



United States Policy toward Southern Africa: Focus on Namibia, Angola, and South Africa

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**UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN
AFRICA: FOCUS ON NAMIBIA, ANGOLA,
AND SOUTH AFRICA**

HEARING AND MARKUP
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
H. Res. 214; H. Con. Res. 183

SEPTEMBER 16, 1981

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**UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN
AFRICA: FOCUS ON NAMIBIA, ANGOLA, AND
SOUTH AFRICA**

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1981

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met in open markup session at 2:16 p.m. in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard Wolpe (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. WOLPE. The subcommittee will come to order.

Before turning to the principal subject of the hearing today, which will be to hear from Dr. Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary for Africa, I would like to ask unanimous consent to take up for consideration by the Committee House Resolution No. 214. This is a resolution condemning South Africa's recent invasion of Angola and the resulting unnecessary loss of lives and destruction of property, and calling upon all parties to the Namibian conflict to cooperate in the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 435.

Is there any objection?

Hearing none, the resolution will be before the committee at this point.

I believe you all have copies of the resolution that has been circulated to members of the committee.

I will entertain either discussion or a motion.

Mr. STUDDS. It is not objected to by the administration, is it?

Mr. WOLPE. I am afraid I cannot speak for the administration in that regard.

Mr. GOODLING. I would merely like to indicate that the original resolution made it sound as if it were strictly a one-sided problem, in my estimation, and of course I do not agree with that. There are always two or three sides to a conflict, and I think we now have included in here the fact that although we are very concerned and upset with South Africa's efforts, we also have some real concerns about Cuba and Russia and other situations that are happening in Angola. So I have no objections to the resolution as it now stands. I do not know about the rest of my colleagues.

Mr. WOLPE. I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

I would indicate the resolution is jointly cosponsored by us and has been developed on a bipartisan basis.

Congressman Erdahl.

(1)

Mr. ERDAHL. Mr. Congressman, I would like to comment on that, too, because I also cosponsored the resolution.

I think as we deal with South Africa, something that becomes very apparent, it cannot be by its nature a bilateral understanding or agreement because our decisions as a Nation that they apply in effect to South Africa also give very clear signals, I think, to what at least the perception is affecting the emerging nations in Africa that are looking for political independence and for economic viability and for all of the emerging nations in the world as well.

And so I think it is well that we as a Congress take what is somewhat of a diplomatic political stand, and yet at the same time is a hard international stand, and for that reason I was pleased to go on as a cosponsor of this resolution.

Mr. WOLPE. Are there any other comments that members would care to make?

I should indicate that though they are not present at the moment, Congressmen Erdahl, Solarz, and Crockett are also additional cosponsors of the resolution.

I believe that the resolution does contain an important expression of congressional concern with respect to the recent invasion. I also believe that it is particularly important in light of some of the understandings that we received from our recent delegation visit to a number of African countries. There is concern about America's posture with respect to this question, and I think this would at least be an important statement of congressional position.

Mr. GOODLING. I think it might be well that you read the last three statements on the resolution.

Mr. WOLPE. Let me ask Mr. Carson to read those.

Mr. CARSON [reading]:

In view of the considerations, the House of Representatives—

One, condemns South Africa's recent military invasion of Angola and the resulting unnecessary loss of lives and destruction of property;

Two, recognizes the presence of Cuban and Soviet military personnel has actively contributed to the conflict and instability in southern Africa; and

Three, calls upon all parties to the Namibian conflict to cooperate in the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 435 which remains a solid basis for continued efforts to achieve a peaceful transition to independence in Namibia.

Mr. WOLPE. Is there any further discussion?

Mr. Studds.

Mr. STUDDS. I just want to say that I think this, to put it mildly, is the very least that this subcommittee and this committee and this Congress can do. I suppose one could say that it is fairly bland. It does have an explicit condemnation of the military invasion of Angola by South Africa. And I think it is essential to this Congress to condemn that action, to counter the impression created in international organizations with respect to the official position of our own country.

While it seems to me there ought to be no doubt whatever anywhere in the world with respect to the opinion and the positions of the United States, I regret that there is such doubt, rightly or wrongly. And the statement speaks for itself. It ought not to be necessary.

Mr. WOLPE. The Chair would entertain a motion.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Solarz.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I rather doubt that anybody's views would be swayed by what I have to say, and I do think that this is relatively an exceptional resolution. I gather that there is not any real opposition to it on the part of other members of the subcommittee, but I did feel compelled to make one, I think, important point. In the long run, in my view, this will serve the interests of the United States not only in Africa but elsewhere around the world by making it clear that even if the administration is reluctant to express criticism of the South African invasion of Angola, that the Congress of the United States is not.

My great fear, when it comes to the policy of the new administration toward South Africa, is that they enormously underestimate the degree to which a tilt toward South Africa will create very serious political problems for us not only throughout the rest of Africa but throughout large parts of the rest of the world as well. At the same time I think the administration tremendously overestimates the degree to which a tilt toward South Africa will give us the kind of leverage with the South Africans which will make it possible to achieve real progress toward the elimination of apartheid in that country.

I want to make it very clear that I would be the first to applaud and approve of the administration's approach if I believed for a minute that it would enable them to facilitate a rapid resolution of the conflict in Namibia, and if it were very likely to produce significant progress toward the elimination of apartheid.

But I suspect we are going to end up with the worst of all possible worlds. We are going to be totally isolated internationally on this issue without being able to produce any movement either on Namibia or toward the establishment of some form of meaningful participation by all of the people of South Africa in their own society.

And consequently, I think the adoption of this resolution can be very helpful because it does indicate the legislative branch of the U.S. Government is very much unhappy with the recent events which have transpired in southern Africa, while also making it clear that we are opposed to the presence of Cuban and other forces in Angola as well.

Mrs. FENWICK. Mr. Chairman, I would like to speak, but since I am not a member of the subcommittee, but since my distinguished colleague who is not a member has spoken—

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Solarz is a member.

Mrs. FENWICK. I thought he could not be because of the Asia subcommittee.

Mr. WOLPE. Well, nevertheless he is.

Mrs. FENWICK. I am opposing this resolution, and I will tell you why. Earlier, a colleague from Massachusetts who spoke said, rightly or wrongly, we feel it is necessary in view of the actions or inactions of the administration. I hope I am not misquoting. Suppose it is right? Suppose that we see here a tilt, as described by our

distinguished colleague from New York, toward South Africa, meaning that we are prepared to put up with apartheid, which we, I hope, are not, and meaning that we are prepared to ignore Resolution 435, which I certainly hope this administration or any administration has no intention of doing.

Suppose, however, that these terrible things are true. In that case, this watered down resolution is of no use whatsoever. It ought to be far more strongly worded than it is, and it ought to convey in no uncertain terms that every single move in this direction is going to be resisted by the Congress of the United States.

Suppose on the other hand we are wrong, and suppose that something is in the offering. It is impossible to tell, in that case, words like "condemn" should be replaced by "deplore." In that case, a far clearer, and I may say we should not totally ignore those who live there and whose families have suffered from the bombs that have been placed in the roads of the Ovambo people.

I think, in other words, it is either too little or too much. I think it is a mistake to move when we do not clearly know what has happened.

I would be far more content to sign and join in such a resolution had we been able to question Mr. Crocker before we wrote it, had we known or even been able to gain some impression as to what the intentions of the administration are.

I join with my colleague from New York, as he knows, because I served with him when he was chairman of the subcommittee last year, in the importance of the whole issue. We cannot avoid it, and we will make a serious mistake if we do. This is not just a question of what goes on in this room, 2255 of the Rayburn Building. It is far wider than that and will have a long-term effect, if any.

The only thing I pray is that we inform ourselves before we act, that we act seriously if we think it is serious, that we speak strongly if we think it is a matter that deserves condemnation.

We have not done anything—I think it is a grave error to introduce such a resolution at this time. I intend to speak and vote against it.

Mr. SOLARZ. Would the gentlewoman yield?

Mrs. FENWICK. Yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. The gentlewoman, of course, will have an opportunity to vote against it when it reaches the full committee, but since her support for this legislation would obviously be helpful, given all of the influence which she has with our colleagues on the full committee—

Mrs. FENWICK. Yes, yes. [General laughter.]

Mr. SOLARZ [continuing]. And since I know the gentlewoman has always been very cooperative in compromising in the past when it comes to formulating legislation that will command a broad and widespread measure of support, not only within the committee but the House as a whole. I gather from the gentlewoman's comments that if on page 3, line 12 of the resolution it said that instead of "condemns South Africa's recent military invasion of Angola and the resulting unnecessary loss of lives and destruction of property," if we substituted for the word "condemns" the word "deplores," so that it read: "In view of these considerations, the House of Repre-

sentatives deplores South Africa's recent military invasion of Angola," et cetera, would it be acceptable to her?

Mr. GOODLING. Well, first of all, let me say to the former chairman and to the former member that we have been down that road. It has been a whole business of compromise. There are many other words that were definitely not of my choice or my liking. So we have been down that old path of can we change this word, can we change that word. That side gave, this side gave, and that is where we are at the present time.

Mrs. FENWICK. It was sent to me.

Mr. GOODLING. I would rather go with her idea of either you do something or you do nothing.

Mrs. FENWICK. It was sent to me and I made suggested revisions, and they were refused. That was one of them. I have two or three.

Mr. SOLARZ. If the gentleman would yield further.

Mr. WOLPE. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. SOLARZ. Let me make it clear to my friend from Pennsylvania who has remained as the ranking minority member of the subcommittee that I have great respect for him. I think you have acted with a great sense of responsibility as a member of this subcommittee, and I think you have contributed in a very significant way in helping to formulate positions which are acceptable to the full subcommittee.

Mr. GOODLING. I think all I was saying is we have a full committee procedure where you take this up.

Mr. SOLARZ. But Bill, the point I am simply trying to get at here is if there were negotiations that went on prior to the presentation of this resolution, I was not part of it. I have to confess I was not fully aware of it. The chairman asked me earlier today if I would cosponsor it. I looked at it and I did not have any problem with it, and I said I would be happy to. But ultimately, as the gentleman knows, legislation is written in the subcommittee and then in the full committee, and I did not think it was amiss to inquire whether through a change of one word, which at least to me did not seem to be all that significant, it might be acceptable to Mrs. Fenwick as well.

Mr. GOODLING. I did not think that we could not present the four or five revisions that she had when we got to the full committee. That is what I meant.

Mr. WOLPE. Well, if the gentlelady would yield, let me indicate first of all that there will be further opportunity for us to continue this discussion in advance of full committee consideration. Perhaps we could work out an agreement that would be acceptable to Mrs. Fenwick and other members of the committee.

But I also want to respond, if I may, to the suggestion that this is not as clear a statement as is desired. I am, as you know, and six of my colleagues, have just returned from a six-nation visit tour of the African continent, including 4 days that were spent in South Africa. We came away with a very distinct impression that inside South Africa itself there is a perception both by the Government and also by those who are opposed to the Government of a very distinct shift in American policy, one that is viewed perceptually—and I want to come to that in a moment when I make my state-

ment introducing Dr. Crocker—what is viewed perceptually as representing a shift in American policy.

As we visited other African states and spoke with some of the African leaders that are closest to us, the most important in terms of American interests—I am talking about President Moi of Kenya, president of the Organization of African Unity, President Siad of Somalia, Prime Minister Mugabe in Zimbabwe, and Nigerian leaders. We spoke with Vice President Quime, the Deputy Speaker of the House in Nigeria. There is a growing perception of a sense of abandonment, of a sense of betrayal of what had been historical American commitments.

Now, there is no question that the vote that took place in the United Nations has reinforced that set of perceptions. The administration argues, both privately and publicly and they have made the statement, that that vote was less a reflection of their evaluation of the meaning of the South African action than it was a tactical decision. This decision was designed to insure the continuity of the negotiations that are in process with the South African Government, and that for tactical reasons, for reasons of private diplomacy.

I happen to think it was not a good decision, but nevertheless, that was the rationale. There was a decision made in order not to undermine the negotiations that were in process with the South Africans over the question of Namibia. I can respect that point of view.

The Congress, however, is not bound by the private diplomacy that is in process, and it seemed to me that it was very important, particularly in light of the administration's own view that we are not supporting or condoning the invasion of Angola. And in our discussions with the gentleman from Pennsylvania, in an effort to work this out on a bipartisan basis, we wanted to make clear two propositions: One, that the South African invasion of Angola is not affirmed and is not supported by the American people. I must say that back in South Africa it is instructive to look at the press that followed the United Nations vote, where the position that was taken by the United Nations may have been well-intentioned and motivated by totally different considerations, was nonetheless used as an affirmation of what the South Africans had done in Angola.

We are not bound by the private diplomacy factors that may have dictated the administration's decision, but it is important, it seems to me, that this Congress put on the record what I am convinced is the overwhelming sentiment of the American people with respect to that kind of action.

We also wanted in our discussions to also affirm very clearly that from the standpoint of American interests, we want to see the Soviets out of Angola. We want to see the blocking of Soviet activities in southern Africa, and that is also stated with force in the body of this resolution.

And it seems to me that both points need to be properly stated, in the body of this resolution. I agree that there is some language in here that I am not comfortable with, as there is by others on the committee. But I would hope that we could respect the basic value of this initiative and represent the clarity that is really contained, I think, in the body of the resolution.

Mr. SOLARZ. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. WOLPE. It is not my time.

Mr. SOLARZ. Would the gentlewoman yield?

Mrs. FENWICK. I would like to say something, and then I will yield to you.

I do believe in hot pursuit, and I do not think it is a pursuit of the SWAPO people into Angola that is the sin here. The sin is that they will not obey the United Nations resolution that makes the presence of South Africa in Namibia unlawful and has for years. The policies that are in back of that and are embodied in that action is what is bad.

Hot pursuit is something that is OK in international law, and I have supported it in many cases here in the Congress as my colleagues know. But quiet diplomacy, as one who has worked for many years before I ever came down here in civil rights, if you want to do something for the people you are talking about, quiet diplomacy is the way to do it. But of course, in back of quiet diplomacy, in order to be effective, has to be the determination of the person who is presenting the quiet diplomacy, a determination to see that justice is done.

You cannot do quiet diplomacy and succeed unless you are determined to do justice and the people that you are talking to know it.

Now, this is what we have not yet determined, and I think before we aspire to let some nation have the honor of doing something decent than it is to take credit for it and make them look as though they were pushed. That is not the successful way to operate if you are concerned about civil rights, in my experience in the field since 1945 when I first became active in it.

I really think we would be well-advised to wait for Mr. Crocker to speak and to form a more mature and considered opinion before we decide what the great sin here is. The great sin is the occupation of the country and the refusal to comply with 435.

Mr. SOLARZ. Would the gentlewoman yield?

Mrs. FENWICK. I yield.

Mr. SOLARZ. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.

If there is anything that pains me more than the continued South African presence in Namibia, which the gentlewoman would agree they should have long since vacated, it is the possibility that the gentlewoman and I might be on different sides of an issue involving South Africa because we have marched arm-in-arm down that road for racial justice and democracy for all of the people, black and white.

Mrs. FENWICK. Right.

Mr. SOLARZ. I had the impression from what the gentlewoman said that if the phrase condemns was changed to abhors, that that would make the resolution acceptable to her.

Now, if I misinterpreted what you had to say, I would appreciate hearing it, because personally my sense is that if that is necessary to get your support, that is a supreme sacrifice which I am prepared to make.

Mrs. FENWICK. It is not just that. I did that in the interest of brevity. I had one or two other minor suggestions perhaps. I just used that because it stuck out.

Mr. SOLARZ. What were the other minor suggestions?

Mrs. FENWICK. Well, I think—as I remember the resolution, however I do not have it before me at the moment—thank you. I would have said South Africa's recent land and air attack represents a qualitative increase in South African military involvement, and in view of this we deplore the invasion of Angola and the resulting loss of lives and suffering and destruction of property. In other words, this would have been more admonitory than condemnatory in the hope that it would establish the position of the Congress without jeopardizing any quiet diplomacy that might be operating behind the scenes.

I would leave out all that business about Cuban and Soviet military personnel. Frankly, that was added, as I understand it, to try to make it more palatable, but to me that is not the point.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, if the gentlewoman would further yield, because I do not want to take up the time of the other members of the subcommittee on this—I suspect that our differences over this resolution can probably be resolved through some quiet diplomacy between us after the subcommittee votes.

I only hope that the administration's quiet diplomacy with South Africa is nearly as effective as I am sure our quiet diplomacy will be on this resolution.

Mrs. FENWICK. I quite agree.

Mr. GOODLING. I ask unanimous consent to adopt this resolution.

Mr. WOLPE. A unanimous consent motion has been made.

Do I hear any objection?

If not, the resolution will be considered adopted unanimously.

At this point I am pleased to welcome to the subcommittee Dr. Chester Crocker, who is Assistant Secretary for African Policy.

This afternoon we will hear testimony from Assistant Secretary Crocker on American policy toward South Africa, Angola, and Namibia.

During the past 9 months the Reagan administration has enunciated the broad outlines of its policy. With respect to southern Africa it has repeatedly stated that it is unequivocally opposed to South Africa's system of apartheid and that it is committed to working with the United Nations and the Western Five Contact Group to achieve an internationally acceptable settlement to the Namibian problem.

In this context, it has also reaffirmed the importance of U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 435 and said that that resolution remains the basic framework for achieving a genuine settlement to the political and military struggle now being waged in Namibia.

