States, destabilization might be considered. Since the underlying objective is to turn Africans against the West and toward the Soviet Union, destabilization which helps that will be pursued and destabilization which does not will be avoided.

Strategic Objectives

One widespread view explains Soviet activities as an effort to gain naval and other military facilities in order to threaten and eventually control the oil and strategic minerals essential to the West. This isn't wrong, but it puts the cart before the horse. Soviet policy is fundamentally political, not military. They are Leninists, not the heirs of Admiral Mahan. If expansion of political influence provides the opportunity for naval or air or communications or intelligence facilities the Soviets will certainly take advantage of it. The same is true for control over natural resources,

for denial to the West or for Soviet use. Certainly the Soviets would be happy to control the world supply of chromite and platinum and much of the supply of manganese, gold, and diamonds. But this is not their basic motivation. To take again the Zimbabwe example, Soviet and allied weapons and training to the Patriotic Front was not a policy to get Zimbabwe's chromite. It was an attempt to implant Soviet influence and presence in liberated Zimbabwe. The use of that influence at some future time to corner the world chromite market would have been a happy extra result.

Guns, Butter, and Soviet Power

While the Soviets and their allies have great influence with the governments of Angola and Mozambique, and significant influence within SWAPO and African the South African/National Congress, they do not directly control any of these as far as I can tell. (On occasion they may even have some trouble controlling their Cuban allies, although we know little about this as Soviet-Cuban and Soviet-East German discussions are secret and disagreements are not leaked.) Hence Soviet power depends on being needed and accepted by Africans. What makes the Soviets and their allies needed? They are purveyors of weapons, military training, and assistance in building a strong centralized state. They arm and train SWAPO and the ANC. In Angola and Mozambique they train internal security police and try to create a well trained army loyal to the central leadership. Cubans and East Germans are the active participants in these activities, with some Soviet personnel. To the other Frontline States the Soviets offer military equipment. Zambia, Tanzania, and now Botswana have accepted Soviet weapons, and Zimbabwe has some left over from the liberation war. If these nations accepted the conditions for socialist orientation, the Soviets and their allies would gladly provide the rest of the package designed to implant communism and make it permanent. Therefore, throughout southern Africa, threats and destabilization

from South Africa work to Soviet advantage by increasing the need for weapons and military training and internal security which the Soviets and Cubans and East Germans provide.

The Soviets and their allies cannot provide effective help to economic development. This has become brutally obvious to the Mozambicans and the Angolans as well as everyone else, and is probably one major reason for Zimbabwe's present policies. Cubans, East Germans, Soviets, and other East Europeans are active in technical assistance projects, which are cheap--Cuba particularly has a host of trained and underemployed young people, and East Germany may find advantage in sending a few of its restless youth to Africa--but the Soviet bloc has no food, money, oil, or consumer goods to spare in its current condition of economic stress and retrenchment.

The situation least favorable to Soviet influence is one in which the Frontline States including Angola and Mozambique and also Namibia under majority rule enjoy a period of peace and security and turn toward the tasks of economic development. In those circumstances the Soviet weapons and military and security training become largely irrelevant. American, European, and also Brazilian and possibly Chinese money, goods, and technology become overwhelmingly important. For economic development, the West is the natural ally.

The Soviets have begun to do what they can--which isn't very much--to counteract economic weakness. Soviet propaganda now stresses development aid. The redoubtable Vasili Solodovnikov, Soviet Ambassador to Zambia from 1976 to 1981 and former Africa Institute Director who coordinated Soviet policy throughout southern Africa, was replaced in 1981 by Vasili Cherednik, an economic expert from the Foreign Ministry. Exports to Angola and Mozambique have increased, but are still insignificant except for weapons. The Soviets import almost nothing from southern Africa.

Will Western economic ties with Angola and Mozambique pull these countries away from the Soviet bloc, or do they just pay for a more comfortable transition to communism? This debate has been going on since Lenin's time. The Gulf Oil Company and Mr. Rockefeller of the Chase Manhattan Bank have urged recognition of the Angolan government and expanded trade and investment. Food aid to Mozambique could be resumed. The Soviet bloc is engaged in activities which deeply penetrate politics in Angola and Mozambique--party organization, ideological training, agreements with the Soviet Communist Party which provide for coordination of propaganda, internal security police. The Soviet hope is that these connections will become strong enough fast enough to withstand the pull of Western trade and investment. And if the leadership is secure, why not let Gulf Oil and its American consumers pay for Soviet weapons, or let American taxpayers feed the hungry in Mozambique as Herbert Hoover's American Relief Administration fed the hungry of Russia in Lenin's day? But Angola and Mozambique are not the Soviet Union of 1921. Political ties are not so easily ensured, and the influx of West Europeans and Portuguese and Brazilians and possibly Americans bringing money and goods and skills has potentially far more impact.

The debate boils down to two questions. First, are the present leaders committed communists who will join the Soviet bloc no matter what? (Whether the MPLA or FRELIMO leaders are committed Marxists isn't the point; the issue is whether they are committed to integration with the Soviet bloc.) Second, do the Soviets and their allies have power within Angola or Mozambique to overthrow and replace any leadership that tries to escape the Soviet connection?

