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THE FACES OF AFRICA: DIVERSITY AND PROGRESS; REPRESSION AND STRUGGLE

REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY MISSIONS TO AFRICA

FEBRUARY 7–MARCH 7, 1971

HON. CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR., Michigan, Chairman
HON. J. IRVING WHALLEY, Pennsylvania
HON. EDWARD J. DERWINISKI, Illinois
HON. J. HERBERT BURKE, Florida

AUGUST 5–SEPTEMBER 8, 1971

HON. CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR., Michigan, Chairman
HON. J. HERBERT BURKE, Florida
HON. SEYMOUR HALPERN, New York
HON. GUY VANDER JAGT, Michigan

JANUARY 7–25, 1972

HON. CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR., Michigan, Chairman

Pursuant to

H. Res. 109

Authorizing the Committee on Foreign Affairs to conduct thorough studies and investigations of all matters coming within the jurisdiction of the Committee

September 21, 1972
THE FACES OF AFRICA: DIVERSITY AND PROGRESS; REPRESSION AND STRUGGLE

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JANUARY 7–25, 1972
HON. CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR., Michigan, Chairman

PURSUANT TO
H. Res. 109

AUTHORIZING THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO CONDUCT THOROUGH STUDIES AND INVESTIGATIONS OF ALL MATTERS COMING WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE

SEPTEMBER 21, 1972
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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1 Mr. Reid elected to committee on Apr. 13, 1972 (H. Res. 924), after House voted to increase standing committee to 39 members (H. Res. 922).
3 Mr. Mathias elected to committee on May 31, 1972 (H. Res. 1065), succeeding Hon. F. Bradford Morse of Massachusetts, who resigned May 1, 1972.
FOREWORD

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

This report has been submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs by the special study mission to Africa conducted between February 7–March 7, 1971, and by the Special Study Missions to West, South, and North Africa conducted between August 5–September 8, 1971 and by the special study mission of January 7–25, 1972.

Findings in this report are those of the Special Study Mission and do not necessarily reflect the views of the membership of the full Committee of Foreign Affairs. It is filed in the hope that it will prove useful to the Congress in its consideration of legislation.

THOMAS E. MORGAN, Chairman.
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Hon. Thomas E. Morgan,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman: I am submitting for consideration by the Committee on Foreign Affairs the report of the special study missions to Africa, February 7–March 7, 1971, and to West, South, and North Africa, August 5–September 8, 1971 and January 7–25, 1972.

The study missions submit this report with the hope that it will be useful to the committee in deliberations on legislation and policy considerations as they relate to these African countries, and the African Continent in general.

The study mission wishes to express its gratitude to Miss Marianne Albertson and Mr. Eric Eckholm of the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University, and Miss Marjorie Ann Browne, Miss Melissa Cutter and Dr. Hermann Ficker of the Library of Congress, for their assistance with this report.

Sincerely yours,

Charles C. Diggs, Jr.,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa.
NOTICE OF DISCLAIMERS AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS

Disclaimers have been submitted in regard to this report by Congressmen J. Irving Whalley and Edward J. Derwinski which appear on page 267.
Congressmen J. Herbert Burke and Guy Vander Jagt have submitted additional views which appear on pages 268 and 270, respectively.
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41. "Southern Africa in the World Economy" by Gilad Loewenstein and Sean Gervasi
Of the member States of the United Nations, only 22 states maintain diplomatic representation in the Republic of South Africa, although others, such as Japan, have trade relations with the Republic. (Awad, “Apartheid—A Form of Slavery,” Unit on Apartheid Document No. 37/71, August 1971, p. 5.) Malawi is the only Organization of African Unity nation which maintains a diplomatic mission in South Africa. (Freedman, “Basic Facts on the Republic of South Africa and the Policy of Apartheid,” No. 5/72, February 1972, p. 40.)

Notwithstanding universal condemnation of apartheid on legal and moral grounds, “roughly 40 percent of English speakers, just under 80 percent of Afrikaans speakers, and over 60 percent of both groups combined believe that ‘apartheid is the only way to solve our Bantu problem’.” (Schlemmer, Future Implications of Political Trends,” SPRO-CAS, “Directions of Change in South African Politics,” 1971, p. 22, citing the 1970 poll by Market Research Africa.)

THE GOVERNMENT

The Government of South Africa is parliamentary in form and is one in which there is no participation by any of the people of South Africa except the white people. Seventeen percent of the people of that country decide upon and make the laws for the other 82 percent of the population. Or, fewer than one in five are enfranchised.

The Afrikaners also have a disproportionate influence. Their rural constituencies are over-represented, whereas English-speaking urban areas are under-represented. Multiracial parties, such as the Liberal Party of Alan Paton, were affected by the Prohibition of Political Interference Act of 1968. Under that act it is illegal to belong to a racially mixed party and conviction of this offense carries a prescribed minimum sentence. The National Party has been in power since 1948 and sees itself as the party of the Afrikaner people. Their numerical superiority over the English makes them very tenacious of power, and it has taken the impending economic crisis, corruption scandals within the party, and an increasing inflexibility to begin to threaten their hold on power. The National Party is closely linked with the Dutch Reformed Church, which provides the doctrinal basis for apartheid.

The Nationalist Party came to power in 1948 and has consolidated its electoral position at every general election since 1948, except the last. The party had gained power with a minority of votes spread over many over-represented rural districts. The Nationalists polled 54 percent of the popular vote in the April 1970 general elections, and hold a two-thirds majority in the House of Assembly. The party can boast a network of member branches in each of the country’s four provinces. Nationalist strength has traditionally been concentrated among Afrikaners in rural areas. With the industrialization and urbanization of the country however, a new urbanized Afrikaner electorate has emerged and there are signs that the party is experiencing some difficulty adjusting to its new environment. The terms “verkrampte” and “verligte” are used respectively to denominate the more fundamentalist and the more pragmatic approaches of Afrikanerdom. Extreme right wingers dissatisfied with what they characterize as “liberal” tendencies in the party have split off to form a “thus far inconsequen-
tial" party of their own, Hertzog's HNP Party. Among the remaining party faithful, there is an increased willingness to differ with the leadership on some issues, such as the position of the Coloureds. A flagging of political enthusiasm among Afrikaner youth has also been noted. The party has not been particularly successful in attracting English-speaking voters. Nevertheless, the party retains a built-in electoral advantage in the Afrikaners' intense folk loyalty. The party believes that the white people of South Africa will be swamped in an integrated society and proposes to protect white interests by making this a rigidly compartmentalized racial society under the doctrine of apartheid. The party has used the power of the state to entrench loyal Afrikaners in key sectors of the state machinery, economy and armed forces and has carried through a series of far-reaching security laws which place the rights of individuals—both black and white—at the discretion of a large and ruthless police apparatus which some opposition politicians fear may some day be used against them.

The present Prime Minister of South Africa is Balthazar Johannes Vorster. He was a Nazi sympathizer during World War II, as were several of his ministers, including Dr. Diederichs and Mr. B. Schoeman. He opposed any South African participation in the allied effort against the Germans, was arrested, imprisoned, and held in an internment camp for some 14 months during the war. The Prime Minister heads the verligte wing, that is the enlightened wing, of the Nationalist Party, as compared to the Verkrampte section of the party, the Reformed National Party (the HNP) which stood for total segregation of the races, even at the cost of prosperity. In the last election, the HNP was completely defeated and is no longer represented in the Parliament.

The United Party is headed by Sir de Villiers Graaff. In the April 1970 general election, the Opposition United Party polled 37 percent of the popular vote, eight Parliamentary seats over the 1966 election for a total of 47 seats. At the same time, the Nationalist Party retained its two-thirds majority in the House of Assembly. Following the traditional pattern, most of the United Party's electoral strength was drawn from English-speaking city dwellers. Since the general election, the United Party has also slightly improved its position in provincial elections. As a result of these electoral successes, party morale is on the increase. For the first time since the United Party was unseated by the National Party in the 1948 general election, the United Party leadership is allowing itself to talk confidently about a return to power and is busy refurbishing policy to take advantage of the fluid political atmosphere. This optimism was reinforced by the 1972 election results in the Brakpan district; this, in turn, however, was dampened by the election in Oudshoorn.

Their leadership's assessment is that the white electorate remains basically very conservative and hopes that disaffected National Party supporters, mostly Afrikaners, will be attracted to the United Party. The United Party stands for continued white "leadership" of South Africa, the establishment of a "race federation" giving all other groups a modicum only of representation at the national level. The United Party also advocates the elimination of those practices, such as job reservation, which hinder economic growth. The United Party
puts its basic emphasis on getting back into power and therefore appeared somewhat vacillating in response to questions by the study mission on its plans for the various racial groups of South Africa. The leaders of the party did discuss their proposal for a federal-type government with a federal parliament in which the majority would be represented, but in which the white groups would have predominant representation, even though their population is only 17.7 percent of the population of South Africa. This reflects the position of many of the whites who would not support political rights for Africans outside the Bantustans, but who might support a policy of some economic flexibility. (A. S. Matthews, “Freedom and State Security in the South African Plural Society,” Institute of Race Relations 1971, p. 25.) The United Party position has been improving recently with the decline in nationalist support.

The third party of the whites in South Africa is the Progressive Party, which has one representative in Parliament, the redoubtable Helen Suzman. Progressive Party membership is difficult to estimate. Relevant figures are 50,000 votes in the April 1970 general election and 30,000 in the October 1970 provincial councils. Their strength lies in urban areas, primarily Johannesburg and Cape Town. It is wealthy for a small party. Of the four white South African parties, its policies, although falling short of American standards of representative government, are far and away the most humane and reasonable. Until the 1968 ban on multiracial parties, the Progressives had “a small but enthusiastic following among the coloured people.” (Whisson, “The Coloured People,” from “South Africa’s Minorities,” SPRO-CAS 1971, p. 67.) (The United and Nationalist Parties have always been all-white.)

The study mission met with Nationalist Party members at Stellenbosch, with United Party members at Pretoria and in Cape Town, with Colin Eglin, the head of the Progressive Party in Cape Town, and with Helen Suzman, the indomitable and sole representative of the Progressives in Parliament, in Pretoria. There is a growing interest in the Progressive Party among the white youth, English and Afrikaans. The Progressives have conducted some preregistration drives among teenagers. All three white parties stand for white domination, although with variations. The Progressives would relax the color bar and allow some black representatives into Parliament. They and the United Party both emphasize the economic necessity of making better use of black skills. The multiracial Liberal Party which advocated partnership decided to disband after the enactment of the aforementioned Prohibition of Political Interference Act of 1968.

**Apartheid**

The purpose of apartheid as set forth in the South African Government publication “Southwest Africa Survey 1967” is namely that “the white nation of South Africa and Southwest Africa must stay as a white African nation” (p. 163). Simply put, the objective is to maintain white domination and white control. The philosophy of apartheid has been further developed in the following recapitulation of official statements of Nationalist officials: (excerpts from par. 18 of the Re-

It is the mission of the white race living in South Africa to protect that civilization "against attacks from outside and subversion from within." In other words, though representing a numerical minority, it must at any cost safeguard its position of domination over the coloured races. * * * The best service, therefore, that the whites can render to the nonwhites is to separate them from the white population, to consider them as distinct social and economic groups, and to see that, as far as possible, they live in territories, zones, or "locations" assigned to them as their own.

A basic technique of the Nationalists is divide and rule. This is seen by the above-mentioned fractionalization of the African, Coloured, and Indian of South Africa into many different categories, as well as the practice of the Government of assigning each African to a particular tribal group in a land which is remarkable for its lack of tribalism among the Africans. According to the Prime Minister, there is to be within South Africa multinational development with "four parallel streams," the whites, the Africans, the Coloureds, and the Asians. A basic tenant and myth of apartheid is that each tribal group wants to have its own separate homeland and government. (This is not applied to the whites, although the divisions between the English and Afrikaner are acute.) Each African is assigned to a Bantustani nationality, whether he is resident in a bantustan or in the city. In the latter case he is considered a nonresident Bantustani. (Mayer, "Urban Africans and the Bantustans," Institute of Race Relations, 1972, p. 2.) The African is considered a foreigner in the cities.

The South African Government has set up for the various African groups as well as the Coloureds and the Asians, nominal councils and territorial executives empowered with no real powers and possessing nominal advisory functions. None of these groups has any rights of political participation in the government of the country. Further, their rights relating to economic welfare and educational matters are determined by their race. The laws require different places of residence for various racial groups, different schools, different hospital facilities and permit differences in pay, all on the basis of race and color. There is "racial zoning" of the beaches, including those beaches in Cape Town which were formerly patronized by whites and Coloureds. Facilities reserved for whites cannot be used by other groups. Nor need those facilities provided for other races be equal. In fact, the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953 makes clear that there need not even be provision of facilities for other groups. The zoning is all-pervasive. It applies to everything—to ambulances, park benches, and telephone boxes. The study mission even beheld, among the welter of ubiquitous "whites' only" and "nonwhites" signs, a sign for a Bantu Animal Welfare Society.

The Prime Minister in April 1971 declared that mixed sports would not be permitted at "club, provincial, or national levels." (Horrell, "Legislation and Race Relations," p. 82 (1971). He added that "white
and non-white South African sportsmen could compete against one another at an ‘international level’ within the country in individual contests such as the Olympic Sports, for example, athletics, boxing, swimming (and presumably golf) as representative of their own racial group.” Ibid. Pursuant to this guideline, there was inter-racial competition in tennis in 1971. South Africa has been excluded from Olympic and other international competition because of its apartheid policy in sports. (See also, the statement by Dennis Brutus, president of the South African Non-Racial Open Committee for Olympic Sport, before the Special Committee on Apartheid, August 26, 1971. Unit on Apartheid Document, October 1971). The General Assembly has condemned the discrimination and segregation in sports. (Unit on Apartheid Document No. 49/71, November 1971.) Interestingly, the Coloureds and Africans have separate living areas, schools, recreational facilities, but they share the same prisons.

Separate Development

The terms apartheid and separate development are often used synonymously. But apartheid refers to the whole system of “legalized material, social, and political privilege enjoyed by the whites,” whereas separate development is that aspect of it which relates to the homelands. (Schlemmer, “Factors Underlying Apartheid” in the SPRO-CAS publication, “Anatomy of Apartheid,” pp. 19-30.)

The philosophy of “separate development” was laid down by the Tomlinson Commission in the mid-fifties, which emphasized the gross neglect of the African “homelands” but concluded that they could be partially rehabilitated to take an increased number of the people officially belonging to them. This assumed that vast sums of money would be available, that fundamental changes would be made in their social and economic structure, and that they would be given political power. The Government rejected the Commission’s major proposals, but proceeded to implement the separation without the development. (Summary of the Commission report published as U.G. 61/1955. White paper on the Commission proposals: White paper F-1956.)

Even if the Commission’s recommended rate of development were maintained, it has been estimated that by the year 2000 there would be up to 25 million Africans and about 7 million whites all in the “white areas.” Separation of the races is therefore a complete impossibility. To make things worse, only about 6 percent of all investments in public projects are flowing into the bantustans. The economic adviser to the Prime Minister has concluded that even the most optimistic forecast of homelands’ growth would only create enough jobs for new workseekers from those areas, and that the Africans employed in the “white areas” can never be absorbed even by the year 2000. (Dr. P. J. Riekert, “The Economy of the Republic,” paper at the 40th annual council meeting of the South African Institute of Race Relations, Cape Town, January 28-30, 1970.) Another pro-Government observer, Dr. Leistner of the African Institute, has estimated that the increase in employment in the homelands will not be adequate even to absorb the natural increase in the working population there. (Quoted in Press Digest, No. 29, July 31, 1969.)

At the same time as the Bantustan territorial authorities are being established and, notwithstanding the support of some 64 percent of
the whites for apartheid, there is developing basic criticism of the
workability of separate development among nationalist academics.
A South African commentator explains the basis of this concern:
"At an unlikely best the homelands will only be able to develop suf-

ciently to offer employment opportunities to match their own natural
increase. Even more serious from the point of view of the thinking
nationalist is the fact that influential Afrikaans academics have heav-
ily criticised the one aspect of Government homeland policy which
stands a reasonable chance of success, the border-industries program.
Professors Hennie Coetzie and Potgieter have frankly warned whites
of the dangers of a program which makes white-owned industry com-
pletely dependent on a potentially well-organized homeland labor
force." (Schlemmer, "Future Political Implications of Present
Trends," SPRO-CAS, "Directions of Change in South African
Politics," 1971, p. 15 at 29.)

The study mission visited a technical training school in Soweto
which it was understood was the showcase school for the Government
to demonstrate how Africans are being trained to be technically self-
sufficient in accordance with the program of "separate development."
It is a 3-year school at the end of which the examination for certifica-
tion is given. The students were learning how to make toys; and this
was called advanced technical training. Upon graduation and certifica-
tion, the graduates would receive R15 a week. Students making the toys
were in their second year of the 3-year course; in order to go to the
school, the finishing of the sixth year is a prerequisite. During the
third year of the technical school, mechanical drawing is taught. The
tuition for this school is 8R a year. There is an enrollment of 200,
with three sections, one for planing, one for plumbing, and one for
plastering. Although the hobby horses which the boys were carving
were being graciously and artistically finished, their connection with
the development of technical and industrial proficiency, in accordance
with the stated objective of the school, was not obvious. In fact, fur-
ther questioning during the mission elicited the information that the
Government has a deliberate policy of prohibiting any training for
blacks that would lead to such proficiency.

Apartheid is a system designed to insure both political domination
by the white minority and control of black labor, when and as needed.
A basic principle of apartheid is that the African is only temporarily
resident in the city. The law makes him a stranger in the urban areas,
and to put it bluntly, the African is conceived of as a work unit. His
residence is a homeland to which he has arbitrarily been assigned.
There he must go when he is no longer working—whether because of
sickness, old age, the industrial situation, or for whatever reason—and
there his family must go when he dies or is no longer with them because
of imprisonment, illness, or whatever reason. Wives and children of
Africans working in towns are frequently considered "superfluous ap-
pendages" and are endorsed out of the urban areas. In line with the
conception of the African as a labor unit, the unemployed, or rather
"nonproductive African," is also subject to endorsement out of urban
areas. There have also been what are known as "black spot removals."
These are removals of entire African communities from areas which
are designated as white areas.

The homelands have been characterized as "little more than reser-
voirs of cheap labor and a dumping ground for Africans whose labor
The Policy of Resettlement

One of the pillars of apartheid and the unconscionable legislative policy enacted to implement "separate development" is the group areas legislation (the Group Areas Acts of 1950, 1957, as amended, and of 1966). The Prime Minister of South Africa, Dr. Malan, said of the Group Areas Act, "What we have in this bill before us is apartheid. It is the essence of the apartheid policy which is embodied in this bill." (As cited in Higgs, "The Group Areas Act and Its Effects," Unit on Apartheid Document No. 28/71, p. 1). The act established the mechanism, group areas boards, for effecting (1) the territorial and residential segregation of Africans, Indians, Coloureds, and whites through the proclamation of defined areas for particular groups, (2) the establishment of control of the holding, disposal, and occupation of immovable property in controlled areas, (3) the allocation of group areas for members of specified racial groups, (4) the disqualification and removal of members of other groups resident in an area proclaimed for a particular group, (5) the ownership in the group areas of property by business interests of a particular racial group, except for mines, banks, and large factories, and (6) the nullification of any property or freehold rights to occupy land or premises of a disqualified person where such rights are contrary to a proclamation issued under the act.

In short, the Group Areas Act provides that the Government should designate the areas which particular racial groups or subgroups are to occupy and that the Government may then forcibly remove members of other racial groups to "their own" areas. In the past 10 years, some 900,000 Africans have been "resettled"; "that is, removed from the 87 percent of the country reserved for whites to the 13 percent reserved for Africans." (Unit on Apartheid Document, "Facts and Figures on South Africa," February 1971.) A total of 1,578 white families, 70,889 Coloured persons, 38,180 Indians, and 933 Chinese families have been removed by proclamation under the Group Areas Act. (Ibid.)

The Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Dr. P. G. J. Koornhof, said in the House of Assembly on February 4, 1969:

I want to ask how much progress we have made in the implementation of our policy; that is, the elimination of redundant, noneconomically active Bantu in our white areas. * * *

Approximately 900,000 Bantu have been settled elsewhere under the National Party regime over the past few years since 1969. Surely this is no mean achievement; on the contrary, it is a tremendous achievement. Over the same period at least 200,000 have been resettled under the National Party regime in terms of the Group Areas Act in the Johannesburg area alone.

The South African priest, Father Desmond, who has made a definitive study on the people in the homelands, in his book, "The Discarded People," has been banned by the South African Government. It is regretted that we were therefore unable to meet with Father Desmond and talk with him about this subject since his book is the dispositive treatise on the conditions in these areas. In his work, he cites the basis
of the policy of resettlement of the Africans by referring to a statement by the Deputy Chairman of the Bantu Affairs Commission, Mr. G. F. Van L. Froneman, as follows:

The policy of the present Government is to consolidate as far as possible all Bantu land into consolidated blocks; that is, by excising smaller scattered areas out of scheduled or released areas and giving compensatory land of equal value contiguous to the larger Bantu blocks. . . . When all these "black spots" and isolated scheduled and released areas are once removed, the chessboard pattern of Bantu areas and white areas in South Africa will also to a great extent be eliminated.

As Father Desmond points out, the names of the resettlement camps are grimly revealing: Lime Hill, Morsgat (Mess Hole), Weenen (Place of Weeping), and Stink Water.

Dimbaza:

It is regretted that we are unable to give a firsthand report on the conditions in the resettlement areas. We had planned to visit Dimbaza, but were refused at the last moment this opportunity. The report of Judge Booth, of New York City, who visited Dimbaza in the spring of 1971, is instructive, however. He stated that he—

Saw in Dimbaza the graves of 38 little children under the age of 1 year, all of whom had died in the previous month of malnutrition. [He] saw 62 more open graves—waiting for infants to die in Dimbaza, the "resettlement or homelands area" where blacks were sent to separately develop.

The study mission was informed when we were only 30 miles from Dimbaza in Alice that the Government had telephoned the U.S. Ambassador in Pretoria and advised him that a permit was required for the visit to Dimbaza. We were able to receive certain impressions of Dimbaza, however. Evidently Dimbaza has two sides; only one is of the nicely Coloured homes, the concrete houses, viewed from the road.

Dimbaza itself has received further publicity as a result of the efforts of Rev. David Russell, a white Anglican priest in King Williams-town—who is being harassed by the security police as a result. A local newspaper report reveals that about 7,000 people live in the camp, consisting of old and disabled people, the families of political prisoners, former political prisoners, and those "endorsed out" of urban areas as being redundant to the work force, "surplus appendages such as wives and children" as a government minister has described them.

There is an acute shortage of work, because of the location of Dimbaza—out of sight of any white urban center. Rations are utterly inadequate, and have resulted in many deaths from malnutrition or, according to the local hospital, outright starvation. Children’s graves outnumber adults’ by 3 to 1 in Dimbaza.

Dimbaza is populated largely by poor widows who have lost their right to live in the town. There are only about 500 men who are working there. Only 65 percent of the households are working. These are mostly women who earn only R6 a month. The working men get R19 a month, out of which they must pay R3.38 a month for rent and still take care of food, clothes, and transportation. The poverty datum line requires R30 a month alone for food. But these people get R15 on
the average when working for everything. An additional burden is the bus fare to King Williamstown which is 40 cents. Rations are given out now, consisting of mealy meal and, on Saturday, skim milk. There is no meat and no sugar. There are no rations given out to people who make R19 a month; to those who make R6 a month, there are limited rations. There is a drastic fuel shortage, although it was understood that the Government had agreed to investigate the fuel problem. A free medical service was only received after correspondence in protest to the authorities.

Perhaps the most ironic thing about these camps is the brightly painted walls of the huts, which inside are damp, overcrowded, and very unhealthy; the object is simply to deceive the passing motorist. If one does stop on the road opposite the camp, the police appear in no time to question the driver. This obsession with hiding the truth is the result as well as the cause of the inhuman conditions. In an apartheid society, the whites do not have to notice, and in fact are unable to go and see how the majority is forced to live. As a result of the efforts of Rev. David Russell, with whom the study mission met, to publicize the conditions at Dimbaza, local officials have been instructed to improve conditions there; a government minister who visited the camp expressed horror and shock at what he saw.

It was the British concentration camps for the wives and children of the Afrikaners, during the Boer War at the beginning of the century, that inspired the lasting resentment of the Afrikaners toward English-speaking whites. Camps like Dimbaza are much worse, and seem likely to leave a legacy of hatred and desperation among the Africans in South Africa for decades to come. The basic question presented by the resettlement camps is why have these people been moved here. The answer is of course the effort to implement apartheid. People come to Dimbaza from Cape Town, from Middleburg, from the western cape. Government policy is to see to it that “surplus appendages are gotten out of the white areas,” and to make apartheid work as cheaply as possible. A final irony was the information that the resettlement camps are being advertised on the Bantu radio.

There are more than 800 of such resettlement areas in South Africa. The Bantustans policy

Unfortunately, the study mission, notwithstanding our efforts, was not able to visit any of the Bantustans. There were brief meetings, however, with Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, executive director of the Zulu Tribal Territorial Authority; with Chief Lukas M. Mangope, chief counselor of the Tswana Territorial Authority; and with Prof. Hudson W. E. Ntsanwise, chief counselor of the Machangana-Tsonga Legislative Assembly, the Shangaan homeland in the northern Transvaal. Chief Mantanzima of the Transkei did not find it convenient to meet with the Study Mission, nor for it to visit the Transkei.

The eight homelands are the Transkei, the Ciskei, Zululand, Swaziland, North Sotho, South Sotho, Tswanaland, Tsongaland, and Vendaland. These homelands are, except in the case of South Sotho, composed of noncontiguous parts. For example, the Transkei is composed of two separate pieces of land, the Ciskei of 17 pieces, Zululand of 29, Swaziland of three, North Sotho of three, Tswanaland of 19, Tsongaland of four, and Vendaland of three pieces of land. The com-
posite areas now comprise less than 12 percent of the area of the country, 11.98 percent, and will eventually comprise no more than 13 percent. Since the early 1900's the Government has had a policy of restricting the purchase of land by Africans. The history of this infamous policy of limiting African land rights to tiny parts of the country is recounted in "Land Ownership in South Africa," Unit on Apartheid Document May 1971.

Under the program of separate development, in which all groups are supposed to have equal rights to develop, the group with 70 percent of the population is allotted less than 13 percent of the land. The rest of the country is considered a "white area" in which Africans have no right to reside or to own land or to have normal civil rights. They may only be present when they are economically productive and have been granted a permit for this purpose, and then subject to all-pervasive restrictions.

The following map shows the African homelands in South Africa:

![Map of African Areas in South Africa](source: "The Discarded People," by Cosmas Desmond, 1971.)
Under the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act of 1971, the Government may by proclamation, subject to approval by Parliament, grant increasing powers of self-government, similar to those of the Transkei, to the newer territorial authorities. In addition to Afrikaans and English, the Government may under the 1971 Constitution amendment act, proclaim an African language as an official language in a homeland. Thus seven different African official languages are contemplated.

Extreme poverty grips the African rural areas. The Government’s budget for “Bantu development” is $150 million for resettlement, $120 millions for loans, and $80 million for education, although the minimum estimate requires at least four or five times this much. Conditions in the homelands continue to worsen. Improvement in the urban areas does not affect these rural areas and while the lot of the urban black may at least stay constant, that of the rural element is steadily growing poorer. The Bantustans are arid, nonproductive areas which lack industry and cannot even produce the food necessary for those who live there.

The Transkei

There are two Xhosa “homelands,” the Transkei and the Ciskei. In 1963 the Transkei Constitution Act was passed, declaring the area to be a “self-governing territory within the Republic of South Africa.” The composition of the legislative assembly insures South African control, since it consists of 64 chiefs and 45 elected members. All chiefs are paid, appointed, and can be dismissed by the South African Government. Between 1955 and 1958, 34 chiefs and headmen were dismissed. The most important matters, such as foreign affairs, banking, and internal law and order, are excluded from the competence of the assembly; this can control only public works and other matters deemed by the South African State President to be of “a merely local private nature.” No law passed by the Transkei Assembly, even within its own area of competence, can take effect without the approval of the State President.

Repressive emergency regulations were applied to the Transkei in 1960 by the South African Government to deal with opposition to the Bantu authorities system, and are still in force. There is also still a great deal of smoldering resistance to the system, and violent outbreaks are common, although rarely reported in the press. School riots have become fairly frequent recently, partly due to the deteriorating conditions in the schools. The emergency regulations prohibit meetings without a permit; arrest without warrant and indefinite detention are practiced; and any person can be forbidden by the South African authorities to enter or leave the Transkei. The whole apparatus of the South African security system, including banning, banishment, and house arrest, is in force in the Transkei under South African control.

The Archbishop of Canterbury, visiting the Transkei, commented: “You can only call the Parliament in the Transkei a dummy Parliament. There are also informers. The special branch operates in the homelands.” (Paper on Bantustan policy by Prof. Leslie Rubin, U.N. Unit on Apartheid No. 12/71, March 1971.)
The Capital of the Transkei, Umtata, is reportedly a city like any other area in South Africa. It is subject to apartheid and segregation, although it is the capital of a homeland. Segregation is applicable to the courts, to the public facilities, to the hotels and to Government buildings as well as to residential areas and facilities. The African magistrates in the Transkei have jurisdiction over Africans only. "They cannot hear charges against Europeans." (Report of the Special Rapporteur to the Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4, Sub 2.301, 1969, para. 622.)

The port in the Transkei, Port St. John, is reserved for white occupation only. As is the case with the development corporations of the other Bantustans and of the urban centers, the board of Xhosa Development Corp. does not have any Transkeians represented on it, although this board is the one charged with the economic development for the Transkei.

In April 1971, at the annual congress of the Transkei National Independence Party, Paramount Chief Kaiser D. Mantanzima declared that in order to be self-governing, the departments of government should be transferred from the control of the Republic of South Africa to the government of the Transkei. He referred to the departments of health, posts and telegraphs, transport, police, and defense. He continued that his government was "patiently awaiting the transfer of the departments as proof of the sincerity of (South African Government) utterances about the development of the Bantu homelands constitutionally to full independence." He also demanded control of the land within the boundaries of the Transkei, specifically those districts which were part of the Transkei as originally constituted in 1883, and especially Port St. John, in order to make the territory a viable economic entity. The South African Government's reaction to these requests was negative. However, they were clearly embarrassed, since the requests were logical extensions of the Bantustan policy which they are presenting to the world as a constructive policy designed "to help the Africans to independence."

**KwaZulu (Zululand)**

A territorial authority has recently been set up for Zululand or KwaZulu, as it is now called. Under the consolidation proposals, the KwaZulu homeland, which now consists of 68 Zulu areas and 157 "Black spots", would be consolidated into five larger homeland areas and one smaller piece. (The Star Johannesburg June 17, 1972, p. 7.) The capital is at Nongoma provisionally. Final decision on the site of the capital of KwaZulu, the Zulu legislative authority, awaits final action on the consolidation proposals. A number of possible historical sites have been considered: Empangeni, Umfolozi and Mahlabatini, where Chief Buthelezi, the Chief Executive Councillor of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, resides. He appears to enjoy the overwhelming support of the Zulu people; in fact he had become so well-known and so outspoken in his demands for the reality rather than the pretense of development in Zululand that the South African Government tried to reduce his influence. They installed the hereditary King Zwelithini Goodwill as monarch; however, Buthelezi promised loyalty to him only as a constitutional monarch on the British pattern.
He then dismayed the South African Government by refusing to accept
into the Zulu Constitution an oath of allegiance to South Africa. The
Constitution will soon be submitted for approval. (See p. 373 of ap-
pendix for text of recent statement by Chief Buthelezi.)

Other homelands

The Tswanaland territorial authority was established in 1968. It is
composed of six large areas and a number of smaller areas. It is near
the Botswana border in former British territory. There are 1,250,000
Tswana in South Africa, compared with about 550,000 in Botswana.
The area covered by the Tswanaland territorial authority is about
12,500 square miles. (The Star, Dec. 12, 1968.) Tswanaland or Bophu-
tha-Tswana became a governing area, like the Transkei, in the Spring
of 1972, with Chief Mangope, with whom the study mission met, as
the "Prime Minister."

Basotha Ba Borwa, or Southern Sotho, was set up in 1969, with its
capital at Witzieshoek in the Orange Free State. (Southern Africa,
London, May 9, 1970.) There are 1,452,000 South Sotho people in
South Africa, of whom 1,308,000 are in "white areas." (Rand Daily
Mail, Nov. 20, 1971.) Their territorial authority has an area of 52,000
hectares. (Keesings Contemporary Archives, May 25, 1971, p. 24601.)

Tsongaland, or the Gazankulu territorial authority, was estab-
lished in 1969. Its capital is intended to be Giyana in the Northern
Transvaal. (Southern Africa, May 9, 1970.) It consists of four separate
areas totaling 890,000 hectares. (Keesings, cited supra.)

Lebowa, or Northern Sotho, was set up in 1969 with its capital at
Sheshego near Pietersburg, Transvaal. It nominally caters to the
1,700,000 North Sotho people and to the Ndebele groups. It is composed
of three areas.

Vendaland was also created in 1969, with its capital at Sibasa. There
are 280,000 Venda. (Southern Africa, cited supra.) Its three separate
areas total 800,000 hectares. (Keesings, cited supra.)

The Ciskei territorial authority was established in 1961. Its capital
is to be at Keiskamarinhoek.

The Ciskei has 500,000 people and 1 million hectares of land. Fur-
ther territorial powers were extended in 1968. The Ciskei became self-
governing on August 1, 1972. On the second day of "self-rule" the
executive officer, Chief Justice Mabandla made a claim for more land.
He stated, "That finalisation of consolidation will take 15 years is
definitely not in the interests of the Ciskeians who are now homeless.
By that time the Ciskei would like to be independent with defined
boundaries within which they would not like any white patches." The
Johannesburg Star of August 5 commented on page 11, "The Ciskei
has obtained a status of government before it has obtained a territory.
Large slices of Ciskei land, as occupied today, are destined to be taken
from it. Larger slices are to be added at some future date to consoli-
date the homeland into four far-flung sections from the more than 20 it
now comprises." In its editorial, the Star adds "Chief Mabandla will
not get his extra land, of course, and possibly not even a decent frac-
tion of it in the face of entrenched White interests in the region." Ibid.

On the 20-mile drive of the study mission from Fort Beaufort to
Alice to visit the Black Theological Seminary, the study mission drove
through the cattle and citrus farming area which is the projected homeland of the Ciskei. The Government is considering territorial status so that a legislative assembly can be set up. The overwhelming majority of the people are Xhosa speakers.

The traditional boundary between the white settlements and what was originally the British territory, which was annexed after the wars, was the river between what is now known as the Transkei and the Ciskei. The Ciskei extends along the southern part of the river in an yet undefined area stretching all the way up to the border with Lesotho.

**Urban Bantu Councils: Soweto**

In line with its theory of separate development, the Government has established in the black townships in the urban areas Urban Bantu Councils pursuant to the Urban Bantu Councils Act of 1961. All moneys accruing to the councils are paid into the municipal native revenue account; but the councils have only consultative powers in regard to expenditures from this account. (Horrell, "Legislation and Race Relations.") By virtue of the Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1963, these councils can "exercise only the powers assigned to them on behalf of and subject to the directions of the local authority concerned"; and such assignments of powers may be withdrawn. (Ibid.) There are 23 Urban Bantu Councils altogether.

The study mission met with the Urban Bantu Council of Soweto. The members of the council were surprisingly frank in their statements about their own country as well as in the questions which they put on conditions in the United States.

The Urban Bantu Council of Soweto was established in 1968. The function of the council is purportedly to advise the white municipal authorities of Johannesburg on matters affecting Soweto. In reality however, not enough power has been ceded by the white authorities to affect their overall control over the affairs of Soweto.

Urban Bantu Councilors are elected by ethnic voter rolls. Thus they are in theory not representative of the community as a whole but only of their respective "national" or tribal groups. In practice, however, the councilors have vocally rejected any return to tribalism in Soweto and, despite political rivalries, speak with one voice in demanding more power to run the affairs of Soweto without outside interference. For example, the Council was bitterly critical of rent increases imposed by the Johannesburg City Council.

As a result of the council's powerlessness, the feeling was widespread among the people of Soweto that the Council is of little practical use to them and few people vote in council elections. But, since the council is one of the very few places where the voice of the residents of Soweto can be heard, the council has assumed importance. Now however, the future of the council is being taken out of the hands of the Johannesburg authorities in accordance with the Bantu Affairs Administration Act of 1971. Under this new legislation, urban African affairs all over the Republic are to be centralized under the Department of Bantu Administration for the avowed purpose of cutting urban African ties to "white" South Africa and linking these city dwellers with their ethnic "homelands." In the circumstances, the
prospects of institutions like the Soweto Urban Bantu Council, which at least purport to admit the principle that Africans should be represented where they live, are tenuous.

Soweto

The study mission toured Soweto, the Southwestern Townships, constituting 26 townships and covering an area of 26 square miles, with 388,416 people in 65,958 housing units and four hostels housing some 14,749 people. (Hellman, "Soweto, Johannesburg's African City," Institute of Race Relations, 1971.) As of June 1970, the total official population of Soweto was 558,798, although there were probably many more people living there. Since 1955, “ethnic grouping” was made compulsory for Soweto; and the townships have been zoned separately for Nguni, Sotho, Sotho/Nguni, Vena/Shangaan/Tsonga people. (Ibid p. 4) The bulk of its citizens, some 204,000, work in Johannesburg. The people in Soweto range from the very poor to one or two African “millionaires.” A great part of the housing is extremely poor. Even so, more than 13,000 families are on a waiting list to obtain houses. (Ibid., p. 1.) In some areas, the houses lack even basic facilities. The roads are not paved.

One medium-sized theater serves the whole population of Soweto. The study mission was informed that a permit could not be granted for another theater, since the people of Soweto were only “temporarily resident” there. By virtue of the Government's policy of influx-control and endorsement-out loans for houses for Africans are difficult to obtain. Bachelor hostels are priorities. (Ibid., p. 6.)

The Government has the water systems for the townships completely separate so that an additional element of control is gained. Further, the electricity can be isolated and sealed off. At a minimum, 70 percent of the people of Soweto live in dire poverty. (Morton, “Are Things Getting Better in South Africa,” p. 2, 1972. The text of this article appears on page 377 of the appendix.)

Cape Town City Council and the South African Indian Council

There are at present two Muslim or Indian members and four Coloured councilors on the Cape Town City Council. They lose their seats when the city council becomes an all-white body in September 1972. The study mission met with a Coloured and an Indian representative of that council. Three Indians from the Cape have been appointed by the Government to sit on the 25-member South African Indian Council.

In Cape Town, where more than one-half of the population is Coloured, there is great sadness among the Coloureds for the old days, when beaches were not segregated—for the days before District Six, a beautifully situated area on the hills of Cape Town overlooking the sea, was condemned for Coloured residence and left in the interim to become the dilapidated hopeless ghost-like town the study mission witnessed. The Coloureds are being dispossessed from Cape Town, with completely inadequate compensation, and moved to the Cape Flats, a barren area outside of Cape Town.

Squatter villages

All over South Africa, and especially around the major towns and cities, there are very large numbers of illegal squatter settlements to-
tally outside the law and the whole system of administration. They generally consist of shacks put together out of corrugated iron, cardboard, and anything else that is available. There are no roads, garbage collection facilities, law enforcement agencies, or even sanitation in a number of cases. Above all, there is no security whatsoever, and the settlements are subject to continual police raids, or total destruction without notice. Around Cape Town, where the Coloureds and Malays are being evicted from the areas which they have inhabited for centuries, District Six and the old Malay Quarter, there is a very serious problem. Apart from the settlements, dirty and violent as they are, there is the even worse situation of people literally turned into wanderers by their eviction: they sleep out in the open, and are constantly moved on by the authorities. Apart from the individual suffering caused, there are acute social problems of disease, violence, and total alienation.

The study mission visited a squatter village outside of Durban and personally witnessed the squalor and the filth, the misery and the deprivation of the wretched people who with their children and their families seek refuge in the squatter village in shanties of packing cases and corrugated tin.

Observations

The study mission found “separate development” reminiscent of “separate, but equal” in that under the latter doctrine there was “separateness” but no “equality” and under “separate development” there is “separateness” but no “development.” The tragedy of South Africa is both the fundamental difference between “equality” and “development” and the fact that “separate development” is a system imposed ruthlessly by a small minority on the majority of the people in violation of their right of self-determination and majority rule.

The Coloured Community

Under apartheid and its corollary thesis of “separate development,” the Coloureds have been stripped of the last vestiges of rights—some constitutionally guaranteed through entrenched clauses—in local, provincial, and national political institutions. The status of the Coloureds was described by the former Prime Minister, Dr. Verwoerd, as follows:

One must distinguish between citizenship of a country and what the components of a homogenous nation are. There is no doubt that the Coloureds are citizens of this country. There is just a little doubt that they are not part of this homogenous entity that can be described here as “the nation.” In South Africa, various groups of the population who in the nature of things are different nations possess citizenship. (House of Assembly debates. April 13, 1962: Hansard 5, col. 1476, as cited in E/CN.4/949, “Study of Apartheid and Racial Discrimination in Southern Africa” (Nov. 22, 1967)).

Apartheid has meant that previous rights of the Coloureds have been abrogated through nationally ordained official segregation. It has
meant the abolition of their participation in the white political parties pursuant to the Prohibition of Political Interference Act of 1968. It has meant that they have been subject to the displacement of thousands of their families in forced removals, under the Group Areas Act, such as from District Six in Cape Town and from Simonstown. It has meant the transfer of the control of education for Coloureds to the Minister of Coloured Affairs.

There is as yet no clearly defined policy by the Government for the Coloureds with respect to their place in the concept of “separate development,” as distinct from that of apartheid. At the time of the visit of the study mission, the papers daily carried reports of the domestic controversy over the status of the Coloureds and the key question of a “homeland for the Coloureds.”

The Government's solution has been the establishment of a “parallel institution” with the Coloured Persons' Representative Council at their center. The 60-member council, whose members are partially elected (40) and partially nominated by the Government (20), is supposed to become the Coloured Parliament after an indefinite period of evolution. At present the council has nominal legislative authority in matters relating to finance, education, community welfare and pensions, rural areas and settlements, and local government. But no act adopted by the council becomes final without the State President's assent. Therefore, the council's role is at most advisory.

The council was established on July 1, 1969, and the first election of councillors was held in September of the same year. The election results were a convincing demonstration that the Coloureds oppose apartheid. Many boycotted the election because they wanted nothing to do with an apartheid institution. Of those who voted, a majority supported the Coloured Labour Party and other outspokenly antiapartheid parties. The Labour Party had used as its slogan, “A vote for Labour is a vote against apartheid, a vote for anyone else or a failure to vote is a vote for apartheid.” (Whisson, “The Coloured People,” SPRO-CAS publication No. 2 (1970) p. 46.) The opposition, that is, the Labour Party, won 20 of the 30 seats, thus receiving what many interpreted as a popular mandate, although it was thwarted from constituting a majority of the council.

The Government acted to insure what it hoped would be a favorable majority in the council for its policies by using its power of nomination for the 20 remaining seats. Many of the Government's 20 nominees, including the man named as chairman, Mr. Tom Schwartz, were defeated candidates of the Federal Party, which had supported “parallel development.”

Despite the different approaches of the various parties, however, the council has not proven to be very receptive to Government advice and policy. Several Federal Party members crossed the floor to join the opposition during the last session and there was much talk of general party realignments. To some extent, the council has established itself as a forum of antiapartheid sentiment among Coloureds.

The study mission met with representatives of the Coloureds, both the self-denominated “pragmatic” group under Mr. Tom Schwartz of the Federal Party which advocates “a policy of cooperating with the Government in order to make the most progress” and also with repre-
sentatives of the Coloured Labour Party which under the leadership of Sonny Leon is the opposition party to the Government. All of the Coloured representatives greeted the chairman and the study mission with great warmth and friendliness and earnestness about their problems.

The Coloured Labour Party was established with Coloured trade union and other support. It has become increasingly active and has emerged as a leading spokesman of the Coloured community. Party members have engaged in some effective political action in the council without abandoning their demand for the ultimate abolition of the council and the extension of full political rights to the Coloureds in the presently all-white Parliament. The party has been investigating the employment practices of U.S. firms in South Africa, reportedly spurred on as a result of contacts with the study mission. In April 1972 at the party's annual congress in East London, South Africa, Sonny Leon, the leader of the party took a firm stand against the continued presence of U.S. businesses in South Africa, declaring that a U.S. withdrawal would do little to worsen the already suffering blacks and Coloureds in South Africa. Mr. Leon called for "a nation in which we can learn to live in harmony with each other regardless of race, language, and religious beliefs." (Christian Science Monitor of April 10, 1972.) The party's showing has, to a certain extent, changed the tradition of the Coloured intellectuals of boycotting elections to the council and other instruments of separate development. (Whisson, "The Coloured People," in SPRO-CAS publication No. 2, "South Africa's Minorities, 1971, p. 62.)

The evening of our meeting with the representatives of the Coloured Labour Party was notable because on that afternoon the members of that party had "walked out of" the meeting of the Coloured Representatives' Council in which the question of the budget for the Coloureds was presented to them. There was sharp disagreement between the members of the Labour Party and the Federal Party as to the best way to secure opportunities for their people, whether through rejecting meaningless cooperation—for example by refusing to "rubber stamp" a budget, on which the council lacked the authority even to transfer one budgetary item from one subhead to another—or whether, by cooperating with the Government to try to gain some flexibility and thus get more for their people. Mr. Schwartz' party is prepared to take the latter line of negotiations with dialog. However, Federal Party members state that they are uncompromisingly against apartheid and feel that their position of fighting it "amounts to a situation of realism in a situation of unreality."

The Coloured Development Corp. was established in 1962 (in the Coloured Development Corporation Act, No. 4 of 1962 and Amendment Act of 1963), purportedly to promote industry, trade, and finance in Coloured group areas. As was stressed to the study mission, the directors of the corporation are all white.

The study mission was also given to understand that, with respect to the ownership of land, title for a Coloured man "means absolutely nothing," because under the Group Areas Law a title can be revoked at any time. Even where there is a stipulation that after 30 years a Coloured person would receive title, the difficulty is that very seldom are
Coloured allowed to stay on their own land for 30 years. In the western Cape and in Johannesburg, Coloured lands are frequently on mines and the Coloureds have been dispossessed as soon as a new vein was found.

The political consciousness of the Coloured people is growing. Enigmatically the Coloured Representatives’ Council has given the Coloured people the first opportunity of expressing in what the Government considers a legitimate platform exactly what they thought throughout the country. Political consciousness among the Coloureds is growing, as indicated by the bread strike last year, which received support from all of the community, the Coloureds, the Indians and the blacks. The effect of the bread strike was felt particularly in the urban areas. In another demonstration of its dissatisfaction, many of the Coloureds stayed away from the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the Republic. Only 2,000 out of a million people showed up for it in Cape Town. The new political awareness among the Coloureds was also shown by the action of many parents of keeping their children home from school when they were expected to salute a flag which they did not consider to represent them.

The uprootings of whole communities of people in forced removals—some without prior notice—the resettlements, disenfranchisement, the bannings, the harassment, and the severe loss because of the drainage of many of their intellectuals to Canada are factors besetting this group. Except for the politically active, the study mission found much sadness among the Coloureds.

Coloured relations with the Africans

The Coloured Labour Party has begun to take a more active interest in the affairs of other “nonwhite” groups in South Africa and consciously to identify with the African majority.

The Coloured leaders, aware that the advantages which are given to them in preference to the blacks may be designed to line them with the whites and against the blacks, are beginning to reconsider the position. But, with respect to the relations between the blacks and the Coloureds, the deliberate efforts of the Government to keep the groups apart and the need for the Coloureds to have a permit to go within the black townships or within the homelands, inhibits contact. Only marriage officials are exempt from the prohibitions against going into the black areas. (The Coloureds cannot visit Namibia, as can the whites, without a permit.) Nor are the business and professional organizations more open; for these are generally established on racial lines. (Ibid. 72.) Official contacts between Coloured and African political organs, between the Coloured Representatives’ Council leaders and the various Bantustan leaders, and between the Urban Bantu Councils and the Coloured Municipal Councils have not yet been approved by the Government. One position on the relation of the Coloureds to the whites, and to the blacks, stresses the points of affinity between the Coloured and whites as: (1) the Coloured group is a minority of 2 million in South Africa and, the whites are a minority of 3 million; (2) the Coloureds have broad ties with the whites; and (3) the economic situation of the Coloureds is superior to that of the blacks.
There is, however, a growing sense among the Coloureds that notwithstanding the efforts of the whites to compete for their support, the day is coming when all those who are not white are black. It was clear that, although the Government’s policy of divide and rule has put barriers between the Africans and the Coloureds, the Coloureds are beginning to question these. This seemed to be particularly noticeable with the Labour Party. The Coloureds in general appeared to be strongly antiapartheid at least for themselves and stressed that they could not accept separate development for they have no homeland.

The Indian Community

The Indians comprise the smallest minority in South Africa. They have experienced discrimination from the time of their coming to South Africa in the 1860’s—some as businessmen, some as indentured laborers pursuant to an agreement between the colony of Natal and the British Government of India. In Natal and the Transvaal, they were subjected to laws limiting their right “to move, trade, and reside.” They were excluded from the Orange Free State. Except in the Cape, they had no voting rights. (Meer, “Indian People: Current Trends and Policies,” in “South Africa’s Minorities,” SPRO-CAS publication No. 2, 1961, p. 13). It was during his residence there that Mahatma Gandhi founded the Indian National Congress and began his work and campaign of civil disobedience.

The repatriation scheme of the Government for the South African Indians, pursuant to the “Cape Town Agreement of 1927” between South Africa and India failed. Still, however, in 1956 discussions at the conference of the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs, the Indian was referred to as having “guest rights” in South Africa. (Ibid., p. 14.) The attitude of the Government toward the Indians has changed to one of acceptance. (Ibid.) The Nationalists in their National Party Constitution “pledge to protect ‘all groups of the population against Asiatic immigration and competition’” and “to prevent further encroachment of Indians on the livelihood of the other groups by ‘an effective scheme of Asiatic segregation and repatriation.’” (Ibid., p. 14.) The United Party has a similar position except that it recognizes the existing rights of Asians born or legally domiciled in the Union. (Ibid.)

Finally in 1961, there came recognition by the Government that the Indians “are here and the vast majority of them are going to remain here, and although repatriation is used on a very small scale, we must realize that the vast majority are South African citizens and as such are entitled to the necessary attention and the necessary assistance.” (Ibid., pp. 14–15.) In 1961, the Government established a Department of Indian Affairs. At the time of its creation “not a single Indian voice was raised in support of it.” (Ibid., p. 18.) An editorial in the Leader, an Indian weekly, at that time observed that “uncompromising opposition can really be the only answer to a minister who calls for Indian cooperation to give effect to the group areas and the so-called job reservation and racial discrimination of the worst kind.” (Ibid.)

In 1968, a South Africa Indian Council became a statutory body with advisory powers only. Its 25 members are appointed by the Minister of Indian Affairs.
INTRODUCTION

There are several critical problem areas which call for firm policy decisions now. These include decolonization in minority-rulled areas of Africa, aid, and trade.

The special study mission of February-March 1971 to several African countries is the fourth such undertaking by the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee within the past 2 years. Previous reports are:


These special study missions to 32 African countries and the hearings provide the background for viewing Africa in perspective.

The Subcommittee on Africa, during the 91st Congress, held a number of hearings, which were printed under the following titles:

2. Rhodesia and United States Foreign Policy.
3. The Postwar Nigerian Situation.
4. South Africa and United States Foreign Policy.
5. Foreign Policy Implications of Racial Exclusion in Granting Visas.
7. Policy Toward Africa for the Seventies.

The chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa feels strongly that far more Congressmen should visit Africa. On this study mission, Congressmen Whalley and Burke were with the Chairman in Somalia and were joined by Congressman Derwinski for the visit to Kenya and the Malagasy Republic. From there Congressmen Whalley and Burke went to South Africa while Congressman Derwinski accompanied Chairman Diggs to Mauritius before joining the others in South Africa, while the Chairman continued on to Gabon, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, and Togo, with Melvin O. Benson, staff consultant.

In each country visited, the study mission generally met and conferred with the heads of state, various cabinet ministers, private citizens, the U.S. diplomatic team, and Peace Corps volunteers were present. We were invariably met with warm hospitality and sincere expressions of friendship in every country.

Great expectations were expressed about the new role a more developed Africa will play in world politics and the world economy decades hence. Time may exacerbate many of the crises Africa now
There has been a recent movement to revive the Congress founded by Mahatma Gandhi. This effort has been led by Mewa Ramgobin, the husband of Gandhi’s granddaughter. It was a signal honor for the study mission to visit the Phoenix Settlement House Memorial for Mohandas K. Gandhi and there to meet his daughter, granddaughter and her husband, the courageous and outspoken Indian leader. (The banning of Mewa Ramgobin is discussed in the section on the legal situation in South Africa.)

Even in the implementation of separate development, the status conferred on the Indians is considered by some to be grossly deficient in relation to that of the Coloureds and that of the Xhosa in the Transkei.

Under the Group Areas Act, the Government has made severe encroachment on the Indian traditional occupation of commerce (or businessmen). In addition to being partially deprived of their livelihood, Indians like the other nonwhites, are deprived of their homes and are subjected to removals under the Group Areas Act. As in other cases, the appalling injustice of removals is compounded by the compensation procedure, whereunder the Group Areas Board proclaims an area, sets the prices at which the property is to be sold and has the first right of purchase. The Board may then resell for a much higher price. (For example, a case is reported (Ibid. p. 25) of the Board’s purchasing a property for 70,000 Rand and reselling it for 453,000 Rand.)

The death in detention of the Iman Haron was spoken of several times. The Iman was the head of the Moslem community in the Cape, a religious minority that is subject to official harassment. There has been an order for their mosque in Cape Town to be demolished to make room for a white residential area. The Iman was officially said to have fallen downstairs while in detention; but it is widely believed that in fact his death was the result of police ill treatment. The Iman’s widow at first campaigned to have the case reopened to public scrutiny, but was quickly induced to accept a settlement by the authorities. Her acceptance of this was questioned by many people, and it was widely assumed that some kind of pressure had been applied.

(This settlement is reminiscent of an incident that occurred during the visit of the study mission. The papers were reporting on the most recent heart-transplant case in Cape Town, which had taken place just before the arrival of the mission. Suspicions were voiced as to the supply of the Coloured heart donor. His widow complained that as far as she knew, his injury had not been fatal; and that she had been refused information about her husband by Groote Schuur Hospital, where the donor and recipient were treated. The widow suddenly stopped her questioning shortly afterward—an indication of the pressure which can be brought to bear upon people in their vulnerable situation.)

A more recent death in detention, that of the Indian teacher Ahmed Timol that occurred soon after the visit of the study mission, has deeply disturbed many people in South Africa, especially the Asian community. It was officially claimed that Timol jumped out of a window, but the doctor who conducted the post mortem is reported as saying that his body showed signs of brutal physical torture.
All-race summit

The idea of a multiracial national convention, the first of its type to be held in South Africa, was put forward by Chief Buthelezi in August 1971. (Prime Minister Vorster has since called it a waste of time, serving no useful purpose.)

Those reported to have indicated interest in participating include the Coloured Labour Party (with Sonny Leon playing a prominent role in the organization stage), Afrikaner academics, Indian leaders, vernigl United Party leaders, the Progressive Party, Bantustan leaders (Transkei, Zululand, and Ovambo have been mentioned), and representatives from Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland.

A barrier to the conference's taking place was the question of whether or not it would constitute a violation of South Africa's Prohibition of Political Interference Act, the Unlawful Organizations Act (under which the State President may simply declare the movement to be unlawful), the Riotous Assemblies Act, and the Bantu Administration Act (under which it is an offense for any African to address a meeting of his fellow black men, if more than 10 people are present unless he has written approval from delegated officials), and the Suppression of Communism Act. (See p. 12 Johannesburg Star, January 29, 1972.)

On October 1, a six-man steering committee for the convention was formed in Durban which included Ray Swart, Progressive Party; Dr. Alex Boraine, Methodist Church; Sonny Leon, Coloured Labor Party; Victor Noel, Coloured Labour Party; Fatima Meer, Indian sociologist; and Bill Bengu, African lawyer.

Reports had indicated that the convention, if held, would take place in Natal sometime during the first 6 months of 1972.

Black Peoples Convention

The Black Peoples Convention was held in July 1972, at which it was decided to form the Black Political Party. The Convention came as a result of a conference in December 1971 called by ASSECA and several other organizations to form a federal convention. The objective of the December meeting was to form an organization to open lines of communication among blacks and to avoid duplication of programs. (For example, nearly all black organizations in South Africa place priority emphasis on education; and one purpose was to avoid dissipation of energies particularly with respect to fund-raising activities and to establish one organization which could also be the recipient of funds for black education.) This did not materialize. Rather, the consensus of the December meeting was that the priority need is for a political party instead of a supracultural organization. So an ad hoc committee was appointed and mandated to investigate the possibilities of a black political party; and the Black Peoples Convention was held on July 8, 1972 in Natal.

The Economy

Comparative situation of whites and blacks

The whites, less than 18 percent of the population, receive 74 percent of the country's total income (Financial Mail, Apr. 18, 1969). The gap between white and nonwhite incomes is growing steadily. White wage movements exceed the growth in productivity, thus exac-
erbating the inflation that eats away at black wages which for some years have been lower than the growth in productivity. (South African Journal of Economics, 1970; also Sean Gervasi, "Poverty, Apartheid, and Economic Growth," U.N. Unit on Apartheid No. 30/71, July 1971.)

In 1968, the average annual earnings of whites was $3,144, as compared to average annual earnings of $117 for Africans (Survey of Race Relations 1968). The average monthly industrial wage is $496 for whites and $85 for blacks. (U.S. Department of Commerce OBR-71-045.) The white 17.8 percent of the population receives 74 percent of the total national income. This is portrayed by graph E-1. As depicted in graph E-2, whites who are less than 20 percent of the economically-active, or working, population receive 74 percent of the country's income, whereas blacks, that is the non-whites, who comprise more than 80 percent of the economically active population receive only 20 percent of the income.

(The graphs referred to appear on pp. 116, 117.)

The disparity between the per capita income of the whites and non-whites in South Africa in various occupations is as follows: 6

| TABLE 1.—ANNUAL AVERAGE CASH EARNINGS BY OCCUPATION AND RACIAL GROUP |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Sector          | Whites          | Coloureds       | Asians          | Africans        |
| Mining          | 4,130           | 902             | 1,187           | 220             |
| Manufacturing   | 3,668           | 883             | 929             | 628             |
| Construction    | 3,904           | 1,315           | 1,905           | 599             |
| Electricity     | 4,429           | 920             | 1,282           | 1,003           |
| Banks and building societies | 3,578 | 965 | 1,282 | 803 |
| Central Government | 3,385 | 1,072 | 1,376 | 538 |
| Provincial administration | 2,692 | 710 | 882 | 431 |
| Local authorities | 3,523 | 1,031 | 722 | 540 |
| Railways        | 3,520           | 947             | 646             | 628             |

Graph E-3 shows annual average cash earnings by occupation and racial groups, with the small shaded area in the various circles depicting the proportion of earnings of the majority, the Africans.

(The graph referred to appears on p. 118.)

The ratio of African to non-African earnings is out of all proportion, and the distribution of income is the most unequal in the world. It can be expressed as follows: 9

| TABLE 2.—WHITE, COLOURED, AND ASIAN EARNINGS AS A MULTIPLE OF AFRICAN EARNINGS |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Sector          | Whites          | Coloureds       | Asians          |
| Mining          | 19.7            | 4.1             | 5.4             |
| Manufacturing   | 5.9             | 2.2             | 1.4             |
| Construction    | 6.5             | 1.4             | 1.4             |
| Electricity     | 6.7             | 2.2             | 1.4             |
| Banks and building societies | 4.5 | 1.4 | 1.6 |
| Central Government | 6.3 | 2.4 | 2.4 |
| Provincial administration | 6.2 | 1.4 | 2.0 |
| Local authorities | 6.5 | 1.9 | 1.3 |
| Railways        | 5.4             | 1.3             | 1.0             |

Note: See chart 1 which graphically illustrates the disparity between white and black incomes, as well as the striking increases in the gap since 1935 to 1936.

6 Africa Bureau Fact Sheet No. 18, August 1971.
7 Africa Bureau Fact Sheet, No. 13, August 1971.
As indicated by the above charts, the most glaring gap between black and white income is in the mining industry where the white wages are almost 20 times that of the black. Because of these extremely low wages, the South African is refusing mining work and the mining companies of South Africa are dependent on foreign Africans—from Malawi, Lesotho, Botswana, and Mozambique. Even within the homelands, there are more foreign Africans than local Africans employed in the mines. ("South African Mines Dependent on Foreign Africans," Unit on Apartheid, April 1971.) For example, in the gold mines, 31 percent of the Africans are local Africans, 23 percent from Botswana, Lesotho or Swaziland, 21 percent from tropical Africa, and 24 percent from the East Coast. (Ibid.)

A recent international survey showed that white South Africans have the highest living standard in the world, even higher than in the United States. Black South African incomes, however, are among the world’s lowest, and compare unfavorably even with Africa, itself a desperately poor continent. A graphic illustration of the comparative relation between South African African incomes and those of Africans in other countries in Africa is given in graph E-4; and the comparatively extremely depressed situation of the African in the Bantustans with that of Africans in other African countries is shown in graph E-5.

The graphs referred to appear on pp. 119, 120.)

The annual per capita income for certain African countries has been estimated in a very recent study as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>Per Capita Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa (Africans only)</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa (Africans in reserves)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table compiled by Barbara Rogers, "The Standard of Living of Africans in South Africa," U.N. unit on apartheid notes and documents, No. 45/71, November 1971.)

In addition to the present poverty of Africans in South Africa, it would appear that their real income is in fact falling. In the homelands, annual per capita income declined from R25.8 in 1954 to R22 in 1969 in money terms, and in real terms fell much further. In the homelands, there are almost 7 million Africans, and the output per capita averages R34 as compared to R116 outside, with an average African wage outside of the homelands of three to four times the average homeland income, even when supplemented by the remittances of migrant workers. These latter are estimated to amount to one-third of homeland production. (Van der Horst, "Separate Development: Is a Consensus Possible," Institute of Race Relations, 1971, pp. 4-5.) In the white urban areas, real incomes of Africans are at best static and, taking the increasing cost of living for Africans into
account, are probably falling—due to a complete lack of any collective bargaining machinery for Africans.

A number of recent studies emphasize the fall in the average standard of living for Africans in South Africa. (See, for example, Sean Gervasi, “Poverty, Apartheid and Economic Growth,” U.N. unit on apartheid notes and documents No. 80/71, July 1971; Barbara Rogers, “The Standard of Living of Africans in South Africa,” U.N. unit on apartheid No. 45/71, November 1971; Johann Maree, an unpublished paper for the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, 1971; forthcoming book by Ruth First, Jonathan Steele, and Christobel Gurney on British investment in South Africa, to be published by Penguin, London, during 1972; John Sackur, The Times, London, April 26, 1971.) The progressive widening of the black-white income gap is shown on graph E-6. Graph E-7 further illustrates the growing worsening situation of the African in South Africa by using this same data while treating the white income as the norm, thus depicting by an alternate method the increasing disparity between the black and white incomes, the difference being some R360 in 1935-36 and some R2480 30 years later.

(The graphs referred to appear on pp. 121, 122.)

Official statistics for African unemployment are not published, although those for the whites are. Prof. J. L. Sadie of the department of economics at Stellenbosch has estimated that the total number of unemployed in South Africa is 1,294,000. Since the unemployment figures for whites, Asians and Coloureds are negligible, it seems that 25 percent of all economically active Africans are unemployed. (Professor Sadie at a national labour conference in Cape Town, reported in The Times, London, April 30, 1971; see also, Barbara Rogers, “The Standard of Living of Africans in South Africa,” United Nations unit on apartheid notes and documents No. 45/71, November 1971.) By 1980, nearly 4 million Africans out of a working population of 10 million are likely to be unemployed. (F. Van Wyk, director of the South African Institute of Race Relations, reported in the Rand Daily Mail, May 7, 1971.)

The Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA) has said that the growing unemployment among Africans could become South Africa’s gravest problem. Its vice-president, Mr. L. C. Scheepers, has said: “We are creating an extremely serious problem. I am convinced the threat of mass unemployment is growing, and . . . we are going to be confronted with more than just an economic problem.” (Rand Daily Mail, May 7, 1971.) This unemployment is largely due to the Government’s restrictive labour policy and tight control over all economic activity—yet the Prime Minister himself has recognised the danger:

“The greatest danger confronting South Africa is not so much the threat from outside her borders, serious though that may be, but mass unemployment and disturbed race relations.” (Financial Mail, April 24, 1970.)

Economic facts

The United States direct investment in South Africa is $860 million or approximately 15 percent of the total foreign investment there which
was $7 billion in 1969. Although this represents only 1.2 percent of total U.S. direct foreign investment, it represents 13 percent of the total direct foreign investment in South Africa. The United States accounts for 16.6 percent of South African imports and 9 percent of its exports. The United Kingdom which supplies 22 percent of its imports and takes 32 percent of its exports is its principal trading partner. Other major ones are West Germany and Japan. The rand which is equivalent to $1.46 is the currency unit of South Africa. Since 1969 real economic growth has decreased from the former 9 percent to 4 percent.

The South African economy, long regarded as one of the most promising in the world, has for the last 2 to 3 years been showing increasing signs of strain. Such strains remain and may be permanent, although in the first half of 1972 imports were down slightly and exports up, due to stringent import control and devaluation, cutting the balance-of-payments deficit on current account by about one-third. Capital inflows have led to a sharp rise in reserves; the South African economy is becoming increasingly dependent on foreign investment. The increase in the free-market price of gold has meant greater earnings to offset rising costs, and may keep marginal mines open longer. However, output is falling and the long-term future is not good.

At the end of 1971, South Africa's gold and foreign exchange reserves had fallen by almost 60 percent. The increasingly dangerous balance-of-payments deficit has forced the South African Government to impose very severe import restrictions in December 1971 as an emergency measure, for an unspecified period. This clearly affects U.S. exports, particularly as the main items—motor vehicles and components, aircraft, mechanical and other equipment—are subject to greatly reduced import quotas. This is in clear contravention of the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and in fact South Africa has been violating GATT rules with her import restrictions since December 1969. (See p. 394 of the appendix for exchange of letters of August 1972 between Congressman Diggs and the Secretary of State on this subject.) It is unlikely that the restrictions will be lifted significantly unless there is pressure from her major trading partners. South Africa's balance of trade is likely to be badly hit by Britain's entry into the European Economic Community, since one-third of her exports go to Britain at present under very preferential terms. Britain's joining the Common Market is expected to cut off 10 percent of South Africa's total exports. However, for the time being, because of the improvement in South Africa's economic conditions, gold and foreign exchange held by the South African Reserve Bank increased from $461m. in November 1971, to $944m. in June 1972.

As of early 1972, South Africa's financial problems had been further exacerbated by the revaluation of European currencies and the devaluing of the rand. This has increased South Africa's external liabilities by 40 million rand (approximately $60 million) (the Star, Mar. 18, 1972). The seriousness of this additional burden can be seen from the fact that South African Reserve Bank figures are already showing service payments on foreign capital as exceeding the value of gold exports, traditionally the bulwark of South Africa's balance of payments. That means that the advantage to the entire South African reserves resulting from devaluation, amounting to R30 million, is more than canceled out by the outstanding loans from Europe.
As the conservative London Economist puts it, "An accumulation of troubles is steering the country toward a crisis." The problems include the balance of payments deficit; a much reduced growth rate; inflation; record bankruptcy levels; workers being laid off; and "the stock exchange is flat on its face." (South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin; the Economist, London, Nov. 20, 1971; see also South African economic journals, especially the Financial Mail, Johannesburg.)

A critical need of the South African economy is a market for its goods. The traditional pattern for industrializing countries is that as the level of goods produced increases, the domestic markets for these goods increase. This is not the picture in South Africa, where the majority of the population does not have income sufficient to make it a consumer. As we have seen, the average per capita income of the African majority is in fact falling. Professor Radel has warned that the disparity in incomes could make the stagnation of consumer demand South Africa's big problem in the 1970's given that the present population of over 20 million, of which 3.8 million are white, at present corresponds to only 6 million white consumption units. (Professor Radel in the Financial Mail, Johannesburg, Oct. 16, 1970.)

Thus, the problem of markets is one of the bases of the "outward policy" of the South African Government, which has a clear choice between introducing economic and political participation by the majority in South Africa, or alternatively of expanding South Africa's economic and political influence. It is the latter alternative which has been adopted in the "outward policy." This is designed to enable the South African Government to resist the domestic pressures for greater participation by its own Africans in the economy and therefore in political life; it is therefore helping to reinforce the apartheid system. Coincident with this "outward" thrust there has occurred in South Africa a wave of arrests and detentions without trial, threats against the freedom of the press, and harassment of liberal and opposition organizations. (On the outward policy, see further Oliver Tambo, "Apartheid - A Threat to Africa's Survival," Unit on Apartheid, May 1971.)

(See also paper by Sean Gervasi "Outward Policy," London, January 1972; also SASO analysis, "Dialogue and Vorster's Outward Policy").

The Chairman endorses the objective of the Department of Treasury, as indicated by Under Secretary Petty in his testimony before the subcommittee on December 7, 1971, toward a de-emphasis of gold in the international monetary system. The role of gold in the system should be eliminated.10

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10 See discussion, in report by Legislative Reference Service for House Foreign Affairs Committee, 87th Cong., first sess., 1961, "Gold and the United States Balance of Payments Deficit," on proposal that "The United States . . . terminate the guarantee to buy gold from foreigners at any fixed price. . . . Stated succinctly, the United States would give assurance that, although it intends to support the dollar in terms of gold, it has no intention of supporting the world gold market in terms of dollars" (p. 46). See page 382 of the appendix for July 20 and Aug. 9, 1972, exchange of letters between Congressman Diggs and the Secretary of the Treasury on South African manipulation of the international monetary crisis. The text of Congressman Diggs' statement before the Joint Economic Committee (Senate-House Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments) is given at p. 385 of the appendix.
Graph E-1—Chart depicting proportionate share of income received by whites and Africans in South Africa

17.8 percent of the people receive 74 percent of the income

Source: Donaldson/Butcher (Howard University, 1972).
Graph E-2—Working Population

Whites who are less than 20 percent of the economically active population receive 74 percent of the income. Blacks (nonwhites) who are more than 80 percent of the economically active population receive 20 percent of the country's income.

Source: Donaldson/Butcher (Howard University, 1972).
Graph E-3—Annual Average Cash Earnings by Occupation and Racial Groups

Source: Donaldson/Butcher (Howard University, 1972).
faces in the areas of health, unemployment, urban development, rural stagnation, urban population pressures. The political solutions African states now choose will set the pattern for future political decisions.

Africa's present as well as its future requires policymaking priority. The lack of urgency with which policymakers approach African-American relations results from their failure to see Africa in perspective, the failure to see how Africa's present will direct its future.
GRAPH E—4—PER CAPITA INCOME OF AFRICANS IN SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Graph E-5—Per Capita Income of Africans in Selected African Areas

SOURCE: Donaldson/Butcher (Howard University, 1972). (Variation on Africa Bureau Fact Sheet, No. 13 graph.)
The problem in South Africa of the allocation of labor in a system where the African who is in great majority is relegated to menial tasks and is forbidden skilled work is a central one. The need for skilled workers is acute.

This is a result of the color bar in industry which constitutes an enormous wastage of human resources, South Africa's biggest economic weakness. With the increasing sophistication of the economy and diversification away from mining, there is an increasingly critical shortage of skilled and semiskilled labor. The economic development program forecasts a shortage of 40,000 skilled workers by 1973. This is a direct result of the industrial color bar which restricts the majority of the work force to unskilled manual labor, and is fundamental to the whole apartheid system. It is applied by a complex network of legislation, honored more in the breach than the observance, but also by customary discriminatory practices and as a result of pressure and careful scrutiny by the white trade unions, jealous of their privileged position. For this reason evasion of job reservation as such is said to have little meaning for improvement. Job reservation, established under the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 to protect white workers, has potential application to less than 3 percent of all jobs (perhaps 50,000 or more jobs; data is restricted), but actual application is to an even smaller percentage because of the exemptions that have been granted. (Horrell, "South Africa's Workers," p. 132, 1969.) Of significance, however, are several other factors. The first factor is the control over apprenticeships. From December 1963 to December 1968, the 47,138 registered apprenticeship contracts were for 41,936 white youths, 4,573 Coloured, and 629 Asians (Ibid., p. 126).
The second factor is the closed shop principle which serves to prevent access to certain jobs by Africans, whom the Native Labour Settlement of Disputes Act prevents from being members of registered trade unions. African trade unions lack official status and the privileges that accompany such status. The same act makes strikes by Africans an offense punishable by up to 3 years imprisonment. Provision is made for the formation of works committees in establishments employing not less than 20 Africans, if the employees desire it. Under the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act of 1959, no African may be appointed as the employees' representative on an industrial council or at conciliation board proceedings. (Ibid., p. 17.) A Central Bantu Labour Board, consisting only of European members is also established by the former act. The Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act of 1959 makes it illegal for employers to collect trade union dues from Africans by stop orders. Thus, basic trade union rights are denied the African. The nonracial trade union, the South African Congress of Trade Unions, SACTU, is unable to function freely in South Africa, since all of its leaders have been banned or imprisoned. (Swope, “A Letter to the Workers of America,” Unit on Apartheid, May 1971.) (See also, “Further Violations of Trade Union Rights in South Africa,” report of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts to ECOSOC, Unit on Apartheid, May 1971.)

More than any other factor, what is critically important is that the white trade unions, with the willing consent of white employers, have sought to exclude blacks from the benefits of economic activity. The industrial color bar distorts the whole economy. White workers can demand rapidly rising wages which are clearly inflationary. At some points within the last 2 years, the South African Reserve Bank has reported that the entire increase in gross domestic product (GDP) was being accounted for by higher semiskilled and skilled wages.

For economic as well as political reasons, the entire legislative and governmental machinery is designed to implement apartheid through the control of the African population. “The basic purpose of apartheid is, and always has been, to secure an abundant supply of cheap labor for the economy.” (Gervasi, “Poverty, Apartheid and Economic Growth,” Unit on Apartheid Document No. 30/71, July 1971, p. 3.) If an African is found to be in an urban area illegally, he may be removed upon court orders to a “work colony, institution, or rehabilitation scheme.” (Bantu Laws Amendment Act.) For an African to breach a labor contract is an offense punishable by 50 rand or up to 3 months' imprisonment. Under the Bantu Affairs Administration Act of 1971, the Minister may declare any area outside the homelands a Bantu Affairs Administration area for which he may make regulations on the movement of African labor and its distribution between different categories of employment.

The increasing unfettered discretion enjoyed by the authorities over Africans is illustrated by a recent law, the Bantu Laws Amendment Act, No. 19 of 1970. Under this law, the Minister of Labor, upon 1 month's notice, may prohibit the performance of work by, or the employment of an African in a special area, class of employment, or trade for a specified employer. This act provides the basis for “a new and regressive job reservation in the urban areas.” (Horrell, “South
The powers granted to the Minister of Labor far exceed those already vested in him under section 77 of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956. The way this act would work was indicated by the action of the Deputy Minister for Bantu Affairs, Mr. Koornhof, who, the month following the passage of the act, passed a Government notice giving 1 month’s warning of the Minister’s intention to prohibit, under section 20A of the act, “the performing of work by, or the employment of, Bantus in various clerical, typing, and cashier positions.” Thus, this law would mean that employment and all the rights thereof, such as the right to reside near the cities, would be dependent on the sole discretion of the Minister. The South African Government is considering further legislation to increase its control over the residence, movement, and employment of Africans throughout the Republic, except the homelands. In January 1971, the Bantu Affairs Administration Bill was introduced. This would create Bantu Affairs Administration Boards which would have responsibility for housing and amenities for Africans, for influx control, and labor bureaus in order to introduce greater flexibility in the use of African migrant labor and probably to undermine the acquired rights of Africans under section 10 of the Urban Areas Act. (ILO Seventh Special Report to the Director-General on the Application of the Declaration Concerning the Policy of “Apartheid” of the Republic of South Africa, Geneva 1971.)

The Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labour of the International Labour Organization has made the following finding with respect to the question of forced labor in South Africa:

That there exists in South Africa “a legislative system applied only to the indigenous population and designed to maintain an insuperable barrier between these people and the inhabitants of European origin,” that “the indirect effect of this legislation is to channel the bulk of the indigenous inhabitants into agricultural and manual work and thus to create a permanent, abundant and cheap labour force” and that in this sense “a system of forced labour of significance to the national economy appears to exist in the Union of South Africa”. (“Declaration Concerning the Policy of ‘Apartheid’ of the Republic of South Africa”, July 8, 1964, Geneva ILO.)