Few, if any, of us can take issue with these policy statements, and I for one applaud this statement of policy, intentions, and direction. I also believe the administration made the right decision in the United Nations General Assembly when it voted to include South Africa in the general debate on Namibia. While I can certainly understand the sentiment of the vast majority of U.N. members who have been consistently frustrated since 1966 by South Africa's refusal to end its illegal occupation of Namibia, I believe that the General Assembly's decision to exclude South Africa from this debate did not advance the independence of Namibia and only plays into the hands of the South African Government.

Having said this, I remain deeply concerned and troubled by the evolving outlines of U.S. policy toward southern Africa. The administration has taken the position that its policy of constructive engagement will increase American influence with the South African Government and our additional leverage will help produce a settlement in Namibia and bring about the elimination of apartheid in South Africa.

Toward this end, the administration has indicated that it is prepared to upgrade its military attaché relationship with the South Africans, to allow the South Africans to open honorary consulates in several parts of the United States, and to allow South African coast guard personnel to be trained in the United States.

And more recently, the administration vetoed a Security Council resolution condemning South Africa's invasion of Angola on the grounds that the resolution was not balanced, but also because the administration felt that supporting such a resolution would not enhance America's influence in Pretoria.

Six other Members of Congress and myself recently returned from an 18-day trip which included a 4-day stop in South Africa. Our clear perception was that however well-intentioned the administration's policy toward South Africa and Namibia may be, it was not having the desired effect. The policy initiatives of the administration, in addition to the administration's decision to repeal the Clarke amendment barring covert military assistance to dissident Angolan groups, the administration's refusal to formally protest the South African Government's cruel and inhuman dislocation of blacks from Capetown, the snafu earlier over admitting South African military officials to this country in their inexplicable meeting with Ambassador Kirkpatrick, and finally, the administration's reluctance to openly and explicitly ask the Eastern Rugby Union to cancel the visit of the Springbok's rugby team to this country have had the unintended effect of reinforcing those forces in South Africa who remain opposed to change in South Africa's domestic policy and in that country's policy toward an early, internationally acceptable solution to the Namibian question.

I hope our perceptions are wrong. Our concern is that these actions, however well-intended, may well have undermined our credibility throughout black Africa and exacerbated our relationships with Angola as well.

Looked at individually, each of these events could be dismissed as either a tactical decision or an aberration in the administration's overall commitment to a just and balanced policy toward southern Africa. Looked at collectively, these events I fear will contribute substantially to the growing perception of a clear and ill-conceived tilt toward South Africa.

Most of the African leaders that we spoke with, many of whom are very close allies, friends of the United States, shared these views.

In today's hearing we would like to know how all of these actions fit into the administration's overall policy toward southern Africa and how these actions impact on our diplomacy not only in southern Africa but throughout the continent.

We are also keenly interested in knowing exactly what U.S. policy toward southern Africa and Angola are and what the status of the current Namibian negotiations are.

Before turning to the testimony directly, I would like to invite my ranking minority member, Mr. Goodling, to make any remarks he might choose to make.

Mr. GOODLING. I am only suggesting we go vote before we interrupt the testimony.

Mr. WOLPE. All right. We will take a temporary recess to accommodate the floor.

Thank you very much.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Crocker, again apologies for that interruption, and welcome.

I know you have a prepared statement. The full text of the prepared statement, of course, will be entered into the committee record. And I would like you to take this chance to present your views.

**STATEMENT OF HON. CHESTER CROCKER, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS**

Mr. CROCKER. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to be with you today to discuss an issue which is of primary concern both to you and to this administration, our policies in southern Africa.

During the first 8 months of this administration, there is no part of Africa on which we have devoted so much energy and attention. As a result, we have formulated a strategy designed to address the major challenges and opportunities facing us in the region, a strategy responsive to our global and regional interests and to the aspirations of the peoples of Africa. The major elements of that strategy were outlined in some detail in my speech before the American Legion in Hawaii on August 29. A full text of that speech is attached with my written testimony today. Allow me to briefly underscore its central points.

First, southern Africa is a region of unquestioned importance to U.S. and western economic and strategic interests. Its potential as a focal point of African economic progress warrants a substantial effort on our part to reinforce those prospects and to forestall heightened conflict and polarization.

Second, this region has the tragic potential to become a magnet for internationalized conflict and a cockpit of East-West tension. It contains an explosive combination of forces—Soviet-Cuban military involvement, African guerrilla operations across and within borders, and a politically isolated but militarily and economically strong South Africa.

It is imperative that we play our proper role in fostering regional security, countering Soviet influence, and bolstering a climate that makes peaceful change possible. We seek equitable and durable solutions to the region's conflicts, and the emergence and survival of genuine democracy and strong economies.

Above all, we seek to dampen the chances for expanded turmoil by encouraging negotiated solutions and an opportunity for the

peoples of this strategically located region to build their own futures. This will not happen if organized violence becomes the principal arbiter of relations between States or the means of effecting needed change.

Third, southern Africa is a region characterized by both substantial interdependence and an absence of a political basis for regional cooperation. It contains within itself the seeds of growing violence. In Namibia there is a low level but increasingly dangerous conflict over the question of how independence—accepted in principle as a goal by all parties—should be brought along. In Angola, foreign intervention complicates and prolongs an ethnic and factional struggle that prevents economic progress and spills across borders.

Between South Africa and its African-ruled neighbors, there are growing pressures as well as substantial linkages. That country's apartheid policies are anathema to its neighbors, who are torn between the political imperative of pressing for change in South Africa and the economic imperative of survival. For its part, the Republic is torn between the urge to build upon existing ties with its neighbors and the determination militarily to deter guerrilla action aimed at South Africa itself.

In these circumstances, there is no easy course for American foreign policy. Some would have us conduct ourselves as though the future of southern Africa had already been written. While all of us can conjure up gloomy scenarios, it does not befit a great power and a free people to act as though we have written off the peoples and potential of southern Africa to a future of revolutionary strife.

This administration is well aware that in seeking to sustain the chances for negotiated solutions and bolster those committed to evolutionary change, it is walking in a minefield of contending fears, emotions, and ideologies—in Africa and beyond. But our analysis leads us to conclude that any other course would be cowardly and irresponsible.

Some would have us play down the seriousness of southern Africa's conflicts, pursue our short-term interests but channel our major efforts to other priorities. This may be a superficially attractive course. But it is inconsistent with our African interests and our worldwide responsibilities as the leader of the Western Alliance. It would ignore our own nature and history as a successful multiracial democracy with substantial and growing ties—of culture, economics and national security—to Africa.

We have concluded that, whatever the difficulties, it is incumbent on the United States to help shape a regional climate of greater confidence, strengthened security, economic advance and, ultimately, greater justice for all who live in southern Africa.

Finally, there are some who would have us take the easy road of alining ourselves with one side or another in these issues. At first glance, such a course might appear attractive—whether on grounds of diplomatic expedience or emotional identification with the issues or actors involved. This administration has no intention of permitting our hand to be forced to choose between South Africa and its neighbors. That course will only insure our ultimate isolation or irrelevance in the issues at hand.

Our task, together with our key allies, is to maintain communication with all parties—something we in the West are uniquely

able to do. We intend to engage constructively in the region as a whole. Today, we enjoy fruitful ties with most of the states in southern Africa, and we are determined to build on that foundation—through our trade and investment, our diplomatic efforts to dampen and resolve conflicts, and our cultural and foreign assistance programs.

Similarly, in South Africa it is not our task to choose between black and white, but rather to foster conditions in which all South Africans can more fully share and participate in the economy and political process. We seek through our policies neither to destabilize South Africa nor align ourselves with apartheid policies that are repugnant to us.

The time has surely come for we Americans to be humble enough to recognize that our influence over events there is limited, realistic enough to grasp the awesome task facing South Africans of all races who seek to dismantle apartheid, and honest enough to recognize that a measure of change is already underway there. We seek a more constructive relationship with South Africa based on these principles, on our shared interests, and on a reciprocal willingness to act in good faith where, as in Namibia, our policies intersect. At the same time, we are conducting a purposeful diplomacy and a reinvigorating commercial and developmental effort with African governments throughout the region.

Let me be absolutely clear in summing up our strategy. There is a significant change in our approach when compared to that of previous administrations. To those who would say we have adopted an ambitious policy, full of potential pitfalls, we would insist that there are few alternatives consistent with the complex variety of our regional interests.

To those who charge that we have introduced an East-West dimension into southern Africa, we reply that that element is already inherent, aggravated by the past actions of our global adversaries, as one significant factor in the situation. Our task is to control this factor, not delude ourselves.

To those who would say this administration has decided to tilt in favor of South Africa's Government or its white population, we simply reject the charge. If there is a tilt in our policies, it is toward developing greater influence and credibility as a regional partner, acting together with our Western allies and seeking to bolster the security of this key region.

We fully recognize that this approach—in Namibia and Angola and throughout the region—makes us a convenient whipping boy on issues that are highly emotive. But this is a price that can be paid if it produces results. That is the basis on which the policy should be judged.

I would now like to indicate how we have applied these principles and this strategy to the interrelated questions of Namibia and Angola over the past 8 months. First, we did not inherit a blank slate. Rather, we inherited a longstanding and highly contentious issue with the potential to damage our relationships with the nations of Africa, strain our alliance ties and generally undermine the Western position in the region.

We also inherited a stalemated diplomatic process involving the question of implementation of UNSC Resolution 435. There could,

in our minds, be no question of abandoning Resolution 435 to which all parties had given concurrence in principle. Rather, the question was how to get it implemented and to assure that its implementation would in fact produce the intended results: genuine independence for Namibia and strengthened security for the region. We have from the outset determined that these objectives are only obtainable in the context of a settlement that would be internationally acceptable.

Second, we have operated on the basis that the Namibia issue is indeed an urgent one. Our interests are in no way served by an indefinite delay in the process, and we know it. At the same time, we seek results. The negotiation of Resolution 435 during previous years represents a substantial achievement. But it is not enough by itself to produce the early settlement we seek. We are confident that it can be strengthened without unraveling or dismantling the previously agreed framework.

It is in this context that we are presently developing, for discussion with the parties, a set of constitutional principles that would provide greater assurance to all Namibian parties prior to the deliberations of the Constituent Assembly whose task it is, under Resolution 435, to draw up a constitution.

Third, we are working closely with our British, Canadian, French, and German allies in the Western Contact Group on these issues. We have had extensive discussions in this forum at many levels. These discussions are under way as we meet here today and they will continue. On September 24, Contact Group Foreign Ministers will meet in New York to review progress achieved and determine next steps with the parties in southern Africa. The Contact Group is a key element in the negotiating process because of the variety and depth of relationships and experience it represents.

Fourth, we recognize openly and without embarrassment a simple fact: There will be no settlement in Namibia without South African concurrence. Though its continued control of Namibia is legally rejected by most, including ourselves, in the international community, its physical position is strong. South Africa is unlikely to implement any settlement it considers to jeopardize its fundamental interests.

Our task, using that measure of influence available to us, is to devise a settlement framework that addresses those concerns, that is acceptable in Africa and that takes proper account of the United Nations' own role in the Namibia issue. We are doing so while seeking to persuade South Africa that such an internationally accepted settlement is in fact the only course consistent with its own interests. This naturally entails developing a dialog of mutual trust on Namibia, an issue that is from the South African standpoint central.

We believe that, whatever the public rhetoric, all parties understand that our options are limited and that such a United States-South African dialog will be essential. We know from our extensive contacts throughout Africa—and particularly in southern Africa—that our decision to give Namibia our highest priority is understood.

As we have repeatedly stated, in public and in private diplomacy, there is an intimate relation between the Namibian and Angolan

conflicts. There is little debate about that observation either as a matter of fact or logic, as the Angolan Government has itself recognized.

But we do not accept the proposition that the Cubans will automatically depart or that the Angolan civil war will automatically end as South Africa withdraws from Namibia. More importantly, we do not believe that proposition is persuasive to others—especially those who must live with the results in the region.

Inevitably, the presence of some 20,000 Cuban troops in Angola affects the calculations of all parties in the region. This administration does not believe they contribute to regional security. Neither do we accept the argument that violence across the Namibia-Angola border has a single cause, as we made clear in our decision to veto a one-sided Security Council resolution on the recent South African attack.

Our approach on the Angolan question is increasingly understood in our diplomatic dialog, and I want to make certain it is understood here at home. We have established no Angolan precondition for a Namibia settlement, just as we do not believe there can be a Namibian precondition for Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. We are seeking to inject greater candor into the discussion and to stimulate creative thinking about how progress on each agenda can contribute to progress on the other.

In our view, a satisfactory outcome will only occur if there is parallel movement in both arenas. We are committed to this as an approach with benefits for all, one that can address the need for confidence and security on all sides. The U.S. Government is not taking sides in the Angolan conflict, which we believe cannot be resolved on the battlefield. We have been and will be in contact with all parties to play our proper role in bringing about an outcome that can address the basic security issues of this part of southern Africa and thereby enable governments and peoples to turn from war to constructive pursuits.

I will be happy to take your questions.

[Mr. Crocker's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHESTER CROCKER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR AFRICA

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE WITH YOU TODAY TO DISCUSS AN ISSUE WHICH IS OF PRIMARY CONCERN BOTH TO YOU AND TO THIS ADMINISTRATION--OUR POLICIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

DURING THE FIRST EIGHT MONTHS OF THIS ADMINISTRATION, THERE IS NO PART OF AFRICA ON WHICH WE HAVE DEVOTED SO MUCH ENERGY AND ATTENTION. AS A RESULT, WE HAVE FORMULATED A STRATEGY DESIGNED TO ADDRESS THE MAJOR CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FACING US IN THE REGION, A STRATEGY RESPONSIVE TO OUR GLOBAL AND REGIONAL INTERESTS AND TO THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLES OF AFRICA. THE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THAT STRATEGY WERE OUTLINED IN SOME DETAIL IN MY SPEECH BEFORE THE AMERICAN LEGION IN HAWAII ON AUGUST 29. A FULL TEXT OF THAT SPEECH IS ATTACHED WITH MY WRITTEN TESTIMONY TODAY. ALLOW ME TO BRIEFLY UNDERSCORE ITS CENTRAL POINTS.

FIRST, SOUTHERN AFRICA IS A REGION OF UNQUESTIONED IMPORTANCE TO US AND WESTERN ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS. ITS POTENTIAL AS A FOCAL POINT OF AFRICAN ECONOMIC PROGRESS WARRANTS A SUBSTANTIAL EFFORT ON OUR PART TO REINFORCE THOSE PROSPECTS AND TO FORESTALL HEIGHTENED CONFLICT AND POLARIZATION. SECOND, THIS REGION HAS THE TRAGIC POTENTIAL TO BECOME A MAGNET FOR INTERNATIONALIZED CONFLICT AND A COCKPIT OF EAST-WEST TENSION. IT CONTAINS AN EXPLOSIVE COMBINATION OF FORCES--SOVIET-CUBAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT, AFRICAN GUERRILLA OPERATIONS ACROSS AND

WITHIN BORDERS, AND A POLITICALLY ISOLATED BUT MILITARILY AND ECONOMICALLY STRONG SOUTH AFRICA. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE PLAY OUR PROPER ROLE IN FOSTERING REGIONAL SECURITY, COUNTERING SOVIET INFLUENCE, AND BOLSTERING A CLIMATE THAT MAKES PEACEFUL CHANGE POSSIBLE. WE SEEK EQUITABLE AND DURABLE SOLUTIONS TO THE REGION'S CONFLICTS, AND THE EMERGENCE AND SURVIVAL OF GENUINE DEMOCRACY AND STRONG ECONOMIES. ABOVE ALL, WE SEEK TO DAMPEN THE CHANCES FOR EXPANDED TURMOIL BY ENCOURAGING NEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS AND AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PEOPLES OF THIS STRATEGICALLY LOCATED REGION TO BUILD THEIR OWN FUTURES. THIS WILL NOT HAPPEN IF ORGANIZED VIOLENCE BECOMES THE PRINCIPAL ARBITER OF RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES OR THE MEANS OF EFFECTING NEEDED CHANGE. THIRD, SOUTHERN AFRICA IS A REGION CHARACTERIZED BY BOTH SUBSTANTIAL INTERDEPENDENCE AND AN ABSENCE OF A POLITICAL BASIS FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION. IT CONTAINS WITHIN ITSELF THE SEEDS OF GROWING VIOLENCE. IN NAMIBIA THERE IS A LOW LEVEL BUT INCREASINGLY DANGEROUS CONFLICT OVER THE QUESTION OF HOW INDEPENDENCE--ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE AS A GOAL BY ALL PARTIES--SHOULD BE BROUGHT ABOUT. IN ANGOLO, FOREIGN INTERVENTION COMPLICATES AND PROLONGS AN ETHNIC AND FACTIONAL STRUGGLE THAT PREVENTS ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND SPILLS ACROSS BORDERS. BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS AFRICAN-RULED NEIGHBORS, THERE ARE GROWING PRESSURES AS WELL AS SUBSTANTIAL LINKAGES. THAT COUNTRY'S APARTHEID POLICIES ARE ANATHEMA TO ITS NEIGHBORS WHO ARE TORN BETWEEN THE POLITICAL IMPERATIVE OF PRESSING FOR CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE ECONOMIC IMPERATIVES OF SURVIVAL. FOR ITS PART, THE

REPUBLIC IS TORN BETWEEN THE URGE TO BUILD UPON EXISTING TIES WITH ITS NEIGHBORS AND THE DETERMINATION MILITARILY TO DETER GUERRILLA ACTION AIMED AT SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF.

IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE IS NO EASY COURSE FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. SOME WOULD HAVE US CONDUCT OURSELVES AS THOUGH THE FUTURE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA HAD ALREADY BEEN WRITTEN. WHILE ALL OF US CAN CONJURE UP GLOOMY SCENARIOS, IT DOES NOT BEFIT A GREAT POWER AND A FREE PEOPLE TO ACT AS THOUGH WE HAVE WRITTEN OFF THE PEOPLES AND POTENTIAL OF SOUTHERN AFRICA TO A FUTURE OF REVOLUTIONARY STRIFE. THIS ADMINISTRATION IS WELL AWARE THAT IN SEEKING TO SUSTAIN THE CHANCES FOR NEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS AND BOLSTER THOSE COMMITTED TO EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE, IT IS WALKING IN A MINEFIELD OF CONTENDING FEARS, EMOTIONS AND IDEOLOGIES--IN AFRICA AND BEYOND. BUT OUR ANALYSIS LEADS US TO CONCLUDE THAT ANY OTHER COURSE WOULD BE COWARDLY AND IRRESPONSIBLE.

SOME WOULD HAVE US PLAY DOWN THE SERIOUSNESS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA'S CONFLICTS, PURSUE OUR SHORT-TERM INTERESTS BUT CHANNEL OUR MAJOR EFFORTS TO OTHER PRIORITIES. THIS MAY BE A SUPERFICIALLY ATTRACTIVE COURSE. BUT IT IS INCONSISTENT WITH OUR AFRICAN INTERESTS AND OUR WORLDWIDE RESPONSIBILITIES AS THE LEADER OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. IT WOULD IGNORE OUR OWN NATURE AND HISTORY AS A SUCCESSFUL MULTIRACIAL DEMOCRACY WITH SUBSTANTIAL AND GROWING TIES--OF CULTURE, ECONOMICS AND NATIONAL SECURITY--TO AFRICA. WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT, WHATSOEVER THE DIFFICULTIES, IT IS INCUMBENT ON THE US TO HELP SHAPE

A REGIONAL CLIMATE OF GREATER CONFIDENCE, STRENGTHENED SECURITY, ECONOMIC ADVANCE AND, ULTIMATELY, GREATER JUSTICE FOR ALL WHO LIVE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

FINALLY, THERE ARE SOME WHO WOULD HAVE US TAKE THE EASY ROAD OF ALIGNING OURSELVES WITH ONE SIDE OR ANOTHER IN THESE ISSUES. AT FIRST GLANCE, SUCH A COURSE MIGHT APPEAR ATTRACTIVE--WHETHER ON GROUNDS OF DIPLOMATIC EXPEDIENCE OR EMOTIONAL IDENTIFICATION WITH THE ISSUES OR ACTORS INVOLVED. THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS NO INTENTION OF PERMITTING OUR HAND TO BE FORCED TO CHOOSE BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS NEIGHBORS. THAT COURSE WILL ONLY ENSURE OUR ULTIMATE ISOLATION OR IRRELEVANCE IN THE ISSUES AT HAND. OUR TASK, TOGETHER WITH OUR KEY ALLIES, IS TO MAINTAIN COMMUNICATION WITH ALL PARTIES--SOMETHING WE IN THE WEST ARE UNIQUELY ABLE TO DO. WE INTEND TO ENGAGE CONSTRUCTIVELY IN THE REGION AS A WHOLE. TODAY, WE ENJOY FRUITFUL TIES WITH MOST OF THE STATES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND WE ARE DETERMINED TO BUILD ON THAT FOUNDATION--THROUGH OUR TRADE AND INVESTMENT, OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO DAMPEN AND RESOLVE CONFLICTS, AND OUR CULTURAL AND FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS.

SIMILARLY, IN SOUTH AFRICA IT IS NOT OUR TASK TO CHOOSE BETWEEN BLACK AND WHITE, BUT RATHER TO FOSTER CONDITIONS IN WHICH ALL SOUTH AFRICANS CAN MORE FULLY SHARE AND PARTICIPATE IN THE ECONOMY AND POLITICAL PROCESS. WE SEEK THROUGH OUR POLICIES NEITHER TO DESTABILIZE SOUTH AFRICA NOR ALIGN OURSELVES WITH APARTHEID POLICIES THAT ARE REPUGNANT TO US. THE

TIME HAS SURELY COME FOR US AMERICANS TO BE HUMBLE ENOUGH TO RECOGNIZE THAT OUR INFLUENCE OVER EVENTS THERE IS LIMITED, REALISTIC ENOUGH TO GRASP THE AWESOME TASK FACING SOUTH AFRICANS OF ALL RACES WHO SEEK TO DISMANTLE APARTHEID, AND HONEST ENOUGH TO RECOGNIZE THAT A MEASURE OF CHANGE IS ALREADY UNDER WAY THERE. WE SEEK A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH SOUTH AFRICA BASED ON THESE PRINCIPLES, ON OUR SHARED INTERESTS, AND ON A RECIPROCAL WILLINGNESS TO ACT IN GOOD FAITH WHERE, AS IN NAMIBIA, OUR POLICIES INTERSECT. AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE CONDUCTING A PURPOSEFUL DIPLOMACY AND A REINVIGORATED COMMERCIAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL EFFORT WITH AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE REGION.

LET ME BE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR IN SUMMING UP OUR STRATEGY. THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN OUR APPROACH WHEN COMPARED TO THAT OF PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS. TO THOSE WHO WOULD SAY WE HAVE ADOPTED AN AMBITIOUS POLICY, FULL OF POTENTIAL PITFALLS, WE WOULD INSIST THAT THERE ARE FEW ALTERNATIVES CONSISTENT WITH THE COMPLEX VARIETY OF OUR REGIONAL INTERESTS. TO THOSE WHO CHARGE THAT WE HAVE INTRODUCED AN EAST-WEST DIMENSION INTO SOUTHERN AFRICA, WE REPLY THAT THAT ELEMENT IS ALREADY INHERENT, AGGRAVATED BY THE PAST ACTIONS OF OUR GLOBAL ADVERSARIES, AS ONE SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN THE SITUATION. OUR TASK IS TO CONTROL THIS FACTOR, NOT DELUDE OURSELVES. TO THOSE WHO WOULD SAY THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS DECIDED TO TILT IN FAVOR OF SOUTH AFRICA'S GOVERNMENT OR ITS WHITE POPULATION, WE SIMPLY REJECT THE CHARGE. IF THERE IS A TILT IN OUR POLICIES, IT IS TOWARD

DEVELOPING GREATER INFLUENCE AND CREDIBILITY AS A REGIONAL PARTNER, ACTING TOGETHER WITH OUR WESTERN ALLIES AND SEEKING TO BOLSTER THE SECURITY OF THIS KEY REGION. WE FULLY RECOGNIZE THAT THIS APPROACH--IN NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA AND THROUGHOUT THE REGION--MAKES US A CONVENIENT WHIPPING BOY ON ISSUES THAT ARE HIGHLY EMOTIVE. BUT THIS IS A PRICE THAT CAN BE PAID IF IT PRODUCES RESULTS. THAT IS THE BASIS ON WHICH THE POLICY SHOULD BE JUDGED.

NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA

I WOULD NOW LIKE TO INDICATE HOW WE HAVE APPLIED THESE PRINCIPLES AND THIS STRATEGY TO THE INTER-RELATED QUESTIONS OF NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA OVER THE PAST EIGHT MONTHS. FIRST, WE DID NOT INHERIT A BLANK SLATE. RATHER, WE INHERITED A LONG-STANDING AND HIGHLY CONTENTIOUS ISSUE WITH THE POTENTIAL TO DAMAGE OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE NATIONS OF AFRICA, STRAIN OUR ALLIANCE TIES AND GENERALLY UNDERMINE THE WESTERN POSITION IN THE REGION. WE ALSO INHERITED A STALEMATED DIPLOMATIC PROCESS INVOLVING THE QUESTION OF IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSC RES. 435. THERE COULD, IN OUR MINDS, BE NO QUESTION OF ABANDONING RES. 435 TO WHICH ALL PARTIES HAD GIVEN CONCURRENCE IN PRINCIPLE. RATHER, THE QUESTION WAS HOW TO GET IT IMPLEMENTED AND TO ASSURE THAT ITS IMPLEMENTATION WOULD IN FACT PRODUCE THE INTENDED RESULTS: GENUINE INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA AND STRENGTHENED SECURITY FOR THE REGION. WE HAVE FROM THE OUTSET DETERMINED THAT THESE OBJECTIVES ARE ONLY OBTAINABLE IN THE CONTEXT OF A SETTLEMENT THAT WOULD BE INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE.

SECOND, WE HAVE OPERATED ON THE BASIS THAT THE NAMIBIA ISSUE IS INDEED AN URGENT ONE. OUR INTERESTS ARE IN NO WAY

SERVED BY AN INDEFINITE DELAY IN THE PROCESS, AND WE KNOW IT. AT THE SAME TIME, WE SEEK RESULTS. THE NEGOTIATION OF RES. 435 DURING PREVIOUS YEARS REPRESENTS A SUBSTANTIAL ACHIEVEMENT. BUT IT IS NOT ENOUGH BY ITSELF TO PRODUCE THE EARLY SETTLEMENT WE SEEK. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT IT CAN BE STRENGTHENED WITHOUT UNRAVELLING OR DISMANTLING THE PREVIOUSLY AGREED FRAMEWORK. IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT WE ARE PRESENTLY DEVELOPING, FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE PARTIES, A SET OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES THAT WOULD PROVIDE GREATER ASSURANCE TO ALL NAMIBIAN PARTIES PRIOR TO THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY WHOSE TASK IT IS, UNDER RES. 435, TO DRAW UP A CONSTITUTION.

THIRD, WE ARE WORKING CLOSELY WITH OUR BRITISH, CANADIAN, FRENCH AND GERMAN ALLIES IN THE WESTERN CONTACT GROUP ON THESE ISSUES. WE HAVE HAD EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS IN THIS FORUM AT MANY LEVELS. THESE DISCUSSIONS ARE UNDER WAY AS WE MEET HERE TODAY AND THEY WILL CONTINUE. ON SEPTEMBER 24, CONTACT GROUP FOREIGN MINISTERS WILL MEET IN NEW YORK TO REVIEW PROGRESS ACHIEVED AND DETERMINE NEXT STEPS WITH THE PARTIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE CONTACT GROUP IS A KEY ELEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS BECAUSE OF THE VARIETY AND DEPTH OF RELATIONSHIPS AND EXPERIENCE IT REPRESENTS.

FOURTH, WE RECOGNIZE OPENLY AND WITHOUT EMBARRASSMENT A SIMPLE FACT: THERE WILL BE NO SETTLEMENT IN NAMIBIA WITHOUT SOUTH AFRICAN CONCURRENCE. THOUGH ITS CONTINUED CONTROL OF NAMIBIA IS LEGALLY REJECTED BY MOST, INCLUDING OURSELVES, IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, ITS PHYSICAL POSITION IS STRONG. SOUTH AFRICA IS UNLIKELY TO IMPLEMENT ANY SETTLEMENT IT CONSIDERS TO JEOPARDIZE ITS FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS. OUR TASK, USING THAT MEASURE OF INFLUENCE AVAILABLE TO US, IS TO DEVISE A SETTLEMENT FRAMEWORK THAT ADDRESSES THOSE CONCERNS, THAT IS ACCEPTABLE IN AFRICA AND THAT TAKES PROPER ACCOUNT OF THE

UNITED NATIONS' OWN ROLE IN THE NAMIBIA ISSUE. WE ARE DOING SO WHILE SEEKING TO PERSUADE SOUTH AFRICA THAT SUCH AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT IS IN FACT THE ONLY COURSE CONSISTENT WITH ITS OWN INTERESTS. THIS NATURALLY ENTAILS DEVELOPING A DIALOGUE OF MUTUAL TRUST ON NAMIBIA, AN ISSUE THAT IS FROM THE SOUTH AFRICAN STANDPOINT, CENTRAL. WE BELIEVE THAT, WHATEVER THE PUBLIC RHETORIC, ALL PARTIES UNDERSTAND THAT OUR OPTIONS ARE LIMITED AND THAT SUCH A US-SOUTH AFRICAN DIALOGUE WILL BE ESSENTIAL. WE KNOW FROM OUR EXTENSIVE CONTACTS THROUGHOUT AFRICA--AND PARTICULARLY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA-- THAT OUR DECISION TO GIVE NAMIBIA OUR HIGHEST PRIORITY IS UNDERSTOOD.

AS WE HAVE REPEATEDLY STATED, IN PUBLIC AND IN PRIVATE DIPLOMACY, THERE IS AN INTIMATE RELATION BETWEEN THE NAMIBIAN AND ANGOLAN CONFLICTS. THERE IS LITTLE DEBATE ABOUT THAT OBSERVATION EITHER AS A MATTER OF FACT OR LOGIC, AS THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT HAS ITSELF RECOGNIZED. BUT WE DO NOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION THAT THE CUBANS WILL AUTOMATICALLY DEPART OR THAT THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR WILL AUTOMATICALLY END AS SOUTH AFRICA WITHDRAWS FROM NAMIBIA. MORE IMPORTANT, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT PROPOSITION IS PERSUASIVE TO OTHERS--ESPECIALLY THOSE WHO MUST LIVE WITH THE RESULTS IN THE REGION. INEVITABLY, THE PRESENCE OF SOME 20,000 CUBAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA AFFECTS THE CALCULATIONS OF ALL PARTIES IN THE REGION. THIS ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT BELIEVE THEY CONTRIBUTE TO REGIONAL SECURITY. NEITHER DO WE ACCEPT THE ARGUMENT THAT VIOLENCE ACROSS THE NAMIBIA-ANGOLA

BORDER HAS A SINGLE CAUSE, AS WE MADE CLEAR IN OUR DECISION TO VETO A ONE-SIDED SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON THE RECENT SOUTH AFRICAN ATTACK.

OUR APPROACH ON THE ANGOLAN QUESTION IS INCREASINGLY UNDERSTOOD IN OUR DIPLOMATIC DIALOGUE, AND I WANT TO MAKE CERTAIN IT IS UNDERSTOOD HERE AT HOME. WE HAVE ESTABLISHED NO ANGOLAN PRECONDITIONS FOR A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT, JUST AS WE DO NOT BELIEVE THERE CAN BE A NAMIBIAN PRECONDITION FOR CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA. WE ARE SEEKING TO INJECT GREATER CANDOR INTO THE DISCUSSION AND TO STIMULATE CREATIVE THINKING ABOUT HOW PROGRESS ON EACH AGENDA CAN CONTRIBUTE TO PROGRESS ON THE OTHER. IN OUR VIEW, A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME WILL ONLY OCCUR IF THERE IS PARALLEL MOVEMENT IN BOTH ARENAS. WE ARE COMMITTED TO THIS AS AN APPROACH WITH BENEFITS FOR ALL, ONE THAT CAN ADDRESS THE NEED FOR CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY ON ALL SIDES. THE US GOVERNMENT IS NOT TAKING SIDES IN THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT WHICH WE BELIEVE CANNOT BE RESOLVED ON THE BATTLEFIELD. WE HAVE BEEN AND WILL BE IN CONTACT WITH ALL PARTIES TO PLAY OUR PROPER ROLE IN BRINGING ABOUT AN OUTCOME THAT CAN ADDRESS THE BASIC SECURITY ISSUES OF THIS PART OF SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THEREBY ENABLE GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES TO TURN FROM WAR TO CONSTRUCTIVE PURSUITS.

I WILL BE HAPPY TO TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you.

Dr. Crocker, you indicated that in the final analysis the effectiveness of the policy that is being pursued must be judged by its results, and in that connection, in an interview with the New York Times Saturday, September 5, Secretary Haig said the administration had made considerable progress toward the independence of Namibia, and that this administration has in its "dialog with South Africa on the Namibian question made progress which thus far goes far beyond that of the previous 3 years."

In explaining the basis of his optimism, the Secretary cited three points: First, that the South Africans now accepted U.N. Security Council Resolution 435, after having rejected it; second, the South African Government's willingness to drop the numbered of detailed constitutional guarantees as a precondition to a settlement in favor of confidence-building measures; and third, South Africa's willingness to accept a United Nations peacekeeping force in Namibia during the transition period after rejecting such a force earlier.

I would like to just pursue that for a moment because the statement of the Secretary's took me a bit by surprise in that it was not at all clear, for example, that the South Africans had ever rejected the U.N. Security Council Resolution 435. My understanding is that in fact they have accepted that as the framework years ago, and that that was not a new initiative on their part.

Could you tell me when the South Africans ever rejected U.N. Council Resolution 435?

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, the acceptance in principle of all parties to U.N. Security Council Resolution 435 occurred in 1978. I think it is fair to say that at that time and since it has been very substantially hedged by a list of concerns, of conditions, of objections, of requests for clarifications, the great majority of which had not been resolved by the end of 1978, were not resolved in 1979, were not resolved in 1980, and when we entered office in January, remained unresolved. If there was a direction to events, I would characterize it as one of moving away from that resolution on the South African side.

Mr. WOLPE. But then, just so we clearly understand, you are saying that there were additional conditions that were imposed by the South Africans after they had in fact agreed to U.N. Resolution 435. Are you saying that the South Africans have ever at any point rejected U.N. Security Council Resolution 435?