The first question is best answered by those more intimately familiar with Angola and with Mozambique. Angolan dealings with the Western Contact Group concerning Namibia, and Angolan and Mozambican initiatives toward

greater Western economic cooperation indicate a pragmatic approach to national self-interest, not blind acceptance of the Soviet view that the world is a dialectic struggle. Contact and cooperation among all the Frontline States, and with other Africans including prominently the Nigerians who have supported the MPLA government, indicate that the pulls of Pan-African cooperation are strong. African ties run directly against the Soviet policy of dividing Africans from each other according to socialist and capitalist orientation. The Mozambicans have repeatedly asked the Soviets for more aid, and have repeatedly been refused. They apparently wanted to join CMEA (Comecon) in 1981 and were turned down. CMEA members are to be "levelled up" to the standards of the richer countries. Cuba and Vietnam are already members, and that is already more "levelling up" than the Soviet economy can afford. The East Europeans show no inclination to provide support beyond a few technicians, except for the East German political-military involvement. In one particularly pointed comment Sergio Vieira, FRELIMO ideological leader and now Mozambique's Minister of Agriculture wrote in World Marxist Review that "we would not like to become a model of 'poor socialism.' That is a particularly sensitive question in Africa." The Angolans, with more potential wealth, might say the same. It is not known how much of Angola's hard currency earnings from oil are transferred to the Soviets and their allies, or how much fish taken by Soviet vessels from Angolan and Mozambican waters goes directly to the USSR, or what arrangements might ensue if the Soviet-East European teams searching for new mineral deposits find them and propose joint mining ventures. But given the admittedly tight-fisted attitude of the Soviets and East Europeans, how much real aid is being given is questionable.

As for the second question, I do not know whether the Soviets could install new leaders if the current ones began to renege on socialist orienta-

tion. Given the uncertainties of factional politics in Africa, the Soviets and Cubans and East Germans may not know either, and would react to circumstances. The fifteen or twenty thousand Cuban soldiers and the more than two thousand East German military personnel in Angola certainly give more leverage there than the relatively few advisors in Mozambique. It is important to repeat that the long-term Soviet position in southern Africa rests on voluntary acceptance by Africans. To be seen as subversive manipulators, imperialists of a variety well known in Africa, would not serve Soviet purposes because the game might be up for further expansion of influence.

Is Soviet Military Intervention Possible?

So far the Soviets have made no claims about the "irreversibility" of the governments in Angola or Mozambique, and have no binding commitments to intervene to save them against internal insurgents or South African attacks. The Cubans could not, and the East Germans would not send troops without Soviet approval, although the Cuban soldiers in Angola could fight. Nevertheless intervention is a dangerous possibility. The Soviet Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation with Angola and Mozambique allow intervention if it is invited and if the Soviets agree to it. The Soviets use these treaties as they see fit; Iraq has received no Soviet help during the war with Iran, while the Soviets cited their Friendship treaty with Afghanistan as a pretext for invasion. All the treaties have almost identical wording. Angola and Mozambique have similar treaties with Cuba, East Germany, and with each other. Capabilities for rapid deployment also exist, in the eight Soviet airborne divisions and long-range transports which could refuel in Ethiopia.

In current unfavorable world circumstances the Soviets will be very cautious. They did nothing for the Syrians and the PLO when Israel invaded Lebanon, and this lesson has been noted by the Angolans, the Mozambicans,

and most of all by the South Africans. Syria too has a Soviet Friendship Treaty. Soviet claims to provide protection are clearly shaky. As noted, the Cubans stay in their barracks when the South Africans cross Angola's border, and as far as I know they have not been in the field against UNITA. East German Advisors stay away when the South Africans raid SWAPO's camps. General A. A. Yepishev, who directs the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Armed Forces, visited Mozambique in June presumably to talk about arms needs, but perhaps also to talk about the reliability of the Mozambican army. The Soviets have been more concerned with political loyalty and control in the Angolan and Mozambican forces, as part of communist state-building, than about numbers or equipment, which have increased only moderately. Perhaps as a response to Soviet reluctance, Mozambique signed its military agreement with Portugal in April and imported Tanzanian military advisors. Angola was talking with the French about a military presence which might supplement, or replace, the Cubans.

The Soviets would like to scare off South African destabilization efforts without making any commitments, and take credit for it. In February 1981, following the South African raid on ANC headquarters in Maputo, Soviet Ambassador Vdovin issued a warning and two Soviet warships visited Mozambique. This is costless as long as it works, but it certainly has not had any effect on the MNR guerrillas supported by South Africa. The next step would be to increase Soviet and allied military personnel and take charge of the counterinsurgency campaign. The important issue is not arms transfers, but control of operations. The 25,000 FRELIMO troops, with some 200 tanks and several hundred armored cars and APCs, probably have all the equipment they can use as it is. Direct Soviet or Cuban control of counterinsurgency would probably be considered a last resort by the Mozambicans. It would, certainly, greatly increase Soviet influence.

Would direct Soviet or Cuban or East German intervention and engagement occur under any conceivable circumstance? In Mozambique, probably not. Mozambique's socialist orientation is welcome and useful, but the country is not important in economic or military terms. Mozambican pressure for more aid is a bother, and the recent economic reforms and growing Portuguese connections point toward an eventual Chinese or Yugoslav-style communism if the future is to be communist at all. Mozambique is not the place for one more unwanted counterinsurgency war, let alone a conventional war with the South African Defense Force which the Soviets and Cubans would probably lose. In Angola, the Soviets may now be seriously worried that a South African invasion designed to engage the Cubans may force their hand, which is the last thing they want. This worry may increase the possibility for Soviet cooperation toward a Namibian settlement excluding the Soviets and their allies from Namibia while maintaining some presence in Angola.

Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia

In Zimbabwe, many feared that the Soviets and their allies would try to destabilize the ZANU government of Robert Mugabe, in favor of Joshua Nkomo and ZAPU which had received more weapons, training, and propaganda support. As far as I can tell, they have not done so. The Mozambicans apparently used their influence to obtain Soviet assurance that they would accept the Mugabe government while maintaining "political ties" with ZAPU. Destabilization of a liberated Zimbabwe would drastically hurt the Soviet image as disinterested friend of liberation. Also, a ZAPU coup in Zimbabwe might easily produce a ZANU-led insurgency among the majority Shona of the northeast, which would then result in a ZAPU call for aid and protection from the Soviets, Cubans, and East Germans. The Soviets cannot afford to be drawn into yet another unwinnable counterinsurgency war in support of a minority government seen as illegitimate by other Africans. What the Soviets

would like to see is failure of the United States, Britain, and the West to provide economic aid, and South African destabilization by economic sanctions or military threats or covert intervention. This combination could push any Zimbabwean regime (and the Soviets probably don't care much who is running it) to invite a closer Soviet connection and perhaps to be drawn into "socialist orientation."