Thus, Africans can be removed to undeveloped homelands when they are not needed as work units, which also can be found outside. Similarly, even labor units for the mines are increasingly being sought outside South Africa, while thousands of Africans in the Transkei are desperately looking for work. The takeover of the cream of southern Africa’s labor force is by no means in the real interests of the independent African countries; they are often forced to comply with South Africa’s economic requirements because of their own economic weakness. Involvement with South Africa as suppliers of cheap labor and raw materials, and as markets for manufactured products from South Africa, is destructive of the development prospects of independent Africa. (See Robert Molteno, “Africa and South Africa,” Africa Bureau, London, February 1971; also a paper submitted by

One widely discussed thesis is that economic growth of the whole economy will bring change in South Africa. It is, of course, true that some individuals will benefit as the society grows economically. But the whole system of apartheid or white supremacy is one which is purposefully executed so as to continue the assured supply of a reservoir of cheap labor from the reserves, while at the same time obliterating from the consciousness of the whites the presence of the African in the cities. The actual separation is mainly between African workers and their families, resulting in the breakdown of very large sections of society with all the consequent social evils. The illegitimacy rate is about 50 percent; crime and violence are among the worst in the world; alcoholism is also at a very high rate.

A study of the interrelationship between poverty, apartheid, and economic growth concludes that while a small proportion of Africans may be better off than previously, to conclude that economic growth is benefitting the majority of Africans would be an illusion. The situation of Africans in the reserves and in “white areas” of South Africa is actually worsening in every sense. The whole system of apartheid has become far more oppressive, and the poverty which dominates the lives of virtually all but whites will certainly not be lifted as a result of further economic growth. (Gervasi, “Poverty, Apartheid, and Economic Growth,” Unit on Apartheid Document No. 30/71, July 1971.)

The basic purpose of apartheid has always been to secure an abundant supply of cheap labor for the economy; this is possible only by forcing the majority to conform to the requirements of the minority, which entails an elaborate system of rules for controlling the lives of the majority. The system also entails a ready will to apply force. (The atmosphere of violence and the threat of violence, implicit in the whole legal and administrative structure, is very strong in South Africa.)

In the “white areas,” which is where virtually all economic activity takes place, the majority of Africans working there have no rights whatsoever. The excuse for this is that they are “citizens of their homeland,” so that in the rest of the country they are at best treated as stateless persons or aliens, without any real claim to protection from the laws of the country. At the moment, far from there being a more flexible labor system being introduced, migrant labor is being made the rule for all Africans, even those long urbanized and with all their roots in the areas where they are now being considered aliens.

Economic growth does not currently affect almost half of the African population, living outside the modern economy on subsistence agriculture. For the others, continued growth depends on increased control and the repression of dissent, and above all no concession to the African need for security and social mobility, or for bargaining about his conditions of work. The fact that this is causing grave problems for the economy as a whole does not alter the white economic interest in increasing white domination of all economic activity, and increasing the white share of the national income and resources.
Finally, the uniquely unequal distribution of income between the races means that the spending power of the rich in South Africa will increase enormously in absolute terms; this will create a demand for luxury commodities, and the available resources will be attracted, by the logic of the market, into the luxury sector. Resources to supply the kinds of goods which the poor require will not be available, by the same logic. The result is that as African money wages rise, prices for necessities will rise faster, and cancel out the potential benefit. (Ibid.)

The taxing situation as established in the Natives Taxation and Development Act of 1925, as amended, and the present act of 1958, further represses the African economically. "The general tax payable by Africans is substituted for the provincial personal tax paid by members of other racial groups, but Africans in the lowest income groups pay more than do whites with the same incomes; no reduction is made for Africans with family responsibilities, as it is for persons of other racial groups; and Africans become liable to pay the general tax on reaching the age of 18, while others are exempt from personal tax until attaining the age of 21 years." (Horrell, "Legislation and Race Relations," 1966, p. 57). (See further, p. 398 of the appendix for text of statement on "Apartheid as a System of Forced Labor," by Gervasi, 1972).

**Education**

As seen above in the discussion of the economic situation of the African, an understanding of the situation of the people in South Africa and of the comparative situation of the blacks and whites requires a grasp of the basic fact that apartheid, with its enormous inequities, is a deliberate policy of the Government. Nowhere is this more evident than in the educational field. In education there are egregious breaches of the rule of law. All education is segregated. A special inferior system is provided for blacks.

Even more than the effects of the economic policy of the Government toward the African and its far-reaching effects on his welfare and all the other circumstances relating to his impoverished financial condition—even more than the homelands policy which relegates the African to the rural, undeveloped, impoverished sections of the country—even more than the legal position of the African who is required to carry a pass at all times and subjected to harsh police-state laws and arbitrary authority—it is the educational policy of the Government which is to be deprecated above all, because that system is the one which will have the most far-reaching and most pernicious effect on the children of the 15 million blacks in South Africa. For this reason, the report includes a detailed statement on the educational situation of the blacks, a situation which can only be properly understood within a comparative analysis both of the educational situation of the various groups in South Africa and of the financial ability and educational resources present in the society itself.

The study mission found a strong African commitment in having every possible child receive education. Various literacy projects are underway. Barriers abound to the realization of this, however; for the African is subject to "Bantu Education."
The Bantu Education Act, No. 47 of 1953, centralized the education of the African in the central government. The act provided that no school may be established or conducted for the education of Africans unless it has been registered. It is a crime for anyone to run a school or even hold a class for black children unless licensed by the official state-controlled Department of Bantu Education. The Minister of Bantu Education was vested with comprehensive power over all aspects of education including the medium of instruction, the control of the admission, treatment and discharge of pupils from any school, religious instruction, the conditions for subsidizing and assisting the schools, the conditions of appointment and service, and the rights, duties, and privileges of teachers and other employees.

There is practically 100 percent literacy for the whites, although for the population as a whole the literacy rate is 35 percent. The rate for Africans then must be 22 percent. This means that the literacy rate for blacks is essentially no greater than that for Africa as a whole, 20 percent.

Blacks in South Africa must pay tuition in order to attend public school and must pay all other costs related to the schooling of their child, including the textbooks, the costs of school buildings, whereas the state finances these costs for white and Coloured children. Education is compulsory for the white child to the age of 16. For the Coloured, education was compulsory in Natal and six small districts in the Cape prior to apartheid. Since 1953, it has not been made compulsory in any additional areas. (Horrell, “The Education of the Coloured Community in South Africa, 1652–1670,” Institute of Race Relations, p. 169.) Indian education is not compulsory. (Meer, The Indian People, Current Trends and Policies, SPRO-CAS, South Africa’s Minorities, 1971, p. 29.)

That education for the African is not compulsory is a deliberate policy of the South African Government—

which separates education into white education, Coloured education, Indian education, and “Bantu education”.

which makes the financing of African education dependent upon taxes paid by Africans, whereas white, Coloured, and Indian education is financed from the General Revenue. The inequity of this is enormous, especially since Africans are the most economically disadvantaged group—again because of a deliberate government policy which is justified by the sophistry “their wages are less because their expenses are less.”

which handicaps the African child from higher education by downgrading the substantive content (for example, mathematics), of the African primary curriculum and also by teaching in the medium of tribal languages throughout primary school. The African child is taught in his home (African) language on the primary level although he must begin the study of English and Afrikaans in his first year of school. In secondary school, the medium of instruction is abruptly changed from the African language to two languages at once, English for half of his subject and Afrikaans for the other half.
which states in Parliament its philosophy “compulsory education can be extended to Africans only when they themselves ask for it, when they can finance it themselves and when their economy can absorb the increased number of educated people.” (Emphasis supplied.) (The Deputy Minister, speaking in Parliament in 1969, from SPRO-CAS, “Education Beyond Apartheid”, p. 21.)

which spends 15 times as much per capita on each white pupil as on the African pupil, or R14.48 per African pupil and R288 per white pupil. (Ibid., p. 24.)

whose policy results in a pupil-teacher ratio in the African schools of 60 to 1 as compared to that of 21 to 1 in white schools (ibid., p. 25). (The ratio for Coloured is 31 to 1 and 27 to 1 for Indians (Horrell, “The Education of the Coloured Community in South Africa, 1652 to 1970.” Institute of Race Relations, 1970, p. 131).)

whose policy, because of lack of facilities, lack of teachers and lack of funds, results in double sessions for 80 percent of the African schoolchildren in school of only 3½ or 4 hours for the first 2 years. (SPRO-CAS, “Education Beyond Apartheid.” p. 26.)

whose policy results in a dropout rate among African pupils so that only 4.2 percent reach high school (in contrast to the 7 percent of Zambian pupils who reach high school), as compared with 32.53 percent of the white school population, 11.14 percent of the Coloured and 23.89 percent of the Indian. (Ibid., p. 32).

whose policy results in 19.9 percent of the teachers in African schools being unqualified. (In 1968, 6,500 African teachers had neither matriculation nor professional training and were being paid R34 a month (men) and R27 (month) for women. (Ibid., p. 26.)

whose policy results in the parents having to employ teachers and pay them privately—17.2 percent of the teachers are employed by the parents (ibid., p. 27).

whose policy results in a per capita expenditure by the state on school books of R6.3 for whites, R2.4 for Coloureds, R2.6 for Indians and 46 cents for Africans (ibid., p. 28).

whose policy results in gross disparities in teachers' salaries.

whose policy, according to the 1960 census, results in 62 percent of the economically active African population (11 million) having had no schooling at all, and many of the remainder being functionally illiterate (ibid., p. 28).

The proportion of State expenditure on education as a whole has been fairly consistent, but the proportion spent on African education fell from 0.57 percent in 1953 to 0.396 percent in 1966. (United Nations Economic and Social Council, “A Study of Apartheid and Racial Discrimination in Southern Africa,” U.N. Document E/CN4/949, Geneva, 1967, p. 149.) Per capita expenditure on African education actually declined from R17.08 in 1953-54 to R11.50 in 1962-63, and remained static in money terms for the 1960's. Real per capita expenditure is therefore very much less than 20 years ago. (Muriel Harrell,
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD AFRICA IN PERSPECTIVE

I. DECOLONIZATION

Colonialism is in its last throes in Africa. On a continent where all but Liberia were at one time ruled by colonial powers, there are now 43 independent countries. Today, the last vestiges of colonialism remain only in six territories—Angola, Afars, and Issas (Djibouti), Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Spanish Sahara. Within most of these territories the desire for independence is strong. A major purpose of the Organization of African Unity as cited in its charter is to free the African Continent from colonialism. Thus, throughout Africa the eradication of colonialism remains the unfinished business of the sixties and of top priority for the decade ahead.

American foreign policy toward Africa has been stated to be support for anticolonialism. However, a wide gulf demarcates our actions from our oral pronouncements. The failure to take firm, resolute policy positions on colonial issues has contributed to later policy predicaments. An excellent example of this characteristic of United States African policy is the case of Namibia. Although the United States since 1962 has voted for United Nations resolutions calling for the end of South African control over Namibia, it was not until May 20, 1970, that the U.S. Government announced it would discourage American investment in that territory. This step was taken 5 years after a report by the U.N. Committee of Twenty-four indicated that international firms operating in Namibia were exploiting the Africans, abetting apartheid, and blocking the drive for independence. Today, the continued exploitation by businesses in Namibia has created an obviously unrestful situation.

At present, a conscientious effort to deal with the problem of continued colonial rule in the Portuguese territories of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau demands that policy pronouncements be supported by firm actions. In the past U.S. statements on Portuguese colonial rule in Africa have revealed a policy which is essentially supportive of the status quo. For example, Secretary of State William Rogers declared in his 1970 message on Africa that:

As for the Portuguese territories, we shall continue to believe that their people should have the right of self-determination. We will encourage peaceful progress toward that goal. The declared Portuguese policy of racial toleration is an important factor in this equation. We think this holds genuine hope for the future.

This is a position which is unacceptable to the peoples of these territories and their brothers in the independent nations of Africa.

1 These conclusions are those of the chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa and do not necessarily reflect the views of the membership of the subcommittee or the other members of this special study mission.
The comparison of per capita expenditure on the different racial groups shows a close correlation with the distribution of total assets; this would indicate that the availability of education to Africans and other nonwhites is not of a sufficient level to enable them to improve their social status as a group:

**EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION PER CAPITA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SA Rands</th>
<th>U.S. dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>114.1</td>
<td>159.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured and Indian</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>104.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>18.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The distribution by primary, secondary, or university level of Africans in school, as compared with the distribution of whites and Coloured pupils is depicted on graph ED-1, which shows that (1) for Africans, 96 percent of pupils are on the primary level, 3.8 percent secondary level, and only 0.2 percent are on university level; (2) for whites, 63 percent are on primary level, 30 percent on secondary level, and 7 percent on university level; and (3) 90 percent of Coloured pupils are on primary level, 9.6 percent on secondary level, and 0.4 percent on university level.

(The graph referred to appears on p. 130.)

The failure rate of those in education is very high, indicating something basically wrong with the educational system. The proportion of passes in the African colleges in 1967 was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fort Hare</th>
<th>Zululand</th>
<th>The North</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st year</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd year</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd year</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>64.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The relative educational expenditure and relative population is portrayed by graph ED-2, which shows a horn of plenty denoting the funds for education and the comparative amounts for the Coloured, white, and black children.

(The graph referred to appears on p. 131.)

The disproportion of candidates for the matriculation examination, necessary for university entrance, is equally evident:

**MATRICULATION CANDIDATES 1968**

<p>| | | | |</p>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>(1967)</td>
<td>39,637</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloureds</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,446</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,289</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,112</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Survey of Race Relations, SAIRR, 1969.)
Of the African matriculation candidates in 1968, only 24 percent passed university entrance, and another 15 percent got school-leaving certificates. (Evening Post, Port Elizabeth, Feb. 9, 1968, quoting The World.)

Graph ED-3 illustrates the abysmally low number of passes of those African students who enter the colleges. In 1967 the average number of college students who completed their third year was less than one in 20. (The graph referred to appears on p. 132.)

**GRAPH ED-1—PERCENTAGE OF ENROLLMENT IN PRIMARY, SECONDARY, AND UNIVERSITY SCHOOLS IN SOUTH AFRICA BY RACE, 1967**

(Each large square represents 1 percent of the enrollment for the race in the particular column.)

*Source: Donaldson/Butcher (Howard University, 1972).*
In South Africa there is not a single African engineer, dentist, quantity surveyor, architect, or town planner. The inadequacy of higher education is only a fragment of the problem, however. An even more grave situation is created by the failure of elementary education to give any kind of basic training to the majority of African children. Fifty-five percent of the African school population do not go to school long enough to become literate; these drop out by the end of standard 2 (4th grade). (SPRO-CAS, "Education Beyond Apartheid," 1971, p. 24.)

Approximately 95 percent of all African pupils drop out before they reach secondary school. Over half the pupils entering school in 1963 had dropped out by 1967. (See Unit on Apartheid Notes and Documents, No. 13 of 1969, p. 12.)

In the 15 years before apartheid, 1935–50, the proportion of African schoolchildren in secondary schools had increased more than 500 percent from a miniscule 0.5 to 3.1 percent, whereas under apartheid from 1955–69 the rate of increase was dramatically decreased threefold, down to 0.05 percent so that the 1955 percentage of 3.5 percent only rose to 4.2 percent. (Ibid., p. 32.)
The average number completing 3 years for these three colleges is less than one in 20.

It is such figures as these which cause concern as to the efforts of the Government in this area of education. Out of the 11 million Africans "economically active" in the African population, only 13,000 have completed secondary education—that is, 0.12 percent, not even two out of every 1,000. ("Education Beyond Apartheid," p. 28.)

It does not appear that the situation can improve in the near future, either in quantity or in the proportion of children given an adequate education, since the number of African teacher trainees dropped sharply after 1954, the first year of "Bantu education," and is only now creeping up to the numbers in training then, some 18 years ago.

The teacher-pupil ratio for all African schools deteriorated from 1:41 in 1953 to 1:58 in 1968. A large percentage of these teachers were unqualified. Only 1.28 percent had degrees and were professionally qualified, and another 0.34 percent had a degree only. Thus, less than 2 percent had any degree. A further 29.81 percent had passed junior
certificate (a low-grade examination normally taken at about 14) and had a professional qualification. All the rest had even lower educational attainment. (1969 Survey of Race Relations, p. 195.)

The deterioration in the quality of education is even more marked, although difficult to quantify. As indicated earlier, courses seem almost to be designed as an obstacle race: For example, elementary teaching is in the African vernacular; then some subjects are taught in Afrikaans up to junior certificate level, when schools switch to English for matriculation (The Star weekly, March 16, 1968). It is significant that one of the major demands of Chief Buthelezi of the Zulus is for all education to be in English; this not only gives some consistency to the educational curriculum, but also puts the people in touch with the necessary books, which do not exist in the African languages, and with the outside world generally. The South African Government seems equally determined not to allow this broadening of horizons.

The principles of Bantu education have been described by Dr. Verwoerd: "There is no place for him (the African) in society, beyond certain forms of labour." (Dr. H. Verwoerd, then Minister of Bantu Affairs, "Bantu Education—Policy for the Future," Bantu Affairs Department, Pretoria, 1954.)

It has been elaborated by Mr. J. N. le Roux in the House of Assembly: "We should not give the natives an academic education, as some people are too prone to do. If we do this we shall later be burdened with a number of academically trained non-Europeans, and "who is going to do the manual labour in the country? I am in thorough agreement with the view that we should so conduct our schools that the native who attends those schools will know that to a great extent he must be the labourer in the country." (House of Assembly Debates, April 2, 1945, col. 4527.)

The establishment of separate university colleges, respectively, for Africans, Coloureds, and Indians was required by the Extension of University Education Act of 1959. The councils and senate for each of the institutions were to be all white, although provision was made for non-white advisory councils and senates. African colleges were to be financed out of the Bantu education account, but Indian and Coloured colleges from the general revenue account.

Fort Hare was required generally to limit admission to Xhosa students. Other "tribal" colleges were established. The University College of the North at Turfloop in the northeastern Transvaal was established for the Sotho, Venda, and Tsonga. The University College of Zululand at Ngoye was established for the Zulu and Swazi. The University College of the Western Cape at Athlone, Cape Town, was established for Coloured students as well as the University of Durban-Westville for Indian students. The respective Minister, that is, the Minister of Bantu Education, Minister of Coloured Affairs, or the Minister of Indian Affairs, has broad powers with respect to these colleges, which were given full university status in 1969.

Fort Hare has a total enrollment of only 486 students. This is slightly less than it had in 1959, before segregation took place. The enrollment at the University of the North is 428 and that at the University of Zululand is 671.
South Africa used to be known for the quality of its higher education, and many African politicians, as indicated below, studied at Fort Hare. There has been a regression in the quality of facilities available, however, and the three university colleges which Africans may attend, offer courses of differing value: Fort Hare, the University of Zululand, and the University of the North. These are located in remote rural sections in contrast to the 10 white universities which are situated in accessible urban centers. They do not now award their own degrees, but prepare students for examinations of the correspondence college, the University of South Africa. Statistics of enrollment there are rising considerably, but this increase consists mainly of students taking correspondence courses and nonmatriculated students pursuing diploma courses. Very few African teachers are employed: In the three colleges there are 202 white teachers, and only 37 Africans.

One of the oldest institutions of higher education for Africans is Fort Hare. In 1959, the Bantu Education Act made it a Xhosa University and ended its accessibility to all Africans including students from other African countries. Many of the officials of majority-ruled African nations of Southern and East Africa are Fort Hare graduates—in the BLS states, Uganda, Kenya, Zambia, and Malawi for example. Fort Hare has an approximate enrollment of 850 students and faculties of law, liberal arts, and Bantu administration (public administration). Faculty salaries differ on the basis of race because, we were told, the Africans have a lower standard of living! Students are marked down for political expressions.

In terms of the University College of Fort Hare Transfer Act of 1959, the management, maintenance, and control of the college was transferred from its governing council to the Minister of Bantu Education. This was the end of a long tradition starting in 1916; it now has been reduced to a “tribal” college accepting only people of Xhosa origin. It is very closely watched for signs of political activity, since it produced many of the outstanding leaders of the African nationalist movement within South Africa. The study mission went to Alice where Fort Hare is located and met with students of Fort Hare and of the Black Theological Seminary.

**Inanda Seminary**

The study mission visited the Inanda Seminary, an American-supported secondary school for African girls near Durban. The philosophy of the Government for education for blacks and of the education for the whites was vividly illustrated by this visit. That the buildings of this school were fast approaching a condition of dilapidation was not borne upon the visiting study mission at first because the spirit and evident ability and competence of both the student body and the faculty overshadowed the condition of the physical plant. However, it did become painfully clear that the school was in radical need of help.

A private school in South Africa for blacks may not charge tuition. The state will not subsidize church schools for Africans as it does for whites and Coloureds.

Inanda, which is run by the American Board of World Missions, has the highest rating of private schools for African girls. (There are three others which are Catholic.) There are some 9,000 graduates of
this school which has been operating for 105 years and which was originally established to provide educated wives for graduates of Adams College. Many of the African women holding responsible positions are Inanda graduates, some of its alumnae have attended foreign universities; one Inanda woman received a Ph. D. in clinical psychology at the University of Chicago. The school is not permitted to take students outside of South Africa with the exception of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Namibia. The study mission found that Inanda students are keenly interested in preparing themselves, upon completion of their education, to work in particular fields that would benefit their communities. Some commented on limitations placed on their people by the Group Areas Act.

Inanda's faculty is integrated. There are no apartheid practices. The Inanda singing group, which has appeared on British programs sang a group of religious, jazz, and other songs for the study mission.

The American Board of Missions is finding it difficult to continue support for Inanda. At the time of the visit, the physical plant was in dire need of repair and the school was experiencing an acute financial plight. It was revealing to hear that South African firms had been more generous than a number of American firms when approached in the fundraising effort. Since that time, however, a number of American firms have demonstrated support for the school.

**Student Associations**

The study mission met with several student organizations: The National Union of South African Students in Cape Town; the Friday Club, a group of students of Stellenbosch University at which some Coloured students from Athlone College, near Cape Town, were also present; with members of SASO, the South African Students Organization, a Black Students Organization, at the Black Medical College near Durban; and finally, with some members of the student body of Fort Hare and the Black Theological Seminary at Alice, South Africa, which is near Port Elizabeth.

**National Union of South African Students (NUSAS)**

The National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) is a 28,000-member student organization with most of its strength on five English-speaking university campuses. Its membership is predominately white, although it claims some 4,000 nonwhite members, some of whom hold dual membership in NUSAS and the black South African Students' Organizations (SASO). NUSAS is the equivalent of national student organizations in any country, but because of the nature of South African society its function is much more widely defined to include basic social and political work with and by students. There are social work programs and educational funds for the nonwhite community; however, the most important function is political, and NUSAS is known in South Africa as one of the main critics of Government policy.

NUSAS's national leadership calls itself "radical" in the South African political context and is working toward a nonracial South Africa, implicitly involving black majority rule. (Many of its 28,000
members are not working toward that objective and express their opposition or disinterest by not participating in NUSAS activities.)

NUSAS's principal objective is to increase consciousness among its own membership of what it considers South Africa's gravest problems. It weighs in actively on national issues, with words and few or many bodies, depending on the issue.

In the case of the 22 people accused under the Terrorism Act, acquitted, rearrested, retried, again acquitted, and then banned, NUSAS organized a series of marches and demonstrations. They also protested vigorously at the 10th anniversary celebrations of the declaration of a Republic in South Africa, calling attention to the deterioration in the political situation during the decade. For this, they were subjected to harassment from Government and other circles.

During the past year, NUSAS has also acted on such issues as censorship, bannings, and the church/state conflict as well as the segregated party given by the U.S. Ambassador on June 1, 1971.

NUSAS is under continuous fire from the Government and the nationalist press. The main role of NUSAS is to liberalize new generations of the white elite. Because of this, there is a severe limit on the extent to which it can be genuinely radical, and it tends to be severely criticized by some blacks, who criticize it as an ineffectual white liberal group, concealing the truth about white supremacy by preserving an illusion of dissent.

NUSAS is much more successful among certain sections of the English-speaking students than among young Afrikaners. Like so many South African institutions, student organizations are split along tribal lines, and Afrikaner students have their own organization, the Afrikaanse Studentebond (ASB). Just as NUSAS is liberal—by South African standards—so the ASB is reactionary—even by South African standards.

One of the most useful activities of NUSAS is arranging tours of South Africa, including some of the hidden areas, for visiting foreigners. They organized the highly successful tour by Robert Kennedy who delivered their Day of Affirmation speech, for example, as well as many visiting legislators from Europe. Congressman Ogden Reid was invited to give the annual speech in 1969, but was denied a visa.

NUSAS has been reviled by Government Ministers, United Party officials, university officials, other student organizations ranging from the conservative Afrikaanse Studentebond (ASB) to SASO.

The Friday Club

The Friday Club is a very informal white organization consisting of one hundred or so, more or less verlig, students and faculty at the University of Stellenbosch. It meets irregularly to hear speakers, primarily on topics of international political interest, over a meal or drinks off campus. It is unstructured, lacking even a titular chairman.

South African Students' Organization (SASO)

The South African Students' Organization is the black student organization formed about 3 years ago, which has now taken over almost all the black membership of NUSAS. It is essentially a collection of autonomous campus units with only a skeleton national
organization. At the very beginning it was favored by the South African Government as an expression of the apartheid doctrine; however, when it became obvious that its philosophy was radical, it became the target of much harassment by the special branch, including the arrest and indefinite detention of some of its leading figures during the recent wave of arrests.

The student demonstrations in June 1972 arose out of the following. A black student speaker, Abraham Tiro, addressing a graduation assembly at the University of the North at Turfloop in May 1972 made the points that (1) although Turfloop is a black university, over 75 percent of the lecturing staff is white; (2) those who formally serviced the university with meat were black, now they are white; (3) in the holidays, it is white students who are employed at the university; (4) it is a black school, and yet his mother was sitting in the back in an assembly which is mostly white. A few days later the student was expelled. SASO coordinated student strikes and other activities in protest of this action on all five black campuses (the Universities of the North, Zululand, Fort Hare, and the Indian and Coloured Universities). At all of these there were demonstrations and boycotts, and student morale was greatly boosted by the amazing solidarity shown. SASO refused to work with NUSAS and the white campuses, which, therefore, held independent demonstrations, dispersed with great publicity about the use of police violence normally used only against blacks.

SASO concentrates on the needs and aspirations of black students and the black community. The main emphasis of the organization is community service combined with the raising of political consciousness; some of its programs are carried out in collaboration with the University Christian Movement (UCM). This organization is essentially the parent body of SASO, and the sole surviving multiracial organization. How long it will survive is uncertain; its president, Justice Moloto, was recently "endorsed out" to his "Bantustan," where he has been banned in order to prevent him from carrying out the community development work he was planning. The Reverend Don Morton, a white minister in the United Christian Movement, has been forced to leave South Africa. Basil Moore, a white United Christian Movement leader, was reportedly placed under house arrest for 5 years at the beginning of March 1972.

Among the projects undertaken by SASO was a survey of two resettlement camps, by African students—who are the only ones to have access—and this included a survey of water resources, basic housing needs, and potential for agricultural development. One of the most interesting projects was a joint literacy campaign with UCM in the Transkei. This was carefully planned, and the students specially trained, but Chief Matanzima, the head of the Transkei "government," did not approve the scheme. A basic motivation behind the emphasis on literacy is "conscientization." This is reminiscent of the Paolo Freire process evolved in Latin America for making people aware of themselves and their environment through teaching basic literacy. For example, in drawing up a list of basic words it was found that the inhabitants of a Johannesburg township, when pressed, decided that the most prominent feature in their situation was "secret police," a factor even more important than housing or food.
The South African Government is doing as much as it can to hinder community development along the lines pursued by SASO. Where the literacy program is allowed to survive, there is an acute lack of funds for the writing of postliteracy manuals dealing with health, education, agricultural innovation, and related topics. White American funds are available to white liberal organizations in South Africa, such as the Christian Institute and Institute of Race Relations; but these funds seem to be negligible for the movements representing blacks and working with them. (See p. 402 of the appendix for text of preamble to SASO Constitution.)

THE HEALTH SITUATION

Health data for South Africa as a whole shows:¹¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births)</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons per hospital bed</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons per physician</td>
<td>1,188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily caloric intake per capita</td>
<td>2,870</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This data may be broken down further for whites, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy (1967)</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons per hospital bed</td>
<td>Not available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons per physician</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily caloric intake per capita</td>
<td>Not available.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the African:¹²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
<td>40 or under.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births)</td>
<td>200-500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) in the reserves</td>
<td>400-450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons per hospital bed</td>
<td>Not available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons per physician (assuming use of African doctors only)</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily caloric intake per capita</td>
<td>Not available.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graph H-1 depicts the infant mortality rate among South African whites. For every 100 white babies there are 2½ coffins. As graph H-2 illustrates, for every 100 African babies there are 25 coffins.

(The graphs referred to appear on pp. 139, 140.)

The Health Profession

Keen concern has been expressed by medical educators as to the education of the African medical student. (Dean I. Gordon, of the King Edward VII medical faculty.)

Moreover there is an official policy of wage discrimination. Unequal salaries are paid by the Government to white, Coloured, Asian, African doctors and nurses. In an unprecedented “strike” move, the nonwhite doctors at King Edwards Teaching Hospital in Durban threatened to resign in the spring of 1969, because of officially determined grossly

¹¹ This data is taken from the publication “Africa: Economic Growth Trends,” Office of Statistics and Reports, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development (January 1971).

¹² These figures are estimates, since there are no official statistics available for African health and mortality rates. (Dr. Raymond Hoffenberg, Source: “Inequality in Health Care in South Africa.” U.N. Unit on Apartheid Notes and Documents Special Article, December 1970. (Dr. Hoffenberg is one of South Africa’s leading medical researchers, and a former consultant physician of Groote Schuur Hospital.)
COMPARATIVE AREA

AFRICA
11,700,000 Square Miles

UNITED STATES
(excluding Alaska and Hawaii)
3,022,000 Square Miles

Source: Office of the Geographer, Department of State.
Graph H-1—Depicting Infant Mortality Rate Among South African Whites

(2 1/4 out of 100 die as infants)

Source: Donaldson/Butcher (Howard University, 1972).
GRAPH H-2—DEPICTING INFANT MORTALITY RATE AMONG SOUTH AFRICAN BLACKS
(25 out of 100 die as infants)

SOURCE: Donaldson/Butcher (Howard University, 1972).
different pay scales for each group. The final outcome was a readjustment in the salary scales which still remained unequal, so that instead of the old scale whereunder African and Asian doctors received respectively 64 percent and 72 percent of the pay for white doctors, they were to receive 70.8 percent and 79.2 percent respectively. (Sixth Special Report of the Director-General on the Application of the Declaration concerning the policy of “Apartheid of the Republic of South Africa” (1970, pp. 16-19).)

**The Legal Situation**

With the advent of the United Nations and the dedication of the Charter of the United Nations to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, a new era of international law dawned. This has been marked by progress in many countries toward the eradication of legal distinctions based on race or color. South Africa is an ignominious exception. While the rest of the world embarked on a course of recognizing the equality and dignity of each man, South Africa has enshrined apartheid into its system of law and has established its entire governmental, political, economic, social, and legal structure on distinctions based on race and color. In South Africa, the vast majority of the people have no freedom of movement, of residence, of employment, no right to land, to family life, to education, or to participate in the Government. A series of security laws has empowered the Government to exercise its power arbitrarily and subject to no review, not only with respect to the non-European, but with respect to everyone, black or white. The Government may exercise arbitrary authority with respect to “communists.” The completely elastic statutory definition of communism includes any doctrine “which aims at the encouragement of feelings of hostility between the European and non-European races of the Republic, the consequences of which are calculated” either to establish a despotic system of government based on the dictatorship of the proletariat or “which aims at bringing about any political, industrial, social, or economic change” by unlawful acts or omissions.

Coterminous with the restrictions of the majority are the corresponding disabilities on the whites. Since life in South Africa is relatively quite luxurious for whites, these disabilities may generally be present as only a background, but they come to the fore whenever anyone—white or black—appears to step out of the mold which the Government has arranged for him. Thus, a striking phenomenon of South African society is its unparalleled rigidity as well as its obsession with race—to its own degradation. A person’s race is the determinant for every aspect of his life and daily existence. The governmental apparatus required to enforce this official dichotomy of people and maintain internal security is an enormous, all-pervasive network of security laws with the Special Branch operating under the awesome aegis of the Bureau of State Security. Simply put, South Africa is a police state.

The International Commission of Jurists made an exhaustive study of apartheid and reported thereon (“South Africa and the Rule of
Law,” Geneva, 1960) “in the hope that world legal opinion will thereby be informed of the profoundly distressing conditions of life in the Union of South Africa and the perilous state of the rule of law in terms of both classic freedoms and social justice.”

In “An Open Letter to South Africans” of July 1971, a group of concerned South African churchmen has noted that “Our whole society is basically structured according to the same principles of nationalism and racialism as Nazi Germany was.”

The Special Rapporteur for the Human Rights Commission in his study, “Study of Apartheid and Racial Discrimination in Southern Africa” (E/CN.4/949, Nov. 22, 1967) placed the pertinent laws of South Africa beside the standards of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and found the laws of South Africa violative of the following fundamental freedoms and human rights: The rule of non-discrimination; the right to take part in Government, freedom of peaceable assembly and association, freedom of opinion and expression, the right to a nationality, the right to seek and enjoy another country’s asylum from persecution, freedom of religion, the right to marry and to protection of family life, the right to property, freedom of movement and residence, the right to leave one’s country and return, the right to privacy, the right to personal freedom and security, freedom from slavery and servitude, freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment, the right to a fair trial, the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to rest and leisure, the right to social security, the right to education, the right to participation in cultural life, access to public facilities and accommodations, and the right to a just social order.

The Abnegation of the Rule of Law

The grossest examples of breaches of the rule of law are found under two broad headings: (a) The so-called security laws, and (b) the complex laws enforcing racial discrimination and segregation.

The security laws create broad political offenses; enforce savage compulsory long-term punishments; permit incommunicado police detention without recourse to court, counsel, clergy, family, or friend; make severe inroads into the ordinary rules of criminal procedure and evidence with the aim of assisting the prosecution; and permit arbitrary restrictions to be placed on individuals confining them to limited areas, preventing their contact with their fellows, and severely limiting their communication and social intercourse.

The infamous Terrorism Act is the most wide ranging of these “security laws.” It creates the crime of “participation in terrorist activities” which is defined as “any act” charged by the prosecution. The onus is then on the defendant to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he did not intend any of a long list of “results,” in order to escape conviction. The results include “embarrassing the administration of the affairs of state,” causing any person substantial financial loss, obstructing the free movement of traffic, and the furthering of the achievement of “any political aim.” Since any act of a political nature is by definition designed to further a political aim, there is no limit on the state’s right to prosecute its political opponents under this statute.

The death penalty is a permissible verdict, and upon conviction, a minimum sentence of 5 years is mandatory. (None of this 5-year period may be suspended.)

The defense of double jeopardy is denied under the act, and the statute authorizes the venue of a trial as any locality the prosecutor selects.

Most provisions of the act are ex post facto in application, being retrospective to 1962; that is to say, 5 years prior to its enactment in 1967. Broad powers of joinder of charges and defendants, and admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence, are conferred on the prosecutor.

Section 6 of the act empowers the police to hold persons incommunicado indefinitely for interrogation. Access to priests or clergy, to counsel, to friends, and even to the courts, is forbidden; and no one is entitled to any information regarding the detainee. Even a wife is not entitled to know if, in fact, her husband is being detained. And, this heinous law is the most frequently used of the detention statutes presently in force. The only form of relief that the courts have been prepared to entertain regarding detainees is an injunction against maltreatment (the Mbindi case). However, the detainee remains in close confinement, and the court is powerless to order his being brought before it.

The defendants in the first Terrorism Act trial, State v. Tuhadeleni, were 37 Namibians. They were tried in Pretoria, 1,000 miles away from their homes. These persons were arrested in 1966, held incommunicado without access to family, friends, or lawyers, without charge. Only 1 day after the Terrorism Act was promulgated on June 21, 1967, they were charged under the act for alleged offenses committed before the act. This case was subsequent to the action of the U.N. General Assembly in October 1966 of terminating the mandate of South Africa in Namibia. The Terrorism Act was condemned universally and by the United Nations in UNGA Res. 2324, SCRes 245 and 246, and many other resolutions. The statement of the defendant, Toivo Herman Ja Toivo, is included in the appendix. (See further the report of the Observer of the International Commission of Jurists, Prof. Richard Falk, "The State v. Tuhadeleni and Others," in the ICJ document "The Erosion of Law in South Africa," 1968, pp. 40–54.)

A series of laws enacted prior to the Terrorism Act also confer powers on the Government to prosecute its political opponents. Chief amongst these is the Suppression of Communism Act, 1950 (amended on numerous occasions) which made it a crime to advocate economic and social change, providing only some legal infraction (however minor) was involved.

The Suppression of Communism Act, when read with the Unlawful Organizations Act, 1960, made membership of any organization decreed unlawful a severe crime, carrying a requisite minimum prison sentence. Under the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1953, the breaking of any laws by way of protest could earn a lengthy imprisonment sentence and also a physical whipping. The Sabotage Act of 1962 created a broadly defined crime of sabotage, placed burdensome onus of proof on the defendant, and also carried a minimum sentence of 5 years.
Protracted political trials have become a commonplace feature of South African legal enforcement. The recent trial of the Dean of Johannesburg on charges under the Terrorism Act, extended over 4 months, culminating in a 5-year prison sentence. But following a protracted appeal heard by South Africa’s highest appeal court, the conviction was reversed.

The marathon trial at Pietermaritzburg of the 13 members of the Unity Movement of South Africa, which commenced in August 1971, and which the study mission attended, continued until April 1972 when the defendants were found guilty. The trial had been punctuated with accounts of police maltreatment, prolonged solitary confinement and torture leading to the death of one detainee (a 68-year-old peasant) and an attempted suicide.

In the African areas or homelands, the Government retains its long-standing powers to rule by decree. Under various proclamations and regulations, meetings of more than 10 persons are prohibited in these areas subject to severe penalties, and there are wide powers of detention available in the Transkei under Proclamation 400 of 1960. This proclamation, like section 6 of the Terrorism Act, empowers indefinite detention for interrogation. But the minimal provision as to possible visits by a magistrate which appears in the Terrorism Act is excluded in the case of this proclamation. (In the Pietermaritzburg trial there was evidence of the operation of a forest camp in Pondoland at which detainees under this proclamation were subjected to prolonged maltreatment at the hands of the security police.)

Also under the laws applicable to African areas, the regime exercises powers of banishment against Africans in rural areas. Under these provisions many persons have been exiled for years to bleak regions remote from their homes. (In 1969 at least 21 persons were still subject to these banishment orders which had been in force for varying periods of up to 18 years in individual cases.)

The various racial residence and labor control laws breach the rule of law in a multitude of respects.

The Group Areas Acts compel each and all “non-white” groups to live in demarcated areas. Together with the job reservation laws, these statutes restrict employment categories, and make it a crime to work in a nonpermitted sphere of employment.

The various laws applicable specifically to Africans—particularly the Bantu (Urban) Areas Act, the Bantu Labour Regulation Act, the Bantu Land and Trust Act—with their numerous and frequent amendments—control every part of a black person’s life. He cannot be in or take up employment in an urban area without official permission; his employment is controlled through a labor bureau; unless he has approved employment he cannot live in the segregated urban townships and loss of employment usually carries with it loss of his home and his right to be in the urban area. Loss of the right to be in an urban area leads to “endorsement out” of the person concerned, that is forcible repatriation to a Government-selected Bantustan “homeland” which may be a region utterly foreign to the “endorsed” person.
The Pass Laws

The cornerstone of apartheid is the system of pass laws which require every African over the age of 16 to carry with him at all times a "passbook." Should an African worker during his lunch period go out on the street and forget his pass, he might be apprehended, charged and convicted and sent off for a period of punishment. Should an African's pass not be perfect in the requisite myriad of little details, including technical ones, he is guilty of an offense. So rigorously and uncompromisingly are the pass laws enforced that thousands of blacks are arrested every day for breaches of the pass laws. One million seven hundred and seventy thousand, six hundred and sixty-six Africans were arrested in 1970, that is 2,500 Africans a day, each day, for forgetting to carry their passes. (From the testimony of Joel Carlson before the Subcommittee on Africa, June 16, 1971.) The Bantu Commissioner's Court dispenses the law with respect to the requirement that the African must carry passes and hears the cases of the African brought before him. But, the sheer numbers arrested indicates the second or two available, per case.

A pass must carry official endorsements that the African is in approved current employment, that he has paid all his taxes, and that he has permission to be in the area concerned, as well as many other details. The records for enforcing the pass laws are now allegedly computerized on IBM computers. Up to 1964 and the passage of the Bantu Laws Amendment Act, the black woman did not have to carry a pass; but now there is a total embargo on entry of African women into the urban area.

Migratory Labor Policy

Unless he has a right to remain in the area, the African must live in hostels in the urban centers. He cannot change his category of work. If an African asks for more wages, he is sent home. The migratory labor policy and the legal disabilities imposed on black residence in the towns, except on a temporary basis, is one of the most critical issues confronting the society, not only for its immorality and inhumanity but because of the implicit economic considerations.

Informers

One of the most vicious aspects of life in South Africa is the omnipresent special branch with its security informer network which penetrates all groups, black or white, who oppose or might oppose the Government.

Persons in detention.

There is a large number of Africans and Coloureds and whites who are in detention as a result of trials of the late 1950's and of the 1960's. Many are Africans; but some are white, such as Bram Fisher, who was sentenced during the treason trials of 1957. Some are Coloured, such as Eddie Daniels; Mr. Daniels' brother is one of the Cape Town city councilors, with whom the study mission met. Eddie Daniels' words upon conviction for sabotage were:

All my life I have believed in fair play and in justice and in doing what I believed was the right thing to do * * * what
appalled me most were the cruel and humiliating conditions under which the nonwhites live in South Africa. I have seen the hardships caused by the apartheid laws. I know these things not only because I live there but also because I was brought up and I move amongst them there and I see the horror, the terror and the suffering. Such things as the reign of terror in the towns where decent hard-working folk are the prey of the "skolly"—thug—are merely one facet of apartheid. Apartheid affects the lives of the people in this land through the cruel, humiliating pass system, the wresting of people from their homes, the denying of employment, the mere pittance which the black old-age pensioner receives and the tearing apart of husband and wife—people married according to Christian rites, in a Christian church in a Christian country. I felt it was my duty to protest against these laws.

Long-term political prisoners on Robben Island had been entitled to take education courses up to degree level, through the efforts of various voluntary organizations. Recently, however, this facility has been taken away from several of the prisoners, including Nelson Mandela, former leader of the African National Congress (ANC) and Toivo Ja Toivo, leader of SWAPO, and Eddie Daniels.

In the fall of 1971 a number of arrests and detentions took place which gave rise to widespread protest. Among those still detained are a large number of Indians, many of them students. Several churchmen were questioned and their houses searched, as were a number of journalists and editors, students—especially officers of the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS)—and academies. Organizations whose offices were raided included two theological colleges, the Charles Johnson Memorial Hospital at Nqutu, Zululand, NUSAS, the Port Elizabeth Evening Post, the South African Students' Organization (SASO), and the Natal Indian College.

During the raids of October 22, 46 or 47 persons appear to have been detained; one student, Ahmed Timol, died in detention and another, Mohammed Salim Essop, a medical student, was hospitalized during detention. (The detainee's father instituted proceedings; and the Pretoria Supreme Court has confirmed an order restraining the security police from assaulting, unlawfully interrogating, and applying undue pressure on Essop. The commissioner of police has announced that this ruling will be appealed.) About 23 of the detainees have been released, 16 without any charge, of whom 10 appear to be held in solitary confinement. Efforts by parliamentarians to get the names of those persons being held were rejected by the police as "not in the public interest."

This wave of arrests and harassment is part of a general tightening of control over all liberation groups and research centers on apartheid. Threats have been made by Afrikaner politicians against the English-language press. If the press were silenced further, it would be a very serious loss to freedom of speech in South Africa. A parliamentary select committee has been appointed to examine the Institute of Race Relations, Christian Institute, University Christian Move-

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14 Unit on Apartheid Document, "Eddie Daniels," November 1971. Mr. Daniels has served 7 of his 15-year term of imprisonment.
ment and NUSAS, all long-standing and highly respected organizations doing invaluable work in the fields of development, education, research, and church affairs.

The trial of the Anglican Dean

On November 1, 1971, the Very Rev. G. R. ffrench-Beytagh, dean of the Anglican Cathedral of Johannesburg, was convicted of violations of the Terrorism Act and sentenced to imprisonment for 5 years, the minimum sentence under the act. The allegations related mainly to acts of charity by the dean and his colleagues, in the form of aid to the families of political prisoners. The dean's arrest was connected with a series of coordinated police raids on liberal and opposition organizations and churches, in the spring of 1971. The evidence used by the prosecution relied heavily on police spies, who had asked for help from the Dean or pretended to be interested in joining the Anglican Church. A great deal of detailed information was also produced about the activities of individuals and organizations in London, showing that the South Africans have a very strong intelligence network there, as well as in other western capitals.

The observer for the International Commission of Jurists, Amnesty International and the U.S. National Council of Churches, Rev. E. Lockwood—himself a lawyer—has reported that some of the evidence was fabricated, that the major charge of receiving money from the banned defense and aid fund remained unproved, and that the dean's major crime was, in fact, his Christian work of helping the poor and the imprisoned. The outstanding feature of this and other trials under the Terrorism Act is that the accused is deemed guilty unless he can prove his innocence. Repeated mistakes and contradictions of the witnesses though pointed out by the defense had no effect on the judge's verdict.

The study mission regretted that, because of time limitations, it was not able to visit the trial which was in progress at the time.

The Terrorism Act trial at Pietermaritzburg

In order to help focus the attention of the world on them and to see first-hand the continued trials under this universally-condemned act by the South African Government, the study mission attended the trial of the 13 members of the unity movement at Pietermaritzburg. The Unity Movement is a resistance movement in South Africa. The indictment charges that the 13 defendants assisted a recruiting drive conducted by leaders of the Non-European Unity Movement from its base in Zambia.

The significance of the trial is partially shown by the fact that the defendants represent all of the nonwhite groups in South Africa, all walks of life, and all ages. There were 10 Africans, two Coloureds, and two Indians. "The 13 faceless accused in the Pietermaritzburg trial represent the struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa for freedom. By its very nature it is a struggle against all forms of racism, whether it goes by the name of segregation, apartheid, development along their own lines; Bantustans (for Africans) or any other stans."


See appendix for New York Times editorial on this case.
Not only did the defendants represent all of the black people of South Africa, but they came from all walks of life. There were “three building workers, two peasants, one schoolteacher, bookkeeper, four clerks, two attorneys, and one student (an article clerk).” In age, they ranged from 31 to 65 years. (See “Letter dated July 14, 1971 from the wives of the accused addressed to the Secretary-General,” Unit on Apartheid, Background Notes No. 34, July 26, 1971).

Reverend Lockwood, the International Court of Justice observer for this trial, as well as the dean’s trial, reported that the trial illustrates the new weapons given to the prosecution by the Terrorism Act. The defense has no knowledge in advance of what the State witnesses say. There is no summary pretrial. The list of witnesses is secret, and all the important ones have been held incommunicado for some time. Some are still held even after testifying. They have no access to lawyers or the outside world. There is no right of habeas corpus. Questioning by police alternates with solitary confinement until a satisfactory statement is obtained, and every care is taken to ensure that the witness repeats the right formula at the trial, with the police inquisitors keeping close watch throughout.

In two cases during the Pietermaritzburg trial, the system has broken down. Jonathan Beyneveldt, 19 years old, differed from his written statement. Under cross-examination, he revealed that in his initial questioning, the police had shouted at him for an hour, and the sergeant in charge, “Spyker” Van Wyk (linked with the death of the Imam Haron in 1970) struck him across the face so hard that his hearing was affected. He was threatened with indefinite detention. As he left the witness box, Beyneveldt was seized and later charged with perjury.

Another witness, named Isaacs, was threatened by the police in the corridor of the court when his evidence seemed to be unsatisfactory to them. Even the defense lawyers were threatened, as was a newspaper reporter who published a witness testimony about 5 months’ solitary confinement. Other testimony illustrates the fact that South African police had acted as if Botswana was its own territory. One witness, a Botswana citizen, had been arrested in South Africa, and his wife seized at her home in Botswana and told to make a statement.

A number of witnesses testified about the appalling conditions at the Mtonsasa police station in Pondoland, Transkei. At a nearby police camp there was alleged to be frequent torture, and Mr. Mtayeni Cutshela, an elderly man from Pondoland, died in mysterious circumstances at the camp. The Unity Movement has commented, “His murder will not go unavenged.”

This trial is of crucial importance, but every official effort has been made to minimize publicity. For example, it was scheduled to start on the same day as the dean’s trial, which since it involved a white man was bound to attract all the publicity. The case is a very complicated one, involving witnesses from all over South Africa and beyond. It also reveals something of the extent of unrest in the Transkei, especially in Pondoland, a fiercely independent area where there were uprisings when the Transkei was first launched. Information emerging from the trial also confirms the suspicion that the South African authorities operate completely freely in the supposedly independent
While the United States has supported some U.N. resolutions which urge the Portuguese to grant self-determination to the people of its African colonies, the United States has continued economic and military support of Portugal. American military and economic assistance acts as a psychological if not fiscal lifebuoy to an economy weighted down by the expenditure of roughly one-half of its national budget on defense. Portugal's major military expenditures relate to the defense of its African territories. Under the U.S. arms embargo policy, Portugal is required to give assurance that American equipment transferred to Portugal through NATO arrangements or the military assistance program or sold to Portuguese buyers will not be used in Africa. However, reports persist that liberation groups are being suppressed by weapons of American origin found in Portuguese Africa. Although these may be weapons of World War II and Korean War vintage which are available on the world arms market and beyond U.S. Government control, it should be noted that the Canadian Government (also a NATO ally of Portugal), has been unwilling to take the chance that the Portuguese might violate their pledge not to use NATO supplied equipment in Africa and consequently has terminated military assistance to Portugal.

In 1970 the U.S. Government approved the private sale of two Boeing 707's to the Portuguese Government. The cover story that these were sold to the Portuguese Directorate General of Civil Aviation cannot obscure the fact that these planes are long-range aircraft to be used by the Portuguese Government for the transport of troops to and from the so-called Portuguese territories in Africa. This sale of planes represents a significant relaxation of the U.S. 1961 embargo against the sale of arms to Portugal for use in Africa.

There is little on the public record which indicates that the United States has ever made a conscientious use of its power and influence to bring an end to the colonial era in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. Surely, it is not because imaginative and practical policy options are not available. During the subcommittee's hearings on "U.S. Policy Toward Africa in the 1970's," a number of witnesses made worthwhile proposals for new policy positions toward Portugal and its African territories. The adoption of any one of the following policy options would add credibility to the U.S. claim to support of anti-colonialism:

1. Develop a program of educational assistance to Africans in the Portuguese territories in order to increase their readiness for independence.
2. Impose stricter controls over the export to Portugal of military equipment or equipment which could be used for military purposes.
3. Encourage the United Nations Secretary-General and high administration officials to visit the Portuguese African territories as part of a campaign to increase international pressure of Portugal to relinquish its colonies.

If American policy in Africa truly supports the final eradication of colonialism from that continent, the United States cannot engage in the wishful thinking that independence will eventually come to the
The Banning Laws

Of the security laws of South Africa, that statute permitting the Government to place any person under house arrest or banning orders is the most despotic.

The Suppression of Communism Act and the Riotous Assemblies Act (originally passed in 1914 and amended on many occasions since then) have given the regime virtually unfettered powers to silence opposition by banning people, prohibiting publications, and outlawing meetings, processions, and the like. These prohibitional orders are not subject to court review. Powers include restrictions of persons to any place, extending even to house arrests (and including 24-hour confinement to a small apartment); prevention of attendance at any gatherings (which gatherings are defined to include meetings of two or more persons); barring of entry to various public places, including any court (unless the prohibited person is required to attend court as a summoned witness or party); barring of entry to libraries, theaters, factories (also widely defined), and many other designated areas and places.

In addition, banned persons are usually ordered to report at specified intervals to designated police stations, and failure to report strictly on time earns a mandatory prison sentence. Also, no banned person can communicate with any other banned person, or with anyone whose name appears on any list of members of an outlawed organization. (Banned husbands and wives have had to obtain special permission in order to even speak to each other.) Any violation of prohibitions on meetings or communications is a criminal offense punishable, upon conviction, by imprisonment. A banned person is silenced even unto his grave. For example, Chief Luthuli, President-General of the banned ANC cannot be quoted in South Africa even now, several years after his death. (See p. 404 of the appendix.)

Banning orders have been issued against "Africans as well as whites, Indians, and Coloureds; men and women; doctors, lawyers, teachers, students, priests, workers, writers, and members of other professions; and a considerable number of trade unionists. They include many officers of organizations such as the South African Indian Congress, the Coloured People's Congress, and the South African Congress of Trade Unions, which were paralyzed by the banning orders, though the organizations themselves, unlike the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress, were not banned." (Unit on apartheid document No. 34/71, "Banning Orders Against Opponents of Apartheid in South Africa," August 1971, p. 1.) The United Nations, which has repeatedly condemned banning, requested the Secretary-General in 1968 to establish a register of banned persons. (Ibid.)

For list of persons banned, see "Address List of South Africans Banned and Banished for Opposition to Apartheid and of Families of Political Prisoners," Unit on Apartheid, November 1971.
The study mission deeply regretted its inability to meet with certain persons who are banned.

The Mandelas

The study mission was not able to see Winnie Mandela, the courageous wife of the African leader, Nelson Mandela, who is serving a life sentence on Robben Island. Both she and her husband, Nelson Mandela, a former lawyer, have long been heroes of the people.

In 1952, the African National Congress and the South African Indian Congress launched a "campaign of defiance against unjust laws." The movement was in protest of a number of discriminatory laws passed by the Nationalists, specifically, the "Pass Laws, Stock Limitation, the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, the Group Areas Act of 1950, the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 and the Voters' Act of 1951." It was scheduled to be held on April 6, 1952, the 300th anniversary of the landing of Jan Van Riebeck in the Cape. Nelson Mandela was "national volunteer-in-chief." During the campaign, which lasted until early 1963, more than 8,000 persons were arrested for violation of "pass laws, apartheid regulations at railway stations and post offices, and the curfew regulations." The volunteers "offered no defense and chose to go to jail rather than pay fines. Prisons in several urban centers became overcrowded." Drastic repressive legislation was enacted by the Government and the campaign was suspended. (Unit on Apartheid document "The Defiance Campaign of 1952," January 1972. See also, Horrell, "Action, Reaction and Counteraction," 1971, pp. 22-25.)

Mandela was the honorary secretary of the National Action Council. This council was formed after the banning of the ANC and PAC pursuant to the passage of the Unlawful Organizations Act of 1960, and, in anticipation of May 31, the date for South Africa to become a republic, the council called for "a time of active protest, demonstration and organization" against a "Verwoerd Republic." The Government issued a warrant for Mandela's arrest.

In 16 months of evading arrest, he became known as the "black pimpernel". In August 1966, he was arrested and sentenced to 5 years imprisonment. (Horrell, op. cit., p. 49.) In the Rivonia trial of 1963 of alleged members of "the Spear of the Nation"—the Umkonto we Sizwe, the military branch of the ANC—Mandela was sentenced to life imprisonment. (Ibid., pp. 52, 53, 80, and 81.) (Abram Fisher, who was counsel for the defense, was charged the next year and after skipping bail, and a long period of evasion of the police, he was subsequently tried and sentenced to life imprisonment.) (Ibid., p. 84).

The South African Government banned Winnie Mandela after she had been found innocent of all charges by the courts. She and her codefendants in State v. Ndou had been detained for 7 months under section 6 of the Terrorism Act. She and her codefendants were then charged under the Suppression of Communism Act and 4 months later were brought to trial. The defendants were acquitted of all of the charges. As they were joyously leaving the court, they were re-arrested under the Terrorism Act. Following "nationwide protests," they were finally charged 5 months later under the Terrorism Act and 3 months later—after some 431 days in jail—were acquitted. Then, upon their release, the Government placed Winnie Mandela under

Robert Sobukwe

Nor was the study mission able to meet with Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe, the president of the Pan African Congress, who initiated the antipass campaign in 1960. Sobukwe, former professor of anthropology at the University of Witwatersrand, announced the campaign on March 18, 1960, with these words:

Let the world take note: We are not fighting against Europeans or Indians or Chinese. In short we’re fighting against nobody. Our energies and forces are directed against a setup, against a conception and a myth. This myth some call racial superiority; others call it herrenvolkism; others call it white leadership with justice, or white supremacy. We fight to destroy this myth, and we start on March 21 with the pass laws.

March 21, the day of the shooting to death of 68 Africans and the wounding of some 184 persons at Sharpeville is now commemorated by the United Nations as “International Day for the Elimination of Racialism and All Forms of Racial Discrimination.” At the trial, Sobukwe refused to plead to “unjust laws made exclusively by a white minority” and was sentenced for 3 years. (Unit on Apartheid Document “Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe;” January 1972.) After Sobukwe had served his 3 years imprisonment, he continued to be imprisoned for 6 more years on Robben Island under an act of parliament, a veritable legislative bill of attainder, annually renewed before the scheduled release date.

After his release, Sobukwe was placed under partial house arrest and banning orders. Sobukwe, who was a member of the faculty at the University of Witwatersrand before the Sharpeville incident, was offered a fellowship at the University of Wisconsin in the United States. The Minister of Interior granted him an exit permit to leave the country; but the Minister of Justice refused to relax the banning orders, so as to permit him to leave the area of confinement at Kimberley and go to the airport. His appeal to the courts was unsuccessful, the court holding that “the restrictions under the banning orders are equivalent to a court order of imprisonment” and dismissing his application for an order to the Minister of Justice to permit him to travel to Jan Smuts Airport for final departure. The Appellate Division upheld the decision of the lower court. (Ibid., p. 4). (A similar injustice has befallen the courageous Miss Shanti Naidoo, a witness in the trial of Winnie Mandela in State v. Ndou. See “Miss Shanti Naidoo Cannot Leave South Africa,” Unit on Apartheid Document No. 4/72, January 1972. Miss Naidoo had refused to give evidence against the defendants despite long and cruel interrogation during detention.)

Cosmas Desmond

Nor did the study mission see the Franciscan priest, Father Cosmas Desmond, author of the definitive treatise on the homelands, “The Discarded People.” He, too, was banned. Father Desmond assisted in
the making of the film, "The Dumping Grounds," which graphically reveals the barren and utterly deficient nutritional conditions in the homelands and the high incidence of kwashiorkor, the dread starvation disease, among the children.

Justice Moloto

Another person banned soon after Cosmas Desmond was Justice Moloto, the African president of the University Christian Movement (UCM). This was significant because the major area of concentration of the UCM, and of Justice Moloto himself, was community development in the homelands. Ambitious literacy programs had been worked out—although Chief Matanzima would not allow it in the Transkei—and careful surveys had been done on the needs of some resettlement camps. The banning of Justice Moloto was clearly calculated to destroy the programs, even though they were fully compatible with the stated Government policy of encouraging Africans to work out their own development in their own areas. Mr. Moloto is banned for 3 years, until September 1974.

Mewa Ramgobin

The most disheartening aftermath of the visit of the CODEL to South Africa came in learning of the imposition of new banning orders in September 1971, shortly after the study mission returned to the United States, by the South African Government against the Indian leader, Mewa Ramgobin. He is the husband of Mahatma Ghandi's granddaughter and a man of singular courage, a man who has exhibited exceptional leadership in the Indian community. The study mission met with him while in Durban at the visit to the Phoenix settlement and museum. This is a memorial to Mahatma Ghandi, who first began his civil resistance efforts in Natal in protest against the discriminatory measures being implemented at that time, the turn of the century, by the British against the Indians. The study mission met Ghandi's daughter as well as his granddaughter and her husband, and commends the family which is a worthy successor to a man whose efforts for freedom and humanity are revered throughout the world. At the time of our visit, Mewa Ramgobin had only recently—in January or February of 1971—come out from under a 5-year banning order. During the few months of his freedom, he had been instrumental in coagulating the movement to revive the Indian National Congress, which, founded by Mahatma Ghandi as the Indian movement against racial repression, had since lapsed into a moribund state. Ramgobin had also been active in the protest on the occasion of the anniversary of Republic Day on May 31.

Some of the restrictions imposed on him under the new banning orders are:

He is not allowed to receive any visitors at his house except his mother, mother-in-law, and his brothers and sisters. He is not allowed to be absent from his residence on Sundays and public holidays; on Saturdays he cannot be absent from his residence except during the hours of 7 a.m. and 5 p.m. On other days he cannot leave his residence between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m.
He cannot attend any social gatherings and he cannot belong to any political organization.
He cannot give educational instruction to any person except his children.
He cannot enter the premises of any factory or educational institution.
He cannot publish or assist in the publication of any books, magazines, or articles.
He cannot enter any African area.

It was the position of some that Ramgobin would have incurred the disfavor of the Government for his other activities, but that his having facilitated the visit of the study mission to the sugar plantations and to the squatters villages might have been the determinative factor in the decision of the Government to impose the new banning order. Congressman Diggs has taken the position in a communication to the Department of State that, where a person has been active in facilitating the visit of a U.S. official and is shortly thereafter subjected to banning orders—whether or not this facilitation of the visit is a factor in the decision of the South African Government to take action against him—some word of deprecation of such action should be communicated to the South African Government. It would seem that a policy of communication, logically pursued, would require a formal communication of the U.S. Government in such instance inasmuch as (1) banning is a lawless act of peremptory governmental authority and totally inconsistent with all precepts of the orderly administration of justice, and (2) banning is a violation of South Africa's international legal obligations under articles 55 and 56 of the Charter, and (3) the United States, itself, has affirmative obligations under the same articles of the Charter in regard to taking action to promote respect and observance for human rights, and (4) notwithstanding its many actions which would indicate otherwise, the South African Government is sensitive to the opprobrium of Western states and particularly that of the United States, and (5) a policy of communication is only meaningful where it includes frank communication in those areas which underscore our concern over the repressive laws of South Africa.

No formal U.S. Government protest, however, has been made.

The Military Situation

In South Africa the African is not permitted to serve in the military nor to receive any type of training which might be relevant for military application. Chief Buthelezi of Zululand recently suggested that, as part of the official Government homelands policy, the African areas should be given responsibility for their own defense against the "terrorist" threat, and that this would take some of the weight off the whites. His suggestion was not well received.

Extreme secrecy is maintained about all military operations and installations, and the press and other media are forbidden even to discuss military matters. This extends also to the enormous secret police apparatus, the Bureau of State Security (popularly known as BOSS); it has virtually unlimited powers over all sections of the
population, and its budget is very large, although mainly concealed in other items.

Total South African budget estimates for defense increased from R40m. in 1959-60 to R271.6m. in 1969-70. (Estimates of Expenditure from Revenue Account.) South Africa now possesses military equipment, much of it from Western countries, including the United States, worth over 2,000,000,000 rand (or $2,960,000,000; two billion nine-hundred and sixty million dollars). (Statement by Commandant-General R. C. Hiemstra in July 1969; quoted in South African Digest, Pretoria, July 25, 1969.)

The strength of South Africa's Defense Force, including the average number of members of the citizen force (the conscript army) who are under military training, is estimated at 39,700, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Regular</th>
<th>Citizen force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td>5,700</td>
<td>22,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>13,200</td>
<td>26,500</td>
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When fully mobilized, South Africa's armed forces (including men who have completed citizen force training) would total 85,500. In addition, there are about 58,000 commandos or part-time militia. (Estimates by the Institute of Strategic Studies, London, in "The Military Balance," reported in The Star, Johannesburg, September 12, 1969.)

This makes South Africa by far the predominant military power in southern Africa. South African forces are operating fairly extensively, although often secretly or in the guise of police, in collaboration with the Portuguese colonial army in Angola and Mozambique; with Rhodesian forces in Zimbabwe, in Malawi, and in the international territory of Namibia, which the international mandate decrees should not be militarized, and which South Africa is occupying illegally. There is also an extensive network of intelligence agents throughout Africa, as well as in London, New York, and other centers of public opinion pressure against the South African regime. Recent investigations in London have revealed a complex network of intelligence activities, often penetrating British Government institutions.

**THE COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA**

**The Press**

In South Africa there is an English press, an Afrikaner press, newspapers for the black readership, those for Indian and those for the Coloured readership. There are no black newspapers as we know them here in the States; there are black papers, but they are white-owned and subject to white decisions as to editorial policy.

A significant feature of the South African society is its "free press." This is particularly notable among the English newspapers which are generally quite expressive of criticism of Government policies, particularly of petty apartheid. The newspapers constantly challenge the Government with respect to implementation of their policy of separate development for the blacks as well as the Coloureds.
The laws do, however, place some severe restrictions on the press under various legislation such as: The Riotous Assemblies Act of 1930, as amended, prohibiting “the engendering of feelings of hostility between the European and non-European”; section 6, et seq., of the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, as amended, which prohibits certain publications; section 10 of the General Law Amendment Act of 1969 (popularly known as the Boss Act, as it enlarged the powers of the Bureau of State Security) which limited publication or dissemination of information about any matter relating to the security of the Republic, including any matter dealt with, by, or relating to, the Bureau of State Security or to the relationship between this bureau and any person.

In 1969 the Rand Daily Mail editor, Lawrence Gandar, and writer, Benjamin Pogrund, were indicted, tried, and found guilty of publishing inaccurate information about torture and treatment of prisoners. The basis for the newspaper articles was sworn affidavits. The evidence on which the conviction was founded was obtained by the jury’s being taken to witness the place where the affiant had said he stood when he watched certain alleged atrocities by the prison authorities and jailers. The jury observed a wall interfering completely with such vision and as a result found the defendants guilty. Later investigation, however, showed that the wall had been erected subsequently to the publishing of the articles and the giving of the affidavit. Lawrence Gandar left South Africa, while Benjamin Pogrund remained, and is now night editor of the Rand Daily Mail. He had been personally threatened by members of the security police, and has faced serious charges in connection with his research into banned organizations.

Television

South Africa is one of the few countries in the world whose citizens could not view the landing on the moon. The basic reason for the reluctance of the South African Government to permit television was a fear of bringing in outside ideas. A second objection was technical and arose from the mechanical difficulties of producing two sets of television—one which would be capable of picking up the stations designated for European listeners and, conversely, another which could only pick up stations and programs designed for non-European listeners. As a result of the clamor arising out of South Africa’s inability to witness the moon landing, the Government has reconsidered its opposition to television. An effort has been underway for some time to bridge the technical hurdles for such special production; and the South African Government has been engaged in dubbing in Afrikaans and a number of old movies in preparation for television broadcasting. Nationally broadcast television was very recently approved for installation by 1975.

Radio

The radio is Government-controlled. It is the SABC (South African Broadcasting Corporation). There are separate stations, for white and the black audiences. As an indication of the propagandistic type of material carried by the station, the study mission was informed
that the radio station for the blacks advertised the resettlement camps, such as the one at Dimbaza, as pleasant places to go, and encouraged resettlement in these desolate areas.

Books

The writings of hundreds of prominent leaders of the African people in South Africa, as well as intellectuals, poets, and creative writers, are banned under the Suppression of Communism Act. If the Government dislikes the writings of any individual inside or outside South Africa, it can simply put him or her on the banned list. Innumerable journals, newspapers—either whole titles or individual numbers—have been censored in this way.

The total number of banned publications was estimated in 1969 at 13,000. Among them are of course hundreds of publications which uphold racial equality, many of them written in the United States or Western Europe. Among the banned authors are James Baldwin, Berthold Brecht, Franz Fanon, Joseph Heller, Kenneth Kaunda, Le Roi Jones, Allard Lowenstein, Francoise Sagan and many others.

The Church

In South Africa, the church consists largely of the Dutch Reformed church, to which Afrikaners belong, the English churches, and the independent religions of the Africans and Indian community. The Afrikaans churches, the Dutch Reformed churches, give moral and religious sanctions to a doctrinal base for apartheid. As the heresy trial of the early sixties showed, however, there are a few dissidents in the Afrikaner churches, who question its principles.

The Christian church is in danger of becoming sterile to a great number of Africans as its relevance to their problems of social, economic, political and legal inequities and repression is not clear. A growing disenchantment with the practices of the Christian church was noted. There have been very many break-away groups of Africans from the white-dominated churches; this constitutes a major threat to their traditional authority. Apart from expressing their desire for churches that answer their own needs, these African churches provide the only forum for the development of organizational and leadership talent.

The established churches are slowly being forced by their concerned members and non-white members' defection to abandon their historical support for white supremacy; and this is a major reason for their emerging confrontation with the State.

In an "Open Letter to South Africans" of July 1971, concerned South African clergymen raised the question of many the parallels between Nazi Germany and South Africa, and they presented for consideration a comprehensive analysis of many facets of South African society and government.

It is out of the dissidents of the Dutch Reformed Church that the Christian Institute has come. The study mission met with some of its leaders who publicly work to get the facts on apartheid and to

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17 For a selected list of publications banned, see "Books Banned in South Africa," Unit on Apartheid, March 1971.
ameliorate the situation. The Institute issues the Pro Veritate publication. Ever since its founding in 1963, the Institute has been subjected to increasing abuse and harassment.

The English churches cooperate in the South African Council of Churches. The Council and the Christian Institute have cooperated in the study project on Christianity in apartheid society (SPRO-CAS) and they are responsible for the SPRO-CAS publications.

Of the 14 American citizens, including four minor dependents, who were deported or required by the Government of South Africa to leave South Africa in the early part of 1971, eight were directly connected with church work. Similar action—deportation—was taken against two British ministers; and three British subjects traveling on World Council of Churches business were denied entry into the Republic. The trial of the Anglican Dean of Johannesburg followed arrest and detention without access to legal counsel, family or friends. During the same period there were country-wide searches of the offices of numerous individuals and religious organizations. Many of the searches, arrests and requirements to leave South Africa appeared to be related to the sharp South African Government reaction to the World Council of Churches decision in September 1970 to provide financial assistance for educational and other non-military purposes to the liberation movements of southern Africa.

In the United Nations, the General Assembly Resolution 2764 of November 9, 1971, expressed inter alia "grave indignation and concern" over the maltreatment and torture of opponents of apartheid and, "noting the recent deportations, bannings, detentions and trials of a number of religious leaders in South Africa for their opposition to apartheid and assistance to victims of that inhuman policy, 'urged' all religious organizations to continue and intensify their efforts for the elimination of apartheid and racial discrimination."

The Secretary-General's statement of November 9, 1971, expressed his grave concern "over the continued persecution and harassment of opponents of apartheid in South Africa, including a number of religious leaders and on the reports of maltreatment of detainees leading to the deaths of several persons." (Unit on Apartheid Document "United Nations General Assembly Calls for World-Wide Campaign Against Repression in South Africa," November 1971).

U.S. Government Activities in South Africa

President Nixon has stated the U.S. position on apartheid:

Clearly there is no question of the United States condoning, or acquiescing in, the racial policies of the white-ruled regimes. For moral as well as historical reasons, the United States stands firmly for the principles of racial equality and self-determination. (The President's Foreign Policy Report to the Congress of February 18, 1970, Department of State Bulletin of March 9, 1970.)

The Secretary of State has further stated:

Yet the modern world demands a community of nations based on respect for fundamental human rights. These are
not only moral and legal principles; they are powerful and ultimately irresistible political and historical forces. We take our stand on the side of those forces of fundamental human rights in southern Africa as we do at home and elsewhere. (Department of State Bulletin of Apr. 20, 1970.)

With reference to the policy of the U.S. Government toward South Africa, the study mission was asked by blacks in South Africa “how do you explain the dichotomy of attitude between the statements of abhorrence of apartheid and U.S. actions, in support of the South African Government?”

U.S. Diplomatic Posts

Until recently it has been the policy of the U.S. Government not to assign black foreign service officers to any U.S. posts in South Africa, a country where the vast majority of the people are not white.* Also as a matter of official policy black U.S. staff personnel are not assigned to U.S. posts in South Africa.

In a country where 83 percent of the people are not white, such a policy is sheer folly. Black foreign service officers at all levels and black staff should be assigned to the embassy and consular posts. There are one or two non-white local employees at our post in Cape Town and at Johannesburg.

U.S. Information Service offices are located in the white cities; there are none in the black townships. It is to be noted that Soweto has a population of at least three-fourths of a million people. A U.S. Information Service office should be opened in Soweto and in other large black communities.

The formal statement on the educational and cultural program should be revised. The main emphasis should be stated to be on the majority of South Africa. Such programs should be supportive of liberal whites. It is vital that the U.S. cultural programs be targeted on the majority of South Africa and on the minority elements working for change. U.S. policy, as presently stated, of focusing on opinion moulders—that is, Government leaders—is not an enlightened one. There are white people in South Africa—a few of whom we met—who believe in the humanity of man and who actively oppose apartheid. As one put it, “we only pray that there will be time for our efforts, to eradicate the evils of racism, to bear fruit.” The customary demarcation of the English as liberal and the Afrikaner as rigidly conservative has its exceptions. Neither the English-speaking white, nor the Afrikaner, is a monolithic group. The study mission met with an Afrikaner, whose people had been in South Africa since 1670, who is working wholeheartedly for enlightened policies.

Sports presents another area for pressure. Concrete measures demonstrating to the South African Government that discrimination in sports is not acceptable can have an impact, since the South African is a devotee of sports.

*See letter of August 2, 1972, of Congressman Diggs to the Secretary of State, p. 406 of the appendix.
Portuguese territories via the slow passage of time. Portugal, for economic and political reasons, considers the retention of these territories a necessity. Africans in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau want independence now.

The economic assistance available to Portugal under the December 1971 Azores Agreement represents an enormous, unprecedented and anomalous commitment to Portugal. (See Recommendation No. 55 of the Action Manifesto, page 189.)

II. MINORITY RULE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

The problem of southern Africa presents the greatest challenge to American foreign policy in Africa. Southern Africa is a tinderbox which could at any time be sparked into flames. The respected Prime Minister of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, has repeatedly warned that a racial holocaust is imminent in southern Africa unless the tide of discrimination and oppression is reversed. Moral indignation is rising throughout the world against the racism in this region. Before our Subcommittee on Africa, Waldemar Nielsen, an outstanding American Africanist, predicted:

* * * once this Vietnam catastrophe is somehow throttled or reduced, . . . Africa and particularly South Africa is going to become the next natural focus of idealism and passion and the commitment of the rising generation in this country.

And, gentlemen, if the United States now does not begin to take a long-run perspective on these problems of South Africa, we are going to reap a harvest of bitterness and division and disorder in our own national life, in the next ten years, that is going to make the Vietnam protest . . . look like a picnic.

The growing protest over United States-South African relations among concerned Americans is mounting.

To assure future domestic and international peace the United States must now take policy positions with regard to southern Africa which will promote the cause of justice. These policy decisions must cease to perpetuate racism by support of the status quo.

Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)

Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa have offered an opportunity to hear a number of divergent views on policy problems related to Zimbabwe. The African members of the United Nations have expressed great concern in that body for several years about the continued existence of the illegal regime of Prime Minister Ian Smith. Members of the subcommittee’s study missions in Africa have discussed the problem of Zimbabwe with several African leaders.

Time has not tempered the course of the Smith regime. The constitution which the regime purported to implement in June 1969 did not offer hope for racial equality in Zimbabwe. The passage of apartheid-type laws such as the Land Tenure Act represents attempts to solidify the control of the minority regime of Ian Smith.

In March 1970 the U.S. Government wisely withdrew its Consulate from Salisbury. This action should clearly demonstrate that the U.S.
That South Africa responds to pressure in the sports milieu has only recently been reaffirmed in the visit of Lee Elder to play golf in South Africa upon the invitation of Gary Player, after the latter had experienced considerable difficulty in the United States as a result of South Africa’s closed policy on sports.

*The NASA tracking stations in South Africa*

The trip to the NASA tracking station represented one of the emotional experiences of the visit to South Africa, for there in a U.S. Government facility were all the trappings and marks of South African society. In short, we found apartheid at the NASA tracking station.

Pursuant to a bilateral agreement of 1961, the National Aeronautics Scientific and Industrial Research through a South African agency designated by the South African Government—namely, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), and a U.S. agency designated by the U.S. Government, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) of California, operates the Deep Space Instrumentation Facility and the Space Tracking and Data Acquisition Network (adjoining stations near Johannesburg), and an Optical Tracking Station at Olifantsfontein, South Africa. These stations are on a tract of land owned by the South Africans.