Mr. CROCKER. I am saying that the positions made clear by the South African Government, both in diplomatic channels and publicly, were substantially at variance with some elements of the documents that are incorporated by reference in U.N. Resolution 435 and subsequent documents.

Mr. WOLPE. Let me just ask the question one more time. There has been the assertion publicly—and I just think it is important that we understand with clarity the public record—the administration has indicated that as one basis of its statement that there has been progress in the negotiations, that today South Africans now accept U.N. Resolution 435 when in the past they have not. All the way up to the termination of the Geneva Conference last October, their position was one of acceptance of U.N. Resolution 435. They had refused to agree to the conditions to implementing that resolu-

tion, but they have never at any point since September 1978 when the agreement was consummated, rejected U.N. Resolution 435, have they?

Mr. CROCKER. Not in those words, Mr. Chairman, but the result is the same.

Mr. WOLPE. Second, the other statement that was advanced was that the South African Government was now willing to drop a number of detailed constitutional guarantees as a precondition to a settlement in favor of confidence-building measures.

In our conversations with Foreign Minister Botha, he indicated that they had never advanced that particular initiative—that the initiative of constitutional guarantees in detailed form had actually come from the American side.

Is that correct or not?

Mr. CROCKER. Both sides have discussed this question. We have had extensive conversations with the South African Government about that question as well as with the internal parties in Namibia. The point the Secretary was trying to make—and it represents from our standpoint substantial progress in terms of the feasibility of this negotiation—is that no one is now insisting on a detailed constitution to be drawn up prior to an election.

Mr. WOLPE. Let me just indicate what I mean. I do want these negotiations to be successful, and I am hopeful that the private diplomacy that is in process will yield results, but what I think that we have to be very careful of as we engage in the dialog together this afternoon is that we are not misrepresenting progress. I mean, if there is no progress, I think that ought to be clear. And when a statement is suggested by Secretary of State Haig publicly that attracted enormous publicity nationally that indeed there is new willingness on the part of the South African Government to drop a number of detailed constitutional guarantees as a precondition for a settlement, the implication is that that was something that was important to the South Africans.

You testified in front of our subcommittee not long ago that indeed that proposal for detailed constitutional guarantees had come from the American side. This had never even been raised in that context by the South Africans.

Mr. CROCKER. It has not been a question, Mr. Chairman, of the United States making proposals. It has been a question of our trying to discover the basis on which we could actually get an implementation of 435. In that context a number of ideas have been put forward.

The initial reactions that we got did suggest that something more elaborate, more rigorous, and more binding would be required. That is not the position today.

Mr. WOLPE. Well, I think we will review again your testimony before our committee last time, and also Foreign Minister Botha's comments to us when we were in Capetown not long ago, but this was a mystery to them. The initiative from their point of view was not theirs. This was our initiative.

The third point that was advanced to demonstrate some movement in these negotiations is South Africa's willingness now to accept a United Nations peacekeeping force in Namibia during the

transition period, after the South Africans had rejected such a force.

Could you indicate when the South Africans formally rejected the notion of a U.N. peacekeeping force?

Mr. CROCKER. The South Africans, both at Geneva and previously, have been making clear, I think really for some months now, if not years, that their perception of the U.N.'s performance was such as to increasingly make them skeptical that the U.N. could play a role, a proper role as an impartial instrument during the transition process.

By the time we entered office, the positions that we were encountering implied that the United Nations transitional assistance group military component was out of the question from the South African standpoint.

Mr. WOLPE. Well, by the time you entered office, my recollection at least is that during even the October Geneva conference that was taking place, the issue of United Nations bias was raised in a direct way for the first time, that even at that point there was no formal rejection of the concept of a United Nations peacekeeping force.

Mr. CROCKER. I believe the South African view of that whole question now is best summed up by the results of the Geneva conference.

Mr. WOLPE. I am sorry, I do not think that is a response to my question.

Mr. CROCKER. A determination to make the issue of the U.N.'s performance and its partiality or impartiality a central issue in the discussion, and from that logically flows the most salient issue in their minds about the United Nations which would be the question of the military component of UNTAG.

Mr. WOLPE. Is there any other evidence of progress in the negotiations that you feel you can point to at this point with respect to the Namibian discussions?

Mr. CROCKER. I think there are substantial elements of progress, but I do not believe at this time it would be helpful for me to go into the nature of the private discussions that are going on with all the parties.

We do believe that the spirit on both sides, that is, our side and the South African side, in trying to explore the basis on which we could move forward has been constructive. We also believe that there is a substantial understanding, vastly more, I might say, than there tends to be in the public arena, on the African side, the frontline states, Nigeria and Kenya, as to what we are trying to achieve, why we are trying to do it this way, and what approach we are taking.

Mr. WOLPE. Do you have any time frame, even in a rough sense, as to at what point you will conclude that either there is success or failure with respect to this current initiative that is in process?

Mr. CROCKER. We have not set deadlines, Mr. Chairman. We are hopeful for early progress. It was indicated, I believe, in an explanation of our position in the special session in New York that it was our hope to be able to move toward the beginning of implementation in 1982.

Mr. WOLPE. Can you identify the remaining obstacles that you see on the horizon to a final agreement?

Mr. CROCKER. There are no doubt a number of very central questions that remain to be pinned down. We do not claim that we have it in the bag, Mr. Chairman. We claim only that we believe we have sorted out a basis on which it may be possible to proceed and at least to identify those things which must be discussed and resolved before we will have implementation.

One of those issues obviously is the question of constitutional principles as we have indicated. Another concerns a number of issues which never were resolved in 435 in the past, concerning the actual application of the transitional measures foreseen in the annex to the Western plan submitted in March and April of 1978, as well as the question of the size and deployment of the U.N. force.

Mr. WOLPE. I want to turn just briefly as my last series of questions, and then yield to my colleagues, to the impact of the administration's policy on the question of internal change within South Africa itself.

You stated in your Honolulu speech that "we recognize that a measure of change is already underway in South Africa."

When our congressional delegation was in that country last month, we heard from virtually all racial communities, that is, the whites, the coloreds, the Asians, the blacks, that the only change that is in process at this point is a backward movement. During the period that we were in the country, Prime Minister Botha stated in Parliament that he continued to support the Nationalist Party 1977 platform which would have three separate Parliaments for whites, for coloreds, and for Asians, but with decisive power in white hands. He further said that blacks in the cities would have national political rights only in the so-called Black Homelands, and he explicitly declared that "white domination" would continue.

Do you believe that the evaluation that was contained in the English-speaking press during the time of our visit in South Africa and that was reported to us in numerous conversations even by Afrikaaners is an inaccurate evaluation of a move backward?

Mr. CROCKER. I think without getting in the business of debating various commentators and their observations of what is taking place in South Africa, I would indicate that there has been throughout modern history in South Africa a tendency for there to be some oscillation back and forth in the trends of the day.

We do not believe that the current situation politically, in white politics and in the politics throughout the country, gives the basis for making a definitive judgment on that. We take the Prime Minister and his colleagues at their word in the commitments that they have made publicly. There is a desire, I believe, to move away from apartheid that has been very clearly enunciated over the past 3 years, and it is obviously on that basis that we have stated what we have stated publicly.

Mr. WOLPE. In other words, you do not believe that Prime Minister Botha's statement that white domination will continue is a contradiction of the pledge to move away from the elimination of apartheid?

Mr. CROCKER. No, I do not. I think it would be dangerous to attribute significance to any particular quotation of that kind. I would point out that we are dealing in the case of South African politics and our understanding of them with a highly complex society with many conflicting voices, with many different divisions of media, of commentary, and it simply is not an easy matter to take one quotation and from that to derive a—

Mr. WOLPE. During the period that we were there, Minister Kornhoff, the reputed liberal in the Government, stated that blacks were "crowding whites" in the white cities and separate parks, and that new bridges might be necessary, which brought a rejoinder from a member of the opposition asking the minister if he was advocating a one-man one-bridge policy.

Do you feel that is a sign of progress?

Mr. CROCKER. I am not going to comment, I do not think, Mr. Chairman, on individual statements of individual South African ministers. I do not think that would really be productive.

Mr. WOLPE. Are you saying you do not want to react to that in a judgmental way?

Mr. CROCKER. I do not believe it is helpful to take individual comments and statements by individual officials of the South African Government and start debating them and interpreting them for the American people and for international opinion. That is not really my function.

Mr. WOLPE. Do you believe that there is any possibility that recent South African actions either, for example, internally with respect to the police action against the squatters in Capetown in which the Government of South Africa attempted to force the squatters that were in the area into returning to their homelands, or the South African invasion of Angola have no relationship whatsoever between the South African Government and American policy toward South Africa?

Mr. CROCKER. I would reject, rapidly reject, Mr. Chairman, any notion that American policy is responsible for those actions which we cannot condone. I think it attributes—and it is a typically American syndrome, I might say—it attributes, it grossly exaggerates the influence and the leverage, positive or negative, that we have on that country. It is perhaps an overoptimistic way we have of looking at our role in the world, Mr. Chairman, to assume that everything that happens in foreign countries is the result, directly or indirectly, of what we do or say here.

Mr. WOLPE. That was not in any sense the inference that I was drawing or intended. The point that I am trying to make is that at least it is the perception within South Africa on the part of the Government that the United States has entered into a new accommodation with the regime. Afrikaaners with whom you speak, as you know, are rather delighted with what they perceive to be a more friendly posture toward their Government. It is the perception on the part of both whites and nonwhites who are pressing for change inside South Africa that we have essentially entered into that accommodation, have betrayed historical American commitments.

I am not saying that is the intention of our policy. I am saying that is the perception that has been created on the basis of some initiatives we have already taken.

And so the question really is, Is there a possibility that the South Africans moved into Angola believing that the American protest would indeed be nominal, and that the South African move to the right, if at least is not being encouraged by American policy, is not being resisted by that policy, and that we may in effect be reinforcing the most intransigent elements of the South African Government albeit unintentionally?

Mr. CROCKER. I would be surprised if the South African Government has reached the conclusion that our new policies toward southern Africa represent either collusion or a blank check or anything of that kind. There is no basis in fact for them to have assumed that they would get any specific response from this administration to their move into Angola which we did indicate clearly we deplored.

At the same time, we issued a statement, I would not call it pro forma or whatever the word was that you used. I think that the statement that we issued was honest. That was its most essential qualification. We deplored the raid; we put it in a broader context.

Mr. WOLPE. After leaving South Africa and arriving in Kenya, our delegation learned that the police action against the squatters was continuing and that indeed it had been accelerated, and we wired the Secretary of State urging that our Government protest formally that action against the squatters.

Subsequently we learned upon our return to the United States that the French ambassador in South Africa had taken the initiative in attempting to pull together a diplomatic, coordinated protest of the South African action against the squatters which was indeed extraordinarily brutal.

We apparently refused to participate in that action, in that effort to protest the South African action.

Could you explain why we could not see fit to protest that?

Mr. CROCKER. This gets into a matter of private diplomatic exchanges that we have had with not only the South Africans but our allies which again I am not at liberty to go into, but I would point this out: We cannot condone that action that you witnessed personally.

Mr. WOLPE. Can we condemn it?

Mr. CROCKER. Pardon me?

Mr. WOLPE. You said we cannot condone it.

Mr. CROCKER. We cannot condone it. We deplore it.

Mr. WOLPE. My question is can we condemn it and deplore it?

Mr. CROCKER. This is a situation in which we are talking about actions taken against individuals whom we consider to be South African citizens. We do not recognize the homelands and do not intend to do so. The treatment meted out there is not anything that any American could be associated with.

The question that you pose, however, I would submit, Mr. Chairman, is a tactical one of how best to make our view known, and we did not believe in that instance that that was the best approach.

Mr. WOLPE. At this point I would like to yield to my colleagues.

Mr. Goodling.

Mr. GOODLING. Well, first of all, Mr. Chairman, I find it very difficult to ask questions because if we are talking about secret diplomacy or quiet diplomacy, I am not quite sure. I would not expect the Secretary to respond to anything I would ask because it would not be very quiet, I would not think, with the room filled with the news media and everything else. So it is difficult to ask him the questions I would really want to ask.

I suppose the one question I would ask is when you are dealing with people and you have something they need and want, you have a good bit of leverage.

In your estimation, how much leverage do we have, how much do we have that South Africa needs and wants?

Mr. CROCKER. I think it may be a little bit early for us to give you a definitive answer to that question, Congressman. We are seeking to develop, not only with South Africa but all the parties involved, a level of influence that I do not believe we have had historically, and the key ingredient to that is not a tangible carrot or a tangible stick that we might have in our arsenal, but rather, an ability to act reliably and to act credibly.

One of the first things we are trying to do, one of our first priorities, is to establish that kind of reputation, recognizing full well that it is not going to win us any popularity contests. We are seeking to do so, and I think this will produce results.

Mr. GOODLING. Are you basically saying to me that we really do not have any tangible carrot or stick and therefore we have to establish this rapport between the governments? In other words, we do not have minerals, money, equipment, whatever it may be, that they truly need, they truly want, and therefore we can beat them over the head and say, well, you will get it if you do as we say you should do.

Is that what you are basically saying?

Mr. CROCKER. As far as tangible carrots and sticks are concerned, that is what I am saying, Mr. Congressman. We do not have any buttons on our desk we can push, either positive or negative, that would deliver us a Namibia settlement. We do not have that kind of influence over South Africa.

I do believe that it is very substantially a matter of confidence, a matter of the climate, and a matter of our readiness to adopt a position in which the core interest and the core concerns of South Africa as well as the other parties can be brought together in a settlement package, and that is what we are seeking to do.

Mr. GOODLING. Prior to the recess you told me you saw positive movement, but that you wanted to caution me not to get overly excited or expect something to happen tomorrow, but that you did see some movement toward our influence with South Africa to try to get them to move toward a Namibian solution.

Do you still have that cautious optimism, or are you still expressing that cautious optimism?

Mr. CROCKER. Yes, I would, Congressman.

Mr. GOODLING. Thank you.

I have no other questions to ask in open session.

Mr. WOLPE. I have just asked my colleague from New York if he would indulge me just in an additional one question before you lean to him for further questioning.

There is a matter that is very current, which is the pending rugby games tour in the United States. I would like to have your assessment of whether you believe that that rugby tour is in the American national interest.

Mr. CROCKER. We have approached this question from the outset, Mr. Chairman, as a private sporting exchange. We believe there is a certain value in having an open door, freedom of travel, freedom of expression, if you will, freedom of private sporting contact. From that standpoint, that is the position we have taken on this issue from the outset.

The results of the sporting tour, of the rugby tour that you referred to, I think it is not possible for me to predict. Perhaps we should look at that a little bit later down the road.

Mr. WOLPE. What has been the position of the African States and the Organization of African Unity with respect to the rugby tour?

Mr. CROCKER. We have heard publicly and very strongly worded expressions of concerns from a number of African countries in opposition to the tour.

Mr. WOLPE. Has it not been expressed to the United States that the tour is being viewed in Africa as evidence of a new accommodation with the government and with apartheid?

Mr. CROCKER. I am sorry, Mr. Congressman; could you say it again?

Mr. WOLPE. Has the view not been conveyed to you by African leaders that the rugby tour in the United States is looked at as evidence of America entering into an accommodation with the South African Government and with apartheid?

Mr. CROCKER. Without putting myself in a position of speaking for them, I would say that we have heard that concern expressed. At the same time we have also heard expressed a recognition that we and only we can accomplish what we have set ourselves as objectives in southern Africa, and I think a measure of understanding as to the approach that we are taking.

Mr. WOLPE. I understand, Dr. Crocker, that the State Department at some point communicated to the Eastern Rugby Union. I believe the language that has been used to characterize that communication was that you described the consequences of a visit of the rugby team to the United States in a letter that was sent to the Eastern Rugby Union.

Is that correct?

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, there has been no written communication with the Eastern Rugby Union. We have been in touch with all parties, all concerned parties who have expressed an interest in this matter from the beginning of the story, to monitor the situation and to be in communication about it. We have not urged the Eastern Rugby Football Union to cancel the tour.

Mr. WOLPE. Was there oral communication of the consequences of this visit to officials of the Eastern Rugby Union?

Mr. CROCKER. We have discussed the matter, as I said, with all parties, including the U.S. Olympic Committee and others who have an interest or a concern in the matter. We have not sought to discourage the Eastern Rugby Football Union from the tour.

Mr. WOLPE. I find that extraordinary, I must say, given the advance knowledge that throughout the African Continent this tour

is viewed as an accommodation to the regime, given the advance knowledge that African States have indicated an intention to boycott the American Olympics, given advance knowledge that the Soviet Union would like nothing better than this opportunity to embarrass the United States, and that we are in effect playing into the Soviet hands as a consequence of this tour, I cannot understand why the State Department did not at least intervene directly, albeit without official action, with the members of the Rugby Union.

I mean, you indicated you did not want to deny the granting of visas, but why could there not have been a direct communication with the Eastern Rugby Union at least describing the consequences in terms of American national interest of this visit going forward?

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, I think it reflects more than anything else the approach of this administration toward the exercise of public power. We simply do not believe it is appropriate for us to intervene in this matter which is a private exchange.

Mr. ECKART. Mr. Chairman, would you yield at this point?

Mr. WOLPE. I will be pleased to yield.

Mr. ECKART. I would like to inject in the record that as a spinoff of your remarks, it is extraordinary of this administration not to say something; it is an outrage. It is an outrage that this administration refused to take into account the international ramifications, the domestic ramifications of countenancing a tour representative of a country that has adopted a racial policy that is anathema to what we believe to be proper in these United States, and Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to insert my remarks at that point in the record because I am appalled at this administration's failure to speak out on that, and I just want this administration to know what this member's viewpoints are on that.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you.