Exactly the same considerations apply to Botswana, where the Soviet embassy now has some 29 people, and also to Zambia. Both countries have recently received Soviet military equipment.

Zimbabwe and Botswana have refused to allow the ANC to operate camps and run guerrilla operations from their territory. The Soviets would like to see that change, and to encourage South African retaliation, but only when their own world position is more secure and they become better able to sustain their favorite role of arms supplier and protector.

War or Peace for Namibia

The real Soviet interest is to establish "socialist orientation" in a liberated Namibia. If elections and a peaceful transfer of power would lead to this result, the Soviets would support them enthusiastically. But if a peaceful settlement would exclude Soviet and allied influence from Namibia continued stalemate and warfare is better. The Soviets say they support whatever SWAPO decides, and their statements carefully echo SWAPO, the Frontline States, and United Nations resolutions. Military victory against the South Africans is out of reach. But continued fighting reinforces of the role of East Germans training the People's Liberation Army of Namibia and increases the chances that SWAPO's leaders will become committed to the Soviet connection. SWAPO is described as a "national-patriotic" movement,

not fully Marxist, but a speech of Sam Nujoma was recently included in Kommunist, the CPSU ideological journal, indicating approval by the mandarins of the Central Committee Secretariat's Ideological Department. Failure to reach a solution damages the prestige of the United States and the Contact Group, and fuels useful suspicions that the United States has been colluding all along with South Africa. Namibia remains a useful issue for Soviet-African bridge-building and anti-Western propaganda at the United Nations and in general.

Beyond persuasion, the Soviets and their allies have no power to prevent a negotiated solution. In November 1981 Moses Garoeb, SWAPO Secretary-General, said that Namibia under SWAPO would pattern itself on Zimbabwe, with a pragmatic economic policy and prohibition of ANC guerrilla activities. This would be the best possible outcome for the United States, and the worst for the Soviets. During the Lancaster House Zimbabwe negotiations, the Soviets counseled continued warfare, claiming that the settlement was a British trick to send an occupation force and rig the elections. This had no discernible effect on the Patriotic Front, even ZAPU whose forces had been built and equipped and trained by the Cubans. The talk-fight strategy of the Patriotic Front needed the Soviets only for the fight part, and when they had played their role as armorer to force negotiations, they were discarded. The same could happen in Namibia. Only South Africa can prevent a transfer of power by election, and here as in other matters the Soviets count on South African intransigence to help their cause.

Long-Term Polarization in South Africa

Soviet policy toward South Africa bears attention. South Africa is considered by the Soviets a developed country, part of the Western economic system, with a real proletariat. The South African Communist Party, originally an organization of white workers, was formed in 1921, joined the

Comintern in 1926, and was banned by the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950. When the African National Congress also went underground following the 1961 Sharpeville pass-book riots and police shootings, the SACP began to work within the ANC, although it maintains its separate identity and organization. This is traditional communist united front strategy designed to associate communists with the national cause and at the same time to make them the dominant force, or vanguard, within it. Anatoly Gromyko says that Umkonto we Sizwe, the ANC military arm, was created by the SACP. Following the Soweto uprising, Cuban and East German instructors began guerrilla training for young South Africans in Angola, and infiltration later began through Mozambique. These recent guerrilla incursions have provoked South African raids against Mozambique and South African pressure on Swaziland to ban ANC access.

The Soviet policy for South Africa is long-term polarization. Recent guerrilla attacks are considered only the opening phase of a long struggle. Spontaneous uprising in South Africa, particularly if led by Black Consciousness movements or groups in the homelands, would be the wrong revolution. What the Soviets want, and expect, is continued repression of labor unions, of groups in the homelands, of intellectuals and of all liberal forces. Over time, this should drive Africans and all who want majority rule to see that the only solution is to join an organized and disciplined revolutionary movement. Workers are seen as the primary recruiting ground. The need for organization and discipline and armed action should also enable communists to gradually assume leadership within the ANC. Eventually, a repressive and threatened white South African state will be confronted by a communist-led vanguard party increasingly able to carry on sabotage and guerrilla warfare, which will be the only opposing force. All this is very traditional revolutionary policy. Much of it is explained in an interesting document called

"For the Freedom, Independence, National Revival, and Social Progress of the Peoples of Tropical and Southern Africa," authored by "a number of communist and workers' parties in Africa."

The real threat to this strategy is not repression, which can be useful. Repression creates convinced enemies of the regime, and also gets rid of people like Steve Biko, who are useful only as martyrs. The real threat is reform and liberalization and the growth of a prosperous African middle class and a labor movement with a stake in the system. The Soviets are counting on the stubbornness of the Nationalist Party and the short-sightedness of the United States to create the polarization which may allow their strategy to work

United States Policy

The United States has three major legitimate objectives in southern Africa--human rights and majority democratic rule for all the people of southern Africa; trade, investment, and access to mineral resources; and limitation or reduction of Soviet and allied influence. I believe that efforts toward majority democratic rule are both a moral and a practical imperative. I think that President Kaunda of Zambia is right when he argues that independent African governments have every interest in trade, investment, and the sale of minerals to the West and therefore have no interest in denying them. Reduction of Soviet influence is a legitimate interest because the Soviets are indifferent to human rights, might seek to deny resources, and most directly because in Southern Africa at least, they have designed their policies to weaken and injure the United States.

The way to reduce or eliminate Soviet and allied influence and presence in southern Africa seems quite clear. The West and the United States should promote by any means possible conditions of peace and stability which allow the Frontline States and a stable Namibia under majority rule to turn to

their economic development needs. The United States must avoid the trap of being provoked into support for South African destabilization which makes the Soviet Union the natural ally and protector of African interests.