The stations are manned completely by CSIR personnel, except for one American, an employee of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in California who is stationed in South Africa under the terms of the NASA/JPL contract. Additionally, there are frequent assignments of personnel to the stations on a short-term duration (averaging a month) of various technicians from NASA and related agencies.

The study mission visited the tracking stations in connection with the then current hearings of the subcommittee on “U.S. Business Involvement in Southern Africa,” including both public and private involvement. The objective was to observe the practices and policies of the U.S. Government where it operates as an enterprise in South Africa. Racial distinctions with respect to all aspects of the operations of the station prevail. These are accompanied by an indifference which itself amounted to callousness. The employment pattern of the station consists of 61 blacks who perform menial work and 225 whites who are the technical staff.

The wage scales at the station are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salaries</td>
<td>$1,426,000</td>
<td>$57,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension</td>
<td>165,000</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment insurance</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>26,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19 TIAS 4562, 11 U.S.T. 2052.
20 Figures supplied by NASA during its testimony before the subcommittee on September 27, 1971.
Thus, the blacks who comprise 21 percent of the staff receive 4 percent of the salaries. The lowest paid whites ($1,596 per annum) receive three times as much as the lowest paid blacks ($533). But the highest paid whites ($12,369) make more than seven times the salary of the highest paid black ($1,655). Whites receive 120 days of sick leave at full pay plus 120 days at half pay whereas blacks ordinarily receive 12 days for up to 10 years service and 28 days for more than 10 years service. Similarly, blacks receive 10 or 15 working days vacation leave and whites between 31 to 39 calendar days. There is a life insurance scheme for whites, none for blacks.

The training facilities available for the employees at the station, and paid for by NASA, are also assigned only to the whites. Nor do the children of the black employees participate in the training and scholarship opportunities available to the children of the white employees.

The facilities at the station are segregated. Although there were no signs, we were informed, "that each employee knew which restroom he was to use." We observed the whites eating in the relative comfort of the cafeteria and the blacks eating whatever lunch they had brought from home outside on the ground. Except for one white employee, NASA does not provide housing for the salaried people. The black employees, who are not considered salaried personnel, live in houses either furnished by NASA or housing already existing at the location when the station was built. Some of the houses lack electricity, running water, plumbing, and cooking facilities.

NASA maintains that because of its geographical position, the location of the station in South Africa is eminently desirable. But NASA's complicity in racist employment practices and policies which we witnessed is a different issue—one which must be confronted. Adherence to U.S. standards in this U.S. Government facility is required.

The Sugar Quota for South Africa

The visit to South Africa permitted on-the-ground inquiry into questions arising in connection with the sugar quota for South Africa, with respect to the employment conditions of the workers and also with respect to the question of whether the benefits of the quota inured to the benefit of the majority. The study mission visited the sugar plantations and was fortunate to be able to make one visit under the guidance of the South African Sugar Association (SASA) and one visit on its own.

Significant benefits are derived by countries receiving a quota under the U.S. Sugar Act (the Sugar Act Amendments of 1971, Public Law 92–138), because allocations mean (1) a guaranteed market for the amount of the allocation and, (2) a guaranteed price. This price usually varies upward from the world market price for sugar, but sometimes the fluctuation is downward.

South Africa originally received its sugar quota in 1961. When the Republic was declared and South Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth it seemed likely to lose its right to preferential treatment and to a British sugar quota. This coincided with our suspension of the Cuban sugar quota; and South Africa received a quota from the United States. It still retains British preferences, however, on an
increased scale. (The British sugar quota is to come up in 1973.) In
1962 and 1963 the world market price for sugar exceeded the quota
price. Since that time the U.S. quota price has been higher. But it is
to be noted that in those 2 years when South Africa supplied the
United States and received a guaranteed market, it received less than
it might have on the world market. The following chart shows the
income advantage to the South African sugar industry from the
U.S. sugar quota:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Income Advantage (Million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>$4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>$3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>$0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>$0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>$0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>$4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>$5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>$3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>$3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971 (Jan.-April)</td>
<td>$1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Statistics obtained by the Subcommittee on the basis of U.S. Government data on
imports into the United States.)

The United States has paid South Africa, from the beginning of
the sugar quota until April 1971, $105,734,662 for its sugar and, as
shown above, $34 million was a bonus.

In South Africa a large number of the sugar plantations are owned
by Africans, although these are small and count for less than 3 per-
cent of the total sugar production. Africans also comprise the sugar
fieldworkers. Both Indians and Africans are millhands. The distribu-
tion of the premium resulting from the U.S. quota is based primarily
on production. Available data for 1969 obtained from the Department
of State on the basis of data supplied by the U.S. Embassy, shows the
following:

The number of growers by race was:

- Africans: 4,286
- Indians: 1,837
- White: 2,127

1 Including 24 miller planters.

Their cane production by tons was:

- Whites: 15,491,000
- Indians: 948,000
- Africans: 388,000

1 Including 3,432,000 production of miller planters.

The production in percentage terms was:

- Whites: 92.4
- Indians: 5.6
- Africans: 2.3

1 Including 20.7 percent of miller planters.

The following chart illustrates the share each group received from
the sugar quota:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Share (Million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>$3,688,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians</td>
<td>$145,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>$59,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following indicates the proportionate share of the various groups in the U.S. sugar quota premium:

1969 Sharing in South Africa Sugar Quota Premium

![Diagram showing the proportionate share of the various groups in the U.S. sugar quota premium]

Source: Butcher (Howard University, 1971).

The African sugar grower receives 2.3 percent (his percentage of the production) of the growers' share of two-thirds of the premium or 1.5 percent of the whole premium. Similarly, the Indian gets 5.6 percent (his proportionate production) of the growers' share of two-thirds, or 3.7 percent of the premium.

In our visit to the sugar estates we found deplorable substandard conditions of employment. The African sugar fieldworkers in the village which we visited on our own advised us that they made $14 a month in cash, that they work from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m., 6 days a week, that their food consists of a mealy meal diet with meat one meal a week, on Saturday.

We also visited a compound for pensioned sugar worker retirees. We were advised that the pension was R18 a month for an old man whom we interviewed who was 71 years old, and who stated he had worked
for the sugar plantations for 37 years and that there were seven people in his family, that he had always worked on the sugar fields. His rent, he stated, was 1R a month and that the 18R he received was the entire income for eight people.

The sugar migrant workers, whom we interviewed, stated that they had signed a 6-month contract.

The other aspect of our visit to the sugar plantations was under the sponsorship of the South African Sugar Association. The South African Sugar Association vigorously protested both in public statements to the South African press and in a letter to our Ambassador to South Africa with the request that it be forwarded to the appropriate authorities in the United States, the visit of the study mission on its own to the sugar plantations and terms such visit as a "sneak visit."

During the tour of the housing sections of the sugar plantations sponsored by SASA, it was observed that SASA operates with segregated housing for the whites, for the Coloureds, and for the blacks, segregated hospital facilities, segregated disbursing offices for wage payments. In the room of a hospital for Coloureds, kwashiorkor was noticed and upon inquiry, it was ascertained that these cases of kwashiorkor did not represent isolated instances. The schooling provided consisted of four primary schools which operate on shifts and one high school for about 500 children. Two Africans are on the SASA advisory council. During the lunch and reception for the CODEL which was graciously provided by SASA at the luxurious home of the director of one of the sugar association's comprising SASA, a film entitled "Faces of Sugar" was shown. Its theme revolved around SASA's objective of operating the sugar plantations in such a way that (1) each particular group; that is, the whites, the Coloureds, the Indians and the Africans is permitted to pursue his own culture and (2) the culture of one, such as the European is not permitted to infringe on the ancestral, tribal, historical culture of the other groups and also (3) as to permit the European to continue in his "civilized recreation." From the viewing of the film, it appeared that the objectives of SASA are fully consistent with the apartheid policies of the Government. In fact, the film was a racist document, saturated with incredible bigotry!

U.S. BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA

The study mission met and talked with representatives of American businesses in Durban and Johannesburg and visited the Ford and General Motors plants in Port Elizabeth. Sincere appreciation is

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21 For studies on U.S. Business in South Africa, with analysis and recommendations therefor, see the study by the Institute of Race Relations in Johannesburg, South Africa, "U.S. Corporate Investment and Social Change in South Africa," popularly called the Horner study, and published in the summer of 1971. For a study by an American, see the publication of the United Church of Christ, "The American Corporation In South Africa," by Timothy Smith (1971). For a study concentrated on the three motor companies, Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler, see the publication of the Economic Priorities Council, "Chrysler, Ford and General Motors In South Africa," (1970). See also the publication of the United Nations Association, "Southern Africa: Proposals for Americans," (1971), and a survey by Africa Today together with the American Committee on Africa, "Apartheid and Imperialism" (September-October 1970). Additionally, there are a number of studies in progress, one under the auspices of the Brookings Institution and others sponsored by various church groups.

22 The press release issued by the chairman of the subcommittee on the evening following the visit to these plants is contained on p. 407 of the appendix. Congressman Vander Jagt did not participate in this statement.
hereby expressed for the cooperation of the business representatives who met with the study mission and for their willingness to engage in frank discussion both on their employment practices and policies and on their role in the economy and society of South Africa, particularly with respect to the black majority. In planning for the discussions with the various American company representatives—both South African and American—it had been requested that the Embassy arrange meetings with a representative group of American businessmen, running the gamut from those showing enlightened practices to those whose policies reflected adoption of the apartheid philosophy. A cross section of U.S. business representatives met with the study mission. This was attested by the variety of attitudes expressed both on present practices of American firms on initiatives toward the equalization of pay and on efforts to upgrade the training of blacks, provide fringe benefits for all workers, and institute extra educational, legal, and social programs of assistance for the black workers and their families. From the discussions it was clear that there was considerable local autonomy; although the degree of control by the U.S. parent varied from relatively independent local subsidiaries to affiliates who develop policy within an overall framework.

Although this report in general will be without attribution, a difference in the approach and information represented by the company which handles the Polaroid sales in South Africa was observed. (Polaroid, itself, has no operations in South Africa and is present there only through its sales agent, Frank & Hirsch.) By comparison with other U.S. business representatives in South Africa, Polaroid appeared relatively enlightened. They were at least able to discuss the issues with a basic knowledge of the law and the issues involved and showed a degree of sophistication as to an acceptable business philosophy. This demonstrates the value of a visit by representatives from headquarters in the United States, to bring home to local representatives the need for rethinking on the issues.

At the same time, it should be acknowledged that it would have been comparatively easy for the Polaroid Co., which had no investment or infrastructure in South Africa, to reexamine its involvement with Frank & Hirsch, their South African distributors. It would have been no trouble to them to withdraw from South Africa altogether, although it became apparent that this would not prevent Polaroid products from reaching South Africa in other countries. It is reported that Polaroid photographic equipment is still being used by the South African Government for use in enforcing the pass laws, supplies being arranged indirectly by other distributors. If this is true, there can be no excuse for Polaroid maintaining its interests in South Africa.

Further, the question of their labor practices has not yet been satisfactorily settled. It would have been as easy for Frank & Hirsch to have improved radically their employment practices as it would have been for Polaroid to have withdrawn the franchise from them. In fact, however, the record is unacceptable. Frank & Hirsch are not paying equal wages to their workers of all races. Some of their employees are even below the poverty datum line, which is itself far too low for an ade-
quate standard of living. In addition, the lowest paid workers are as badly paid as ever. New employees, hired since the “experiment” started, are being paid the minimum legal wage, which is far below the subsistence level for a family. When further inquiries were made, it was admitted that there was a “junior employee” aged 44 earning R55 per month. This compares with the subsistence level of R70 per month. Since white workers are earning many times this amount, it is clear that the “experiment” has failed to provide equal pay for blacks and whites, or even to give the basic minimum required for subsistence. (Figures from the “Financial Mail,” Dec. 3, 1971.)

In the discussions of the study mission with the business representatives, basic concerns of the study mission related to:

1. the corporate consciousness of social responsibility;
2. the relationship between the U.S. parent and the local enterprise, for example, the demonstrated concern of the president of the company with the operations in South Africa by making on-the-ground visits and requiring frequent and regular reporting;
3. the commitment to the principle of equal pay for equal or comparable work or “the rate for the job,” as it is known in South Africa;
4. the differences in training programs available for whites and blacks;
5. the way in which the business shares the benefit of doing business in a particular society with the people of that society.

The business representatives, as might be expected, were exponents of the need to work within apartheid to change the system. It was argued that complete isolation would play into the hands of the verkramptes, that from the businessman’s standpoint, the only peaceful, purposeful way to achieve constitutional change is for U.S. companies to become involved. The position that the sheer force of the economy is breaking down the barriers was advocated, as well as the argument that expansion of businesses in, and with South Africa, was the solution.

With respect to the attitudes expressed by the black majority toward U.S. business in South Africa, the study mission observed that this varied from the position of the youth that businesses should be forced to leave, to the more conservative posture of some older persons that what is needed is to require U.S. business both to cease exploitation of African labor and, by paying decent wages, to become meaningful to black workers. (It should be noted in any recital of the attitude of black South Africans toward U.S. businesses, that in terms of the Suppression of Communism Act, it would be a criminal offense to advocate the withdrawal of foreign investors.* Further, under the Terrorism Act the advocacy of such a position would conceivably be an offense punishable by death. Thus any African who told a visitor that American business should disengage from South Africa would be running a great risk.)

*See p. 408 of the appendix for relevant analysis of Terrorism Act.
The study mission observed generally that U.S. businesses in South Africa:

(1) are inadequately informed. There was a great deal of ignorance on the part of American businessmen, particularly about the allowable scope of action with respect to wages and job reservation;

(2) tend to use South African laws as an excuse for low paying wage practices. Job reservations under section 77 of the Industrial Conciliation Act,** were cited by several businesses as the justification for their inability to place black workers in better positions; although, when pressed, they did not know whether any of the 23 or so job reservations even applied to them (see p. 409 of the appendix for list of job reservations). In fact, such reservations affect only 2 percent of the jobs;

(3) do not actively pursue means of improving the employment conditions of the black majority—there are of course problems inherent in that society, yet if the employer approaches the question creatively, he still has considerable scope of action;

(4) find difficulty even committing themselves orally to the principle of equal pay for equal work. Various evasions were used including that of sidestepping the question by pointing out either that they do not have the same kind of jobs done by the same group of people or that the professional or the highly skilled employee has to be well-qualified;

(5) generally lack the necessary carry-through in terms of training programs, even where willing to recite adherence to the principle of equal pay;

(6) would not give a simple yes or no to the question, whether they classify jobs involving the same work differently for whites or blacks, and thus circumvent the equal pay for equal work principle;

(7) vary greatly in providing fringe benefits for whites and blacks. There was much insensitivity to built-in inequities. For example, in several cases company representatives advised that their educational fringe benefits were equal but further inquiry brought out that these benefits consisted of refunding tuition and costs for obtaining a degree—a case obviously favoring the white employee who is more likely to have the opportunity for advanced training. Another example is the practice of giving scholarships to whites and blacks for their high school education, oblivious to the fact that whites do not have to pay tuition. In fact, one company interviewed had high school scholarships for children of employees; five for whites; five for non-white, i.e., three for Coloureds and two for blacks—but only the black child must pay tuition;

(8) are generally desirous of fitting into the South African scene, and often exceed their South African counterparts in their collaboration with the Government. Accordingly, they

** Ibid.
appeared generally unwilling to take open initiatives in exploring actions to benefit their black workers—this attitude is symbolized by the statement of one U.S. businessman, who following a recital of his American ideals declared: "But for me to react in any way that would deprive me of the opportunity of the willing cooperation of my South African colleagues here where we have a small group would not be fair";

(9) tend to give employment policies in terms of white and nonwhite employment practices so that the significant differences in employment conditions for Africans, as distinguished from that for Coloureds and Indians is obscured;

(10) tend to use the popular image of the preferability of their wage practices to those of the Japanese as an excuse for their failure to move faster in correcting inequities

(11) use euphemisms to define their activities. For example, in response to an inquiry as to the reasons for business expansion in view of the stated difficulty in instituting enlightened policies, one company answered that expansion is merely "growth in an industry" and required in order to maintain its share in the competitive South African market. Nor was the "local content" program given as the reason. Under the local content program, which was instituted by the Government to gain industrial self-sufficiency, businesses must use a given minimum percentage of locally produced components. This percentage requirement increases regularly. For example, the local content program applies to the auto industry and reduces the amount of U.S.-manufactured items used by U.S. firms in South Africa, and thus reduces the number of jobs in the auto industry in the United States. At a minimum, U.S. firms, like the Japanese, should seek exemption from this requirement. There is little doubt that the South African Government, rather than force a confrontation with large U.S. corporations, which would be very damaging to business confidence, would accept the consequences of a policy decision not to invest fresh capital in a U.S.-controlled plant. With the auto industry in a state of depression in South Africa at the moment, the Government is not in a position to impose further restrictions;

(12) use various devices to avoid effectively upgrading black workers, such as fragmentation (the practice of subdividing one previous white job into three black jobs while keeping the total wage payment to the three black workers well below the one wage previously paid the one white worker) and downgrading (the practice of reclassifying a previous white job into a lower classification wherein black workers are paid less). (See p. 412 of the appendix for excerpt on job reservation and these practices.)

(13) use as an excuse the argument that "if U.S. businesses don't invest in South Africa, others will". An examination of this argument, however, reveals its many fallacies. (See comment on this on p. 415 of the appendix.)
(14) tend to justify their policies by stating their reluctance to become involved in the domestic policies of a foreign country;

(15) are unaware of the institutions which can aid in the assumption of social responsibilities. One businessman stated he had never heard of the Institute of Race Relations until the question was put to him by the study mission as to his support of the Institute. U.S. businesses should establish communication with institutions such as the Institute of Race Relations which (a) provide informed advice and statistics and discursive documentation to businesses operating in South Africa on the conditions of labor and employment as well as on the most critical needs of the black workers; (b) make recommendations for enlightened employee practices with the objective of alleviating the many legally imposed disadvantages of the black worker; (c) have available information on various bursary funds or organizations to which the employer might contribute toward the education of the black employee and his children;

(16) tend to contribute to the South African Foundation, a propaganda organization for South Africa, but do not contribute to the Institute of Race Relations;

(17) are in general "light years" away from the policies and attitudes of U.S. firms in the United States.

Although these observations were not encouraging, it was evident both in South Africa and on our return to the United States that an increasing number of businesses are finally beginning to be aware of the problem. This is due in significant measure to the efforts of various interested groups during the past few years. Thus, it was our understanding that, despite the retrogressive attitude and failure to admit concern by the businesses, inquiries are being made of our Embassy and consulates in South Africa, of the Departments of State and Commerce and of the Institute of Race Relations, as to means by which the businesses can appease their critics.

U.S. direct investment in South Africa was $860 million in 1971. U.S. involvement in South Africa and the economy of apartheid has several aspects. First, political implications cannot be separated from the economic implication of U.S. business presence in that area. But even disregarding the larger question of the implications of the presence of American businesses for the economic support and nourishment of apartheid, there is the second aspect, that is the immediate concern of their participation in a labor system dehumanizing vast numbers of people. The study mission noted that all the company managers could tell some story of a good deed. But the question arose: If added all up, how many people have been affected? Even if all wage employees are benefiting, they form a small minority of the black population.

The primary concern for those companies who decide to continue their involvement in South Africa is: How far are the companies testing the system in an honest endeavor (1) to offer equal opportunity to all employees and to remove the abhorrent discriminatory practices
Government does not recognize the existence of the illegal Smith regime. Until the Byrd amendment (section 503 of the Military Procurement Act of 1971), the U.S. Government had supported the U.N. program under Chapter VII of the Charter of economic sanctions against the Smith regime. The United States is now the only nation, except South Africa and Portugal, openly violating sanctions.

**Black States in Southern Africa**

The sovereign black African states in southern Africa occupy a particularly difficult position. Their economic dependence upon South Africa draws them into a neocolonial relationship with that nation, while their natural desires are for greater economic self-sufficiency and greater ties with black Africa and the outside world. Subcommittee study missions have now visited all of these nations—Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Mauritius, and the Malagasy Republic.

In policy declarations the United States has taken cognizance of the special problems these nations face in building independent states. Through self-help funds and regional projects, and the Peace Corps, the American foreign assistance program has tried to aid these nations in developing more independently viable economies. The subcommittee, however, feels that an even greater effort should be made to assist these nations. The adoption of some of the subcommittee’s past policy recommendations and some additional suggestions made herewith would add substance to the U.S. assertion of its interest in helping these new states. Principal recommendations are:

1. Encourage greater American investment in this area. The development of additional industries and other economic activity in these countries would lessen the necessity for vast numbers of their people to travel to South Africa in order to find employment.

2. Encourage greater American trade with these nations; in most cases South Africa is their principal trading partner.

3. Increase U.S. Government economic cooperation and assistance to these countries.

Great care should be taken to insure that projects follow these countries’ policy of reducing their dependence on the minority-ruled areas. We should learn from the experience with the Tan-Zam railway: where Western interests refused to cooperate with this policy, the Africans were forced to turn to the Chinese.

There are several more specific ways in which the economic development of these nations could be assisted. In Swaziland the nation’s largest single exchange earner and the greatest source of employment is the sugar industry. Ninety-five percent of Mauritius’ exports and most of its employment are dependent upon sugar and molasses. Similarly, the Malagasy Republic also has a large sugar industry. As legislation recently defeated by a narrow margin in Congress proposed, South Africa’s sugar quota should be withdrawn and reallocated among these nations.

With 87 percent of its resident population engaged in subsistence agriculture, Lesotho is in great need of new means of economic progress. There is a high probability that Lesotho possesses some mineral wealth, although pre-independence surveys indicate little
which we observed, and (2) to share the profits with the people of the society. The study mission found that the businesses were not yet really moving on any of these fronts. More creativity and perceptiveness are required.

For example, the uniform percentage wage raise only increases the gap between black and white income. A 20-percent across-the-board raise in salaries for African mechanics earning 70 rand a month and whites earning 470 rand a month would make the difference in black and white earning power, 480 rand rather than 400 rand per month. This example also illustrates the dilemma posed to the white workers themselves by an economic system in which the white wages are not tied to productivity, and where employers, given the opportunity, will use black workers instead of whites, paying them only a fraction of the original wage. This indicates the reasons for support by some labor unions, such as the Trade Union Council of South Africa, of the “rate for the job” concept. As far as the black worker is concerned, the “rate for the job” would be an improvement, but not the real solution because (1) white workers are frequently paid more than the rate laid down in those areas where rate-for-the-job applies and (2), where performing the same work, blacks and whites are often given different work classifications—the white is “a mechanic” and the black an “operative.”

U.S. businesses in South Africa must be required to institute fair employment practices in South Africa. There is no limit under South African law on the maximum pay for Africans in the private sectors; there is enormous scope for equalizing wage and fringe benefits.

Although under the laws of South Africa the black worker is not permitted to strike, limited labor relations are at least possible through Works Committees. American employers or companies representing American firms should establish such mechanisms for discussions with work councils with respect to wages, hours of work, conditions of work, fringe benefits, vacations, bonuses, sick pay, sick leave, severance pay, and employee grievance procedures, hiring and firing practices, and appeal procedures. U.S. businesses should therefore retain legal counsel, either jointly or separately, to advise both on the meaning of South African legislation such the the Industrial Conciliation Act (Job Reservations) and legislation applicable to collective bargaining as well as on the whole gamut of legislation conditions affecting the employee and his family’s entry, residence, and stay in the area where he works. It must be borne in mind that in theory the legislation in this area is such as to bring any business to a complete standstill in a very short time; in practice the rule is administration by exemption. In this way, the Government bureaucracy has arbitrary control over industry, if it chooses to exercise it. It appears that this kind of threat, actual or implied, is often used against companies which the Government wishes to influence—for example, in joining the South African Foundation and doing public relations on behalf of the South Africans in the United States. Such subtle pressures should be resisted; if U.S. investors make clear their refusal to become involved in advocating apartheid abroad, the South Africans would certainly withdraw from any confrontation, since they are heavily dependent on foreign capital and skills.
Thus, U.S. businesses must reexamine the basis of their presence in South Africa. For those U.S. companies who, notwithstanding the harsh realities of apartheid and the fact that business operations in South Africa inevitably involve working within the apartheid system, decide to remain in South Africa, a concentrated effort must be made toward decent employment practices; and the big companies should be the battering ram.

Vigilance and interest must be maintained by the public to insure that the business community is genuine in its concern and does not pass over the problem with a gloss of improved practices and token gestures and that the gift of a few bursaries for African education is not resorted to as a “whitewash,” as one South African put it, of their employment policies. It has yet to be proved that a U.S. company would find it worthwhile to do business in South Africa, if it applied principles which have to be observed at home. High rates of return there coincide with very low wages. If the resistance to the concept of fair employment practices is due to the fact that this would make business in South Africa unprofitable, then there can be no justification, even in terms of ordinary business ethics, for remaining there.

The study mission understood that interest is growing by companies of other countries. The study mission further found that other embassies have made direct inquiries of our Embassy with regard to steps which might be taken by businesses. It seemed clear that if leadership were provided by the American community, many others would join.

Basic to an evolution in the practices and policies of U.S. business in South Africa is a complete reformation of the U.S. Government of its practices in its Embassy and other enterprises, such as the NASA tracking station, in South Africa.

As indicated in the previous chapter, consistent with this is the necessity for a change in the function of the economic and commercial attachés at our post in South Africa. Their present function appears to be primarily one of actively promoting U.S. businesses in their business operations in South Africa. This must be changed to a role of actively assisting U.S. businesses already established there to become both fully informed on applicable laws and regulations and to institute enlightened policies in their plants. The chairman believes that the U.S. Government should develop disincentives to new investment and to expansion.

Further, it is the position of the chairman of the subcommittee that American companies must go beyond the permissible in South Africa, that it is not acceptable for an American company to practice apartheid and that the segregated facilities, the racist signs, and the racist practices must be eliminated. It is inconceivable that the South African Government would not—as it has in the case of Japanese businesses and Japanese persons in South Africa—make dispensations if it is clear that this is the price for having U.S. businesses. Further, there is flexibility under South African law. The act which the businesses recited again and again as compelling separate facilities, The Factories, Machinery and Building Works Act of 1941, as amended (section 51(h)), does not require separate facilities; rather, it empowers the Government to issue proclamations stipulating such requirements.
Rationale

As a vital part of sharing the benefit of their economic participation in that society, American businesses should provide substantial educational assistance to the employee and to his children. Under South Africa’s laws, the African child must pay for all aspects of his education from the earliest years. It is regrettable that subsidizing the education of the employee’s children is, in a way, underwriting this gross inequity. Yet, the need is to do what is possible to alleviate the educational disabilities of the African child. The interests of the children have priority and dictate full support for their education.

It must be borne in mind, however, that the South African education system—like the economic system—is not one in which external assistance in education—or in the economic area—although individually meaningful can make a real impact on the basic problem... apartheid.

For Africans, the educational apparatus is not geared to produce literate or educated students. The standard of entry to professional training for African teachers is low, formerly standard 6, now 8. There is a strikingly large pupil-teacher ratio and a decrease in the number of teachers being trained. A recent study showed pupils increasing at the rate of 13 percent, teachers at the rate of 87 percent, but the number of teachers in training only at the rate of 6.5 percent. (SPRO-CAS Commission, Christian Institute, South Africa, 1971). Over 80 percent of African children in the first two grades attend classes only half-a-day, that is, 3½ or 4 hours. Thus, as stated above, the significance of assistance is help for the individual rather than help, which will, or can, basically affect the society of apartheid and the massive deprivation that goes with it.

An understanding of the facts of the educational and economic structure of South African society brings a realization that the various programs for amelioration of the African’s wages and working conditions does not get to the root of the problem. It may, however, place the Africans affected in a better position to get there. What is the benefit, then, of a policy advocating that U.S. businesses must, if they choose to stay in South Africa, institute certain practices? Is that rationale that economic advancement by the employees of U.S. firms will effectively change the situation of the blacks in that society? No, not only would this affect only a very few, but the requisite, fundamental change needed in South Africa is political, namely self-determination for the people of South Africa. It must be borne in mind that no group has ever abdicated power. Even the Progressives which would give some political participation to Africans through a limited franchise would keep control firmly in the white minority. Further, the businesses themselves furnish an economic bulwark for the government. So long as the labor and residence situation of the blacks in South Africa is not free and remains controlled by the Government the basic ameliorative capacity of wage increases and better fringe benefits is limited. Similarly, so long as “Bantu education” remains the education designed for Africans, educational assistance to the children of employees of American firms will not reverse the appalling educational deficiencies resulting from the system. So long as the pass laws and influx control operate, there will be no significant social or economic betterment. So long as the African is bereft of all political rights, the key to change, voting rights, is absent. Thus, the effect of business improvement is severely circumscribed. What, then, is the
benefit of U.S. businesses instituting certain practices? Does this pessimism mean that such programs cannot be meaningful? No! Certainly, they will benefit the individual worker affected and their families. But, even more, such programs can help place the African in a better position to challenge the present system.

The basic change sought is majority rule. Accordingly, the Chairman supports the principle that U.S. business should disengage from South Africa. Because of obvious practical and legal difficulties, he is concentrating present efforts on: (1) seeing to it that U.S. business exploitation of the African is ended, (2) that new investment is halted, and (3) that there is no further expansion of existing U.S. investments. External pressures reinforced by the tinderbox nature of South African society may ultimately force withdrawal.

PROGNOSIS

Among the whites, there appeared in the summer of 1971 a certain amount of discussion and questioning of the system—ferment, as it was popularly denominated—specifically in regard to the problem of the Coloureds and the inequities of separate development in their case. There was much talk of change in South Africa, notwithstanding the obstacle course which the Government itself has created through the complex maze of its social, economic, security, and legal apparatus. Observers of the South African scene pointed to the emergence of certain new factors operating in the political field and creating a more flexible approach in contrast to the rigidity of the previous regime under Prime Minister Verwoerd.

The first of these factors cited was in the outward deviations from apartheid as originally conceived. The visit by President Banda of Malawi, which took place while we were in South Africa is given as an example of this.

A second change given was the use of the legal framework of self-development—the Bantustans and other self-government mechanisms, such as the Coloured Person's Representative Council—by the non-white leaders to make claims on behalf of their people. Chief Matanzima's position that Africans should work in the post office in Umtata, the capital of the Transkei, was awkward for the Government because it's denial revealed the inherent contradictions of self-government. The statement by Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, at the occasion of his installation as Executive Director of the Zulu Territorial Authority, reminding the South African Government officials that "we cannot live in the moon age and move at the pace of oxen" sent reverberations throughout South Africa. On the vital issue of the viability of the homelands, Matanzima and Buthelezi are demanding outlets to the sea—Richards Bay for Zululand and Port St. John for the Transkei. The study mission heard voices such as the United Party, which capitalizes on such difficulties, raise questions as to the dangers for whites implicit in this projected establishment of independent African states and consequent "encirclement of white South Africa."

A third new factor is the drastic change in the Coloured community which, with its emergent political consciousness, is becoming a significant factor. Some elements of Afrikanerdom—the voices of academia and of students at Stellenbosch University, the citadel of Afrikanerdom—in reaction to the seeming inability of the Government to fit the
Coloureds, who have not been assigned a homeland, into the concept of self-development, are calling upon the Government to do something about the Coloureds. This in itself is a fractionalization of the former monolithic Afrikanerdom.

Fourth, there are changes in the structural composition of the Afrikaner; in the rural/urban alinement of the Nationalist Party, as well as in the increasing involvement now of Afrikanners in commerce and industry. This raises the possibility of a coming change in white political alinements. (The early 1972 elections in which the United Party made significant gains at the expense of the Nationalist Party underscores possible indications of change.)

Fifth, the economic situation presents new factors. The manpower shortage may have a beneficial effect. The galloping inflation presents critical problems.

There was concern expressed by some whites about the direction of apartheid and some realization that it may lead to a situation disastrous to all. A few appeared to realize that their own self-interests required a multiracial country. These persons realized that time is a critical factor. A South African Progressive Party member, who was a manager of a U.S. business in South Africa, explained the situation as one of political fluidity in which thinking South Africans ask of the rest of the world a certain amount of tolerance and understanding. He cautioned that a big stick drives the donkey in the wrong way. Such people stressed various changes in the society—changes which were not foreseen a few years ago.

Cited most frequently in this connection was the concurrent visit of President Banda of Malawi to South Africa; his reception by the Prime Minister at an otherwise segregated dinner; his nonsegregated dinner for South African officials, including the Prime Minister; the front page newspaper pictures of President Banda embracing two little white girls at Stellenbosch. Also cited was the luncheon hosted by the mayor of Johannesburg for those black and white Americans and Africans attending the recent interracial meeting at the airport hotel at Johannesburg under the auspices of USSALEP (United States-South Africa Leader Exchange Program). The luncheon caused quite a clamor and precipitated much criticism of the mayor by the verkrampte element. The residence in Pretoria of the first black Ambassador, the Malawian envoy, was given as another example of significant change. Also cited as precedent-shattering was the Prime Minister's meeting with Buthelezi—following the latter's statement upon his return to South Africa (from a U.S. Government leader grant) that, when asked in the United States whether he, the head of the Zulu Territorial Authority, had met with the Prime Minister, he was forced to say “No.”

It was emphasized that the rapid conversion of the new factors discussed above, the changes in the system here noted, as well as the vocal questioning of its policies by some whites, pose real problems for the Government as to its direction.

But, there was no evidence, or even indication, of any substantive change in the laws of apartheid, or in the apartheid policy of the Government and its concomitant inequities. The thrust of concern appeared to relate to the trappings of apartheid—to petty apartheid, as it is
called—and to the means which the Government is using to enforce its system of separation of the races and of economic and political control by the whites, rather than to the system itself of apartheid and of separate development. The bannings, the trials, the arrests and detentions without recourse to judicial authority, the pass laws, the whole system of using the blacks as a labor commodity for the benefit of the whites, the efforts at total physical separation of the society on the basis of race and color—all of these continue.

As the thinking liberal element of whites realize—even looking at the situation from the optimum point of view; namely, that forces for meaningful change exist within the society—the central question is whether these factors can bring about change rapidly enough to avert the forces of impending violence—forces fed by the intensifying repression by the Government. These factors may, no doubt, compel some fluidity; but without a fundamental change in the commitment of the South African Government, and in the laws of the society which legitimize the violence of the Government, it is difficult to see how these factors can be pivotal.

It should be noted that previously hopeful periods of ferment in South Africa, in the twenties and before Sharpeville, resulted in a tightening of state control and of unprecedented political, legal, and racial repression. Nor has this gloomy projection been altered by events in South Africa subsequent to our visit: bannings; detentions under section 6 of the Terrorism Act of some 77 persons; continued deaths in detention; retaliatory actions against those opposing apartheid on religious principles; the October police raid on clergymen and others, making a total of 126 persons raided; and the February 1972 announcement by the Prime Minister of a proposed Parliamentary Committee to investigate the Christian Institute, the South African Institute of Race Relations, the University Christian Movement, and the National Union of South African Students, and the incredible attack by the police on the students demonstrating peacefully on the steps of St. George's Cathedral in Cape Town for racial equity in education—an attack, commended by the Prime Minister.

These are in addition to similar actions by the Government earlier this year: the expelling of churchworkers without granting them hearing or judicial recourse as required by due process and the rule of law; the seizing of the passports of some five clergymen as well as representatives of the World Council of Churches; the trial of the Anglican Dean of Johannesburg under the infamous Terrorism Act; the trials at Bloemfontein, the Pietermaritzburg case; and the bannings.

At the same time that we met some whites in South Africa expressing some concern over this state of affairs, the Africans were expressing an avowed determination that these conditions would be changed.

**Conclusion**

The basic fact found by the study mission is the unquenchable will of the people of South Africa to be free. The study mission observed that, while repression of the majority—economic, social, legislative, educational repression—pervades every area of the society, there is yet a will to be free existing in the majority that must be reckoned with.
Previous reports of others that the majority in South Africa are cowed, abject, down-trodden in spirit did not coincide with the findings of the study mission, whose observations resulted from meeting with a variety of groups:

From conversations with the students who exhibited the militant spirit of youth;
From conversations with members of the Government-created administrative structure such as the Urban Bantu Council of Soweto;
From conversations with the various representatives of the Coloured group;
From visits to the sugar workers' compound, where the study mission was greeted with raised fists and guttural shouts of "welcome," of cries "the white people are killing us," of entreaties "you must help us, we work ourselves to death and get no money";
From listening to the dynamic, moving singing of the girls at Inanda and to the recitations by a few of them of their goals in life;
From the intellectuals, the illiterates, the young and the old, from the rich and the poor;
From the Coloureds, the Indians, from the blacks and from representatives of various political divisions of each of these groups;
From all geographical locations which we visited from Pretoria, from Cape Town, from Durban, from Port Elizabeth, from Alice, from Johannesburg;
From all quarters we heard the voices of courageous people.

In a society rampant with informers and the omnipresent Special Branch observer, it is significant that the study mission found stark frankness of the majority with respect to the Government. The study mission did not meet any "nonwhite" who had anything complimentary to say about the Government of South Africa!

The study mission found that South Africa is not isolated from the tide of freedom which has revolutionized the world in the second half of the 20th century and that the tide of freedom is a surging undertow in South Africa.

The conclusion is inescapable that a holocaust looms in South Africa—a racial conflagration of awful proportions—and that this cannot be staved off by the kindhearted attempts on the part of the few whites who are beginning to realize that their own future may well be dependent upon their willingness to share the benefits of their society with all the people of South Africa. Indeed the situation might spark a world power confrontation.

On the other hand, pressures from the outside might be a crucial factor in encouraging the progressive forces in South Africa as well as the inanimate forces toward change. U.S. policy should be supportive of those of the majority and of the minority working for change.

In fact, the historical record proves decisively that the myth of African docility is totally without basis. The chronology of resistance to white domination, included on p. 417 of the appendix, shows that just the opposite is true. Throughout this century of increasingly discriminatory legislation, resistance has been widespread.
Among the blacks there is a movement out from the shell of the sixties. Sharpeville had triggered off a period of repression and security laws which, the study mission was given to understand, had a drastically inhibiting effect on African expression. A decade of silence followed—the political leaders were banned, exiled, or imprisoned. Now, several factors are interacting:

The frustration caused by the inhuman pressure upon the Africans;

The influence of the black movement in the United States, the study mission was told, has played an important part in fostering black identity and black consciousness;

The rise of articulate duly-constituted black critics of the Government;

The enthusiasm and leadership engendered by Chief Buthelezi's forthright approach;

The spirit of the black youth—the growing black solidarity; and

The incipient consciousness among the Coloureds and the Indians—especially the youth—that there is a community of interest between the Africans, the Coloureds, and the Indians—and they must work together.

All of this has changed the relationship of the blacks to white liberals and is bringing about a feeling among blacks that, as a substitute for their former joint efforts with whites, they must now depend on themselves alone. Indeed the SASO "message and cry" is "black man you are on your own" (SASO Newsletter, September 1971, p. 18, quoting from the text of an address by Steve Biko, 1969-70 SASO president, to a black theology seminar in Maritzburg on Aug. 28, 1971). Even some Africans who formerly showed some cooperation with the South African Government are becoming outspoken, as shown by the demands for "one black nation" in South Africa by Chief Mantanzima, upon his return to South Africa in August 1972 from a visit to the United States on a U.S. leader grant.

It is clear that U.S. policy planners cannot build policy on a hypothesis of the continuance of the status quo in South Africa. The endurance of the human spirit and its undying resistance to oppression was only recently demonstrated by (1) the strike by the Ovambos in Namibia who had been thought by South Africa to be a "safe" group accepting their administration, and (2) the reaction of the Zimbabweans to the Heath/Smith settlement proposals and the Pearce Commission. Any planning that fails to take into consideration the will and determination of the majority of the peoples of these areas is worthless.

To be meaningful, the U.S. policy of communication must be directed toward those elements in South Africa supportive of change, not of a cosmetic change in petty apartheid, but of fundamental change in the political participation in the society. The United States must revamp its present policy so that our actions show that our support is for a free South Africa for all its people—black, brown, and white. The capability of external forces to change the situation can be overrated. Yet, it is clear that external pressures can serve either to help entrench
apartheid or to help replace it. The way in which change will come in South Africa can be affected by our actions and policies. Further, it is in our own enlightened interest to be on the right side. Majority rule is inevitable. This realization must become a fundamental hypothesis of U.S. policy toward South Africa and all operational policies revised accordingly.

**Recommendations (Action Manifesto)**

On December 14, 1971, the chairman of the subcommittee issued the following Action Manifesto with recommendations to the Secretary of State and to Dr. Kissinger for U.S. Government action. The recommendations are based on the study mission to South Africa, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. Recommendations were added on the proposed Heath/Smith settlement and on the base rights agreement with Portugal on the Azores because of the immediacy of concern on those two subjects. (See p. 423 of the appendix for the text of the State Department's reply to the Action Manifesto.)

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<td>The Azores Agreement</td>
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1. That the United States take meaningful steps, as spelled out below, (1) to end its complicity with apartheid, (2) to implement its pronouncements of adherence to the principle of self-deter-
mination and of abhorrence of apartheid with concrete actions toward their realization, (3) to comply with U.S. obligations under articles 1, 2, 55, and 56 of the United Nations Charter, and (4) to act in accordance with the moral and legal standards of the Constitution.

2. That the U.S. Government show cause why it should not, as an earnest of its position on human rights and self-determination, downgrade its representation in South Africa and Portugal to the Chargé level.

3. That the United States condemn the violence with which the Governments of South Africa and Portugal perpetuate their rule in these countries.

4. That the United States cease its condemnation of the efforts by the majority of the people of these areas to achieve their freedom by the only means available to them, and in reaffirmation of the principles enunciated in the Declaration of Independence—principles which gave birth to the American Revolution and to the United States of America—acknowledge the sacred right of these peoples to use, so long as the recalcitrance of those governments continues, whatever means are necessary to achieve self-determination and to win their freedom.

5. That the United States contribute to the United Nations Trust Fund. The Fund is made up of voluntary contributions and is used for:

   "(a) Legal assistance to persons persecuted under the repressive and discriminatory legislation of South Africa;

   "(b) Relief to such persons and their dependents;

   "(c) Education of such persons and their dependents;

   "(d) Relief for refugees from South Africa."

(The General Assembly Resolution 2357 (XXIII) of Dec. 2, 1968.)

The General Assembly report of October 1971 listed the following contributions as received during the previous 12 months: Austria, $6,000; Belgium, $20,149; Bulgaria, $1,000; Cyprus, $242; Denmark, $66,796; Finland, $25,000; France, $20,000; Ghana, $1,000; Ireland, $2,750; Jamaica, $840; Japan, $20,000; Khmer Republic, $1,000; Liberia, $1,000; Morocco, $6,972; Norway, $35,000; Pakistan, $3,000; Saudi Arabia, $2,400; Sweden, $77,369; Yugoslavia, $1,000. Note, there was no contribution by the United States.

6. That U.S. NATO contributions to Portugal should be suspended until Portugal recognizes its obligations under the United Nations Charter with respect to the self-determination of the people of Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique, and until Portugal ceases its expenditure of a disproportionate amount of its budget to fight a colonial war in Africa. This recommendation is underscored by (1) the absence of any significant military reason for such contribution (the U.S.-NATO contribution to Portugal amounts to "approximately one-fourth of 1 percent of Portuguese military expenditures") and (2) Portugal's expenditure of almost 50 percent of its budget for military purposes.
except diamonds. The United States is currently cooperating in a natural resources survey of Lesotho by providing satellite photographs under the ERTS (Earth Resources Technology Satellite) program.

Because of the strategic position they occupy in the Indian Ocean, Mauritius and the Malagasy Republic have become of great interest to the world's sea powers, including South Africa. Great Britain has a naval communications base on Mauritius. The Soviet Union, in return for economic and technical assistance, has reportedly been granted docking facilities at Mauritius' Port Louis. Under a defense pact with France, French troops are currently stationed at the Malagasy port of Diego Suarez. Malagasy delegations were at one point discussing the coordination of seaport development and tonnage-sharing with Portuguese and South African officials. The South African Navy has asked for bunking and shore facilities on the island, although it is not now likely to receive this.

In both these nations there is domestic opposition to strengthening their ties with South Africa, and in Madagascar this was a factor in the recent change of government. The United States might well consider providing an alternative to South African assistance. The strategic position of these islands in the Indian Ocean is an important consideration. More important, however, is the desirability of preventing South Africa from preserving the heinous system of apartheid by strengthening its domestic economy through trade expansion. At present U.S. assistance to these two nations is minimal. Preliminary figures for 1970 set total American economic aid to Mauritius at $2.6 million and to the Malagasy Republic at $0.7 million. Though legislative limitations prevent the granting of bilateral assistance, perhaps the United States could initiate the formation of a consortium of countries interested in thwarting apartheid and willing to combat it by aiding the economic development of these and similar other African nations. At the very least, American investors could be encouraged to replace the South Africans in the development of Malagasy's mining industry.

III. AID

Africa is one of the world's most underdeveloped regions. One of the greatest concerns of the new African nations in their relations with the United States is their desire for increased American assistance in meeting the challenge of development. In the past the United States has generally contributed only a little over 25 percent of the outside economic assistance received by Africa. However, the recent trend toward decreasing overall U.S. foreign aid obligations has resulted in severe cuts in the appropriations for Africa. The net obligations and loan authorizations for Africa of the Agency for International Development (AID) and its predecessor agencies fell from the high of $326.2 million in 1962 to $176.1 million in 1971. Revised statistics for 1972 set AID assistance to Africa at $163 million.

The decline in American assistance to Africa has come at a time when the United States has been reconsidering its aid policies around the world. It is a matter of concern, however, that there is not a greater understanding in the United States of Africa's needs. For example, while the American Government and private American
7. That the United States suspend all sales to the Portuguese armed forces until such time as Portugal takes the two actions specified in recommendation 6.

8. That again, until Portugal takes the two actions specified in recommendation 6, the United States suspend all sales to the Government of Portugal or to Portuguese buyers, whether such sales are public or commercial, of the following:
   (a) Aircraft which can be used for troop transport;
   (b) Arms, ammunition, and items of a weapons nature;
   (c) Items for the use of, or by, the Portuguese armed forces;
   (d) Spare parts and third party componentry for any of the above.

9. That U.S. export licenses for the sale of any of the items listed in the prior two paragraphs be denied. The present arms embargo against Portugal not only raises questions of adequacy of enforcement; it continues a military partnership with Portugal without regard to either Portugal's violations of the rights of the people of those territories or to Portugal's obligations under international law, and indeed without regard to our own obligations under the United Nations Charter. Regulations of the Department of Commerce (validated and G-dest license controls) and State Department (munitions control) should be amended accordingly.

10. That the United States suspend all Export-Import Bank facilities to Portugal until such time as Portugal takes the two actions specified in recommendation 6.

11. That the United States pursue a positive program for bringing Portugal to rethink its obdurate position on Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.

12. That the United States cease its obstruction of efforts by other NATO countries to place on the agenda an item to reconsider NATO assistance to Portugal and that the U.S. Government use every effort to have this item placed on the agenda for the next NATO Council meeting.

13. That the United States take whatever steps are necessary, including amending its validated license regulations, to prevent the sale of defoliants to Portuguese buyers.


15. That the United States either bilaterally, or through the United Nations, give humanitarian aid to the PAIGC and other liberation movements. (The feasibility of such aid is attested by the program of the Swedish Government which has an ongoing assistance program to liberation movements and, in the calendar year of 1971 will contribute to the PAIGC 1,750,000 kroner in kind for humanitarian or educational purposes.)

16. That the U.S. Government welcome the leaders of the PAIGC and other liberation movements for visits to this country and that U.S. officials meet with such leaders.

17. That the United States endeavor to get the two sides, the PAIGC and other liberation movements, and the Government of Portugal,
together to the conference table on the basis of the Lusaka Mani-
festo, the principles of which the United States generally
endorsed.

18. That the U.S. support multilateral and/or bilateral programs of
humanitarian support to the liberation movements, through the
provision of educational and reading materials, as well as medical
supplies, to people in the liberated areas and to refugees.

19. That the United States adopt a positive and substantial program
of assistance to southern African refugees.

20. That our foreign policy toward South Africa be completely re-
vamped. Our present foreign policy toward South Africa is based
on pronouncements of abhorrence of apartheid on the one hand,
and coexistence with, and even support of, its adherents on the
other. In our own enlightened interest, this must be changed, and
we must come to grips with the fact of change in South Africa
due not to the largesse of the whites, but to the determination of
the majority to achieve self-determination. To this end, the United
States should affirmatively adopt a policy, attuned to and support-
ing the majority and their rights.

21. That the United States clearly and publicly state the legal position
on the Bantustans, namely, that (1) they are illegal under inter-
national law, and (2) that international law requires the right of
political participation in the Government of South Africa by all
the people without distinction as to race, color, sex, language or
religion.

22. That the United States establish substantial contact with the ma-
jority in South Africa through the opening of USIS offices in
Soweto and in other large black communities.

23. That the Government reform its own enterprises in South Africa
and terminate the apartheid practices I observed there, and that
the Embassy and consular staffs be integrated at all posts and at all
levels in South Africa, and specifically:

(a) That the United States assign black personnel without
delay to the embassy and consulate staff and to the USIS
staff in South Africa on all levels and

(b) That local blacks be employed by the diplomatic and
consulate staff at each post and in all categories.

24. That guidelines be established for the U.S. Embassy and con-
sulate post for (1) the use of segregated facilities in South Africa,
and (2) for entertaining by U.S. Government personnel on a
non-racial basis, and (3) for their attendance at segregated func-
tions. (I cannot accept the position of the Department of State
that (a) it gives maximum discretion to our Ambassador in regard
to the “delicate problem of having to maintain adequate relations
with the authorities while continuing to support and project our
aborrence of apartheid and dedication to multiracial principles”
and (b) it permits the Ambassador to exercise “this discretion in
tailoring the nature of his entertainment and that of his staff to fit
the needs of the occasion.” Under these vague standards, spelled
out in Mr. Abshire’s letter to me of July 26, 1971, our Ambassador
gave a large, segregated reception which has subjected the United
States to much criticism in South Africa and in the United States. Our policy interests require the establishment of functional and legal guidelines for embassy, consular and all official U.S. Government personnel in South Africa as to their participation at official and social functions and their use of segregated facilities).

25. That the agreement with South Africa for tracking stations in South Africa (TIAS 4562 of September 13, 1960) be terminated according to its terms and, in the interim, (1) that NASA be required to end its apartheid policies and racist practices and (2) that there be no discrimination in either the conditions of labor and employment or in the facilities available to employees. The callous racism and apartheid which I found at the NASA Tracking Station near Johannesburg must be ended.

26. That the role of the Commercial Attaché and Economic Officer be reexamined and their functions of encouraging U.S. businesses in South Africa be terminated.

27. That the U.S. Government take a stand against business expansion in South Africa until such time as South Africa ceases its racial policies, and implement effective disincentives to U.S. business investment in South Africa.

28. That the United States advise businesses that, if they decide to stay in South Africa, they do so at their own risk; and in the event of difficulties with liberation elements, the U.S. Government will not support them or afford protection.

29. That the U.S. Government actively and publicly use its power and influence to cause and assist U.S. businesses in South Africa to:

(a) Close the communications gap between U.S. headquarters and their subsidiaries and branch offices in South Africa;

(b) To pay equal pay for equal work;

(c) To get on with the task of training and whatever else is necessary so that blacks, Coloureds, and whites are performing equal work on a substantial scale;

(d) To throw off local coloration and give respect to all employees;

(e) In sum, to establish fair employment practices and to refuse to adhere to racial policies and practices.

30. (a) That Executive Order No. 11246 be amended so that, with respect to those U.S. businesses in South Africa, fair employment practices in the South African enterprises be a condition for their eligibility for government contracts. I am also planning to introduce legislation for this purpose.

(b) In accordance with Executive Order 11246 requiring nondiscrimination by government contractors and in view of Pan-Am's exclusion of black Americans from its African runs, each U.S. Government agency having a contract with Pan-Am should review such contract under section 301(6) concerning sanctions and remedies for noncompliance with the discrimination clause.

31. That an appropriate mechanism be established within the executive departments to investigate the practices of American firms in South Africa, to report to the executive and Congress thereon,
and to advise as to those firms which are not implementing fair employment practices.

32. That the U.S. Government establish an honor roll of those firms who are implementing fair employment practices, and are providing substantial educational, counseling, and training for their African employees.

33. That the U.S. Government end all Export-Import Bank facilities and services for South Africa. As brought out in our hearings of June 3, 1971, at which the vice president of the Export-Import Bank appeared before the subcommittee, the following services of the Export-Import Bank are allowable under present guidelines for South Africa:

1. Short-term FCIA—Foreign Credit Insurance Association—insurance.
2. Medium-term FCIA insurance, As of April 30, 1971, $9,882,000 insurance was authorized.
4. Guarantees of loans by non-U.S. financial institutions to South African purchasers of U.S. goods or services.

(Export-Import Bank has informed the subcommittee that as of Apr. 30, 1971, $20,246,000 guarantees were authorized as medium-term guarantees, but did not indicate the nationality (i.e., United States or South African) of the exporter bank.)
5. Exim discount loans to South African purchasers. In his statement on May 20, 1970, before the subcommittee, a State Department witness had listed the Eximbank exposure in South Africa as confined to medium- and short-term insurance and guarantees, adding that no Exim loans or credits have been issued for transactions with South Africa since 1959. However, four discount loan commitments to South African companies were approved by Exim between October 20, 1969, and February 25, 1971, for export sales to South Africa, indicating a change and relaxation of policy by this administration. (Two of these transactions were canceled by the borrowers.)
6. The facilities of the Foreign Credit Insurance Association for insuring political risks in South Africa.
7. The export expansion facility for insuring higher risks transactions.
8. Guarantees of non-U.S. loans to cover local costs related to U.S. purchases.
9. The relending credit program.
10. The provision by Exim staff of guidance and information to South African importers and U.S. exporters to South Africa.
11. And the availability to South Africa of Exim's program of providing direct loans to a foreign government suffering temporary dollar shortages was not stated outside of present guidelines by the Eximbank witness before the subcommittee on June 3.
That section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. 1307, prohibiting the importation into the United States of goods produced by forced labor be enforced. This provision reads:

“All goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in any foreign country by convict labor or/and forced labor or/and indentured labor under penal sanctions shall not be entitled to entry at any of the ports of the United States, and the importation thereof is hereby prohibited, and the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary for the enforcement of this provision. The provisions of this section relating to goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured by forced labor or/and indentured labor, shall take effect on January 1, 1932; but in no case shall such provisions be applicable to goods, wares, articles, or merchandise so mined, produced, or manufactured which are not mined, produced, or manufactured in such quantities in the United States as to meet the consumptive demands of the United States.

“Forced labor, as herein used, shall mean all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty for its nonperformance and for which the worker does not offer himself voluntarily. (June 17, 1930, ch. 497, title III, sec. 307, 46 Stat. 689.)”

That the sugar quota for South Africa be terminated; and that in no circumstances should South Africa be permitted an increased allocation so long as the benefits of the quota do not inure to the majority of the people. I personally witnessed the blatant racism of the South African Sugar Association and the deplorable conditions of employment of the workers as to wages, housing, diet, and hours of work. To this end, I recommend:

(a) That the President, acting pursuant to section 202(d) (1) (B), suspend the continuation of the sugar quota for South Africa. This section provides:

“(B) Whenever and to the extent that the President finds that the establishment or continuation of a quota or any part thereof for any foreign country would be contrary to the national interest of the United States, such quota or part thereof shall be withheld or suspended, and such importation shall not be permitted. A quantity of sugar equal to the amount of any quota so withheld or suspended shall be prorated to the other countries listed in subsection (c) (3) (A) (other than any country whose quota is withheld or suspended) on the basis of the quotas then in effect for such countries.”

(b) That South Africa not be eligible for the benefits of the provisions of section 202(d) (2) (A) of the Sugar Act. This section provides:

“(2) (A) Whenever the Secretary finds that it is not practicable to obtain the quantity of sugar needed from foreign countries to meet any increase during
the year in the requirements of consumers under section 201 by apportionment to countries pursuant to subsections (b) and (c) and the foregoing provisions of this subsection, such quantity of sugar may be imported on a first-come, first-served basis from any foreign country, except that no sugar shall be authorized for importation from Cuba until the United States resumes diplomatic relations with that country and no sugar shall be authorized for importation hereunder from any foreign country with respect to which a finding by the President is in effect under paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection: Provided, That such finding shall not be made in the first 9 months of the year unless the Secretary also finds that limited sugar supplies and increases in prices have created or may create an emergency situation significantly interfering with the orderly movement of foreign raw sugar to the United States. In authorizing the importation of such sugar the Secretary shall give special consideration to countries which agree to purchase for dollars additional quantities of U.S. agricultural products. In the event that the requirements of consumers under section 201 are thereafter reduced in the same calendar year, an amount not exceeding such increase in requirements shall be deducted pro rata from the quotas established pursuant to subsection (c) and this subsection."

36. That the arms embargo against South Africa include:

(a) All sales to, or for, the South African military, including the provision of spare parts, componentry and repairs. The relaxation of the arms embargo by the present administration to permit certain sales of aircraft to the South African military must be ended.

(b) All sales of light aircraft, military or civilian, destined for South Africa. The significance of this recommendation is indicated by the structure of the South African military forces, in which all physically qualified white males must serve and in which Africans cannot serve—a structure such that the "citizen forces" and citizen "air commandos" form an integral part of the defense force of the country. Thus, planes sold for civilian use are in fact available for military purposes.

(c) Training to South African military, including correspondence courses and participation in conferences.

(d) Cooperation in, and the transfer of, research, development and/or military know-how, including the testing of military equipment. At the subcommittee hearings of November 12, 1971, the Department of Defense testified that the United States had tested, in the United States, weapons (surface-to-air missiles) developed by joint South African-French participation, while dealing only with the French firm, to which we had provided money for the testing.
37. That the role of the military attaché in South Africa be reviewed and cause be shown why these functions not be terminated. (Note, information supplied by the Department of Defense at the November 12 hearings before the subcommittee indicated that there are more U.S. military attachés assigned to South Africa than to any other African country.)

38. That the United States institute an expanded educational and cultural program with the South African majority as a primary target and with those institutions and individuals working for change to majority rule as a secondary target.

39. That the United States facilitate private efforts and programs to provide legal and humanitarian assistance to the victims of the repressive legislation of South Africa.

40. U.S. cooperation with South Africa in the field of nuclear energy should be ended and, in no event, should there be a new agreement or an amendment to the present agreement to provide for an increase in the amount of uranium enriching services which the United States can supply South Africa. (South Africa has allegedly developed a new uranium enrichment process which the Prime Minister estimates (speech of Aug. 3, 1971) may bring South Africa $336,000,000 a year in foreign exchange.) Any support of South Africa in this effort would thus significantly undergird apartheid economically and militarily. South Africa has not signed the Nonproliferation Treaty.

The Chairman of the South African Atomic Energy Commission has been quoted (Rand Daily Mail, Apr. 12, 1971) as saying that:

"With its uranium enrichment process, South Africa is theoretically in a position to make its own nuclear weapons, whereas before, it was not practical to make the bomb from plutonium since that would have to be imported from abroad and the installation would be subject to international inspection."

41. That U.S. policy in international financial organizations be consistent with a policy of supporting change in South Africa and not of economically undergirding the status quo.

42. That the U.S. visa policy toward South Africa be based on quid pro quo considerations.

43. That, in conformity with the international legal obligations of the United States and in accordance with the acceptance by the United States of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the “Legal Consequence for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276,” the United States:

(a) Recognize the illegality of South Africa’s presence in Namibia and the invalidity of its acts on behalf of and concerning Namibia, and

(b) Refrain from any acts and in particular any dealings with South Africa implying recognition of the legality of, or lending support or assistance to, South Africa’s illegal presence and administration of Namibia, and in particular

(1) that United States firms doing business in Namibia not be allowed tax deductions or tax
credits for moneys paid to the South African administering authority (see also (5) (V) below);

(2) that grants, concessions, titles, licenses, privileges, or interests of any kind granted by the South African Government in regard to Namibia, Namibian products, goods or property of whatever kind be declared invalid (see also (5) (IV) below);

(3) that the importation of goods originating in Namibia into the United States on the basis of rights or interests purported to be granted by the South African authority be prohibited;

(4) that the United States not apply the provisions of any treaty with South Africa on behalf of, or concerning, Namibia (see also (5) (III) below);

(5) that the United States implement without delay the recommendations of the American Committee on Africa, as presented to Ambassador George Bush on November 4, specifically those regarding:

(I) American diplomatic and consular accreditation to South Africa;

(II) Preventing South African representation of Namibia in international affairs;

(III) No invocation of treaties extended to Namibia;

(IV) Invalidity of South African concessions and other acts;

(V) Treatment of American businesses in Namibia;

(VI) Political asylum for Namibian refugees;

(VII) Actions which should be taken by the United States through the United Nations.

(c) Cooperate with the legal administering authority for Namibia by joining a reconstituted Council for Namibia and seek to implement practical measures to end South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia. (See (5) (VII) above).

44. That recommendations 26 through 32 regarding U.S. policy and its implementation with respect to U.S. investment and business involvement in South Africa also be applied to U.S. investment and business involvement in the Portuguese territories.

45. That all investment-incentive programs of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) in, and for, the Portuguese territories be terminated and that the U.S. Government adopt an affirmative policy proscribing OPIC programs for the minority-rulled areas of Africa.
46. That American companies operating abroad, directly or indirectly, be required to furnish to the Departments of State, Commerce and Labor and to the appropriate committees of the Congress an annual, detailed comprehensive statement on their employment and wage practices. I also intend to introduce legislation to make this a statutory requirement.

47. That the U.S. support in the United Nations and all other appropriate forums, as well as bilaterally in our relations with South Africa and Portugal, the application of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to the freedom fighters, and participants in resistance movements and to the civilian population. The status of, and treatment as, prisoners of war should be accorded to the freedom fighters. The humanitarian provisions of these conventions should be extended to the combatants as well as the civilians in conflicts arising from the struggle for the liberation and self-determination of the minority-ruled areas of Africa.

48. That the United States (1) place increased emphasis on the majority-ruled states of southern Africa, particularly through economic and technical assistance and educational and cultural programs, and (2) assist their efforts to resist South African domination.

49. That the United States should encourage and assist feasibility studies into the mineral resources of the majority-ruled countries of southern Africa in order to lessen the dependence of those countries on South Africa.

50. That the United States look for an effective means to encourage greater interest in the majority-ruled states of Africa from U.S. investors and businesses.

51. That the United States cease its hypocrisy, dissimulation and legal dishonesty and recognize that the situation in southern Africa is within the purview of article 39 of the United Nations Charter. This section provides:

"The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security."

In order that the Security Council can get on with the task of considering appropriate measures to be taken, the United States must acknowledge that the situation in each of the minority-ruled areas of Africa—the situation in South Africa, the situation in Namibia, the situation in the Portuguese territories, as well as the situation in Southern Rhodesia—that each of these presents a threat to the peace.

52. That a Special Task Force on Africa be created:

(a) Composed of ranking members of the Departments of State, Commerce, Defense and other pertinent agencies, and of recognized experts on Africa including Members of Congress, academicians, journalists and businessmen;

(b) Charged with the task of making a comprehensive review of our policies toward Africa; and
(e) Established on the principle that its recommendations will be effectively implemented.

53. Finally, that the United States recognize the validity of, and take appropriate action on, the following recommendations and findings of the United Nations Association—United States of America National Policy Panel on Southern Africa:

(a) That "the 'rightness' of any particular course of action should be judged on the basis of its ability to assist in the realization of racial equality and representative government in South Africa"; and thus that "a boycott in sports and a strengthening of exchange programs may both be helpful in promoting change." (P. 41 of Panel Report of December 2.)

(b) That (in addition to those points made in recommendation 29) U.S. businesses in South Africa institute the following:

(1) "providing hot lunches, improved medical care, pension programs, and disability insurance" (Ibid. p. 45);

(2) facilitating the organizing of black workers (Ibid. p. 45);

(3) "that American companies cease making financial contributions to the South Africa Foundation" (Ibid. p. 57);

(4) "that American companies appoint as managers of their South African affiliates only those who are willing to work for change and are committed to the implementation of fair labor practices" (Ibid. p. 46).

(c) "That all U.S. groups and organizations concerned with apartheid and racial discrimination—and particularly the American labor movement in its tradition of active concern with the betterment of working conditions throughout the world become concerned with the need for American companies to adopt a program of fair labor practices in their South African operations" (Ibid. p. 47).

(d) "That concerned stockholders take advantage of the annual stockholders' meetings to bring to public light the matter of employment practices and conditions in South Africa" (Ibid. p. 47).

(e) That "each American company operating in South Africa should assess the use to which its products are employed in terms of the Government's apartheid policy. Any products used directly or indirectly in support of apartheid or racial discrimination—particularly those used by the police or military—should be withdrawn from the South African market" (Ibid. pp. 47-48).

(f) That "U.S. business should not, within the framework of its own domestic labor practices and in the context of its social responsibility, rely on racially discriminatory labor practices in other parts of the world to make a profit" (Ibid. p. 48).
citizens were most generous in their outpouring of relief assistance to starving Nigerian children, it is disillusioning to know that at the very same time as many unnoticed children were critically affected by malnutrition in other countries and continue so today. Throughout Africa, there are problems of malnutrition and health care. The new African states are engaged in a race against time. Their populations are growing at a rate faster than their economies. As Gunnar Myrdal has pointed out, this population pressure has deprived the lesser developed countries of the luxury of choosing to maintain their traditional societies and to renounce progress. Like most other lesser-developed nations, the new states of Africa must opt for rapid “modernization” in order to survive.

There are several aspects of the American aid program in Africa which have been of concern to the subcommittee. Many African leaders have been distressed with our program since it has favored regional aid for all but a few development-emphasis countries. Two difficulties occur with this approach: (1) the concept has never been implemented properly: regional aid was not conceived as a method of cutting overall aid appropriations, in fact its success depended upon an increase in funding; (2) many needs are not subject to a regional approach—several of the smaller African countries are not even sufficiently developed to take part successfully in regional projects and their problems cannot be ameliorated through such project support. To meet this situation, the subcommittee has previously suggested an increase in the Ambassador’s Self-Help Fund for those countries which do not receive bilateral assistance. In this manner American assistance might make an impact on some of the problems of every African state. But providing self-help funds to certain countries should not be used as an excuse for providing less development assistance to Africa.

The Malagasy are anxious for U.S. development assistance and believe they have a special claim because they have permitted the construction of the NASA tracking station. Instead of receiving special consideration, they find themselves penalized because their isolated location makes it especially difficult for them to participate in regional projects eligible for American assistance.

In October 1969 the pro-American government of President Abdussahid Ali Shermarke was overturned by a military coup. The new ruling group, the Supreme Revolutionary Council, is directing Somali toward a more independent policy. Aid to Somali has been terminated because Somali ships called in North Vietnamese ports (Section 620(n) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended). During the last 6 months of 1969 the Shermarke government had made its best efforts to stop Somali ships from trading with North Vietnam. In January 1970, under the new government, Somali ships once again began entering North Vietnamese ports. In the first 6 months of 1970 only 13 Somali ships entered North Vietnamese harbors; during this same period 30 ships of our ally Great Britain entered these same harbors. Congress might well reexamine the question whether this amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act serves our policy in Africa. Somalia needs developmental assistance. It seems most inequitable to deprive her people of economic assistance while no sanction is taken against the Government of our ally Great Britain for a similar action.
(g) "That U.S. banks and other financial institutions refuse to accord any financing to South African Government subsidiaries or to Government-sponsored commercial or military projects" (Ibid. p. 48).

(h) "That the U.S. Government review questions concerning the impact and future of international companies operating in South Africa with other investing nations. The United States might initiate such discussions in GATT and the OECD as well as in the United Nations" (Ibid. p. 50).

(i) That the United States assist the Governments of Botswana, Zambia and Tanzania in their programs "for the thousands of political refugees from southern Africa whose needs are great in terms of housing, education and health care" (Ibid. p. 76).

54. That the United States, cognizant of its obligations under the United Nations Charter, and specifically articles 1, 2(2), 25, 55, and 56;

(a) Recognize that the Heath/Smith "Proposals for a Settlement" do not secure to the people of Zimbabwe majority rule, self-determination, human rights or the enjoyment of the totality of their rights as set forth in article 73 of the United Nations Charter.

(b) Recognize that the situation in Zimbabwe continues to constitute a threat to the peace.

(c) Support the authority of the Security Council with respect to Zimbabwe.

(d) Recognize the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe to secure their rights.

55. (a) That the U.S. Government must be required, and is herein called upon, to explain the enormous, unprecedented and anomalous commitments which the United States is making to Portugal in connection with the agreement to extend U.S. base rights in the Azores—an agreement under which Portugal is to receive in the next 2 years (the agreement expires on Feb. 3, 1974) the following quid pro quo:

- $15 million in Public Law 480 agricultural commodities;
- the loan of a hydrographic vessel at no cost;
- $1 million for educational development programs;
- $5 million in drawing rights for nonmilitary excess equipment;
- the waiver of MAAG support payments ($350,000) for the MAAG (military assistance advisory group) to Lisbon;
- $400 million of Exim loans and guarantees for development projects.

(b) That specifically, the Government is called upon to address each of the following points:

1. From the point of view of U.S. interests, the new agreement with Portugal represents an unusual and anomalous commitment. There is no apparent justification for the quid pro quo in the new agreement.
a. The general availability of funds for foreign economic assistance has been diminishing since 1967. In that year, funds for economic assistance totaled $5,120 million. In 1968, they were $4,634 million. In 1969, they were $4,067 million. Last year, they totaled $4,711 million. The Export-Import Bank is an exception to the rule; its funds have been increasing in the last few years. But the question must arise why loans and credit guarantees to Portugal are rising at a moment when Federal funds are so scarce, and when total appropriations for economic assistance are falling.

b. The funds projected for commitment to Portugal are out of all proportion to previous development commitments through the Export-Import Bank to either Europe or Africa. The total of Export-Import Bank loans to Africa in the whole period 1946–70 was less than $358 million. The total of long-term economic loans to Europe from the same source in that period was only $753.7 million.

c. The projected commitment is also out of proportion to any previous commitments to Portugal itself. That country received less than $50 million in the whole period from 1946–70 through the Export-Import Bank. The present administration is proposing to provide more than four times this amount in the next 2 years alone.

d. The projected new commitments would constitute a tremendous drain on the funds of the Export-Import Bank. They would represent about 10 percent of the average annual commitments to all countries from the Bank in the last few years; and this does not even take into consideration the $200 million in Exim credit guarantees.

e. The question which remains to be answered, therefore, and it is a most important question, is why a small nation of 8.6 million people should receive such extraordinary special treatment.

2. The United States, furthermore, is now going through the worst balance-of-payments crisis in its history. We now have the largest deficit on record. Unemployment has risen to high levels as a consequence of deflationary measures designed to remedy that situation. In this context the administration has undertaken an agreement with a small European country which will lead to a substantial increase in the foreign exchange costs of our economic assistance. Again, the question must arise why Portugal should qualify for such special treatment.

3. Total U.S. dollar flows to Portugal and its overseas territories now exceed $400 million. (See table below.) These flows are important to that country's balance
of payments. The administration is now proposing a substantial increase in these flows through the loans provided for in the new agreement.

Portugal and overseas territories: Gross flows of funds from North America,1 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Million</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Imports from Portugal and overseas territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Freight and insurance on merchandise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Other transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Travel</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Investment income</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Other government</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Other private</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Unrequited transfers (pension remittances, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Non-monetary sectors: Direct investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 These figures refer to flows from the United States and Canada. U.S. funds account for almost the whole of the total.


4. The Portuguese are now running a trade deficit of just under $500 million. This deficit is, to an important degree, the result of the drain on Portugal's economy created by the pursuit of three colonial wars in Africa. Additional, and substantial, assistance to Portugal in this context will have the effect of helping it to continue those wars at the very moment when it is being forced to consider seriously whether it ought to withdraw from its overseas territories.

5. It should be noted that parts of the new agreement can easily become open-ended commitments. The expanded commitment under Public Law 480 may well be increased still further when the agreement is reviewed 2 years from now. The provision dealing with excess equipment is already open ended. Secretary Rogers' letter clearly states that $5 million for this purpose is not to be considered a maximum ceiling.

6. Dollar flows to Portugal, from both the private and the public sector, are already on a scale amounting to "economic intervention that might just decide the outcome of the colonial war." The new agreement increases that indirect assistance by a substantial amount and changes the character of our commitment to Portugal.

7. The political context cannot be ignored. Particularly:
   the liberation forces control large areas of Angola, east and south of the Central Plateau.
   in Mozambique the liberation forces control several provinces and operate freely south of the Zambesi River.
   in Guinea-Bissau, the PAIGC have forced the Portuguese to leave the countryside and to retreat to the urban areas and a few scattered military bases.

The obvious effect of the Azores agreement is to enable Portugal to continue waging the three wars in Africa.
8. There is nothing to indicate that the military value of the Azores is of overriding importance to U.S. security so that it merits such an inordinate expenditure. Further, the fact that the base agreement remained dormant for the past 10 years (since 1962) indicates this.

9. The injection of huge sums for economic and educational assistance, as well as aid in kind, into the Portuguese economy, in the existing internal situation of considerable domestic unhappiness with, and criticism of, wholly disproportionate budgetary expenditures on colonial wars, will greatly assist the Caetano Government in dampening the domestic antipathy to the wars and thus to continue their prosecution.

(c) That, if the administration cannot provide a statement of compelling reasons for making this agreement, it must be considered as admitting that it is the intention of the administration to directly assist Portugal in waging these wars against the peoples of Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique.

(d) That the U.S. Government respond to the following questions:
   1. What projects were reviewed, or are contemplated for Exim loans?
   2. Are these projects in Portugal, that is in so-called “metropolitan Portugal” as distinguished from Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique?
   3. Are similar increases in Exim loans being considered (i) for South Africa, (ii) for majority-ruled African countries?

(e) That, in view of the implications of this agreement for the United States, the administration explain why this agreement was entered into by the executive agreement route rather than as a treaty and submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

(f) That the administration explain the discrepancy between its claimed lack of funds to assist black business in the United State, with its 23 million blacks, on the one hand and, on the other, its expenditure of tremendous sums to assist the economy of Portugal, a country with only 8.6 million people, and thus to assist the waging of wars against black people in Africa. According to its reports to the Congress, the Federal Government is now giving only $213.8 million in loans to minority businesses in this country (including blacks and Spanish-speaking Americans), whereas the sums projected for Portugal in this agreement are more than double that amount.
MAURITANIA

The Islamic Republic of Mauritania lies on the Atlantic Ocean on the edge of the Sahara Desert in the northern part of Africa. In addition to the ocean boundary, Mauritania is bounded by four other areas. Mali forms the greater part of the eastern and southern boundary. Algeria lies in the northwestern corner. On its western side, Mauritania is bounded by Spanish Sahara in its upper half and by the Atlantic Ocean on the southwest. Senegal borders the southeastern part of Mauritania with the Senegal River forming the boundary between Mauritania and Senegal.

Mauritania’s area is approximately 400,000 square miles. As compared to other African territories in area, it is a little larger than Tanzania (which is 363,000 square miles) and also a little larger than Nigeria (which is 357,000 square miles). Mauritania is approximately the combined size of Utah, New Mexico, Colorado, and Arizona.

There are three distinct regions in Mauritania which, except for the Senegal River valley area in the south, is a flat desert country. This is evidenced both by the band of sand plains and dunes to the north of the Senegal River Valley area and even more by the arid area about this band, which forms the predominant part of Mauritania, and which, in the north, stretches into the Sahara Desert. Except in the river area, there is almost a complete absence of rain in Mauritania, whose climate is hot and dry. During the dry season the temperature exceeds 100°F.

The land and the people of Mauritania link two great regions of the African continent. It is a biracial country, inhabited by the Arabs in the north and the Africans from the south. Three-fourths of Mauritania’s 1,200,000 population is Moorish, that is, of Arab and Berber stock. The concentration of population varies from the sparsely populated desert regions in the north to the densely peopled river valley area in the south. But on the average, Mauritania has a low population density of three persons per square mile, as compared with Nigeria’s density of 158, Ghana’s 96, Congo’s 20, and Kenya’s 50. There are the following tribal groupings: the Toncouleurs, who comprise some 10 percent of the total population of Mauritania as well as such other groups as the Sarakole, the Pulani or Peulh and the Wolof people. The African tribal groups in the south are the descendants of the Zenaga, who founded the empire of the Almoravides in the 11th century. There are also some European residents in Mauritania. Although the blacks are now resident throughout the country, they were originally from the Senegal River Valley area, which they continue to populate heavily, particularly as farmers. In general, Mauritians are a desert-type people who are especially appreciative of nature, quietude, and simplicity.
Arabic is the national language of Mauritania; French is the official language. French is spoken by all groups. Language presents a minor problem in that the Moors would like to have Arabic as the lingua franca, and the Africans prefer French.