Well, I at this point yield to Mr. Solarz.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, as someone who has been deeply involved in the Namibian question, I must say that I was delighted to discover that we have succeeded in finally making some real progress toward the resolution of that problem, which I gather was the thrust of Secretary Haig's observations a short while ago.

But I would very much appreciate it, as I think would my colleagues on the committee, if you could let us know in very clear and specific terms exactly what form this progress has taken and what has led the Secretary to the conclusion that, as a result of the diplomatic efforts of the administration, progress has in fact been made.

Mr. CROCKER. I do not know what evidence you seek, Congressman, but this has taken place in both extensive oral exchanges between us and the South African Government senior leadership, in written form, over a period of some 4 months or so, from roughly April through mid-August. Those exchanges continue, and I will underscore the words that I used in response to a question from Congressman Goodling. We are talking here about a situation of guarded optimism, but we believe that the position that we are dealing with now is one that gives us the elements of a basis to move ahead.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Secretary, I do not doubt for a moment that this issue has occupied your attentions considerably over the last several months. If you were to tell me that you have become a stranger to your own family because of your untiring efforts to bring about a successful resolution of the Namibian question, I would believe you. No one here doubts for a second that there have been innumerable literary and rhetorical exchanges between ourselves and the South African Government.

But that, Mr. Secretary, was not the question. I would like to know in very specific terms what the indications are that this kind of progress has been achieved. Can you point to anything which the South Africans have agreed to, to which they did not previously agree which has moved forward the resolution of this issue? Can you point to anything which the people on the other side have agreed to that they had not agreed to previously which has enabled us to claim that progress is being made?

Or does progress consist exclusively of intensive discussions and communications? In other words, what is the basis in concrete, specific, practical terms—we all know what the issues are—what are the concrete indications that progress has been made?

Mr. CROCKER. I am not certain that we are not getting ourselves tied up in a semantic distinction here. We have been seeking to get some principles established that would enable us to negotiate Namibia's independence. One of those principles, for examples, is that 435 is indeed the basis on which we must proceed. Another is that independence must be internationally acceptable. We do not have any interest in alarming ourselves with—

Mr. SOLARZ. Are you saying that one manifestation of the progress which has been made is the acceptance by South Africa of 435 as a basis for settlement?

Is that what you are testifying to today?

Mr. CROCKER. I am saying I believe in conjunction with other elements that this will be possible.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Secretary, South Africa has accepted 435 long before you were appointed to your present position; is that not the case?

Mr. CROCKER. In principle, with many caveats.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, Mr. Secretary, South Africa has accepted, long before you arrived, the notion that there had to be an internationally acceptable solution to Namibia; has it not?

Mr. CROCKER. In principle.

Mr. SOLARZ. Yes, but with many caveats.

Has South Africa not continued to express caveats to 435 and to the notion of an internationally acceptable solution? So, if it accepted, or if it expressed its reservations about these two principles before, and continues to express reservations about those principles now, please tell us again what form this progress has taken. You are not dealing with children here. We can understand the English language. We are seized of this issue, and I think that the dignity of the institution obligates you to give us a serious response.

If you want to tell us that the progress is so top secret that you cannot divulge it in public session, I will strongly support the suggestion of my colleague that we go into executive session. But I think we are entitled to know, and I think the American people

are entitled to know, what this progress is, and if there has not been any progress, then say so. But if there is, let us know what it is.

Mr. CROCKER. There are many aspects to it that I could refer to, Congressman, but it seems to me the thrust of your question is to be looking for a tangible proof in written documentary form or something like a smoking gun.

Mr. SOLARZ. Or a whisper in your ear.

Mr. CROCKER. Well, I am prepared to tell you we feel there has been very substantial progress from the position we faced when we first came into office, and furthermore, we feel that the situation we inherited was going no place; it was dead.

Mr. SOLARZ. Let me say that my dentist goes further trying to extract teeth without novocain than I am apparently able to do in getting you to answer what I think is a very simple question. I think the record will have to stand that the Secretary is unwilling to describe in specific terms what progress has been made.

Nothing would please us more than to accept your conclusion that progress has been made, but you will forgive us, Mr. Secretary, if we are unwilling to accept that just on faith. I think we are entitled to some evidence. Unfortunately, you have not been willing to give it to us.

Now, let me ask you another question.

You worked on the National Security Council, I gather, under Mr. Kissinger when the tar-baby option was developed.

Could you tell us in what way, if any, the present policy of the administration toward South Africa differs from the tar-baby option?

Mr. CROCKER. Well, just for the record, so that it would be as accurate as possible, I was not on the NSC staff at the time when that policy was developed.

Mr. SOLARZ. Please forgive me, then, for that misstatement. I was under that impression, and I am glad that it was cleared up for the record.

But more importantly than whether you were on the staff of the NSC at that time is whether there is any substantive difference between the present policy and the policy outlined in that paper.

Mr. CROCKER. As I indicated in my opening remarks, Congressman, the policy that we have developed represents a substantial change from that of our predecessors; plural. In my view, this country of ours has very seldom historically had a serious, and engaged in, credible, southern African policy that would look at all aspects of the issues and seek to resolve them.

There is no relationship between the policies associated with mission 39 that you were referring to and the policies we are discussing today.

Mr. SOLARZ. Now, Mr. Secretary, on page 3 of your testimony, I find a rather striking, somewhat remarkable observation. You say at the end of the second paragraph that our analysis leads us to conclude that any other course would be cowardly and irresponsible.

Are you suggesting, Mr. Secretary, that those of us who may have some reservations about the wisdom of the policy on which

this administration is embarked are either cowardly or irresponsible, and if not, what are you suggesting by these words?

Mr. CROCKER. Congressman, I am not suggesting that critics of our policies at home or in other countries are cowardly and irresponsible. What I am suggesting here is that the assumption that the future has already been written and that the die has been cast, that we know what the future is going to be and therefore we have to simply aline ourselves with the forces of history is a fundamentally cowardly assumption. That is what I am saying.

Mr. SOLARZ. So in other words, you are saying that you believe that if someone disagrees with you on the direction of our policy, that they are acting in a way which is either cowardly or irresponsible?

Mr. CROCKER. No, I would qualify again very sharply what you just said, Congressman. It is on this specific point, that history has been predetermined in southern Africa that we disagree on.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Secretary, on page 5, the bottom of page 5, and page 6 of your testimony you say "If there is a tilt in our policies, it is toward developing greater influence and credibility as a regional partner."

Has our new policy given us greater influence and credibility with any black African states in the region? Has it given us greater influence and credibility with Zambia, with Zimbabwe, with Botswana, with Swaziland or Lesotho, or Mozambique or any of the other countries in the region?

Mr. CROCKER. We have been in office 8 months, Mr. Congressman. I would simply say that is the objective. We seek to be credible and to be relevant and to have influence. I do not believe we inherited it.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, let me ask you the next question because later on in your testimony, in two sentences subsequently you say, after you recognize that this policy has made you a convenient whipping boy on highly emotional issues, and I salute you, Mr. Secretary, for your willingness to recognize and acknowledge that your policies have not been particularly popular, you go on to say that "this is a price that can be paid if it produces results."

I assume the operative part of this statement is "produces results."

How long will we have to continue on the course on which we have embarked before the administration concludes it is leading us down the path to diplomatic disaster in Africa and in other parts of the world, assuming that there are no results?

Obviously, Mr. Secretary, if there are results, we will all be among the first to say mea culpa, you were right, we were wrong, and we drink a toast to your success.

Mr. GOODLING. That is a different approach from the Congress of the United States. [General laughter.]

Mr. STUDDS. It has never happened. [General laughter.]

Mr. SOLARZ. But 6 months, a year from now, 2 years from now, if the Namibian problem is still unresolved and if no real progress has been made toward dismantling apartheid, at what point will you be prepared to say that this is a price that is too high to pay?

Mr. CROCKER. All I can really say in answer to that very important question, which I do take seriously, is I think it is not easy for

us sitting here now to name when that time will come, but we do not think that is going to be all that long before there will be some greater evidence on the record which will be evidence that you and I could probably agree about. But I would also add on the specific question which was addressed in this context, which was the Namibia question, you know, it has been 8 months. We had a brilliant approach which I gather you were strongly supportive of for the past 4 years, and it did not produce results. It produced a framework never to be implemented, or which was never implemented. So I simply do not think we are yet at the point in history when that question is fair to the administration.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, that policy may not have produced a solution to the Namibia problem. Obviously it did not, although it brought us, I thought, very close. But at the same time, it did not bring down the opprobrium of the rest of Africa upon our heads, and it significantly strengthened our credibility elsewhere in Africa because we were seen as genuinely trying to achieve a settlement.

The problem with your policy, Mr. Secretary, is that we may end up with the worst of all possible worlds. We may end up without a settlement in Namibia, and we may end up at the same time having earned the criticism and the opprobrium of all of the other countries that have an interest in this issue. I hope your policy succeeds, but I also hope that you are courageous enough to recognize after a period of time—and I recognize nobody can say whether that is 2 months, 3 months, or 6 months—that if it has not worked, that the time has come for a change of policy.

Now, I noticed that in your speech to the American Legion in Honolulu, you said in South Africa, the region's dominant country, it is not our task to choose between black and white.

Mr. Secretary, if your speechwriter had submitted language which said in South Africa, the region's dominant country, it is not our task to choose between justice and injustice, or it is not our task to choose between right and wrong, would you have been able to say those words with the same equanimity and enthusiasm with which you said it was not our task to choose between black and white?

Mr. CROCKER. I think it was a totally different question, a different statement.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, do you not think that in South Africa that we have here a conflict between right and wrong, between justice and injustice?

Mr. CROCKER. The conflict between apartheid and its opponents comes close to the description that you are offering, but to imply in any fashion that white equals wrong and black equals right is fatuous and cynical. I do not think you mean that either.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, I am glad you exempted me from being fatuous and cynical as distinguished from cowardly and irresponsible. I accept the clarification.

Obviously I do not think that white is synonymous with injustice or black with justice. In South Africa some of my best friends are white, and I understand the difficulties which confront them.

But I was surprised that in your speech at the same time you made the point that it was not our responsibility to choose between black and white because I agree with you, it is not. You did not

make it clear that we had a responsibility to choose between right and wrong or between justice and injustice.

Mr. Secretary, you have kind of suggested that the reason we abstained on this resolution critical of South Africa, and I think we vetoed the resolution also in the Security Council, was that basically we wanted to enhance our leverage with the South Africans so that we could produce results. And I agree with you that results are the ultimate test of our diplomacy.

But if that was our approach in southern Africa, how come it was not our approach in the Middle East when we voted in favor of the resolution in the Security Council condemning Israel for its raid against Iraq? It seems to me that the very same arguments you used in the South African situation would have been applicable there, yet we did not hesitate to cast a vote condemning Israel for what it did in Iraq. When it comes to South Africa we abstained, or we vetoed the resolution.

Can you explain this apparent inconsistency?

Mr. CROCKER. In my daily activities, Mr. Congressman, I am asked to walk out on a lot of limbs, but I think that is one I would not choose to walk out on, being as my responsibilities pertain to the African field. I do suspect there is a difference in the sense of the Israeli activity having been of a special kind, of a special nature, and unprecedented. What we are dealing with in the context of violence across the Namibia-Angola border is a two-way pattern of violence with many precedents, with a great deal of violence, much of it on both sides directed against civilians. We think it was important to make clear that that was indeed a broader framework.

I think you also referred to the question of abstention in the most recent U.N. activity on the special session's resolution.

I think I should point out, we and our allies jointly abstained on that resolution, as has been the pattern for many years on such resolutions where the matter is before another body, namely the Security Council.

Mr. SOLARZ. Just one or two other questions. On August 4 all of the members of this subcommittee sent a letter to the President urging the President, as an example of the kind of constructive engagement which you had called for in our South Africa policy, to convene a conference at the White House or some other suitable location the chief executives of all of the American corporations doing business in South Africa, particularly those that have not yet subscribed to the Sullivan code, in an effort to persuade them to voluntarily do so.

Since that time we have not, to my knowledge, received a reply. I assume it was referred to your desk and I would appreciate it if you could let us know whether there will be any kind of affirmative response to this, what I think is a very constructive suggestion.

Mr. CROCKER. The spirit it was offered in, I would not argue as constructive. It seems to me that the Sullivan principles reflect precisely the kind of constructive engagement which American society should be proud of and should undertake.

I do not have a specific answer as to where the piece of paper is and where the reply is, but I will certainly look into it.

Mr. SOLARZ. Finally, Mr. Secretary, you are undoubtedly familiar with the legislation that was adopted in the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House and the Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate and the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House as well, providing for the establishment of the South Africa Scholarship Fund, which would provide scholarship resources for up to 150 South African students here every year.

Despite several discussions on this matter that we had, I have been unsuccessful in eliciting any kind of a definitive response from the administration about whether it supports or does not support this initiative. I think you had ample time to study it. Clearly the overwhelming majority of the Members of Congress who have so far dealt with the issue think that it would be a constructive initiative, and I would like to know if you can tell us anything more about how you feel about it now.

Mr. CROCKER. There is no question in our minds, Congressman, that this is an area in which society can play a constructive role, that is to say support for education for blacks in South Africa. And we intend to put concrete suggestions forward in the near future.

Mr. SOLARZ. Are you talking about a constructive role to play in making it possible for South African college and technical and graduate school students to study in our country, given the absence of real opportunities for them at that level in their country? Or are you talking about our providing resources to the South African Government or to others within South Africa for utilization within the country itself?

Mr. CROCKER. We are looking at a full range of options which would address different aspects of the educational bottlenecks that do inhibit black advancement in South Africa. But we do not yet have a firm proposal to put forward.

Mr. SOLARZ. Finally, Mr. Secretary, you probably have been apprised of yesterday's hearing, where Mr. Nguza testified, the former Prime Minister of Zaire who, when he was appointed to that post was hailed by the administration that was then in power as the kind of person who could help bring about real reforms in Zaire and whose very appointment was an indication of the determination on the part of President Mobutu to bring good government to his long-suffering country.

It was, I must say, the most remarkable testimony I have ever heard by a former official of a country with which we are allied. He gave us amounts, dates, places, times of torture, corruption and other examples of malfeasance, and abuse in high office, leading up to and including the president of the country itself.

Will his testimony have any impact whatsoever on our policy toward Zaire?

Mr. CROCKER. I have not had a chance to see his testimony, Congressman. I certainly will look at it.

We have a very important relationship with that government. We consider it to be an important player in the African scene. We are anxious to strengthen the possibility for it to address the problems which it has, as well as the opportunities which it has. But I would not go beyond that to predict any impact of his positions publicly in this country concerning the government he worked for very recently.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much.

Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Chairman, may I merely say to my colleague from New York that we will determine which words should go and attitudes should go on his tombstone when he is sitting on that side of the table or this side. But one word we will insist on is "finally."

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Erdahl.

Mr. ERDAHL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being with us today. I think it becomes apparent, and I trust it is more apparent probably to you than it is to us on this side of the table as well, that our policies to South Africa have ramifications far beyond the borders of either of our two countries. I think that is the reason for the intense interest we have.

I want to commend the administration for the goals and objectives you set—I do not quarrel with it at all—for eventual independence in Namibia and for establishment of civil and human rights for the black majority in South Africa. I make that statement because some of the questions I have maybe will seem a bit probing and critical.

On page 4 of your statement, you said, "Today we enjoy peaceful ties with most of the states of southern Africa and we are determined to build on that foundation." I think we have enjoyed historically, and I trust we still do, fruitful ties with these nations.

But I think, as we have already expressed here today, that the perception of many of the African countries—and I have had the occasion to be in Africa recently and at least met with some of the leaders—is that we are unduly embracing the philosophy and policies of South Africa. We trade with the Cubans—not the Cubans.

We trade with the Soviets and Chinese and will continue to trade with South Africa. And it seems that the overall perception has been, because of the several things that have happened recently, is that we are being unnecessarily cozy with that regime.

Would you care to comment on that?

Mr. CROCKER. I guess the main comment that I would have, Congressman, is that I think there is a substantial gap between the perception that you referred to, which I referred to, and the reality of what is happening. It is a major purpose of our policies and of our diplomacy, and has been for weeks, to close that gap because it is an artificial gap.

The fact of the matter is—and I hope that members are listening when I say this—that what we are hearing from African leaders in the channel that they choose to communicate to us in is that they know that only we can do what we are seeking to do. They want us to do it and they are expecting great things of us.

Now, obviously if we fail to deliver the record will be clear. But we are not running into people saying to us: Gee, I wish you would stop doing that, because if you stopped something else might work better. We do not see anybody else volunteering to stand up and go deliver the South Africans or Namibia. We do not see anybody in southern Africa proposing that we actually apply economic sanctions against South Africa.

None of these things are put forward to us in diplomatic channels, and we know why. So I think what we are doing is in fact

consistent with the objectives of the nations of Africa and particularly those that live next door.

Mr. ERDAHL. Thank you.

You have talked and the administration has a position of quiet diplomacy, and I think that your responses to my colleague from New York were properly vague in a public meeting. We trust you are going on. I will accept that. And yet it seems that one of the—there is a policy that involves this idea that quiet diplomacy is Teddy Roosevelt talking about: "Talk softly but carry a big stick."