The competing view argues that now is the time to clear the Soviets and their allies out of southern Africa by covert and military means. I think this policy is mistaken even in its narrow purpose of eliminating Soviet and allied influence. Its consequences even if temporarily successful would be United States complicity with South Africa which would turn all Africa against us, and United States involvement in the policing of southern Africa against the interests of all Africans seeking majority democratic rule. The Soviets would then become the true natural ally. This is not in our interest, although it is what the government of South Africa would like to see.

Some specific applications in policy which I would propose are these: Direct diplomacy with the Soviet Union and with South Africa to avert the one possibility that both the USA and the USSR want to avoid--a South African invasion of Angola (setting off the Cuban trip-wire) or of Mozambique that would elicit a call for Soviet military intervention and back Soviet credibility into a corner. Whatever the world situation, a Soviet decision to intervene is possible and the consequences of intervention in the present political climate could be very dangerous.

Continued efforts through the Contact Group to reach a negotiated transfer of power in Namibia, on condition that Namibia bar ANC use of its territory and also that Namibia not allow a major internal Soviet or Cuban or East German presence. This last is far more important than the Cuban soldiers in Angola, who would then become superfluous.

Recognition, trade, and investment for Angola. This, and not the Namibian settlement, might be linked to the departure of the Cubans. This leaves the question of UNITA which cannot be ignored. Whether it might be

possible to ensure an amnesty, or even a political role for Jonas Savimbi, is a question for those who know Angola better than I.

Economic measures including encouragement of Angola and Mozambique to join the IMF and the Lomé Conventions, resumption of food shipments to Mozambique, and cooperation with Portuguese and other European efforts to expand trade and investment including arms sales.

Continued aid and other measures to strengthen the government of Zimbabwe.

Encouragement of economic and also political cooperation among the Frontline States including contributions to the infrastructure projects of the SADCC.

Diplomatic efforts to discourage ANC guerrilla operations and South African reprisals, which are the destabilization cycle that both the Soviets and the South Africans promote. If Namibia were to ban ANC operations, Mozambique might also be persuaded to interrupt them if South Africa stopped supplying the MNR.

This leaves the major issue of how to approach South Africa. At the present time the United States at the very least should speak out against the South African military buildup and destabilization policies which threaten South Africa's neighbors. The major emphasis, however, should be on positive measures toward the Frontline States combined with whatever can be arranged to reduce the level of conflict. This seems the most effective way to limit Soviet influence.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to present these views.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much.

I want to thank all of the witnesses for some very excellent testimony that was responsive to the queries that we put to you.

I want to begin with a few questions for Dr. Isaacman, inasmuch as he will very likely have to be leaving early and we certainly understand that.

Dr. Isaacman, I wonder if you might respond to Dr. Butterfield's thesis, which is essentially, as I understand it, that the basic cause of the conflict that is evident today in Mozambique is internal factors and that we ought not be seeking to place blame on South Africa as the cause of the problems that Mozambique is experiencing. Would you concur with that? What would be your reaction to that analysis?

Mr. ISAACMAN. I think it is not only my assessment but the assessment of Western diplomats, including I might note members of our own mission in Maputo. If we look at the statement made by Rhodesian security director Ken Flowers in *Africa Confidential*, in July 1981, I believe, he acknowledged that he was the one who personally oversaw and organized the MNR. A variant of this account, but one that supports it, by and large, is that of Gordon Winter in his book "Inside Boss." Now, Gordon Winter worked with South African security and he acknowledged both Flower's central role as well as Boss' central role.

Moreover, the captured documents to which I made reference clearly indicate that South African security meeting with the MNR in the Transvaal designated the strategies that the MNR was to pursue and, indeed, indicated its displeasure that the MNR was not acting more vigorously to undercut the SADCC and create an aura of terror.

But above all else, it seems to me the MNR's own actions are the best indication that Dr. Butterfield's claim lacks validity. That is, any guerrilla organization whose policies are based exclusively on terrorism—and there are repeated accounts reported in the *Guardian*, and in a number of other Western journals and magazines of MNR's arbitrary and capricious terrorism—cannot hope to organize any sort of mass political movement. This is not only my assessment but the assessment of Western diplomats in Maputo.

So I guess, in response, I don't see it as an indigenous organization borne out of popular displeasure within Mozambique, although to be sure there are very serious economic problems in Mozambique, some of which have been heightened by the MNR and South African attacks. But I see it, in fact, as a continuation of a policy begun by the Rhodesians, of funding and providing support for mercenaries to try to destabilize Mozambique and, more importantly, prevent the growth of SADCC.

Mr. WOLPE. I am interested in Dr. Butterfield's reaction to what was just said, but beyond that, the point I found a bit obscure and I wonder if you could help us work our way through to this understanding, is—what I heard you say essentially is that there are internal problems that these countries are facing, and the internal problems of these countries are, in large measure, responsible for the instability that they are confronting.

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. I think I should—

Mr. WOLPE. I am not so certain that that's terribly useful in terms of the broader question of what should American policy be in response to external intervention by South Africa in the internal affairs of these countries, and by South Africa's intervention.

Now, I didn't hear you to suggest that South Africa was not, in fact, involved—

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. No, I didn't, and I'm not trying to say that South Africa is not involved in Mozambique. I am saying I simply don't know.

What I am saying, however, is that you simply cannot manufacture a guerrilla war. It presumes massive discontent. Are we saying that if Moscow did not supply SWAPO there would be no SWAPO? I wouldn't say that. I think SWAPO is an indigenous movement. It mirrors discontent on the Namibian situation. Similarly, we have to apply the same categorization to the MNR. Its existence presupposes major problems within Mozambique. South Africa may or may not be supplying the MNR, but the MNR would nonetheless be there and be operating.

Mr. WOLPE. Fine. But what should America's response be to the South African activity?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Our first response, logically, should be to encourage countries such as Mozambique to follow logical economic policies which will give them an enhanced degree of stability which will prevent outside powers from coming in and taking advantage of that instability.