As indicated by the name, Mauritania is an Islamic country. Mauritania was administered by France as a part of the Federation of French West Africa. St. Louis, which is in Senegal, across the Senegal River from Mauritania, was the capital. When it became independent, Mauritania built its own capital city of Nouakchott, which means the City of Tents. The French, Chinese, and Federal Republic of Germany assisted in the building of the new capital. The improved port facilities at Nouakchott service the copper exports as well as the bulk of the imports. In only the last few years the population of Nouakchott has increased from 28,000 to 50,000. Consequently, there are the regular problems of rapid urban growth, including a scarcity of water.

The other large city in Mauritania is Nouadibou which formerly was called Port Etienne. It is a coastal city in the northern part of Mauritania and provides support facilities for shipping the iron ore which is one of the mainstays of the economy. The airport at Nouadibou is also used as a regular stop by planes going from Dakar to Casablanca. Nouadibou has a population of 13,000. Other principal cities are Rosso and Atar.

**History**

In the prehistoric period, the climate of Mauritania was humid. A population of black African farmers, hunters, and fishermen lived a settled agricultural life on what is now steppe or desert. As the climate became progressively drier, they moved south and were replaced by the nomadic Berbers. In the fourth century, A.D., the major nomadic tribe, the Sanhadja, established the major north-south trade routes that carried gold, slaves, and salt across the Sahara. In the eighth, ninth, and 10th centuries, the Sanhadja tribes formed a confederation to maintain their independence from the Islamic empires, and became a haven from political persecution for other Berbers.

Mauritania was the starting point for the Almoravid Empire, built on an austere Islamic doctrine that was to become the religion of much of West Africa. Its fighting monks established Marakesh in 1062, destroyed the Ghana Empire in 1076, spread east beyond Algeria and extended their rule into Spain. The Moors established contacts with Portugal, the Netherlands, and France in the 15th century. At the top of Almoravid society were the warriors—the Hassan tribes. Below them were the Marabout tribes, the teachers of Islamic traditions whose leaders formed brotherhoods which are still influential in Senegal, Guinea, Mali, and the Maghreb. Below them were the tributaries who paid the warriors for their protection and held much of the land, and finally the peasants and artisans. The Empire itself was loosely organized—a nomadic confederation whose rulers collected tribute but did not care to establish administrative control over foreign and culturally different peoples. A series of rebellions broke it up in 1125.

The history of Mauritania after the Arab conquest (16th century) was one of long feuds between tribes and confederations of tribes with internal plotting for tribal leadership. From the beginning of the 20th
century the French capitalized on these divisions and made different tribal groups believe they were on their side by promising "protection" without tribute. But it was not until 1934 that they extended their control over all of Mauritania. Even then, they found it easier to "rule" Mauritania through the indigenous tribes rather than by direct colonial administration. In 1960, Mauritania became completely and unconditionally independent from France, and in 1966 withdrew from the French community.

**Economy**

The population of Mauritania is largely nomadic, following the herds to pastures, 89 percent of the labor force is in agriculture and only 2 percent of the population is urban. The gross domestic product was estimated in 1968 to be $170 million with a $153 per capita GDP. This compares favorably with the average per capita GNP for Africa, excluding South Africa, of $140, or including South Africa, of $177.

The currency of Mauritania is the CFA franc, issued by the Central Bank of West African States (278 equaling $1). Mauritania is an associate member of the European Economic Community. It is also one of the seven member countries of the West African Customs Union. Mauritania has a favorable trade balance with the United States, and in its total trade its chief export is iron ore which counts for 90 percent of the exports. The iron ore mines are run by a French company, MIFERMA, of which a French Government agency holds 24 percent, and 71 percent is held by private French, English, Italian, and German shareholders. The iron ore is of a very high grade, 64 to 67 percent, and there are substantial deposits, particularly on the Port Gouraud area. Because of estimates that these deposits will be worked out in 8 or 10 years, the Government is beginning to investigate other sources where, although the grade may be lower, the iron ore can profitably be used.

One-third of the budget of Mauritania is provided by the iron ore, although the Government only gets 5 percent plus royalties of the iron ore contract. The company has built 300 to 400 miles of railroads from the mines to the expanded deepwater port facilities in Nouadibou. The railroads run twice a day, and form one of the longest trains in the world. Mauritania ranks second among African countries in the export of iron, exporting some $67 million of iron in 1969. (Note.—Liberia exported $137 million in iron ore.)

In 1969, the exploitation of the intensive copper deposits at Akjoujt was undertaken in a $60 million copper mining operation. French, Spanish, and local interests own a good-sized fish port complex at Nouadibou. Mauritanian industry also includes a sugar refinery, meat freezing plant and the match and cement facilities. A $100 million iron ore concentration plant is being considered.

As a further money earner, Mauritania is seriously considering developing tourism. It is also developing its rugmaking industry into a thriving export business. The rugs from Mauritania are particularly lovely. There are several distinctive Mauritanian patterns.

The Afro-American Labor Center, with the support of USAID funds is building a $35,000 labor and education center in Nouakchott, as was projected before the June 1967 break in relations. According
to plans, the building was to be officially inaugurated on May 1, 1972. Even during the suspension of diplomatic relations the AALC maintained its relationship with the Union des Travailleurs de Mauritanie (UMT). The AALC is also assisting two cooperatives: a fishing cooperative in Nouakchott and an agricultural cooperative in Adrar.

**Education and Health**

In the field of education the gains of the African countries since independence are indeed notable. Five years after independence, Mauritania had almost doubled the number of primary school students with this population rising from the 11,000 of 1960 to 20,000 in 1965. Similarly, the number of primary school teachers had arisen from 600,000 in 1960 to 1 million in 1965. But the rise in the number of children in secondary schools is even more impressive, increasing from 530,000 in 1960 to 1,380,065.

In the field of health, there is particular emphasis on prenatal, postnatal and early child care, which is part of Mauritania's efforts to continue to raise the health of its people. In the south, cholera is a problem and the United States has provided assistance through the World Health Organization.

**Government**

Under the Mauritanian Constitution, the Government is headed by a President elected by direct, universal suffrage with legislative power vested in a unicameral 50 member National Assembly, similarly elected. The Cabinet is appointed by and solely responsible to the President. Uniquely, the Constitution provides that there should be only one political party, the Mauritanian People's Party. The study mission met and held discussions with the President, His Excellency Maitre Moktar Ould Daddah, and other Government officials. Interestingly, the President, a French-trained lawyer, with his wife, constitute two of the five lawyers in Mauritania. The Constitution provides for an independent judicial authority, with the Supreme Court judges appointed by the President. Of the 50 deputies, two are women. A national council is held every 2 years.

**Foreign Relations**

The foreign policy of Mauritania is nonaligned. Although Mauritania is a francophone country, it pursues an independent policy with respect to African issues, including southern African matters and in regard to the Middle East. Two years ago Morocco, which had claimed sovereignty over Mauritania, announced a reversal of this policy following talks between Nigeria, Mauritania, and Morocco, thus opening up normal relations with the north. As an Islamic state, Mauritania demonstrated its solidarity with Arab States when it broke relations with the United States after the 6-day war in 1967. Mauritania was the first state which broke relations at that time to renew relations with the United States. On December 22, 1969, it was announced that Mauritania and the United States had agreed to the resumption of diplomatic relations.
The United States maintains an Embassy in Mauritania. At the time of our visit, the Embassy was headed by a Chargé, but as of December 1971, a resident U.S. Ambassador arrived.

Mauritania considers itself a bridge between the Arab States of the north and the black African States. President Ould Daddah of Mauritania was the former president of the OAU—Organization of African Unity. The President headed a delegation of African foreign ministers to the September 1971 meeting of the Security Council to consider the problem of Namibia in light of the recent decision of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences for states of South Africa’s continued illegal occupation of Namibia.

**REGIONAL COOPERATION**

Mauritania is a member of the Organization of Senegal River States (OERS) which was formed in March 1968 by the Presidents of Mali, Guinea, Senegal, and Mauritania. The purpose of OERS is the promotion and development of the Senegal River Basin and of economic cooperation between the four members, with the objective of forming a customs union. The combined population of the four countries—the 1.2 million of Mauritania and the approximate 4 million of each of the other three—would provide a much larger economic market. President Ould Daddah the Executive Secretary of the organization, expressed the rationale for the organization as follows:

> Separately, these four states finished their first decade of independence by realizing that regional integration was the . . . only interesting possibility for their development.

The United Nations Development Program is financing preinvestment surveys in the following:

1. A $1.2 million study to determine the best location for a dam to regularize the flow of the Senegal River and at the same time to provide electricity;
2. A hydroagricultural project, in a $4.7 million study of irrigation and agricultural possibilities along the river and the delta;
3. A $2.3 million study of electricity generation and irrigation possibilities in the upper Senegal River Basin, mainly in Guinea;
4. A $1.8 million study of the best system for navigation and ports and ocean river shipping from St. Louis, Senegal, at the river’s mouth to Kayes, in Mali;
5. A $2.4 million allocation for three agricultural research centers and pilot projects in Senegal, Mauritania, and Mali.

Projects for a four-country effort to improve grain storage facilities and a program for livestock and meat marketing are in the planning stage.
IV. TRADE

Africans want more trade, not only because they regard it as a more equitable relationship than aid, but also because they believe that it will more surely advance the cause of economic development. The principal need of developing countries is foreign exchange to finance development projects; this need can be filled either through external assistance, foreign investment, or export earnings. Trade has two important advantages: (1) foreign assistance, like investment, is often dependent upon political factors, while trade is generally dependent on apolitical market prices; and (2) development experts have found that a rise of 10 percent in exports will generate more foreign exchange than a 50-percent increase in foreign aid. In view of the fact that the volume of foreign assistance flowing to developing countries is generally declining in real terms, the second advantage becomes critical.

At present United States-African trade is not extensive, although it expanded during the decade of the sixties. Among the underdeveloped regions, Africa comes in a distant third in its volume of trade with the United States. The United States in 1969 exported $1,303 million worth of goods to Africa and imported $1,003 million. In that same year U.S. exports to Latin America totaled $5,577 million in value and its imports from Latin America were worth $5,160. United States-East Asian trade in 1969 was even greater; $6,236 million in exports and $7,472 million in imports. Concerted steps are needed to strengthen U.S. trading relations with Africa on fair terms.

U.S. exports to Africa are marginally affected by the "reverse preferences" which Francophone states give to the EEC. However, the effect of this has been grossly exaggerated. The former colonial powers' predominance in African markets is due more to traditional links than to the preference. Instead of complaining so loudly about this, the United States should devote at least as much effort to export promotion here, through the Export-Import Bank, as it does to Portugal and South Africa. Japan is in the same discriminatory position and has managed to increase its exports to Africa greatly in recent years.

The United States has pointed to its proposals for generalized tariff preferences for all developing nations as a means by which United States-African trade may be improved. Such an agreement among the developed countries will be important for Africa's economic future. However, since the terms of the agreement which the developed countries are currently likely to accept emphasize tariff reductions for manufactured and semimanufactured goods, African trade will not immediately profit as greatly as that of other developing regions. Most African economies are based upon the production of one or two primary commodities for export. Algeria and Ghana are the only African nations among the top 20 developing countries exporting manufactured and semimanufactured goods to the nonsocialist bloc of developed countries.

International commodity agreements, as Secretary Rogers indicated in his 1970 report, are essential for African economic development. The International Coffee Agreement was beneficial to African countries. It is to be hoped that negotiations will result in an International
The Mauritanians have received considerable economic assistance from the European Economic Community, Nationalist China, and Spain. In the southern part of Mauritania, there are four medical, first-aid centers built and operated by the Chinese. There have also been discussions of a port in Nouakchott to be built by the Chinese. U.S. assistance for Mauritania consists of support for an OERS poultry project in which Mauritania participates with Guinea, Mali, and Senegal. Regional poultry centers are to be set up in each of the four-member countries. This project is an outgrowth of an AID project in Mali. Under the regional projects, chicks from the Mali poultry farm are to be sent to the reception centers in the other OERS country for distribution to individual farmers and poultry cooperatives.

The 1971 self-help allocation of $15,000 financed three projects. The bulk of $10,000 was used to assist with in-house facilities for the AID regional poultry project in Nouakchott and Rosso, and $5,000 for the construction of storage rooms for the Nouakchott maternal and child welfare center (PMI). The Nouakchott PMI was a $100,000 U.S. AID project inaugurated in 1966, and has served as a model for 12 other such centers in Mauritania. Because the Nouakchott PMI did not have adequate storage facilities to store medicines and equipment and food received through the Catholic Relief Service, the self-help program was used to finance new warehouses.

The United States has no AID personnel in Mauritania and the program is under the AID Regional Director in Dakar.

Other U.S. programs

The Peace Corps was in Mauritania before the 1967 break in relations, and one Peace Corps volunteer has now been assigned to assist with the poultry center. There is no USIS in Mauritania, but the Embassy has plans to start English language classes.

Conclusion

Mauritania is a biracial country dedicated to living harmoniously in developing cooperative relations.

The President has made clear his determination to weld the various groups and tribes into a nation. There is an even-handed policy and jobs are balanced out carefully. The study mission to Mauritania which directly followed our visit to South Africa, where the Government is engaged in a deliberate policy of legal, economic, and social discrimination on the basis of race and color, was particularly pleasant and enjoyable. U.S. official visits to Mauritania have been infrequent. The first congressional delegation to Mauritania was in November 1969 under Congressman Poage and three or four other members of his committee visited Mauritania with him. In July 1970, Mayor Washington of Washington, D.C., visited Mauritania over the Fourth of July.

It is strongly urged that expanding the present pattern of visiting African countries would, as our visit to Mauritania demonstrated, provide great satisfaction, but exemplify the kind of interest on the part of the United States that is justified.
THE GAMBIA

The Gambia, a testament to the imperial scramble for territory and of the artificial allocation of colonial boundaries, is situated on the west coast of Africa on both banks of the River Gambia. The river rises in the Fula Jallon Mountains of Guinea and flows in a narrow stream for some 1,000 miles to the Atlantic Ocean, having increased to a breadth of 12 miles at Cape St. Mary. Except for its coastline on the Atlantic Ocean, The Gambia, which varies in width from 7 to 20 miles, is completely surrounded by Senegal. This narrow enclave in Senegal extends lengthwise for some 300 miles from its Atlantic coast, with its width of about 30 miles on the coast shrinking in half up-country. The Gambia is relatively flat country. Its area of some 4,000 square miles makes it the smallest country on the African Continent proper. (Mauritius and Reunion are the only countries linked to Africa with smaller areas.) The Gambia, which is about twice the size of Delaware is a part of the savannah land of Africa. It is a subtropical country, fortunate in having a relatively agreeable climate with distinct rainy and dry seasons and with temperatures ranging from 61° F. to 81° F. in the dry season, that is from November to mid-May. The River Gambia provides excellent communication and transportation for the whole country. It is tidal for most of its length in The Gambia; 3,000 ton oceangoing vessels can sail 150 miles up the river. The Gambia Government operates a passenger and cargo steam vessel to Basse, some 242 miles up the river.

The Gambia's population in 1970 was estimated to be 357,000. There is an annual growth rate of about 2 percent. Its density of 83 persons per square mile makes it one of the most densely populated countries of Africa. (The average density rate for Africa is 28 persons per square mile.) It is inhabited by the Mandingo Tribe, the largest group in Guinea; the Fula, especially in the eastern part of The Gambia; the Wolof in Bathurst and in the western section; the Jolas in the western division; and the Serahuli in the upper river division. These same groups are also found in Senegal. The Gambia also has immigrants from Senegal, Mali, and Guinea. In fact, about one-tenth of its population was born in Senegal.

The Aku community, which comprises another group in Guinea, are descendants from liberated slaves who returned to Africa during the British campaign against the slave trade. There are about 500 Mauritians residing in Bathurst as shopkeepers and cattle traders; there is a Lebanese community and also a small European community.

The official language of The Gambia is English. It is predominantly a Moslem country whose motto is "Progress, Peace, and Prosperity. The Government shall endeavor for Progress and Peace so as to achieve prosperity for all its people." About 45,000 of the people live in the capital, Bathurst, which lies on an island near the mouth of the River Gambia.
The Gambia was part of the three great empires: the Ghana, the Songhai, and the Mali, which ruled West Africa from the sixth through the 15th century A.D. These empires brought political stability to the area and linked it with the flourishing trans-Saharan trade. The Mandinka tribe ruled the Senegambia area long after their Mali empire had deteriorated. They brought Islam, cotton, and weaving, encouraged agriculture, and controlled trade, first with the interior and later with the Europeans along the river. The Senegambia Stone Circles in Gambia, burial mounds of Kings, are among the ruins of the Mali empire at its height.

The Portuguese entered the mouth of the Gambia River in search of gold in 1455. The history of European activity from this time until the 19th century is one of unsuccessful attempts to settle, develop trade, and find the huge deposits of gold that were supposed to exist along the river banks. The British, French, Dutch, Portuguese and numerous privateers were constantly fighting from island forts for control of The Gambia, the local chiefs making profits by selling these islands periodically to different countries. In 1765, British forts and settlements on the river were made part of the British colony Senegambia, most of which was traded to the French 18 years later. The Gambia was given to a British trading company and became an important base from which to suppress the slave trade. In 1816, the English founded the settlement of Bathurst for that purpose.

The Gambia was torn by religious wars throughout the 19th century. The Marabouts, strict Moslem leaders, with a large peasant following, fought the Saninkis, ruling class Moslems with less strict beliefs. In these wars, the chiefs asked England for protection, making it possible for her to extend control over the whole of The Gambia by the end of the century. In 1889 The Gambia became a separate Crown Colony, divided between four “Protectorates” and a “Colony” (the cities Bathurst and Georgetown). Boundaries were established in an agreement with the French. These had no indigenous basis, geographical or ethnic, and were drawn primarily to deny the French any access to The Gambia River. This, the British believed, would make The Gambia good for trading purposes later.

Under the British colonial administration ground nuts became the major export crop. The cities grew, and with them the gap between the urban peoples, such as the Wolof, and the rural, agricultural peoples such as the Mandinka. A legislative council was established which met continuously from 1888 on. Universal suffrage was granted in elections to this council in 1962, and Sir Dada Jawara’s People’s Progressive Party took office after the first election. Since independence in 1965, his government has worked at removing artificial boundaries drawn during colonial administration. The Protectorate and Colony distinction has been abolished, and economic and cultural ties with the former French Senegal are being reaffirmed.

Economy

At the present time, The Gambia is not known to have mineral resources and its economy is basically agricultural: 53 percent of the land, in fact, is agricultural land, and 85 percent of its 165,000 popula-
tion work in agriculture. Ninety percent of the people live in rural areas. For 1971, The Gambia had an estimated GDP of $46 million, and was expected to exceed its average annual growth rate of 8.4 percent. The reason for this relatively high average annual growth rate lies in The Gambia’s added development program, particularly in water, land, and swamp reclamation. The development of The Gambia is indicated in its GNP per capita figures which were $94 in 1968 and $128 in 1971.

The Gambian currency was formerly based on the Gambian pound which was at par with the British pound, but is now the Gambian dalasy, which is issued by the Gambian Central Bank. The dalasy is fully backed by sterling securities. The balance-of-payments picture is greatly aided by tourism and fishing; the deficit in its trade picture of $23 million in imports and $19 million in exports is offset by the inflows of private capital.

The new 5-year development plan places its prime interest on one of The Gambia’s fastest growing industries, tourism, and development of the necessary infrastructure. The Gambia is the closest English-speaking country to Europe, and there is significant tourist interest in The Gambia, especially Swedish. Several new hotels are being constructed in Bathurst so that hotel capacity will be 1,000.

Peanuts or ground nuts comprise the chief export of The Gambia and account for 95 percent of the export earnings which in 1970 brought $19 million, showing a $1 million increase over 1969. The economy is naturally affected by the world market prices of its one crop. The Gambia has instituted a major drive to develop agriculture generally, and is focusing on alternate cash crops of rice, palm kernels, cotton, and limes. Although rice has long been grown in The Gambia as a subsistence product, The Gambia is still importing 14,000 tons of rice from Burma. The closing of the Suez Canal added to the effort to develop its own rice production to the point where The Gambia can, in the future, export rice. The Gambia has announced a policy of self-sufficiency in rice as soon as possible, and notable advances are being made by The Gambia in rice production with the assistance of the Taiwanese. The Nationalist Chinese provided technical assistance under The Gambian-Chinese Agreement. The plan is to bring under production 2,000 new acres a year of irrigated rice, to produce two crops a year and to change the former average yield per acre from 1,500 paddies (that is 2.1 tons of clean rice equivalent) to a long-term goal of 4,000 paddies per acre. The Government is seeking World Bank assistance for a large $3 million project so that it can get 6,500 irrigated acres under production in a few years. A World Bank mission is currently underway in The Gambia for an on-the-ground observation in further consideration of this project.

The Government has established an agricultural station which is developing higher-yielding strains of ground nuts and fertilizers appropriate to The Gambia, which it sells to farmers at subsidized prices. It has also developed strains of high-yielding varieties of rice and kola adaptable to The Gambia in an attempt to diversify the one-crop economy. The Government has mounted an oxenization program by which it hopes to get enough oxen for all the farmers. This, they realize, is more essential and probably more appropriate
than obtaining tractors for a few. An oilseeds marketing board has been established to stabilize the income of farmers by paying a fixed price for their produce. A steadily growing cooperative movement provides agricultural credit and agricultural extension programs.

The fishing division of the Ministry of Agriculture is actively developing the tremendous fishing resources of The Gambia, which include shrimp and lobster. A frozen fish export industry has begun with the assistance of two internationally registered fishing companies which are beginning the frozen fish export industry. Two fish processing and cold storage plants are under construction. There is an active program to complete the substitution of outboard motors for the traditional canoes for Gambian fishermen; donations have been received from the FAO. The Government has instituted a program to train fishermen in all aspects of distribution and marketing of fish.

The Gambia has only a little light industry. There are small peanut and other agricultural processing plants, and there are 15 local operations supplying consumer goods.

The Afro-American Labor Center is involved in The Gambia and has advised on certain projects, including a mobile labor center. The AALC maintains fraternal relations with the Gambia Workers' Union and the Government of The Gambia. Several workers' education training programs have been organized as well as administrative support projects, including the provision of vehicles. The AALC is currently engaged in a unique project in the health field—the first dental trailer unit for Africa. This unit will be presented by the AALC to the Gambian Workers' Union for the use of the Gambian Ministry of Health.

The Organization of African Unity has been assisting The Gambia and Senegal with respect to the problem of exploitation of fishing resources by vessels of other countries, and pollution.

As with many other African countries, The Gambia has more cattle than people and a 4-percent annual increase in cattle as compared to a 2-percent rate for its people. The Gambia has launched a program both to reduce the numbers of cattle to a level which the dearth of grazing area in certain parts of the country permits and to develop this cattle resource for exporting meat overseas by constructing slaughtering facilities and abattoirs.

The Gambia is endeavoring to improve its transportation and internal communications with respect to roads and docks. Pursuant to a feasibility study, financed by the U.S. Government, plans are going forward under a Senegalese-Gambian agreement for a bridge across the River Gambia. This bridge will be a vital link in West African highway development. Completion of the airport is deemed essential for further development of tourism.

The Gambia has very little trade with the United States. Forty-seven percent of its export markets are to the United Kingdom and 36 percent are to the European Economic Community, particularly the Netherlands. The Government officials stress their policy of encouraging private investment and have liberal investment laws and regulations. They are also actively encouraging foreign assistance to finance their development.
The Gambia has a literacy rate of 10 percent as compared with that of 32 percent for Africa generally. Seventeen percent of the 5- to 14-year-old age group is in school as compared with the average figure for the whole of Africa is 20 percent. But the significance of The Gambia's efforts in education is illustrated by the fact that 12 percent of the 15 to 19 age group is in secondary schools as compared with the African average of 8 percent. Further, since 1960 when there were 7,000 students and 200 teachers in the primary schools and 1,600 students and 90 teachers in the secondary schools, The Gambia has made great strides in education. As of 1968 there were 16,000 children in primary schools with 500 teachers and in the secondary schools 4,290 students and 220 teachers. The Ministry of Education and Health is engaged in an effort to expand education in rural areas, including secondary level training emphasizing agricultural studies.

The Gambia has one teachers training college, but does not have a college or university, although there are many Gambians in universities in West Africa and elsewhere.

Health

To improve health in the country, 10 percent of the annual budget is spent on curative and preventative medicines. Two hospitals, numerous health centers and a nursing school have been constructed. The Gambia is making innovations in those areas important to economic growth and welfare improvement in underdeveloped countries, and emphasizes that it is sacrificing more glamorous, but less substantive, projects in so doing.

The Government

The 1970 Constitution divides the Government of The Gambia into independent executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The President is popularly elected for a 5-year term and appoints a Cabinet. The legislative consists of a unicameral House of Representatives with 37 members, 32 elected by universal adult suffrage for 5-year terms, four elected by tribal chiefs and the Attorney General. The Gambians take great pride in the integrity of their electoral system. A referendum supported unanimously by the President and the legislature was defeated by the electorate by a margin of 1 percent. The judiciary consists of a supreme court, a court of appeals, and subordinate courts. The civil service is composed largely of Gambians who were part of the British administration in other colonial areas.

The Gambia has one of the few multiparty systems in Africa. In the February 1971 elections, President Jawara's People's Progressive Party won 31 seats in the House of Representatives, the United Party three, and the People's Progressive Alliance two. Another extremely influential organization in The Gambia is the Gambia Workers Union. Though not a political party, it speaks for a large number of workers and has so far succeeded in winning its demands. It is headed by M. E. Jaleow, Secretary-General of the African Regional Body of the ICFTU.
The reason for the PPP's political success is the fact that it grew up out of the rural areas, which still contain four-fifths of The Gambia's population. The PPP first campaigned on a platform of opposition to the traditional dominance of Bathurst political parties and to the Butash Government's overconcentration of resources in Bathurst. Since coming to power, the PPP has made impressive steps toward equalizing the urban-rural imbalance and has concentrated on the agricultural development essential to economic growth.

**FOREIGN RELATIONS**

The Gambia's diplomatic representation abroad is severely limited. It continues to maintain close ties with the United Kingdom which in many countries, including the United States, carries on the diplomatic relations on behalf of The Gambia. The Gambia's trade and investment is oriented principally toward the United Kingdom. The Gambia also maintains close ties with its neighbor, Senegal. In 1968, a Seneg-Gambian Secretariat, with headquarters in Bathurst, was formed. There are representatives or high commissioners stationed in both countries; and biannual meetings are held. Joint agreements between Senegal and The Gambia on external affairs, defense, and security were signed upon independence. There is also a 1965 agreement on development of the Gambia River Basin as well as agreements on agricultural development, cultural exchange, and communications. Gambia has a fishing attaché in Abidjan. Discussions have been held as to The Gambia's becoming a full or associate member of the OERS, the Organization of Senegal River States.

The Gambia is a member of the United Nations, of the OAU, and of the British Commonwealth. Discussions are in progress with international financial agencies on various projects as well as with various countries on multidonor assistance projects.

**UNITED STATES-GAMBIAN RELATIONS**

United States relations with the people of The Gambia predate its independence. The first visit to the Africa Continent by a U.S. President in office was to Bathurst, the capital of The Gambia, when President Roosevelt stayed overnight there en route to and from the Casablanca Conference. During the Second World War, The Gambia contributed troops to the Allied cause; and Bathurst provided an airstrip for use by the U.S. Army Air Corps and was a port of call for allied naval convoys. In the 7 years since The Gambia became independent, United States-Gambian relations have been strong and friendly.

The visit of the study mission to The Gambia was marred by the news of the death of the U.S. Chargé to The Gambia only 2 days before our projected arrival. Upon investigation, it was our understanding that (1) Bathurst is a one-man post, and (2) that the sheer brunt of the work (administrative, including the handling of communications, as well as the substantive work of providing total representation of the U.S. Government) may well have been sufficient to aggravate or in fact cause health deterioration, and (3) that some other countries,
such as the United Kingdom, do not have one-man posts—either three persons are assigned or none at all. It is strongly recommended that this Government have a minimum assignment of three personnel in each diplomatic post.

Although the U.S. provides assistance to The Gambia only through regional projects. The Gambia presents an excellent example of the need for bilateral aid planning and for assistance programming with a view to the individual needs of each country.

A successful 5-year U.S. immunization and health program under the Public Health Service was scheduled to be phased out by the end of 1971.

It seems especially important that in small countries, where U.S. representation is minimal, such as The Gambia, there is a USIS reading room. For the cost involved, the return would be quite large. There is an active ongoing Peace Corps program in Senegal, with a sizable Peace Corps contingent in mathematics and science, secondary school teaching, as well as a few Peace Corps volunteers in sports and physical education. The United States also provides scholarships and other educational assistance under the African scholarship program of American universities (ASPAU) program for undergraduates and there are currently three students from The Gambia in this program. At present 21 Gambians are participating in the educational inter-African degree training program which the United States supports. The United States also provides educational leader grants under educational exchange programs for educational travel in the United States.

As part of the unfortunate pattern, U.S. visitors to Africa tend to concentrate on the coastal and better known larger states. The occasion of the visit of the study mission marked the first visit by a U.S. congressional delegation to The Gambia.

The vigor, dynamism, and resourcefulness of The Gambian leaders whom we met and of the people of The Gambia makes clear, however, that, notwithstanding the disadvantages of its size and its enclave situation, The Gambia is a country which deserves more attention than these factors would indicate.
Cocoa Agreement. Five African countries are major producers of cocoa. Regrettably, the domestic lobby has been active here; and the United States has persisted in its refusal to cooperate in an agreement. Additional agreements for other major African primary products would also help shelter fragile African economies which are dependent upon the fluctuating world market prices for these commodities.

Perhaps one way in which the United States could immediately and directly assist the trade of some African nations whose economies are bound to the production of primary products is to raise their U.S. import quotas for sugar and cotton. This could be done without upsetting the American economy by slightly reducing the quotas of developed countries in favor of these developing nations. The Pearson Commission report recommended that an increasing share of the domestic consumption of certain selected commodities be supplied by imports from developing countries. For example, in the case of unprocessed cotton of a certain length, the U.S.S.R., a relatively developed country, has a larger quota than most of the African nations with quotas, and a quota much larger than that granted to some Latin American nations. As the only developed nation with a quota, the U.S.S.R. could have its quota reduced and the excess volume could be added to the quotas of selected developing countries such as Chad, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Morocco, Tanzania, or Uganda. In the case of the U.S. sugar quota, Australia, South Africa, and Ireland are the only developed countries granted quotas. The South African and Irish quotas and a share of Australian quota should be reallocated to sugar-producing black African countries. Ireland will have ample market for its sugar in the EEC, when it joins in 1973.

While such support for African commodity economies might help increase United States-African trade in the short run, long-range development of these economies requires diversification. Earnings from the export of these products is limited because of the inelasticity of demand. It is impossible to assure sufficient growth earnings from these products which will enable Africa to achieve overall economic growth. Consequently, if the United States truly desires a strong trading partnership with Africa it must help provide the financial resources for economic diversification and the development of agroindustries which will allow Africa to profit from the value added by agricultural processing.
ALGERIA

Algeria is situated in the northwest of Africa between Morocco and Tunisia. It has a Mediterranean coastline of 600 miles. With an area of 920,000 square miles (2,382,000 kilometers), it is the largest of the three countries that comprise the Maghreb, the region of mountains, valleys, and plateaus between the Mediterranean and the Sahara. Algeria is thus almost one-third the size of the United States. It consists of two main topographical regions. The first, the mountainous, relatively humid terrain of the north, is part of the Atlas mountain system running southwest to northeast across the Maghreb. The second, the expanse of lower, flatter desert of the south (four-fifths of the land area), is part of the Sahara tableland. The climate varies geographically. Northern summers are usually hot and arid; the winters are mild and rainy. Rain varies from 5 to 40 inches and falls largely during the winter. There is complete drought for 3 or 4 months, during which dry and dusty winds often blow off the Sahara. They can raise the temperature to over 100° Fahrenheit and kill crops in a few hours. In the Sahara, summers are extremely hot and winters relatively cold, with little rain (6-8 inches annually, falling in spring and fall). Here, the dust storms last twice as long as they do on the coast.

Of the 13.8 million people, a majority are young and rural; 90 percent of the population lives in the northern coastal area. In 1966, 57 percent of the population was less than 20 years in age; 37 percent ranged between 20 to 60 years; 6 percent were 60 or more. Sixty percent of the people live in rural areas.

Algeria is a mosaic of different peoples due to the waves of conquests which have swept the Algerian shores for 2,000 years. Berber, Greek, Phoenician, and Carthaginian all passed that way from the sixth to the second century, B.C. Rome conquered and colonized from the second century, B.C. to the seventh century, A.D. Pronounced ethnic influence came with the Arab invasions of the seventh to 11th centuries and the attendant spread of Islam. Assimilation, mingling of Arabs and Berbers, was limited to the plains, high plateaus, and main travel conduits. Berber tribes in isolated villages in the Tellian Atlas, Kabylia and Aures Mountains, and in the south of the Abaggar have kept their physical type, language, social organization and traditional life style intact.
The attached chart gives basic data on Algeria:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>Latest</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agricultural land</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Acres</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agricultural land per capita</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Millions</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth rate</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Percent</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons per square mile</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent urban</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of labor force in agriculture</td>
<td>Latest</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP per capita</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>U.S. dollars</td>
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Health:
- Life expectancy: Latest, Years
- Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births): do, Number
- Persons per hospital bed: do, do
- Persons per physician: do, 5,500
- Daily caloric intake per capita: do, Calories
  - Primary as percent of 5 to 14 age group: do, Percent
  - Secondary as percent of 15 to 19 age group: do, do
  - Literacy rate: do, Percent
  - Number of telephones: do, do
  - Radio broadcasting transmitters: do, do
  - Daily newspapers (per 1,000 persons): do, do
  - Roads (improved, per 1,000 square miles): do, Miles
  - Motor vehicles registered: do, do
  - Electrical production per capita: do, do

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students as percent of 5 to 14 age group</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy rate</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>25-30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>156</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radio broadcasting transmitters</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Daily newspapers (per 1,000 persons)</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>do</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor vehicles registered</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical production per capita</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>101</td>
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1 Consists of arable land under permanent crops.


HISTORY

Pre-Colonial

The original inhabitants of Algeria were Berber. From the time of the Phoenicians' westward expansion, they had to assimilate and/or combat a series of growing empires. Usually it was the coastal tribes which adopted the religious, economic, and political institutions of the invaders, while the nomadic tribes of the Sahara and mountains successfully defended themselves against all outside rule and raided the coastal communities.

The Phoenicians brought settled agriculture and Judaism as well as Mediterranean trade to the coastal areas. They were followed in the middle of the second century B.C. by the Romans, who extended their direct rule as far as the Saharan steppes and converted many of the nomadic peoples to a settled agricultural way of life. Numidia (most of Algeria north of the Sahara) was transformed into a Roman vassal state, controlled not by Romans, however, but by Romanized Berbers. Nearly 50 of the 70 Roman towns whose sites are known in Northwest Africa are in this area.

When Christianity became the dominant religion of Rome, it spread rapidly in Numidia—Carthage (the Phoenicians' trading center) was one of the two great centers of early Christianity. St. Augustine was a Libyan Berber. During the fourth century A.D., the Numidia Berbers split off from Roman Christianity and adopted Donatism, a religious expression of their resistance to the pressures
of Roman rule. But a more effective expression of resistance came from the nomadic peoples, whose power had grown as a result of the introduction of camels from Asia. The trend of the Carthaginian and Roman periods—the expansion of sedentary agriculture and towns—was reversed—and nomadic pastoralism grew. This was reinforced by the invasion of the Vandals, who brought more civil disorder and religious persecution to the cities.

By the time the Moslem Arabs captured Carthage and established their own city of Tunis (650 A.D.), the Berbers of the desert were becoming recognizable as the distinct people now known as Tuareg. They had tribal links with the sedentary Berbers, but they were politically, culturally, and economically a different group. They retained matrilinealism, which was being extinguished in coastal areas. When coastal settlements were politically and socially democratic, the nomads maintained a hierarchical order with distinct castes of nobles, vassals, and slaves. The nomads and the coastal settlers are two distinct groups of people, and their differences are still important in Algerian politics.

As part of the Ummayad Empire, the Berbers were converted en masse to Islam, enrolled in its armies and participated in the conquest of the western Maghreb and of Spain. But they adopted Muslim heresies just as they had Christian ones. By 750 they had been converted to an esoteric, leftwing sect, Kharijism, and in 910 embraced Shi'i doctrines and established the Fatimid dynasty over the central Maghreb. Most of the period of Moslem rule was one of political chaos—different dynasties, often proclaiming different Islamic doctrines, fighting over the Maghreb. Often the area that is Algeria was broken into several small, heretical states, sometimes united in conflicting confederacies. During the 14th century the coastal towns organized themselves into independent republics which supported themselves by piracy. It was under Ottoman rule, beginning in the 16th century, that the whole coast of north Africa was brought together under a single jurisdiction and that Algeria emerged as a political concept.

During the 17th century Algiers was one of the wealthiest and most attractive cities on the Mediterranean. Its Ottoman rulers (Deys) were elected by a group of merchants and scholars who were the most influential men in the city. The merchants (corsairs) provided the main financial support of the state for over three centuries; and in the 17th century Algiers was a center for legitimate trade, piracy, and the north African slave trade. It had diplomatic relations with England, Holland, and France. As the trading fleets of these countries grew, however, Algiers diminished in importance. All the coastal cities were plagued by raids of the Arab and Berber tribes of the high plateau who had maintained their independence throughout Turkish rule. Still, at the time of its surrender to France in 1830, Algiers was described as “perhaps the best regulated city in the world,” and the French conquerors found its population better educated than that of France.

Colonial

“The French invasion of Algeria was one of the most unprincipled and ill-considered acts of policy in the whole of the 19th century.” (Oliver & Atmore, “Africa Since 1800”, p. 96.) It was staged
purely for the purpose of diverting the French people’s attention from the misgovernment of Louis XVIII and Charles X. Algiers had lent France wheat during the Napoleonic wars, which France refused to pay for. In an argument over this, the Dey struck the French consul with a fly whisk—the alleged diplomatic incident and the rationale for an invasion 3 years later.

Like the Turks, the French found it easier to rule the coast than the interior of Algeria. In 1832, Abd al-Qadir united Arab and Berber tribes of West and Central Algeria in a jihad against the French. His army defeated the French several times, but in 1841, General Bugeaud began a systematic conquest of his territory, using the “flying columns of French soldiers” in brutal campaigns in which homes were burned and families killed. The hostility this caused was reinforced when the French decided to encourage immigration from France and to settle all immigrants in the most fertile coastal areas where they could be easily defended. Algerian farmers were moved to more remote, less fertile areas. There was resistance throughout Algeria through the 1860’s, and military did not give way to civilian rule in the interior until 1879. Even then, Kabylia and other mountain districts remained unpacified.

By 1880, the number of French colonists had grown from 100,000 (1847) to 350,000. They quickly became the most powerful group politically but did little to bolster the economy. They were largely poor French farmers from the south of France whose vineyards had been attacked by disease—they simply took over the best land, planted new vineyards and farmed them using their archaic methods. They finally gave up and moved to the towns—along with the Spanish, Italian and Maltese who had come there to engage in petty trade and look for employment. They sold the farmlands to a few wealthy individuals and companies, who converted them into large estates.

By 1900 the number of colonists had grown to 500,000 and by 1936 to a million. They had relatives in France, were represented in the French National Assembly, and exercised an influence in French politics out of all proportion to their number or real importance. They occupied the best land and competed with Muslims for jobs in the towns. The Muslim population doubled between 1900 and 1950 (4½–9 million) and, as all the sources of wealth in the country were closed to them, they grew poorer as their numbers grew. Many had to go to France to find work. Before World War I, however, they had a hard time organizing a liberation struggle. There was then relatively little national consciousness in Algeria. It had always been divided between the coastal and the nomadic peoples. By now the educated Muslims had all been to French schools and spoke French better than they did Arabic. Yet they were denied participation in French political and cultural life as well—in order to vote, they had to give up Islam.

As for many African states, the world wars had a nationalizing influence in Algeria. Algerian units participated in World War I and nationalism grew up first among veterans after the war. In 1924, the first Algerian nationalist newspaper was founded by a group of expatriates in Paris under the leadership of Messali-Hadj. They called for total independence, the recall of French troops, the establishment of a revolutionary government, reforms in land ownership and nationalization of industrial enterprises. A more moderate group
of Algerians was organized in 1930 to bring about integration with France on the basis of complete equality. The story of Algeria's fight for independence is one of a rivalry between these approaches, the moderate being encouraged by the French Government but every attempt to implement its proposals being defeated by the uncompromising French colonists. Therefore the goals of the "extreme" group and violence gained more and more support as the only way the Algerians could achieve self-government. After the Allies freed Algeria from the Vichy government, nationalists hoped they would make it an independent nation; but in 1945 it was returned to France. A few days after the end of the war the first outbreak of anticolonialist violence occurred. Police fired on a procession at Setif. Muslims responded by turning on colonists, provoking ruthless retaliation by the French. A hundred Europeans and 15,000 Muslims were killed in the disturbances.

It was not until 1954, however, that the Front de Liberation Nationale began its armed rebellion against French rule. The war that followed was long, costly, and brutal. It is not surprising that Algeria, the only French African state that had to fight for her independence, has been a leader in fighting colonialism throughout Africa. Between 1945 and 1958 France had a series of weak governments which could not afford the unpopularity of losing Algeria. In 1958 De Gaulle won the election and a broadening of Presidential powers on a platform of victory in Algeria. But once elected he adopted his "artichoke policy"—stripping away, layer by layer, the combination of rightwing generals, settlers and reactionary administrators who had defied the peacemaking efforts of his predecessors. He arranged a cease-fire, and, on July 1, 1962, held a plebescite in which 91 percent of the total electorate of Algeria voted for independence. Two days later independence was proclaimed.

Independence

Ben Bella emerged from the brief civil war which followed independence as the strongest of the several party and tribal leaders. Eight years of warfare had left the country in total economic turmoil. Over half the Europeans—technicians, teachers, entrepreneurs, doctors—had left; 70 percent of the population was unemployed. Over a million had died in the war; 2 million were in concentration camps; and half a million refugees were living in Tunisia and Morocco. Ben Bella imposed an entirely new kind of order on the chaos. He nationalized the land abandoned by the Europeans, and later most large estates, and put them under the control of workers committees as State farms. He also followed a policy of turning over many factories to workers management—on the Yugoslav model—as a way of avoiding both entrepreneureal control and Soviet-style bureaucratic communism. His policy called for the nationalization of transport, banks, insurance, large-scale industry and a State monopoly of foreign trade.

In foreign affairs Algeria under Ben Bella played the role of an active neutral. It was one of the leaders of the Pan-African movement and in the OAU. It had good relations with the Soviet Union—the U.S.S.R. gave money, technical assistance, and training for Algerian development. At the same time, Algeria maintained close ties with
France, and French companies continued to drill Algerian oil. After some initial border disputes Ben Bella was able to achieve greater Maghrebian cooperation. Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia established a joint committee to correlate economic plans and to coordinate industrialization projects. In 1965 Algeria was to be the site of the Afro-Asian Conference.

But the conference was never held. In June 1965, Colonel Boumedienne overthrew Ben Bella in a bloodless coup d'état. Ben Bella had been opposed by many groups in Algeria: The Berbers of Kabylia District whose opposition he had ruthlessly crushed; the former soldiers of the FLN who saw him as a noncombatant (he had spent most of the war in a French jail); many who wanted more concentration on internal and less on external affairs; the army, which saw his plans for a popular militia as a threat to their position.

Boumedienne's new government was a coalition of Ben Bella men, army officers, technocrats and experts in development, and representatives of the various Algerian factions. Boumedienne would continue to follow Ben Bella's policy of active nonalination and to pursue the goal of socialism. He secured for himself a broad enough base of support and made enough changes in Ben Bella's more controversial programs to make his a more stable government.

**Education**

In 1961, after 130 years of French rule, the number of children in school was 300,000. This was 14 percent of the school-age children. At the time of the visit of the study mission 9 years after independence, the Algerians had a little more than 2 million children in school, or 70 percent of the school-age population. This significant gain had required a tremendous effort. The budget for education was almost one-fourth of the national budget. Similarly, in 1961 the University of Algeria was the only university; its enrollment was 5,000 students and only 1,000 of these were Algerian, the others were French. Now there are almost 19,000 students distributed among three universities—the Universities of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine. Before independence, certain careers were forbidden to Algerians. This is given as the reason for the present shortage of Algerian engineers, since technical and scientific studies were prohibited. Now almost 50 percent of Algerian students are studying in technical and scientific faculties. The target of the Government is to reach, by the end of the 4-year plan, a rate of school attendance of 75 percent of the school-age children and to reach 100 percent by 1980.

Up to 1962 the children going to school under the French would learn only in French and when the child reached the secondary school level he would be asked what foreign language he wished to learn, English, German, or Arabic. One of the objects of the Government now is to give to the national language, Arabic, the place that the Government believes Arabic is due in the country. The first 3 years of primary school are completely Arabized. Now, starting the fourth year, the child learns French. On the advanced level certain disciplines are now completely Arabized; the rest are in French. There are problems, however, in that classical Arabic is very different from the version spoken locally.
ECONOMY

Domestic

During the colonial era the Algerian economy was marked by a very heavy emphasis on agriculture and a static economic growth rate. Gross domestic product (GDP) stabilized at an average annual increase of 6 percent for the period 1963-67. Gross national product (GNP) was $3.7 million in 1969. GNP per capita was $275. The 1970's have wrought a transformation on the Algerian economy as it is being reoriented, bolstered by expanding oil and gas reserves, toward industrialization as not only the key to the future but also the optimum long-range solution to the country's two major problems—reorganization of agriculture and utilization of surplus or underemployed labor.

The key, in turn, to Algeria's industrial development is the petroleum and gas sector. The latest development in the petroleum field was the decision in February 1971, announced by President Boumedienne, to nationalize French oil interests and to take over all pipelines and gas resources. Since the April refusal of French producers to buy Algerian petroleum, production has fallen to about 55 percent of its 1970 level. Short-term earnings have declined sharply.

SONATRACH, acting for the Algerian Government, has successfully negotiated settlements with all U.S. oil companies who had their assets nationalized or sequestered in previous years. The long-delayed, billion dollar SONATRACH—El Paso natural gas project, which will be the largest in the world, dominates Algerian-American economic relations. Possibilities for pipelines to Western Europe from this and other installations are being studied. Thus, gas probably represents for Algeria, which has the third largest gas reserves in the world, the principal new asset in future developments.

Industry is still favored by the economic policy. Besides the three petrochemical complexes now underway, the El Hadjar iron and steel complex, a lead and zinc complex at El Abed, and an electrolytic zinc plant at Ghazuouet, are promising.

In July 1971 the Government issued a new series of laws aimed at delineating a new policy of reforms in agriculture. This includes reducing individual holdings and encouraging various cooperative and collective farming schemes. Improvements in agriculture are essential to improving the overall standard of living, since one-half million workers and five times that number of dependents (70 percent of the country's population) rely on it for their existence.

There are 13.3 million hectares of agricultural land of which 6.2 million are arable, 370,000 devoted to vines, 200,000 are orchard, and 5.2 million are pastures (often desert or semidesert). The most valuable crop is the grape harvest. Wheat, barley, and oats are grown for local consumption. Other crops include maize, sorghum, millet, rye, rice, citrus fruit, olives, figs, dates, and tobacco. Algeria is the third largest date producer in the world.

In 1969 grain production was only mediocre, and probably 800,000 tons of wheat had to be imported to meet domestic needs. Vegetables and fruits have shown only a slight increase between 1969-70. Algeria has recently had a surplus of wine, and on July 15, 1971, the Government decided to further hasten the closure and reorientation of existing
vineyards. Twenty-five thousand hectares are to be eliminated in 1971–72, for a reduction of about 10 percent. Plans for mass production of wheat are afoot with the Ministry of Agriculture actively promoting the planting of Mexican wheat. The efforts by the Government (including the formation of a new state cooperative (SONAGTHER), are underway in the field of irrigation projects.

Foreign Trade and Financial Policy

By a system of license and monopoly controls, the Algerian Government is proceeding with its program to place all foreign trade under its direct control. The Algerian 4-year plan has stipulated a large increase in capital goods purchases. To this end many consumer goods purchases are being blocked and a major portion of Algerian foreign exchange resources are being set aside. Oil and gas dominate Algeria’s exports. The export of foods and wine improved in 1970, although wine sales to France were stopped again in 1971. Worthy of note is the gradual substitution of semifinished products for raw materials being exported which suggests that the policy of industrialization is now beginning to take effect. Trade with the EEC and France, its main trading partner, keeps Western Europe dominant within Algeria’s market. Recently, Algerian trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has been increasing. France applied severe economic pressure in 1970–71, at the time of the nationalization of French-controlled petroleum production. Relations are still strained, and Algeria obviously needs to diversify its economic links.

In order to control inflation, Algerian financial authorities are pursuing a cautious financial policy; cutting back on nonessential expenditures and projects, imposing stringent financial controls on state enterprises, and adjudging almost all imports and services. In the management of the economy, the Finance Minister is attempting to prevent inflation; pricing controls are enforced, and demand is controlled by taxation and credit restrictions.

Commercial relations with the United States

United States-Algerian relations are expanding significantly. The Export-Import Bank approved in early 1972 preliminary commitments for over $100 million worth of credits and guarantees for exports to Algeria. Algeria has contracts with many American consultant firms. 8.1 percent of its imports are from the United States. It is a large buyer of American wheat, cotton, aircraft, electronic equipment, earthmoving and farming machinery, and oil field material. Under the projected El Paso arrangement, Algeria would sell large amounts of liquid natural gas to the United States. It had $1.5 million in exports to the United States in 1969. A number of new factors are at play which will affect these relations. A significant number of construction contracts were recently signed with U.S. companies and negotiations for many more are underway. U.S. financial institutions and the Export-Import Bank in particular are now granting more credit to the Algerian state enterprises. The conservative financial program combined with the sharp drop in 1971 revenue caused by the cutback in oil production is at present causing concern among some U.S. firms working in Algeria. At the same time, Algeria’s efforts to diversify its trade relations is opening new markets to U.S. suppliers.
RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

U.S. relations with Algeria have been suspended since the 6-day Arab-Israeli war of 1967. The U.S. Interests Section in Algiers, which operates under the protection of the Embassy of Switzerland, maintains cordial relations with Algerian officials. The Assistant Secretary of State has only recently returned from a visit to Algiers. Thus, notwithstanding basic foreign policy differences relating to the Middle East and Vietnam, Algeria's pragmatic emphasis on development has led to growing economic relations with the United States.
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN AFRICA

FOREWORD

In Algiers, the chairman of the study mission met with representatives of several prominent African nationalist liberation movements: ANC (South Africa), SWAPO (Namibia), ZAPU (Zimbabwe), MPLA (Angola), PAIGC (Guinea-Bissau), and FRELIMO (Mozambique). The latter three groups, all fighting in Portuguese territories, are allied in the Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP). Many other organizations with which we did not have the opportunity to meet during this trip are also maintaining struggles against colonialism and white domination. Description of all significant liberation groups has been included in this section. (See also, Report of Special Study Mission to South Africa, August 1969, pp. 7-14.)

Algeria, ever mindful of its prolonged 9-year struggle against the French for independence from 1954 to 1962, has a commitment of both actively assisting other peoples fighting for the liberation of their countries and of providing a haven for liberation movements. Pursuant to the satisfying of the official registration requirements and of other requisite conditions, Algeria provides a villa and a stipulated monthly allowance for representatives of these movements which it deems worthy, as well as further direct assistance of a military nature to the liberation movements. Moreover, various Americans have found refuge in Algeria, including Eldridge Cleaver and Timothy Leary.

The primary interest of these representatives is to secure for their movements support as well as concern—humanitarian support, such as medicines, foodstuffs, educational supplies, clothing, and in addition to obtain financial and other support toward the fighting effort. They also desire assistance in the dissemination of information on the liberation movements, on what they are doing, and on what they need. They are greatly concerned that opportunities be provided for the liberation leaders, or their representatives, to come to the United States on carefully planned lecture tours designed to serve both the informational and fund-raising functions.

The liberation movements with which the later study mission of January 1972 met in Lusaka, Zambia, are ZANU, FROLIZI, ANC, the UNITY Movement, SWAPO, COREMO and ZAPU.

In addition, following the visit in August 1971 to Guinea-Bissau, the chairman met in Dakar with the brother of Amilcar Cabral and there expressed appreciation for the efforts of the PAIGC—an appreciation especially keenly felt because of the visit and on-the-ground observation in Guinea-Bissau by the study mission.
Following World War II a large number of African organizations opposed to Portuguese rule appeared in Angola. Their bases of support were usually either tribal, educational, or urban groups, and most were short-lived and of little effect. By the time violence broke out in 1961, however, two major parties had emerged.

The MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola), formed in 1956, is seen by many current observers of the nationalist struggle as having been the best organized and most effective of the liberation movements fighting in Angola in the last few years. Its membership is eclectic, but is chiefly drawn from educated, urbanized groups. Its party line is multiracial. It is believed to be supported heavily by the Soviet Union and Algeria and also receives aid from Sweden. Since 1968 it has been the chief beneficiary of OAU aid to the Angolan struggle.

The MPLA's military headquarters now operates within liberated territory in Angola, but the organization has offices in Lusaka, Dar es Salaam, Algiers, Stockholm, and elsewhere. The MPLA is currently fighting on six different fronts within Angola: one north of Luanda in the Cuanza district, one in the Cabinda enclave, and the remaining four stretching from north to south in the eastern half of the territory. A new front was recently opened near the Cunene dam scheme on the Namibian border. The MPLA is strongest in the Moxico and Cuando-Cubango districts. The MPLA's president is Dr. Agostinho Neto.

The second important party fighting in the early 1960's was the UPA (Uniao das Populacoes de Angola), formed in 1958. Its leader is Holden Roberto. Its main base of support is the powerful Bakongo tribe in the northern part of Angola, where most of its military operations are carried out. From its inception the UPA has had less of a Marxist orientation than the MPLA, and the organization elicited a great deal of sympathy in the United States in the early sixties.

In 1961, soon after the launching of armed struggle, the UPA established close ties with a smaller Bakongo-based movement, the PDA (Partido Democratico de Angola). The two joined their military forces in an alliance known as the FNLA, and formed a government-in-exile under Roberto's leadership known as GRAE (Governo Revolucionario de Angola no Exilio). The UPA and GRAE are based in Kinshasha, Zaire, and have offices elsewhere including Stockholm. Roberto is reported to have a close association with Zaire's President Mobutu.

Although GRAE was the favored movement of the OAU in the early 1960's, the MPLA's military successes, and success in political and social work in its liberated areas, led the OAU Liberation Committee to switch primary support to the MPLA in 1968.

Since 1966 another movement has emerged—UNITA (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola). It was formed by Jonas Savimbi, who had broken with Roberto in 1964. It operates almost exclusively in occupied areas of Angola, and has very few external links. UNITA operates primarily near the Angola-Namibia border, and is said to have cooperated with SWAPO of Namibia. UNITA's main source of outside support is believed to be China.

At the OAU summit meeting in Rabat in June 1972, there was a public reconciliation between MPLA and UNITA, which is regarded as possibly very significant for the liberation struggle in Angola.
GUINEA-BISSAU

The PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde) led by Amilcar Cabral, is fighting for the independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde from Portugal. It is often considered the most successful revolutionary movement currently operating on the continent of Africa. The Party has placed great emphasis on the political and social as well as the military aspects of its struggle, and has avoided the extreme factionalism weakening many other liberation movements.

The PAIGC is widely believed to operate freely in about two-thirds of Guinea-Bissau, though the Portuguese retain control of larger towns. The party has established schools and hospitals in the liberated areas. The PAIGC headquarters is in Conakry, the capital of neighboring independent Guinea. For more detailed information on the PAIGC and the status of its struggle see the section on Guinea-Bissau in this report as well as the report on page 34b of the appendix by the Special U.N. Mission to Guinea-Bissau and the resolution adopted by the Special Committee, April 13, 1972, affirming that the PAIGC is “the only and authentic representative of the people of the Territory,” which appears on p. 429 of the appendix.

A rival movement, FLING, has less effectiveness in opposing the Portuguese. This organization, based in Senegal, objects to the PAIGC’s inclusion of Cape Verde in its goals of national liberation, and considers itself less radical politically.

MOZAMBIQUE

FRELIMO (Frente de Libertacão de Moçambique) is the principal nationalist movement in Mozambique. It was formed by the union of older nationalist groups in Dar es Salaam in 1962, and launched the military struggle in Mozambique in 1964.

Until his assassination in February of 1969, FRELIMO’s president was Eduardo Mondlane, a former U.N. civil servant and professor with a Ph. D. in sociology from Northwestern University. His death and the subsequent defection to the Portuguese of Lazaro Kavandame, a FRELIMO province chief, were serious setbacks for the organization but it has continued the struggle under a tripartite presidency currently dominated by Samora Machell. FRELIMO has been recognized by the OAU since 1963 as the sole recipient for aid from the OAU Liberation Committee. It has also received aid from Algeria, the Soviet Union, other Communist countries, Sweden, and private Western groups.

Some areas of Mozambique, mainly in the northern districts of Cabo Delgado and Niassa, are controlled by FRELIMO. Like the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau, FRELIMO has carried out a political and social program in controlled territories. Schools, health clinics, and a government have been established in these areas. The colonial administration in Mozambique has been seriously disrupted, even in the more secure South, and after Guinea-Bissau, this seems to be the most serious confrontation.

Since the late 1960’s military operations have been carried out in the Tete District (the portion of the country nearly entirely surrounded by Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi), where the Cabora Bassa Dam is
being built with South African, American, and European financing. FREIMO has greatly built up its strength in Tete, where it concentrates attacks on economic targets, causing considerable problems of communication. Even the main road from Malawi to Rhodesia has been made so unsafe that any traffic goes in armed convoys. The Portuguese have announced their intention of defoliating a vast area round the dam site as the only way of countering the attacks. The U.S. supplies defoliants and napalm to the Portuguese colonialists. The Portuguese plan to settle large numbers of Europeans—estimates are 1 million white settlers (not admitted)—in the project area, and much of the hydroelectric power produced if it is completed will be sold to South Africa.

A variety of FREIMO dissidents formed the rival party COREMO (Comite Revolucionario de Mocambique) in Lusaka in June 1965. Its president since 1966 has been Paulo Gmunane. COREMO has received support from Zambia and China, and has carried out limited forays in Western Mozambique.

Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia)

ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People’s Union) is the oldest of the major African nationalist organizations in Zimbabwe. Its president, Joshua Nkomo, is in detention within Zimbabwe, while the group’s operational leaders maintain headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia.

ZAPU originated as the African National Congress of Rhodesia in September 12, 1957. This group was banned in 1959, and subsequent reorganizations under different names were also outlawed, so the party went into exile and underground in the early 1960’s.

In 1963 dissidents from the organization formed ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union). Led by Ndabaningi Sithole, this group objected to what it considered a lack of militancy on the part of ZAPU at that time. ZAPU is also headquartered in Lusaka, and Sithole is in prison in Zimbabwe.

Particularly since the Rhodesian Front’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence from Great Britain in 1965, both groups have carried out sabotage and guerrilla activities within Zimbabwe. Mainly operating from Zambia, guerrillas have battled both Rhodesian and South African forces in the northern regions of Zimbabwe. They have suffered heavy losses, but Rhodesian reports indicate that their technique has improved radically recently. (‘The Silent War,’ Reg Shav and Chris Vermaak; Salisbury, 1971). Since 1967 ZAPU has been allied with the ANC (South Africa), and the two have sometimes collaborated in military operations in Zimbabwe. Both ZAPU and ZANU charge Britain with failing to discharge its responsibilities to the territory by failing to intervene against the illegal Rhodesian front regime, and both groups totally reject the British-Rhodesian settlement under discussion in early 1972.

The major split in the nationalist movement, and further factionalization within ZAPU and ZANU themselves, has severely hampered the development of more effective African resistance to white rule. Personality and tribal tensions among leaders of the groups have led to clashes in Lusaka.

In October of 1971 elements of ZAPU and ZANU announced the formation of a united front in an organization called FROLIZI (Front
for the Liberation of Zimbabwe). They declared their intention to unite "to wage a resolute, long-term people's struggle against British colonialism and its Hitlerite agents in Zimbabwe." A 12-point political program was announced including a pledge to establish an independent socialist economy in a democratic Zimbabwe. The idea of unity met with approval among neighboring African governments, but ZANU and ZAPU continue to exist as independent entities.

The OAU Liberation Committee voted to support FROLIZI soon after the alliance's inception. An agreement to increase cooperation between ZAPU and FROLIZI was achieved at the OAU summit in Rabat.

Although it is not a liberation movement, some mention should be made here of the African National Council, inasmuch as there is no separate section in this report on Zimbabwe (the Chairman having been refused admission into Zimbabwe by the illegal Smith regime). In the words of Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the chairman of the African National Council:

"The ANC was formed in December 1971 as a spontaneous grassroots reaction to the announcement of the terms of the Anglo-Rhodesian proposals. Although having a formal structure it represents the demands of African people in the country to express their views as to the terms of the settlement. ANC is not a political party and is not interested in building up a large membership as such, but is prepared to join with any person of any political party or organization who wishes to say 'no' to these proposals." (From the statement by Bishop Abel Muzorewa to the Security Council, Feb. 16, 1972.)

The ANC claims to represent the overwhelming number of people in the country (5½ million), and is the leading voice of the strong spontaneous African rejection of the proposals.

The ANC has called upon the British Government "to convene a constitutional conference, which will enable all the interested groups within the country to discuss and formulate an acceptable solution to the people of Rhodesia as a whole." (From the May 3, 1972, statement of the African National Council Delegation to the Right Honourable Sir Alec Douglas Home.) (See p. 435 of the appendix for excerpts from the Pearce Commission Report.)

**South Africa**

The ANC (African National Congress) was formed in 1912 by a group of South African leaders alarmed by the color bar and segregationist tendencies built into the South Africa Act, which gave the Union of South Africa virtual independence from Great Britain in 1910. Throughout this century it has organized various forms of resistance against each major step in the increasing institutionalization of white supremacy in South Africa.

Throughout its early years the ANC fought nonviolent campaigns against the pass laws and in favor of workers' rights. Representatives attended the first Pan-African Congress in 1919, and tried unsuccessfully to persuade Great Britain to intervene in Africa on behalf of African rights. Since the 1930's the ANC has had many contacts with the now-outlawed South African Communist Party, which was at
that time the only political organization in the country favoring multiracial politics.

The 1949 adoption of a program of action marked a new period of increasingly militant, though still nonviolent, activism by the ANC. This new surge of opposition was in part a reaction to the 1948 election of the Afrikaner-dominated nationalist government on a platform of legal apartheid. Throughout the 1950’s, often in alliance with the South African Indian Congress and the South African Coloured People’s Congress, the ANC helped organize strikes in defiance of the repressive legislation being produced by the nationalist government. Thousands of ANC leaders and supporters were jailed in the early 1950’s during various protests.

A major ANC counteroffensive was in 1955, when on June 26 under the leadership of Chief A. J. Luthuli, a large Congress of the People produced a freedom charter calling for human rights for all people in South Africa. (See p. 437 of the appendix on the posthumous awarding of U.N. Human Rights Prize to Chief Luthuli.) This charter remains the basis of the ANC program. The Government responded by arresting 156 leaders and supporters of the ANC and charging many with treason.

In 1957 the ANC assisted in the planning of the massive bus boycotts protesting increased bus fares to and from the African townships of Johannesburg and Pretoria. Despite police harassment, about 45,000 Africans walked 18- to 20-mile distances daily for 10 weeks until they forced the Government to back down and reduce the fares. In April, 1958, the ANC organized a 1-day national strike. In 1959, its national conference resolved to undertake a massive nationwide struggle against the pass laws in the following year. The famous “Resistance Campaign” was a mass protest against petty discrimination, and was crushed, together with the hopes for a peaceful solution, by massive repression.

Also in 1959 the rival Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) was formed by elements of the ANC unhappy with the influence of whites and the Communist Party in the organization, and with what they considered its lack of militancy in opposing white rule. Its leader was Robert Sobukwe. As part of the pass law protests, the PAC called on crowds in major urban centers in March 1960, to hand in their reference books to the police. At Sharpeville, in an incident which received worldwide notoriety as the Sharpeville massacre, police opened fire on the unarmed crowd and killed 69 Africans. The ANC, though it had opposed these particular demonstrations, responded to the killings by calling a national day of mourning which was observed by hundreds of thousands of Africans.

The Government then declared a state of emergency, banned all public meetings, and arrested nearly 20,000 people. In response, 30,000 Africans marched on Cape Town to demand the release of their leaders. On April 8, 1960, both the ANC and PAC were declared illegal by the South African Government. Both groups went underground and added violent tactics, including sabotage and the hope for a future guerrilla movement, to their programs of resistance to white domination. An internal military group, Umkonto We Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) was formed by the ANC, and a similar group, POQO (Pure), was formed by the PAC.

In 1961 several major acts of sabotage were carried out by these groups in South Africa. However, the overwhelming military superi-
ority of the white minority, combined with the widespread use of informers made a campaign of internal subversion difficult to sustain. Most leaders of the ANC's clandestine internal movement, including the famous Nelson Mandela, were arrested in 1964, a serious setback for the organization.

In 1967 the ANC declared its close alinement with ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union), and ANC forces joined ZAPU forces in a series of attacks in the northern area of Zimbabwe. This was given as the reason for the South African decision to supply security forces to the Rhodesian Government to assist in the protection of its northern regions from guerrillas.

The ANC claims to be maintaining a well-trained fighting force outside South Africa and to have carried out joint operations with FRELIMO in Mozambique and SWAPO in Namibia as well as with ZAPU. Inside South Africa there have been a series of coordinated "leaflet bombs" in major cities, whose organization has been remarkable. The ANC's present tactics appear to rely on sabotage from within, rather than the introduction of units from outside. PAC members have been deeply involved in incidents of sabotage and resistance, and their network inside South Africa, although not very visible, appears to be far from dead. On the day preceding our arrival in South Africa there were such ANC "leaflet bombs" in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban.

The ANC, like the PAC, has carried on an international campaign to expose and isolate the policies of the South African Government. It urges total political and economic disengagement from South Africa by all countries. It has offices in Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, Algiers, Cairo, New Delhi, and London. The monthly journal Sechaba, and weekly Spotlight on South Africa, are published from its London office. Its official headquarters is in Morogoro, Tanzania.

The PAC split into factions during the sixties but the OAU-recognized headquarters is now in Dar es Salaam. Its president, Robert Sobukwe, cannot leave South Africa. (See discussion of his case in the section on the legal situation in South Africa.) The PAC reportedly gets outside aid from China, while the ANC gets considerable aid from the Soviet Union. Both have received aid from the OAU, but since 1967 OAU funds have gone mainly to the ANC.

A third South African organization which has gained substantial publicity in the past year is the Unity Movement of South Africa. It is a federal organization composed of various political, professional and workers organizations, of which the largest are the All African Convention, the Society of Young Africa, and the African People's Democratic Union of Southern Africa.

The Unity Movement was founded in 1943 for the purpose of bringing peaceful pressure to bear on the Government of South Africa to grant the economic, political, and social demands of its various member organizations. The headquarters of the movement is in Lusaka, Zambia. The London Committee of the Unity Movement publishes the journal, "Apdusa."

In 1971, 14 Unity Movement members were arrested and charged under South Africa's Terrorism Act. The government claimed that four of the defendants had entered South Africa illegally from Zambia to assist South Africans to leave the country, to undergo military training abroad, and to evade the police. Before the trial opened in
late 1971, one of the defendants died and the others charged they had been tortured. Various international legal organizations denounced the South African procedures of arrest and trial in the case as contrary to the Rule of Law. The defendants were found guilty in early 1972. This and other cases have revealed a surprisingly active Unity Movement program. (See discussion of visit of the study mission to the trial in Pietermartizburg in the section on the legal situation in South Africa. A chronology of major events in black resistance to white supremacy in South Africa is included on p. 417 of the appendix.)

Namibia

SWAPO (South-West Africa People's Organization of Namibia) is the major liberation movement operating in Namibia. The organization originated with the Ovamboland People's Congress in 1957, together with the loose organizations of Namibian workers, first in South Africa and then in Walvis Bay and Windhoek. The SWAPO leadership now includes a cross-section of the tribal groups. In 1959 another group was formed, SWANU (South-West African National Union), which drew its main support from the smaller Herero tribe.

Throughout the 1960's these groups competed for the leadership of the Namibian struggle, but SWAPO became increasingly dominant and by 1970 SWANU had virtually ceased to operate. SWAPO's leader is Sam Nujoma.

SWAPO's efforts have brought international attention to the illegality of South Africa's administration of Namibia, the oppressive nature of South African rule in Namibia, and the illegality of the convictions in South African courts of many SWAPO leaders and followers under South Africa's infamous Terrorism Act in 1967. Both the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly have declared in a number of resolutions that the enforcement of such South African laws in Namibia is illegal.

These have also supported the legitimacy of the African nationalist liberation struggle in Namibia, of which SWAPO is the undisputed leader. Security Council Resolution 269 of August 12, 1967, which passed by a vote of 11-0-4, included a statement that the Council, "recognizes the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Namibia against the illegal presence of the South African authorities in the territory." The United States supported G.A. Res. 2145 of 1966 terminating the mandate and declaring South Africa's continued presence in Namibia illegal, and has accepted the opinion of the International Court of Justice affirming this position. SWAPO has unsuccessfully called on the U.N. to back up its resolutions by using force if necessary to end South African rule in Namibia.

SWAPO started military activities in 1966, in response to the failure of the International Court to pronounce on South Africa's violation of the Mandate at that time. Activity has been mainly in the North, especially the Caprivi Strip with its forest cover. South African losses through SWAPO mines have been considerable, and in response to this, in 1972, they announced the use of African and Coloured troops for the first time in South African history.

SWAPO's current headquarters is in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The organization also maintains offices in London, Lusaka, Algiers, Cairo, New York, Helsinki, and Stockholm. The London office publishes the Namibia News.
EUROPEAN VISITS

FRANCE

The study mission visited Paris to hold discussions with key French officials on French policy in Africa. We met and among others, conferred with the Deputy Director for Political Affairs and with Secretary General Foccart’s Director of Cabinet. Although there was particular emphasis on greater enforcement of the arms embargo against South Africa, the topics which were discussed included: stopping the sale of small arms and helicopters to South Africa; discouraging private enterprise in Rhodesia; the Houphouet-Boigny dialog initiatives with South Africa; and French economic aid to Africa. With respect to the arms embargo, it was made clear that the French interpretation of the U.N. non-mandatory arms embargo differs from that of the United States and the latitude to deal with South Africa is evidently considered greater. In the discussions of the French position toward the South African policy of “dialog” and of the “Ivory Coast initiative”, the French took the position that it is their policy not to interfere but to follow the lead of the Francophone countries with respect to policy toward South Africa. With respect to aid, the French assistance is about 15 percent. Whereas the United States has a multilateral approach, the French have a purely bilateral approach to foreign policy.

HOLLAND

The study mission then visited The Hague to discuss with Government officials the Dutch policy toward support of the liberation movements and in particular the gift of the Queen to the liberation movements. The officials advised that this was the personal, rather than official, act of the Queen and that the Dutch Government was not associated with this contribution.

With respect to the question of Dutch companies doing business in South Africa, the officials reminded us that Holland is a small country, but that Unilever is one of the largest corporations in the world and has investment in South Africa. The officials indicated their interest in following the lead of the United States with respect to its companies in South Africa. There has recently been a very effective boycott of Angolan coffee, produced by African forced labor. Angola, which used to be a major supplier, has now been excluded from the Dutch coffee market. The organizing Angola Comité has announced its intention of challenging Angola’s quota in the International Coffee Organization.
In order to discuss with the Government of Sweden their support of the liberation movements, a brief visit was made to Sweden on September 6 and 7, 1971. There the Swedish officials charged with the administration of this program of assistance met with the study mission.

The Swedish aid program to Africa consists of bilateral support to the liberation movements. This type of assistance started in 1969. The support is either humanitarian or educational. No finances are involved; and the aid is only in kind. For the fiscal year of 1971 (which parallels our fiscal year 1971), such aid totaled SKr 4 million and included aid to the victims of apartheid through the United Nations Trust Fund. (The United States has not supported this Trust Fund in recent years.) The breakdown for the calendar year of 1971 included:

- SKr1,750,000 to the PAIGC.
- SKr750,000 to FRELIMO (COREMO failed to apply).
- SKr500,000 to the MPLA.
- As well as small amounts being carried out from earlier allocations to ZAPU, ZANU and SWAPO.

One of the criteria for allocating their aid resources is the size of population under the control of the liberation movement. Thus the Portuguese movements receive a large share of their aid and for this year Swedish aid to the PAIGC amounted to about $1 million.

An application for assistance by one of the liberation movements is referred to the advisory board for an opinion on support of its activities.

A Swedish agency (SIDA) handles the procurement of supplies in accordance with Swedish normal procurement regulation on developmental assistance. Included in the assistance is the shipping costs. The goods are shipped to a neutral territory (for example, goods for Bissau are shipped to Conakry). As indicated above, support to victims of apartheid is given through the United Nations Trust Fund.

The study mission was advised that its program of assistance to liberation movements is carried out in support of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly resolutions in many cases, it was pointed out, with only one dissenting vote. It was also stated that there is disagreement in Sweden on this program, both by those who do not support assistance for liberation movements and by those who believe much more should be done.

There are a number of liberation movements based in Stockholm. One of the three U.N. representatives comprising the special mission from the United Nations which recently spent a week (April 1–8, 1972) in the liberated regions in the south of Guinea-Bissau was Swedish. This however, in the words of this official, is "not unfamiliar for the Swedish people" who have had several of their people visit these areas and where several books have appeared on this subject. (Letter of April 10, 1972 from Folke Lofgren to the President of the General Assembly.)
Other Scandinavian countries are also assisting the liberation movements now. According to the Tanzanian News Review of April 1972, in March, Denmark's Foreign Minister visited the headquarters of various liberation groups in Dar es Salaam. He announced that the Government of Denmark would raise its annual contribution to liberation movements from 1.8 million Tanzanian shillings to 6,163 million—to be used for education and the settlement of refugees. He added that Denmark has been providing FRELIMO with financial and material aid since 1967.
SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

The Somali Democratic Republic comprises Italy's former trust territory of Somalia and the former British protectorate of Somaliland. Together with Ethiopia and the French territory of Afars and Issas it is often referred to as the Horn of Africa. The population is estimated to be about 2.7 million. However, no census has been taken for many years and some estimates place the figure considerably higher. The Somalis are a Hamitic people, predominantly Moslem, and more than 75 percent are nomads or semi-nomads.

The country became independent under U.N. auspices on June 26, 1960. On October 21, 1969, the army and police seized power and renamed the country the Somali Democratic Republic. A Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) of 25 members—20 army officers and five police officers—was created to rule Somalia. The United States has continued normal relations with the new government, although several problems have arisen which have temporarily caused some strains in our relationship.

In December of 1969 the Government requested the removal of all Peace Corps Volunteers by the end of the year. In April of 1970 five U.S. Embassy and AID employees were expelled from Mogadiscio on allegations of engaging in counterrevolutionary activities. In the summer of 1970 the private oil exploration vessel, the Midnight Sun, was seized and held for 6 weeks, and again in the summer of 1971 five U.S. owned vessels and barges were detained in Somalia.

The Somali Democratic Republic is one of the poorest countries in Africa. The gross national product (GNP) for 1968 was U.S. $170 million—$63 per capita. Since its independence the country has followed a foreign policy of nonalignment. It has received economic assistance from the United States, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as from the Soviet Union and Communist China. The U.S.S.R. has provided about $35 million in military assistance.

Because of the failure of the new Somali regime to take appropriate steps to stop its flagships visiting North Vietnam, the United States acted on June 1, 1970 in accordance with the requirements of section 620(n) of the FAA which directs the cessation of all further assistance in such cases. At the time of the visit of the study mission the Somali program was phased out under another provision of the FAA (sec. 617) which allows up to 1 year for winding up the ongoing program. Since 1954 more than $65 million of technical and development assistance had been furnished to Somalia.

All technical assistance projects were practically terminated with the departure in July 1970 of contract teams from the University of Wyoming (agriculture) and Eastern Michigan University (education). Two capital (loan) projects remain to be completed. Under a loan to the national water agency, a contract has recently been signed with a U.S. firm (Amelco Corp.) for the construction of the Mogadiscio water supply system. The total value of U.S. assistance to this project (13)
STUDY MISSION TO AFRICA, JANUARY 7–25, 1971

INTRODUCTION

In January 1972, the study mission under the chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa, Hon. Charles C. Diggs, Jr., accompanied by Melvin Benson, staff consultant for the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Goler T. Butcher, consultant for the Subcommittee on Africa, visited London, The Sudan, Zambia, and Botswana.