It seems like—and maybe this sounds overly critical—we are saying: "Talk softly but carry a wet noodle." I mean, what pressure are we putting on them? I gather from talking with some South African leaders that they will acknowledge also, at least privately, that the independence of Namibia is probably inevitable; that more rights for the black majority in Africa is also inevitable.

And yet, the unstated feeling seems to be, "but not in my generation." And it seems to me that we have to keep the pressure on to see that it does occur, in addition to the quiet diplomacy. And maybe this is going on and I am not seeing it. Maybe the big stick is more obvious to South Africans than it is to some of us in the Congress.

Mr. CROCKER. Well, there are many discussions that have been held and many comments made publicly about the question of, do you not believe in pressures, does not the Reagan administration believe in pressure? Congressman, I believe that pressure is absolutely inherent in the situation, in both what we do and what we do not do.

If this exchange that we have had, this lengthy dialog that we have had produces nothing, or if there is not reciprocal good faith as there has been so far, obviously what we are doing is not sustainable. That in itself is a very substantial price tag, it would seem to me.

Mr. ERDAHL. Just one other comment. On page 8 a comment struck my eye: "There will be no settlement in Namibia without South African concurrence, for though its strategic control of Namibia is legally rejected by most, including ourselves, in the international community, its physical position is strong."

I am not trying to put words into your mouth. But it almost seems that that is a statement that might be read—but it is obviously not the position of this administration. I know it to be that. But I hope this position is not taken out of context to give that impression.

Mr. CROCKER. The intention is simply to indicate that we are dealing here with a very difficult problem, and we have to use everything at our disposal to bring about a solution. We intend to do that.

At the same time, it is also there indicated, I think, that in trying to get South Africa to agree to a settlement we are asking—for South Africa, a substantial and very large and difficult decision for them, as you yourself indicated—we are also asking for concessions from other sides. There has to be a balance of concessions and we recognize that.

Our approach to this problem is in fact to balance all these conflicting policies, all these conflicting factors that weigh upon us.

You know, quite often the commentary we hear about this approach to Namibia implies that there is an easy solution. If there is, I hope people will step forward and tell us.

Mr. ERDAHL. I do not claim there is an easy solution. And I suppose that we should have the right, I think, as people in this country, in this Congress, to see some evidence of progress, whether it is in Namibia or in South Africa's internal policies.

And yet I suppose that when we look back at our own history we cannot be too self-righteous, because it took a long time, and it has not been accomplished yet, to absorb a 15- or 20-percent minority into the mainstream of life. And I guess we are asking them to absorb an 80-, 85-percent majority into the mainstream of life.

And yet I think we have been right to expect the progress, and I trust that for a while, at least, with quiet diplomacy you will continue pushing hard. And I think in response to Mr. Solarz' question, if it becomes apparent that is not working, we have the latitude and the courage to maybe modify that policy if that becomes necessary.

Thank you very much.

Mr. CROCKER. Thank you, Congressman. Since I have used the word "courage," I take the spirit of what you are saying myself.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you.

Mr. Studds.

Mr. STUDDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Crocker, I was not on the trip to southern Africa. I suspect if I had been I would find it even more difficult than I do to keep emotion from these proceedings.

Just thinking about it, maybe that is one of the factors that is missing both from these proceedings and in your policy. I frankly do not understand how one contemplates the situation in South Africa without having at least an appreciation, if not a sharing of emotion. As you must know, it is an intensely emotional thing, and is as fraught as emotions are with symbols.

And one of the things with respect to your policy in your statement that quite frankly simply horrifies me are the symbols, perhaps not how you intended them, but surely how anyone over the third grade could have predicted they would be interpreted by everybody in the world, not just in South Africa or in Africa or in the Third World, but in Chicago, New York, Detroit, Los Angeles, in the cities of this country, where I think there are going to be some ramifications of what is perceived to be, as you put it, a significant change in our approach compared to that of previous administrations.

I have already had one emotional confrontation with the Department of Interior this morning, and my staff does not allow me more than one a day. So I will try to be reasonably calm.

But quite frankly, I am disturbed by many of the things that Mr. Solarz articulated, although I will not articulate them at quite such length. [Laughter.]

Mr. STUDDS. Your speech, your American Legion speech from which you excerpted—in many cases verbatim—for your testimony right here today, is full of just such symbols, and I think you rejected a bit quickly and abruptly Mr. Solarz' taking of umbrage at

some of them. I suppose the one that most people have seized on is your black and white statement.

But darn it, if you look at the context of your speech, I ask you: How else would you have somebody read what you have said? You start with saying: "The legally entrenched apartheid policies of South Africa are anathema." I thank God you finally said that. But the rest of that sentence is: "to its African neighbors." There is no expression of outrage on the part of the United States.

You then have a couple of sentences about the conflict in Angola, a couple of sentences about the conflict in Namibia. Then you say: "We cannot and will not permit our hand to be forced or aline ourselves with one side or another in these disputes."

And then immediately thereafter you say the line to which Mr. Solarz referred: "In South Africa, the region's dominant country, it is not our task to choose between black and white. In this rich land of talented and diverse peoples, important Western economic, strategic, moral, and political interests are at stake."

Now, I submit to you that there is nothing in your speech that indicates an awareness of Western moral issues being at stake. And I submit to you—again, I am not one to challenge your own personal set of values or what you thought you intended to be conveyed by this—but surely it is perfectly clear to you and to whoever it is in this administration who clears things like this precisely what signals you are sending to the world.

We have sent similar signals to similar people in other continents in the last 6 months. And it just seems to me, as the folks who were on this trip said, they found people throughout the heterogeneity of South African society interpreting it the same way, Afrikaaners and blacks and coloreds. It meant the same thing to everybody.

Surely you knew that is what it would mean. Surely you have squandered much of the moral stature and credibility of this country in that region and in that continent by persisting in giving statements like this.

Your next sentence—or two paragraphs later, you say: "The U.S. also seeks to build a more constructive relationship with South Africa, one based on shared interests." That sounds hauntingly familiar to me of Secretary Haig's statement to me a few months ago that we had shared values with Argentina.

Aside from our anticommunism, if you will, what interests did you have in mind—economic I suppose—in that sentence that we share with South Africa? Not moral, I assume?

Mr. CROCKER. Congressman, which part of what you said would you like me to start with? I mean, I think the question of shared interests is a very genuine and real one. There obviously are areas of common interest between us and South Africa or we would not be saying it, whether it is in some areas of scientific cooperation, whether it is in areas of trade and investment, whether it is in the desire to, as I indicated in my remarks, to check the expansion of Soviet influence in the region.

But there are also areas of difference, and the nature of the South African system is one of those areas of difference. What we are saying is—and I will go back to the point that you made about the black-white business and not taking sides—we do not think it is

going to be helpful to us and our ability to be in any way relevant, excepting as a source of moral posturing, irrelevant moral posturing when the chips are down, for us to indicate that we have already chosen as between the different contending forces in South Africa.

That is different from saying we are not going to take a position on apartheid. Of course we take a position on apartheid.

I do not think it takes—you made a reference to third grade education. I think that if people read what is said they will understand the distinction that I am talking about.

Mr. STUDDS. Then surely you must be absolutely flabbergasted at the fact that practically nobody in the world understands the distinction you just articulated.

Mr. CROCKER. Well, I would not say that. I think that again I would refer to more than simply some of the louder voices based on the media reaction that we have heard here and abroad. I think we are hearing other voices, too.

Mr. STUDDS. You did not, then, mean to suggest what the Secretary of State suggested with respect to the shared values with the Government of Argentina?

Mr. CROCKER. I would not comment on what he said about Argentina. I think he knew exactly what he was saying, but I am not an expert on Argentina so I would not comment on that.

Mr. STUDDS. Well, he gave us a new insight into Argentina.

Would you characterize the South African Government, in the words of the famous statute, as one which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights?

Mr. CROCKER. I believe that definition of South Africa certainly applies to many aspects of what happens there, yes indeed.

Mr. STUDDS. You think it does fit South Africa?

Mr. CROCKER. Yes, indeed.

Mr. STUDDS. Am I correct that earlier this year the administration granted a waiver of a Commerce Department embargo on U.S. exports to South Africa?

Mr. CROCKER. There has been no across-the-board change of anything. There have been selected cases that have been examined on a case-by-case basis.

The point that you raise, however, Congressman, it seems to me needs to be looked at very carefully. When you say that and make the conjunction you have between Commerce Department policies and gross patterns of violations of human rights, it is obvious this administration is operating in many areas on the basis of an approach toward the human rights issue which may be at variance with your own.

It is not our view that public confrontation as a government to another government is necessarily going to produce any productive result of a kind we would like to see. We think there are ways to communicate our feelings. We believe our society communicates its feelings every moment. We think it is doing so right now on the issue several people have raised, which is the question of the Springbok tour.

But for us to publicly stand up and pound our fist on the table and lecture to other governments on a government-to-government basis, I do not think the track record for that kind of policy is true.

Mr. STUDDS. That is not just true when you are talking about the Soviet Union and Cuba.

Mr. CROCKER. We are not talking about just for human rights. We have a lot of other issues to talk about with the Soviet Union.

Mr. STUDDS. Well, let me just ask you one specific question before I make a general observation. I take it from the response to my question with respect to the waiver that we do not plan any permanent waiver in terms of export policies to South Africa; is that correct?

Mr. CROCKER. We do not plan on a permanent—

Mr. STUDDS. Any permanent change in policy. You say in a couple of ad hoc cases the embargo was lifted, is that right?

Mr. CROCKER. That is what I said.

Mr. STUDDS. What kinds of cases were those?

Mr. CROCKER. I believe one of them involved medical equipment.

Mr. STUDDS. Do you know what the others were?

Mr. CROCKER. It involved airport scanning equipment.

Mr. STUDDS. That is what I thought.

What I want to make sure is, to your knowledge do we intend or are we considering granting export licenses for any products which are now or recently were on the crime control list?

Mr. CROCKER. The whole question of export policy vis-a-vis South Africa under the regulations you are referring to has to be reviewed and either renewed or changed by the President on an annual basis, as you know. And that process will be followed with this administration, too.

Mr. STUDDS. Are you giving consideration to the possibility of exporting to them items that are now on the crime control list?

Mr. CROCKER. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. STUDDS. Not to your knowledge, OK.

I will not presume to take more time, which I think I have already used. I just want to say, I hope to God, and I think every member of the committee, no matter where we come at you from on this policy, shares this feeling and we have all said it one way or another. I hope to God you are right. I just hope to heaven that something is happening that for whatever reason you are unable to share with us.

Because if you are wrong and if some of our worst fears are right—you know, this speech of yours, it is not going to end up in one of the National Archives as one of the great testaments to human freedom. It is a document of shame in terms of a signal to the world that this country either no longer stands for or is from this point forward no longer going to articulate what many of us thought made us unique in the world.

I do not think that is naive. My own constituency—I think this is fair to say—insofar as I have been able to speak with them since this, is somewhere between incredulous and ashamed of what they perceive to be the articulated policy of their Government. And if this misunderstanding is widespread in our own country, never mind in Africa, the administration I think will have created prob-

lems for itself that transcend the international sphere and this will come back to haunt us here at home as well.

I hope, having said that, that I am inaccurate in my impression of what you said. And I hope you have nice secrets that you cannot tell us, since for once I might even be prepared to vote to go into closed session just in case you might have. But something here tells me you do not.

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Eckart.

Mr. ECKART. I am concerned, Mr. Secretary, about the recent reports—September 5 is what I am reading from, Secretary Haig's report of making progress on the Namibia issue. He says during the course of that interview that this month the United States will discuss what he calls a new situation with Britain, Canada, France, West Germany, and other Western intermediaries, on a set of proposals to be presented to South Africa and black African parties.

Are you allowed to tell us what these new initiatives are? Were they discussed by the Secretary in his just-returned trip from Western Europe? And would you be prepared to share those new initiatives with us?

Mr. CROCKER. Yes, Congressman. What Secretary Haig is referring to in this context is, in the first instance, the drafting of constitutional principles that is going on at this time, which will serve as a basis for discussion with all of the parties concerned, as well as other elements of what must be in the final analysis a package if we are to settle these problems.

At the September 24 meeting, I expect that there will be, as I indicated in my opening statement, a review of what we have got and decisions taken as to how we present them, in which sequence, to which parties, and how much, at what time, and that sort of thing, the actual implementation of what has been achieved so far.

Mr. ECKART. To the best of your knowledge, however, there was no discussion by the Secretary in his most recent trip now, when he was in Western Europe?

Mr. CROCKER. He just got back and I am not party to the agenda of all those discussions. It would not surprise me, however, if the subject of southern Africa came up in some of those discussions.

Mr. ECKART. Is it your intention to—I am not sure if I want to use the word "consult" or "report"—to this subcommittee what will be included in these new initiatives after this meeting on the 24th?

Mr. CROCKER. It is our hope that we will be able to be in a position to be more forthcoming with the subcommittee and in the public arena generally about these matters. And I am happy to come down any time and brief on the position as I see it at that time, as I have before.

Mr. ECKART. I would like to take you up on that offer. Please expect a call from my office some time after the 24th to discuss that.

I too share the concern with some others on the panel here, of an administration who in many instances is replete with messages, signals, and symbols, and just in the nature of my comment, Mr. Secretary, if you were to ask the average mythical American, if there is such a person, about South Africa they would probably, if

they could even in fact identify the country, maybe even only refer to this so-called official government policy of black and white.

And I have to believe that on the street, which is where we also have to practice foreign policy, that we have sent the wrong messages or the wrong signals to the people in this country and people in the international community as well. And it would be my hope, Mr. Secretary, that you would recognize the strong concerns of other nations in sub-Saharan Africa as well.

And I know that that is in the nature of a wish, and I suppose if wishes were horses beggars would ride, someone once said. But the fact of the matter remains, Mr. Secretary, that I think that we cannot advance longstanding goals of international policy that this country has espoused simply by taking very simplistic views. And I am afraid that that is where we are headed. And I just offer you that that is my observational caveat.

I would very much like to followup this session after the 24th, to review with you and your office these new initiatives that the Secretary has reported.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLPE. I have some further questions, Mr. Secretary. But if you will indulge us for a moment.

Mr. Chairman, Bill Gray, a former member of this subcommittee and now a member of the Appropriations Committee, has asked our committee to take up a resolution that he has introduced and has been referred to our committee. And I will yield at this point to Mr. Gray.

Mr. GRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am delighted to be back here with the Subcommittee on Africa, with many of my distinguished colleagues.

But I want to make it perfectly clear that Olympia Snowe has not gone through a radical change. In fact, I just talked to her just 15 minutes ago and she is doing well. [Laughter.]

Mr. Secretary, you and I have had several conversations. I think you know how I feel about our policy in South Africa. I share some very grave misgivings about that policy. I hope that you prove us to be wrong, but I do believe that the policy as I have seen it is not the kind of policy that this country should be moving toward.

I would like to ask you a couple of questions about something else which was brought up by the chairman, and that is the tour of the Springboks, the national rugby team of South Africa. And of course, as you pointed out, there is a distinction between a private tour and government involvement.

But I believe you also pointed out that you have received commentary from many African nations. We know for a fact that the Soviets have made an indication that they plan to go to the International Olympic Committee and call for a boycott of the 1984 Olympics, to be held here in this country.

We also know with historical experience that—I believe it was the same national team that created a boycott in 1976 of the Olympic games by many African nations; and that, as you point out, there is perhaps a perceptual problem with regard to the rugby team visit, and that the U.S. Government is not a sponsor, that they are here as private citizens.

What are the prospects that you imagine that the Soviets would be successful in leading a boycott of the 1984 Olympics? Do you have any thoughts on that?

And then, how would you react to a clear statement from the Congress disassociating itself from any sponsorship of the rugby tour, expressing the sense of the Congress that the national rugby team of South Africa, the Springboks, should not play in the United States?

Mr. CROCKER. On your first question, Congressman Gray, I think it would be important for us to point out that we do not have yet a whole lot of information on what the prospects are of what the Soviets will do in seeking, if they choose to, to move the venue for the 1984 Olympics. Nor do we know what success they might have with other parties. I have no doubt this is a very real possibility, that they will seek to do so; and it is also a real possibility they would be successful.

We accept that possibility. We have been aware of that from the outset of this discussion.

Mr. GRAY. I think there was a second part of my question, to the fact that the U.S. Congress disassociated itself in dealing with that perceptual problem which you acknowledged under the questioning of the chairman. Would you like to comment on that?

Mr. CROCKER. Whether we think it is a good idea for the Congress to do this or not? From our standpoint, we have made clear from the beginning this is a private tour. We did not invite the Springboks here; we did not sponsor their trip.

Such a statement would perhaps clarify in the minds of many that this is in fact the case, particularly that there is a need for more voices other than that of the executive branch in that. But we have made it clear on that, and perhaps that would help as well.

Mr. GRAY. So they could make it clear from a congressional standpoint.

But let me just say this. I am deeply concerned about that business, Mr. Crocker, because of what has happened in New Zealand. We know there have been large massive demonstrations with the arrests of almost 2,000 persons. We also know that here in this country, because of the potential threat, at least three cities have passed through Executive order or through council resolutions—withdrawn their municipal facilities: New York, Chicago, and I recently heard today that Albany, N.Y., has done the same thing.

And there is even a suggestion that the head of the Rugby Club Association of the United States, through a newspaper article, received a rather large contribution from a private citizen in South Africa associated with rugby, and 1 week or so after that, made the invitation to the Springbok team.