Mr. WOLPE. And should we have no response to South Africa?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Oh, certainly. We should make it always clear that we are not going to support destabilization and we should try to find out if it's going on, which I believe we are doing. But we don't have the definite answers which I believe some of the people here feel they have today. My own conversations with members of the administration indicate that the matter is somewhat of a mystery.

Mr. WOLPE. Dr. Isaacman?

Mr. ISAACMAN. I have two responses. First of all, to my knowledge, there is no indication that the Reagan administration has publicly condemned the South African attacks on Mozambique. Moreover, there is a sufficient amount of evidence that South Africa is not only supplying arms to the MNR and logistic support, but, in fact, is paying black mercenaries. Upward to 3 to 500 rands per month in support of their activities.

But I want to make one fundamental point. The term "guerrilla" itself is an analytically imprecise term. What we are seeing in Mozambique is relatively small groups of MNR guerrillas, airlifted into Mozambique from South Africa, along a very large and open border, disrupting key economic targets. There is no indication whatsoever that they have any popular support. I question the basis on which the claim is made, that there is, indeed, substantial populace support for the MNR. The best indication is that they move in and attack strategic sites, they are very effective, they do intimidate peasants, and in fact do create very serious problems for the Mozambican Government. To the extent that that Government has economic problems, and to the extent that that Government is unable to protect the peasantry, the MNR is relatively successful

in creating havoc and weakening the position of the Government. But there is no indication whatsoever that the MNR has made any effort to mobilize popular support, to create an alternative, legitimate nationalist movement.

Mr. WOLPE. Is there any evidence of Mozambican support for ANC military bases in Mozambique?

Mr. ISAACMAN. I put this question to Mozambican officials and to Western diplomats in Maputo. The Mozambican Government officials were unequivocal, that there are no ANC bases. Indeed, President Machel and other Mozambican officials have publicly indicated that the ANC presence in southern Mozambique is to be limited to a small number of offices and houses.

Now, it is probably true that ANC guerrillas are passing through Mozambique. Western diplomats with whom I spoke indicated that the long border between South Africa and Mozambique, which is unguarded and unprotected, allows for easy access. They have suggested that, in fact, the Mozambican Government is unable to contain small groups of ANC guerrillas who pass through Mozambican territory. But there is no evidence whatsoever of ANC bases in Mozambique as there were ZANU bases during the struggle over Zimbabwe.

Mr. WOLPE. What was the motivation for the raid on ANC houses in Maputo by South Africa in early 1981 if these houses were not used militarily?

Mr. ISAACMAN. I want to emphasize that they were just that, houses. I have passed through that area and have lived in Maputo when I was teaching at the university not very far from that area. It was just that, a series of suburban homes in which South African refugees, some of whom belonged to the ANC, resided. There is no indication that there was any military presence or military organizing from those homes.

Mr. WOLPE. Is there any evidence—and I would ask this of all the panelists here—of any Angolan-Mozambican-Zimbabwean troops crossing into South Africa?

Mr. ISAACMAN. In the case of Mozambique, there is certainly no evidence. It would be suicidal for Mozambique.

Mr. WOLPE. Is there anyone else who could respond?

Mr. BENDER. I don't think the South Africans ever accused the Angolans of crossing over, no incidents that I'm aware of.

Mr. WOLPE. Does anyone else have any evidence or any other comment they could make?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. No. I would just like to add that I would agree with the analysis of the ANC presence in Mozambique. There may have been a military presence before the raid on Matola, but certainly after that the Mozambican government did not want to risk another raid by the South African Defense Force.

Mr. WOLPE. So that all of the cross-border activity with respect to government forces is one-way—South Africa into Angola in particular; is that correct?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. There may be ANC people crossing the border without government permission. There is not necessarily the capacity, particularly in Botswana, to control a group such as the ANC.

Mr. WOLPE. So there may be some transit activity of ANC guerrilla—

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Yes, there may be, but not necessarily with government permission.

Mr. WOLPE. I am putting that question aside for the moment and focusing simply on the issue of the governments themselves and the activity that they would support. What I'm getting at, of course, is that this posture the South African Government has taken has been one of justifying its invasions into Angola on the grounds of hot pursuit of SWAPO forces. The question I put to the panelists is, should the American policy view that as a legitimate rationale? Do we put that on the same basis as we would ANC guerrilla activity directed to overthrow the South African Government?

Mr. BENDER. Mr. Chairman, as I indicated, there has been no accusation by anybody that Angolan troops have ever crossed into Namibia, nor am I aware of anybody who suggested a single Cuban has crossed into Namibia from Angola. All of the crossing of the border by military forces of states is from South Africa crossing into Angola.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. I think, in addition, Mr. Chairman, we ought to point out in the case of Namibia, that this is a country which the United States agrees, along with the rest of the United Nations, is illegally occupied. So the first problem is South Africa's invasion and occupation of Namibia itself which has been universally condemned. The ending of this occupation would go a long way toward solving the problem of incursions into Angola also.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you.

Dr. Butterfield, did you want to make a comment?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Just a practical observation, in the sense that SWAPO is, by definition, trying to get into Namibia. It just doesn't have the capacity to do so any more. South Africa is in Angola preventing SWAPO entering Namibia.

Now, the fact that SWAPO has not succeeded in the past year should not alter the fact that penetration is its essential purpose. So in a sense it is a cross-border situation with both sides there. It is just that one has been more successful than the other.

Mr. WOLPE. But in international law, and as a matter of American diplomatic response, should those two situations be viewed as equivalent situations?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. No, I'm not saying equivalent situations. What I'm saying is, in this particular case, if we are going to solve the Namibian problem, standing on our honor on questions of legality and illegality, is not going to take us very far.

Mr. WOLPE. No, the issue is not—I am not trying to raise fine points of international law. What I am trying to raise is the fine points of what America's political position is.