The itinerary had originally included Zimbabwe and Namibia. Before leaving Washington, the chairman was advised by the head of the Rhodesian Information Office that he would be denied admission into Zimbabwe by the illegal Smith regime which considered his presence there undesirable during the testing period conducted by the Commission to ascertain the wishes of the people on the Heath/Smith settlement as it was felt it might unduly influence the people of Zimbabwe to reject the settlement (See page 438 of the appendix for the Chairman’s statement at his press conference on this matter on the eve of his departure. See also page 440 of the appendix for excerpt from article analyzing the effects of sanctions.)

The Government of South Africa also advised the chairman that, notwithstanding his possession of a valid multiple-entry visa to the Republic, he would not be admitted there or in Namibia, the international territory which South Africa continues to occupy in defiance of the authority of the United Nations. (See page 445 of the appendix for text of Chairman’s press conference in London on this action by the South African Government of failing to honor its own visa or its undertaking in the visa agreement with the United States. The text of the visa agreement, as amended is also included on p. 447.)

In London, the study mission held conversations with British officials concerned with African affairs and with representatives of various African groups.

The study mission was extremely fortunate in being able to visit the southern Sudan and of spending 2 days in Juba, the capital of the province of Equatoria. The graciousness of the Government of Sudan is deeply appreciated. News of the settlement later reached in February 1972, is indeed heartening.

The occasion of the visit to Zambia was the African-American Conference in Lusaka which opened on January 17, 1972, with an address by President Kenneth Kaunda. (The text is included on p. 455 of the appendix.) This conference of American parliamentarians and African officials provided a valuable opportunity for exchange of views. The study mission made a brief visit to Botswana on January 21 and was fortunate to meet with the President, Sir Seretse Khama, and other Government officials. The mission ended with a brief visit to Brussels to discuss with United States and other representatives to NATO our policy toward Portugal and toward Africa.

The chairman wishes to express his keen appreciation for the warm hospitality extended by the Government, officials, and the people in all of the countries visited.
THE SUDAN

Geography and Demography

Area and Topography

The Democratic Republic of Sudan is the largest country geographically in Africa (967,000 sq. mi.). It is about one-third in size of the continental United States. The sand and arid hills of the north are linked to the swampland and tropical savannah in the south by the Nile River. The Nile enters the Sudan from Uganda. The White Nile, a slow, meandering river, drains the Sudd region northward and provides irrigation for that area. The Blue Nile drains a large part of the Ethiopian highlands. The two rivers meet in Khartoum, where for most of the year the White Nile provides 83 percent of the total discharge. But in August the Blue Nile is in flood and provides 90 percent of the discharge. North of Khartoum the Nile is the focus of most agricultural activity. Pump irrigation along its banks provides a green strip through the desert to Wadi Halfa and Lake Nasser.

Away from the Nile, The Sudan is mainly a plainland and plateau country. The important mountain ranges are the Imatong and the Nuba Mountains in the south; Jebel Marra, a largely extinct volcano, in the west; and the Red Sea Hill ranges in the northeast. Elsewhere the plains slope gently toward the north and toward the Nile.

Climate

The Sudan is divided climatically, as in almost every other way, between north and south. North of latitude 19° N. is a desert region. Here the temperature reaches an average high of 104°F. in May and June and drops to 68°F. at night. There is a 1-month rainy season in August and only 50 millimeters of rainfall. In the south, dry northerly winds blow southward during the winter and moist southerly winds blow northward in summer. The hottest months are February and March, and the average high then is 86°F. There is an 8-month rainy season and precipitation is 1,000 millimeters, 20 times that in the north.

Geographical Divisions

The south is a combination of tropical rain forest and wooded grassland which merges northward in Kordofan, Darfur, and Blue Nile Provinces to a low-wooded savannah with large areas of short grassland. Northward is a gradation through semidesert to desert. In the Sudd area there are large swamp grasslands.

Political Divisions

The Sudan is politically divided into provinces. The three southern provinces are Bahr El Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Equatoria. Together they have a population of 3,063,000. The northern provinces are Darfur, Kordofan, Blue Nile, Khartoum, Kassala, and the Northern Province. These provinces are divided into 52 districts. The major
cities are Khartoum, the capital (population 225,740), Omdurman (252,450), El Obeid (68,170), Wadi Medani (74,519), Port Sudan (108,930), Khartoum North (123,050) and Atbara (55,669). Khartoum, Khartoum North, and Omdurman form a triple city. Khartoum is the seat of business and banking as well as government. In the south and west of Sudan there are many smaller towns which are more important than their size indicates—serving large areas as market towns, administrative headquarters, and centers of communication.

Population

With the highest birth rate (51.7 per thousand) in 1955 and the highest death rate (18.5 per thousand) in Africa, The Sudan has a population of 15,503,000 which is increasing at the rate of 3.3 percent per year. The population density varies from 62 per square mile in Khartoum to 5 per square mile in the Northern Province, with an average of 11 per square mile. It is one of the most sparsely populated countries in the world, but there is tremendous population pressure in the irrigated areas. Over 50 percent of the people live on 15 percent of the land area.

Ninety percent of the population is rural. Twenty percent of them are nomads, wandering during the wet season and settling around areas with water during the dry season. Their only contact with the larger population centers is an occasional visit to cities to trade animal products. The rural agricultural settlements vary from villages (often built around wells) to scattered individual homesteads. The Nuer and the Dinka of the south take their cattle far into the grasslands during the dry season and return to settlements in the hills when the plains flood.

The population is divided culturally between the North and the South. The Northerners are of mixed Arabic and African origin, are traditionally nomadic, predominantly Muslim and Arabic-speaking. The major Northern groups are the Arabs (3,989,000) and the Western peoples (1,315,000). The largest minority in the Sudan are the West African Moslems who decided to settle in and around the Gezira after making their pilgrimages to Mecca. They are said to be a source of irritation for the Northern Sudanese, some of whom resent the industriousness of the West Africans.

The Southerners, numbering 3,056,000, are Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic and Sudanic peoples. They are Animist or Christian and speak non-Arabic native languages and English. The major Southern groups are the Azande, Jii, Dinka, Shilluk, Nuer, Bari, Lotuko and Topasa.

Religion

The North is predominantly Moslem and the South almost entirely Animist or Christian. In 1955 there were 6,474,453 Muslims; 2,428,703 Animists; 162,745 Catholics; 94,981 Protestants; 12,525 Orthodox; and 380 Jews. Islam is strongest among the dominant urban classes. As the socially prestigious and government-sanctioned religion, it is gaining strength. The administration is largely Moslem. But outside the cities, most Northerners are not strict Moslems or even strict monotheists.
Much of the Sudan's history has been determined by its relations with Egypt. The Pharaohs, the Persians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Arabs, the Turks and the British—all the rulers of Egypt—have sought to extend their rule further up the Nile into the Sudan. From the 16th to the eighth century B.C., the northern Cush (the Sudan from the Gezira northward) was under the control of the Pharaohs. As the power of the Egyptian Pharaohs diminished, Cushite leaders established the 25th Pharaonic dynasty (725 B.C.). The extension of Cushite power into Syria and Judea are recorded in the Bible. Although the empire was defeated by the Assyrians, the Cushite kingdom survived for a thousand years.

In A.D. 350 the first Christian king of Axum raided the Nile Valley. Out of this disruption emerged three Nuba kingdoms, which were converted to Christianity by the Empress Theodora early in the 6th century A.D. The Arabs “conquered” the two northern kingdoms largely through infiltration and intermarriage in A.D. 1250 and ruled them until 1504, when the Islamic Sultanate of The Funj, “the Black Sultanate” conquered them from the South. This confederation of smaller sultanates ruled Cush and Nubia until the 19th century, when Muhammad Ali Pasha came into the Sudan, looking for gold and slaves with which to build an Egyptian-Arab empire independent of the Sultan in Istanbul. His Nile Valley empire lasted from 1821 until 1885, when Khartoum fell to the Mahdi.

Egyptian rule under the successors of Muhammad Ali, especially Khedive Ismail, became corrupt and inefficient. The Sudan was semi-independent, ruled through the traditional tribal structure by a governor general and provincial governors but subject to frequent and arbitrary interference from Cairo. Ismail decided he was going to abolish slavery in his lifetime—and worked with British troops under Gen. Charles Gordon and Sir Samuel Baker, who carried out his crusade with excesses of violence which were in the spirit of the slave trade itself. This caused economic and social disruption, weakened the control of the government, and brought about the rise of the Mahdi.

The Mahdi led a “jihad” to establish The Sudan as an independent theocratic nation-state. Its laws would come from fundamentalist Islam—egalitarian and communistic, evangelical and puritanical. The only books allowed the followers of the Madhi were the Koran and a devotional book he wrote himself. All others were burned as products of a corrupt society. The British, who had taken effective control of Egypt, decided not to interfere with the establishment of the Mahdist state but to concentrate their resources in the development of Egypt. They sent Gordon to bring home the Egyptian troops (which he probably had no intention of doing)—and he was killed in the Battle of Khartoum. This evacuation of the Sudan was resented by Egyptian nationalists, who saw it as a betrayal of Egyptian interests to further British policy. They saw the “reconquest” of the Sudan 10 years later in the same light. Indeed, the British aim was to protect their Egyptian “property” from France and other European
powers in the general scramble for Africa. The reconquest was executed in the name of the Khedive under General Kitchener and subordinate Egyptian officers 1896–98. The battle against the Mahdi and his "whirling dervishes" (a British misnomer for Mahdist soldiers) contributed much to the adventure stories and exotic tales of faraway places that were part of the British Empire. After the Mahdi fell, most of his followers went back to traditional Islam or Animism; but there are many among the Western tribes who still await his apocalyptic return.

With the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1899 a new regime was established in the Sudan. The agreement emphasized British claims resulting from her participation in the reconquest, but was silent on the precise relative powers of the two conquering states. This left England considerable scope for political and diplomatic maneuver as well as effective control. She was able to answer French protests to the takeover with claims she was acting on behalf of the Khedive and Egyptian nationalists' protests at their inferior position with the assertion that Egypt could not even govern herself without the guardianship of England. Although the governors-general, province governors, and district governors of the Sudan ruled by Khedival decree, they were "approved" by the British Government and were all British. The Sudan was, for all practical purposes, a British colony.

But the British continued to have trouble exercising real control over the Sudan, both from the Egyptians who helped rule and felt it was Egyptian territory and from the politically active, educated Sudanese, who sympathized with the Egyptians because of common language and religion. In 1924 the British evacuated all Egyptians from the Sudan and embarked on a policy of indirect rule (rule through local tribal units) which would strip the educated Sudanese of their power, replacing them with tribal leaders. In the Sudan as in the rest of the British African colonies, indirect rule reinforced and in some cases created intertribal animosities. In fact, it is British colonial policies more than indigenous cultural, religious, or racial differences which modern leaders blame for the present north-south conflict. British policy was to separate the southern provinces from the nationalistic north and make them part of an East African Federation under British control. They became "closed districts". All foreign Arabic-speaking Moslems, no matter what their origins, were forced to leave and none were permitted to come in. Southerners had to get a hard-to-obtain passport to travel in the north. Missionary and government schools were opened to teach Christianity and English and to discourage Islamic and Arabic culture. Southerners who had taken Arabic names and wore Arabic clothes were "encouraged" to adopt English names and southern dress (sometimes by burning their clothes).

The Sudanese nationalists resented these policies and agitated for the unification of northern and southern syllabae and the end of missionary subsidization as well as Sudanese control of their own government and administration. But they were divided over their relations with Egypt—the Mahdists (Umma Party) preferring English guardianship to Egyptian control as long as Egypt held to a policy of "Unity of the Nile Valley," while others identified culturally and politically
with Egypt and wanted to unite with her. When Egypt abandoned her claims to the Sudan, an Anglo-Egyptian agreement was signed (1953) which provided for the Sudanization of the army, police force, and administration of the Sudan—and for self-determination within 3 years.

The north-south split became evident as soon as Sudan began preparing for independence. The official opening of Parliament (March 1, 1954) was the scene of a violent demonstration by the Mahdists, threatening civil war if the northern-controlled government pursued a policy of unification with Egypt. In August 1955, there was a mutiny of southern troops in which nearly 300 northern Sudanese officials, merchants, and their families were massacred. Before they would vote for independence, southern members of Parliament insisted that their request for a federal form of government be given full consideration. On December 19, 1955, Parliament unanimously declared the Sudan an independent republic. Faced with this fait accompli, Britain and Egypt had no choice but to recognize the Sudan's independence.

The independent Republic of Sudan has been hampered by economic difficulties and regional conflict. In 1958, the military regime of Gen. Ibrahim Abboud replaced the parliamentary government. The coup was the result of economic difficulties brought on by too rapid expansion and low cotton prices, as well as the traditional difference in attitudes toward Egypt. The PDP was for giving more support to Egypt during the Suez crisis and against accepting American aid to help them out of financial difficulties. The Umma Party saw these positions as a threat to Sudanese independence from Egypt. The military government was successful in establishing closer relations with the United Arab Republic while maintaining good relations with the West. It followed sound economic policies (especially in stabilizing cotton sales and prices) and embarked on several successful development projects (such as the Roseires and Khashm Al Girba Dams).

But discontent began to grow because of corruption in the ruling military elite. In October 1964, the judiciary, university staff, workers, and others joined in a general strike and civilian coup against the government.

The immediate cause of the revolution was the military government's southern policy. In 1964 it had expelled all missionaries and taken military action against the Anya Nya rebels and the civilian villagers. This had forced thousands of southerners to live as refugees in neighboring countries and convinced many that the only solution for them was to have a separate and independent state in the south. This dramatized the problem for both the outside world and Sudanese students, who were forbidden to discuss the problem. It was the police opening fire on the students who broke this ban that provoked the general strike which brought about the fall of the military government.

In June 1965 elections were held and a coalition government formed by Umma and the N.U.P. with Mohammed Ahmed Maghoub (Umma) as Prime Minister. The Government immediately encountered problems in the south, and responded by sending in Government troops. It became increasingly right-wing, banning the Communist Party. The Umma Party attempted to save the civilian government by electing the younger and more moderate Sadik El Mahdi Premier.
He appointed two southerners to his cabinet, achieved economic recovery and was drafting a settlement to the southern problem when he was defeated in the Assembly, and Maghoub was again elected premier.

Under Maghoub’s second and third governments, thousands were killed in government action in the south, the economic situation deteriorated, and political factionalism increased. On May 25, 1969, a bloodless military coup took place in which a group of officers and civilians led by Major-General Jacifer al Nemery took power. A National Revolutionary Council with one civilian member (the Prime Minister, Abu Bakr Awadalla) was established and given absolute powers. Five members of the new Cabinet were members of the Communist Party, and a policy of “Sudanese socialism” and solidarity with the North African countries was announced.

In December 1969, an alliance was formed with the U.A.R. and Libya and in November 1970, the three countries announced plans for federation. The Sudan was thus becoming fully involved in Arab politics, a united western front being formed against Israel, and Libyan finance and Egyptian skilled manpower being made available for Sudanese development. The federation was postponed, however, because of the war in the south and Communist opposition. The Nemeri government’s southern policy, announced June 10, 1969, was to appoint southerners to ministerial and diplomatic posts in preparation for southern self-government. But the rebels had mixed reactions to this policy and, receiving some aid from Israel, continued fighting.

**Economy**

With an economy which is highly agricultural and pastoral (over 50 percent of the GNP) and very little industrial development, the Sudan has many of the problems which characterize less developed countries. It is heavily dependent on one export crop—extra-long staple cotton accounts for as much as 70 percent of the total export in some years. The modernized sector of the economy is quite small. Manufacturing industries contribute only 2 percent of the GDP, minerals less than 1 percent; 48 percent of the GDP is produced in the traditional sector, and 25 percent is produced and consumed in the subsistence sector. Per capita income is low (less than $100); GNP is $1.6 billion. The economy has been growing at an annual rate of 4 percent. Sudan suffers from a labor shortage, especially during the cotton picking season. It also suffers from a shortage of private capital investment. The government must assume responsibility for modernization. It owns the majority of modern capital establishments and has had by far the largest share in gross fixed capital formation. Its development plan has been to encourage industries based on Sudan’s primary products—sugar refining, cotton ginning, food processing, tanning, and tourism. In May and June 1970, all the banks and several major commercial firms were nationalized, indicating an increasingly important role for the government in economic development.

**Agriculture**

In the nation united by the Nile, the most important economic resource is water. It is concentrated in too small an area, and moving it is too expensive. With a system of irrigation which reached all her arable land, Sudan would have over 200 million acres of farmland.
But only 8 percent of it is now being cultivated; and only 4 million acres are under irrigation. The largest irrigation scheme, the Gezira, produces all Sudan’s cotton. It is being expanded and its crops diversified; other schemes are being built—that is, the Rahad and Sukhi projects. But, with the exception of cotton, most of Sudan’s foodstuffs and agricultural exports come from the rainlands rather than irrigated areas. Here, production costs are low, mechanization is increasing output, and enough is being produced to make Sudan agriculturally self-sufficient.

Although the drier lands cannot be cultivated, they are often suitable for grazing. Cattle, sheep, goats, and camels together account for 10 percent of Sudan’s GDP and 6 percent of her export. Other important products are fish, dura (a combination of sorghum millets which is the staple of the rural Sudanese), wheat (which is becoming the staple of the urban population) and gum arabic. Sudan produces 92 percent of the total world consumption of gum arabic.

**Industry**

The first industries to be developed were those which processed goods for export (the result of European colonial policy, which concentrated on developing those commodities which could be exported to the mother countries). The ginning of cotton was begun early in this century—and the Gezira board alone is now the largest ginning enterprise under single management in the world. The processing of cotton seeds into oil and oil cakes is increasing. Groundnuts are shelled for export.

After 1960, however, the government embarked on a policy of import substitution. Since then, industry geared toward meeting the domestic market demand, as opposed to exporting, has grown considerably. The Industrial Development Corp., founded in 1962, was by 1968 managing nine manufacturing factories. These include two sugar factories, a tannery, and five food processing plants. Textiles, soap, footwear, softdrinks, printing, flour, and knitwear are also important industries. The government has encouraged industrial development not only through direct investment, but through generous concessions to infant industries, allowing very high rates of depreciation, giving exemption from business profits tax for a number of years, reducing import duties on machinery and raw materials, and protecting domestic production by high tariffs and import restrictions. Most industrial development is in the north.

**Foreign Trade**

Sudan faced a trade deficit every year throughout the 1960’s. Although exports increased from Sd£ 63.4 to Sd£ 86.3 million in that decade, imports rose by more—from Sd£ 63.7 to Sd£ 89.3 million. The government has tried to correct this by imposing high import duties and light export taxes, but domestic industry is not developed enough to meet all internal demands.

Since the Gezira scheme was established in 1925, cotton has been the dominant export. Between 1960 and 1969 its share of total exports ranged from 46 to 62 percent. The EEC is the largest buyer of cotton, followed by India, the U.S.S.R., the People’s Republic of China, Japan, and eastern European countries. Gum arabic is the
second largest export product (10 percent)—the main buyers are the EEC, Great Britain, and the United States. Nine percent of the export is groundnuts—of which the EEC is the largest buyer. Sudan’s major imports are vehicles, transport equipment, machinery, appliances, and (ironically) textiles.

Sudan’s trading patterns have changed considerably since independence. The United Kingdom used to be her largest trading partner, accounting for 30–40 percent of the trade. But that place has been taken by the EEC, and Britain’s share has dropped to 6.7 percent of the trade. Trade with socialist countries and with Arab countries has been expanding since independence.

Foreign Aid

The Sudan receives general aid from a number of sources and does not appear to be overly dependent on one donor. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has financed a number of development projects—the Roseires Dam, mechanized farming, Sudan Railways extension and dieselization and the Managil extension of the Gezira scheme. American aid used to be 14 percent of the total, is given largely in nonproject commodities. Yugoslavia gave a tannery, a cardboard factory, and the three ships which constitute the Sudan shipping line. The U.S.S.R. gave grain elevators, food processing factories, a hospital, and veterinary laboratories. The Arab countries have given 30 percent of the total foreign aid. Italian contractors, Dutch bankers, and Japanese financiers have all invested in Sudanese development. Total foreign aid during 1960–69 was Sd£ 141 million. With a socialist government in power, The Sudan now gets most of its aid from socialist countries.

Labor

Forty-eight percent of The Sudan’s population is engaged in some kind of productive activity. Most of these are male (62.4 percent). Most are primary producers (86.7 percent). Only 1 million of a total of 5 million are wage earners outside agriculture. In the three southernmost provinces and the nomadic tribal areas of the north, subsistence agriculture predominates. The modern sector is centered in the Gezira. Here there is intensive cultivation with fertilizer, machinery, and hired labor (half of which is supplied locally, a third West African, and a sixth Sudanese from other areas). Most workers with modern technical skills are here and in the urban areas, as are most technical schools, experimental research farms, and extension services.

Sudan had a shortage of skilled labor until 1965; but the Khartoum Senior Trade School, opened in 1960, provides many of the mechanics, electricians, carpenters, draftsmen, engineers, surveyors, and secretaries necessary for the modernized sector. The Government is the most important employer of skilled labor, both in Government industries and on the railroads.

Labor organization began in 1946. By 1960, 2 percent of the labor force was organized, made up mostly of Government workers in northern cities and towns. Unions are organized by the industry rather than by skill; but there are tremendous divisions between skilled and unskilled, as well as between Government and private workers. The Sudan Railway Workers’ Union (with 28,000 members) and the
is a loan of $8.5 million and technical assistance of $1 million. The actual construction is expected to take at least 2 years. The Somalia Development Bank is in the process of utilizing the $2 million AID loan under the credit development project. Another capital project, the Chisimaio Port, has recently been completed and turned over to the Somalia Government. Self-help funds and PL-480 food shipments (except for emergency relief) are also prohibited.

The study mission met with Maj. Gen. Mohamed Said Barre, President of the Supreme Revolutionary Council, and several Government officials. Somalia's progress was recognized, as was the necessity for practical expectations. It was claimed that more rapid progress is now expected because, since the revolution, there is a new spirit. The new government has called for realism, self-reliance, and sacrifice, and for less dependence on outside assistance and guidance. However, despite increased taxation and nationalization of principal industries, the budget remains unbalanced and basic needs are still not being met.

Although certain sectors have been nationalized, the Government officials advised the study mission there is no intention of abolishing the private sector, and that it is attempting to expand the public sector as much as possible.

Somalia does not delude itself about foreign assistance. It cannot do it all by itself—it needs outside help. However, it does not desire help which is conditional or which detracts from Somalia's national sovereignty. Help without political ties is welcome. One official said that Somalia, above all, wants to be left alone to develop its own system. He thought, indeed, that this principle applies for all of Africa, which should be given the opportunity to solve its own problems. The Somalia Government feels that the U.S. aid termination was unjustified, and would like to see it resumed, provided that it is not tied to political policies.

A major goal of Somalia has long been unification of the Somali people, one-fourth of whom live in the neighboring lands of Kenya, Ethiopia, and the French territory of Afars and Issas. Disagreements regarding the future status of these 1 million persons has caused grave tensions between Somalia and its neighbors for a number of years.

Relations with the United States, according to U.S. Embassy personnel, seem to have improved slightly throughout 1971, and were described as "normal" in early 1972 by State Department officials. Contacts with Eastern bloc nations have expanded, and the Government has tended to adopt anti-Western stands on major international issues such as the Middle East and Vietnam. Soviet influence has increased and the Soviet-built port of Berbers in northern Somalia is now frequented from time to time by Russian merchant and naval vessels. The Somali regime has asserted its desire for good relations with all countries.
Gezira Tenants' Association are the two most important unions. The federation of unions—the SWTUF—was founded in 1950, and has been committed to attaining union ends through political action. All unions were dissolved in 1958 and restored in 1961, subject to limitations.

Wages are higher in the public sector than in the private sector and higher in the north than in the south. The Government minimum wage is Sd£ 13.9, while the private is Sd£ 6. The rationale for lower wages for southerners has been that labor productivity is lower there. Although some workers are better paid than others, no one can be considered well paid. The cost of living has been steadily rising, and it is estimated that real wages fell by 30 percent between 1951 and 1968.

Power and Transport

Both electrical power and transportation facilities are concentrated in the north, where the modernized sector of the economy and most of the towns and cities are located. All the main towns and many small towns lying near transmission lines are supplied with electricity. There are 68,529 residential and commercial, 558 agricultural and 844 industrial electrical power consumers. Ginning factories, large oil mills and sugar factories generate their own electricity from byproducts. Sudan depends mainly on railways for transport. There are only 208 miles of asphalt roads, 178 in Khartoum Province. The rainy season makes most other roads unusable. By contrast, there are 11,020 miles of tracks, 3,210 miles of which are passable even immediately after the rains. There is also the Sudan Shipping Line, which carries 5 percent of the country's trade. The Sudan Airways link 20 important Sudanese towns and provide service to Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.

Health and Education

Health

The Sudan has one of the highest mortality rates in the world; 100 of every 1,000 babies die in their first year. (Note, this is, however, less than one-half of the infant mortality rate in the Bantustans of South Africa.) Life expectancy is 28 years. Death rates are twice as high in the southern provinces as in the north; health and sanitation facilities are less developed. The shortage of transportation facilities in the south prohibits trade of foods between areas, limiting families to two or three locally produced staples and causing malnutrition. Short periods of famine and semistarvation are frequent when these staples fail due to flood or locust. There are always food shortages in the dry season.

The towns have fewer problems with malnutrition and more with sanitation. Housing is congested.

Medical facilities are being expanded as fast as possible. Though there are few doctors, there is an attempt to provide more medical assistants (with 3 years of nursing and 3 of supervised hospital experience) and dispensary units for the rural areas. Radio programs, agricultural shows, tribal gatherings, and hospital stays are all used for instruction in disease prevention, child care and nutrition. The Ministry of Health received a budget allocation of about $2,355,056 for 1969-70, higher than that for any ministry outside education.
Education

The Sudan is trying to bridge the educational gap between the north and the south created by the British. School facilities available in the South are utterly deficient. Arabic is supposed to be taught in all elementary, intermediate, and secondary schools and is intended to become the nationwide medium for instruction. Northern Syllabuses are being introduced wherever Arabic is used. The former 2-year village schools in the south are being expanded into 3-4 year elementary schools like those in the north. But education, especially secondary and postsecondary, is still concentrated heavily in the north and is far from being available to everyone. Entrance to both intermediate and secondary schools is by competitive examination.

In 1967–68 there were 71,607 pupils in government secondary schools and 63,800 in private. At the time of the visit of the study mission there was no secondary school in the south, although one for the students from the south was conducted in Khartoum.

The government subsidizes a variety of special educational programs apart from the normal primary-secondary schooling. The Department of Religious Affairs runs a number of schools (54) designed to teach the Islamic culture and subsidizes 41 private religious schools. In 1967 there were 6,261 students in the government's system of technical education. These schools, which range from intermediate level to Khartoum Polytechnic, are considered important for development.

The University of Khartoum, which has approximately 3,240 students, is heavily subsidized by the Government even though it is technically private. Courses here are taught in English. Teacher training colleges are being expanded to meet the needs for more teachers who can speak Arabic and teach the northern syllabus in the south. There is also an Egyptian university in Khartoum which is considered more prestigious than the Sudanese university. There are also a higher technical institute, a high trade school, a higher nursing college and school of hygiene and an agricultural institute. In spite of the general shortage of places in schools, technical and agricultural schools are seldom filled. Students would rather compete for the high salaries and prestige that go along with a liberal arts education and a position in business or a government bureaucracy. Finally, the government has a number of programs for people who have either completed their formal education or were never able to attend schools. The Institutes of Education have run adult education programs in order to reduce illiteracy and instruct mothers in child welfare. Boys’ clubs, libraries, and programs of community development workers teaching courses and organizing cooperative efforts on the level are all important in this.

Relations With The United States

The Sudan severed diplomatic relations with the United States as a consequence of the misunderstandings engendered by the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967 and as a sign of Arab solidarity. Consular relations, however, continued; and the U.S. Interests Section operates under the protection of the Royal Netherlands Embassy. Pursuant to the arrangement provided for in the Exchange of Notes of August 9 and August 14, 1967, between the Royal Netherlands Embassy and the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, members of the U.S. Interests Section have direct access to appropriate authorities.
After the June 1967 war, the Sudan's former western orientation changed to a period of identification with the Eastern bloc. Following the coup and counter-coup of the summer of 1971 some disillusionment with its Eastern ties was noted and warmer relations with the United States resulted. The Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs visited the Sudan in December 1971. In August 1972, the restoration of diplomatic relations between The Sudan and the United States was announced.

The Sudan's Southern Problem, and Its Possible Solution

Background

The Sudan is a reasonable national entity, centered as it is on the Nile, and with a population that is neither Arab nor black African, although it contains elements of both. There is no economic or other rationality for splitting off the south, either as an independent unit in order to connect up with any other country.

Nevertheless, differences between the various regions of the Sudan are a major source of internal conflict (although by no means the only one); this is a common experience of many African countries, whose frontiers were drawn arbitrarily by competing imperial powers.

With its scattered population and immense size, The Sudan faces problems of immense distances, shortages of water, the usual administrative and other problems of underdevelopment, and the social tensions which spring from and perpetuate the geographical imbalances.

The most intractable problem, largely responsible for the downfall of the last three governments, has proved to be the alienation of the three southern provinces of Equatoria, Upper Nile, and Bahr El Ghazal from the political processes of an independent Sudan. This is derived ultimately from a combination of many factors, including cultural, religious, historical, geographical, economic, and political ones, and exacerbated by certain policies since independence.

The southern provinces are physically divided from the north by extensive swamps, called the Sudd; regular transportation links were established only under British administration during the Anglo-Egyptian condominium. While the northern area is of mixed population, migrating from the north and united by Islamic culture and the Arabic language, the south is even more mixed in origin, made up through migrations from the south, and mainly animist in religion with a great variety of languages and cultures.

Turkish and Egyptian empires covering the northern regions found it difficult to penetrate the south, which was ruled by a succession of African empires before the arrival of the British. Although nominally administering the south from 1898, the British did not finally “pacify” the area until about 1930.

Colonial policy is frequently blamed, especially by the northerners, for inciting hatred against them in the south. Before the First World War, however, the people of southern Sudan were hardly affected by the administration as such, which relied on a wide variety of Christian missionary organizations to establish education, training, medical, and social services. The missionaries insured that education involved conversion to Christianity, and in their extreme anxiety to halt the
spread of Islam, insisted on the use of English instead of Arabic, the natural common language even in the south, and the imposition of Western customs. They also seem to have harped on the theme of the northerners' exploitation of the south as a source of slaves (although in fact the slave-traders were primarily European and Egyptian). With the exception of the Catholics, the missionaries also used education as a means of teaching Christianity and the liberal arts, instead of developing skills which would be of practical value to the community in the southern Sudanese context.

It was not until after the First World War that the British adopted a conscious policy of administering separately the south Sudan from the rest of the country. This was partly due to the new ethic of preserving regional cultures, but perhaps more to the fear of nationalistic and anti-British feeling penetrating from the north and ultimately reaching to East Africa. All the northern traders were expelled, which greatly damaged the commercial life of the region.

The independence movement, and electioneering at the time of independence, therefore had little relevance to the south, and there was a distinct feeling of nonparticipation in the affairs of the country from the start. Resistance to the imposition of northern-dominated administration started with the mutiny of southern troops against their new northern commanders in 1955. After the suppression of the mutiny, many of those involved went underground, and provided the nucleus of the rebel forces in the south.

The introduction of the northern school system was also greatly resented, as was the expulsion of the missionaries who had been instrumental in the formation of the Christian, English-speaking elite of the south. Being ill-equipped to fit into the new Sudanization policy because of their irrelevant education, southerners had a big grievance about the allocation of administrative positions in the south to northerners.

**Economic development**

Probably more fundamental than the linguistic and cultural rift between north and south is the disparity in economic development. From the beginning of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium, the northern area, with its established Moslem school system, greater accessibility and more complex economic activity, was seen as easier to develop than the remote, heterogeneous south. The development projects were therefore concentrated in the northeast, particularly the ambitious irrigation schemes such as the Gezira project, which established cotton as the Sudan's major export crop.

The original idea seems to have been to concentrate all development funds on the northeast and Khartoum, which by producing quick results would generate further capital for reinvestment in the rest of the country. In fact this was not possible because the northeast, once on the road to development, acquired overwhelming political power, and the other regions of the country were used merely as sources of migrant labor; there was strenuous opposition to the idea of diverting profits to development of other areas.

This represents an early example of the widely applied policy of the concentration of development finance on areas which are already semi-developed. The fact that the Sudanese irrigation schemes were ex-
tremely successful, in their own terms, makes the result even more ironic. The net effect is to increase the gap between rich and poor, whether between individuals, regions or entire countries. The poor majority tends, under this form of “development”, to become worse off in absolute as well as relative terms. In addition, the richer individuals or areas acquire disproportionate political influence, and so the imbalance tends to increase in spite of a realization that the economic effects are not to the general advantage.

The tendency for injustice to increase in such a development situation is clearly linked to the social unrest and even organized resistance movements in a number of developing countries—for example, the Ibos in Nigeria; the poorer Eastern wing of Pakistan; Naxalite violence in India; strikes and violence in Namibia, Rhodesia, the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau; the secessionist movements in Ethiopia and Chad; intertribal tensions in a number of countries where one faction controls economic and political power in a fast-growing economy; and the general social dislocation resulting from mass unemployment.

The case of the Sudan is not therefore unique, but can be seen as a warning to those concerned with development that aid should not be concentrated on the most fortunate. The Sudan could also serve as a model for a general solution, in removing the causes of factionalism by building up the economy of the South.

The War

The seeds of violent resistance were sown at the 1955 mutiny. The terrorist organization, Anya-Nya (a slow but fatal snake poison) was not formed until 1963, although there had been a succession of political organizations in the south, with rather conflicting strategies.

Much of the problem has been the result of a general dislocation of society, and universal lawlessness, which flowed from the initial minor activities of a few extremists; the Sudanese army would then move in with massive retaliation, including massacres of unknown numbers of civilians and the uprooting of whole villages. Refugees and the unemployed swelled the number of insurgents to perhaps 5,000–10,000. Both sides directed their attacks against the civilian population, either to raid villages for supplies or to exact revenge.

The guerrillas, operating in separate units and often little better than independent brigands, were very poorly equipped and organized, but were able to keep the fighting going because of the vast areas involved and the inadequacies of the other side, who were unfamiliar with the territory. On the whole, the Sudanese Army controlled the towns, and the guerrillas the countryside. In the last few years, the army appeared to be making progress, but they could not hope to impose a purely military solution.

In this respect the Sudanese civil war is typical of civil wars in Africa. In the case of Nigeria, for example, the suffering of the civilian population was a major element in the war. Military activity is also indecisive in Chad and Ethiopia. An element of attrition is inevitable where the insurgent area is already suffering from growing poverty and injustice, and where it is dependent to some extent on providing migrant labor for the richer zones.
Apart from the casualties from the fighting, therefore, the Sudanese civil war caused enormous suffering in the form of starvation, disease, homelessness and the dislocation of all economic activity, so making the root causes of violence all the more powerful. The population fled into the bush, or into neighboring countries; those arriving in the UN refugee camps alone numbered nearly 200,000, and the total number of displaced persons was many times that number, amounting to the vast majority of the south's 3 million population. This makes the disaster half the size of the much-publicized one in Bangladesh.

Since 1969, when Nemer offered a general amnesty to the rebels and a degree of regional autonomy, and started some development projects, refugees have been drifting back, mainly crowding into the towns for safety. Further assurances were offered by allocating southerners to governorships of all three provinces, with the rank of Minister (although in the other six Sudanese provinces they are only Deputy Ministers).

International factors

There was very little support for the southern rebels from outside, even from the black African countries bordering on the south. The general feeling of all African states is strongly against secession in principle, since so many of them are faced with this possibility within their own borders. The only fairly regular supplier of arms and equipment seems to have been Israel, which provided some arms captured from the Arabs during the 6-day war. This support seemed in danger of escalating recently, as the Arab States became increasingly interested in the Sudanese war.

Arms, equipment and foreign mercenaries are readily available to any secessionist group able to pay. This is one of the most dangerous aspects of the various African tensions. Perhaps the worst governmental offender in this is France, although many other governments and private agents are involved. The Sudanese rebels had some arms from the Congo secessionists, bought or captured; they also had at least one foreign mercenary, Rolf Steiner of West Germany. Significantly, he was captured by the Ugandans and handed over to the Sudanese Government.

On the other side, the Sudanese Government was until recently receiving large supplies of arms, equipment and technical advice from the Soviet Union, China and other Socialist countries, and from some of the Arab States. The purge of the Communists in 1971 cut off the close relationship with the Soviets and other East Europeans.

One of the stumbling blocks to a settlement with the south was the Sudanese Government's alignment with the Arab States over the Middle East conflict. They broke off diplomatic relations with the United States in 1967 over the 6-day war, and for some time debated whether to join the Arab Federation with Libya, Egypt, and now Syria. Reports of the war in 1971 indicated that for the first time, the Sudanese conflict was taking on an international character, as part of the general Middle East conflict, with Arabs and Israelis becoming increasingly committed to their respective sides and Soviet influence becoming increasingly apparent. A serious escalation of the war was being predicted, in the absence of any agreement. In this perspective,
the settlement appears all the more welcome; if the situation is allowed
to revert to its previous state, there could be some very dangerous
implications.

There is a strong current of feeling in the Sudan against close links
with the Arab world, especially with Egypt; the Government's former
position was largely ideological, and now seems more in touch with
the realities of public opinion. Similarly, the close links with the
Socialist countries resulted in disillusionment with their ways of
operating, ranging from bureaucratic delays to manipulation of the
trade agreements to Soviet advantage, by, for example, reselling Su-
danese cotton at a higher price than they paid.

Nemerí's purge of the Communist Party after the attempted coup
of July 1971, and his movement away from pan-Arabism in foreign
policy, were undoubtedly important in preparing the way for the
Sudan's coming to terms with its non-Arab nature, and a settlement
with the south. The Arabs are actually a minority in the Sudan, and
Nemerí's new course seems to have increased his popularity. Thus,
a more balanced foreign policy is clearly linked to the attempt to
reconstruct the stability of the country as a whole.

Relations with Ethiopia, which had been antagonistic, have been
restored with the negotiation of the settlement. There have been
strenuous efforts to reassure the neighboring black African countries
about the Government's intentions. Relations with Western Europe
are being actively cultivated; diplomatic relations with West Germany
have been restored, there have been talks with the Vatican (significant
in that Catholic missionaries have been among the most vocal critics
of the Government), and new offers for the compensation of na-
tionalized British assets are being worked out, contributing to the
general improvement in relations with the United Kingdom; the
latter has publicly welcomed the settlement with the south. A $25
million credit guarantee has been provided by the United Kingdom
for new cotton schemes, with the possibility of a further $25 million.

There have been visits by IMF and IBRD officials, with the pros-
pect of a $100 million Bank loan, and acceptance by the Sudan of
IMF stipulations for currency stabilization. The Sudan was the first
government to ratify the Kuwait project for an investment guarantee
scheme, to give security to foreign investors in the region. The Sudanese
Government has also inaugurated a $10 million development project
with the United Nations World Food Program, which provides a
foundation for economic development in the south.

Terms of the settlement

The negotiations took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, having
been brought about by the good offices of the World Council of
Churches (whose credibility to the Sudanese Government was
insured by their support for the Southern African liberation move-
ments) and by Haile Sclassie himself, who played a significant part
in keeping the talks going by his clear concern for African unity.
This role was played early by African observers at the 1964 Khartoum
conference between northern and southern leaders, at which a form
of agreement was reached, but not made effective because of the
Government's lack of control over its army at that time, which killed
large numbers of southerners, including many of the intellectual
leadership.
The 12 days of talks at Addis produced agreement on a general amnesty for the rebels, who are to be absorbed into the Sudanese Army under the supervision of a joint committee of Government and Anya-Nya representatives. An international commission with representatives of African countries, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the Red Cross, and the World Council of Churches is supervising the cease-fire and repatriation of refugees.

A regional government is being set up in the south with a higher executive council and elected regional assembly. There will be complete autonomy, except for the areas of defense, foreign affairs, finance, planning, higher education, and other matters. The Sudan will continue as a unity under the central Government, competent to legislate on all national affairs without the south having the right of veto. Arabic will continue to be the official language, but English will be one of the working languages in the south—an item of great local importance.

Free elections are to be held within 18 months of the settlement; southern political parties, banned with all the others when Nemer came to power, will not be permitted but will obviously influence the choice of candidates. Until the election, half of the 12,000-strong army in the south will be southerners; this will not necessarily prevail afterwards. The south will have its own independent armed police force. The arrangement includes a safeguard for the south, since the law providing autonomy can be amended only by a two-thirds majority in a plebiscite of southerners.

The basic problems relating to the implementation of the settlement should not be ignored. It offers an opportunity for a reversal of the Sudan's self-imposed policy of alignment with the Arab and Socialist blocs; in moving away from these, however, it is left in desperate need of assistance from other sources. The war, which has cost about $3 million a month since 1964, has left the country's reserves so depleted that its hope of a rapid reconstruction and development of the southern economy—essential if southern enthusiasm for the settlement is not to turn into disillusionment and frustration—depend to a large extent on the provision of international financial and technical assistance.

There seems to be widespread support for the settlement, especially in the south where the guerrillas seem to be thankfully laying down their arms as news of a cease-fire spreads through the bush. Nemer himself made an extensive tour of the south in March, and received an enthusiastic and grateful welcome, according to newspaper reports. The songs that greeted his arrival apparently blamed the Communists for having held up the settlement for so long. Support in the north is not so unequivocal, since the south seems to have been given more political freedom than they themselves enjoy; however, there was obviously relief that the debilitating war is over, and alignment with a foreign ideology reversed. The general mood in the Sudan is reported as giving priority to internal unity and urgent economic development programs.

As far as the south is concerned, this is crucial to the entire settlement; in the first instance there is the enormous problem of returning refugees. Facilities are so inadequate that several have gone back where they came from, finding nothing to live on in their own areas.
Thousands of people have crowded into the towns, where there is no work and no facilities. Their farms have been neglected for so long that they will need a lot of work to return to production; many of the cattle have gone; and for the time being there is a serious subsistence problem.

There is also a long-term problem of resources for developing a basic infrastructure of administration, transportation and communications, and a wide range of development projects especially in the agricultural sector. The south has good potential for agricultural and agro-allied industries, including modern tropical farming, the use of their animal resources of cattle and game, food processing, gold mining, and paper-making from papyrus. The region can supply a range of essential commodities at present imported into the north.

Now that diplomatic relations with the United States are being restored, the U.S. Government has a fine opportunity to participate in reconstruction and development. It is to be hoped that it will give priority to an aid program for the south, based on the experience of past mistakes, especially the problem of regional imbalance.

Conclusions and recommendations

The Sudan's southern problem is not basically a racial conflict, as it is often labelled. It is primarily the general problem of unequal development and a consequent failure of communication between different sections of the population.

A conference was held at Khartoum in February 1972 for international voluntary aid agencies, to discuss the coordination of relief and development efforts; this was followed by a major international conference of voluntary and U.N. agencies, in Geneva on May 29. Several voluntary organizations are starting work immediately. Three U.S. organizations have announced that they will participate in the international effort: Lutheran World Federation, Catholic Relief Services, and Church World Service. Public Law 480 aid is to be channelled through them. The American chapters of international agencies such as the Red Cross and World Council of Churches will also be involved.

The U.N. agencies are aware of the situation, and the London meeting on April 11 of the Administrative Coordinating Committee (ACC) of the agencies concerned with relief and development had Sudan on its agenda. The Sudanese Foreign Minister was attending the meeting before proceeding to New York, for consultations at the U.N.; to Washington, to see Secretary of State Rogers and Mr. McNamara at the IBRD, and then Paris and Bonn. This visit to the United States followed a series of contacts between the United States and the Sudan, both direct—with visits by George Ball, David Newsom, and ourselves as well as indirect, through Ethiopia and Somalia.

While we were in the Sudan, we were repeatedly told that the country was in desperate need of aid from any source, including the United States. $4½ million worth of Public Law 480 food assistance is being made available for U.S. voluntary agencies' projects the State Department Office for Migration and Refugee affairs will provide relief assistance, and that this office is also coordinating the work of the U.S. voluntary agencies. This immediate relief assistance is likely to be of great use in solving immediate problems.
However, the vast size and urgency of the problem make these relief efforts seem woefully inadequate. There is an immediate need for a comprehensive relief and development plan, providing the essential services necessary for the southern Sudanese to rebuild their shattered economy from scratch. Only the U.N. agencies have the expertise and personnel to carry out such a project, and they are suffering from serious financial problems at the moment, much of this due to the United States' unwillingness to pay its agreed share.

The case of the Sudan offers a rare opportunity for the United States to take the lead in humanitarian assistance at a critical moment. There is nothing to prevent a U.S. contribution to a project set up by multinational agencies, whether for refugees or for lasting development. If necessary, the President's contingency fund could be used for this emergency. The Sudanese decision to restore diplomatic relations with us is a welcome one, and particularly in the context of gradual reduction of Cold War tensions in the Middle East.

We therefore recommend that the United States make available immediately its full share of the necessary international funds for the development of the southern region. We are impressed by the evidence of the Sudanese Government's good faith in its desire to tackle the problem, and particularly the detailed memorandum on immediate development requirements (including information services, local government, communications and transportation, and various relief projects) presented to the Khartoum Conference on Relief and Resettlement of the Southern Region, in February.

The United States was one of the first countries to recognize independent Sudan, the first African country to gain its independence, and has in the past played an important part in the development of the north, providing $110 million up to 1967—the second biggest contribution after the U.N., IBRD and IDA's $155.5 million. The Sudan is now in a position to resolve its regional confrontation by reducing the imbalance in regional development, and also by recovering its national identity as a truly independent and nonaligned country. This is a concept and an approach which the United States should welcome, since a nonaligned state is neither dependent on the United States nor hostile to it, but would maintain normal, businesslike relations at all levels. This achievement could be of enormous benefit not only to the Sudan, but in the African and the international context, by promoting national stability, reducing regional tensions, and helping the cause of East-West détente.

Postlude

The Sudan became independent on January 1, 1956. This, the largest country in Africa, is the size of the United States west of the Mississippi.

U.S. priorities in regard to Africa and our relative neglect of this continent, with the primary exception of the large coastal states, is typified in our relations with the Sudan.

This study mission was amazed to find that it was the first congressional delegation to visit the Sudan, particularly since such missions had been to all the surrounding countries and to some of them several times. A country of its size should be given greater priority by U.S. Government officials, and policy planners generally; and it is hoped that the study mission will help focus attention on this area.
Upon Kenya's independence on December 12, 1963, Jomo Kenyatta became Prime Minister. A year later Kenya became a Republic and Kenyatta became President and head of state. Under his strong and generally pragmatic leadership Kenya has managed in recent years to attain an enviable record in economic growth and an impressive degree of political stability. The country has averaged 6.3-percent annual growth in gross domestic product while continuing to diversify its relatively sophisticated economy. Following the assassination of Minister of Economic Development Tom Mboya in mid-1969 the country entered into a period of severe internal stress. However, an election held at the end of 1969 was peacefully held and appears to have revitalized the National Assembly. Tribal rivalries remain a major threat to the continued stability of the country, but so far have been held within bounds. Other major problems are a rapidly growing population and increasing unemployment, particularly among school leavers.

United States-Kenyan relations are at present warm and cordial. There are no outstanding bilateral problems, and the Kenyan Government to date has not felt itself obliged to criticize seriously the United States policy in other parts of the world. The friendly character of political relations is reinforced by growing economic and commercial links. Trade continues to increase each year while private American direct investment (now about $75 million) and American tourists (over 40,000 in 1969), are becoming increasingly important to the burgeoning Kenyan economy.

Although relatively moderate on many international issues, Kenya is officially a nonaligned country and shares the concern of other black Africans about the situation in southern Africa.

In spite of an impressive 6.3-percent growth rate since independence, Kenya faces a number of important problems. Some which were crucial at the time of independence have now receded in importance. Kenya first needed help in developing and staffing institutions and for some time to come will continue to need the assistance of experienced personnel with special skills. The question of land and resettlement of Kenyans on formerly white-owned holdings was a problem of major significance at independence, but its importance has declined.

**Foreign Aid**

The director for AID briefed the study mission on their activities. Of the 92 people working for USAID in Kenya, 49 are Americans. Their main business is technical assistance. For fiscal year 1971, AID planned to obligate $2,637,000 for 11 technical assistance projects and overhead costs.

U.S. economic assistance to Kenya began in the 1950's when Kenya was a British colony. It totaled approximately $90 million by 1971, and has been largely devoted to the educational and agricultural
ZAMBIA

The occasion of the visit of the Special Study Mission to Zambia was the first annual African-American Representatives Conference which was held the third week of January 1972 at Mulungushi Hall in Lusaka, Zambia. The Conference was organized by the African American Institute and the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University and was financed by The Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Corp. of New York, with the Zambia Government covering much of the local costs. The Honorable Elijah Mudenda, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zambia, and Congressman Charles W. Whalen of Ohio were co-chairmen of the Conference to which “11 American legislators, representing more than 15 million people, traveled to Lusaka to meet with 11 African officials in what represented a unique opportunity to hold face-to-face talks on important issues in United States-African relations.” The AAI April 1972 Report on the Conference continues, “The drama of what for many of the Americans was their first African visit was heightened by the outbreak of violence in nearby Rhodesia as Blacks in that country protested the proposed settlement between Britain and Rhodesia.” (See p. 458 of appendix for text of Congressman Diggs’ statement at the final session of the Conference.) Interestingly, the Conference was the first occasion when four black Members of Congress were together on African soil. (See p. 460 of the appendix for text of their press conference.)

Zambia, with a population of 4.1 million, is a landlocked country, surrounded largely by the white regions of southern Africa. (See also the chapter on Zambia in the Report of the Special Study Mission to Southern Africa, August 1969, p. 23 et seq.). Although since independence she has maintained a policy of independence and nonalignment, the pressures resulting from her geographical position, and the consequent hold of the white regimes on her transport, power supplies, and entire economy are such that, with the catastrophic decline in the price of copper—on which the economy has long been dependent—instability is increasing.

The racial confrontations inherent in the southern African situation have influenced Zambia profoundly. Apart from the tensions of the area as a whole, there are active civil wars going on in Angola, Namibia, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and Mozambique, all of which border directly onto Zambia, and whose liberation movements have offices in Lusaka. The illegal declaration of independence of the white settlers in Rhodesia, in 1965, has had a particularly severe impact on Zambia. When international sanctions were first imposed on Zambia, she agreed to participate in them—with certain provisos relating to her own economy—even though this entailed a crippling effort in the economic sphere, and was felt to be a very poor second choice to a decisive show of force by Britain, against whom the rebellion was.

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initially directed. The effectiveness of Zambia's sanctions program can be seen from the drastic reduction in Rhodesia's share in Zambia's imports, from 40 percent in 1964 to 7 percent in 1969, almost all of this comprising vital electricity and coal supplies. The major beneficiaries of Zambia's diversification program have been the United States, United Kingdom, and other Western countries; South Africa is the only major supplier which has not substantially increased its share of the market, although because of its proximity would be the most economic supplier.

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Zambia's vulnerability has been made painfully obvious since independence, by the periodic interference with her transportation facilities. At the time of UDI in Rhodesia, oil and other essential supplies had to be airlifted into the country. Traffic had to be rerouted away from the main routes to the coast, through southern Rhodesia, and road transport had to be used, via the notorious "Hell Run" through Tanzania to Dar es Salaam. The delays and obstructionism on the railway lines running through Angola and through Rhodesia and Mozambique culminated in the Portuguese holding up essential imports of maize and wheat which Zambia was importing in reaction to an acute shortage.

Zambia is also dependent on the hostile white regimes for her power supplies. With the Kariba Dam and power station, intended to serve both northern and southern Rhodesia, as they then were, controlled from the southern side, Zambia has been faced with the constant threat that her electricity supplies would be cut off at any time. She is now building a new hydroelectric power scheme at Kafue, and the World Bank has agreed to construct a Kariba North power station, to provide a further independent source of power. Rhodesian coal has also been essential, both for power and for the processing of copper, and there have been constant fears that this too could be cut off.

At the breakup of the white-controlled Central African Federation, almost all the railway wagons were handed over to Southern Rhodesia by the British, making further transport difficulties. This was general practice, applied also to the federation's air force, also handed over to southern Rhodesia; without this, UDI would have been unthinkable. Since, under the federation, the copper from the north was used largely to finance development in the south, independence found Zambia with little or no infrastructure, the task of constructing a basic economy and political system from scratch, and almost no trained administrators. The British left behind them seven college graduates to get the country started.

Progress has been remarkable, in the face of these difficulties, largely due to Zambia's valuable copper deposits. Over the past 2
years, however, the world copper price has fallen drastically, and Zambia is facing severe economic dilemmas as a result. There is a growing realization that agriculture will have to be built up dramatically—a huge task, but one that is facilitated by the good soil and climate of the country. The influence of Tanzania, an almost entirely agricultural country which has placed unprecedented stress on the need to develop the rural economy, is beginning to be felt here. The two countries have always been close, since their problems are very similar, particularly as regards pressures from the white regimes.

The Tanzam railway, offering both countries an escape from dependence on these hostile regimes, has been the subject of much ill-informed comment. It is being financed and directed by the People’s Republic of China; the decision to ask for their aid was taken only after all Western sources had turned down the project. The World Bank was engaged in lengthy discussions about it, as were a number of consortia and individual companies in Britain and other Western countries; however, none of these agreed to undertake this ambitious project. It is regarded as of vital importance to their development plans by Zambia and Tanzania, since apart from opening up an independent transport route for Zambian copper and other items to the coast, it will open up vast areas of presently remote countryside, provide badly-needed employment, and provide the marketing and distribution infrastructure necessary for the development of agriculture and of the rich mineral areas of northern Tanzania, which includes a coalfield suitable for supplying Zambia. If the building of this railway by the Chinese represents a threat to Western interests, this is primarily because in order to pay the local costs, both Tanzania and, to a certain extent, Zambia are importing Chinese consumer and other goods on very long-term credit terms, and this is closing off a sizable and healthy market to Western exporters. However, this can obviously be overcome by an intelligent approach, involving the willingness to identify with Zambia’s priorities. The Japanese and Italians in particular are very successful in this, investing heavily in certain sectors. The Italians won a great deal of goodwill by building the oil pipeline from Dar es Salaam to Lusaka, at the time of great tension when the British concerns that tend to regard Zambia as a closed shop for themselves, were still explaining why they could not undertake the project.

Apart from the economic problems—shortage of foreign exchange, inflationary spiral, unemployment, agricultural difficulties, and so forth—Zambia’s dilemmas are essentially political, although greatly exacerbated recently by the economic recession. Domestically, there has been an increase in the persistent tensions within the government. President Kaunda is nontribal in his affiliations, coming from what is now Malawi; however, his former Vice President, Simon Kapwepwe, is very much a spokesman for the dominant Bemba people. He broke away to form his own United Progressive Party, setting off such tensions that Kaunda felt obliged to ban the party and detain some of the leaders. He has now announced an experiment of one-party democracy, which will allow for a choice of candidates within the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP), rather than a choice of party, each of which nominates a candidate. This drastic action is largely motivated by the fear that if tribal politics become dominant, the Luo minority in the southwest are likely to wish to secede. Many
complex factors have been involved in this power struggle. Among them has been the closure of the East German trade mission in Lusaka, soon after the formation of the new UPP, after charges of East German interference in Zambian politics.

As far as foreign relations goes, Zambia feels threatened by the dominant forces of the South African Army, which has just established a large military base in the supposedly demilitarized Caprivi Strip panhandle of Namibia, an international territory as being illegally occupied by South Africa. In October 1971, South African troops made incursions into Zambia following a serious incident in which liberation fighters of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO, the Namibian liberation movement) blew up troop transports, killing a number of South Africans. At the time of the incursions, Mr. Vorster threatened to crush Lusaka with his superior armed forces. Zambia has felt obliged to spend some much-needed foreign exchange on BAC Rapier ground-to-air missiles from Britain.

Relations between Zambia and Britain, the former metropolitan country, have deteriorated badly after a year's honeymoon following independence. This results from a series of confrontations, including the entire Rhodesian episode, Britain's attitude toward the southern African regimes in general, and such disputes as that over contingency aid, when Britain unilaterally withdrew from an agreement to repay Zambia for any losses incurred directly as a result of sanctions.

The United States, which has not had serious disputes with Zambia itself, could very well take over some of the goodwill which Britain has been losing so dramatically, although this is likely to be extremely difficult in view of the Azores agreement with Portugal, the breaking of Rhodesian sanctions, and the much more benevolent attitude towards the minority regimes in general.

What is required in this case is, first and foremost, a commodity agreement on the price of copper, sponsored by the United States. This would provide a firm basis of Zambia's development plans. It is also essential if Zambia is to be able to provide the very generous compensation agreed with U.S. and other nationalized foreign interests, at the time when copper prices were at their peak.

Following that, Zambia should be considered a priority area for the provision of foreign aid, particularly for a rural development program which will increase the country's self-sufficiency and make her less vulnerable to pressure from her neighbors. A useful approach would be to link the development projects to the opportunities being opened up by the Tanzam railway. This offers the best hope for helping Kaunda to live up to his commitment not to be dominated by the Chinese—just as he does not wish to be dominated by the West—but simply to cooperate with any country that is prepared to work with Zambia in fulfilling her national development needs.

Since it is the economic problems facing Zambia that are the most important immediate cause of the increasing instability there, it is important that enlightened U.S. aid policies be applied to insure that Zambia proceeds with her development in an atmosphere of security, both political and economic.

Zambia should be one of the AID-concentration countries. Such economic cooperation by our Government would be concrete expression of our oral support for majority rule in southern Africa.
Botswana is one of the poorest countries in the world, largely consisting of the Kalahari Desert; it is land-locked and surrounded by the white-controlled states of Namibia, South Africa, and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), apart from a very narrow strip of frontier along the Zambesi River, with Zambia; even this is disputed by South Africa, without any right on its part, since it is on the basis of its illegal occupation of Namibia.

Although the country covers a large area, its population is only about half a million. The economy is based almost entirely on subsistence agriculture, primarily cattle breeding. Because of the very low rainfall and poor soils, cultivation is virtually impossible without irrigation. This is feasible in the southernmost corner, on the banks of the Zambesi, and in the northwest corner, with the Okavango swamps, although little has been done as yet on this.

Communications are extremely poor. For imports and exports, as well as the movement of goods northwards from Gaberones, the capital in the southeast of the country, there is total reliance on Rhodesian railways, which controls the railroad from Johannesburg, South Africa, via all the major towns in Botswana, concentrated in a line along the railroad on the eastern side of the country to Bulawayo and Salisbury, in southern Rhodesia. None of the roads are tarred, except for the one from Gaberones into South Africa. Dependence on the railway therefore makes Botswana's whole economy very vulnerable to disruption by the white regimes.

The dependence on these regimes is almost complete in other areas of the economy. Botswana is part of the South African dominated Customs Union; its currency is the South African Rand, and all its external trade is either with or through the channels of the Customs Union. Because so many of its exports go to South Africa, the country is suffering considerably from the economic recession and particularly the harsh credit squeeze which involves an increasing number of late or unpaid bills.

The most striking aspect of Botswana's dependence on the South African economy is the pattern of migrant labor from Botswana to the mines in South Africa. Contrary to South African claims, this is not evidence of the attractiveness of work in South Africa; it is simply a case of there being no choice whatsoever. This is true in the case of the workers, for whom the Botswanan economy can provide no employment, and even more true for the Government, which is largely dependent on the remittances of migrant workers in South Africa for revenue—although not to the extreme degree of Lesotho, for example. This state of affairs results in a vicious circle; it is the most enterprising people who tend to go to work in the mines, which deprives Botswana of valuable human resources. In fact, the mines deliberately recruit labor from outside South Africa, partly as a deliberate process.
of keeping the countries concerned dependent on South Africa economically, and partly because it is easier to break up any kind of labor organization if the workers can simply be sent back to another country, and an inexhaustible supply of strikebreakers is available. There has always been a limit to the number of South Africans employed in the mines; in the last year, the demand for work there in the Transkei and elsewhere has been met with decreased quotas, and unemployment in the Bantustans is becoming a serious problem.

For these and other reasons, the Botswana Government is anxious to reduce the number of their workers going on contract to the mines in South Africa. This will depend on sufficient revenue to generate jobs as an alternative. Botswana's independence is seen as a factor of its own economic development, and the provision of alternatives to relations with the white regimes.

Priority is therefore being given to development projects that will promote Botswana's links with independent Africa. A direct flight between Lusaka and Gaborone is being initiated. The ferry at Kazungula, linking Botswana with Zambia, is being replaced with more modern equipment capable of taking increased traffic. The South Africans, significantly, protested vigorously about this; at one point they even threatened to take the case to an international adjudicator, even though they would have been purporting to act on behalf of Namibia, the international territory of which they are in illegal occupation. The road from Gaborone to Kazungula, which will link up with the ferry and the Zambian road system, is being surveyed with U.S. assistance. It is hoped that construction will be finished by 1975. Apart from opening up Botswana's links with the independent African countries to the north, this road will also contribute greatly to the development of the Chobe region of the country. The northwestern corner, in contrast to the aridity of the rest of the country, consists of semitropical swampland. Game is very plentiful, and there are good opportunities for agriculture and fishing provided access to reasonable markets can be provided.

The major area of concentration for Botswana's development planners at the moment is the mining sector, with the opening up of copper and nickel mining in Selebi-Pikwe, on the northeastern side of Botswana. This is seen almost entirely as a source of revenue for other, more useful development projects. The mines will provide very little employment, especially for unskilled workers, and will have a relatively small spin-off effect on the economy as a whole. They will be owned and operated by large foreign concerns, dominated by the South African-based Anglo-American corporation. American Metal Climax, a multinational U.S.-based corporation, is also taking a large interest in this scheme through Botswana RST, a wholly-owned subsidiary. Amax sold out their interest in the Palabora Copper Mine in South Africa, in order to be able to participate in the Botswana deal. It has been suggested that this was not primarily for economic reasons, but represented a desire to decrease their involvement in South Africa (although Amax still retains interests in the Tsumeb Corp. and O'okiep, both of which are operating mines in Namibia).

Botswana was assisted in its negotiation with the companies by expert advice from a United Nations consultant. They were enabled by this to obtain better terms than they could otherwise have hoped
for. Revenue, in the form of royalties, taxes, et cetera, will reach the target level in the mid-1970’s. Until then, however, Botswana faces an acute problem of development finance, even for essential items such as technical training. This is because the British Government is phasing out the budgetary aid which it has been giving to Botswana since independence; there will be a time-lag between the phasing out of British aid, and provision of revenue from the mines. Assistance for a variety of essential schemes will be urgently required during the next 2 or 3 years.

Botswana’s development plans show a high degree of realism, and some new ideas are being worked out, which are particularly applicable to a country which is classified as one of the least developed in the world. In education, for example, a new concept of brigades is being developed, by which students work as apprentices under instruction, covering their own living and training costs by the value of the work they do. There are brigades in a very wide variety of trades, including construction, carpentry, textiles, and agriculture—although it is difficult for the latter to cover its costs.

Although as poor in resources as the South African reservations, or “Bantustans,” Botswana provides a striking contrast to them. Instead of apathy, official indifference and neglect, the necessity for voluntary organizations to fight for their very existence and for the right to help people at a grassroots level, and a general fear of authority, in Botswana there is a genuine attempt to provide a framework for popular advances in agriculture, education, and self-government. It would be a disservice to those involved to pretend that these efforts are invariably meeting with unqualified success, but there is a feeling of awareness of what development should be about, and of determination to define priorities according to the local circumstances of the country. Many of the difficulties are the result of Botswana’s isolation from neighbors with similar goals and ideals. In view of its problems and initial poverty, the efforts being made are worthy of strong support from aid donors.

The entire annual GNP of Botswana is about the same as the annual cost of upkeep of the central section of the New Jersey Turnpike. Seen in this context, it is obvious that a minute contribution from our point of view will make a significant difference to Botswana’s prospects. The administration has said in the past (notably in Secretary of State Rogers’ statement following his tour of Africa in 1970) that as part of its policy toward southern Africa, involving an alleged dislike of South Africa’s apartheid regime, it would give priority for aid to the landlocked countries of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, entirely surrounded as they are by white-occupied territories and in great need of assistance in asserting their independence from this racist ideology. We strongly recommend that this policy be carried much further. At the moment, the only projects being undertaken by the U.S. bilateral aid program in Botswana are the laying of a 50-mile water pipe to the new mining complex (with a $6.5 million loan); the design work for the Botzam road (a grant of $850,000); and an abattoir study (a grant of $45,000). In view of the great needs for the immediate future in Botswana, this seems to us to be totally inadequate.
The United States should also give strong moral support to the political stand taken with great courage by Botswana's leaders, notably the President himself, Sir Seretse Khama. Botswana has a huge problem with the number of refugees from South Africa and Rhodesia. The South African secret police are very active in Botswana, and it has been openly announced in various trials that political prisoners have been captured by the South Africans from Botswana. South Africa's censorship applies to all publications and mail coming into Botswana, which the South Africans control. Political pressure can be completely overt: for example, soon after a speech in which Sir Seretse Khama criticised apartheid, the South African Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Mr. Vorster and Mr. Muller, personally visited Gaborone. Since the Botswanan leader is saying, in the face of great pressures, what the United States orally professes, substantial support should be provided to his defense of freedom and democracy, in the face of his overbearing opponent. He has made his position quite clear, as for example in a speech at the opening of the Zambian High Commission Chancery in Gaborone, October 25, 1971:

“We in Botswana have always made it clear that our geographical position places certain serious limitations on the contribution we can make to common African causes, but we have never sought to conceal that our national objectives are those of Africa. We have always stated our confidence in the eventual triumph of human dignity and self-determination in southern Africa. We have always refused to give comfort to those who seek to deny these fundamental rights to the oppressed people of our region.

“. . . It should be pointed out to the ruling minorities that the only rational and responsible answer to the internal violence provoked by their policies is peaceful change—certainly not ambiguous threats to extend the violence they themselves have brought about.”

(The complete text of the speech appears on p. 462 of the appendix.)

During the visit to Gaborone, the study mission was happy to meet the able U.S. Ambassador to the BLS states. It is felt that the appointment of an ambassador to these states is already reaping benefits and should enable better communication and economic cooperation with these countries.
BRUSSELS

The study mission met in Brussels with the officials of the U.S. Mission to NATO, with other representatives to NATO and with officials of the U.S. Economic Commission.

AFRICA AND THE EEC

In the discussions with the U.S. Economic Commission, African relations with the EEC and the effect thereon of British entry into the Common Market was of principal concern.

The major agreement on African relations with the EEC so far is the Yaounde Convention, signed on July 20, 1963, and renewed for 5 years on July 29, 1969, by representatives of the EEC and the 18 Francophone states whose economies are closely linked with France or Belgium. These are: Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Togo, Upper Volta and Zaire (formerly Congo-Kinshasa). The Yaounde Convention was a continuation of the 1957 Convention, which the EEC countries signed on behalf of their colonies. The Agreement covered free entry for the African countries' goods into the EEC and some reverse trade preferences over a graduated timetable; the movement of workers within the Convention area; and financial aid through the European Development Fund.

The Lagos Convention was signed between the EEC countries and Nigeria in 1966, but has not yet come into force. It concerns trade preferences mainly, Nigeria having substantial trade links with some members of the EEC. Nigeria did not ask for aid from the Development Fund, apparently having some suspicion of the association institutions. Nigeria gained duty-free entry quotas for her most important exports, and in return dropped customs duties on certain items from the EEC.

The Nigerian example was followed by the countries of the East African Community, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The Arusha Convention, signed in July 1968 and renewed in September 1969 until 1975, has not in fact come into effect because not all the European parliaments ratified it. It provides for mutual trade preferences on a wide variety of products.

Morocco and Tunisia also have an association agreement, effective from September 1969 for 5 years, and with an undertaking to negotiate an increased level of association. Tunisia and Morocco have tariff-free entry for most of their exports to the EEC, and Tunisia has granted certain preferences in return while Morocco has reduced tariffs on a range of imports regardless of origin.

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Of the 41 African countries (including Madagascar), 24 are now associates of the EEC. With Britain's entry, there will almost certainly be an extension of the associated area to include most of the Anglophone countries, probably along the same lines as the Yaoundé Convention.

**Discussions With United States and Other NATO Representatives**

Of immediate concern in the discussions with representatives to NATO was the implications of the U.S. Azores Agreement with Portugal, and the interest of NATO in this agreement. The study mission was advised that it was so minimal that the U.S. Mission to NATO had not been kept apprised of the negotiations on the agreement. There was observed a general attitude on the part of both the United States and other representatives to NATO of relative disinterest in policy toward Africa and in African problems. It is believed that such an attitude—which fails to be aware of the grave implications in the impending crisis in southern Africa—is unrealistic and myopic.
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY MISSIONS

EPILOGUE*

Although the sixties saw some 41 African nations become members of the United Nations and constitute the Organization of African Unity, in the United States, there has been far too little serious consideration of the new issues which the emergence of Africa has created. The geopolitics of the situation of Africa demonstrates the basis of our concern. Africa is the huge land mass—some $3\frac{1}{2}$ times the size of the continental United States—to the south of Europe and between Asia and the Americas. There are some 300 million people on this continent. Moreover, the minerals and other primary products of this continent are absolutely essential to the United States’ industrial society. Southern Africa is the source of “very high proportions of the world supply of more than 10 important minerals.” It is clear that the United States has vital interests in Africa, whether we are speaking of political, economic or strategic interests. The geopolitics of Africa makes clear that U.S. self-interest in itself dictates an enlightened policy towards Africa. And yet, the policy the United States has been pursuing towards Africa can only be characterized as one of disaster. While the African-Americans in this country have suffered under the policies of “benign neglect,” the African peoples have seen our Government formulate the insidious policies of malignant neglect and even nourishing the cancer of racism.

This Nation cannot afford such limited and distorted vision. The lack of an adequate program of economic assistance and cooperation with the African nations in the past 4 years has seriously undermined our earlier position. Moreover, recent U.S. actions with respect to the liberation of the areas of Africa remaining under colonial and minority rule imply, that the United States supports the maintenance of the status quo and the minority rule of Africa. Actions that are not supportive, of, or would even try to stem, the tide of self-determination—a tide I personally witnessed on the Study Mission to South Africa—are not only folly, they are useless.

The population facts of these minority-ruled areas, when added to the increasingly demonstrated determination of these people to win their freedom, shows the folly of any policy which refuses to recognize their right to do so.

In Rhodesia, where Ian Smith, pursuant to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, rules in defiance of the legal sovereign, the United Kingdom, and in defiance of the United Nations Security Council, 95% of the population is black.

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*These conclusions are those of the Chairman and do not necessarily reflect the views of the other members of the study missions.

1 See Lowenstein & Gervast, “Southern Africa in the World Economy,” 1972, p. 6, the text of which appears on p. 464 of the appendix.

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In South Africa, the land of apartheid, 82% of the population is not white.

In Namibia, the international territory formerly mandated to South Africa, which continues its illegal occupation thereof in defiance of the United Nations and the International Court of Justice, 84% of the population is African.

In Angola, the Portuguese territory, where the liberation forces control large areas east and south of the central plateau, 93% of the population is African.

In Mozambique, the Portuguese territory, where the liberation forces also control several provinces and operate freely south of the Zambezi River, 96 1/2% of the population is African.

In Guinea-Bissau, where the Portuguese control only the urban areas, 97 1/2% of the population is African.

The strike by the Ovambos in Namibia, the opposition by the people of Rhodesia or Zimbabwe to the Heath/Smith Settlement Proposals, and the current upheaval in South Africa itself growing out of the protests of the Black students and the brutal repression by the government of white demonstrators underscores the determination of the people of these areas to be free.

Majority rule is coming to South Africa, to Rhodesia, to Namibia, to Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau; and the United States has no choice but to get on the side of freedom. The geopolitics of Africa means that considerations of justice, human rights and morality aside, our own national security interests require that we support majority rule in Africa.

Even more, with respect to Africa, U.S. foreign policy and domestic interests converge and compel us to redirect our international priorities. Southern Africa holds the frightening, but real, potential for another Vietnam. The same elements of racism, imperialism, and militarism are present, but on a more awful scale. The United States must act to avoid such a racial holocaust. This is why the present policy is so lamentably disastrous. Our business involvement in southern Africa—the direct investment alone exceeds $800 million—not only forms a bulwark for the status quo for apartheid, but also stands as the same kind of “interests” which the U.S. has used in the past to justify military intervention when the liberation struggle heats up—as it most definitely will. When that day comes, the composition of this country with some 25 million African-Americans makes it clear that any such involvement would be suicidal to democracy.

Thus, all of our interests—domestic, foreign, strategic, military, economic, and moral—those items essential to the development of a strong, unified America converge on the question of Africa. And only a sane foreign policy can protect those interests.

There are two priorities. One relates to economic cooperation and assistance. The present aid policy whereunder only 10 of 41 countries of Africa receive bilateral aid must be revised for a more comprehensive, more flexible and more meaningful program. We must pursue all avenues of aid—bilateral, multilateral and international programs. For the growing gap between the developed and developing, between the poor and between the affluent nations, may well present the single most pressing problem to the coming generation. The United States
should allot one percent of its gross national product for programs of economic cooperation and development; and Africa should share equitably, that is a minimum of 15 percent in these programs. The U.S. should support the African Development Bank.

The other priority is for a complete overhaul in the U.S. policy towards the liberation of southern Africa.

What I believe to be the essential elements for U.S. policy with respect to the liberation of southern Africa and Guinea-Bissau are contained in the 55 recommendations which I made to the executive in December 1971 as a result of the Study Mission to South Africa and to Guinea-Bissau and are set forth on page 177 of this report.

Point 4 of this Action Manifesto is, I believe, basic:

That the United States cease its condemnation of the efforts by the majority of the people of these areas to achieve their freedom by the only means available to them, and in reaffirmation of the principles enunciated in the Declaration of Independence—principles which gave birth to the American Revolution and to the United States of America—acknowledge the sacred right of these peoples to use, so long as the recalcitrance of those governments continues, whatever means are necessary to achieve self-determination and to win their freedom.

The stifling words of hypocrisy must be ended, and actions must be initiated which support the legitimate aims of self-determination and majority rule of the peoples in the present minority-rulled and colonial areas.
DISCLAIMER OF HON. J. IRVING WHALLEY

While on a study mission (February 8 to March 2, 1971) to Africa as a member of the Subcommittee on Africa, I visited five of the 11 countries on the study mission’s itinerary. I went to Somalia, Kenya, Madagascar, South Africa, and Zambia. However, my South African visit was on a study mission preceding that of the subcommittee chairman. Nor was I a member of the study missions to Africa of August-September 1971, or January 1972. For these reasons I did not participate in the development of this report, which encompasses all three study missions, and do not concur in all of its findings and conclusions.

DISCLAIMER OF HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI

As a member of the subcommittee on Africa, I joined the study mission in Kenya, and traveled to the Malagasy Republic, Mauritius and South Africa. Along with the subcommittee Chairman, I met with governmental officials in the various countries and participated in the work of the study mission.

However, I did not participate in drafting this report and do not concur in all of its conclusions.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. J. HERBERT BURKE
OF FLORIDA, SEPTEMBER 8, 1972

During the month of February 1971, as a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, I traveled with several other committee members as part of a study mission to a number of South African countries including Somalia, Kenya, Madagascar, South Africa and Zambia.

Chairman Charles C. Diggs, Jr. Chairman of the African Subcommittee and several other committee members, took part in this study mission but we did not all visit the same countries at the same time. South Africa was visited by me in February 1971. I was accompanied at this time by Congressman J. Irving Whalley and Congressman Edward J. Derwinski, but Chairman Diggs did not make this visit.

Subsequently, in August of 1971, I visited Portugal, Morocco, and Algeria in the company of Chairman Diggs and Congressman Seymour Halpern on a subsequent study mission. Chairman Diggs and others had just returned from a visit to several other African countries, including South Africa, prior to my joining Chairman Diggs and other staff members of the second study mission in Morocco.

Since I did not, however, accompany Chairman Diggs at the time he visited South Africa, and did not participate in his draft of the report, I do not, therefore, concur in all of the conclusions made therein.

One of the main purposes of my visiting the various countries mentioned, was to determine the attitudes of the government officials, as well as people of these countries with respect to the United States, and the success, if any, of our future trade relations as well as the success of our foreign assistance programs where such assistance had been given to the countries we visited.

Our visit to South Africa was principally to talk with the members of parliament and the other officials of that country and to see first hand the apartheid practiced therein, which policy I, together with other government officials have long criticized as have many other nations of the world.

In South Africa, however, I was particularly impressed with the conduct of our United States Diplomatic Mission under United States Ambassador to South Africa, John Hurd. Ambassador Hurd and his staff were in close contact with the political leaders of South Africa, but were also in contact with others including the nonwhite segments of South Africa.