And from my point of view, I think it is awfully important that it is made clear that the U.S. Government, particularly Congress, has in no way supported the tour. Looking at the experience of 1976 and looking at the experience of 1980, the boycott in 1976 by many third world countries and also in 1980, when many of those third world countries refused to join us. Even though we sent Muhamed Ali to help round up support, they refused to join us in a

boycott of the Moscow Olympics because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

I would think and hope that this administration would make it very clear—and I would also hope that the Members of Congress would make it very clear—that we in no way support the national rugby team of South Africa visiting the United States. It would be almost like the world champion Philadelphia Phillies going to play some baseball team in Peking. That is what we are talking about. We are talking about the national championship team.

And whether we like it or not, there are perceptual problems throughout the world. They are the national champions. And again, it would give the impression that this country is supportive of sporting links, when the International Olympic Committee for the last two decades has refused South Africa participation in international Olympic competition because her reprehensible apartheid in the selection process.

And so I am glad to hear you say in response to the distinguished gentleman from Michigan, the chairman, that the Nation had been raising this issue and that there is a perceptual problem, and I certainly would hope that this committee would support such a sense of Congress resolution.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you, Mr. Gray. I am going to move for the adoption of this resolution on behalf of the committee. I will just be very brief.

I must say that when I and other members of a congressional delegation traveled recently to South Africa and to the continent, we never initially anticipated that this question of the rugby tour would be in any sense a significant issue. We were focused in, indeed, on broader questions on the dimension of internal changes in South Africa, the status of the Namibian discussions, and so on.

We suddenly learned, much to our surprise, that this rugby visit to the United States is a political event of enormous consequences within South Africa itself and throughout the continent. The South African Government is using the visit as evidence of its growing respectability within the United States and within the international community.

That that visit would take place within this country is viewed by whites as well as nonwhites who are pressing for change in South Africa as evidence of a new accommodation to the regime. And again, while I respect very fully the directions and intention of administration policy, there is that perception, and that perception I think is a very troubling one.

Finally, in our conversations with President Moi, chairman of the Organization of African Unity, and conversations with Prime Minister Mugabe and with Nigerian leaders, urged us at different points to do everything in our power to prevent this trip from taking place, that they felt that it was not the kind of symbol that would advance American relationships throughout the African continent. It would simply reinforce the most intransigent elements of the South African Government.

For all of these reasons, I think it is important that we attempt, as I have on other occasions, to find ways of persuading, in the absence of official action by the administration, persuading the East-

ern Rugby Union to withdraw its invitation and let the games that are scheduled be canceled.

I appreciate your candor this afternoon in acknowledging the dimensions of the protests that have been forthcoming. I would point out finally that Mr. William Simon, involved with the International Olympic Committee, and the other Olympic Committee officials have expressed themselves very forcefully and with great concern that indeed we will be essentially undermining the American Olympic games in 1984.

It is my view that we are really very substantially playing right into the hands of the Soviet Union by countenancing the conclusion of this trip. And so I hope that this sense of Congress resolution will be adopted by this subcommittee and that it will at least add additional weight to the effort that has been made by a number of people to try to call off the pending games that begin this Saturday.

Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Chairman, may I say while we still have a quorum we better get on to our business. And let me say that I think when we do this we just have to keep in mind that we probably will be called on many occasions to pass a similar resolution, keeping in mind that most countries have national teams. They do not have individual teams as we do in the United States.

Keeping that in mind, you know, I think we will do this many times in the future.

Mr. WOLFE. Mr. Studds.

Mr. STUDDS. Mr. Chairman, I have to support this, and I know exactly what the gentleman is trying to do, and he knows I am sympathetic to it. I have some of the same reservations expressed by the gentleman from Pennsylvania. I do not want, every time the Chinese Ping-pong team comes through, to have a meeting of the committee to have someone demonstrate their displeasure with the government at hand.

I am delighted that the gentleman has not drafted it in a way that suggests that we in any way wish to limit the freedom of travel. The team is welcome to come here and spend all the money they wish, do all the sightseeing they wish. But it is the symbolic carrying out of the activity for which they have become a symbol that the gentleman objects to. And if in fact we were to be associating ourselves with the Government of South Africa, we would have banned their travel.

Mr. GRAY. I think you hit a very important point, because there are many third world nations, particularly in Africa, where sporting events do not have the same character as they have here in the United States. They are often government sponsored.

The Sports Council of South Africa is a quasi-government body. Often we lose sight of that. And I think that under the circumstances of what has happened in New Zealand, the possibility of the Soviet Union using this as a tool to call for a boycott of the 1984 Olympics, and the resulting damage, should that occur, to the United States and its interests, I would hope that we would be able to pass such a resolution.

Mr. STUDDS. Perhaps they will have time, if they are not playing rugby, to attend some congressional hearings.

Mr. WOLPE. If there are no other comments, I would move adoption of the resolution by unanimous consent. Any objections?

[No response.]

Mr. WOLPE. Hearing none, the resolution is unanimously adopted.

Mr. GRAY. Mr. Chairman, could I perhaps just say one other thing to Mr. Crocker on the southern African issues, if I may? I would just like to remind the Assistant Secretary that understanding your argument, I do not agree with it. But when we look at the question of whether we should apply pressure or whether we should not apply pressure in southern Africa, there are those who say we should not apply pressure, it should be the back room; there are those who say we should apply pressure.

But I think it is always very interesting that no one asks the 85-percent black population in South Africa what do they want, and I have been there on several occasions and I have yet to find one who will not tell you privately, because it is against the law to tell you publicly, that they want our country, the citadel of democracy, the home of the free and the land of the brave and all that, to apply pressure.

Mr. WOLPE. I would just like to ask a few further questions, Mr. Crocker. By way of background, I just want to say a word about a few other observations that were made to us during our African visit. And I do this, again, not in the context of having a quarrel with the policy direction or intentions of yourself or of the administration.

You have reaffirmed American opposition to apartheid. You have reaffirmed the importance of a Namibian settlement. And you have placed the importance of that Namibian settlement squarely on the shoulders of South Africa, which I think is appropriate.

But when we entered South Africa, we had conversations with people like Bishop Tutu, Dr. Mdlana, Mandela and with other leaders of the black and the mixed race or colored communities. Dr. Mandela, Bishop Tutu indicated initially—Bishop Tutu actually initially rejected a request from me and the American delegation. He and Dr. Mandela eventually made the agreement to meet with us, but then proceeded to describe their substantial reservations because of the perception throughout the nonwhite community within South Africa that we had indeed entered into not a tactical arrangement, but into a long-term accommodation to apartheid.

And so it is in within the perception of that context of our foreign policy that we need to be careful of what we are doing. I certainly accept the importance of carrots as well as sticks. I think it is a legitimate question to ask whether or not we have been overly generous in the effort to achieve a settlement in not condemning actions by the South African Government internationally or internally within their own country.

One last point that I think just needs to be reinforced is the statements made to us by President Siad, by Chairman Moi of the Organization of African Unity, and by other African leaders, and President Mugabe. President Mugabe, at some point I think his language was that we were beginning to wonder if American silence is acquiescence.

Nigerian leaders spoke to us of their sense of—I think their language was not of anger, but of sadness and disappointment. They place enormous value on their relationships with the United States, to the extent that they have taken the American Constitution and adopted it as the model for their new constitutional system. And they are deeply troubled by what they see as an accommodation to the regime.

If there is a Namibian settlement down the road, clearly that will help to correct any impressions to the contrary, at least with respect to the Namibian issue. But I would simply hope that it might be possible for the administration to speak clearly when clear statements are in order, when we see extraordinary violations of human rights or extraordinary violations of international law.

I want to ask—I know you have a 5 o'clock meeting and I will not delay you beyond another 5 minutes or so. But I would like to ask for a little bit further clarification of presently the status of the arrangements we have entered into with the South African Government. What decision has now been taken and what is the status of implementation of the decision with respect to the increase in the number of defense attachés in our two Embassies and with respect to the training of South African Coast Guard?

Mr. CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, on the question of defense attachés, I would like to start by making a simple factual point, which is that this is not an area in which the South African Government came to us with a request, but rather one in which we came to them with a proposal, and did so because it is very much a question of reciprocal interest and mutual interest.

We have communicated, as I said, our desire to normalize that attaché relationship to what it had been in the past prior to an incident that took place, I think, a year or 2 years ago. There is understanding that that will be done. There are people being identified on each side who will take up positions in the near future in our respective cabinets. So that is the position.

There are people being identified by each government who will actually take up the posts as defense attachés in their respective cabinets, returning the situation to roughly what it was in 1978, I believe, prior to an incident, as you know, in 1979.

Mr. WOLPE. What of the question of the Coast Guard training?

Mr. CROCKER. There has been a short course of training offered to South Africans in the Coast Guard Academy. I thought it was 2 weeks. It is a short course.

About 3 weeks.

Mr. WOLPE. Will this be a continuing practice of our Government training of South African Coast Guard?

Mr. CROCKER. I think it is quite possible, yes, Congressman. There is no firm plan.

Mr. WOLPE. What is the message you think is conveyed by those actions? What was the reason for those actions?

Mr. CROCKER. The reason for the first action is because we have an interest in having proper coverage throughout attaché relationships of our interests in South Africa, and which we have not been able to have under the situation that applied for the past 2 years. So it really is a question of being responsive to our own national interests. That sort of thing is normally done on a reciprocal basis.

If we were to send another attaché or two, they will do the same thing.

Mr. WOLPE. Is this part of the effort to gain more leverage with the South African Government? Are you saying this is more a question of America's military desire to create a closer military relationship of the two governments?

Mr. CROCKER. No. It is not a question of a carrot or a lever vis-a-vis South Africa in the Namibia context or any other context. We do not believe that sending attachés there or having them here, that we are doing South Africa a favor. We believe it is in our interest to do so, and that view is very widely shared amongst many Americans who look at the situation closely.

We do not have all we would like to have in the way of attaché coverage at the present time in that country.

Mr. WOLPE. And why the Coast Guard training? What is the message that is intended by the provision of Coast Guard training to the South Africans?

Mr. CROCKER. We think there is a perfectly legitimate function, which we are quite happy to state, that can be served by a Coast Guard in those crucial waters around the southern tip of Africa, and it is in our interest that that function be properly performed by the government over there.

Mr. WOLPE. You are aware of the publication of what had been developed as talking points for your use in conversations with the South Africans. And in the course of that, this material that has been published, there is a discussion in there about how:

We can; however, work to end South Africa's polecat status in the world and seek to restore its place as a legitimate and important regional actor with whom we can cooperate pragmatically.

You will also need to respond with an artful combination of gestures and hints. The gestures include, as described in the attached paper, small but concrete steps, such as the normalization of our military attaché relationship.

Now, I thought you just said a moment ago that the military attaché discussion had nothing whatever to do with an effort to communicate a set of signals to South Africa with respect to normalization. I believe these are your talking points that you developed for Secretary of State Haig.

Mr. CROCKER. I believe what I said, Mr. Chairman, was that we did not see ourselves as doing the South African Government a favor by normalizing our attaché relationships. Certainly what it does indicate is that we are prepared to have a normal attaché relationship with South Africa, and that in itself is a signal, if you will. We are quite happy to say so.

Mr. WOLPE. Do you think that is the kind of signal that is advantageous in terms of our relationships with the rest of the African continent?

Mr. CROCKER. I would simply point out that we are prepared to have the same attaché relationship with South Africa as the Carter administration was, that it in fact sought to maintain.

Mr. WOLPE. What are the provisions—what is the status of the implementation of the provisions concerning honorary consulates, the establishment of honorary South African consulates in the United States?

Mr. CROCKER. It is my understanding, Mr. Chairman, that there are two additional honorary consulates being added at this time.

Mr. WOLPE. Where?

Mr. CROCKER. In Phoenix, I believe, and Pittsburgh.

Mr. WOLPE. What is the distinction between an honorary consulate and a real, nonhonorary consulate?

Mr. CROCKER. An honorary consulate concerns itself primarily with, as it would imply, consular matters concerning trade, concerning private visits of individuals. Honorary consulates are not government employees of the country they represent. They tend to be, in this case, Americans.

Mr. WOLPE. Are there other honorary consulates that have been established by other governments?

Mr. CROCKER. Many of them, all across the country.

Mr. WOLPE. What is the significance of the military attaché relationship? Would you expand upon that? What is it that we are gaining that we had sacrificed without the military attachés being there?

There were—as I understand, it was not a question of no military attaché relationship. The issue is the number of military attachés.

Mr. CROCKER. That is correct.

We believed that it was in our interest to be able to have a greater degree of coverage. I would be glad to go into that further with you, if you wish, in executive session, as to what that implies. But we were not properly staffed to be able to have the liaison that we sought with the counterparts, that is in the South African establishment, as well as in the normal function of defense attachés, which is an intelligence function.

Mr. WOLPE. Was our military attaché able to provide information with respect to the recent South African invasion of Angola, in advance of that invasion?

Mr. CROCKER. In advance of that invasion? Not to my knowledge, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLPE. Did the military attachés provide subsequently useful information with respect to the invasion?

Mr. CROCKER. Yes, indeed, they have.

Mr. WOLPE. Finally, given the time, according to many newspaper reports and foreign observers in South Africa—and even the congressional delegation's interview with Foreign Minister Botha last month seems to confirm this—South Africa does not want a United Nations election in Namibia until it can establish its own peace, that it can be certain of a DTA victory over SWAPO.

Do you agree with that assessment of South Africa's view that it is not about to enter into a final agreement on Namibia until there is virtual certainty that the DTA will prevail over SWAPO in an election?

Mr. CROCKER. I would not share that assessment, no. I would point out—and I do not mean to be trite—that it is rather unlikely that the South African Government would ever indicate in public what its bottom line position is on a matter of great importance to it.

But I think there are public statements on the record which have been made which do not lend themselves to that interpretation or, to put it more directly, the South African Government has not said

it would not settle Namibia unless it can assure that SWAPO cannot win.

Mr. WOLPE. The statement that was made precisely by Foreign Minister Botha was that it was the DTA that was the critical party to the Namibian discussions. South Africa was not about to consummate an agreement that did not have concurrence of the DTA. The Foreign Minister claimed that they were attempting to use South African influence to secure DTA cooperation, but they were not about to do anything that DTA was resisting or opposed to, that is the internal parties within Namibia.

Is that your view? The conclusion that we reached, at least on the basis of this admittedly public session with the Foreign Minister, was that the South African Government has adopted a position which gives effective veto power to the DTA? And if that is true, then indeed it would appear that a final settlement is far into the distance, because the DTA is not about to enter into an agreement for an election that they do not feel they can win that election.

Mr. CROCKER. The approach that we have taken to these negotiations is that every effort must be made by the states concerned to bring along the political parties concerned to agreement. That implicitly indicates that we will not—we do not believe that any political party can have a veto power.

But we certainly intend at the same time to make clear that the parties involved should be treated with some degree of equity, and we are prepared to do that as well. SWAPO is an important party, DTA is an important party. Its views will be taken into account. But we are not acceding to a basis that there could be a veto power by any one party.

Mr. WOLPE. Well again, I would just——

Mr. ERDAHL. I was going to suggest that we respect Mr. Crocker's request that he be able to get away to maybe a less tumultuous meeting. And thank you being with us today.

Mr. WOLPE. I want to thank you very much for being here today. It has been a useful hearing. May we wish you well in the negotiations. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[The following was received for the record:]

APPENDIX 1

LEGISLATION

[H. Res. 214, 97th Cong., 1st sess.]

RESOLUTION Condemning South Africa's recent invasion of Angola and the resulting unnecessary loss of lives and destruction of property, and calling upon all parties to the Namibian conflict to cooperate in the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435

Resolved, That (a) the House of Representatives finds that—

(1) it is in the foreign policy interest of the United States to achieve a peaceful solution of the armed conflict in Namibia in order to end the unnecessary bloodshed, violence, and destruction in Namibia and Angola, to facilitate the early withdrawal of Cuban and Soviet military personnel from southern Africa, to maintain our good relations with economically and politically important black African States that are concerned about this issue, and to support international efforts to achieve independence for the Namibian people;

(2) the Government of the United States under both the previous and the current administration has joined with Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Canada to advance a "Western plan" for bringing Namibia to independence based on a cease-fire supervised by the United Nations and a free and fair election for a Namibian constituent assembly;

(3) this plan, which has been approved in principle by South Africa, the Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), Angola, and the other five frontline African States, is embodied in United Nations Security Council Resolution 435;

(4) considering the delicate state of the Namibian negotiations, any perceived military escalation by either side could jeopardize a Namibian settlement and increase regional tensions, increasing the opportunities for the growth of Soviet and Cuban military and political influence; and

(5) South Africa's recent land and air attack on Angola, including the destruction of purely Angolan radar installations and civilian economic structures, represents a qualitative increase in South African military involvement in Angola.

(b) In view of these considerations, the House of Representatives—

(1) condemns South Africa's recent military invasion of Angola and the resulting unnecessary loss of lives and destruction of property;

(2) recognizes that the presence of Cuban and Soviet military personnel has actively contributed to conflict and instability in southern Africa; and

(3) calls upon all parties to the Namibian conflict to cooperate in the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 which remains a solid basis for continued efforts to achieve a peaceful transition to independence in Namibia.

[H. Con. Res. 183, 97th Cong., 1st sess.]