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. We cannot condone foreign troop presence in other states, and I don't believe we are doing that at the moment.

Mr. WOLPE. Well, my recollection is the United States at one point vetoed a U.N. Resolution condemning South Africa's invasion of Angola, and did so on the basis that it was a two-way exercise that was involved, because of SWAPO activity in Angola that essentially complicated the situation and justified the American veto.

Is that your position as well?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. One could hardly call it a simple, one-sided situation. We have one group crossing one border one way and another cross the other way.

Mr. BENDER. I just want to reemphasize that there has been no Angolan forces crossing into Namibia, but the Angolan people and their government has paid a dear price in attacks on themselves. I'm not talking about SWAPO. I acknowledge SWAPO's military forces do try to go into Namibia. But no Angolans go into Namibia, but South Africa frequently enters Angola and presently occupies some Angolan territory.

Mr. WOLPE. Are not SWAPO forces Namibian in character?

Mr. BENDER. I must have misspoke. I meant Angolan. SWAPO forces go in and are punished by South Africa inside Angola. No Angolan forces go into Namibia, but Angola is severely punished.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you.

We will be recessing for a moment for a vote that is imminent on the House floor. Before doing so, I wanted to give an opportunity for Mr. Goodling to ask a series of questions.

Mr. GOODLING. First I would say that I'm always glad we eventually get around to hearing several different points of view. I do become quite concerned and at times most upset when I hear the only problem we have is one of American involvement and America not doing what America should be doing. Everyone else involved, of course, is clean as can be, and if we would just, number one, bridle South Africa—which I doubt we could accomplish, nor do I believe that we probably have that right—then everything would just turn out just fine.

I was glad to hear that there are some other problems in most of these states in Africa, major problems that are not the result of U.S. involvement, and we are not going to solve those problems; they are going to solve those problems internally.

I have a couple of questions that I would like to ask. Dr. Isaacman, in your summary you say "To the extent that the Reagan administration chooses to view events in southern Africa through the prism of cold war, and adopts a pro-South African posture." You apparently know a lot that I don't know about the policy of the United States in relationship to South Africa. Then you go on down below and say, "the most relevant for this discussion is the February 1980 exposure of CIA activities in Mozambique."

Are you connecting those two statements? February 1980 is pretty early in this administration.

Mr. ISAACMAN. No.

Mr. GOODLING. You did not mean to connect those?

Mr. ISAACMAN. The intent was not to connect them, no. If those charges are correct, they clearly antedate the present administration.

Mr. GOODLING. Pardon?

Mr. ISAACMAN. If those charges made by the Mozambican Government are correct, then CIA activity clearly antedated the Reagan administration.

Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Bender states in his testimony, "The Reagan administration has claimed that its policy of constructive engagement would produce independence in Namibia and peace in south-

ern Africa. Is the administration prepared to acknowledge that it has not produced the promised results?"

Are you saying that, since very little happened since 1948, and nothing in the 4 years prior, that in the 2 years now a complete successful handling of the Namibian question should have been concluded by this time? Is that what you're indicating?

Mr. BENDER. Well, I am measuring the present administration here by their own predictions and claims. Former Secretary of State Alexander Haig told us that Namibia would be independent by the end of 1981. Then other administration spokesmen——

Mr. GOODLING. He's not a member of the cabinet.

Mr. BENDER. But those who were advising him then suggested that Namibia would be independent by 1982, and——

Mr. GOODLING. Isn't that amazing; in all the meetings we have had with those same officials, we never got that kind of promise.

Mr. BENDER. Well, they have stated it for the record, and I actually have a \$50 bet with one of them that Namibia will not be independent by Easter of this year because they were so sure that it would. I mean, they have stated it publicly for the record.

Mr. GOODLING. I would up that bet considerably, because it hasn't happened since 1948. And I don't necessarily say it will happen tomorrow, or by Easter. I think there is at least some hope. I think that you now have a face-to-face discussion going on with the MPLA and South Africa. That's a hopeful sign.

Mr. BENDER. But that is no different than the previous administration, sir.

Mr. GOODLING. No different than previous administrations? I would say there was more movement in the last year than there has been in all of the years up to this point.

Now, again, that doesn't say by Easter there will be a settlement, nor do I think there is anything that the U.S. Government can do to guarantee a settlement. I don't believe we are in that position there or any other place throughout this world, nor do I think we have the right to guarantee that because it would indicate that we are going to do something forcefully within somebody else's country.

Mr. BENDER. Two responses. One, if you take movement to mean movement by American diplomats around the world, you are absolutely correct. There has been more movement than we have seen before, although I——

Mr. GOODLING. And less rhetoric.

Mr. BENDER [continuing]. Although I did meet Don McHenry once in Angola on his 18th trip during a 17-month period, so there was a lot of movement also in the Carter administration. But we haven't seen movement on the part of South Africa, Angola, or SWAPO that convinces me that this administration is taking negotiations appreciably further than the previous one.

Mr. GOODLING. I wanted to make an observation, that I had never heard of a guerrilla operation or a freedom-fighting operation that doesn't use terrorism as one of its tools. I sort of got the impression that maybe you felt that was something new.

I do want to compliment Professor Singleton on many of his statements. In fact, it is his testimony that I would like to get this administration to read and read carefully.

Mr. SINGLETON. Thank you.

Mr. GOODLING. It's unfortunate that every other administration did not have the opportunity. I would like this administration to read your testimony carefully when they are dealing with their Caribbean problems, because you made some very important observations that if they overlook, they will do no better there than any prior administration.

I do want to thank all of you for your testimony, and if you have any other comments or responses that you would like to make, I have jotted down some of the things and underlined some of the things because—

Mr. BENDER. I would just like to correct one very serious typo in my testimony, on page 4, the last paragraph, where it says 20 million dollars' worth of weapons, that should be \$200 million. That's a very serious typo.