In South Africa we had the opportunity of making first hand observation of the political system which advocates apartheid and of making known our U.S. policy and our personal opposition thereto to many of the South African officials. In addition, we visited with a number of South African business people as well as with American businessmen in that country and other countries.
Since my visit to some of the countries covered in the report, there have been many political changes within certain of these countries, particularly in Somalia and the Malagasy Republic and perhaps even in Kenya. The unfortunate events at the Olympics may result in further changes in views.

For these stated reasons, the report in some respects would require some updating because of the time which elapsed from the time of the separate visits by the study group to the date of the report.

Except as noted, and since as I stated, I did not participate in the drafting of this report, and for the reasons hereinabove indicated, I cannot concur in all of the conclusions set out in the report.

I wish to take this opportunity of commending Chairman Diggs on his interest and work as Chairman of the African Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Congressman Diggs as Chairman always showed a strong willingness to be fair and impartial with the other members of the Committee that accompanied him and handled himself at all times with dignity and fairness.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. GUY VANDER JAGT

The 9 days spent by the study mission in South Africa represented my first visit to that country. The insights thereby afforded have been invaluable to me generally, and have had one especially important application—that of helping me to focus more keenly on the issues involved in the on-going subcommittee hearings on U.S. business involvement in South Africa.

During the study mission’s 9-day visit I was party to an often stormy and always intense introduction to the Republic of South Africa. We were permitted to move freely and openly in both white and black areas of South Africa. Many of the Chairman’s routine acts as he circulated totally unrestricted represented the first time in South African history that a black man had done so. Small wonder that the Chairman’s every move and word was covered by a horde of news men and reported daily on the front pages of the major newspapers. I believe the fact that the Chairman and I traveled together as a team, as respected colleagues, as friends, spoke more eloquently to South Africans about the U.S. commitment to equality and dignity for all without regard to race, creed or color than words could ever have achieved.

For a number of reasons the presence of the Chairman in South Africa touched a responsive note in the hearts of South African blacks that everywhere unleashed a joyous welcome that was totally unexpected and unprecedented in its intensity. The tumultuous welcomes for an FDR or a Kennedy or an Eisenhower or a Nixon around the world were pale by comparison. For one thing, because of the free South Africa press the people knew Diggs as a man who had battled long and hard and successfully for equality in his own country. For another, Diggs’ long interest in and efforts for Africa were well known. Then too, the unique historicity of his visit had made the Chairman a national celebrity and the curious thronged, caught up in their own excitement. But above all, Charles Diggs in moving freely through South Africa was doing all the things prohibited to the blacks of South Africa by a rigid, relentless apartheid. As such he symbolized their deepest yearnings and longings for their own lives and for their children. From the wide-eyed innocent hopefulness on the faces of the school children in Soweto who sang a hymn to the “lion-hearted black man who was there with them that day,” to the throngs who gathered on the streets of Pretoria to touch or shout “thank you” to the Chairman, the sight of Diggs unleashed long submerged passions. The Chairman’s response to these repeated outpourings throughout our stay was always dignified, courteous, thoughtful and low key. His search for answers to the questions posed by the South African problem was thoughtful and knowledgeable, marked by an exhaustive and seemingly endless schedule. The vast corpus of material contained in the section prepared by the Chairman on South Africa bespeaks the breadth and degree of substance of the inquiries.
undertaken by the study mission. The Chairman is to be commended for the extensive efforts expended on this account.

Most of the work and many of the observations represented in the report are products of research undertaken subsequent to completion of the study mission. This particular section therefore represents research in which I did not share and accordingly it would be inappropriate for me to associate myself with its entirety.

There are a few brief observations I would like to underscore which complement the report of the visit. One of the central purposes of this fact-finding mission to South Africa was to witness the practices of our Government in South Africa, particularly regarding the implementation of stated U.S. policy concerning apartheid. (I have appended the latest statement of that policy, a speech by Assistant Secretary of State David D. Newsom, on page 282). I was personally heartened at all times to witness the dedication and sensitivity shown by the U.S. Diplomatic Mission in the performance of its duties. I was equally impressed by the degree to which the American representatives had established contact, indeed deep and meaningful associations and friendships, with the non-white segments of South African society.

Under the innovative leadership of the U.S. Ambassador to South Africa, John Hurd, the U.S. Diplomatic Mission is serving as uncompromising testimony to the American ideal of equality for all. As the Chairman told the Ambassador at one point during our stay, “It is gratifying to see that we are singing notes from the same sheet of music”.

A matter of concern to me at the time was the fact that there were no black Foreign Service Officers in South Africa. Therefore, I welcome the recent announcement by the Department of State that a black Foreign Service Officer has been assigned to our Embassy in Pretoria, and shall soon be in residence. It seemed to me at the time that black Americans not only by virtue of their qualifications but also by their very presence would enhance the credibility of espoused American ideals and policy in the eyes of South Africans of all races. I would expect that future assignments to South Africa will continue to be made without regard to race.

As a second point, I found most interesting the firsthand contact with American and South African representatives of the U.S. companies operating in South Africa. On the one hand, I was deeply disturbed by the lack of sensitivity, indeed the manifest indifference, evidenced by several U.S. corporate representatives, regarding race relations and the implications for business operations in South Africa. But on the other hand, I ended by leaving South Africa with the knowledge that many companies were making real contributions. This fact has led me to be cautiously optimistic. We not only learned of a spreading awareness of the condition of black workers, but also found increasing instances of concrete benefits—in wages, working conditions, worker-management relations, and job benefits—accruing to the non-white labor force. This must be only a beginning. These efforts on the part of American business are not yet sufficiently wide-spread. Yet, there are in South Africa encouraging signs of a stirring in the American business community that could have significant repercussions for the cause of equitable participation in the riches of South
sectors. Apart from some technical assistance, U.S. economic assistance in the future will probably be of the export credit type.

Prime emphasis in fiscal year 1971 was given to rural development. The objective of the rural development program is to improve economic opportunities in rural areas and arrest the migration of people to the urban areas. AID's part in the program centered in a heavily populated pilot area known as Vihiga located in western Kenya. Beginning with a specially tailored program for achieving increased maize production on a sample of 600 selected farms, AID proposed to broaden the project to address labor, intensive roadbuilding activities, small industry possibilities, marketing problems, new training opportunities outside the traditional education system, and augmented family planning assistance in the area.

As an area of growing importance, family planning is being directed toward slowing down the rate of population increase (presently estimated at 3.3 percent) through demographic studies, education and training programs, and contraceptives.

**Private Investment**

Private American investment is attracted to Kenya by favorable location and government investment policies. At the time of the study mission, 84 American firms had invested over $58 million in this country and there were plans for an additional $24 million of investment in the coming months. These firms employed 6,900 people, 94 percent of whom were Kenyans, and they train 1,200 workers each year. Forty-four percent of them shared ownership with Kenyans or had plans to offer shares to citizens of this country in the future.

The study mission was informed that the favorable investment climate is expected to continue for the foreseeable future. In this regard it is worth noting that the development plan covering the years 1970 to 1974 envisages a capital inflow of nearly $400 million in the private sector. This represents nearly half of the total foreign exchange requirements of the plan. Kenyan officials express particular interest in increased investment from American businesses since they have been favorably impressed by U.S. management capabilities.

**Peace Corps Volunteers**

The Kenya Peace Corps program began January 1965. At the time of the study mission there were 260 volunteers serving in Kenya, plus an additional 46 agricultural trainees participating in an in-country training program at Ember. Volunteers are assigned to the Ministries of Agriculture, Education, Health, Lands, and Settlement.
Africa for all her peoples. American businesses in South Africa, and their domestic corporate headquarters should be encouraged in these endeavors by responsible, positive efforts by Government and private concerns. Hopefully, voluntary positive actions on the part of private interests will make legislation unnecessary.

I have had appended to this report (on page 287) the full text of the Financial Mail article of December 3, 1971, that is cited in the report in reference to the Polaroid "experiment". The narrative and figures comprise a useful evaluation of these innovations. The conclusions—that the cause of African advancement would be retarded, not helped, by a pullout on the part of Polaroid—is important as a corroboration of what the Study Mission repeatedly encountered in response to this question. To my recollection only one solitary group, SASO, of all the representatives of the non-white community with whom the Study Mission met, advocated a simple withdrawal of U.S. investment. The overwhelming majority of those groups with which we spoke actively favored continued American investment.

Since the vast majority of non-whites in South Africa saw U.S. business as a positive force for change and a continuing force for great opportunities and equality, they rejected as uninformed the cries from within the United States for the withdrawal of American business from South Africa. Withdrawal would benefit no one, least of all the blacks of South Africa. Since the blacks of South Africa who are personally struggling to overcome the indignities of apartheid do not believe the withdrawal of U.S. business from South Africa would serve their self interest, I would think we here should be most reluctant to superimpose our far distant judgment on them in a "we know better than you what is best for you" manner.

While the majority of non-whites want U.S. business to remain in South Africa, they couple this desire with a challenge. They urge that U.S. business, in the course of its profitable operations, accept the public responsibility to create more opportunities and a better life and thus, by its actions, help set the stage for the type of change whereby the majority of the people could share equitably in the expanding economic prosperity of South Africa. The challenge is a call to awareness and to responsible action. Quite rightly, American business should be encouraged and prodded to continue and expand its response to this challenge. U.S. business should provide a creative leadership to maximize opportunity and dignity for blacks.

The recommendations included in the section of the report on South Africa were issued by Chairman Diggs on December 14, 1971, in the form of an "Action Manifesto." They are far-reaching and provocative, deserving of full consideration by interested parties in both public and private sectors. It would be of great interest, I am sure, to any persons undertaking a study of these recommendations to have as a reference the reactions of the Department of State to Mr. Diggs' proposals. I am therefore having inserted in this report, on page 276, a letter sent me in response to a request for the Department's comments on this document.

The recommendation that troubles me the most is recommendation four (4) which implies a call for U.S. support of violent efforts to overthrow the South African Government. This I totally reject. I reject it because violence does not provide the solution to the
problem of South Africa and I reject it because suffering, bloodshed, deprivation, hunger and hatred would spew forth for decades amidst all of the people, especially those for whose benefit the violent revolution was initiated.

One night talking with Chief Buthelezi, who is the black political leader of the Zulu people, I was thinking of a colleague of mine who had thundered at a witness in the course of our subcommittee hearings something like, "Time, you say is what is needed to overcome the inequities built by centuries, but what about the black children growing up there now. They don't have the time you call for. Their lives will be over before time brings the changes you call for. These children need action now—by whatever means necessary. Not later, but now!"

I asked Chief Buthelezi, who stands for peaceful change, whether the time involved to effect that peaceful change wouldn't mean that a whole generation of black children under his leadership would live and die without ever having known the precious blessings of freedom, dignity and equality. The Chief's response remains indelibly with me. Though not verbatim, the following is the gist of his words:

Yes, that may true. But what does violence offer them? It is all right for liberals far removed from the struggle to say that violent revolution now is the only answer, but what would that mean for my people? The conflict would be long, bloody and costly. What would happen to the children growing up in the meantime? Irrespective of the eventual outcome they would have grown up amid chaos with little hope of advancement, and with hunger, starvation and death haunting their entire lives. These children have only one life to live. What about them? Violence may sound good to some far across the sea. But not to those who must live through it or die in it.

I am not unaware that the seeds of a bloody confrontation are there and multiplying. Late one night in an isolated black school with my wife, two staff members and myself the only whites present, during a hot, emotional session in which the student chairman had refused to pronounce my name because Vander Jagt, an Afrikaans name, would have polluted his tongue, a young black student spewed forth a heated tirade that went something like this: "The white man has been on my back for many centuries. He has taken my labor; he has taken my women. He has never negotiated with me. He will never negotiate with me about getting off my back. The only way to get him off my back is to kick him off my back by force. By force I will wrench from him what is rightfully mine!" This outburst was greeted with lusty shouts of approval.

Violence becomes more likely as the oppressive practices of the South African Government drive more and more people in South Africa into thinking of the bounties of South Africa as "his" and "mine". At a meeting one night in Soweto with an upper-middle class group of blacks, the individuals persisted in talking about what belonged to the whites as "his" and what belonged to the non-whites as "mine". "He will never give me what's rightfully mine until I take it away from him" was the oft repeated refrain. Obviously what the
non-white sees as "his" the Afrikaaner also sees as "his". As long as both Afrikaaners and blacks think of South Africa as "his" and "mine", in spite of the awesome tools that the state has amassed to suppress it, violence looms like a threatening dark cloud on the not too distant horizon. How to get the people to stop thinking of South Africa as "mine" and "his" and start thinking of South Africa as "ours" is the dilemma of South Africa. Only when the people of South Africa stop thinking of how I can keep or get "mine" from "his" and begin thinking of their common destiny will South Africa fulfill the potential of greatness that is there.

Perhaps the hope that there can be a transference of power and economic opportunity along with feelings of concern, care, love and togetherness that will overcome centuries-old enmities and injustices and thus prevent violence is as unrealistic as is the faith in violence as a helpful solution. But certainly a call to violence—however veiled—ill serves the attempts to solve the problems of South Africa. Violence, together with the hate and polarization that inevitably accompany it, are exactly what is not needed in South Africa at this juncture.

Twenty-six years ago a black character in the novel, *Cry, The Beloved Country* by the distinguished writer Alan Paton spoke these words:

> I have one great fear in my heart that one day when they (the whites) turn to loving, they will find we (the blacks) have turned to hating.

That day may be approaching. What is needed now is for the people of goodwill to address themselves urgently to bridging the gap between the extremes of white power and black power. As Paton says today, twenty-six years after having written those moving words, "The alternative of violence must be avoided at all costs." Support of violence does a great disservice to all the people of South Africa.

And there is some hope that the gap between white and black may yet be bridged before it is too late, that somehow the blacks and whites of South Africa may learn to think of South Africa as "our country".

The political officer of the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria told of a high school teacher in a black school in Soweto who assigned his class the task of writing to a friend or relative in a foreign country urging them to visit South Africa. Almost without exception the children's essays urged their friend to come and see the wonders of Johannesburg. "You would be so thrilled by the wonders of our city" was a typical comment. *That*, from blacks who are barred from Johannesburg except for going to or coming from work in the purely white city and who are confined all the rest of the time to their city of Soweto. Perhaps there is yet time to transform the "his" and "mine" syndrome into "our" common destiny. Certainly the attempt must be made. The major part of the efforts of the United States should be directed toward encouraging this goal.

And certainly it is in the interest of South Africa to bridge the gap between races. South Africa is a land of unlimited potential. It is rich and prosperous. Its economy is throbbing, its technology modern. Its natural resources are phenomenal and its landscape incredibly beautiful. Its people are ambitious, industrious, friendly and interesting. It is a fascinating country, rich in the diversity of its people, culture and
history. It is a country reminiscent of America's early days when young, vibrant, pioneers in covered wagons carved a nation out of nothing.

But in all of this there is a sickness, a sickness that is pervasive and that saps South Africa of its strength and robs it of its potential greatness.

I left South Africa feeling a great affinity for much that is there. I left South Africa loving much of it. But I loved it with an ache in my heart like that for a friend crippled by a paralysis. Just as I know that it would be painful for him to exercise his body back to health, that only he could do it and then only if he really had the desire, I know there is little that I or the United States can do to help South Africa solve its problems. South Africans must do that themselves. All of their people together must do it or it won't get done. I hope they will.

I hope that South Africa will find a way to bring its people together. Because if South Africa can figure out a way to get all of its people to work together instead of against each other there is no limit to the greatness that country can achieve. South Africa has so much of what the rest of Africa needs: the technology, the resources, the education, the skill, the leadership. What an opportunity South Africa has to lead the rest of Africa into a more prosperous future!

(From Financial Mail, Dec. 3, 1971)

POLAROID

TOO EARLY TO JUDGE

A decision by the US Polaroid Corporation on whether or not to pull out of SA seems imminent. The company's SA distributor, Frank & Hirsch (F&H), expects finality this month, although the decision was to have been made only after January 13 next year, when the results of the one year experimental programme were to be collated and assessed.

The programme called for F & H "drastically" to improve non-White wages and to initiate a well-defined programme to train non-Whites for important jobs. Polaroid also undertook to make substantial grants to African education.

Finally it was hinted that the decision whether to remain or not depended largely on the response of other companies in SA, especially US companies, to Polaroid's lead.

What is the evidence so far of success or failure?

To take F & H first. There has been evidence of fairly considerable advancement for African staff. Average African salaries have gone up 21% in a year, from R74 to R90 pm. And the minimum wage for those with one year's experience at F & H is R840 pa, or about R65 per month excluding annual bonus.

More important is the reduction in the number of those in the lower group:

FRANK & HIRSCH SALARIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Earning group</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R50 to R70</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R70 to R130</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R130 plus</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Including annual bonus.

A surprising and disappointing feature is the R50-R70 salary group. The average salary in this income group is R58. An African F & H employee told the
FM (in the presence of managing director Helmut Hirsch) that a matriculated 21-year-old had been hired only two months before at R52 per month. This is the minimum amount F & H could legally pay him.

Hirsch argues that most untrained beginners are not worth more (“we’d pay a White the same for the same work”). He agrees they are being paid well below the Johannesburg poverty datum line of R70 per month for a family of five, but says that they are not generally sole breadwinners.

Had he checked whether they were or not? No. A couple of days after our first interview, however, he telephoned the FM and said that he had now checked and was “delighted to have had this brought to my attention. I came across a ‘junior’ aged 44 I didn’t know of before, earning R55 per month.”

He has now introduced a system by which new African male employees “with proven experience” will start at a minimum of R65. Those without experience will be put on probation for three months, with clerks continuing to start at R52 and others at R55. If they prove satisfactory, their wages will then be upped immediately to R60 and R65 respectively.

All of these salaries are below the PDL level for a family of five. In any case, shouldn’t these moves have been made months ago? Can the Polaroid group justify itself to its US detractors when its distributor still pays some employees the minimum rate allowed by law?

On the training side of the F & H programme, there are now nine African supervisors (receiving between R136 and R195 per month including annual bonuses) compared to one last year. Two African storemen have been appointed for the first time.

Hirsch says Polaroid is satisfied with the progress made by F & H so far. Polaroid itself has played its part in the experimental programme spending R45,000 on non-White bursaries, and general African educational and cultural development. This is a considerable sum, perhaps a quarter of its SA profits.

How have other firms reacted to Polaroid’s lead? Have there been advances? If so, do they justify Polaroid staying here? The evidence so far is inconclusive.

The SA Institute of Race Relations has produced a somewhat amateurish independent report on the experiment, which finds that its intention to significantly improve the wages and working conditions of Africans generally has failed.

The report has prejudged the issue, however, relying largely on Press cuttings covering the year in which the experiment was actually taking place. Changes such as these take time: boards have to be consulted, new policies thrashed out, salary scales reviewed, the machinery set rolling.

Furthermore, the experiment is only due to end on January 13, 1972. Companies are still in the process of making decisions with it in mind.

This is not to condone procrastination on such an urgent issue. But Polaroid, after all, itself set the terms. Any decision based on information collected before January 13 next (whether by Polaroid or the SA Institute of Race Relations) must be regarded as premature and ill-judged.

Polaroid’s decision will have wide ranging implications. It should not be taken hastily or on the basis of incomplete information.

In any event the wider question which the Polaroid board must ask itself, regardless of whether specific wage and occupational targets have been reached, is this: Will we help or retard the cause of African advancement by pulling out? The answer ought to be self-evident, even to those Negro activists urging Polaroid to leave South Africa.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., June 20, 1972.

Hon. GUY VANDER JAGT,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Vander Jagt: Thank you for your letter of June 7, 1972 in which you expressed your interest in having the Department’s comments on Chairman Diggs’ “Action Manifesto”. We found the Manifesto a comprehensive document which provided thought-provoking ideas regarding virtually all aspects of U.S. relations with southern Africa. The Department’s comments on the Action Manifesto were sent to Chairman Diggs on February 18. I am pleased to forward them to you at this time.

In the complex area of southern Africa conflicting interests often make it particularly difficult to define policies that will best meet the total requirements of the United States. The Manifesto brings this out most forcefully.
In responding to the Manifesto’s many points, we believe it pertinent first to mention several actions of the U.S. Government responsive to African concerns not mentioned in the Manifesto.

The United States Government, for example:
- has led the field in actively discouraging investment in Namibia (South West Africa);
- supported the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on Namibia (the United Kingdom and France abstained);
- continues to maintain the embargo on the sale of arms and military equipment to southern Africa, despite the actions of certain other governments and heavy domestic pressure for the resumption of such sales;
- continues to maintain, despite concern over the Indian Ocean, the ban on U.S. naval visits to South Africa because of the problem of exposure of U.S. personnel to discriminatory treatment there;
- gives total support for U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia, except where this has been limited by act of Congress;
- has encouraged and facilitated a greater degree of black American contact with South Africans of all racial groupings;
- has upgraded the level of U.S. diplomacy representation to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland with the assignment of an Ambassador;
- has developed a sound AID program designed to help the three black majority ruled states advance their economic and political independence; and
- is not involved in the Cabora Bassa project.

In commenting on the Manifesto itself, I will group our remarks by subject and attempt to present the basic rationale for our position and strategy.

**GENERAL**

Policy on southern Africa clearly affects our entire stance in Africa. A major policy review was conducted two years ago, and its basic elements are under constant reexamination. In this reexamination, we welcome inputs such as the Manifesto. Recommendations from private organizations are also appreciated. The African Advisory Council, established to advise the Department on matters pertaining to U.S. policy in Africa, has been most helpful. (Manifesto: Point 52)

**SOUTH AFRICA**

Discrimination on the basis of race is the central element in the policies and programs of the white minority South African Government, and it permeates all aspects of life. That this is anathema to the United States we have made amply clear, both in our public utterances and in our bilateral discussions with the South African Government. President Nixon has specifically stated that we cannot condone the violence to human dignity implicit in apartheid. (Points 1 and 3)

In this situation, the crucial question is how the United States can effectively support its political position on behalf of the African majority and its rights. Our basic approach to this is through communication—communication not only with the South African Government but with all elements of the South African population. Our Embassy and United States Information officers are in active contact with leaders in the African, colored and Indian communities. They are constantly working to expand these contacts, and the extension of USIS facilities to serve SOWETO is currently under consideration. (Points 20 and 22)

In our discussions with the South African Government, we seek to bring home the points that they are dangerously and unacceptably out of step with the rest of the continent; that change is essential to their own future in Africa; and that it is best to adjust before internal and external pressures become un Forgivable.

The Embassy and Consulates General in South Africa play a central role in all of this activity, and we believe our ability to make contact with all elements of the South African population is substantially enhanced by the extent and level of our diplomatic and consular representation. Any downgrading of representation would lessen our impact, our insight into the problems of the area, and our awareness of opportunities to make a constructive contribution toward their solution. (Point 2)

Our Embassy and Consulates General themselves provide examples of racial integration, follow fair employment practices, are seeking to recruit additional non-white staff, and provide informational and cultural programs that cut across
racial lines. There has been no change from the policy on integrated entertain-
ment laid down under the Administration of President Kennedy and enunciated
in a statement made by Ambassador Satterthwaite in South Africa on July 4,
1963. Although we have at present no black American personnel in South Africa,
we intend to make further personnel assignments solely on the basis of ability
and without regard to race. (Points 23 and 38)

In all of their activities in South Africa, our Embassy and Consulate General
personnel conduct themselves in keeping with our opposition to apartheid and
are particularly careful to avoid actions which would be seen as condoning that
discriminatory system. It is not desirable at this time to set more specific guide-
lines governing their activities, as contact and communication with as broad a
spectrum of South African life as possible is an essential part of their function.
(Point 24)

As pointed out in the Manifesto, many questions have been raised with regard
to the business and other material interests which the United States has in
South Africa. In weighing possible courses of action with regard to these inter-
ests, the fundamental considerations must of necessity be the practicality and
the consequences of the actions concerned.

We believe the current efforts of the National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration (NASA) to improve the situation of its non-white workers in South
Africa will have a constructive impact on attitudes and practices in that country
and specifically in the South African scientific community. The visit you and
Chairman Diggs made to the station was very helpful in this connection. On the
other hand, removal of the NASA tracking station would harm the US space
program without leading to any constructive consequence in South Africa and
with respect to the South African racial situation. (Point 25)

Similarly, termination of all nuclear cooperation with South Africa might
create problems in the area of international inspection and control without lead-
ting to any constructive consequence in South African racial or other relations.
(Point 40)

Visa retaliation on a *quid pro quo* basis would be incompatible not only with
our general policy of encouraging travel to the United States but with our policy
of communication and with the open nature of our society. (Point 42)

The general area of trade raises a number of interesting questions. The export
of American products to South Africa stimulates production and provides jobs
in this country. ExIm Bank guarantees and insurance constitute assistance to
American exporters. The withholding of American exports from South Africa
would merely result in the diversion of South African purchases to other sup-
pliers. ExIm Bank does not extend loans to South African borrowers. (Point
27 and 33)

We do, of course, maintain and faithfully observe the embargo on sale of arms
and military equipment to South Africa. Extension of that embargo to cover all
sales to the South African Defense Forces or to prohibit the sale of light air-
craft to civilian purchasers in South Africa would not, in our estimation, serve
the basic purpose of the embargo, which was related to the conduct of military
operations and maintenance of internal security. (Point 36)

In an effort to clarify a gray area in the arms embargo, the decision was made
that no major transport aircraft will be sold to the South African Defense Force
and that sales will be limited to small, executive aircraft for military VIP trans-
port—aircraft which would be difficult to adapt for any other use. The South
Africans have apparently found this ruling too restrictive and have purchased
their executive aircraft from other sources. (Point 36)

We have suggested to the Department of Defense that it might usefully review
other parts of Points 36 and 37.

In the area of imports, we ban the importation of goods produced with convict
or forced labor. I understand that the Treasury Department is examining the
question of whether non-white labor can be categorized as forced labor. With
regard to the sugar quota, the Congress did not increase the South African share
last year, and all quota allocations are to come up for review in 1975. I might
add that while the South African sugar quota was maintained essentially un-
changed in the congressional action last year, the quotas for certain developing
black African countries were substantially increased (Swaziland, Mauritius and
Madagascar), and quotas were established for others which had not had them
before (Uganda and Malawi). (Points 34, 35 and 48)
U.S. private investment in South Africa has come under extensive criticism as representing support for the white South African Government and its system of apartheid.

Arguments can be made on both sides of this matter. While it can be said that U.S. plants do make a contribution to the South African economy, it is clear that the investment possibilities in South Africa are so attractive that in most cases withdrawal of American investment would have no effect other than to shift the activity concerned to South African or other foreign hands. I question the benefit in withdrawing U.S. business, which is increasingly conscious of its responsibilities toward non-white workers in South Africa, simply to leave room for businesses of other countries less concerned. (Point 27)

We do not encourage private U.S. investment in South Africa, as we do in the cases of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. OPIC does not operate in South Africa at all. (Points 45 and 50)

American firms can make a constructive contribution to improvement of the conditions and prospects of non-whites. Following the catalytic action of Polaroid a year ago and the efforts of the subcommittee during the past year, attention of American industry has been focused on the question of business practices in South Africa. Concrete improvements have been made along the lines suggested, and further constructive progress is expected. We believe improvement in non-white wages, training opportunities, worker-management relations, etc., in American firms can provide an important impetus to South African and other firms to take similar measures, thus accelerating improvement in the status of non-whites on a broader scale. We urge U.S. firms to move ahead in this area. At the same time, however, U.S. legislation on fair employment practices applies in South Africa only to American employees and others hired in the United States, and can not be applied to South African employees of American firms without amendment. (Points 29, 30 and 53)

The role and functions of the mission’s economic/commercial officers are viewed in light of the above considerations, and a serious and continuing attempt is made to limit their activities to those which are clearly in the United States interest and to avoid the appearance of giving support to the South African Government or to the system of apartheid. (Point 26)

The question of the Bantustans is a complex one. On one hand, their establishment represents a flagrantly unequal and unjust allocation of territory, resources, and finances, with the African majority receiving a disproportionately small share. On the other hand, in the absence of alternatives, many black South Africans believe the arrangement offers the only real possibility, at this time, for political as well as economic advancement. Thus, while the Bantustan system is clearly undesirable as a final solution to the South African problem, many responsible Africans are seeking to make use of it for the advancement of their peoples while still not abandoning the hope ultimately for equal political participation in a unified South Africa. (Point 21)

NAMIBIA (SOUTH WEST AFRICA)

The problem of Namibia is highlighted by recent events. The international status of the territory is established; the interest of the world community is direct and insistently; and yet the South African Government remains in complete and defiant control. In keeping with the conclusions of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice and with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2145, the United States considers South Africa’s presence in and administration of Namibia illegal, and we are careful to refrain from any acts or dealings with the South African Government which would imply recognition of the legality of, or lend support to, its presence and administration there. (Point 43)

Under this rubric, we do not plan to apply to Namibia any bilateral treaty we have with South Africa, and we would oppose any South African attempt to represent Namibia in international meetings or conferences. Refugees from Namibia are entitled to seek political asylum in the United States on the same basis as those from other parts of southern Africa. (Point 43, paragraphs 4 and 5)

As the International Court of Justice opinion itself recognized, fundamental considerations in any action taken with regard to Namibia concern the interest and welfare of the people of the area. It is important, for example, to have access to the territory so we can know conditions and developments there and base our actions on the realities of the situation. Similarly, calls for military action and
economic sanctions against Namibia must be examined in light of the effect they would have on the people of the territory. (Point 43, paragraphs 3 and 5)

Other practical considerations relate to the rights and interests of the Tsumeb Corporation and any other U.S. business interests which were established in Namibia legally and properly prior to termination of the League of Nations mandate in 1966. We would not consider it legal or equitable to regard Tsumeb's concessions in Namibia as invalid or to prohibit the importation into the United States of products from this or other American enterprises in the same situation in Namibia. The question of whether U.S. firms doing business in Namibia should be allowed tax deductions or credits for monies paid to the South African administering authority is currently under examination by the Treasury Department. (Point 43, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3).

These measures do not resolve the problems, however, and it is a difficult task to devise a course of action on the basis of self-determination for the people of Namibia. A step in that direction was taken by the United Nations Secretary General in his visit to South Africa and to Namibia in March and by the discussions he has had with the South African Government. We hope that progress will come from these discussions.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA

The Rhodesian problem remains one of serious concern to the international community. It is recognized that responsibility for the situation and its resolution rests with the United Kingdom, which is the acknowledged sovereign in Rhodesia. The UK last year reached agreement with the Rhodesian regime on a set of proposals for a settlement, implementation of which might have provided a basis for resolution of the issue. However, the British Commission charged to determine the question of acceptability, found after consultations with the population, that those proposals were unacceptable to the population as a whole as a basis for Rhodesian independence. As a result the British continue to acknowledge responsibility for seeking a solution to the Rhodesian problem, and are maintaining their sanctions in effect.

The United States remains committed to a peaceful solution to the issue which could lead to self-determination and eventual majority rule and—except to the extent that recent legislation permits the importation of strategic and critical materials from Rhodesia—continues to support and effectively enforce United Nations sanctions against the territory.

PORTUGAL

Portugal and its African territories represent a classic case of conflicting U.S. interests and the problems and limitations imposed on the United States Government by the policies of another state. Our military assistance to Portugal, running currently about $1 million a year, is designed to enable that state to carry out its responsibilities under NATO. (Point 6) The use of the Azores base is important to U.S. security interests, not only for anti-submarine warfare in the North Atlantic but also to enhance this nation's ability to deal with crises in the Mediterranean and Near Eastern areas. Extension of the Azores base agreement was therefore of considerable importance to the United States. As this continued arrangements which had existed since World War II, and as it contained no new U.S. defense commitments to Portugal, the matter was handled by executive agreement. (Point 55, paragraphs (b) 8, (c) and (e))

The economic assistance that we will provide to Portugal does not, in our view, contribute to Portugal's ability to continue its wars in Africa. None of the assistance is military in nature, and all of the development projects for which assistance was discussed are in metropolitan Portugal.

Very little of the assistance that we have offered is in grant aid. The $400 million figure for Ex-Im Bank credits, for example, represents the global value of a number of development projects the Portuguese Government has under consideration for construction of bridges, railroad facilities, roads, schools, etc., in metropolitan Portugal. The figure is only illustrative and does not represent a specific aid package. (Point 55, paragraph (d))

Ex-Im financing is intended to help U.S. firms and contractors compete for contracts and as such is designed to improve the U.S. balance of payments situation by fostering U.S. exports. A key criterion in the extension of such export loans is the ability of the foreign state to repay. Portugal's credit rating is good.
While the availability of Ex-Im Bank financing enhances the competitiveness of U.S. exporters, there is no assurance that Ex-Im support will actually increase the U.S. share of the Portuguese market. Ex-Im facilities were available for Portugal before the Azores agreement was extended, yet the U.S. share of the Portuguese market has not been impressive. Meaningful comparison of the global Ex-Im Bank figure for Portugal with financing extended to Africa and other areas is therefore difficult to make. (Points 55 (b) 1.b, 1.c, 2, 4 and 6)

As for the rest of the agreement, we have offered Portugal a two-year PL-480 program in the amount of $15 million per year. The program provides credits for the importation of U.S. goods (in this case agricultural commodities) by Portugal. The only items of direct grant aid for Portugal are the following:

A. The use of an oceanographic ship which is being loaned on a no-cost basis;
B. $1 million for educational development projects in metropolitan Portugal; and
C. $5 million worth of non-military excess equipment, also for use in metropolitan Portugal. The excess equipment will be calculated at acquisition cost—what it cost the United States Government when new—not the current value. If comparisons are to be made, this limited amount of grant aid could be compared with the $61.6 million in grant assistance for Africa in 1971.

With regard to U.S. policy on Portugal's African territories, we have made clear our view that the time for colonialism is past and that self-determination holds the only hope for a viable long-range Portuguese relationship with these territories. We have repeatedly urged the need for peaceful negotiations to explore ways in which progress can be made toward this goal and toward the economic, social and political advancement of the peoples of the African territories. We maintain normal relations with Portugal, a NATO ally, and our conduct of these relations is enhanced by maintenance of full diplomatic representation in Lisbon. (Points 2, 11 and 14)

In order to avoid any contribution to military activity in the Portuguese territories, we have since 1961 maintained an embargo on the sale of arms and military equipment to Portugal for use in Africa. We believe this has been an effective policy, and despite allegations to the contrary, we have no evidence that U.S. arms supplied since 1961 under Portugal's assurances against African use have in fact been used in Africa. Suspension of military sales to Portugal would degrade Portuguese ability to carry its NATO responsibilities but would have little effect on Portuguese policies and activities in Africa. (Points 7, 8, 9 and 12)

The U.S. Government has not supplied any herbicides or herbicide equipment to Portugal, nor has it provided Portugal with training, advice, or other assistance on the use of herbicides. Anti-plant chemicals (herbicides) with primarily a military use are subject to Munitions Control licensing. No such license has been issued to Portugal in recent years. Herbicides for primarily agricultural use may be purchased in normal commercial transactions and are not the subject of special licensing arrangements. It should be noted that Portugal, itself, manufactures herbicides. (Point 13)

On the economic side, we have no interests in Portuguese Guinea, and U.S. investment in Angola and Mozambique is modest. We neither encourage nor discourage investment in the Portuguese territories, but we point out to potential investors the political and security problems of the area. OPIC has been involved on a limited scale in Angola and Mozambique, but on the specific basis that any investment must serve to benefit the economic and social advancement of the indigenous population. Ex-Im operates on the same basis. We believe that as they become increasingly aware of political considerations, American businesses could exert a constructive influence in these territories. (Points 27, 29 and 45)

Our economic officers play an important role in identifying such possibilities and they are active in encouraging U.S. business to improve wages, training facilities, and other arrangements affecting African workers. Actual investigation of the practices of U.S. companies abroad lies outside our competence but encouragement of such firms to adopt enlightened policies can be and is being pursued. (Points 26 and 31)
LIBERATION GROUPS

We recognize what is at stake in the question of U.S. relations with liberation groups. The problems are similar to those faced two decades ago in dealing with liberation groups in various African colonial territories. While we wish to encourage peaceful resolution of independence struggles, failure to give support to liberation groups leaves the field to other world powers, thereby increasing their influence.

These issues have been carefully weighed in determining our policy. We have concluded that as a government we cannot endorse or be a party to the use of force by the liberation movements, although we are not unmindful of the problems of individuals affected by the conflicts in southern Africa. (Points 4, 15, 16, 18 and 19).

We extend assistance to southern African refugees, both directly and through international organizations, although, as you know, budgetary restrictions limit these activities. The Administration has not been able for the past two years to get Congressional approval for a contribution to the UN Trust Fund. (Points 19 and 53.)

I hope this information will prove useful to you. Please let me know if I can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

DAVID M. ABSHIRE,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

[From the Congressional Record—Extensions of Remarks, July 20, 1972]

SOUTHERN AFRICA: CONSTANT THEMES IN U.S. POLICY

HON. GUY VANDER JAGT OF MICHIGAN

Mr. Vander Jagt. Mr. Speaker, recognizing that the President’s African policy has, on occasion, been misunderstood and misinterpreted, I would like to place in the Record an address by Mr. David D. Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, entitled “Southern Africa; Constant Themes in U.S. Policy.” Mr. Newsom’s address clearly sets forth the convictions and policies of this administration as they concern southern Africa:

SOUTHERN AFRICA: CONSTANT THEMES IN U.S. POLICY

Interest here at home in a meaningful U.S. policy toward Africa has clearly been growing in recent years. We welcome this interest. We feel it should be accompanied by an accurate knowledge and an interested understanding of what our policy is.

I regret to say that our policy and actions have been misunderstood on occasion and misinterpreted. It is not my purpose here today to make a partisan speech. As the steward of our African policy over the past three years, however, I should like to take this occasion to set the record straight.

The growing interest in Africa in this country was manifested most dramatically during the last weekend in May when a conference of 400 black Americans at Howard University was followed by an impressive demonstration by over 10,000 persons in Washington on behalf of African liberation.

As is natural to an occasion totally directed to one area of policy, there were many critical of official policies—not always, however, with a full knowledge of what the policies are and of the complexities of making that policy. Charges ranged from “neglect” of Africa to assertions that present policies represented a shift from the past purposely in favor of the white-dominated regimes of southern Africa. Quite understandably, because of the identity with racial problems, the focus of attention of this surging interest in Africa is on the southern portion of the continent.

There have been other manifestations of both rising interest and serious misconception. The New York Times of April 2 highlighted what it called the deliberate increase of contacts and communication with the white-dominated regimes of southern Africa. A statement issued through the office of Congressman Diggs of the House Subcommittee of Africa spoke of “collaboration” with the white regimes.
There has also been criticism from those who dislike our policies on the grounds that these policies do not sufficiently recognize certain of our interests in southern Africa. Motivated by concern over strategic or economic considerations, by basic sympathies with the white populations of the area, or by reluctance to see us become involved in problems of distant regions, many express their disapproval of traditional U.S. restraint toward the regimes of southern Africa. Individual American attitudes toward this area vary widely. Those making policy are in the middle.

To set the record straight on what our policies can be and what they are, let us examine first those elements that have been constant in U.S. policy toward southern Africa since the late Fifties.

First, the United States Government has consistently supported the principle of self-determination for all peoples in Africa.

Second, we have strongly and actively indicated our abhorrence of the institution of apartheid.

Third, we have consistently favored peaceful change in southern Africa through supporting constructive alternatives to the use of force.

Our implementation of these principles has been governed, for more than a decade and through several Administrations, by our recognition of four realities:

One, as a nation, we have complex worldwide relationships. Our response to the needs of one area frequently is limited by our interests in another. For example, the difference between interests in Europe and in Africa has affected our position in both.

Two, we are dealing in southern Africa with governments which react strongly to outside pressures and are not easily susceptible to persuasion.

Four, there are many real limitations on the extent to which we can influence the situation, both in terms of what might be supported domestically and of what we might be able to do in Africa.

The actions of the U.S. Government in this area over the past three years have been consistent with these general policy lines and limitations laid down in the years just after the emergence of independent Africa.

By the strict maintenance of arms embargoes toward both South Africa and the Portuguese territories, we have tangibly demonstrated our support for self-determination and our desire to avoid any support either for the imposition of apartheid or the continuation of colonial rule.

The maintenance of an arms embargo may sound like a passive act. It is not. It requires constant vigilance over shipments to the area. It means considerable sacrifice on the part of U.S. exporters who have seen substantial sales in southern Africa go to countries less conscientious about the embargo and less criticized by the Africans. It means a continuing effort on our part to explain to those in this country the absolute necessity of maintaining them in terms of our wider interests in Africa. We believe this policy has been effective. No proof has ever been presented that any weapons have gone from the United States to southern Africa since the embargoes were established in 1963.

The maintenance of the arms embargo has been accompanied, particularly in the case of South Africa, by a strict limitation on contact with that country's military. Because we have not wished to risk subjecting our men to apartheid, we have since 1967 avoided U.S. naval visits to South African ports despite the frequent need for U.S. Navy transit of this area. This has added to logistical problems for the Navy.

The U.S. Embassy and the U.S. Consulates General in South Africa continue to constitute significant bridges between the races in that country Multi-racial entertaining, contact with South Africans of all races, and the facilitation of such contacts for American visitors in the country leave little doubt as to where the United States stands with respect to apartheid. The record of the U.S. mission in this regard is in important respects a unique one.

We have, further, during the past three years sought to add new dimensions to these efforts.

We have expanded our contacts with all elements of the South African population. We have offered significant members of the South African majority the opportunity to visit this country. During the past three years, we have had 45 official visitors from South Africa, of whom 30 have been from the black, colored and Indian communities. Many of the white as well as the black and colored
South Africans whom we have invited here have been persons deeply involved in seeking alternatives to apartheid.

It is, perhaps, pertinent that the Foreign Minister of South Africa felt obliged to point out to his parliament on May 5 that present U.S. policy did not accept the South African approach to evolution within that country, but sought, through persuasion, to bring about peaceful change.

We have begun to break down racial barriers regarding the assignment of American official personnel to South Africa. Black diplomatic couriers have now been placed on the runs to South Africa. Three black Foreign Service officers have, during the past year, been on temporary duty assignments in the Republic. Black Americans have been sent to South Africa under our official cultural exchange program.

In the case of Namibia, or South West Africa, we strongly supported the proposal at the United Nations to have the International Court of Justice take up the question of South Africa's continued administration of the territory. We accepted the Court's conclusions that South Africa's mandate over the territory was terminated and that South Africa's continued presence there is illegal.

We alone among major countries have taken the position of discouraging any new investment in the territory. We encourage U.S. firms already in Namibia to set the pace in improved employee relations. We consistently have supported the U.N.'s responsibility in the territory.

In our support for alternatives in southern Africa, we have increased our assistance dramatically to the smaller majority-ruled states of southern Africa: Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. We will in July, be signing a $12,000,000 loan agreement for the construction of a road linking Botswana to Zambia and providing alternative economic outlets for that nation. In 1971 for the first time, we appointed an Ambassador, a black American, to represent us in these three countries.

In the continuing interplay of U.S. interests, decisions must be made in which one set of interests may prevail—in any specific case—over another. In the region of southern Africa there are five areas in particular where conflicting interests have affected policies—in every administration. For southern Africa has in the past fifteen years presented particularly difficult policy problems: the Portuguese territories, relations with the liberation movements, pressures at the United Nations, Rhodesia, and Investment in South Africa are some of these.

Critics of U.S. policies seek to take isolated decisions in these problem areas and read into them a basic change in the course of U.S. African policy. In doing so they tend to neglect decisions which with equal logic point in the opposite direction.

In the more extreme form, a few critics have claimed that there is a conscious effort on the part of the U.S. Government at this time to favor the white-ruled governments of southern Africa. I have had to deny both in Africa and in this country that we have chosen sides in the southern conflict, and that the U.S. would intervene on the side of the white regimes in the event of trouble.

There is no basis for such assumptions. They ignore the large and growing U.S. interest in black Africa and, particularly, our interest in the majority-ruled states in southern Africa. They ignore the fact that our one major intervention in Africa, in close collaboration with the U.N., was to preserve the unity of the Congo—against efforts to dismember it supported by the white-dominated regimes. This intervention was ordered by President Eisenhower and fully supported and carried on by President Kennedy.

The most difficult area relates to our relations with Portugal. Portugal is an ally, a charter member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. For more than two decades, we have enjoyed the use of base facilities in the Azores, Portuguese islands in the mid-Atlantic. These base facilities are of great importance to our anti-submarine defenses in the face of a growing Soviet submarine presence in the area.

Although our last formal agreement to continue stationing forces in the Azores lapsed in 1962, the Portuguese permitted us to stay on. When a new Portuguese Government took office in 1965, it insisted that we formalize our presence in the Azores by renewing the lapsed agreement. We concurred and also agreed to a related request that we examine areas in which the United States could assist Portugal in economic and social development. The final agreement did not follow the usual pattern of granting military assistance for military bases, but was instead solely related to economic and educational development in metropolitan Portugal.
Now this base agreement has drawn a great deal of attention and has attracted substantial comment, both in the United States and in Africa. I am afraid that despite our best efforts at explaining the terms, it has been greatly misunderstood, and even misrepresented. Much of the confusion has concerned Export-Import Bank credits for American exporters competing for contracts in Portugal. In a letter to the Portuguese on this subject, the Secretary of State said that we had reviewed a number of development projects that they had in mind and that the Export-Import Bank would consider financing exports for those projects in accordance with the usual loan criteria and practices of the Bank. Export-Import Bank facilities have always been available for U.S. firms seeking business in Portugal and this agreement represented absolutely no change in that policy. No commitment was made to extend credits in any amount, only to consider applications as before.

The principal objection voiced against the agreement holds that it releases Portuguese resources for use in the African wars. But in fact, Portugal has large exchange reserves, as the result of conservative fiscal policies. Our refusal to grant credit would not lead others to do the same. There is no evidence to suggest that our withholding credit would in any sense deter the Portuguese from pursuing their present policies in Africa.

We recognize that the question of our relations with Portugal and with Portuguese Africa is becoming increasingly an emotional issue in this country. Closely related to this is the question of our relation with all liberation movements in Africa. Many in Africa and America judge one's attitude toward the southern African issues as a whole by the attitude taken toward the liberation movements and their leaders.

The African movements targeted against the several parts of white-ruled southern Africa vary widely in size, effectiveness, cohesion, and activity. Those targeted against the Portuguese territories appear to be militarily the most active. They are receiving help from the Soviets and Chinese. The leaders of the movements seek contacts with and help from the West.

The question of U.S. official relations with leaders of opposition movements in colonial territories has always posed a dilemma for American policy makers. It was true in the Fifties with respect particularly to North Africa. It has been no less true throughout the Sixties and today in that part of Africa still under colonial or white domination.

These movements are a political fact. On the one hand, the absence of contact or support from us leaves the leaders subject to certain other outside influences. On the other hand, the U.S. has traditionally been unwilling to recognize opposition elements in colonial territories until an internationally recognized transfer of power has taken place. That situation still prevails today. Nevertheless, in such areas, as in the past, both U.S. Government and private organizations seek opportunities to help with appropriate humanitarian and educational assistance to refugees affected by the conflicts.

The problem in the United Nations is particularly difficult.

We have a basic sympathy with the aspirations of the Africans to see an end to apartheid and colonial government, and to see a greater recognition of the need for racial justice and equality. Most African leaders understand and appreciate this. At the same time, because of our own traditions and historical experience, they expect more of the United States—more than they expect of others. We cannot always meet these expectations.

During 1971, if we take together General Assembly and Security Council votes on African issues, we voted for 15 specific African proposals, against 11, and abstained on 12.

Many Africans believe this record is inadequate. Yet, underlying the careful consideration given each vote, was a deep dedication to many of the same principles motivating African representatives and our desire, whenever possible, to vote with the Africans. Ironically, we could have voted for most of these proposals if only one or two extreme or unrealistic features had been eliminated. We were able to negotiate, however, in many cases, agreements on language changes so we could vote with the Africans. Many of the problems we had did not relate to Africa per se, but involved broader questions. They related to:

- Our desire to avoid establishing world-wide legal precedents which could affect broader U.S. and U.N. interests;
- The need to verify facts before condemning another state;
- Our deep concern over increases in the budget of the United Nations.
With regard to Rhodesia, the U.S. Government has sought to support United Nations economic sanctions as an alternative to a violent solution and as a form of pressure on the Smith regime to negotiate a new basis for independence. We closed our Consulate in Rhodesia. We closed off all contact with the Smith regime. We enforced sanctions against Rhodesia as conscientiously as any nation, and more so than most.

This has not been a universally popular policy in this country. There are those who dislike the idea of sanctions against anyone, those who are aware of extensive violations by other countries, those whose own interests have in some way been affected, and still others who are disillusioned with the United Nations and opposed to the concept of United Nations mandatory action infringing on the United States.

There are those who deplore the fact that while other countries have been ignoring sanctions with impunity, the United States was forced to pay higher prices to the Soviet Union for strategic materials. These attitudes resulted in the action of the Congress last year to exempt strategic materials from Rhodesian sanctions and allow their importation into the United States unless there is a similar embargo on such materials from Communist countries. Efforts this year to obtain the repeal of the resultant legislation have not been successful.

This move has caused adverse reactions in Africa. It created a contradiction between our domestic and international obligations. It came at a time when Britain was seeking a settlement with Rhodesia and undoubtedly led the Rhodesians for a time to believe that sanctions as a whole were visibly crumbling. While there have been far more extensive sanctions violations by others, this open and official U.S. act has made us appear the principal culprit, in New York and in Africa, condemned by resolutions both in the U.N. and in the Organization of African Unity. I dislike deeply seeing ourselves in this position.

Finally, there is the question of U.S. investments in South Africa. There are those who see the failure of the U.S. Government to seek to restrict such investments as an indication of sympathy for the policies of South Africa. There are those who assume that the presence of these investments automatically means that we will intervene in the event of trouble in that area. Neither assumption is correct.

Here again, the record needs to be set straight:

First, U.S. investment in South Africa represents only 16 per cent of total foreign investment in that country. It represents only a fourth of total U.S. investment in Africa—a ratio that is decreasing all the time. It is not likely that U.S. withdrawal of this investment—assuming this were feasible—would force change in South Africa. There is no valid basis for speculating that the U.S. would take extraordinary measures to protect this investment in the event of civil or other disturbance when, among other factors, more substantial investment in the rest of the continent would need to be weighed in the balance.

Secondly, much of this investment is linked with South African business interests; withdrawal would not be easy even if the U.S. had authority to force withdrawal by American companies. New U.S. investment in South Africa comes to a large extent from current profits of U.S. firms operating there.

Thirdly, the United States does not encourage investment in South Africa nor extend guarantees covering such investment. It is the economic situation in that country that attracts investment.

Fourthly, while there is debate in the U.S. and in South Africa on this point, our soundings indicate that the black and colored populations of South Africa do not want to see U.S. investment withdrawn. The majority see U.S. investment as a constructive force; they wish to see it remain and make an impact on that society.

The United States Government, therefore, neither encourages nor discourages investment in South Africa. It does encourage U.S. firms that are there to lead the way in upgrading the status of non-white workers and in contributions to social and educational improvement. It is a misleading over-simplification to suggest that the presence of that investment either draws us into the conflict of races in that area or commits us to a policy favorable to apartheid.

That southern African aspect, however, is not the only element in the U.S. policy toward Africa. There are 41 independent African states other than South Africa. In many of them we have major interests and investments. We desire satisfactory relations with all.
Cliches exist about this aspect of our policy as well. People speak of "neglect," and "low priority." The facts do not bear this out.

With patient effort, we have established reasonably satisfactory relations with all but one of these states. We have, in the past three years, resumed diplomatic relations with Mauritania. We have strengthened our relations with Algeria and the Sudan, despite the continued absence of formal diplomatic ties. Of all the states in Africa, only in Congo (Brazzaville) do we not have reasonable access to the leadership and a reasonably respected relationship.

African nations welcome the attention we have given to them and to their citizens as significant members of the world community. We have, from its inception, recognized the Organization of African Unity as a forward-looking institution representing the common interests and identities of Africans.

Through visits, correspondence, and the work of our diplomatic missions, we have established bonds of friendship and common interest which belie any suggestion of neglect. The Ambassador of one of the most militant African countries recently told one of our officers that he was preparing a memorandum for his government emphasizing the degree of attention given both personally to him and to the needs and interests of Africa by those in the U.S. Government. We are in continuing correspondence with several African heads of state, including one from another militant government who, while not agreeing with all that we are doing, emphasizes his appreciation for the attention we give to him and to the needs of his country.

In the last analysis, each African leader places the greatest emphasis on the needs of his own country, particularly in the desperate search for the means of development. Here, there is neither neglect nor low priority on the part of the United States.

During a period of increasing disillusionment with foreign aid and of declining overall appropriations, we have been able to maintain assistance to the African countries at a constant level. In 1972, in fact, the overall sum was the highest since 1968. Our role was part of an international effort which gives the African continent the highest per capita development aid in the world.

The United States follows policies in Africa today which are consistent with the main themes of that policy since the late Fifties. It follows policies which give us a meaningful relationship with a continent increasingly important in terms of both trade, investment, and its role on the international stage.
“Our stake in the continent will not rest on today’s crisis, on political maneuvering for passing advantage or on the strategic priority we assign it. Our goal is to help sustain the process by which Africa will gradually realize economic progress to match its aspirations.”

Africa is a continental experiment in nationbuilding. The excitement and enthusiasm of national birth have phased into the more sober period of growth.

Our historic ties with Africa are deeply rooted in the cultural heritage of many of our people. Our sympathy for Africa’s newly independent states is a natural product of our traditional antipathy for colonialism. Our economic interests in the continent are substantial, and growing. And our responsibilities as a global power inevitably give us an interest in the stability and well-being of so large a part of the world.

Reflecting these close ties, Secretary Rogers last year became the first Secretary of State to visit Africa. His personal observations and experiences in Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Zambia, the Congo, Cameroon, Nigeria, Ghana, and Liberia gave a new dimension at the highest level to our knowledge and understanding of Africa. A major result of that visit was the basic policy statement issued with my warm approval in March 1970. In that statement Secretary Rogers summarized our aim in Africa as “a relationship of constructive cooperation with the nations of Africa—a cooperative and equal relationship with all who wish it.”

We recognize that it is not for us to attempt to set the pattern of relationships among the states of Africa. Only the Africans can forge national unity. Those problems having to do with the building of stable national institutions are neither appropriate for, nor amenable to, much of a contribution from us. Only the Africans themselves can do such work.

The promise of the newly independent African nations is great. But they face all the normal problems associated with independence, and some special ones stemming from historic reliance on tribal organizations not always reflected in national boundaries drawn for the administrative convenience of the former colonial powers. Moreover, colonialism and racial injustice in southern Africa continue to frustrate the African sense of fulfillment.

These facts complicate the essential task of clothing new political institutions with authority. They make more difficult the problem of working out stable relationships among the nations of Africa, and between Africa and the rest of the world. They compound the exigent task of obtaining and applying the resources needed for economic development.

The Nixon doctrine’s encouragement of self-reliance has an immediate and broad applicability in Africa. Africa has depended less than other areas on American leadership and assistance, and its institutions and relationships were created without our providing either the impetus or the concept. In Africa, therefore, the conflict between the application of our new doctrine and the requirements of continuity are minimal. To an unusual degree, our conception of the current realities is unencumbered by the weight of previous undertakings. Our freedom of decision is not constrained by the demands, legal or implicit, of past commitments and actions.
Within the framework of African efforts, however, there are three primary needs of the continent to which we can contribute. Africa seeks peace, economic development, and justice; and she seeks our assistance in reaching those goals. It is in our interest to respond as generously as our resources permit.

Peace
The major contribution we can make to the peace of the continent is to support the African effort to keep free of great power rivalries and conflicts. Africa's unresolved problems should not be used as a pretext for non-Africans to intervene. African needs for assistance should not be manipulated to establish an undue outside influence. The nations of Africa need tranquility and a chance to resolve their own domestic and inter-African problems. Conflict and involvement in cold war rivalries can only bring harm to Africa and tragic delay in its progress.

For that reason, we seek no positions in Africa which threaten the interests of others. Nor can we condone activities by others which have that effect. Therefore, support for the inviolability of African borders and the integrity of African states is a cardinal point of American policy.

Development
The second great African need to which we can contribute is economic development. Africa must obtain material resources and technology from abroad. Multilateral and private investment channels are, we believe, the most efficient means to effect capital development. But external resources can bring real progress only if Africa's own human resources are developed and mobilized for this effort. It is in this area that we believe our bilateral assistance programs can be most effective. We therefore hope to contribute to Africa's economic development in four major ways:

Our bilateral assistance programs in the years ahead will concentrate on the development of human resources—on education, population problems, and agricultural skills. In the technical assistance field, we intend to send more highly trained technicians. This will be particularly evident in the "New Direction" of the Peace Corps programs in Africa.

But aid alone is not sufficient. African countries also need new markets. Generalized tariff preferences will help to open new markets for their manufactured goods in the more industrialized countries. I will shortly submit legislation to authorize U.S. participation in this program. We will also continue to participate in international efforts to maintain and stabilize markets for traditional exports of primary products.

We intend to use our influence in international lending and development agencies to encourage greater assistance to Africa. In this respect we applaud the decision of the World Bank to increase its assistance to Africa threefold. Finally, we will actively encourage private investment in the developing countries of Africa. Private investment is the easiest and most efficient way to transfer both resources and human skills from a developed to a developing society. American investment in Africa now stands at about three billion dollars, of which more than two-thirds is in the developing area. It has been growing annually at over 12 percent. We expect that a high rate will continue in coming years. In African countries favored with resources and wise leadership, I have no doubt that private investment will play a far more significant role than public aid in speeding their progress.

Justice
The third broad area in which Africans seek our assistance is the search for racial and political justice in southern Africa. There is perhaps no issue which has so pernicious a potential for the well-being of Africa and for American interests there. It is, for many, the sole issue by which our friendship for Africa is measured. I wish to review in all frankness our policy toward this grievous problem.

Both our statements and our actions have, or should have, made it patently clear to all concerned that racism is abhorrent to the American people, to my administration, and to me personally. We cannot be indifferent to apartheid. Nor can we ignore the tensions created in Africa by the denial of political self-determination. We shall do what we can to foster equal opportunity and free political expression instead. We shall do so on both moral and practical grounds, for in our view there is no other solution.
The United States has, therefore, reaffirmed and continued to enforce the embargo on the sale of arms to South Africa. When Southern Rhodesia attempted to sever formal ties with Britain, we closed our consulate there. We have reaffirmed and continued to enforce the economic sanctions against Rhodesia, and we have sought ways to insure a more universal compliance with those sanctions.

The United States also has continued its embargo on the sales of arms for use in Portuguese African territories. In support of the United Nations effort to terminate South Africa's jurisdiction over southwest Africa, we have adopted a policy of discouraging American investment in that territory. We have sought to provide assistance and encouragement to Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland in their efforts to prove the viability of multiracial societies in the heart of southern Africa.

These measures define our policy toward the problems of southern Africa. We intend to continue these efforts, and to do what we can to encourage the white regimes to adopt more generous and more realistic policies toward the needs and aspirations of their black citizens.

However, just as we will not condone the violence to human dignity implicit in apartheid, we cannot associate ourselves with those who call for a violent solution to these problems.

We are convinced that the use of violence holds no promise as the solution to the problems of southern Africa. Neither the military nor the economic strength is available to force change on the white minority regimes. Violence would harden the resistance of the white minorities to evolutionary change. Resort to force would freeze the prejudice and fear which lie at the heart of the problem. Finally, violence would certainly hurt most the very people it would purport to serve.

The interests of the white regimes themselves surely dictate change. The United States believes that the outside world can and should use its contacts with southern Africa to promote and speed that change. We do not, therefore, believe the isolation of the white regimes serves African interests, or our own, or that of ultimate justice. A combination of contact and moral pressure serves all three.

**Progress**

I have dwelt at length on the problems of Africa because it is to them that our policies are of necessity addressed. But it is necessary also to recognize the progress which is taking place.

The return of peace to Nigeria was the paramount African event of 1970. That event was all the more welcome to us, for the American zeal to help reduce the anguishing human cost of that conflict led to some misunderstanding and strain in our relations with the Nigerian Government. The United States views with admiration the humane and statesmanlike policy of reconciliation which Nigeria has adopted. We ourselves know the suffering and bitterness which a civil war entails. Our country emerged stronger and more united. Nigeria, too, has emerged from the challenge stronger and united, and ready to assume the significant role in Africa which her size, her resources, and her 60 million people dictate. That is a development of the highest significance for the future stability and well-being of Africa. We welcome it.

I should also mention the striking progress which has been made in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Five years of peace have transformed that country from perhaps the most tortured of African states to one of the most stable. This development vindicates the faith in a united Congo which the United States displayed in darker days. President Mobutu's visit to Washington in August served to recall the support we extended to the Congo at that time, and to reaffirm the strong friendship between our two countries which has resulted.

The Emperor of Ethiopia, unique among world leaders in the length of his reign and his contribution to independent Africa, visited the United States in October. That occasion provided an opportunity for me to review with him the role of the United States in the economic progress of that ancient land and to reaffirm the close ties of cooperation between our two countries. Ethiopia has been a leader in Africa's creation of regional organizations. Their growing vitality is encouraging, and we hope that activities of this kind will serve increasingly as the focus for economic cooperation between African countries. We believe such a development will both promote and increase the effectiveness of foreign assistance.
The potential of Africa is great, but so are its problems. We view Africa with the strongest of good will, tempered by the sober recognition of the limits of the contribution which we can make to many of its problems. We look to African leadership to build the framework within which other nations, including the United States, can fully contribute to a bright African future. A peaceful, progressive, and just Africa is an exciting and worthy goal. We hope by our policies to facilitate economic progress in one part of Africa, human and social justice in the other, and peace in both.
MALAGASY REPUBLIC

Madagascar is the geographical name for the island; Malagasy Republic is its full title. It is the fourth largest island in the world, situated in the Indian Ocean 250 miles across the Mozambique Channel from the southeast coast of Africa. Full independence was proclaimed on June 26, 1960, and Philibert Tsiranana became the first president. He was reelected in March 1965 by an overwhelming majority, receiving better than 97 percent of the vote with 98 percent of the electorate voting. In 1972 a change of government was forced through by students and intellectuals in the capital, Tananarive, which brought the army into the administration.

The study mission met former President Tsiranana and with several Government officials. The President discussed the country's history and was very candid in explaining his nation's relations with South Africa. It was interesting to note that the President displayed on his office wall a letter to him from John F. Kennedy on civil rights.

The foreign policy of the Malagasy Republic is importantly influenced by the country's close ties with France. Malagasy remains heavily dependent on French financial aid and technical assistance and French private investment is preponderant. Under a defense agreement, the French maintain a naval base and station troops in Malagasy. Cooperation between the two governments is thus understandably close. However, there is considerable resentment at the continuing dominance of France, which was a major factor in the recent disturbances.

In bilateral relations and in the United Nations, Malagasy policy have been moderate and Western-oriented. The Government has generally been anti-Communist; there is no Communist diplomatic or consular presence in Madagascar today. The establishment of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia and Romania has been agreed, but no diplomatic representatives have been exchanged. The possibility of appointment of a Malagasy ambassador to one of these countries has recently been raised publicly.

Madagascar has a close community of interests with black Africa, including membership in African regional organizations such as OCAM and the OAU. Association with the EEC through the Yaounde Convention has also developed Malagasy ties and cooperation with Africa as well as with Western Europe. However, there is an ideological and cultural gulf between Madagascar and black Africa that is far wider than the few hundred miles of the Mozambique Channel that separates them. The Malagasy, and notably the people of the central plateau, are descended from Polynesian stock and do not consider themselves Africans. Similarly, their island's position in the Indian Ocean makes it geographically not a part of continental Africa. As a result, Madagascar can best be described as a country that by ethnic composition, geographical location, and culture is Afro-Asian. This Afro-Asian vocation is evident in recent Malagasy foreign policy. The Government has expressed support for a regional grouping that in
APPENDIX 2

AFRICAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE SEVENTIES: PROSPECTS AND PROGRAMS

(Address by H. E. Seretse Khama, President of the Republic of Botswana at Opening Public Session)

THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE, AFRICAN-AMERICAN DIALOGS, LAGOS, NIGERIA, MARCH 8, 1971.

1. I should like to pay tribute to His Excellency Major-General Yaukubu Gowon for his opening address and thank him for the hospitality he, his Government, and people have extended to us. Thanks are due as well to the organizers of this conference, the Africa-American Institute and the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, and the Ford Foundation for providing us with this opportunity for free and uninhibited debate. Such opportunities are becoming increasingly rare in a world where prepared positions and set speeches are more common than informal face-to-face discussion.

2. We are gathered here as individual Africans and Americans in Africa's most populous state, and one of her most prosperous, whose progress is of vital importance for the progress of the Continent as a whole. So, quite apart from the warmth of the Nigerian welcome, Lagos is an appropriate setting for a review of the relations between Africa and America during this decade. We are about to engage in a dialog, a word which, through no fault of the organizers of this conference, has achieved a certain currency of late—some might even say notoriety. But this will not be a dialog between two interlocutors with fixed and agreed positions.

3. I should be very surprised if our American friends spoke with one voice. There are few constraints on them to do so. Africa is far from being the most pressing problem facing the United States today. The United States is engaged in a major internal debate on the extent to which it should involve itself in areas which in the last quarter of a century have been of immediate concern to it. The great power confrontations which are currently preoccupying the world are in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. In addition, the United States is today facing in acute form what many of us fear will face other developed industrial, urbanized societies—an internal problem of considerable dimensions which, in the U.S. case, is complicated by the issue of race. Indeed there are cynics who say that it is only the racial factor which makes it necessary for America, in its present mood of introspection, to have an African policy at all—rather than a set of bilateral relationships with individual African states. Certainly the enthusiasm for African independence which was a hallmark of the “new frontier” has been replaced by a new mood which some might call disillusion but which might more neutrally and accurately be described as an absence of illusion. As President Nixon put it in his foreign policy statement: “The excitement and enthusiasm of national birth have phased into the more sober period of growth.” Perhaps this transition has not been without its moments of postnatal depression. I suspect much the same mood guides African attitudes to the United States and to other Great Powers. This is far from being a bad thing. Relations between states, like relations between people, prosper best when there is an absence of illusion. But an absence of illusion should not be allowed to degenerate into an atmosphere of indifference or mistrust. I take it that one of the objectives of this meeting is to prevent this from happening.

4. But whatever differences of opinion emerge from among our American friends, the African participants are in no better position to put forward a unanimous viewpoint. We in Africa, for all our talk of unity, are a long way from achieving it. And when I speak of unity, I do not mean the United States of Africa which was the dream of an earlier generation of Pan-Africanists, I mean the more modest concept of unity in diversity, a unity which seeks to take into account the differing circumstances of individual African states and the limita-

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tions on the freedom of action which almost all of us face. This was the unity of which the President of Tanzania spoke in his important statement, "A New Look at the Conditions of Unity," in Cairo in April 1967. We are not united on issues involving the relations of outside powers with those areas of our continent which have still to achieve self-determination. On the one hand the vast majority of Commonwealth countries have condemned all arms sales to South Africa from whatever source, and have sought to dissuade the new United Kingdom Government from departing from its predecessor's policies. On the other, President Pompidou has recently toured a number of French-speaking states, and the issue of the very considerable French arms supplies, not only to South Africa but also to Portugal, does not seem to have figured largely in his discussions with his hosts. Similarly, while all African states put their name to the Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa, the interpretation of its call for a new look on the basis of self-determination has become a potential source of division within the OAU.

5. Nor have we always been able to agree on a common reaction to events within independent African states as was demonstrated most recently by reactions to the change of Government in Uganda. There is, I fear, a new danger. Africa may once again divide itself into "moderate" and "radical" groupings. The old "Casablanca" and "Monrovia" groups could, unless care is taken to prevent this development, emerge in new forms and new combinations. Africa cannot but be weakened by such divisions. Equally we must avoid the bogus unity which seeks to base itself on unanimously adopted resolutions which all too few, not even many of those who subscribe to them, take seriously. I mention these differences and the dangers to which they might lead, not only because they are a current source of anxiety to me, but also in order to warn our American friends that our side of the dialog may also speak with more than one voice.

6. I do not feel myself competent from my vantage point in the deep South of our continent to review the full sweep of past and future developments in U.S.-African relations. I do not underestimate the importance of such issues as commodity process, terms of trade, and the transfer of resources, both public and private. I consider that these issues have been realistically and sensibly dealt with in President Nixon's recent statement and in the statement by Secretary Rogers, which he made on his return from Africa last year. We in Africa recognize the other pressing demands on U.S. resources, and, above all, the unfavorable domestic climate towards foreign aid to which U.S. legislators are not unnaturally sensitive. I approve particularly the emphasis on encouraging greater assistance to Africa by international lending and development agencies, and I recognize that the U.S. contribution to these multilateral agencies is considerable. I am glad too that President Nixon's statement did not overlook the importance of technical assistance. Improved technical assistance policies will be necessary if these increased flows are to be successfully absorbed. I should like in this context to suggest that the U.S. Government take a lead from the policies of American private foundations and places greater emphasis on making possible the training of personnel from African countries in other African countries. In the same way third country finance can facilitate the movement of skilled and competent personnel from countries which can afford to train them to countries which badly need them. This process need not be confined to Africa. To help the developing countries to help each other in this way would be entirely consistent with the Nixon doctrine's encouragement of self-reliance.

7. Current U.S. priorities in bilateral aid are welcome, especially in their emphasis on rural development and population problems. The attitudes of African countries may differ somewhat in their approach to private investment. We in Botswana certainly seek to encourage U.S. investment, especially when it comes in the spirit of partnership set out as a desirable end by Secretary Rogers. But I do not think that I shall be alone in questioning whether the recipients of private investment, however blessed with resources and wise leadership, will find that it plays "a far more significant role than public aid in speeding their progress." Development in Africa must mean more than the pursuit of an expanding GNP, important though that is, African countries cannot afford to share the disdain of Professor Galbraith for growth, but we do face the twin problem of generating employment and correcting the dramatic urban-rural imbalance which is in many cases at the root of African instability. Unless private investment can be integrated into these broader objectives, balanced development will not take place and the stability, on which successful partnership between foreign investor and African government depends, will not be achieved. There is certainly a need for many of us to generate revenue. Botswana, which still, though we hope not for long, depends on external aid to balance its budget, feels this most keenly. But
foreign private sources alone cannot provide directly or indirectly all the inputs of capital and skill which are needed, if rural transformation is to keep pace with urban growth.

8. But there are others more qualified than I to analyse such problems. I hope I shall be forgiven if for the remainder of my address I concentrate on the areas of our continent and those aspects of U.S. policy with which I am most familiar. I mean, of course, southern Africa. I do not think my concern will be regarded as parochial, since the problems of my area take up a large part, some would say a disproportionate part, of the deliberations of international bodies.

9. We have reached the stage where we must question the effectiveness of the great expenditure of words devoted in the United Nations and elsewhere to the problems of southern Africa. This is not, I want to make clear, because I do not share the objectives of those who draft, sponsor and speak to the manifold resolutions on southern Africa which are endlessly debated at so many international gatherings. I recognise only too clearly that my country's prospects of fully independent development are inextricably bound up with the emancipation of all the minority-ruled populations of southern Africa. Because of this I regret the situation in which we find ourselves. I see few signs that the peoples and governments of Asia and Latin America, much less the Great Powers and their allies, are more committed to our cause than they were 10 years ago, even though more is now known about conditions in southern Africa. Indeed it may be the case that greater knowledge has led to pessimism about the prospects of change. Behind the screen of words, international activity has been directed toward areas where the dangers of great power confrontation and the risks of starting a Third World War are much more immediate. I find this understandable. Although I and my countrymen have first-hand experience of the inhumanities and indignities of apartheid and white supremacy, I cannot regard Africa, as some of my colleagues do, as the world's unhappiest continent. I was recently in Asia, and it was sobering to reflect that parts of that continent had been in a state of war for 30 years. The tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the long blood-letting in Indo-China serve to put Africa's problems in some kind of perspective. They serve also to illustrate the kind of sacrifice which will have to be made, the kind of risks the world will have to run, if a more or less peaceful solution is not found to the problems of southern Africa.

10. Similarly the events which overtook Europe in the "thirties" and "forties," the culmination of nearly two thousand years of white Christian civilisation (to borrow a phrase much used in certain quarters in southern Africa) which involved the extermination of 6 million Jews and the deaths of millions of others, reminds one that other parts of the world have seen their share of human tragedy and mass destruction. Africa is not unique in its suffering. Neither has it any special claims to be regarded as the "dark continent."

11. Yet when we are drawing up the long and dreary catalog of man's inhumanity to man, the situation in southern Africa does warrant a special entry. I should like to underline the unique character of the moral issue with which southern Africa confronts the world. Its problems remain a matter for international concern because of the peculiar nature of the oppression and injustices involved which is, to a greater or lesser extent, based on race. Above all, South Africa is unique among sovereign states in its nationwide institutionalisation of racial injustice. It is precisely these elements of racial oppression and racial confrontation in the southern African situation which make it a matter for world concern. In an increasingly inter-dependent world the problem of race is not only affecting situations within states but relations between them. Neither the U.S.A. nor the U.S.S.R. is racially homogeneous, though it is the problems of the former that have attracted more international attention. Britain, since the war has become a multiracial and is striving to become a nonracial country. Everywhere in the world the destinies of different racial groups are too inter-linked to enable any single ethnic unit, however clearly it sees its own identity, to stand aloof. Even China, which at times in its history has opted for autarky and isolation is looking outward, and may involve itself, with as yet uneasable effect, in problems far from its borders.

12. But let us bring the matter closer to our respective homes. Africa is watching with fascination and sympathy the efforts of black Americans to assert their identity and to win themselves their rightful place in U.S. society. The cross fertilisation of political concepts and cultural values between Africa and black America over the last half-century or so has been fascinating and complex. Its current cultural implications are not without irony. An African drummer in a band in Botswana wears an "Afro-wig", a fashion which has reached Africa.
from the United States. And in Cape Town whites blacked their faces in order to be admitted to concerts given by one Percy Sledge, a soul-singer better known in southern Africa than in the United States, who, at that state in his South African tour was appearing only before “nonwhite” audiences.

13. More seriously we in Africa are watching with interest the growing influence of black Americans in U.S. politics and I am happy that some of them are with us here in Lagos. Our interest in this, and not least in the developing black representation in Congress, is not motivated by the hope that this as yet small group will press the United States to solve our problems for us. We recognize that the first duty of Charles Diggs, John Conyers, Louis Stokes and their colleagues is first to their constituents of all colors and to the black American community. But we are not unaware of the past and present influence of ethnic pressure groups in U.S. policymaking. And the presence and increasing power of this group of legislators underlines what I was saying earlier about the essential indivisibility of the racial situation throughout the world.

14. It is this indivisibility which means that the problem of southern Africa is at the core of United States-Africa relations. Questions of aid and investment are important, as they are in U.S. relations with other parts of the developing world. And they are not separate from the issue of freedom and human dignity in the South. But the guts of the relationship between Africa and America is race, and hence southern Africa.

15. And just as the problem of violence has always been part of the problem of race within the United States from slavery to the ghetto, it is impossible to discuss the problem of southern Africa without discussing the issue of violence. Botswana’s policy is to work for peaceful solutions to the problems of our area and to minimize violence, but we cannot ignore its existence or bury its origins in a conspiracy of silence. I believe it is possible still to work for peaceful change, but there are no easy and wholly painless solutions to the dilemma of southern African independence. Violence already exists. Violence exists in the Portuguese territories where the African nationalists have resorted to armed struggle because peaceful means of achieving self-determination were denied them. Violence exists, albeit sporadically and on a smaller scale, in Rhodesia where the Republic constitution, which specifically excludes the possibility of majority rule presents an obstacle to peaceful progress quite as unyielding as Portugal’s insistence that its boundaries extend to Africa. Violence of a kind exists in South Africa. In that country, as we have been forcibly reminded in recent weeks, the machinery of oppression is all pervasive, and resistance, whether violent or nonviolent, from whatever quarter, receives short shrift.

16. Western leaders in tones of varying severity have deplored the resort to violence by the oppressed throughout southern Africa, and not all have been as forthcoming as President Nixon in recognizing the violence of apartheid. We can no more condemn those who resort to violence to gain freedom in such situations than we could condemn the violence of European resistance movements against German occupation or the violence of the Hungarians against the Russians in 1956. The United States of America was born in an act of violence against a colonial power, which would not respond to pleas for representative government. It is possible, of course, to be more or less skeptical about the success of violent tactics in different situations, but that is essentially a matter of political and military judgment, and not of morals.