Expressing the sense of the Congress that the National Rugby Team of South Africa should not play in the United States

Whereas the Government of the Union of South Africa continues to enforce the morally reprehensible policy of Apartheid thereby oppressing the majority of the population in South Africa;

Whereas South Africa has been banned from Olympic competition for the past two decades because of the racial apartheid system practiced in that nation;

Whereas the U.S. Olympic Committee is opposed to the proposed U.S. tour of the Springbok National Rugby Team; and

Whereas there are clear indications that the tour in the United States of the Springbok National Rugby Team may trigger a boycott of the 1984 summer Olympics: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives the Senate concurring, That it is the sense of the Congress that the Springbok National Rugby Team of South Africa should not play rugby in the United States.

APPENDIX 2

TEXT OF SPEECH MADE BY HON. CHESTER CROCKER IN HONOLULU, AUGUST 29, 1981

I am pleased and honored to be addressing the American Legion on a subject of vital national and international significance. Africa is an integral and increasingly important part of the global competitive system. The United States did not cause this to come about, but it is a reality, one which many Americans have only recently begun to perceive. Africa is part of the large, interdependent world system within which the position of the United States is critically important. And thus, the quality and the maturity of our relationship with African states is a potent force for international, as well as our own national security and well-being.

The Reagan administration has established some tough goals for our country in the area of foreign affairs just as it has in the area of domestic policy. They are goals which are supported by the American people and which are based upon the values which we as a nation have subscribed to for over two hundred years.

As Secretary of State Haig has said:

We will be consistent in the pursuit of U.S. interests;

The United States will be reliable as a force for peace and stability;

There will be balance in our approach to individual issues and orchestration of policy in general.

We, whose job it is to help shape and implement this Administration's foreign policy, take these principles seriously, and I believe that progress is evident. Let me enumerate what this Administration has set forth as its objectives in Africa:

America seeks to promote peace and regional security in Africa, and to deny opportunities to all those who seek contrary objectives.

We will support proven friends and be known as a reliable partner, in Africa as elsewhere.

We support open market opportunities, access to key resources and expanding African and American economies.

The U.S. actively supports regional security and peaceful solutions to the problems of Southern Africa.

We seek to expand and assist that group of nations whose development policies produce economic progress and which have working democratic institutions.

The U.S. will do its share in meeting Africa's humanitarian needs and in supporting basic human liberties, in keeping with both American principles and American interests.

To reach those objectives, we must each day address a number of natural and man-made problems. Let me touch on just a few of them in the African context.

We are concerned about the influence of the Soviet Union and its surrogates in Africa. The Soviets seek to exploit for their own ends existing differences and actual conflict, and they seek to create and sustain situations of conflict from which they can profit. They are aided in these efforts by their client states (such as the Cubans and the East Germans), but also by less traditional partners who also pursue their own aims to the detriment of their neighbors. Under the leadership of Colonel Qaddafi, Libya has been transformed into the leading Third World arsenal of soviet-supplied hardware. Libyan arms and cash are at the center of a skillful and sinister campaign of subversion that has become a major source of African instability. The activities of the Soviets and their partners threaten the security of Africa in every corner of the continent, and in accordance with our objectives the U.S. is working to frustrate these activities and to help African states resist them.

I would like here to emphasize a point I have made elsewhere on this subject, and that is that the United States has no desire nor, for that matter, any mandate to act as the policeman of Africa. But let there be no misunderstanding: This country will not hesitate to play its proper role both in fostering the well-being of friends in Africa and in resisting the efforts of those whose goals are the opposite. Without a minimum of regional political order, our other regional interests—humanitarian,

economic, commercial—cannot be pursued. Equally important, without political order, African states will fail in their crucial tasks of nation-building, economic development and, in general, assuming Africa's rightful place in the community of nations. As leader of the west, the U.S. has a responsibility to help shape the strategic context that impinges on Africa. As I stated at the outset, Africa is an integral part of the world political system. It is time for us Americans to recognize this reality and cease indulging in the romantic illusion that Africa is somehow uniquely buffered from the effects of destabilization whether it is of external or regional origin.

We are also alert to the danger inherent in the economic crises which are affecting Africa. Several factors have combined to produce one of the most serious economic situations since African countries became independent. The causes are several: policies which bloated government's role in the economy and distorted the pricing mechanism; severe droughts that cut food production; the recession in the Western industrialized countries which sharply reduced Africa's export earnings; and the higher oil prices which hurt the poor countries even worse than the industrialized ones. The result is that, across Africa today, countries which are already among the poorest in the world are facing stagnant economies, debt burdens which they cannot meet, oil import bills which eat up most of their foreign exchange earnings, food shortages which threaten famine in some cases, and spiralling costs for basic necessities that create deep social tensions. We are well aware that others are eager to exploit these tensions. African governments, still in the early stages of institutional maturity, are easily shaken, often overthrown in the face of such crisis. Some of the governments so threatened today are those which have consistently supported the United States in such international situations as Iran and Afghanistan, and some of those which today provide us with access to key military facilities in our reach to the Persian Gulf.

The United States cannot be the financial "angel" for Africa, any more than we intend to be Africa's policeman. But we have no intention of allowing this economic threat, any more than the threat of terrorism or subversion, to undermine basic American interests in Africa. This Administration aims to meet this threat by emphasizing our strengths—specifically by helping bring the poorer African nations more into the mainstream of the free market economy which is the soundest and surest way to growth. Strengthening our own economy is a vital part of this, for this enables us to fulfill our international financial responsibilities and it increases the potential markets for African countries. Our bilateral assistance program will be an indispensable element in Africa during this period. Under the Reagan Administration, our bilateral aid will be targetted on areas where our interests are most clearly manifest and focussed more to produce policy changes of broad and lasting impact. These changes include giving a much greater opportunity to the private sector, both within these countries and from abroad. Multilateral assistance agencies, such as the World Bank, provide the bulk of assistance resources to Africa, far more than we can or need to provide bilaterally. This Administration will play a strong role in these institutions, pushing for combining this aid with the kind of basic structural and policy changes that are essential if Africa is not to reel from one economic crisis to another. We believe that, if helped through this crisis period with the right mix of aid, policy reform, and a strongly reinvigorated role for the private sector, African peoples will opt for the growth and the freedom—the personal, economic, and political freedom—that is inherent in the free world's international economic system.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

But it is to Southern Africa that I would like to direct the thrust of my remarks. The African policy of this Administration places a very high priority on addressing the problems, and opportunities, of this key region. We have dedicated a substantial effort, engaging the energy and attention of the highest levels of government, to reviewing the regional situation, weighing our options, and consulting in-depth with all the key players including our allies and the governments of Southern Africa. During the early months of this year we concluded that U.S. and Western interests can only be advanced by serious and determined U.S. leadership aimed at strengthening the region's security and backing its development potential. We have defined a new regional strategy, responsive to our national security, economic-commercial, and political interests. That strategy is based on three basic realities of Southern Africa:

① First, U.S. economic interests in sub-Saharan Africa are heavily concentrated in the southern third of the continent. Nearly \$3 billion of direct investment, or about 60 percent of the sub-Saharan total, is located there. Our Southern African trade

totals over \$6 billion. This concentration of our interests reflects Southern Africa's tremendous mineral wealth and the relative sophistication of the area's economies—especially those of South Africa and Zimbabwe. Southern Africa accounts for over 40 percent of sub-Saharan Africa's GNP, 70 percent of its industrial and 60 percent of its mining output, 80 percent of the steel and 85 percent of the electricity consumed. The area contains immense deposits of many strategic minerals which are vital to industrial economies like ours including: the platinum group (86 percent of world reserves), manganese (53 percent), vanadium (64 percent), chromium (95 percent), and cobalt (52 percent) as well as a dominant share of world gold and diamond output and internationally significant output of coal, uranium, copper and other minerals. Many of these minerals are vital to Western defense and high technology industries.

There is no longer much debate about Southern Africa's economic significance. With regional stability, the area can prosper and serve as a focal point of African economic progress. Trade and private investment flows from the U.S. and other Western nations can reinforce this potential and provide a solid basis of mutual interest for U.S. African relations. If there is a slide toward regional turmoil, however, Southern Africa's potential economic dynamism becomes a mirage. This Administration strongly supports Southern African economic development through encouragement of trade and investment throughout the area, and through the provision of timely and carefully tailored foreign assistance. Equally important, we support regional development by an active diplomacy aimed at addressing outstanding conflicts and thus discouraging the recourse to violent solutions and foreign intervention.

A second reality is that Southern Africa is an increasingly contested arena in global politics. The worldwide significance of the region derives from its potential—unless nations of the area can find a basis to resolve outstanding conflicts and coexist—to become a cockpit of mounting East-West tension. Despite the ending of the drawn-out struggle in Rhodesia and the successful transition to independent Zimbabwe, there remains a combination of local and external pressures that could lead to expanded conflict and polarization. Since Portugal's departure from its ex-colonies in 1975, the USSR and its clients have shown every interest in keeping the pot of regional conflicts boiling. Six years after Angola's independence, substantial Cuban combat forces plus Soviet advisors remain there, as participants in a still-unresolved and tragic civil war. This external factor inevitably shapes the calculations of Angola's neighbors. Warsaw Pact countries have arms agreements with four nations of the area and provide the bulk of external military support to guerrilla groups aimed at Namibia and South Africa. Faced with large-scale foreign intervention, the pressure of African guerrilla groups, and strains in its relations with its traditional Western partners, South Africa has significantly expanded its defense potential in recent years. The Republic, through a sustained self-sufficiency drive, is now an important regional military power. It has clearly signalled its determination to resist guerrilla encroachments and strike at countries giving sanctuary.

Let us make no mistake. This is an explosive combination. The potential damage to Western interests is enhanced by Southern Africa's geopolitical importance along the strategic sea routes around Africa and by its growing importance as a source of critical minerals. It is imperative that we play our proper role in fostering the region's security and countering the expansion of Soviet influence. We intend to do so by building the confidence necessary for equitable and durable solutions to conflicts and by encouraging the emergence and survival of genuine democratic systems and productive economies. We will not lend our voice to support those dedicated to seizing and holding power through violence. If the peoples of Southern Africa are to have the chance to build their own futures, it is essential that military force not become established as the arbiter of relations between states or the means of effecting needed political change. In this respect, Southern Africa could become a crucial arena for defining the rules of international conduct in the decade ahead.

The third reality is that Southern Africa is a highly complex arena which must be understood on its own regional merits if we are to succeed in our efforts. There are powerful linkages—transport systems, labor migration, electric power grids, flows of capital and expertise, active and vital trade ties—that bind together the states of Southern Africa. Interdependence is reinforced by the presence in the region of six landlocked states. Economic pragmatism is strengthened by the many nearby examples of negative growth rates and falling living standards. But there are also deep-rooted sources of conflict within the region itself. The political basis for regional cooperation is strikingly absent. The racial and ethnic pluralism of these societies—and the raw emotions generated by colonialism and white minority rule—make it difficult for them to come to terms with themselves and their neighbors.

The legally entrenched apartheid policies of South Africa are anathema to its African-ruled neighbors. They seek lessened dependence on South Africa and increased political pressures on it for domestic change. All parties are aware of the enormous price that will be exacted if the pressures in and around South Africa degenerate into destructive revolutionary violence.

Angola has been plagued since independence by continuing ethnic and factional struggle, complicated by foreign intervention, that spills into neighboring countries and diverts attention from needed development. It is unlikely that the struggle between the MPLA government and opposition forces—chiefly UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi—can be resolved militarily. Cuban troop withdrawal and national reconciliation would be supported by all Angola's neighbors, but these in turn are intimately related to the question of Namibia.

The low-level guerrilla conflict over Namibia's status has gradually expanded in recent years, as Western-led efforts to find a negotiated basis for independence from South African control continue. All parties accept the principle of independence, and some measure of agreement exists about the procedures for a transfer of power. But talks under UN auspices led by the Western Contact Group states (U.S., Great Britain, France, Germany and Canada) had stalled by early 1981. It is clear that Namibia is a focal point of regional conflict and African diplomatic concern. It is also clear that the war could continue and expand unless the core concerns of all parties, including South Africa, are addressed in a settlement.

Thus, it is clear that Southern Africa contains within itself the seeds of growing violence. To ward off this possibility we must have a realistic strategy, one that assures our credibility as a regional partner. We cannot and will not permit our hand to be forced to align ourselves with one side or another in these disputes. Our task, together with our key allies, is to maintain communication with all parties—something we in the West are uniquely able to do—and to pursue our growing interests throughout the region. Only if we engage constructively in Southern Africa as a whole can we play our proper role in the search for negotiated solutions, peaceful change, and expanding economic progress. In South Africa, the region's dominant country, it is not our task to choose between black and white. In this rich land of talented and diverse peoples, important Western economic, strategic, moral and political interests are at stake. We must avoid action that aggravates the awesome challenges facing South Africans of all races. The Reagan Administration has no intention of destabilizing South Africa in order to curry favor elsewhere. Neither will we align ourselves with apartheid policies that are abhorrent to our own multiracial democracy. South Africa is an integral and important element of the global economic system, and it plays a significant economic role in its own region. We will not support the severing of these ties. It does not serve our interests to walk away from South Africa any more than it does to play down the seriousness of domestic and regional problems it faces.

The Reagan Administration recognizes that the future of Southern Africa has not yet been written. It would be an act of political irresponsibility and moral cowardice to conduct ourselves as though it had been. We need policies that sustain those who would resist the siren call of violence and the blandishments of Moscow and its clients. The U.S. enjoys fruitful ties with most of the African states in this region—Zaire, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland and Tanzania. We seek to strengthen and expand these relationships through diplomatic efforts on the inter-related conflicts in Namibia and Angola, through strong programs of foreign assistance, and by fostering expanded trade and investment. The U.S. also seeks to build a more constructive relationship with South Africa, one based on shared interests, persuasion, and improved communication. There is much ferment in South Africa today centered on the question of how all South Africans can more fully share and participate in the economy and political process. We recognize that a measure of change is already underway in South Africa. At such a time, when many South Africans of all races, in and out of government, are seeking to move away from apartheid, it is our task to be supportive of this process so that proponents of reform and non-violent change can gain and hold the initiative.

NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA

Let me now sketch out for you briefly what we are trying to achieve in Namibia and Angola. Much has been said and written on this subject over the past six months—some of it has even been accurate. We believe that our straightforward and realistic approach is increasingly understood—at home and abroad.

On Namibia, I would emphasize that this Administration did not inherit a blank slate. We inherited a long-standing and highly contentious issue over which West-

ern-led diplomatic efforts had reached an apparent impasse. We immediately recognized that the Namibia negotiations formed a central part of our developing relationship with black Africa and South Africa, as well as an important item on the allied agenda. Namibia, we concluded, was an issue that—unless resolved—could be devil these relationships and offer splendid opportunities to our adversaries.

All parties shared our view that South Africa held the key to a settlement, and agreed further that the new American Administration was uniquely positioned to explore with the South Africans conditions under which they would be prepared to turn that key. We recognized that UN Security Council 435 represented a significant diplomatic achievement, having been agreed to in principle by all parties. The issue was to identify the obstacles to its actual implementation and develop a means to address those obstacles. In extensive consultations with all parties on three continents, Secretary Haig, Deputy Secretary Clark and I have explored the issue. We believe that progress has been achieved, and we are now working closely with our European and Canadian allies in the Contact Group to shape concrete proposals to put before the parties in Southern Africa.

A Namibia settlement is, we believe, desirable and obtainable at an early date. To succeed, it must be internationally acceptable—under UN auspices and in accordance with UNSC Res. 435 which must form the basis of a settlement. That framework, in our view, can and should be supplemented by additional measures aimed at reassuring all Namibian parties of fair treatment and at answering certain basic constitutional questions prior to elections that will lead to independence. A Namibia settlement, to be successful, must offer a genuine and equitable resolution of the conflict and lead the way toward an independence that strengthens, not undermines, the security of Southern Africa.

Our diplomacy recognizes openly the intimate relationship between the conflicts in Namibia and Angola. We have repeatedly made clear our position that progress toward a Namibia settlement could set the stage for withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. There is little debate about the logic of this proposition which the Angolan government itself accepts in part. But we do not share the view that there is anything automatic or predictable about that relationship, as some would argue. The assumption that Cubans will depart—or that UNITA will evaporate like the morning dew—as South Africa withdraws from Namibia is problematical. What if the civil strife in Angola continues after Namibia's independence? We also wonder how a young government in the fragile new state of Namibia can be expected to survive and prosper with a seemingly endless civil war on its northern border, with substantial Soviet-Cuban presence nearby and with the consequent prospect of new sequence of intervention involving perhaps both South Africa and communist forces.

Clearly, the relationship between Namibia and Angola cuts both ways. One of our first priorities has been to inject some greater logic and candor into this discussion, and to stimulate creative thinking about how progress on each front might contribute to progress on the other. I would like to emphasize that we are not laying down preconditions to any party. But there is a factual relationship on the ground that cannot be denied. We believe that movement on Namibia can reinforce movement toward Cuban withdrawal—and vice versa. Furthermore, we are convinced that a satisfactory outcome can only be based on parallel movement in both arenas. In our dialogue with the Frontline states, including the MPLA government in Angola, we have repeatedly underscored our sincere commitment to a process with benefits for all—one that need threaten no one. Thus, as we make clear our view that UNITA represents a significant and legitimate factor in Angolan politics, we have also maintained our mutually fruitful commercial ties with Luanda as a symbol of the future relationship that could one day be possible.

In conclusion, I believe the objectives and strategy defined here represent an approach responsive to regional realities and consistent with US national security and foreign policy interests. The time has come for us as a nation to erase any shadow of doubt about the importance of Africa to US interests, and to demonstrate by our actions that we can conduct a serious and sustained diplomacy in Africa.

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