Mr. GOODLING. Speaking of arms, I always tell my dear friend, Mr. Solarz, that if he could help me stop the flow of Israeli arms to South Africa, maybe I could help him do some of the things he would like to do in relationship to South Africa.

Mr. BENDER. I didn't respond to your second question because I wasn't quite sure I understood it.

Were you saying that the United States should not make pronouncements about South Africa's activities in southern Africa, that we don't have the right to do that?

Mr. GOODLING. No, I didn't say that at all. I said that I would imagine that some of the easy solutions that I thought that I was hearing would mean that somehow or other we should become involved internally in the operation of some other government, and perhaps forcibly, and I didn't think that we had the right to do that kind of thing.

I happen to believe that public pronouncements many times stiffen the backs of the very people whose backbone you would like to crush. I don't like to give them the opportunity to have their backbone stiffen. If I can take them out in "the woodshed" out of sight you have some chance of having some impact on them. Being an old educator myself, I know that you don't discipline youngsters in front of their peers and expect to gain any respect, nor correct anything that they may have done. I would like to think that privately, behind the woodshed or in the woodshed, you can do some of those things with South Africa.

Again, I do want to say, Professor Singleton, that I think you have some real lessons for this administration to learn embodied in your testimony. I write to them regularly, giving all of my expertise, and will encourage them to read your testimony as they deal with foreign policy.

Mr. SINGLETON. Thank you.

Mr. CROCKETT [presiding]. Mr. Wolpe has asked me to preside in his absence. I am at a very distinct disadvantage because I was unable to be here to hear the formal presentation by you gentlemen. As you know, we are debating the defense budget on the floor, and you can't be in both places.

I am told that there are certain portions of Angola, in the southern part, that are actually under the jurisdiction of South Africa, that South Africa has actually moved in and taken over with some

members of its armed forces and is actively administering that area.

Is that information correct? Can any of you gentlemen verify that?

Mr. BENDER. Yes, it is. The South Africans themselves acknowledge it, so I don't think it is a secret. I, myself, was traveling with my wife in that area 2½ years ago and we went all through the area that is now occupied. We tried to return there two summers ago and last summer and it was impossible because of the South African occupation.

Mr. CROCKETT. Is that same situation true with respect to Mozambique?

Mr. ISAACMAN. No, it is not. There is no permanent South African military or political presence in Mozambique.

Mr. CROCKETT. Now, Mr. Crocker and the State Department have repeatedly tried to convince us that they are pulling out all the stops in an effort to get South Africa out of Namibia. It seems to me the place to begin is to get South Africa out of Angola, but I don't think the State Department is addressing that question.

Am I wrong in that regard, Mr. Bender?

Mr. BENDER. I am not aware that the State Department has openly insisted on South Africa removing her troops from southern Angola and ending her occupation. I don't know whether Congressman Goodling's theory that if you don't say these things publicly that somehow you can better produce results. All I know is, whatever the administration is doing or not doing, it has not had any impact on South Africa's decision to remain in occupied territory in southern Angola.

Mr. BUTERFIELD. I would like to add that as part of a Namibia settlement inevitably there will be South African withdrawal from any part of Angola. Even as we are here, the South African Government at the moment is talking to the MPLA presumably about South African withdrawal from Angola. It is not as if we can portray this as a hopeless situation. Talks are taking place at the moment.

Mr. BENDER. It is rather hopeless for the hundreds of thousands or millions of Angolans who are in the area. As I say, we often in our discussion of strategies and tactics forget about those people. There are discussions in Cape Verde going on right now, but we don't know what they're about and we don't know whether or not they will lead to a South African withdrawal.

Mr. CROCKETT. Some time ago this committee learned that there had been some contacts in Morocco between Savimbi and representatives of the Government of the United States. We also have heard to the effect that some of the arms that Savimbi is using are made in the United States, according to captured weapons.

My question is whether or not Savimbi could last if he did not have the active support, one, of South Africa, and the silent support of our State Department.

Mr. BENDER. Well, I don't think we can assume that the presence of American weapons anywhere in the world today, given the international arms market, is indicative that the United States directly provided them. In the case of UNITA, I personally do not think that the U.S. Government is directly providing weapons to UNITA.

Also, the second half of your question, I believe that UNITA will go on if all South African support were to dry up tomorrow. I don't think U.S. silent or vocal support—and it has been rather vocal from this administration—of UNITA will make any difference, really. Despite what all MPLA officials state, publically and privately, UNITA does have roots in the country and will continue even if South African support is withdrawn.

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. I would like to underwrite that statement. I don't think there is going to be any political stability in Angola until, at some stage, the MPLA and UNITA come together. I think the Carter administration misled the MPLA very seriously by leading it to believe that somehow it could avoid this. It is going to be essential that some sort of settlement comes about, a coalition government or, better still, national elections.

Mr. BENDER. But the thrust of my testimony, sir, that you unfortunately missed was to suggest that that reconciliation cannot come about as long as there is the South African connection. It just cannot come about. The MPLA is not going to reconcile with UNITA as long as it is carrying its South African baggage. That's a fact.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. I would like to support professor Bender's observation. I had a conversation with the Foreign Minister of Angola, Paulo Jorge, just about the middle of September of 1981, in which he also said that UNITA was a force that they recognized but that the problems of South African support and the tribalism were the two major obstacles to some kind of rapprochement.

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. I would agree that there is going to be no settlement between UNITA and the MPLA while UNITA has South African support; similarly, there is not going to be any reconciliation while the MPLA has Cuban support. The real problem we've got here is to get all foreign troops out of the country—and I mean all. We can't just adopt a one-sided approach. They have all got to leave and that's when we will finally get a true settlement.

Mr. CROCKETT. One final question for me—I don't know if Chairman Wolpe will be back in time—we hear a lot about South Africa's fear of communism and of the influence of the Soviet Union. That is given as the reason for its insistence in being in Namibia and for its incursions into Mozambique and into Angola.