17. And this is one reason why we should not overlook the need to examine separately the component parts of the southern African situation. I am opposed to a general escalation and extension of violence in southern Africa because, in President Nixon’s phrase, it would “hurt the very people it would purport to serve.” I base my view on an assessment of the balance of forces in southern Africa. Wholesale violence, particularly if accompanied by greater external involvement, would assist not the independence movements nor the African governments who share their aspirations, but the minority regimes. I want to make it quite clear that this viewpoint is not based on special pleading, influenced by the peculiar vulnerability of my own country. Nor are my statements on the use of force in southern Africa designed to please any particular audience. My concern is for the future of Africa. We should not overlook the essentially defensive position of independent Africa in the face of South African economic, political and military power.

18. But if we turn from the general situation to the particular, and look at Portugal’s colonies, it becomes immediately clear that violence is not a negative element in the special circumstances of Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Mozambique. Even such a subtle American apologist for the status quo in southern Africa as
George Kennan observed of Portugal, "Members of the Portuguese administration in these territories make no bones of the fact that the armed challenge with which they have been confronted in recent years has stirred them, and, more importantly has stirred the Lisbon authorities, to reforms and improvements that might otherwise have taken decades to complete." Violence has therefore achieved change in the Portuguese territories. One is bound to question whether the change would continue if the stimulus of violence was removed. As the Prime Minister of Ghana, Dr. Busia, has said in a different context, "Dialog and armed pressures are not necessarily incompatible."

19. The offer of dialog on the basis of a commitment to human dignity and self-determination has been made in the Lusaka Manifesto. Implicit also in the manifesto is a set of practical priorities which we must not lose sight of. We must not let our sense of outrage and moral concern about apartheid blind us to those points at which pressure can be most effectively applied. One of those points is Portugal. Nowhere is the West offered greater opportunity for promoting change by communication and pressure. But the West has not taken advantage of their defense and economic links with Portugal to press its rulers to take up the offer contained in the manifesto. Instead, having been singled out for approval because it does not share South Africa's form of institutionalized racism, Portugal has been encouraged in its present course. This may turn out to have been an opportunity tragically lost. To be sure Dr. Caestano has instituted new reforms which grant greater autonomy to the overseas provinces, but I fear that the effect of these reforms may be to push Angola and Mozambique closer to Rhodesia and South Africa. Their European minorities, if they feel threatened by African advancement with the official framework of assimilado multiracialism, may opt for the overtly racist pattern of their southern African allies.

20. Again, concerned as we were with the arms sales issue at the recent Commonwealth Conference, Rhodesia was given only a perfunctory mention. I am glad that the option of communication which the American administration has chosen specifically excludes Rhodesia. I hope that United States influence will be exerted at the United Nations and elsewhere to insure that sanctions are maintained until a settlement can be achieved which guarantees unimpeded progress to majority rule.

21. There is, of course, widespread skepticism about sanctions, and, because they are flouted by South African and Portugal, their effects are often lightly dismissed. But these are far from negligible, and are weakening the regime in a number of ways, which we can discuss in more detail later in our meeting. These weaknesses give rise from time to time to doubts about the long-term viability of Rhodesia as a white-ruled country. Some South Africans, including the verligte elements in the ruling Nationalist party are irritated by what they regard as an obstacle in the way of the outward-looking policy and in addition fear an open-ended financial and security commitment. A settlement between Britain and Rhodesia on any terms acceptable to the men who enunciated the five principles is far from sight. Sanctions are having a distinct economic, social and political effect. There are continuing indications of South African ambivalence to a white-ruled Rhodesia (an ambivalence, which, incidentally, I suspect extends to Angola and Mozambique). This is therefore not the moment for any relaxation of sanctions.

22. But an important part of establishing our priorities for Southern Africa is the analysis of South Africa itself, its internal situation and its external ambitions. I have already stressed the reality of South African power, which affects the situations I have just mentioned. South Africa has attracted world attention, by its outward-looking policy, especially its overtures to African states and the sharp focus into which this outward movement has placed its domestic anomalies and injustices. South Africa has left the laager and is pursuing its interests in a continental, indeed an international arena. It has the power, the resources and the will to do so. At times it has come close to proclaiming a Monroe doctrine for southern Africa. Its ambitions may grow with increasing confidence. Both the United States and Britain have tacitly welcomed the outward-looking policy, primarily because they have sought to work for accommodation between majority-ruled and minority-ruled Africa in order to relieve the pressure on themselves. If Africa can live with apartheid, no one can expect Western countries to do otherwise. Western observers and some Africans have also claimed that the outward-looking policy will, by ending South Africa's isolation, bring change within its borders. But we must be clear about the motives behind South Africa's strategies. The outward-looking policy is for export only—it has nothing to do with internal liberalization. The condition for dialog with South Africa is acceptance of the
status quo. Its rulers have made it clear that the dialog with black Africa can be about many things, but it cannot at this stage be about political change or self-determination.

23. And yet white politics in South Africa are in an interesting condition. It remains to be seen whether any new policies will be born of the present uncertainty and confusion among white South Africa's leaders. But any significant change which does take place will not result from contacts with African states, though South Africa does mind desperately about western attitudes. The decisive forces for change, however, are internal. The nature of Afrikanerdom is changing following the new trek from the platteland to the cities. White opinion is becoming increasingly aware of the contradictions within South African society—the most notable of which is the contradiction between economic growth and straightforward white supremacy.

24. Black politics are changing too, although the limitations on self-expression make these changes hard to interpret. There are leaders emerging, some of whom are genuine and who, while working for their people within the framework of separate development, have lost no opportunity of pointing out the vast credibility gap between theory and practice. I reject sovereign political units based on ethnic criteria, but the potential significance of the Bantustan experiment should not be overlooked. Its consequences are feared by the white public, but increasingly politicians from the largely English-speaking United Party and the more liberal 'Progressives' are accepting that the consolidation of the Bantustans and the development of quasi-democratic institutions in them is a policy which would be difficult to reverse completely. Much remains to be done, however, before these fragmented and over-populated areas could begin to look like even remotely credible mini-states. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are a constant challenge to their credibility. Bantustan development cannot be condoned, but its implications deserve careful analysis.

25. It is developments such as these which I imagine prompted David Newsom's statement in his interesting address at Northwestern University: "Communication does not mean acceptance. It means in a sense a greater challenge than isolation." The United States and Britain have expressed their abhorrence of apartheid. They seek to change the system in America's case by communication and moral pressure and in Britain's by contact and trade. Initial results of these new policies have not been encouraging. President Nixon's statement was greeted in South African Government circles as "realistic" and a visa was promptly refused to Arthur Ashe. Britain's announcement on Wasp helicopters came in the midst of an unprecedented campaign against the churches, which has involved the harassment and expulsion of both British and American clergy. The question is, given this unpromising beginning, how is the West going to pursue Mr. Newsom's challenge? If communication does not mean acceptance, where do we go from here?

26. These developments in United States and United Kingdom policy have been interpreted as a triumph for South Africa's outward diplomacy. The contact has been accepted, the pressure for change brushed aside as rhetoric. But Botswana is the last country to call for the total isolation of South Africa. Can anything be achieved by a policy of communication on the part of Western countries whose friendship South Africa clearly values? Only, I suggest, if the West does not behave as if it needs South Africa more than South Africa needs the West, when, in fact, the reverse is the case. The advocates of contact and communication must spell out what they hope to achieve by these means. Perhaps this meeting can consider some possibilities. The case of the Polaroid Corp. and some of Carl Rowan's statements before the Diggs committee might make a starting point.

27. Moreover, if South Africa is to be pressed to make concessions in return for a measure of respectability, which is the only way communication could differ significantly from acceptance, then concessions abroad might come more easily than concessions at home. The attitude of South Africa is clearly critical in determining the future of Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories.

28. Progress could be made towards common objectives if we were to recognize a mutual interest in limiting violence and working for peaceful change. Peaceful change will not be secure if existing minority-ruled situations are allowed to harden and South Africa's outward-movement encouraged. Separate solutions must be sought for the problems of Portugal, Rhodesia, South-West Africa and eventually South Africa itself. This involves restraining South Africa's outward expansion, eroding the outer edges of the white bastion developing in southern
Africa, driving wedges between its constituent parts, preventing its further consolidation, and maintaining contact and communication with all the forces for change throughout the region. Unless a positive overall strategy is developed along these lines, then communication will slip into acceptance and moral pressure will be reduced to mere rhetoric.
APPENDIX 3

AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES—DATES OF INDEPENDENCE AND POPULATION FIGURES

(Date of independence follows country name. Population figures based on United Nations mid-1969 data)

Algeria—1962: Houari Boumediene, President of Revolutionary Council. Population—13,154,000
Angola—Portugal Colony. Lt. Col. Camilo Rebocho Vaz, Governor-General. Population—5,530,000
Botswana—1966: Seretse Khama, President. Population—618,000
Burundi—1962: Col. Michel Micombero, President. Population—3,442,000
Cameroon—1960: Ahmadou Ahidjo, President. Population—5,655,000
Cape Verde Islands: Portugal Colony. Cmdr. Leao Sacramento Monteriro, Governor-General. Population—224,000
Central African Republic—1960: Col. Michel Micombero, President. Population—1,513,000
Chad—1960: Francois Tombalbaye, President. Population—3,492,000
Congo (Brazzaville)—1960: Maj. Marien Ngouabi, President. Population—875,000
Equatorial Guinea—1968: Francisco Macias Nguema, President. Population—285,000
Ethiopia: Haile Selassie, Emperor. Population—24,161,000
French Territory of the Afars and Issas—(F.T.A.I.): French Overseas Territory. Population—81,000
Gabon—1960: Albert Bongo, President. Population—481,000
Gambia—1965: Dawda Jawara, Prime Minister. Population—354,000
Guinea—1958: Sekou Toure, President. Population—3,848,000
Ivory Coast—1960: Felix Houphouet-Boigny, President. Population—4,149,000
Lesotho—1966: Leabua Jonathan, Prime Minister. Population—924,000
Liberia—1847: Wm. R. Tolbert, Jr., President. Population—1,141,000
Libya—1951: Mu'ammar Al-Qaddafi, President, Revolutionary Command Council. Population—1,834,000
Malagasy Republic—1960: Gen. Gabriel Ramamantsoa, President. Population—6,582,000
Malawi—1964: Hastings Kamuzu Banda, President. Population—4,370,000
Mauritania—1960: Moktar Ould Daddah, President. Population—1,147,000
Mauritius—1968: Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, Prime Minister. Population—797,000
Morocco—1956: Hassan II, King. Population—14,840,000
Mozambique: Portuguese Colony. Dr. Baltasar Rebello de Souza, Governor-General. Population—7,252,000
Niger—1960: Hanni Diori, President. Population—3,723,000

(300)
Reunion: French Overseas Territory, Jean Baudeville, Prefect. Population—433,000
Rwanda—1962: Gregoire Kayibanda, President. Population—3,466,000
Senegal—1960: Leopold Sedar Senghor, President. Population—3,810,000
Sierra Leone—1961: Siaka Stevens, Prime Minister. Population—2,494,000
Somalia—1960: Mohamed Siad Barre, Chairman, Revolutionary Council. Population—2,785,000
South Africa—1910: B. John Vorster, Prime Minister. Population—19,406,000
Southern Rhodesia: British Colony in rebellion against Britain; illegal regime under Ian Smith. Population—4,733,000
Sudan—1956: Ja'far al-Numayri, President, Revolutionary Command Council. Population—15,002,000
Swaziland—1968: Sobhuza II, King. Population—401,000
Tanzania—1961: Julius Nyerere, President. Population—12,703,000
Togo—1960: Brig. Gen. Etienne Eyadema, President. Population—1,792,000
Tunisia—1956: Habib Bourguiba, President. Population—4,714,000
United Arab Republic—1922: Muhammad Anwar Sadat, President. Population—32,088,000
Zambia—1964: Kenneth Kaunda, President. Population—4,135,000
APPENDIX 4

FIFTH SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES
HELD IN LUSAKA, ZAMBIA—APRIL 14–16, 1969

MANIFESTO ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

1. When the purpose and the basis of states' international policies are misunderstood, there is introduced into the world a new and unnecessary disharmony, disagreements, conflicts of interest, or different assessments of human priorities, which provoke an excess of tension in the world, and disastrously divide mankind at a time when united action is necessary to control modern technology and put it to the service of man. It is for this reason that, discovering widespread misapprehension of our attitudes and purposes in relation to Southern Africa, we the leaders of East and Central African states meeting in Lusaka, April 16th, 1969, have agreed to issue this manifesto.

2. By this manifesto we wish to make clear, beyond all shadow of doubt, our acceptance of the belief that all men are equal, and have equal rights to human dignity and respect, regardless of color, race, religion, or sex. We believe that all men have the right and the duty to participate, as equal members of the society, in their own government. We do not accept that any individual or group has any right to govern any group of sane adults, without their consent, and we affirm that only the people of a society, acting together as equals, can determine what is, for them, a good society and a good social, economic, or political organization.

3. On the basis of these beliefs we do not accept that any one group within a society has the right to rule any society without the continuing consent of all the citizens. We recognise that at any one time there will be, within every society, failures in the implementation of these ideals. We recognise that for the sake of order in human affairs, there may be transitional arrangements while a transformation from group inequalities to individual equality is being effected. But we affirm that without an acceptance of these ideals—without a commitment to these principles of human equality and self-determination—there can be no basis for peace and justice in the world.

4. None of us would claim that within our own states we have achieved that perfect social, economic and political organization which would ensure a reasonable standard of living for all our people and establish individual security against avoidable hardship or miscarriage of justice. On the contrary, we acknowledge that within our own states the struggle toward human brotherhood and unchallenged human dignity is only the beginning. It is on the basis of our commitment to human equality and human dignity, not on the basis of achieved perfection, that we take our stand of hostility toward the colonialism and racial discrimination which is being practiced in southern Africa. It is on the basis of their commitment to these universal principles that we appeal to other members of the human race for support.

5. If the commitment to these principles existed among the states holding power in southern Africa, any disagreements we might have about the rate of implementation, or about isolated acts of policy, would be matters affecting only our individual relationships with the states concerned. If these commitments existed our states would not be justified in the expressed and active hostility towards the regimes of southern Africa such as we have proclaimed and continue to propagate.

6. The truth is, however, that in Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia, South-West Africa, and the Union of South Africa, there is an open and continued denial of the principles of human equality and national self-determination. This is not a matter of failure in the implementation of accepted human principles. The effective administration in all these territories are not struggling towards these difficult goals. They are fighting the principles; they are deliberately organising their societies so as to try to destroy the hold of these principles in the minds of men. It is for this reason that we believe the rest of the world must be interested. For the principle of human equality, and all that flows from it, is either universal or
addition to Madagascar would include Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mauritius, Malawi, and the Seychelles. At the same time it has expressed the intention of developing relations with the Far East and with Australia and New Zealand.

Madagascar is disadvantaged by its distance from major world markets. It has a relatively small home market because of low per capita income; its economy, predominantly agricultural, is especially sensitive to fluctuations in world prices for its exports and the economic growth rate is low; the regional market for manufactures is limited; and the compounding effect of these factors has been to restrict new foreign private investment essential to the country’s development. It was with this in mind that Madagascar began discussions with South Africa over economic relations. However, aid was limited to tourism, to attract South African visitors, rather than true development for the benefit of the people, together with certain private business deals. These links have been broken off by the recent change of government, providing the coup de grace for South Africa’s “outward policy.” This experience serves to demonstrate the impracticality of U.S. businesses dealing with Africa through South African headquarters, as Holiday Inn has found.

Though formerly cordial, U.S. diplomatic relations with the Malagasy Republic have been quite strained since May 30, 1971. On that date, President Tsirinana publicly accused an unnamed foreign embassy of plotting with one of his assistants for his overthrow. Subsequently the U.S. Ambassador and five embassy officials were named as conspirators and asked to leave the country. Since then a Chargé has headed a reduced American Mission in Madagascar.

The U.S. categorically denies any involvement in such a plot. Though President Tsirinana claimed to have documentary evidence, he has refused to produce the evidence in several meetings with U.S. officials who have speculated that either a forged or a misinterpreted document might be involved.

U.S. Agency for International Development bilateral assistance to the Malagasy Republic, which began in 1961, was phased out in fiscal year 1969 after providing more than $17 million in technical (grants) and development (loans) assistance. The current program consists of a modest self-help program and a Public Law 480, title II food program administered through the Catholic Relief Services and the World Food Program of the Food and Agriculture Organization. Also, through the International Planned Parenthood Federation, AID is providing a small amount of assistance to the Malagasy Republic Family Planning Association. Two development loan projects are still being implemented, one for railway improvement ($3 million) and the other for telecommunications improvement ($2 million).

Currently, additional assistance to the Malagasy Republic will be considered only on a regional or multidonor basis. Under this policy, AID has under consideration the possible participation in the multilateral financing of a livestock project in Majunga Province which is presently being negotiated among a private U.S. company, the Malagasy Government, and aid agencies of the French Government.

The Malagasy Government expressed to us a particular desire for American aid in the form of an increased sugar quota. They then hoped that their 1971 quota of 9,000 tons would be increased to 30,000 tons when the 1972 Sugar Act was passed. The private syndi-
it does not exist. The dignity of all men is destroyed when the manhood of any human being is denied.

7. Our objectives in southern Africa stem from our commitment to this principle of human equality. We are not hostile to the administrations in these states because they are manned and controlled by white people. We are hostile to them because they are systems of minority control which exist as a result of, and in the pursuance of, doctrines of human inequality. What we are working for is the right of self-determination for the people of those territories. We are working for a rule in those countries which is based on the will of all the people, and an acceptance of the equality of every citizen.

8. Our stand toward southern Africa thus involves a rejection of racialism, not a reversal of the existing racial domination. We believe that all the peoples who have made their homes in the countries of southern Africa are Africans, regardless of color of their skins; and we would oppose a racist majority government which adopted a philosophy of deliberate and permanent discrimination between its citizens on grounds of racial origin. We are not talking racialism when we reject the colonialism and apartheid policies now operating in those areas; we are demanding an opportunity for all the people of these states, working together as equal individual citizens, to work out for themselves the institutions and the system of government under which they will, by general consent, live together and work in harmony in a new and just society.

9. As an aftermath of the present policies, it is likely that different groups within these societies will be self-conscious and fearful. The initial political and economic organizations may well take account of these fears, and this group self-consciousness. But how this is to be done must be a matter exclusively for the peoples of the country concerned, working together. No other nation will have a right to interfere in such affairs. All that the rest of the world has a right to demand is just what we are now asserting—that the arrangements within any state which wishes to be accepted into the community of nations must be based on an acceptance of the principles of human dignity and equality.

10. To talk of the liberation of Africa is thus to say two things. First, that the peoples in the territories still under colonial rule shall be free to determine for themselves their own institutions of self-government. Second, that the individuals in southern Africa shall be freed from an environment poisoned by the propaganda of racialism, and given an opportunity to be men—not white men, brown men, yellow men, or black men.

11. Thus the liberation of Africa for which we are struggling does not mean a reverse racialism. Nor is it an aspect of African imperialism. As far as we are concerned, the present boundaries of the states of southern Africa are the boundaries of what will be free and independent African states. There is no question of our seeking or accepting any alterations to our own boundaries at the expense of these future free African nations.

12. On the objective of liberation as thus defined, we can neither surrender nor compromise. We have always preferred, and we still prefer, to achieve it without physical violence. We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill. We do not advocate violence; we advocate an end to the violence against human dignity which is now being perpetrated by the oppressors of Africa. If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible, or if changed circumstances were to make it possible in the future, we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change. But while peaceful progress is blocked by actions of those at present in power in the states of southern Africa, we have no choice but to give to the peoples of those territories all the support of which we are capable in their struggle against their oppressors. This is why the signatory states participate in the movement for the liberation of Africa under the aegis of the Organisation of African Unity. However, the obstacle to change is not the same in all the countries of southern Africa, and it follows, therefore, that the possibility of continuing the struggle through peaceful means varies from one country to another.

13. In Mozambique and Angola, and in the so-called Portuguese Guinea, the basic problem is not racialism but a pretence that Portugal exists in Africa. Portugal is situated in Europe; the fact that it is a dictatorship is a matter for the Portuguese to settle. But no decree of the Portuguese dictator, nor legislation passed by any Parliament in Portugal, can make Africa part of Europe. The only thing which could convert a part of Africa into a constituent unit in a union which also includes a European state would be the freely expressed will of the people of that part of Africa. There is no such popular will in the Portuguese colonies.
On the contrary, in the absence of any opportunity to negotiate a road to freedom, the peoples of all three territories have taken up arms against the colonial power. They have done this despite the heavy odds against them, and despite the great suffering they know to be involved.

14. Portugal, as a European state, has naturally its own allies in the context of the ideological conflict between West and East. However, in our context, the effect of this is that Portugal is enabled to use her resources to pursue the most heinous war and degradation of man in Africa. The present manifesto must, therefore, lay bare the fact that the inhuman commitment of Portugal in Africa and her ruthless subjugation of the people of Mozambique, Angola, and the so-called Portuguese Guinea, is not only irrelevant to the ideological conflict of power politics, but it is also diametrically opposed to the policies, the philosophies, and the doctrines practised by her allies in the conduct of their own affairs at home. The peoples of Mozambique, Angola, and Portuguese Guinea are not interested in communism or capitalism; they are interested in their freedom. They are demanding an acceptance of the principles of independence on the basis of majority rule, and for many years they called for discussions on this issue. Only when their demand for talks was continually ignored did they begin to fight. Even now, if Portugal should change her policy and accept the principle of self-determination, we would urge the liberation movements to desist from their armed struggle and to cooperate in the mechanics of a peaceful transfer of power from Portugal to the peoples of the African territories.

15. The fact that many Portuguese citizens have emigrated to these African countries does not affect this issue. Future immigration policy will be a matter for the independent governments when these are established. In the meantime, we would urge the liberation movements to reiterate their statements that all those Portuguese people who have made their homes in Mozambique, Angola, or Portuguese Guinea, and who are willing to give their future loyalty to those states, will be accepted as citizens. And an independent Mozambique, Angola, or Portuguese Guinea may choose to be as friendly with Portugal as Brazil is. That would be the free choice of a free people.

16. In Rhodesia the situation is different insofar as the metropolitan power has acknowledged the colonial status of the territory. Unfortunately, however, it has failed to take adequate measures to reassert its authority against the minority which has seized power with the declared intention of maintaining white domination. The matter cannot rest there. Rhodesia, like the rest of Africa, must be free, and its independence must be on the basis of majority rule. If the colonial power is unwilling or unable to effect such a transfer of power to the people, then the people themselves will have no alternative but to capture it as and when they can. And Africa has no alternative but to support them. The question which remains in Rhodesia is therefore whether Britain will reassert her authority in Rhodesia and then negotiate the peaceful progress to majority rule before independence. Insofar as Britain is willing to make this second commitment, Africa will cooperate in her attempts to reassert her authority. This is the method of progress which we would prefer; it could involve less suffering for all the peoples of Rhodesia; both black and white. But until there is some firm evidence that Britain accepts the principles of independence on the basis of majority rule, and is prepared to take whatever steps are necessary to make it a reality, then Africa has no choice but to support the struggle for the people’s freedom by whatever means are open to her.

17. Just as a settlement of the Rhodesian problem with a minimum of violence is a British responsibility, so a settlement in South-West Africa with a minimum of violence is a United Nations responsibility. By every canon of international law, and by every precedent, South-West Africa should by now have been a sovereign, independent State with a Government based on majority rule. South-West Africa was a German colony until 1919, just as Tanganyika, Rwanda, and Burundi, Tanganyika, and German colonies. It was a matter of European politics that when the mandatory system was established after Germany had been defeated, the administration of South-West Africa was given to the white minority government of South Africa, while the other ex-German colonies in Africa were put into the hands of the British, Belgian, or French Governments. After the Second World War every mandated territory except South-West Africa was converted into a trusteeship territory and has subsequently gained independence. South Africa, on the other hand, has persistently refused to honor even the international obligation it accepted in 1919, and has increasingly applied to South-West Africa the inhuman doctrines and organization of apartheid.
18. The United Nations General Assembly has ruled against this action and in 1966 terminated the mandate under which South Africa had a legal basis for its occupation and domination of South-West Africa. The General Assembly declared that the territory is now the direct responsibility of the United Nations and set up an ad hoc committee to recommend practical means by which South-West Africa would be administered, and the people enabled to exercise self-determination and to achieve independence.

20. Nothing could be clearer than this decision—which no permanent member of the Security Council voted against. Yet, since that time no effective measures have been taken to enforce it. South-West Africa remains in the clutches of the most ruthless minority government in Africa. Its people continue to be oppressed and those who advocate even peaceful progress to independence continue to be persecuted. The world has an obligation to use its strength to enforce the decision which all the countries cooperated in making. If they do this there is hope that the change can be effected without great violence. If they fail, then sooner or later the people of South-West Africa will take the law into their own hands. The people have been patient beyond belief, but one day their patience will be exhausted. Africa, at least, will then be unable to deny their call for help.

21. The Union of South Africa is itself an independent sovereign state and a member of the United Nations. It is more highly developed and richer than any other nation in Africa. On every legal basis its internal affairs are a matter exclusively for the people of South Africa. Yet the purpose of law is people and we assert that the actions of the South African Government are such that the rest of the world has a responsibility to take some action in defense of humanity.

22. These things are known and are regularly condemned in the councils of the United Nations and elsewhere. But it appears that to many countries international law takes precedence over humanity; therefore no action follows the words. Yet even if international law is held to exclude active assistance to the South African opponents of apartheid, it does not demand that the comfort and support of human and commercial intercourse should be given to a government which rejects the manhood of most of humanity. South Africa should be excluded from the United Nations agencies, and even from the United Nations itself. It should be ostracized by the world community until it accepts the implications of man's common humanity. It should be isolated from world trade patterns and left to be self-sufficient if it can. The South African Government cannot be allowed both to reject the very concept of mankind's unity, and to benefit by the strength given through friendly international relations. And certainly Africa cannot acquiesce in the maintenance of the present policies against people of African descent.

23. The signatories of this manifesto assert that the validity of the principles of human equality and dignity extend to the Union of South Africa just as they extend to the colonial territories of southern Africa. Before a basis for peaceful development can be established in this continent, these principles must be acknowledged by every nation, and in every state there must be a deliberate attempt to implement them.

24. We reaffirm our commitment to these principles of human equality and human dignity, and to the doctrines of self-determination and nonracialism. We shall work for their extension within our own nations and throughout the continent of Africa.
APPENDIX 5

SEVENTH SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES, MOGADISCU, SOMALIA—OCTOBER 18–20, 1971

MOGADISCU DECLARATION

1. At the sixth ordinary session of the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, the leaders of independent Africa adopted the Lusaka Manifesto. The manifesto which was prepared by the Conference of the Heads of State and Government of East and Central Africa and adopted at Lusaka on April 16, 1969, made known to the world, the position of the independent African states on the racialist policy of apartheid practiced by the Government of the Republic of South Africa.

2. The leaders of independent Africa intended, through the Lusaka Manifesto, to dispel any misunderstanding by the international community of Africa’s reasons for its united opposition to the racialist policies of the Governments of South Africa. It was also intended to reaffirm their conviction of the equality of all men and of their inalienable right to human dignity and respect without regard to color, race, religion, or sex.

3. The Lusaka Manifesto was presented to the United Nations Organization at the 24th session of the General Assembly by the President of the Federal Republic of Cameroon, H. E. Ahmadou Ahidjo, as chairman of the Organization of African Unity. After its discussion and debate, it was adopted and made a United Nations document. The voting at the United Nations was overwhelmingly in favor of the document, with only South Africa and Portugal voting against. In other words, out of 126 members of the United Nations, there were only the two countries whose policies were under scrutiny and attack who opposed the contents of the Lusaka Manifesto.

4. Having defined the objectives of liberations of southern Africa, the leaders of independent Africa made it known to the whole world and in particular—the Republic of South Africa and Portugal—that there could be no compromise or concession made about the freedom, dignity, and respect of the oppressed peoples of southern Africa. Consequently, the only alternative left to Africa is to use all means available to them to change the abominable and hateful policies of apartheid, colonialism, and racialism.

5. For the Portuguese colonialist government and for the minority racist Governments of South Africa and Rhodesia, there was also a choice to be made; to abandon their colonialist and racist philosophy and to negotiate other questions related to the political, economic, and social well-being of the populations of those countries or to maintain the status quo and thereby breed eventual large scale violence and wanton destruction of lives and property. The possibility of independent Africa’s participation in a peaceful solution of the problem of southern Africa also depended on the way that the Governments of South Africa and Portugal would have treated the Lusaka Manifesto, for, as the African leaders said then: “as long as a peaceful evolution is hindered by the men who are in power in southern Africa, we have no choice but to give to the peoples of these territories all the support that we can muster in their struggle against their oppressors.”

6. After the adoption by the International Community of the Lusaka Manifesto, the South African Government began its so-called outward looking policy, the result of which has been the opinion held by a small group of some African leaders that dialog with South Africa is the way to assisting the oppressed people in that country to liberate themselves. The “outward looking policy,” however, should not fool anyone about South Africa’s intentions. Indeed, Vorster has time and again told the South African white population that his policy in no way whatsoever, deviates from the official Apartheid policy. Vorster’s so-called policy of friendship with independent Africa has been motivated by his government’s growing isolation in the whole world and the necessity therefore to want to
change that situation without, however, removing the cause for that isolation. With promises of aid or with the threat of “hitting” them “so hard that they will never forget it” Vorster is using blackmail to divide the African States. While the South African Government rejected and continues to reject the idea of dialog with the African people in South Africa, the African governments should not have been deceived about the real reasons for the outward looking policy of Pretoria.

7. In the territories under Portuguese colonialist domination the wars of national liberation have continued to expand. The African people in Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola have won many and important victories against a more ruthless enemy with a vastly expanded war program. Indeed, the victories of the national liberation movements in the three countries have led to vast areas being completely liberated from Portuguese colonial authority in whose, places peoples governments have been set up. In response to these victories, Portuguese colonialism has increased the use of napalm, of defoliants and other chemical and gaseous substances in its war which have resulted in more deaths, and greater need of the liberation movements for assistance of all kinds which in turn they must bring to the populations who will increasingly depend on them.

8. In Mozambique, the Portuguese colonialist with the assistance and participation of other imperialist countries are frantically going ahead with the construction of the Cabora Bassa Dam. This dam whose objective is to eventually settle one million white emigrants from Europe and to provide power to the racists in southern Africa is opposed by all freedom-loving peoples of the world as evidenced by the withdrawal from participation in the financing and constructing of the dam by several European firms and banks or the refusal by their governments to guarantee their investments in the Cabora Bassa Dam project. The front for the Liberation of Mozambique has opened and carried out successful operations against the construction site of this dam in Tete Province.

9. The struggle against Portuguese colonialism in Guinea Bissau in Mozambique and in Angola is winning great victories and the Conference of east and central African states takes pride in these victories as our own and warmly congratulates the gallant people of African Somaliland are also with their brothers and sisters in countries under foreign domination, struggling for their freedom and independence.

10. In Rhodesia, the situation has deteriorated. The British Government is currently engaged in yet more talks about a solution which does not have as its basis independence based on majority rule. The Conference of east and central African states condemns from the very outset any solution of the Rhodesian problem which contradicts or in any way changes the principle of NIBMAR. The leaders of the African independent states of east and central Africa have reviewed the situation with regard to the question of decolonization of southern Africa. We have noted with regret the concerted support given by some NATO countries to South Africa and Portugal in their wars of suppression of the peoples of southern Africa and Guinea Bissau. This assistance in military, economic, and other forms is extremely important in the execution of the vicious wars being waged against the peoples in the territories under consideration. It is, therefore, a hostile act against the African people as a whole and in particular the states and people of this region who, by their proximity to the areas under colonialist and minority domination have, on numerous occasions in the past, been victims of military and other forms of aggression.

12. We, the leaders of east and central Africa, have also examined the question relating to the establishment of diplomatic and other relations by some of its members with South Africa and Portugal contrary to the OAU and United Nations resolutions. We, in particular, have examined the implications of the visit by one of the heads of state, member of the Conference to South Africa and of the exchange of visit between South Africa and some other members of the OAU.

13. We, the leaders of east and central African states, therefore, do declare at this meeting in Mogadiscio that there is no way left to the liberation of southern Africa except armed struggle to which we already give and will increasingly continue to give our fullest support; that the policy of dialog advanced by a small group of African leaders which has already been rejected by the OAU is again rejected because it is a play to hoodwink the African people. The policy of dialog as has been stated by member states of the OAU individually must start with the peoples of the countries of southern Africa to be of any meaning and consequence to Africa. We condemn the African countries which in establishing diplomatic and other relations with South Africa and Portugal have betrayed the African
freedom struggle. We, therefore, strongly urge to break off these relations and to
desist from any action which would make their membership in this Conference
incompatible with its aspirations.

14. We, the leaders of east and central African states strongly condemn all
forms of colonialism, neo colonialism and imperialism anywhere in the African
Continent and particularly in South Africa, Rhodesia, Manitua, Mozambique,
Angola, Guinea Bissau, French Somaliland, Comoro Islands and the so-called
Spanish Sahara. We also condemn these monopolies and firms which have continued
to give financial aid and support to South Africa and Portugal and in this respect
urge the OAU in cooperation with the east and central African states, to study the
activities of those monopolies and firms which are at present engaged in southern
Africa and in independent African States with a view to sanctioning them. We,
the leaders of east and central African states, reaffirm our support of the resolution
and declaration made by the OAU Council of Ministers and the Summit Confer-
ence atAddis Ababa in June 1971. We condemn the governments, organizations
and individuals that assist the mercenaries in their activities against the inde-
pendent African states.

15. We also condemn, without reservation, those imperialist NATO powers
which continue to assist South Africa and Portugal in their wars against the
peoples of southern Africa.

16. We whole-heartedly support the just struggles of the oppressive African
people under colonial and racist domination. We have resolved to increase our
assistance, both material, diplomatic, and moral to the national liberation move-
ment in accordance with the U.N. and OAU resolutions until final victory is
achieved.

17. We, the leaders of east and central African States also appeal to the inter-
national community to take urgent and strong measures towards the liquidation
of all forms of colonial operation and to uphold the fundamental principles of
self-determination and the inherent rights of all peoples to freedom and liberty in
accordance with the United Nations declaration on granting independence to
people under colonial rule and the principles enshrined in the OAU Charter.
THE CUNENE DAM SCHEME

[By Barbara Rogers]

A symposium of 60 church and action group representatives, organized by the World Council of Churches February 29–March 3 at Arnoldshain, West Germany, ended with a challenge to the churches on their investment in racism. The main theme of the discussions was the Cunene River chain of dams and power stations, on the Angola-Namibia border, and its strategic as well as economic significance.

The Cunene scheme parallels to some extent the Cabora Bassa Dam in Mozambique, which is under attack by Frelimo and the subject of heated debate in Africa and Europe. For example, Zambia nationalized the United Transport Co. of the United Kingdom for its participation in the project, which will break United Nations sanctions on Rhodesia. Both Cunene and Cabora Bassa involve the mass removal of Africans, and the settlement of European immigrants to take advantage of the economic benefits of the schemes.

Cunene differs from Cabora Bassa in being a series of small projects, tackled mainly by local firms with large-scale financing by international consortia of banks. Cabora Bassa will have 10 times the power, but Cunene will eventually cost twice as much.

The two dams are an essential part of the process of strengthening the hold of the white minority regimes in southern Africa, through the economic and strategic links of the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola with South Africa and Namibia—which South Africa is occupying in violation of international law. There is also a “third dam,” according to the symposium: the Azores agreement between the United States and Portugal, which will provide the ailing Portuguese economy with almost half a billion dollars in export credits and other assistance.

The Cunene scheme serves as an illustration of the problems and opportunities involved for opponents of white domination in Africa. The mandate to the churches to oppose involvement in such schemes already exists in a resolution from the World Council of Churches Central Committee, meeting in Addis Ababa in January 1971.

The project itself consists of a series of dams and hydroelectric installations, 200 miles in length, partly along the Angola-Namibia border, which is formed in the west by the Cunene River, and partly through the center of Angola. This will form a strategic barrier to the liberation movements of Angola (UNITA and MPLA) and Namibia (SWAPO) in areas of increasing tension. The Namibian side in particular has been an area of conflict, with Ovambo workers sent home after the general strike in the south showing increasing resistance to South Africa’s occupation.

There have been many incidents, involving several casualties, and 80 miles of the frontier fences with Angola have been torn down. The area is closed to journalists and the situation remains obscure. However, there are reliable reports of mass arrests, detention without trial, and the use of torture at Oshakati, the new white town which will serve the Cunene scheme. On the Angolan side, massive army action and reprisals against whole villages have sent people fleeing into Namibia. The MPLA is reported to be active in the frontier area (New York Times, Feb. 12, 1972).

South African Army patrols have been openly sent into Namibia for the first time since the granting of the original mandate by the League of Nations in 1920. This stipulated that the territory should be free of all armed forces. The flagrant violation of the mandate represents a further escalation in South Africa’s confrontation with the United Nations, which has resumed legal authority over Namibia according to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in June 1971. The United States has announced its acceptance of the opinion.

South Africa’s continued presence in Namibia is illegal. Its mandate over the international territory is terminated. Any international treaties or agreements which it purports to make on behalf of the territory are illegal and invalid. In
January 1969—over 2 years after the General Assembly had decided in G.A. Res. 2145 of 1966 that the mandate had been terminated—an agreement was signed in Lisbon by the Foreign Minister of Portugal and the South African Ambassador to Portugal. The agreement outlined the first phase of construction, accepted the financial arrangements, and purported to cover the juridical aspects of the project arising from the international nature of the river and the fact that South Africa would be constructing some works inside Angola. This agreement is illegal and invalid, and any company which takes part in the construction, financing or other activity based on the agreement would not be protected by international law.

Progress so far on the scheme is limited. The total project will involve construction of 27 dams and hydroelectric plants. The first dam, at Gove in northern Angola, is scheduled for completion in 1972. Work is beginning in connection with the dam and hydroelectric plant on the Namibian side of the Ruacana Falls. Contracts for the Ruacana generating plant are being tendered for.

Complete details of the Cunene scheme, the companies involved and related considerations are available in the form of a pamphlet, “Cunene Dam Scheme,” published by the WCC, Geneva, in December 1971, and also in the papers prepared for the conference at Arnoldshain.
APPENDIX 7

STATEMENT ON COMPLAINTS TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL SUBMITTED BY SENEGAL ALLEGING PORTUGUESE VIOLATIONS OF ITS BORDERS AND THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE COUNCIL AND UPDATED MATERIAL

REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY—JULY 16, 1961—JULY 15, 1962 (A/5202; EXCERPTS)

CHAPTER 20—COMMUNICATIONS FROM SENEGAL AND PORTUGAL

In a cable dated December 22, 1961 (S/5039), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Foreign Minister of Senegal stated that on December 16, 1961, units of Portuguese army based in so-called Portuguese Guinea had penetrated the village of Bakkakapatapa and created panic among the Senegalese population, that on December 21, 1961, two Portuguese jet fighters had flown over the Senegalese region of Ouassou at a low level, and that on the same day, motorized columns of the Portuguese army pursuing deserters had trespassed Senegalese territory. Senegal drew the attention of the Security Council to the provocative nature of those acts, and expressed its firm determination to defend its people and territorial integrity.

In a letter dated January 9, 1962 (S/5055), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Permanent Representative of Portugal, having referred to Senegal's communication of December 22, stated that Senegal's allegation regarding the trespassing by motorized units of the Portuguese army was untrue. He indicated that, due to an error in the route, a Portuguese reconnaissance patrol, on December 16, had crossed to Senegalese territory, but after the patrol had been shown the correct route, it had immediately returned to Portuguese territory. No panic had been caused among the local population. With regard to the Portuguese jet fighter in Senegalese air space, it was explained that that had been caused by a technical error in navigation, but that the overflight had not exceeded 30 seconds. The Portuguese Government regretted these incidents, but it noted the intention of the Senegalese Government to create an atmosphere of imaginary hostility directed against a Portuguese territory whose peace and order had only been altered at the borders by reason of subversive activities which had been prepared and fomented in the neighboring territories.


In a letter dated April 10, 1963 (S/5279), the acting chargé d'affaires of Senegal requested an early meeting of the Security Council to discuss "The repeated violations of Senegalese airspace and territory." He added that on April 9 four Portuguese aircraft had violated Senegal's air space and had dropped four grenades on the village of Bougniaik. The letter recalled that in December 1961 Senegal had drawn the attention of the Security Council to earlier violations of a similar nature. In view of the recurrence of such acts, Senegal had no recourse but to appeal to the Security Council. In a subsequent corrigendum (S/5279/Corr. 1) Senegal stated that the incident referred to had taken place on April 8 and not on April 9.

In a letter of the same date, the representative of Portugal stated (S/5281) that after a careful investigation by his Government it could be declared categorically that the charge of violation contained in the Senegalese letter was
"without the slightest foundation." On the day in question, no Portuguese military aircraft had overflown the area referred to or any other area along the border of Senegal. As regards Senegal's reference to the alleged earlier violations, Portugal had already replied to them in its letter of January 10, 1962 (S/5055). Portugal regretted that Senegal had seen fit to combine those old complaints with a new and entirely unfounded allegation in order to create an atmosphere of hostility against Portugal in the furtherance of certain political objectives. In the circumstances, Portugal considered that the convening of the Security Council would be entirely unwarranted.

The Security Council included the item in its agenda at its 1027th meeting on April 17, 1963, and invited the representatives of Senegal and Portugal to participate, without vote, in its consideration. At its 1028th meeting on April 18, the Council agreed to accede to the requests of the representatives of the Congo (Brazzaville) and Gabon (S/5286 and S/5288 respectively) to participate in the discussion at the appropriate time. The Council considered the item at its 1027th to 1033d meetings (inclusive) between April 17 and 24, 1963.

At the 1027th meeting of the Security Council on April 17, 1963, the representative of Senegal stated that it was not the first time that such incidents had taken place. As early as December 1, 1961, motorized units of the Portuguese Colonial Army had penetrated into the Senegalese village of Bakaka creating a sense of terror in the population of that village. Portugal had continued that policy with similar actions, including flights of Portuguese jet fighters over Senegalese territory. Senegal had requested the Security Council to consider those incidents at the time but had been advised to seek a direct arrangement with Portugal. Even though Senegal had followed that procedure it now unfortunately had to appear before the Security Council because even graver incidents had occurred than those of 1961.

On April 8, 1963, the Senegalese village of Bougniack had been bombarded by four aircraft of the Portuguese Colonial Army. Two small aircraft had first flown over and had been followed by two heavier bomber aircraft. They had dropped bombs on the village of Bougniack and had strafed the village with machinegun fire. A team of Senegalese Government officials had found the tailpieces of rockets and machinegun cartridges. One person had been wounded and hospitalized. The Portuguese authorities at Bissau had admitted that on April 8 combined air and land maneuvers had taken place in the region in which the village of Bougniack was located.

Besides the bombardment of the village of Bougniack, a second element of tension resulted from a systematic policy of division of the border population. The Portuguese were massacring and terrorizing the population of Diola who were of Portuguese nationality in order to induce them to fight the nationalists and incite them against the local inhabitants on the Senegalese side, who were called Mandjakes. Such a situation was fraught with considerable danger because if foreigners were to cross the border to attack its nationals, Senegal would be forced to take action. A third element of tension had resulted from the arrest of two Senegalese drivers who had been attacked and later arrested after entering Portuguese Guinea on normal business. The Senegalese Government had not been able to establish any contact with them. Among other factors aggravating the situation was the operation of a Portuguese espionage network on Senegalese territory. Two spies who had been arrested had confessed to working for Portugal.

Portugal had often accused Senegal of harboring annexationist aims regarding Portuguese Guinea, Senegal's record in the United Nations and its support for the principle of self-determination and national independence refuted such charges. Moreover, in all matters relating to frontiers of former colonies, Senegal adhered strictly to the juridical principle that whenever a colony became independent its territorial boundaries must remain the same as when it had been a colony. The tension on the border was due solely to the policy pursued by Portugal. In fact, the atmosphere was so tense and storm laden that it could lead to armed conflict, and constituted a threat to international peace and security. His delegation therefore considered that the Council should condemn Portuguese incursions on Senegalese territory and the attacks made on Senegalese villages. It also asked the Council to take all measures to make Portugal conform to international law and apply Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) on decolonization.

The Representative of Portugal stated that consideration of Senegal's alleged grievances was irregular and premature in terms of the Charter of the United Nations. Senegal's request for a meeting fell under chapter VI of the charter which provided that the parties to a dispute should first of all seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, or other peaceful means. Only after those steps had been
cate controlling the sugar industry in Madagascar have hired a Washington lobbyist to represent their interests. While the 1972 quota was not formally increased by Congress, Madagascar did benefit slightly from a "minimum boatload" requirement which was set at 12,000 tons. Its 1972 quota is thus the minimum possible, 12,000 tons.

The Malagasy Government has generally been very cooperative with the United States with the exception of the recent diplomatic difficulties. It has permitted U.S. vessels and aircraft to use its ports and airfields, and has often supported American positions in the United Nations. Despite the downturn in relations, the agreement between the United States and Malagasy Governments for the operation of our NASA Satellite Tracking Station there was renewed in September 1971, and it continues to function normally. The study mission visited the NASA Satellite Tracking Station and was given a tour and detailed briefing as to its purpose and activities. Our visit was scheduled so that we could participate in the ceremony at which the Director of the Goddard Space Center presented the award to the station for outstanding performance.

NASA Satellite Tracking Station, Tananarive, Malagasy Republic

**History**

NASA first came to the Island of Madagascar in 1964 with the establishment of a transportable station at Majunga for the purpose of obtaining injection telemetry data. Later in the same year, requirements for information from the Madagascar/Indian Ocean area increased and the transportable station was moved from Majunga and a larger fixed station established approximately 32 kilometers southwest of the capital city of Tananarive. The station has remained at that location.

**Purpose**

The primary purpose of the present station is to provide injection tracking and/or telemetry support to those NASA programs having requirements for data from the Madagascar/Indian Ocean area. The station also routinely provides, on a 24 hours per day, 7 days per week basis, tracking and/or telemetry support to many of the "in-orbit" unmanned scientific spacecraft programs.

**Fiscal data**

The station has an estimated value of approximately $12.9 million; $8.2 million of this is in technical equipment, $1.3 million is in spare parts and supplies for this technical equipment, and $3.4 million is in real property (building, structures, and so forth).

**Personnel complement**

The personnel complement at the station at the present time totals 232. Two of these are NASA civil service employees (Station Director and Deputy Station Director), 99 are U.S. employees of the Bendix Field Engineering Corp. (the organization which operates and maintains the station under NASA direction), and 131 are Malagasy nationals. NASA's policy at present is to replace the Bendix U.S. employees with Malagasy nationals as quickly as the Malagasy can be trained and can demonstrate on-the-job performance. A large and comprehensive training program is being conducted by the station.
tried and failed could an approach be made to the Security Council. But Senegal had not even made a show of attempting any of those methods of settlement as provided in article 33 of the charter, and his Government had only learned of the alleged grounds of the dispute through the press. Yet Portugal had always tried to maintain with the present Government of Senegal only the most correct and good neighborly relations, as was becoming to states having common frontiers.

The Representative of Portugal then said that on April 9, 1963, no Portuguese military aircraft, based in the province of Guinea, had taken to the air, and, therefore, no Portuguese aircraft could have overflown the village of Bougnialack or any other area along the border of Senegal. Furthermore, all Portuguese Forces in the province of Guinea had the strictest orders to respect scrupulously the sovereignty and integrity of the Republic of Senegal. Senegal had later claimed that the alleged incident had taken place not on April 9 but on the previous day. It was not quite clear why Senegal had waited for 7 days to correct such an important point.

His Government's inquiry had shown clearly that on April 9 no military planes had taken to the air in Portuguese Guinea, and that on April 8 there had been only small-scale military exercises, but no bomb or grenades had been used by the planes and all operations had taken place strictly within Portuguese territory. It appeared that the Senegalese authorities were neither certain of the date on which the incident had occurred nor were they certain about the damage that was alleged to have been done. It was to avoid confused situations such as the present that reference to the provisions of article 33 of the charter was recommended to the parties to a dispute. He emphasized that it had become quite clear that there was no ground for complaint. No overflights or bombings of any part of Senegalese territory had taken place.

Senegalese complaints regarding the incidents of December 1961 had been cleared up at the time. It had been explained that they were due mostly to errors in navigation and that no deliberate violation of Senegalese territory had been intended. Portugal had also then expressed its regrets and offered explanation in a manner which placed its good faith and sincerity beyond doubt. The complaint that motorized columns of the Portuguese Army had trespassed on Senegalese territory was without any foundation, and, along with the other complaints, had been dealt with in S/5055. Concerning the charge that agents of Portuguese police were operating in Senegal, he could say that the allegation was devoid of foundation and that the men arrested by Senegal were not agents of Portugal. As for the allegation regarding the arrest of two Senegalese drivers, it was the first time that he had heard about that charge, but he would assume that it was a routine case and he was certain that if the men had been found innocent they must have been released. In any event, the alleged incident provided no basis for a complaint to the Council. He concluded by stating that his country was always willing to cooperate and discuss with Senegal matters of common interest in order to reach acceptable solutions.

At the 1028th meeting of the Council on April 18, the Representative of Senegal noted that Portugal had charged Senegal with not having made use of the provisions of the Charter to seek conciliation of the dispute. That did not imply that Portugal was all of a sudden an ardent follower of the Charter of the United Nations, because Portugal's defiance of the Charter was well known. Moreover, after the incidents of 1961 and at the beginning of 1962, Senegal had done its best to settle its differences with Portugal through negotiation, but those talks had been without success. Senegal had had to realize the inescapable fact that there could be no possible dialog with Portugal. Portugal denied everything, and even in its letter of April 10, 1963, it had described Senegal's complaint as groundless and as at best of a trivial nature. Senegal was left with no choice but to bring its complaint before the Security Council.

Portugal had tried to confuse the issue by stating that the Senegalese complaint was vague and also that the date of the incident had been corrected in a subsequent telegram. The date of the first telegram was due to an error in transmission. The commune issued by the Portuguese authorities of Bissau would prove that there had been aggression and that there had been aerial maneuvers in the frontier region. The first Senegalese communique had spoken of hand grenades because it was based on the report then received. Precise information was given in the second communique of the Senegalese Government. However, the details of aggression aside, the important thing was that it had been proved that Senegalese airspace had been violated, a Senegalese village had been bombed, and the lives of Senegalese nationals had been endangered, one citizen being seriously wounded. To the Representative of Portugal, all that might seem trivial, but to Senegal it was a matter of very serious consequence. Portuguese action had
caused great tension on the borders of Senegal. That tension was also due to Portugal's general policy in Africa. The United Nations had debated and condemned that policy for many years. The Security Council could not do a greater service to Portugal than to make it realize how far behind it had been in the implementation of General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. Senegal also hoped that the Security Council would help it to reestablish peace and tranquility on its borders with so-called Portuguese Guinea by forcing Portugal to understand better the principles which regulated relations between neighboring states.

At the same meeting, the representative of Ghana stated that after an examination of the statements made before the Council his delegation was convinced that the Council's meeting was regular and important. Under Article 35 of the charter, any member state could submit to the Council a dispute or a situation which was likely to endanger international peace and security. Ghana believed that there was such a threat to international peace due to the incidents reported to the Council by Senegal. Senegal had tried earlier to settle its dispute with Portugal bilaterally, but, since the incidents had persisted and since Senegal had broken off diplomatic relations with Portugal, there was no question of continuing those negotiations. Moreover, the violation of Senegalese territory by Portugal stemmed from the existence of a Portuguese colony on the borders of Senegal, that is, so-called Portuguese Guinea. Senegal's complaint was indeed a complaint from the whole of Africa. To the African states, the provocative and arrogant display of force by Portugal in so-called Portuguese Guinea and in Senegal and other parts of Africa was of great concern. In the face of material damage and casualties, one might be tempted to describe the incidents on Senegalese soil as "trivial" but, in fact, they had real significance for the Council because they revealed a situation of tension which was building up on the frontier between Senegal and so-called Portuguese Guinea as a result of Portuguese policies. That situation was fraught with the gravest consequences for international peace and the Security Council could not in all sincerity ignore it. The Senegalese complaint was only one of the many incidents that were happening in Africa. It could not be viewed in isolation as it was part of the whole question of Portuguese colonialism. To stop such incidents it was necessary that the Portuguese military buildup in Africa should be liquidated and frontier incursions, violations of air space and sporadic attacks on villages be deplored.

In view of Portugal's categorical denial of the incident, and of the increasing tension on the border, the representative of Ghana believed that an on-the-spot investigation would be helpful. He therefore suggested that a Security Council commission be appointed to visit the area and to report back to the Council with recommendations to avoid recurrence of similar incidents. He believed that such action would also have a salutary effect in other areas of Africa where similar problems existed.

The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that the Security Council was faced with an act of aggression resulting from the violation of Senegalese air space by Portuguese military aircraft and the bombardment of the village of Bougniack. The case was rendered even more grave by the fact that it was not the first time that Portugal had committed such aggression. Portugal had tried to minimize the significance of its latest act of aggression and had even described the Senegalese charges as trivial. Would Portugal consider the violation of its own air space and the bombardment of its territory as trivial? Portugal had also used the old technique of the colonialists of denying that it had committed aggression. However, the authorities in so-called Portuguese Guinea had admitted that in the course of what they had described as combined military operations, "bombardment of ground targets from the air had taken place." Thus, while on the one hand, Portugal had declared in an official communiqué that there could not be any possibility of Portuguese violation of Senegalese air space or of any other act of aggression, there was, at the same time, an equally official Portuguese statement declaring that, on both April 8 and 9, Portuguese military aircraft had undertaken several flights over Senegalese territory and that during those flights bombardment of ground targets had taken place. It was quite clear that even for Portugal it was not easy to deny facts. Portugal had also complained that Senegal had not made use of those provisions of the charter which urged peaceful settlement of disputes between member states. Leaving aside the fact that Senegal had tried to do so in 1961 when three acts of aggression had taken place against it, it would indeed be a mockery of the charter and of common sense that an appeal for peaceful settlement be advocated by a country which had repeatedly committed aggression and had constantly violated the provisions of
the charter. Portugal’s aggression against Senegal was not an isolated action. It was a part of the policy followed in cooperation with other colonialist powers in order to restore their crumbling position in Africa. Thus the Portuguese authorities in Angola and the British company, Benguela Railway, had cooperated in the organization of supplies of weapons and equipment to Tshombé. Portugal would not be able to repress the national liberation movement of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies without the support and assistance of other members of NATO. It was quite clear that such a policy was a serious threat to international peace and security. In its resolution 1807 (XVII) of December 14, 1962, the General Assembly had already noted with concern that Portugal’s policy and actions in respect of territories which were under its administration had created a very serious threat to world peace and security. The Committee of Twenty-Four had also drawn the attention of the Security Council to the situation which had been created as a result of Portuguese actions and had asked the Council to take appropriate measures, including sanctions, against Portugal. By its latest act, Portugal had proved conclusively that it was violating systematically and stubbornly the principles of the charter and it was, therefore, absolutely indispensable that the Council should take immediate and decisive action.

At the 1030th meeting of the Council on April 19, the representative of Portugal stated that the tone and contents of the statements of the representative of Senegal and of those who had supported him had made it quite clear that the Senegalese complaint was indeed part of a carefully considered plot to prepare the ground for an unwarranted Council discussion of matters exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign state. The incidents reported by Senegal were of little significance and all subsequent charges of “repression,” “barbarities,” and “atrocities” were without any foundation. The Senegalese representatives had used indiscriminately the terms grenades, hand grenades, bombs, rockets. There was an obvious attempt to create confusion and to cover discrepancies regarding the date of the incident and the facts of the alleged damage. Even the documents (S/5287) submitted later by the Senegalese delegation and circulated at its request were not a proof that the bullets or rockets in question had actually been fired from Portuguese aircraft on the day in question, whether it was April 8 or 9. Furthermore, there was no proof that they had been fired at the village of Bougniack. The statements recorded by the Senegalese Government in support of its case appeared to have been made by individuals who were natives of Portuguese Guinea and who had gone to Senegal to avoid an inquiry by the Portuguese authorities. Moreover, there was no indication as to the date when those statements had been made or the manner in which they had been authenticated.

The representative of Portugal then said that mention of the alleged tension on the border between Senegal and Portuguese Guinea was made only to reinforce the original Senegalese complaint. In point of fact, there was absolutely no tension on the border save for those occasions when agitators entered into Portuguese Guinea, claiming that they were nationalists, when in fact they were agents provocateurs. Similarly, there was no truth to the charge that Portugal was operating “a network of espionage” on its territory against Senegal.

Senegal had tried hard to assure that it harbored no expansionist designs on Portuguese Guinea. However, in September 1951, when Senegal had broken off its diplomatic relations with Portugal, one of its reasons had been that Portugal had refused to give up its province of Guinea. It was with that end in view that Senegal had utilized subtle methods of pressure against Portugal. Radio broadcasts had carried subversive anti-Portuguese propaganda. Groups of terrorists had been granted facilities for aggressive raids into Portuguese territory. Planes, presumably coming from Senegal, had made a number of overflights of Portuguese Guinea. Portugal still desired to discuss with Senegal matters of common interest and to cooperate with it in reaching an acceptable solution. Moreover, as there were conflicting versions about the alleged attack on Bougniack, Portugal would suggest that a small commission be appointed to carry out an investigation into the subject matter of the Senegalese complaint. That commission should be constituted of an equal number of competent technicians to be named by each party and presided over by a neutral acceptable to both sides. Portugal was submitting that proposal in a spirit of good faith and out of a genuine desire for conciliation.

The Representative of Gabon stated that his delegation had requested to participate in the discussion because Gabon was bound by bilateral defense agreements with Senegal and it felt that if Senegal had a conflict with any State, Gabon was justifiably interested in that question. The present conflict was not merely confined to the two parties but was also a concern of the allies of Senegal.
and the African States in general. He had been authorized by the states constituting the African and Malagasy Union to extend their unconditional support to the Republic of Senegal. The repeated terror of the motorized elements of the Portuguese army and the violation of Senegalese air space had furnished unquestioned proof that the Portuguese colonial army was ready to use every means to maintain its presence on the African Continent. The United Nations, however, could not remain indifferent to that situation and allow Portugal to continue to refuse the right of self-determination to the people of Portuguese Guinea or to carry out its raids against neighboring countries.

The representative of the Congo (Brazzaville) said that it was indeed ironic that Portugal, which had an unenviable record of deliberately ignoring the resolutions of the General Assembly and of refusing to cooperate with all the Committees set up to solve the problem of decolonization, and which had repeatedly committed aggression against African States, should ask for bilateral talks when such talks had previously failed. Similarly, Portugal had attempted to minimize the importance of the Senegalese complaint. Nevertheless, whatever confusion might have been due to an error regarding the date of the occurrence or the terms used, the fact remained that aggression had taken place and that it was not the first time that Portugal had been guilty of such an act. Moreover, the Congo (Brazzaville) on its frontier with Cabinda had also suffered incidents similar to those Senegal had undergone. Those incidents were indeed a reflection of the tragic situation that Portugal had created in different parts of Africa because of its obstinate policy of not recognizing the legitimate aspirations of the peoples under its administration. The very existence of independence was being endangered. If the Security Council failed to take strong action to stop Portugal from following its repressive policy, it might be called upon to deal with more serious incidents involving Portugal against the united African nations.

At the 1031st meeting of the Council of April 22, the representative of Senegal said that his delegation had proved clearly that the incidents resulting from Portugal's action touched the very roots of the independence of the African States. If Portugal could drop bombs on Senegal, it could with impunity bomb any other African State. The very existence of independence was being endangered. The Portuguese representative had not put forward any argument except to deny everything. Portugal had accused Senegal of carrying on a campaign through radio and publicity against Portugal. In the first place, broadcasts from Radio-Senegal were only intended to inform the Senegalese people on the conduct of Portugal in Africa. Moreover, Senegal, like other African States, was determined to uphold the right of people to self-determination and would continue to proclaim its attachment to liberty, justice, and human dignity for all the peoples in the world. All the states which could not accept the backward policy of Portugal had officially defined and outlined their legal position and the means that they would deem appropriate to hasten the liberation of the oppressed peoples in the Portuguese colonies. Portugal's offer to establish a committee of enquiry was only a dilatory move and its sole purpose was to prevent the Security Council from taking a just and efficient decision.

At the 1032d meeting of the Council on April 23, the representative of Morocco stated that Senegal had given ample proof of its desire to base its relations with Portugal on mutual respect and international law. But the incidents which had taken place since December 1961, and the frustrated efforts of Senegal to settle those incidents amicably, had clearly established which side had continuously failed to observe mutual obligations. Portugal had tried to minimize the importance of the incidents and had even suggested that Senegal should have resorted to article 33 of the Charter before submitting its complaint to the Security Council. As Senegal itself had pointed out, a country which had obstinately ignored not only the resolutions of the United Nations, but had paid little attention to the fundamental principles of the Charter, had clearly demonstrated the futility of bilateral discussions. It was for that reason that Morocco had given its complete support to Senegal in bringing the present question before the Council. Moreover, the incident referred to by Senegal was not an isolated affair. It was a characteristic act of aggression perpetrated by Portuguese imperialism against the territorial sovereignty and integrity of Senegal. For in point of fact, Portugal's continued presence in Guinea was of such a nature as to compel Senegal to run the risk of new violations which would inevitably be committed by the armed forces of Portugal. Portugal had tacitly accused Senegal of giving refuge to Guinea nationalists and had described Senegal's action in that respect as constituting an act of
belligerence. If that were so, Portugal would find itself in a state of war with all the countries of Africa and many others who might wish to give support and shelter to the nationalists of Angola, Guinea, and Mozambique. However, leaving aside for the moment the larger implications of the Bougainvill incident and confining itself to the actual fact of aggression in a precise locality, the Moroccan delegation could not but consider it truly a violation by Portugal of the territorial integrity of Senegal. The Council must, therefore, take appropriate action to meet that situation. It was for that reason that his delegation, together with that of Ghana, was submitting the following draft resolution (S/5292):

"The Security Council,

"Declaring the incidents that have occurred near the frontier between Senegal and Portuguese Guinea,

"Noting with concern that the state of relations in this area between the two parties concerned may lead to tension on the occasion of any incident, and expressing the hope that such tension will be eliminated in accordance with the provisions of the Charter,

"Taking note of the declared intention of the Portuguese Government scrupulously to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Senegal,

"1. Deplores any incursion by Portuguese military forces into Senegalese territory as well as the incident which occurred at Bougainvill on April 8;

"2. Requests the Government of Portugal, in accordance with its declared intentions, to take whatever action may be necessary to prevent any violation of Senegal's sovereignty and territorial integrity;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the development of the situation under review."

The representative of Morocco added that his delegation recognized that the above draft resolution (S/5292) fell far short in adequately expressing the feelings and sentiment of the African states regarding Portuguese behavior in Africa. In submitting it they had tried to secure a spirit of cooperation and unanimity among the members of the Council regarding a fundamental principle of the Charter. Any division of opinion on the issue would not only be prejudicial to the Council's authority, but would also have serious repercussions throughout Africa.

The representative of Ghana said that his delegation also realized that the draft resolution (S/5292) which it cosponsored did not measure up to the seriousness of Senegal's complaint. There was serious tension on Senegal's borders due to Portugal's actions. Portugal had not denied the incident, but had sought to play it down. The representative of Ghana emphasized the third operative paragraph of the draft which requested the Secretary-General to keep the situation under review.

The representative of France stated that his delegation had not taken lightly the concern expressed by Senegal to which France was bound by close ties. However, that close sympathy did not prevent his delegation from examining the matter objectively. According to information available to it from different sources, the French delegation was certain that on April 8 an incident had taken place during which the village of Bougainvill had been struck by bullets and at least one rocket fired by planes based in Portuguese Guinea. Indeed, there was really no contradiction between the facts as presented by Senegal and the information from Portuguese sources. However, the regrettable incident was not of such gravity as to threaten international peace. In such matters France considered that the broadest use should be made of the procedures mentioned in article 33 of the Charter. Accordingly, the Portuguese proposal for a commission of investigation would not have been considered by his delegation inappropriate if the consent of Senegal had been obtained. Since the relations between the two Governments concerned had not made such an arrangement possible, the French delegation might give its support to the joint draft resolution (S/5292) before the Council.

At the 1033rd meeting of the Council on April 24, the representative of Venezuela stated that the events mentioned in the Senegalese complaint, if considered in isolation, would not be of any great gravity, but because of their repetition and because they had occurred against the background of tension resulting from the colonial policies of Portugal, they had acquired a much greater significance. Incidents involving violation of the territory and air space of a country could not be ignored. Since diplomatic relations between the parties did not exist and there was tension between them, growing out of nationalist movements in Portuguese Guinea that had enlisted the sympathies of Senegal and other African states, it had not been possible to settle the present incident through bilateral talks. It was, therefore, up to the Council to consider the truth of the matter and make a decision. From statements before the Council and from information available from
other sources, it was established that on April 8 Portugal had carried out maneuvers on the border resulting in projectiles being dropped both in Portuguese Guinea and Senegal. Doubtless, the damage had been caused unwittingly, but because of the tension between the two countries such mistakes could give rise to serious conflict. It would, therefore, be quite appropriate for the Security Council to deplore the events that had occurred and ask Portugal to take in future all necessary precautions to prevent a recurrence of those events.

The representative of the United States said that since the underlying cause of tension between Portugal and the states contiguous to Portuguese Guinea—the question of self-determination—was not likely to be resolved at present, the best course to pursue would be to help to reduce the current tension. The Council was primarily asked to deal with one specific incident. That incident had been presented against the background of previous similar problems in 1961. In all cases, the incidents were minor, and on some previous occasions, Portugal had acknowledged that unintentional violations had occurred and, having expressed regret, had reiterated its policy of respecting Senegalese sovereignty and showed a willingness to take measures to avoid further difficulties. The United States, therefore, did not believe that there was any evidence of a pattern of incursions into Senegalese territory.

While it was true that under article 35 of the charter a member state could draw the attention of the Security Council to a dispute or situation similar to the one submitted by Senegal, the U.S. delegation believed that in circumstances like those of the present case the provisions of article 33 should have been resorted to in the first instance. It therefore hoped that in the event of a recurrence of any such minor incidents, the parties concerned would use the measures provided by the Charter.

The representative of the United States then said that the geographical relationship between the two villages with the same name on both sides of the border and the configuration of the poorly demarcated border in that area were factors that had lent themselves to a high degree of risk of accidental violation during air operations. From the reports of witnesses and other evidence, it had, however, to be concluded that an incident along the lines as stated in the Senegalese complaint had in fact happened. The Portuguese statement before the Council, nevertheless, made it clear, that no incursion had been intended and it also reaffirmed the policy of the Portuguese Government of scrupulously respecting the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Senegal. The suggestions for impartial investigation, while presenting difficulties in modalities, had demonstrated moderation and good faith. Senegal had also expressed its desire to utilize peaceful approaches and the machinery of the charter to help provide it with assurances against infringement of its territory. To the United States that was the proper and constructive approach. For that reason, the United States would support the joint draft resolution (S/5292) because it kept the incident concerned within an acceptable perspective, including recognition of Portugal's stated policy, and at the same time responded adequately to the complaint submitted to the Council by Senegal.

The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the Council had under discussion a complaint about an incident which was minor in itself but could lead to larger things. Size was not the only relevant question in assessing its importance. At the same time, it would be wrong to ignore the provisions of article 33 of the Charter which emphasized the importance of direct negotiations. The United Kingdom delegation regretted that the parties had been unable to come together both to establish the facts and to discuss how to prevent similar problems in the future. Since the Council was considering the case, it must first establish the facts and form an opinion on them and, second, see what could be done to remedy the situation and reduce the tension in the area. Although the evidence submitted to the Council was not complete and it was not possible to be entirely certain about all that had happened, Her Majesty's Government were inclined to accept that a minor incident had occurred on April 8 in the village of Bougniack in Senegalese territory. For that reason, the United Kingdom delegation could accept operative paragraph 1 of the joint draft resolution (S/5292) because it kept the incident concerned within an acceptable perspective, including recognition of Portugal's stated policy, and at the same time responded adequately to the complaint submitted to the Council by Senegal.

The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the Council had under discussion a complaint about an incident which was minor in itself but could lead to larger things. Size was not the only relevant question in assessing its importance. At the same time, it would be wrong to ignore the provisions of article 33 of the Charter which emphasized the importance of direct negotiations. The United Kingdom delegation regretted that the parties had been unable to come together both to establish the facts and to discuss how to prevent similar problems in the future. Since the Council was considering the case, it must first establish the facts and form an opinion on them and, second, see what could be done to remedy the situation and reduce the tension in the area. Although the evidence submitted to the Council was not complete and it was not possible to be entirely certain about all that had happened, Her Majesty's Government were inclined to accept that a minor incident had occurred on April 8 in the village of Bougniack in Senegalese territory. For that reason, the United Kingdom delegation could accept operative paragraph 1 of the joint draft resolution (S/5292). There was certainly nothing to show that the Bougniack incident had been an act of deliberate aggression. His delegation was inclined to the opinion that what had occurred was in all probability the result of a genuine error or miscalculation.

As for what the Council could recommend to ease the situation, it seemed to the United Kingdom delegation that the essential point in any problem regarding an ill-defined frontier should be to avoid scrupulously any trespass, incursion or action which could lead to a frontier incident. It therefore welcomed Portugal's assurances that it would respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Senegal
and that the Portuguese forces had the strictest instructions to the effect. The United Kingdom delegation hoped that Portugal, as suggested in the draft resolution, would take all measures to prevent any incidents on its borders and felt sure that it could rely on Senegal to do the same. If, in the future, minor incidents were alleged to occur, then the two Governments could hold consultations with a view to taking preventive measures. This appeared to be the thought underlying the third preambular paragraph of the draft resolution. Portugal's offer to participate in a joint commission of enquiry was evidence of its willingness to propose ways of cooperating in settling the dispute. The United Kingdom delegation regretted that that offer was unacceptable to Senegal. However, looked at from the practical point of view, the fact remained that such a commission could only be useful with the agreement of both parties. Moreover, it was perhaps doubtful whether some time after that kind of event a commission would be able to add much to the Council's knowledge of the facts. The United Kingdom delegation considered that the joint draft resolution submitted by Morocco and Ghana was appropriate to the circumstances and would support it.

The representative of Norway said that in presenting its case Senegal had made it clear that it was concerned not only with the incident of April 8, and with previous incidents in December 1961, but also with the general tension on its borders. There was a fear that if that tension continued unabated, it might result in an armed conflict. Senegal had pointed out that it did not possess the requisite arms and equipment with which to patrol the border and prevent violations. The Norwegian delegation had sympathy and understanding for Senegal's position and hoped that the Security Council's action might ease the tension and relieve Senegal's expressed fears. In that respect, it also welcomed Portugal's assurances that the Portuguese armed forces had the strictest orders to respect scrupulously the sovereignty, the integrity and the air space of Senegal. In spite of the contrasting viewpoints submitted to the Council—a frequent feature in cases of border disputes—it seemed to his delegation that it had clearly been brought out that there was tension along the border between Senegal and Portuguese Guinea and that a Portuguese incursion had taken place at the Senegalese village of Bougniaack on April 8. In the circumstances, it would be better for the Council to focus its attention on the preventive aspect of the matter and to take such steps as would alleviate the natural anxiety of Senegal. Inasmuch as the draft resolution submitted by Ghana and Morocco had those aims in mind, the Norwegian delegation welcomed it and believed that a Security Council resolution on those lines would go a long way toward preventing further episodes along the frontier, and that the request to the Secretary-General to keep the situation under review would have a particularly beneficial effect.

The representative of the Philippines said that while the Senegalese complaint involved also the question of the relationship between African States and Portugal, the Council at present was dealing with the dispute precipitated by the specific incident of April 8. That incident showed that the air space and territory of a member state had been violated which the Council must deplore. Although the present occasion was not one to examine the problem of Portuguese territories in Africa, the Philippine delegation took into account the larger issues involved in Senegal's complaint. It therefore particularly approved the inclusion in the joint draft resolution (S/5292) of operative paragraph 3 which requested the Secretary-General to keep the situation under review. The Philippine delegation also hoped that the Council's action would put an end to further incidents between the two countries and would help remove tensions between them.

The representative of Brazil stated that since the Council was confronted with diametrically opposed versions of the incident under its consideration, it was not in a position to take a decision on the substance of the complaint. If it were to do so, it would be necessary to make an impartial investigation of the case and then examine it in the light of those findings. It would, however, be quite proper for the Council to recommend that the parties resort to other means of peaceful settlement as set forth in article 33 of the charter. In the present case also, the Council must act in accordance with chapter VI of the charter. The Brazilian delegation would therefore support the joint draft resolution because it sought to confine itself to the issue at hand and was imbued with the spirit of chapter VI of the charter. Brazil, however, had one reservation related to the first operative paragraph, which was worded in a way that might be interpreted as representing a decision by the Council on the substantial aspects of the question. The Brazilian delegation would, therefore, ask for a separate vote on that paragraph so that it might abstain on it. Except for that reservation, it favored the draft resolution as a whole.
The President, speaking as the representative of China, said that the statements by the parties concerned, although contradictory, had been made in good faith. Portugal, while admitting that some small-scale maneuver had taken place on April 8, had denied that any overflight of Senegalese territory had taken place. As the representative of France had noted, however, Portugal might not have been able to verify the accidental impact of bullets and other projectiles on Senegalese territory. Thus each party was telling the truth according to its own lights. In normal circumstances, such an incident might have been settled by direct negotiations but direct talks in the present case had been difficult because of the existing strained relations between the parties. It was, however, gratifying that no further incidents had occurred since April 8. The fact that there had been no deterioration of the situation showed that Senegal had no intention of aggravating it. Similarly, it was also gratifying that Portugal had given assurances of fully respecting Senegal's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Since the draft resolution before the Council sought to effect an immediate relaxation of the existing tension, the Chinese delegation would vote in its favor.

Commenting on the joint draft resolution (S/5292), the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the draft, as the sponsors had themselves pointed out, was indeed very weak. Its principal shortcoming lay in the fact that it did not reflect the whole essence of the situation that had been brought about by Portugal's numerous aggressive actions against Senegal. There was no direct condemnation of those actions, despite the fact that Senegal had furnished convincing evidence about them. The Soviet delegation was, however, aware of the desire of the African members of the Council, a desire which it shared and respected, to reach a generally acceptable solution of the question. Despite its shortcomings the draft resolution clearly and unequivocally expressed a negative evaluation by the Security Council of the hostile actions of Portugal against Senegal. The Council was duty bound not to ignore the appeals of Senegal and other African States for a solution of the problem created by Portugal's actions.

In a further statement, the representative of Portugal reaffirmed his government's stand that the results of its investigations carried out at different stages had made it impossible for it to accept responsibility for any incident alleged to have occurred in the village of Bougniack. There had been no overflights of Senegalese territory, nor any bombing of any Senegalese villages or populations. It was alleged that there was a contradiction between the version of events issued from Lisbon and that given out at Bissau. That was not correct. Senegal had complained to the Security Council that an incident had taken place in the village of Bougniack on April 9. The Portuguese Government at Lisbon issued a communiqué denying it, based on its investigation. Then the Portuguese authorities in Bissau, also denying the Senegalese allegations, volunteered the information that military exercises had taken place on April 8, and that in the course of those exercises, two soldiers of the Portuguese Army had been wounded. The Portuguese delegation failed to see any contradiction in that because the two statements referred to two different dates. In a skillful move, the Senegalese delegation had altered the date of the alleged incident from April 9 to 8—and that only after 7 days—and, basing itself on the statement of the authorities at Bissau, had argued that its complaint had been substantiated. In any case, Portugal had suggested a commission of inquiry in a spirit of good faith and with a desire to bring about conciliation in accordance with the provisions of article 33 of the charter. It was regrettable that the uncompromising attitude of Senegal had made the establishment of such a commission impossible. Instead, a resolution had been drafted which prejudged the main issue without even making an effort to appreciate the Portuguese side of the question. Much as the Portuguese delegation regretted that, it could not in fairness deny that the terms of the draft resolution reflected his government's repeatedly declared policies based on respect for the sovereignty of Senegal and its desire for close cooperation. In the vote, the representative of Morocco, as cosponsor, appealed to the representative of Brazil not to press his delegation's request for a separate vote on operative paragraph 1 so that the Council might adopt the draft resolution unanimously. The representative of Brazil said that in view of that appeal his delegation would not press its request but noted that if a separate vote had taken place, the Brazilian delegation would have abstained on that paragraph.

Decision.—At the 1033d meeting on April 24, 1963, the joint draft resolution submitted by Ghana and Morocco (S/5292) was adopted unanimously.
After the vote, the representative of Senegal expressed his delegation's gratification at the unanimity of the Council's decision, although his Government would have preferred a formal condemnation of Portugal's aggression and a more concrete action on the part of the Council to meet it. However, the Council had clearly deplored the violation of Senegalese territory by Portugal and in particular, the incident which had occurred on April 8, 1963. Furthermore, the Council had implicitly condemned Portugal by asking that country to refrain from similar action. Senegal attached particular importance to the request made to the Secretary-General to keep the development of the situation under review.