I would suggest that perhaps that really is not the reason, but that South Africa might be taking a leaf from the Soviet's book and is intent on surrounding itself with a group of buffer states that will be responsive to South Africa and will service the purposes of South African security.

Do any of you gentlemen wish to comment on that?

Mr. SUTHERLAND. Perhaps, Mr. Crockett, it is the fact that they did lose those buffer states. They had them at one time, of course, when Portugal had these states as colonies and Zimbabwe was Rhodesia. But I think that from the testimony here today and from other expressions that I have heard at other times, it is quite clear that the Marxist governments of Africa have a very independent position much like Yugoslavia, if you could put it that way, as far as their own interests are concerned. It does seem as though the problem rests primarily with whether this country and South Africa itself can accept the fact that people are going to put their

own interests ahead of the interests of the South African economic or military dominance or even the Western dominance.

Mr. ISAACMAN. I think there is another dimension. I would agree with Mr. Sutherland, that of Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, whatever their path of internal development, are committed to nonalignment and to retaining their autonomy. I think the issue is essentially their commitment to retain a degree, greater rather than lesser of autonomy on the one hand, and the South African strategy, which I think is very clever, to internationalize the conflict. To the extent that South Africa threatens Angola and the Angolan government finds it necessary to and have Cuban troops the conflict is internationalized there. To the extent that South Africa is intensifying its military actions against Mozambique, there becomes pressure within the Mozambican Government to look to military support from wherever it can get it, namely, from the socialist countries primarily—further internationalizing the conflict.

As a result, the South African Government is, in effect, trying to create a self-fulfilling prophesy; that is, through its policies, to narrow the international options of Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe by forcing them to look to the socialist countries who have helped them in the past. Then Pretoria turns around and says to the West, "Look, events in southern Africa can be seen primarily and predominantly through the cold war. After all, there's a growing Soviet/Cuban/East German presence."

It is in the interest of Angola and in the interest of Mozambique—and both countries have stated this unequivocally—that they maintain a nonaligned policy. In the case of latter, Mozambique has clearly indicated this desire by refusing to provide naval bases to the Soviet Union, by its attack on the militarization of the Indian Ocean, and by its recent military agreements with Portugal, a NATO ally. So I think, given the choice, Mozambique would much prefer to have this threat of South Africa removed so it could proceed with a nonaligned policy and try to resolve the very important problems of economic development, which South Africa attacks South African-backed MNR attacks clearly frustrate.

Mr. SINGLETON. May I add something to that.

In these affairs I think we must always guard against being mesmerized by words. I would remind everybody that Cuba is the world's most nonaligned country. The reason Cuba is the world's most nonaligned country is because it is the world's most anti-imperialist country. Words can be used in different ways by different people to mean different things.

Now, I agree with Dr. Isaacman, that the Angolans and the Mozambicans, certainly the Mozambicans, are not in anybody's pocket and don't want to be. On the other hand, I think we should be quite careful, because from the Soviet and Cuban—particularly Soviet, and East German also—end of the relationship with Mozambique, and more so with Angola—there is a very strong effort being made to, make those countries more Cubas. They are treated as, if you will, "candidate" members of what the Soviets call the socialist community.

Now, I agree completely that with intelligent U.S. and Western policies that will not be the result.

Mr. GOODLING. Just one comment. I did want to say to Dr. Butterfield that I think that for anyone listening today, your testimony raises the stock of the Heritage Foundation considerably because of your ability to look at many sides of the issue and indicate that there are many sides. The most frustrating thing about serving on the Foreign Affairs Committee is that I have to sit here time and time again and listen to those who are either totally naive about the real world we live in or, even worse, know what they're doing, and on the other hand having to sit here and listen to those who truly believe that security assistance is the answer to all problems. I find it just the most frustrating experience and one of the reasons why I am looking for greener pastures.

I have nothing further.

Mr. CROCKETT. Mr. Sutherland, do you believe—and if you do, what evidence is there to support your belief—that the internal opposition, for example, on the part of Mr. Nkomo in Zimbabwe, may be supported by South Africa?

Mr. SUTHERLAND. Would you mind repeating that, sir?

Mr. CROCKETT. Yes. Do you believe—and if you do believe, what evidence is there to support that belief—that the internal opposition that Mr. Nkomo is giving to Mr. Mugabe in Zimbabwe is supported by South Africa?

Mr. SUTHERLAND. I, myself, have no evidence of that belief, and I don't really think that is the major problem in terms of the differences between the two. However, I have heard it said that there have been some efforts to combine the dissidents who have been in the white population with those in the black population in the western part of the country and discussion of secession. But I don't think that that is the major question.

I have not myself heard that Mr. Nkomo is by any means working with the South Africans in any way. That is not to say it isn't happening, but I have not heard it.

Mr. SINGLETON. I was just going to add to that, nor is it my understanding that he is working with the Soviets. As far as I know, the Soviets and their allies have avoided any efforts to destabilize Zimbabwe because their whole position in southern Africa rests on being voluntarily accepted by Africans. If they get the reputation as destabilizing those who are accepted and popular among Africans, that clearly does not serve their interests. So I don't think the Soviets and their allies are supporting Mr. Nkomo's destabilization to the extent that it exists, either.

Mr. CROCKETT. Thank goodness, the chairman is back.

Mr. WOLPE. I am sorry to have to absent myself for a period of time there.

Mr. ISAACMAN, you indicated in your testimony that Mozambique has been helpful in efforts to obtain diplomatic settlements in Rhodesia and Namibia. Could you explain the status of those initiatives that Mozambique has taken?

Mr. ISAACMAN. Well, with reference to the Lancaster House agreements, behind the scene, Mozambique encouraged very vigorously the Patriotic Front to pursue a political settlement. Mozambican leaders took the position with their counterparts in the Patriotic Front, that at the moment Zimbabwean Independence could be most effectively achieved through political means. In fact,