Chapter 9—Letter Dated May 7, 1965, From the Representative of Senegal Addressed to the President of the Security Council

1123. In a letter dated October 14, 1964 (S/6012), the representative of Senegal charged that on October 10 a Portuguese Piper aircraft had violated Senegalese territory, flying over the military camp at Kolda. In a reply dated October 16, (S/6014), the representative of Portugal rejected that allegation, stating that the Portuguese Air Force did not possess any aircraft of the "Piper" class or any other similar to it.

1124. In a letter dated February 4, 1965 (S/6177), the representative of Senegal informed the Security Council that from January 6 to 8, 1965, a number of bullets and projectiles of larger caliber had been fired at the Senegalese village of Salikené along the frontier between Senegal and Portuguese Guinea, wounding citizens of the village. Hand-grenades had also been thrown, and property damage was considerable. On the night of January 10, 37 Portuguese soldiers had been observed as if considering an attack on the Senegalese village of Sonithiou Elhadji, but they had desisted in view of the presence of a security force. The Government of Senegal called the attention of the Security Council to those grave incidents, which constituted a threat to the peace.

1125. In a letter dated February 16, 1965 (S/6192 and Corr. 1), the chargé d'affaires of Portugal said that his Government categorically rejected the accusations as devoid of justification. On January 7, a group of terrorists had penetrated into Portuguese Guinea and had attacked a village. The village population had been forced to protect itself, and exchange of fire had taken place on Portuguese territory. The Portuguese security forces had not intervened in the fight and had strict instructions to respect the territorial integrity of Senegal. The Government of Senegal had no authority to make accusations when in its territory it gives its consent and assistance to the training and equipping of terrorists who attack peaceful villages on foreign soil.

1126. In a letter dated February 24, 1965 (S/6196), the acting chargé d'affaires of Senegal drew attention to a serious incident which had occurred on February 15, when the Senegalese frontier village of Ngorce NGobry had been burnt by Portuguese soldiers who had also destroyed nearby forests and crops. Following the incident, Senegalese authorities had found 37 cartridge cases on the scene. The Senegalese Government could not long remain passive in the face of such frequent acts of provocation.

1127. In a letter dated March 16, 1965 (S/6240), the chargé d'affaires of Portugal replied to the Senegalese letter of February 24, declaring that on February 15, a group of civilians in Portuguese Guinea had been shot at by terrorists from the territory of Senegal. Those civilians had had to defend themselves and repel the attackers, expelling them from national territory. The Government of Portugal categorically rejected the Senegalese accusations.

1128. On May 7, 1965, the representative of Senegal addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/6338) requesting that the Council be convened as soon as possible for the purpose of considering repeated violations of Senegalese air space and territory by the Portuguese authorities. Since the adoption on April 24, 1963, of the Security Council resolution (S/5293) on Senegal's complaint, 13 violations of its territory had been noted by his Government, some of which had been brought to the attention of the Council in February 1965. In view of those acts of the Portuguese authorities, Senegal considered that the Council should again ask Portugal to cease the violation of Senegalese territory.

1129. The Security Council included the item in its agenda at its 1205th meeting on May 12, 1965, and invited the representatives of Senegal and Portugal to
participate, without vote, in the discussion. At its 1210th meeting on May 18, 1965, the Council agreed to accede to the request of the representative of the Congo (Brazzaville) (S/6359) for participation in the discussion. At the 1205th meeting on May 12, 1965, the representative of Senegal stated that during the preceding 2 years, 16 violations had been committed by the Portuguese authorities against Senegalese air space and territory following the bombing of the Senegalese village of Bouniak by four Portuguese aircraft on April 8, 1963. Those 16 new violations had occurred despite the Security Council resolution of April 24, 1963, which had deplored the incursions of Portuguese military forces into Senegalese territory as well as the incident of Bouniak. In the course of the new violations, Portuguese troops had invaded the villages of Thiamouli (on April 18, 1964), Sara Coube (on June 14, 1964), Saliekagne (on January 6–8, 1965), N’Gobry (on February 15, 1965), Bambatoding (on April 11–12, 1965), Sambalounda (on April 1965), and Bam onto (on April 18–20, 1965), opening fire on the villagers and causing considerable material damage. Portuguese soldiers had also crossed the frontier in the neighborhood of the villages of Coumbacara, Bam onto and N’Gore. There had been overflights over the villages of Tanaff, Djijadi Balante and Doña. Bullets, cartridge shells, tear-gas bombs and a hand-grenade had been found at the sites where the incidents had taken place. The representative of Senegal stated that in addition to that evidence, his Government could substantiate its allegations by other proofs, such as burned-out grain stores and huts left behind after the attacks and the two Portuguese soldiers and their intelligence agent who had been arrested by the Senegalese authorities.

1130. In answer to the complaints that Senegal had sent to the Security Council during February (S/6177 and S/6196), Portugal had not challenged the facts of the alleged incidents but had tried rather to justify the violations. In its search for justification, Portugal had not found and could not submit the slightest evidence in support of its version of the incidents. It had then resorted to the strategy of counterattack before the Security Council. Such a strategy, however, could not prevent the loss of Portuguese territories in Africa, because the liberation of the peoples of Africa was an irresistible movement. His Government appeared before the Council, the representative of Senegal said, in order to request it once again to invite Portugal to respect scrupulously the sovereignty of Senegal and the integrity of its territory and airspace. Senegal asked the Security Council to call upon Portugal to respect scrupulously the sovereignty of Senegal and the integrity of its territory and airspace.

1131. At the same meeting, the representative of Portugal took issue with the mention of document S/5279 in the agenda of the Council. He rejected as completely baseless and unwarranted the allegations made by the Government of Senegal.

1132. Continuing his statement at the 1206th meeting on May 13, he said that Portugal found it amazing that the Government of Senegal had again come to the Security Council with vague and unsubstantiated charges and without having made a preliminary attempt, as required by article 33 of the Charter, to settle its complaints directly with the Portuguese Government or through mutual friends. The vagueness and the unsubstantiated nature of the allegations could be proved by the fact that Senegal had based its new complaint in part on the alleged incidents of which it had complained in February 1965, although those incidents had already been dealt with by Portugal in its replies to the President of the Security Council. Regarding the other incidents referred to by the Representative of Senegal at the previous meeting of the Council, the Portuguese Government had made careful inquiries but had been unable to find the slightest evidence of the alleged violations. Reviewing the alleged incidents in detail, he said that there had been no violations of Senegalese airspace by any Portuguese aircraft, and that there had been no violations of Senegalese territory by Portuguese security forces. Senegal must look elsewhere for an explanation. It might find the answer in the irregular gangs which it harbored. It was a matter of common knowledge that the Government of Senegal permitted and assisted armed gangs of terrorists, organized in its territory, to attack the peaceful population of Portuguese Guinea. At least five Senegalese localities were known to be used either as operational bases or as medical aid centers by armed terrorists raiding Portuguese Guinea with the consent of the Government of Senegal. They should be called to account and controlled by the Senegalese authorities, who knew who they were, especially because their activities inevitably harmed the peaceful relations between the people of Portuguese Guinea and the people of Senegal. The Representative of Portugal assured the Council that the Portuguese security forces were under
at this time to expedite the training of the Malagasy employees and prepare them to assume more technical and/or responsible positions.

Benefits to Madagascar

Financial.—During fiscal year 1970, the station contributed approximately $2,333 million to the Malagasy economy. Some of this was in personal expenditures by Bendix U.S. employees, part was in salaries to Malagasy nationals, a large portion was in payment for communication services, and some was for construction of facilities and facility support services.

Technology.—The station is one of the few places within the Malagasy Republic where Malagasy nationals interested in electronics and space technology can train and work with the state of the art, technical equipment and operational techniques. NASA has also provided the Malagasy meteorological services with an automatic picture transmission (APT) station which is presently receiving weather information from the U.S. weather satellite as they pass over or near the Island of Madagascar. The data is disseminated to numerous recipients and is a major source of weather information (probably the prime source). The NASA station trains personnel to operate this station, provides it with expendable supplies and spare parts, and maintains it. In addition to the above, the station provides technical consulting services, on a noninterference basis to mission support responsibilities, to a number of local organizations.

Addendum

Indicative of the success of the training program at the NASA station and the attitude of Malagasy talent is an outstanding performance that in March 1971 brought a rare personal commendation from the Director of the Goddard Space Flight Center. A team of 11 Malagasy technicians who man entirely on a round-the-clock basis the “Mini-track” facility at the station completed 2 years of error-free performance. The “Mini-track” system is used to obtain vital orbital data permitting constant pinpointing of the location of scientific satellites. This team, which operates and maintains the Mini-track equipment, achieved such a high degree of proficiency that some 262,800 operational functions were carried out without a single error for 21,900 satellite passes.
strict orders to respect the frontiers of Senegal and that they were obeying those orders. There was no intention on the Portuguese side to harm Senegal in any way. Portugal wanted to cooperate with Senegal; it profoundly regretted the Senegalese attempts to seek disputes where none existed. In order to dispel Senegal’s doubts and fears, Portugal was ready to agree that an inquiry team be set up to investigate the specific allegations made by Senegal, with two members to be selected by the two Governments, and the third to be appointed either by the Secretary-General or by the President of the Security Council in consultation with the two Governments.

1133. The Representative of the Ivory Coast observed that in spite of the Security Council’s resolution (S/5293) adopted on April 24, 1963, the incidents provoked by Portugal on Senegalese territory had been recurring and growing in magnitude. The incidents were sufficiently numerous to cause anxiety in the Council. The Representative of Portugal, however, had summarily rejected the Senegalese charges. But it was inconceivable that a respected government should come to the Council with facts that did not exist. Senegal had presented the facts and the Council should take due notice of them. The many incidents which the Representative of Senegal had brought to the attention of the Security Council should not be viewed as mere frontier incidents. They could not be isolated from the context of contemporary history or from the determination of the patriots of so-called Portuguese Guinea to become free. The blows received by Senegal and Guinea were the last convulsions of an expiring colonialism. Senegal should be praised for its patience and sense of responsibility, and the Council should not fail to condemn Portugal for the incursions its troops had made on Senegalese territory. It should urge the Government of Portugal to take all the necessary measures to prevent any violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Senegal.

1134. The Representative of France stated that his delegation could only deplore the continuance of the dispute between Senegal and Portugal, and could only express the hope that it would be possible to find a solution to the problem as soon as possible. After studying the facts of the case, the French delegation concluded that while during 1963 and 1964 the dispute had remained within limits and could have been eliminated with good will, the nature of the incidents had changed after January 6, 7, and 8, when troops, no longer individually, but in fairly large groups, had crossed the frontier, quite heavy firing had on several occasions taken place, and dwellings and granaries had been seriously damaged, particularly by fire, at several localities. That could furnish proof of the usefulness of the resolution adopted 2 years before. The Council could again invite the two parties to explore the possibilities laid down by article 33 of the Charter. The Council should reaffirm its previous resolution which had requested Portugal to take whatever action might be necessary to prevent any violation of Senegal’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

1135. In reply to the Representative of Portugal, the Representative of Senegal said that his Government had brought to the Council specific charges which would be substantiated by material proofs if the Council so wished. Senegal had not sought a direct understanding with the Government of Portugal, following article 33 of the Charter, because it had no confidence in direct negotiations with the Portuguese Government, which had shown bad faith in response to the solemn warning given to Portugal by the Security Council in 1963.

1136. Commenting on the remarks made by the Representative of Senegal, the Representative of Portugal said that he had carefully verified the facts in the Senegalese allegations and was in a position to reiterate that the allegations were false. There was no tension across the border between Senegal and Portuguese Guinea. Senegal wanted to start quarrels with Portugal, and for that the responsibility must fall on Senegal.

1137. The Representative of the Ivory Coast observed that if there was no tension along the border between Senegal and Portuguese Guinea, it was certainly not thanks to Portugal, but because Senegal had patrolled the Senegalese side of the frontier only with a very small number of Senegalese policemen in order to avoid the creation of possible incidents. On the other hand, Portuguese troops were stationed on the Portuguese side of the frontier between Senegal and Portuguese Guinea.

1138. At the 1210th meeting of the Security Council May 18, the Representative of the Congo (Brazzaville) stated that the item under discussion was not an isolated matter, for his Government had also complained to the Security Council about similar acts of penetration by Portuguese troops into Congolese territory in February and March 1965. As in the case of incidents on Senegalese territory,
Portugal had also rejected the changes which the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) had brought to the Council's attention. It was indispensable that the Council should take note of the numerous acts of deliberate aggression by Portugal against Senegal, and that it should induce Portugal to adopt a more realistic policy concerning the peoples of Africa.

1139. The Representative of Jordan considered that two basic factors should be taken into consideration: The first was the continuity of the incidents, which could develop into dangerous clashes; and the second was the political atmosphere in which the acts had taken place. Senegal had again asked the Security Council for adequate measures of security for its borders against Portuguese military incursions. In minimizing the importance of the question or completely denying the facts, Portugal's approach did not serve a constructive purpose but rather aroused doubts about Portuguese intentions. Neither the incursions nor the method of counteraccusations to justify the incursions could be accepted and the Portuguese Government would do better to take, on its own initiative, effective measures to keep the Senegalese border in peace and not to provoke hostilities with the people of Senegal and all of the peoples of the African Continent.

1140. The Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland referred to two suggestions which had arisen from the discussion. He agreed fully with Senegal's suggestion to reaffirm the purpose of the Security Council's resolution (S/5293) of April 24, 1963. He also expressed interest in the suggestion made by the Representative of France that possibilities of action under Article 33 of the Charter should be explored. Second, along the lines proposed by Portugal or on some other basis the United Nations could do more to investigate charges, establish facts, and contribute to a reduction of tension on the frontier. He assured the Representative of Senegal that any practical proposals along these lines would be seriously considered by the Council.

1141. The Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that the Security Council was urgently examining the question of provocations against Senegal by Portugal, an ally of the United States and the United Kingdom in the aggressive military bloc of NATO. Portugal disregarded the Security Council resolution of April 1963. Portugal had not provoked incidents against Senegal alone; it had also tried to feel out the borders of other independent African countries, such as the Republic of Guinea, the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), and the United Republic of Tanzania. The policy of Portugal in Africa was being inspired and promoted by larger imperialist powers, in particular by the United States and the United Kingdom. It was certain that Portugal was being prompted in its actions against the independent countries of Africa by such actions as the intervention of the United States and Belgium in the Congo, which had been undertaken with the assistance of the United Kingdom; the American aggression against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; the American armed intervention in the Dominican Republic; the colonial war of the United Kingdom in Aden; and so on. It was the duty of the Security Council not only firmly to condemn, but also to take effective action to check the colonialists and their protectors. The Soviet Union shared the view of the African countries that such measures should be adopted to protect the countries of Africa from Portuguese provocation. The protection was badly needed, for Portugal had been assisted by and benefited from unlimited military, economic, and moral support from its partners in NATO. One of the reasons for support of the imperialistic policies in Africa was connected with considerations of a strategic character. The military airbases in Mozambique located in Beira, Quete, and Nacala were serious sources of tension in Africa, and were playing a far from insignificant role in the preparation of punitive operations against the peoples of the Portuguese colonies and in the provocations against independent African countries. The Soviet Representative remarked that the role played by American, British, and West German companies in the economy and military establishment of Portugal had enabled Portugal to maintain its colonial policy in Africa. Approximately two-thirds of all the funds and capital invested in Portugal and the territories subjugated by it were controlled by foreign monopolies. Among the foreign companies operating in Portugal and its colonies, the principal role was played by the companies forming part of two American groups—Morgan and Rockefeller—as well as those forming part of the British group, Midland Bank.

1142. In trying to retain their strategic and economic positions in the Portuguese colonies, the United States and other members of NATO rivaled one another in providing military assistance to Salazar, thereby flagrantly violating the Security Council resolution of July 31, 1963. The Soviet delegation expected the Security Council to condemn most formally the provocations of
the Portuguese authorities against the Republic of Senegal and to put an end to deliberate violations of the Security Council resolution of April 24, 1963 (S/5393). The Council should call upon Portugal immediately to cease violating the airspace and territorial integrity of Senegal and adopt effective measures to prevent repetition of such violations.

1143. At the same meeting, the Representative of the Ivory Coast submitted, on behalf of his own delegation and those of Jordan and Malaysia, a joint draft resolution (S/6366/Rev. 1) which, as later revised, read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Taking note of the complaint by Senegal against Portugal contained in documents S/6177, S/6196 and S/6338,

"Having heard the statements of the Representatives of Senegal and Portugal concerning violations of Senegalese territory by the Portuguese military forces,

"1. Deeply deplores any incursions by Portuguese military forces into Senegalese territory;

"2. Reaffirms its resolution S/5293 of April 24, 1963;

"3. Requests once again the Government of Portugal to take all effective and necessary action to prevent any violation of Senegal's sovereignty and territorial integrity;

"4. Requests the Secretary-General to follow the development of the situation."

1144. Speaking for the sponsors, the Representative of the Ivory Coast said that they had taken note of the statements made concerning the Senegalese complaint and found that the resolution of April 24, 1963 (S/5293) had not been effectively implemented. The incursions by Portuguese military forces into Senegalese territory were becoming more and more frequent and were taking on extremely dangerous proportions. The sponsors were convinced that the Senegalese complaint and the incidents which Senegal had submitted to the Council were indirect repercussions of a colonial war that Portugal was waging in different parts of Africa, in so-called Portuguese Guinea, in Angola, and in Mozambique. In the present situation, when all countries of the world deplored the position of Portugal, it would be difficult to ask an African State such as Senegal, which was a victim of Portuguese ambitions, to accept the suggestion to sit down and discuss directly with Portugal any dispute that had arisen between them. If those members of the Council who believed that the draft resolution should have contained more specific suggestions would agree that the Organization of African Unity should be invited to intervene to settle the problem posed by Portuguese colonization, he would be happy to make such a proposal. He hoped that as international public opinion condemned the actions of Portugal, so would the members of the Council by their support of the draft resolution.

1145. The representative of Bolivia stated that it was of vital importance that the governments referred to in the resolutions of the Security Council should respect and obey the provisions of those resolutions. He also considered that an investigation of the facts in the Senegalese complaint might serve the purpose of article 33 of the charter, provided that such investigation would be followed by decisions and concrete measures by the Security Council.

1146. At the 1211th meeting, also on May 18, the representative of Uruguay stated that the Security Council was not the right place and it was not the appropriate moment to investigate the facts of the case, for the Security Council was not a judicial body and, since many of the relevant events had occurred a long time ago, it would be almost impossible to find complete material evidence. The incidents in question were related to the situation created by the granting of asylum by Senegal to a considerable number of political refugees from the territory of neighboring Guinea. The Latin American countries with long tradition in the matter were concerned when allegations were made that a frontier had been violated in order to pursue refugees seeking asylum in another country so that not only was the territorial integrity of the country violated by the right of asylum as well. The representative of Uruguay believed that the draft resolution submitted by the Ivory Coast, Jordan, and Malaysia was capable of contributing effectively to the reestablishment of a normal situation along the border between Senegal and Portuguese Guinea.

1147. The President, speaking as the representative of Malaysia, said that though the Council was not a court of law where every allegation had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt nevertheless the Council had to arrive at a reasonable judgment by a quasi-judicial process. It was interesting to note that in 1963, when a similar dispute had arisen between the parties, Portugal had presented its case in the same way, holding that the allegations were totally rejected, that the Security Council had no competence in that matter and that an examination of the
merits of the trivial complaints only helped to demonstrate their inherent improbability. In this case the Portuguese answer had taken the same course. On the opening day of the debate, the representative of Portugal had not felt at all deterred from making at once a reply which had been anything but vague and imprecise and had rejected as baseless the Senegalese allegations. Analyzing the statement made by the representative of Portugal, the representative of Malaysia observed that, in his judgment, that episode was alone sufficient to satisfy him that not much reliance could be placed on Portugal's denials and rejections of all incidents about which the Government of Senegal had complained. In the wider context of the problem, Portugal did not appear to have paid any attention to the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council in which they had recognized that the situation in the Portuguese territories constituted a threat to the well-being of humanity and to international peace and security in Africa. He observed that if Portugal learned soon to come to terms with the world of today, it would better survive in history. Meanwhile the draft resolution asked for it to take effective steps so that the atmosphere of suspicion and strife might be dissipated.

1148. At the 1212th meeting of the Security Council on May 19, the representative of the United States of America stated that the charges of violations of airspace and territorial integrity brought by Senegal before the Council were serious both in number and in gravity, as were the counter allegations by Portugal. The U.S. delegation had expected that the sentiments expressed in the Security Council resolution of April 24, 1963 (S/5293) would reduce if not eliminate the causes of friction and tension existing along the border between Senegal and Portuguese Guinea. That was not the case. Because of the geographical relationship between many of the villages along the border, and the general configuration of the terrain leading to confusion over the line of demarcation between Portuguese Guinea and Senegal, it was entirely possible that incursions could have occurred inadvertently. Whether the incursions were inadvertent or not, the draft resolution submitted by the Ivory Coast, Jordan, and Malaysia provided a formula which would be directed toward bringing an end to the situation. The U.S. delegation felt that the provisions of article 33 of the charter would be resorted to in order to avoid a recurrence of incidents which could aggravate the situation, and in this connection perhaps the proposal of the representative of Portugal for an investigating commission should be examined further. His delegation would vote for the joint draft resolution, although it had some reservations as to the terms in which it had been drafted. The United States had hoped for more balanced language and would have preferred a text containing some reference to the letters from the representative of Portugal to the President of the Security Council. It would also have preferred it if the Council's concern over the general tension existing all along the border were emphasized. Also no mention was made of possible incursions into Portuguese Guinea from Senegal; his Government deplored incursions from either side across the border.

1149. The representative of the Netherlands regretted that in spite of the previous resolution of the Security Council, border tension between Senegal and Portuguese Guinea had continued and recently appeared to have increased. He considered the complaint by Senegal a serious one, meriting the full attention of the Council, the more so since it was brought by a government which had always shown great responsibility and restraint in the United Nations. He stated that in cases like the present one where the facts were disputed by the parties, the Council would be well advised to make full use of the means provided for in article 33 of the charter. Portugal had offered an impartial investigation, but that offer was unacceptable to the other side. In such a case the Council could itself have ordered an investigation in accordance with article 34 of the charter. The draft resolution avoided pronouncing any judgment and provided a formula which could lead to the elimination of existing tension. On other occasions the Netherlands had made it clear that it did not support the policy followed by Portugal with regard to its African territories. Agreement or disagreement with that policy should, however, not influence the judgment of the Council on the complaint before it. His delegation believed that where disputes were not investigated, the Council would be well advised to adopt such a draft resolution as had been introduced.

1150. The representative of the U.S.S.R. expressed satisfaction that almost all members of the Security Council had firmly condemned Portugal for its provocative actions against Senegal and for the crimes it had committed against the African peoples. The Soviet Union was prepared to support the draft resolution, although it would have preferred a more energetic condemnation of Portugal. In this connection he referred to the statement by the representative of the Ivory Coast to the effect that the Council should appeal to the Organization of African
Unity to intervene in the Portuguese colonies for the purpose of liberating the people there who were still under the authority of the colonialists.

1151. Not only Salazar’s regime, but also those providing it with moral, economic, and military assistance should draw the necessary conclusions from the discussions that had taken place in the Security Council.

Decision.—At the 1212th meeting on May 19, 1965, the revised joint draft resolution submitted by the Ivory Coast, Jordan, and Malaysia (S/6366/Rev. 1) was adopted unanimously (Resolution 204 (1965)).

1152. The representative of the United Kingdom welcomed the adoption of the resolution, but wished to emphasize the United Kingdom belief that in all matters of that kind, the best basis for a solution was to have an impartial investigation.

1153. The representative of Portugal placed on record his Government’s formal reservations regarding the resolution, which he considered to be discriminatory against Portugal and as not corresponding to any reality.

1154. The representative of Senegal expressed gratification at the unanimity of the Council’s decision and thanked in particular the cosponsors of the resolution. Portugal should be brought to realize that its outmoded myth of commanding the loyalty of Africans who were supposed to be Portuguese citizens could no longer be maintained.

1155. The representative of the Congo (Brazzaville) thanked all members of the Security Council for the common stand they had taken concerning Portugal.

1156. The representative of the Ivory Coast pointed out that the only formula acceptable to the African states was contained in operative paragraph 4 of the resolution. The inquiry suggested by Portugal and supported by certain delegations was unacceptable. The Ivory Coast hoped that Portugal would heed the resolution just adopted. If Portugal did not take it into account and continued to threaten Senegal then Senegal had the sovereign right to protect its citizens and in that Senegal would not be alone.


CHAPTER 15.—COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN SENEGAL AND PORTUGAL

828. In a letter dated July 19, 1967 (S/8080) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Permanent Representative of Senegal said that on July 12, 1967, Portuguese soldiers from Guinea-Bissau had penetrated Senegalese territory as far as the village of Boussolomm in the Niaguiss arrondissement. After having fired on Senegalese citizens, killing a young man, the Portuguese had kidnapped a Senegalese couple. Portugal was responsible for the serious violation of Senegal’s territorial integrity.

829. In a further letter dated September 11, 1967 (S/8151), the Permanent Representative of Senegal charged that on August 5, 1967, Portuguese soldiers from Guinea-Bissau, supported by heavy weapons and machineguns, had infiltrated the area of Santiaba-Manjack and had remained for several hours on Senegalese territory, engaging in destruction, thefts, and pillage. Seven houses were burned, plantations and rice barns were looted, and much property was destroyed or stolen.

830. On September 22, 1967 (S/8164) the Chargé d’Affaires of Portugal addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council replying to the letter of Senegal on September 12 and stating that, on the night of 5/6 August, several terrorist elements coming from Senegalese territory had crossed the frontier of Guinea and attacked the hamlet of Cossolol Catetia, utilizing machineguns and submachineguns and causing two dead and six wounded. The population had reacted in self-defense, having repulsed and pursued the invaders beyond the frontier. The Portuguese Armed Forces had not proceeded beyond the limits of the national territory. There had been no violation of Senegalese territory; consequently the accusation made to this effect was devoid of foundation. Portugal could not refrain from underlining that the episode referred to would not have taken place if Senegal had not authorized terrorist elements to utilize its territory as a base of aggression. So long as Senegal persisted in disrespecting its international obligations for peace and good neighborliness, the entire responsibility for such episodes and their consequences belonged to it.

831. On September 22, 1967 (S/8164) the Chargé d’Affaires of Portugal addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council replying to the letter of Senegal of September 12 and stating that, on the night of 5/6 August, several terrorist elements coming from Senegalese territory had crossed the frontier of Guinea and attacked the hamlet of Cossolol Catetia, utilizing machineguns and submachineguns and causing two dead and six wounded. The population had reacted in self-defense, having repulsed and pursued the invaders beyond the frontier. The Portuguese Armed Forces had not proceeded beyond the limits of the national territory. There had been no violation of Senegalese territory; consequently the accusation made to this effect was devoid of foundation. Portugal could not refrain from underlining that the episode referred to would not have taken place if Senegal had not authorized terrorist elements to utilize its territory as a base of aggression. So long as Senegal persisted in disrespecting its international obligations for peace and good neighborliness, the entire responsibility for such episodes and their consequences belonged to it.

832. In a letter dated October 9, 1967 (S/8186), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Chairman ad interim of the delegation of Senegal to the 22nd session of the General Assembly, charged that on September 1, Portuguese
elements opened fire on Senegalese territory with automatic weapons and mortars; that on September 16, Portuguese elements infiltrated into Senegalese territory in the area of Santhiaha-Manjacque, where they set fire to seven houses and engaged in looting; and that on September 23, Portuguese elements infiltrated into Senegal and killed one refugee.

In a further letter dated November 29, 1967 (S/8277), the Permanent Representative of Senegal charged further violations of its territory committed by Portugal: on October 7 Portuguese aircraft had flown over the M'Paack arrondissement, this violating Senegalese air space; during the night of 5–6 Portuguese elements had crossed the Senegalese border and thrown two grenades, wounding several people; on November 5 Portuguese elements had crossed the border, carried off a refugee, struck a woman and stolen some money. Portugal, it was stated, was responsible for these violations of Senegal's territorial integrity.


CHAPTER 7—COMPLAINTS BY SENEGAL: LETTERS DATED NOVEMBER 27 AND DECEMBER 7, 1969, FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SENEGAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (S/9513 AND S/9541)

A. Communications and request for a meeting

542. In a letter dated November 27, 1969 (S/9513), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Senegal complained that on November 25, 1969, regular Portuguese armed forces situated at Bissau in Guinea (Bissau) had shelled the village of Samin6 in southern Senegal, killing one woman and seriously wounding eight other persons, causing damage to property and rendering several villagers homeless. It was not the first time, the letter declared, that Portuguese forces had attacked Senegal nationals and deliberately violated Senegalese territory. In view of the growing loss of human life and destruction of property, Senegal was obliged to denounce Portugal's systematic acts of provocation and to request that a meeting of the Council be convened as soon as possible to consider the question.

543. On December 2, 1969, representatives of 36 African States, in a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/9524 and add.1), supported Senegal's request, stating that, in doing so, they were demonstrating their solidarity with their sister state of Senegal in conformity with the provisions of the charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and were also expressing Africa's concern at the threats and acts of aggression constantly committed by Portugal against the African States bordering on the territories under Portuguese domination. The African States hoped that the Security Council would be able to deal with the situation and, acting in accordance with chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, would take the necessary measures to put an end to those acts of aggression on the part of Portugal.

B. Consideration at the 1516th to 1520th meetings (December 4–9, 1969)

544. At its 1516th meeting on December 4, 1969, the Security Council included the item in its agenda and, at their request, invited the representatives of Portugal, Senegal, and Morocco to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. Subsequently, the Council issued similar invitations to the representatives of Guinea, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, and Yemen.

545. At that meeting, the representative of Senegal described in detail the incident cited in his letter of November 27 and went on to complain about numerous provocative violations of Senegal's sovereignty and territorial integrity committed by Portuguese forces between April 8, 1963, and November 1969, during which period, he recalled, the Security Council had adopted resolutions 178 (1963), of April 24, 1963, and 204 (1965), of May 19, 1965, both deploiring such activities. Notwithstanding those resolutions, Portugal had, in fact, intensified its acts of aggression and between January and November 1969, he charged, the incidents had become more frequent and more serious, as Portuguese forces violated Senegalese air space and fired on Senegalese villages every month, killing, wounding and kidnapping villagers. Portugal's policy of systematic provocations and violations of the territorial integrity of African countries, the representative of Senegal continued, was supported by its allies, particularly South Africa. If Portugal were to continue that policy, then Senegal would have no other choice
than to resort to force in order to impose respect of its territorial sovereignty and integrity. However, Senegal was convinced that the Security Council would condemn effectively the Portuguese authorities and their acts of aggression.

546. The Representative of Algeria referred to the letter from the 36 African delegations supporting Senegal's complaint and charged that Portugal had committed similar acts of aggression against the Congo (Brazzaville), the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Tanzania, and Zambia. Senegal, he said, had been attacked because it had complied with the Charter of the Organization of African States, and because, like all African states, it had implemented the OAU and United Nations resolutions condemning Portugal for refusing to accord the right of self-determination to the African peoples under Portuguese domination in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea (Bissau). It was well known to all African countries that Portugal persisted in its policy of aggression because it counted on NATO for weapons and logistic support. Indeed, it had formed an alliance with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia in an attempt to consolidate their colonial-racist regimes. Algeria believed that there was no other path for the liberation of the African people under Portuguese domination than armed struggle, as had been the case in the liberation of certain countries in Asia and Europe and of Algeria itself. The Security Council should unequivocally condemn Portugal for its acts of aggression against Senegal and other independent African states.

547. Before making his statement, the Representative of Portugal asked three questions of the representative of Senegal in order to clarify certain basic facts: (1) Whether anti-Portuguese organizations dedicated to violence had not been allowed to operate from bases in Senegal; (2) whether the village of Samine was not one such base; and (3) whether Senegal had contacted Portugal on its complaint before notifying the Security Council.

548. In reply, the Representative of Senegal stated that there were in Senegal approximately 50,000 refugees from Guinea (Bissau) under regular supervision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. As to the second question, he suggested that the necessary conclusion be drawn from the list of casualties at Samine, which included persons from 70 years down to 1 year of age. As to the third question, Senegal had no need to contact the Portuguese Government; it had addressed itself to the Security Council and was awaiting the decision of that body.

549. The Representative of Portugal explained that the significance of his questions, which he said had not been answered, was to ascertain whether in the case at issue the Portuguese forces had attacked or reacted in self-defense. The attacks, he declared, had in every case, come from Senegal; Portugal had limited itself to actions strictly in conformity with the needs of self-defense. It was a matter of common knowledge that anti-Portuguese forces operated from bases in Senegal, of which Saminé was one. For several years now, the population living in the frontier areas of Portuguese Guinea were constantly harassed by armed bands coming from Senegal. Furthermore, those armed bands were equipped with sophisticated weapons which could come only from the arsenals of powers outside Africa whose avowed policy was to feed the fires of international strife. The Security Council he added must take into account that aspect of the problem because it threw a new and sinister light on the entire pattern of hostile acts directed against Portuguese Guinea. In 1969 alone, he asserted there had been 37 attacks with heavy Senegalese artillery fire against Portuguese Guinea; 25 further attacks mounted by raiders from Senegal; 10 violations of Portuguese Guinea's airspace by Senegalese helicopters supporting infiltrating raiders; and eight other violations of airspace by Senegalese planes apparently flying reconnaissance missions. In the face of those attacks, no one could contest Portugal's right of self-defense, which it exercised to the indispensable minimum.

550. The Portuguese Representative then quoted the statement made by the President of Portugal on December 1, 1969, to the effect that Portugal's policy had always been to respect scrupulously the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighboring countries, but that pursuit of invading raiders retreated to those countries might have given rise to an error along extensive and poorly demarcated borders. Therefore, the Representative continued, the possibility could not be excluded that in the particular incident under consideration, Portuguese return fire might have produced the results alleged by Senegal. If so, Portugal was prepared to settle the issue by conciliation, after convening a bilateral commission of investigation, should Senegal be willing to contact Portugal for that purpose in terms of article 33 of the Charter. He emphasized that Portugal had no interest in antagonizing Senegal or any other African country, and that it had unsuccessfully tried to seek cooperation with the neighboring African countries and to con-
clude nonaggression pacts with them. However, they were avowedly hostile to Portugal and were aiding and encouraging violence against its territories in Africa. They then complained to the Security Council when border incidents occurred as a result of Portugal's exercise of the right of self-defense. Dislike for the internal policy of a country did not justify the use of violence to force that country to change its policy.

551. The Representative of Guinea informed the President of the Security Council that by a letter dated December 4, 1969 (S/9528), Guinea had decided to request a separate meeting of the Council to consider a recent act of aggression committed by Portugal against Guinea. Accordingly, he postponed the invitation granted him to address the council until an appropriate moment.

552. At the 1517th meeting of the Council on December 5, the Representative of Senegal denied that Senegalese troops had participated in attacks against Guinea (Bissau) and asked the Representative of Portugal to prove his allegations. The Representative of Portugal replied that he would do so at a later stage.

553. The Representative of France deplored the fact that Senegal—a country with which France had long had friendly relations—had not, in spite of its commendable patience, been spared from frontier violations by the Portuguese Armed Forces. He expressed concern that Portugal had not abided by the undertaking it had given in 1963 to respect the territorial integrity of Senegal. Notwithstanding France's cordial relations with Portugal, his delegation could not, whatever the reasons advanced by Portugal, approve of actions contrary to article 2 of the United Nations Charter, which called on member states to refrain from the use of force against the territorial integrity of any state. France wished that Portugal had sought through bilateral negotiations a solution to difficulties for which Senegal appeared in no way responsible. He hoped the Council would adopt a resolution that would be satisfactory to Senegal and contribute to a lasting solution of the problem.

554. The Representative of Sierra Leone stated that this latest act of aggression against Senegal confirmed that Portugal, despite its claim, was not ready to extend a hand of friendship to African countries. Disconcerted by the victories of freedom fighters, who controlled large areas within Guinea (Bissau) itself, Portugal had embarked upon acts of provocation and aggression against Senegal and other independent African states that constituted a threat to international peace and security. His delegation disagreed completely with the notion, expressed or implied, that countries aiding liberation movements to attain their goal of freedom and independence for their homelands were committing any wrong. Such a notion would certainly be in conflict with United Nations resolutions. Nor could his delegation support the concept of reprisals under the guise of self-defense. The truth of the matter was that because of relentless repression of Africans in territories under Portuguese domination thousands had sought refuge in the neighboring independent African states. The complaint before the Council was a result of that situation, and the Council must deal with it firmly.

555. The Representative of Liberia said that the Representative of Senegal had given the Council a clear picture of the horrors of Portuguese aggression in Africa, but the Representative of Portugal had limited himself to asking extraneous questions. It was well known, he continued, that Portugal, a country with limited resources, could not maintain 150,000 troops to suppress the rightful aspirations to self-determination and independence of the people under its domination without the active support and participation of its NATO Allies. He deplored that certain states were unwilling to take positive steps to put an end to Portuguese aggression, thereby prolonging a battle that would grow increasingly bitter as the last opportunities for peaceful conciliation were frittered away. He referred to the Lusaka Manifesto on southern Africa and asked Portugal to attune its policy to realities by realizing that eventual independence of its African territories was unavoidable. He hoped the Security Council would strongly condemn Portugal for its acts of war against African states.

556. The Representative of Morocco said that it had become clear over the past 6 years that neither the Council's resolutions 178 (1963) and 204 (1965) nor Portugal's assurances of good neighborliness had succeeded in preventing the recurrence and multiplication of incidents between Portugal and the African countries bordering on its territories. Senegal, he added, had no quarrel with Portugal; it had, however, a moral duty to support the struggle of people under colonial domination. If the "right of hot pursuit" in areas of conflict were to be accepted, he said, the result would be an expansion of the conflict to neighboring countries, as was the case in the Middle East and the Far East, where countries were becoming victims of aggression because they opened their borders to people
fleeing from oppressive regimes and overwhelming military power. He asked the Council to consider the current complaint in the light of the aggression committed rather than the number of victims or the amount of damage caused.

557. The Representative of Hungary said that Portugal was pursuing an outdated and shameful colonial policy, under which it maintained its so-called overseas territories in Africa by force of arms, in complete defiance of numerous United Nations resolutions and elementary rules of international law. He emphasized that responsibility for the continuation of Portuguese policy of repression in its African territories and acts of aggression against its independent African states must be shared by its NATO Allies, which gave Portugal uninterrupted military and economic support. In the view of his delegation, the Security Council should condemn Portugal's premeditated aggression against Senegal and its continued occupation of territories in Africa. The Council should also call upon all States giving military and economic aid to Portugal, whether bilateral or multilateral, to withdraw such aid.

558. The Representative of Saudi Arabia stated that colonies were an anachronism in the era of the United Nations. Citing cases of countries that had been liberated after the Second World War, he urged Portugal which, he said, had a commendable record of nondiscrimination in racial matters, to follow the example of former colonial powers and to heed the lessons of history, as no country had long succeeded in suppressing the aspirations of liberation movements. He felt that such a course would save Portugal from the economic ruin of trying to retain its colonies by force of arms.

559. At the 1518th meeting, on December 8, the President informed the Council that, by a letter dated December 7 (S/9541), the Representative of Senegal had submitted another complaint for consideration by the Council concerning renewed shelling of Saminé on that day, resulting in further casualties and damage to property.

560. The new complaint was included in the agenda of the Council and considered together with the previous one.

561. The representative of Senegal, referring to the above complaint, charged that on the morning of December 7 regular Portuguese forces had continuously shelled the village of Saminé, killing five people and seriously wounding another. He stressed that the new aggression, committed at the time when the Council was considering a similar complaint, was aimed both at Senegal and the Council itself, for which Portugal had no respect. Moreover, the shellings were Portugal's only answer to the four-point peace plan for Guinea (Bissau) publicly proposed by the President of Senegal; namely, a cease-fire, followed immediately by negotiations between Portugal and the nationalist movements, and a period of internal autonomy granted by Portugal to be followed by independence within the framework of a Lusitanian-African community. In those circumstances, Senegal again asked the Security Council, if it wished to avoid a catastrophe in west Africa, to condemn Portugal severely and without delay for its acts of aggression against the Senegalese village of Saminé on November 25 and December 7.

562. The representative of Madagascar declared that the right of self-defense invoked by Portugal could not be exercised to the detriment of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Senegal, which had attacked no one. His delegation believed that if the rights of the administering power were to be recognized, its duties should be equally stressed, and it was Portugal's main duty, in accordance with United Nations decisions, to lead the people under its administration to the exercise of self-determination; otherwise, the Africans in Guinea (Bissau) had a legitimate right to engage in the struggle for their freedom and independence. The representative of Madagascar renewed his appeal to the great powers to implement previous Security Council resolutions requesting all states to refrain from giving any assistance to the Portuguese Government that would enable it to continue its repression of the peoples of the territories under its administration. The great powers, he added, were in a position to persuade Portugal to take a more realistic and less rigid attitude in its relations with the African states, which could not ignore the just aspirations to independence and freedom of their brothers under Portuguese administration. With regard to suggestions made during the debate that Senegal should have exhausted all the means available under article 33 of the charter before bringing its complaint to the Security Council, his delegation believed that bilateral negotiations or conciliation presupposed a will on the part of the parties concerned to abide by the terms of the
settlement and that the situation giving rise to the dispute was one which lent itself to peaceful settlement; however, given nonimplementation by Portugal of Security Council resolutions and the deliberate and premediated attacks by that country against Senegal, the latter had rightly turned to the Council.

563. The representative of Tunisia considered that it was the duty of the Security Council to put an end to a situation that threatened the security and integrity of a member state and to help eliminate the vestiges of colonialism, which was one of the most serious obstacles to international peace and security. Senegal's efforts to avoid aggravating its relations with Portugal had met with the lack of realism and intransigency characteristic of a colonialist mentality. The new aggression by Portugal, he said, confirmed its refusal to comply with United Nations resolutions and confronted the Council once again with the problem of colonial wars spilling over on to territories of neighbouring independent states. Portugal, he continued, had no grounds to invoke the right of self-defence as it did not possess any legitimate claim over African territories. On the contrary, the General Assembly had, since its adoption of resolution 1514 (XV) on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, reiterated the inalienable right of the peoples under Portuguese domination to self-determination and independence and had recognized the legitimacy of the struggle of the national liberation movements. There could be no peace in Africa, he said, so long as African peoples continued to suffer under the yoke of colonialism.

564. The representative of the United Arab Republic observed that Portugal had not denied the charges brought by Senegal but had argued that Portuguese forces had acted in self-defence against the activities of nationalists allegedly operating from Senegal. However, the Security Council in dealing with previous complaints against Portugal, as well as in the case of complaints by Jordan and Lebanon against Israel, had made it abundantly clear that the concept of retaliation was contrary to the charter and contemporary norms of international law. Retaliation, he added, ignored the basic cause of the conflict—the injustice imposed upon a people by colonial rule—the effective remedy for which was the eradication of that injustice. The attacks alleged by Portugal could not be considered attacks against the Portuguese people; they were attacks on the forces of colonialism and the occupiers of Guinea (Bissau), a non-self-governing territory entitled under the United Nations Charter to self-government and independence. On the 25th anniversary of the United Nations, Portugal should honor the ideas of “peace, justice and progress” and grant the peoples in its territories the freedom and independence to which they rightfully aspired.

565. The representative of Mali said that Portugal's acts of aggression against Senegal, Zambia, Guinea, and other independent African states were multiplying, a situation which urgently called for effective measures by the Security Council. It would be useless, he said, to try to persuade the Government of Portugal to change its policies. Portugal had never understood the changes that had occurred in Africa nor the determination of the African people to free themselves from foreign domination; thus, it had refused to cooperate with the United Nations in promoting a peaceful evolution of its territories toward self-government and independence. In his delegation's view, peace and justice in Africa could only be assured when Portuguese colonialism and the racist policies practiced by the regimes of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa had been abolished. He called on the Security Council for unanimous condemnation of Portugal's acts of aggression against Senegal and Guinea and for measures to insure that such acts were not repeated.

566. The representative of Yemen said that Portugal, in defiance of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and utter disregard of international public opinion, persisted in its aggression against peace-loving African states. The colonialism that Portugal wished to perpetuate had become obsolete and was condemned by almost all states, including those which had recently practiced colonialism. The representative of Yemen went on to say that Portugal depended heavily on the exploitation of the economic resources of its territories; a discriminatory and force system enabled the Portuguese and foreign interests to exploit African resources and manpower. Every means, he said, was considered appropriate to favor Portuguese companies operating on a system of force and unremunerated labor. Thus, it was not difficult to understand why Portugal clung to its colonial possessions, even at the cost of maintaining a huge army. The Security Council had been too lenient with Portugal, as it had been with South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Israel, countries which had refused to implement its resolutions. Another resolution deploring border clashes between Portugal and its African neighbors would not be an adequate response to Senegal's
Those Americans who are familiar with Mauritius generally know it only through its valuable old stamps and as the habitat of the dodo, now celebrated on the Mauritian coat of arms. Less well known is the motto on the coat of arms: "The Star and Key of the Indian Ocean." Mauritius occupies an important location, and its native beauty and strategic importance were once familiar to generations of Americans.

However, with the decline of American whaling activities during the Civil War, and the subsequent opening of the Suez Canal, Mauritius became an infrequent port of call for American vessels.

The closing of the Suez Canal in 1967 and the proclamation of Mauritian independence in March 1968, have revived some American interest in Mauritius. More than twice as many American ships called at Port Louis in 1970 as in 1966. Our own presence, reestablished at the consulate level in December 1967, was raised to embassy status on independence and, in June 1970, the first resident ambassador was accredited. These steps coincided with increased interest on the part of the British, French, Russians, and other powers.

Mauritius has been described as "a French colony under 150 years of British administration." The British undertook not to disturb the existing habits and cultural heritage of the local population, then largely French in origin. As a result, English and French are still used interchangeably by the educated. Mauritius regards the Queen as sovereign and looks to the British for economic and security support. The British have a major naval communication center on the island. A GOM/UK "defense agreement" provides for consultation in the event that the GOM feels threatened by domestic or foreign forces. But after independence France has become increasingly active, taking advantage of the country's cultural heritage and its proximity to Reunion (an integral part of France).

Through the conversations the study mission had with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Governor-General, and several others, we came away with a far better perception of Mauritius' problems, aspirations, and achievements.

When one speaks of Mauritian economic activity, one is very largely speaking in terms of one commodity—sugar. The sugar industry gives employment to about one-third of the active population of Mauritius and accounts for about 30 percent of GNP. Over 90 percent of the cultivated area is devoted to sugarcane.

Sugar earnings are virtually the sole source of foreign exchange, currently amounting to 92 percent of export revenues. About 60 percent of the crop is sold under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement at preferential prices; 30 percent is sold on the world market at unregulated prices; 3 percent or about 17,000 tons was the 1970 U.S. quota. About 19,000 tons were purchased by the United States in 1971.
complaint; the Council must take the measures necessary to put an end to Portugal’s aggression and apply sanctions, if its resolutions were not implemented.

567. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that the colonial war waged by Portugal in its territories was rapidly becoming a war against the independent states of Africa. In clear defiance of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, Portuguese forces had again violated the territorial integrity of Senegal and other African states. As the Soviet delegation had pointed out in its proposals to the General Assembly concerning the strengthening of international security, peace and security in southern and western Africa could only be strengthened by the immediate cessation of the war being waged by Portugal against the people of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) and by the granting of independence to those peoples in accordance with the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Furthermore, General Assembly Resolution 2507 (XXIV) of November 21, 1969, had reaffirmed the inalienable right of the peoples in territories under Portuguese administration to self-determination and independence, and if Portugal did not grant them that right peacefully, they had every justification to fight for it. Under those circumstances, it was the people of Guinea (Bissau), not Portugal, who should claim the right of self-defence.

568. The representative of the USSR further stated that, contrary to certain illusions resulting from its now leadership, Portugal, supported by its NATO allies, had actually increased its military expenditure, its armies and its police force in order to fight the patriotic forces in its colonies. Indeed, Portugal had joined in alliance with the Fascist and racist regimes of south Africa and Southern Rhodesia, whose purpose was to prevent the liberation of the oppressed African peoples and to maintain considerable territories of Africa as a base for imperialism and as a beachhead for attack against independent African countries. The General Assembly, in its resolution 2507 (XXIV), had also called upon all states to give moral and material support to the peoples in Territories under Portuguese domination; the Soviet Union fully supported peoples in Africa in their struggle for liberation.

569. The representative of Nepal said that the representative of Portugal had sought to justify the shelling of the Senegalese village of Samine on grounds of self-defence, but that argument could not be accepted, first, because it was fallacious and unsupported by facts, and, secondly, because Portugal, which had admonished Senegal for not seeking negotiations under article 33 of the charter, had not availed itself of the means provided for in that article but had resorted to armed retaliation. The failure of Portugal to implement the numerous Security Council resolutions indicated that that country had adopted a policy of all-out hostility and punitive action against African countries bordering on its colonial territories. Furthermore, Portugal had disregarded several decisions of the General Assembly that had unreservedly upheld the right of the peoples in Portuguese territories to immediate independence and had chosen to cling to its colonial possessions, a situation which created a permanent source of friction in the African continent.

570. In conclusion, he said that his delegation was prepared to support any draft resolution that would insure against further violations of Senegal’s territorial integrity.

571. The representative of Mauritania said that the policy of provocation and intimidation followed by the Fascist regime of Lisbon would not deter any African country from fulfilling its duty to give aid and support to the national liberation movements struggling against an intolerable and universally condemned colonialist adventure. The representative of Portugal had once more distorted the facts by assuming the guise of those who acted in legitimate defense. He deceived no one. Portugal was not an African country, and Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) were not and did not wish to be provinces of Portugal. His delegation wished to emphasize the dangers involved both for Africa and the United Nations by a repetition of Portugal’s acts of aggression against Senegal. The Security Council therefore should unequivocally condemn Portuguese attacks against Senegal and provide for specific measures that it would adopt without delay if such attacks were renewed.

572. At the 1519th meeting, on December 8, 1969, the Council had before it a draft resolution (S/9542) sponsored by Algeria, Nepal, Pakistan, and Zambia that was subsequently revised by the representative of Pakistan on behalf of the sponsors. The revised text of the draft resolution (S/9542/Rev.1) read as follows:

"The Security Council
Taking note of the complaints by Senegal against Portugal contained in documents S/9513 and S/9541,
"Conscious of its responsibility for taking effective collective measures to forestall and eliminate threats to international peace and security,

"Bearing in mind that all states must refrain in their international relations from recourse to the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any manner incompatible with the purposes of the United Nations,

"Concerned about the serious situation created by the shelling of the village of Saminé in the southern region of Senegal from the Bégène base,

"Deeply concerned at the fact that incidents of this nature jeopardize international peace and security,


"1. Strongly condemns the Portuguese colonial authorities for the shelling of the village of Saminé, which (1) on November 25, 1969, caused one death and seriously wounded eight persons, struck a building of the Senegalese gendarmerie and completely destroyed two houses in the village of Saminé, and (2) on December 7, 1969, caused five deaths and seriously wounded one woman;

"2. Again calls upon Portugal to desist forthwith from violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Senegal;

"3. Declares that in the event of failure by Portugal to comply with operative paragraph 2 of the present resolution, the Security Council will meet to consider other measures;

"4. Decides to remained seized of the question."

573. In introducing the four-power draft resolution, the representative of Pakistan said that the complaint by Senegal should not be considered in isolation but should be seen in the context of the confrontation between the Governments and peoples of free Africa and Portuguese colonialism. In his statement the representative of Portugal had contended that his country had reacted to a series of violent actions directed against Portuguese Guinea that had been caused or allowed to be caused by Senegal. That claim to self-defense was untenable first, because neither the United Nations nor the Organization of African States recognized Portugal's colonial possessions in Africa and, second, because the General Assembly itself, in resolution 2105 (XX), had called on all States to provide moral and material assistance to national liberation movements in colonial territories. With regard to Portugal's assertion that frontier incidents between Portuguese colonial territories and their African neighbors should be settled through bilateral negotiations, Pakistan felt that, even if that were possible, the root of the conflict involved an issue which concerned the international community, especially the Security Council, which was primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. It was the duty of the Council, if it wished to ease tensions in Africa, to extend the fullest moral and political support to Senegal in defense of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The draft resolution, which his delegation, together with those of Algeria, Nepal and Zambia, had submitted to the Council, was not, he declared, animus against Portugal but inspired by grave concern at the situation existing on the Senegal-Guinea border and the potential danger along the entire frontier between free Africa and Portuguese colonialism.

574. The representative of Finland stated that the complaint of Senegal merited the Council's most serious consideration and should be seen in the larger context: the underlying cause for the pattern of tension and violence between African territories under Portuguese administration and neighboring African States was Portugal's persistent refusal to make any advance towards granting the people in its territories the self-determination and independence to which they had an inalienable right under chapter XI of the United Nations Charter and the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. In the case at hand, the representative of Portugal had not disclaimed responsibility for the incident of November 25 but had maintained that his country had acted in legitimate self-defense. In the view of the Finnish delegation it was the primary duty of the parties concerned to resolve such a dispute by the means envisaged in article 33 of the charter; however, as the minimum measure of mutual confidence required for such a procedure seemed absent, it was the Council's duty to investigate the complaint and seek an effective remedy within the terms of chapter VI of the Charter.

575. The representative of Syria said that the problems arising from the non-compliance by Portugal with United Nations resolution 1514 (XV) must indeed be the concern of all Member States inasmuch as colonialism was incompatible with the principles and purposes of the Organization. In the opinion of his delegation,
the denial of the right of self-determination to Africans under colonial rule and the repeated encroachments on the security and territorial integrity of independent African States constituted a threat to international peace and security. If Portugal's defiance of United Nations resolutions were allowed to continue with impunity, the United Nations would be unable to fulfill its role in insuring peace and justice. In his statement, the representative of Portugal had suggested that Senegal should have resorted to bilateral negotiations. But had not the Lisbon regime undermined from the start the very premises of any fruitful dialog by its absurd claim that the African Territories under its domination were Portuguese provinces and had no right to self-determination? The presence of Portugal in Africa by force of arms was unwanted and illegitimate. It was therefore the duty of the Security Council to enforce the rule of law, accelerate the access of the subjected people to the exercise of self-determination and silence with effective measures the guns of the aggressors in Africa once and for all.

The representative of Colombia stated that his delegation's position in connection with principles involved during the Council's discussion of the item was against the survival of all colonial regimes and that the self-determination of peoples was one of the essential tenets governing his country's international relations.

The President, speaking as the representative of Zambia, stated that the representative of Senegal had given the Council a precise account of Portuguese violations against his country, but the representative of Portugal had been content with making an overall, cynical denial of the charges. He recalled that in connection with Zambia's recent complaint against Portugal, some of Portugal's allies had not supported the resolution then adopted by the Council, on the grounds that Zambia had failed to establish a prima facie case. He hoped, however, that those countries would join in a unanimous condemnation of Portugal's acts of aggression against Senegal. He said that Portugal, comforted by the support it received from its NATO allies, defied with impunity all General Assembly and Security Council resolutions concerning the granting of independence to peoples in colonial territories and sought to confuse the Council's debate by falsely claiming that the African countries neighboring on its territories were at war with it. Actually those countries, by giving shelter to refugees from the Portuguese Territories were simply complying with General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX) and the Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa. He appealed to Portugal, which he said was spending 45 percent of its national budget for defense, to permit the people of its territories to shape their own destiny, because no single nation, however strong, could crush the spirit of nationalism and freedom.

At the 1520th meeting on December 9, 1969, the representative of Portugal, in exercise of his right of reply, said that the representative of Senegal had asked him to furnish proof that Senegalese troops had participated in the attack against Guinea (Bissau). But he pointed out, Senegal itself had furnished no proof in support of its complaints; and if the statements of the Senegalese representative were to be regarded as proof, so should his. Contrary to what some delegations had asserted during the debate, his delegation had not admitted the charges in Senegal's first complaint or used such expressions as "reprisals," "retaliation" and "pursuit" in stating Portugal's position on the right of self-defense. With regard to the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions quoted by many delegations, he said that such resolutions were only recommendations, which member states could accept or reject in exercise of their sovereign right and judgment. He emphasized that Portugal had been admitted as a state member of the United Nations with all its territories as defined in the Portuguese constitution; it was therefore beyond the competence of the United Nations to question the territorial integrity of the Portuguese State.

Referring to Senegal's complaint of December 7, the representative of Portugal said that information obtained by his delegation indicated no involvement by Portuguese security forces in the new incident at Saminé. However, he asserted that a fracas did appear to have occurred at Saminé on that day, involving the local population and rival groups among the armed elements there organized to attack Portuguese Guinea.

The representative of Senegal, exercising the right of reply, said that the statement of the representative of Portugal had sidestepped the issue and had been made only for the benefit of those who wished to find attenuating circumstances for Portugal.
In explanation of his Government's position before the vote, the representative of Paraguay said that all the circumstances of the incidents indicated that there had been a violation of Senegal's sovereignty and territorial integrity by Portugal. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states was one of the cornerstones of international relations and a principle of the charter. His delegation would vote in favor of the draft resolution.

The representative of China said the facts of the Senegalese complaint against Portugal were not in dispute. His delegation would vote for the draft resolution because, in its view, the use of armed force by Portuguese authorities to violate the territorial integrity of Senegal could not be condoned.

The representative of the United States stated that it was not his delegation's intention to cast doubt on the credibility of either party; however, as in the case of the Zambian complaint, his Government would have been more prepared to take a position on the merits of the case, if the Council had been in possession of some impartially verified account of the current complaints. Indeed, from the information provided to the Security Council, it appeared that force had been used by both sides. The draft resolution made a specific finding against Portugal, he declared, which his delegation was unable to support in the circumstances described. Its position on the draft resolution did not, however, have anything to do with its attitude on the more fundamental question of self-determination for the Portuguese Territories, which the United States had consistently supported. Its position on the draft resolution did not, however, have anything to do with its attitude on the more fundamental question of self-determination for the Portuguese Territories, which the United States had consistently supported.

The representative of France said that his delegation, although it did not challenge Portugal's right of self-defense, could not approve of the firing by Portuguese authorities on the territory of Senegal, an eminently peaceful country; consequently, it would vote for the draft resolution.

The representative of the United Kingdom stated that his Government did not support the policies of Portugal in Africa by moral, military or economic means, and it had long advocated a policy of self-determination in the Portuguese territories. The Council, however, was not dealing with Portugal's overall policy but with a specific complaint, with regard to which the Council had to make a judgment on the basis of the reports before it. Those reports had been well presented by both the representative of Portugal and the representative of Senegal and should be accepted in good faith. The reports of the representative of Senegal were convincing, and they had not been denied by Portugal. Consequently, his delegation would vote for the draft resolution, which was forward-looking and demanded nonrepetition of such incidents in the future.

The representative of Spain stated that his delegation had hoped that the parties concerned would have conducted talks to determine the facts and possibly decide on payment of compensation, since Portugal was prepared to do so, if the facts so warranted. Spain could not support the draft resolution but appealed for avoidance of the repetition of incidents which caused the lives of so many innocent victims.

**Decision.**—At the 1520th meeting, on December 9, 1969, the draft resolution (S/9542/Rev. 1), as amended, was adopted by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Spain and the United States), as resolution 273 (1969).

In a statement after the vote, the representative of Portugal deplored resolution 273 (1969) as totally one-sided and based on unproved allegations. Claiming that the draft resolution had been introduced even before his delegation had had an opportunity to examine Senegal's second complaint, which it had since denied, he stated that the situation raised serious doubts as to the usefulness of his delegation's continuance of the attitude it had so far maintained toward the Council.
411. In a letter dated July 16 (S/9870), the Chargé d'Affaires of Portugal denied the charges lodged by Senegal on July 8, stating that no Portuguese troops had violated Senegalese sovereignty and that the village of Sarré Samba Dialé had not been attacked by Portuguese soldiers on June 22, 1970. In reality, it stated, subversive elements from Senegal had penetrated Portuguese Guinea at that time and set fire to three hamlets.

412. In another letter dated July 16 (S/9871), the Chargé d'Affaires of Portugal charged that, on the night of July 12/13, about 300 subversive elements from Senegal had initiated an operation of vast proportions in Portuguese Guinea. As a result, 15 persons were dead, 41 wounded, and one was listed as missing, and 50 family dwellings were burnt. The letter stated that the Portuguese Government could not tolerate the continuous killings of the civilian population and hoped that measures would be adopted to put an end to such acts.

413. In a letter dated July 17 (S/9875), the Chargé d'Affaires of Senegal charged that, on July 14, Portuguese artillery had totally destroyed a Senegalese village, killing two persons and wounding two others. Attached to his letter was a list of acts of aggression committed by Portugal against Senegal since December 1969. The letter stated that Portugal had continuously violated Senegalese airspace and shelled villages situated in border areas. As a result of those acts of aggression, 31 persons had been killed or wounded or taken away, and 293 houses and a considerable amount of property had been destroyed. His government therefore warned Portugal that such actions should stop at once.

414. In a letter dated December 16 (S/10043), the Representative of Senegal charged that Portuguese aircraft had been dropping leaflets over Senegal inviting the population of the southern part of the Republic to rebel against their government. Furthermore, Portuguese soldiers had continued their intrusions into Senegalese territory, committing acts of banditry. The letter posed the question of how a poor country such as Portugal could afford not only to sustain a struggle against Africans in the territories under its administration, but to intervene in the affairs of a neighboring sovereign state.

415. In a letter dated April 27, 1971 (S/10182), the Representative of Senegal complained to the Security Council that, on the night of March 31-April 1, units of the Portuguese Army based in Guinea (Bissau) had attacked and burned a Senegalese village. As a result of that attack, one person had been killed, five seriously, and 12 slightly wounded and a considerable amount of personal property destroyed. On the night of April 16/17, Portuguese units had launched an attack against two other villages that had resulted in the death of three persons and the wounding of another three. In addition, 75 huts and tons of rice and millet had been burned. The letter stated that Portugal, in contempt of Security Council resolution 273 (1969), had continued its policy of aggression against Senegal and requested the Council to warn Portugal that Senegal would take appropriate measures to defend its territory.

416. In a letter dated May 10 (S/10191), addressed to the President of the Council, the Representative of Guinea corroborated Senegal's complaints of April 27 and expressed his government's support of the people of Senegal in the face of the attacks by Portugal.

CHAPTER 13—COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN SENEGAL AND GUINEA

417. In a letter dated December 22, 1970 (S/10053), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Senegal protested the accusation made against his country by the President of Guinea in his message (S/10045) of December 19 (see above, ch. 7, sec. E) to the effect that military formations were being massed along Guinea's border with Portuguese Guinea (Bissau) and Senegal. He stated that it was inconceivable that Senegal, a fellow member of the Organization of the Senegal Riparian States that had also been subjected to almost daily attacks by Portuguese Regular Armed Forces and had been one of the first to speak out in support of Guinea, would ever allow its territory to be used as a drillground for Portuguese forces or for mercenaries preparing to invade Guinea.

418. In a letter dated December 23 (S/10056), to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Guinea pointed out that it was not his government's intention to make unfounded accusations, as the representative of Senegal had charged. He broadcast a letter from a Guinean resident in Senegal reporting a concentration of troops of African and European origin along the Guinea-Senegal border. Moreover, information subsequently provided
by the Government of Senegal indicated that the troops were to hold joint maneuvers. Such information had understandably alarmed the Government and people of Guinea.

419. The representative of Senegal, in a reply dated December 28 (S/10064), maintained that the grave misunderstandings occasioned by Guinea's circulation of reports obtained from a mere Guinean resident in Senegal could only serve the common enemies of the African peoples. He quoted from a press report indicating that the perplexing accusation by Guinea was detrimental to African unity and recalled the message of friendship and gratitude sent by the President of Guinea to the President of Senegal, following the meeting in Lagos of the Council of Ministers of OAU. He added that, immediately upon the announcement of an intended attack on Guinea, the routine joint French-Senegalese maneuvers, normally held in various parts of Senegal, had been canceled.

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

LETTER DATED JUNE 16, 1971, FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (S/10227)

On instructions from my Government, I have the honor to inform you of the extremely grave events which have occurred on the border between Senegal and Guinea (Bissau) during the month of June 1971.

On June 5, 1971, a military vehicle of the seventh CFV, based at Samine, struck a mine which had been laid in Senegalese territory by the Portuguese forces. Seven persons were wounded, two of them seriously. (One sustained a severe head injury.) All were evacuated to Dakar by military aircraft.

On June 6, 1971, the village of Simbour, district of Diatta Coumnd, department of Sedhiou, was attacked by elements of the Portuguese Army. Grenades were thrown, killing a 17-year-old girl, and four head of cattle were stolen.

Previously, on April 26, 1971, the village of Salikogné, district of Dabo, department of Kolda, had been attacked by elements of the regular Portuguese Army. Six shells were fired on that occasion, wounding two persons.

On May 4, 1971, it was discovered that explosives had been set for the purpose of destroying the bridge situated between the localities of Salikogné and Saré Sissao, district of Dabo. There were two explosive devices on and under the bridge, each composed of nine bags of yellow powder together with 750-gram sticks of TNT bearing the inscription "Petardo Ted Pex No. ASRO/68"; each charge had a detonator cord ending in a detonator and a slow fuse. The two fuses had been lit and had burned to within 10 centimeters of the detonators. The devices had unquestionably been placed there by a 25-man Portuguese patrol which had been seen in the area.

On May 9, 1971, an antipersonnel mine was discovered in the village of Bambato, district of Diatta Coumnd, department of Sedhiou, and an antivehicle mine was found near the same village on the right side of the Ziguinchor-Tanaff road. The mines had apparently been laid by soldiers from the Bediene base in Guinea (Bissau), since there is a trail leading from the Senegalese locality in question to the base and footprints left by ranger boots, found at the place where the mines had been laid, were followed along the trail toward Bediene as far as the frontier.

On May 21, 1971, a mine-clearing operation was carried out between the villages of Saré Mansaly and Tidelly, Coumbacara sector, district of Dabo. The operation took 3 hours. Two antipersonnel mines were removed at a point 800 meters from Saré Mansaly; their removal was witnessed by the prefect of the department of Kolda, the sector chief, a noncommissioned officer in the gendarmerie and the captain serving as commandant, the GMI at Kolda. Before the arrival of the prefect and his aides, a third antipersonnel mine was discovered on a heavily traveled trail. Three policemen, Oumar Samb, Oumar Cisse and Moussa Sy, exploded it so that there would be no danger to the villagers. Two antivehicle mines were also removed at a point 200 meters northwest of the village of Tidelly; they bore the inscription "NULOZKA 116/53 200 C format 30 cm x 15 cm, grey color" and were in a rectangular wooden box. They were designed to explode on pressure. The footprints (Pataugas shoes) found around the mines led to the village of Saré Bakary in Guinea (Bissau), where there is a Portuguese base. The mines had apparently been laid during the night of May 19, 1971.

On May 23, 1971, in connection with the preparations for the visit to be made on May 24 by the departmental prefect, the frontier sector chief, Abdou Diæass,
left Kolda at 2 p.m. in his official vehicle (No. 3889 SO) together with a policeman, Daouda Bá. At a point 4 kilometers from the village of Saré N'Diaye, the vehicle struck a mine which had been laid between the latter village and the village of Medina Alpha Sadio. The explosion hurled the vehicle a distance of 7.5 meters; the sector chief was thrown 2 meters from the spot where the vehicle landed to a point 1 meter north of the trail and the policeman was thrown 9 meters in the direction of Medina Alpha Sadio. The two were taken by military ambulance to Kolda, where sector chief Abdou Diasse died of his wounds during the evening of May 23. The policeman was seriously wounded and the vehicle completely destroyed.

The laying of mines in Senegalese territory by the regular Portuguese armed forces constitutes an obvious and flagrant violation of Senegal's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

This complaint is further to the complaint communicated to you on April 27, 1971, which we are, of course, still pressing.

I reserve the right to request a meeting of the Security Council when I have received fuller information from my Government.

In the meantime, I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official Security Council document.

Accept, Sir, et cetera.

Ibrahim BOYE.

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

LETTER DATED JULY 6, 1971, FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SENEGAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (S/10251)

You will recall that on June 16, 1971, I sent you a letter which was circulated as document 10227 of June 17, 1971.

On instructions from my Government, I have the honor to inform you that on June 19, 1971, at about 11:50 a.m., the official vehicle of the chief of the district of Dioulaecol, department of Kolda, struck a mine at a point between the villages of Saré N'Diaye and Medina Alpha Sadio. Four persons were in the vehicle, which bore the registration number 49011SD. The chauffeur of the district chief and the apprentice chauffeur were wounded; the mechanic was killed outright and the assistant mechanic was seriously wounded. The wounded were taken to the hospital at Ziguinchor; the vehicle was completely destroyed.

Prior to this incident, on June 11, 1971, at about 5 p.m., an antitank mine was discovered on the Paradianto trail, 3 kilometers from Samine. This mine bore a Russian marking and was contained in a model 52 double charge wooden box.

During the night of June 30-July 1, 1971, between 2 a.m. and 5 a.m., two antitank mines were laid on the Cap Skiring Road, 100 meters from the Senegalese village of Santiaba Mandjack. The mines were laid about 1.5 meters apart. The Senegalese Army was sent to the scene and removed the mines. The Governor of the Casamance area was due to travel along this road on July 3, 1971, during a visit to the department of Oussouye.

During the same night of June 30-July 1, 1971, probably also between 2 a.m. and 5 a.m., a further antitank mine was laid about 1 kilometer away from the two mines referred to above. A public transport vehicle struck this mine; it was hurled 10 meters away and blown to pieces by the explosion. The toll of casualties was one dead and nine seriously wounded and two slightly wounded who were taken to the hospital at Ziguinchor.

On July 2, 1971, a fourth mine was discovered on the Cap Skiring Road near the Basse Casamance Park, at a point between the villages of Emaye and Santiaba Mandjack. The removal of the mine was witnessed by the Governor of the area, who was visiting at the time.

On the same day—July 2, 1971—between 2:10 p.m. and 2:30 p.m., six Portuguese jet aircraft flew over the sector of Basata, district of Diattacounda, department of Sédhiou.

On July 2, 1971, an "antitank" mine was discovered at a point 500 meters southwest of the village of Saré Alpha, department of Kolda. The mine was removed without damage.

During the night of July 2-3, 1971, a group of mercenaries launched an attack on the village of Diaby Counda, district of Diattacounda, department of Sédhiou, killing one person.
As promised in my letter of June 16, 1971, I am supplying you with the following additional information:

With regard to the incident of June 5, 1971, the military vehicle of the 7th Rifle Company based at Samine—type U 55, registration No. 20440388—struck a mine laid on the track linking Samine to the village of Touba Counta, 3 kilometers south of the village of Samine; the explosion occurred at about 2:40 p.m. The identity of the persons wounded is as follows:

2. Mandiaye Babou, "No. 77001162".
3. Mory Tall, "No. 37100653".
4. Momar Lissa Sarr, "No. 37001494".

With regard to the incident of May 21, 1971, the "antipersonnel" mine which was removed at a point 800 meters from Sarré Mansaly was marked "Russian RP BCC-200," main part plastic, wooden box, "pressure-operated." A second "antipersonnel" mine was removed at a point 850 meters northwest of Sarré Mansaly, near a rice plantation separating Sarré Mansaly from the village of Tidally; this mine was marked "Russian AP TP ONVOBAR allika 200 BC," main part plastic, wooden box, "pressure-operated." As indicated in my previous letter, the removal of these two mines was witnessed by the prefect of the department of Kolda, the sector chief, a noncommissioned officer in the gendarmerie, and the captain serving as commandant, the GMI at Kolda.

In view of all these facts and also the facts related in my previous letters of April 27 and June 1971, my Government requests that a meeting of the Security Council should be convened as a matter of urgency.

My government considers that the laying of mines in Senegalese territory by the regular Portuguese Armed Forces constitutes a further obvious and flagrant violation of Senegal’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, which should be punished by the international community.

The Senegalese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Karim Gaye, requests your permission to take part in the Council’s discussions without vote.

IBRAHIMA BOYE.

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

RESOLUTION 294 (1971)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1572d meeting, on July 15, 1971

The Security Council,

Taking note of the complaints of the Republic of Senegal against Portugal contained in documents S/10182 of April 27, 1971, and S/10251 of June 6, 1971,

Taking note of the letter of the Chargé d’Affaires a.i. of Portugal (S/10255 and Corr. 1),

Having heard the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Senegal,

Bearing in mind that all states members of the United Nations must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations (art. 2, par. 4, of the charter),

Conscious of its duty to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to international peace and security and for the suppression of acts of aggression (art. 1, par. 1, of the charter),

Disturbed at the increasingly serious situation created by acts of violence perpetrated by the Portuguese armed forces against the Republic of Senegal since the adoption of Security Council resolution 273 (1969) of December 9, 1969 (E/CN.4/1050 of Feb. 2, 1971),

Deeply distressed by the repeated laying of mines in Senegalese territory,

Gravely concerned that incidents of this nature, by threatening the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Senegal might endanger international peace and security,


Noting that Portugal has not complied with the provisions of operative paragraph 2 of resolution 273 (1969) of December 9, 1969 (E/CN.4/1050),

1. Demands that the Government of Portugal should stop immediately any acts of violence and destruction in Senegalese territory, and respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of Senegal;

2. Condemns the acts of violence and destruction perpetrated since 1963 by the Portuguese armed forces of Guinea (Bissau) against the population and villages of Senegal (E/CN.4/1050);

3. Condemns the unlawful laying of antitank and antipersonnel mines in Senegalese territory;

4. Requests the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General to send to the spot, as a matter of urgency, a special mission of members of the Security Council assisted by their military experts, to carry out an inquiry into the facts of which the Council has been informed, to examine the situation along the border between Guinea (Bissau) and Senegal and to report to the Security Council, making any recommendations aimed at guaranteeing peace and security in this region.

United Nations Security Council

Letter dated November 15, 1971, from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the United Nations (S/10388)

On instructions from my Government I have the honor to inform you of further incidents which occurred on the frontier between Senegal and Guinea (Bissau) in the night of November 3-4, 1971.

On November 3, at about 2230 G.m.t., the Senegalese army had to take action against Portuguese army units who were laying mines in the village of Djibanar, compelling them to abandon their task.

During the same evening, at about 2340 G.m.t., the Senegalese Army had to take action again, against Portuguese Army units who had just entered the village of Simbandi-Balante in order to steal cattle. The thieves took 200 head of cattle with them after firing several bursts of machinegun fire and throwing grenades. (Twelve 7.62mm cartridge cases were found and evidence of grenade explosions was noted.)

The owner of the cattle has been identified: Mackissé Mansaly, born in 1912 in the village of Simbandi-Balante (Sedhiou department), farmer and stock breeder living in that village.

On November 4 at about 2 a.m. a skirmish took place between Senegalese and Portuguese Army units in the sector of the village of Kolane. In the course of this operation a Senegalese soldier was killed instantly and another, seriously wounded, was evacuated to the hospital at Ziguinchor.

The Senegalese soldier who was killed was Amath N'Diaye, born in 1951 at Fatick, private second class, registration number 6.71.01213, who was serving in the 7th Ziguinchor Company. The wounded soldier is Mamadou N'Diaye, born on December 27, 1950, private second class, registration number 5.700.1448, serving in the 7th Ziguinchor Company.

It should be noted that an incident had already occurred on October 30, in which two persons were seriously injured and four slightly injured when a Senegalese military lorry struck a mine in Djibanar.

It is evident that all these incidents coming after the inquiry carried out by the Security Council mission on the frontier between Senegal and Guinea (Bissau), prove, if further proof is needed, how little heed the Portuguese authorities pay to the actions of the Security Council.

I should be grateful if you would bring these facts to the attention of the members of the Security Council and add this further material to the file of aggressive acts carried out against Senegal, a matter which is now before the Council and regarding which my Government would very much like to see the Council arrive at definitive conclusions.

I would request you to be good enough to have this letter circulated as an official Security Council document.

Accept, sir, et cetera.

Medoune Fall, Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations.

75-577 0-72—23
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

RESOLUTION 302 (1971)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1601st meeting, on November 24, 1971

The Security Council, Considering the complaints by the Republic of Senegal against Portugal contained in documents S/10182 of April 27, 1971 and S/10251 of July 6, 1971, recalling its resolutions 178 (1963) of April 24, 1963, 294 (1965) of May 19, 1965, and 273 (1969) of December 9, 1969, Having considered the report of the Special Mission of the Security Council established in accordance with resolution 294 (1971) of July 15, 1971, Deeply concerned at the climate of insecurity and instability fraught with a threat to peace and security in the region, Affirming the need to insure prerequisites for eliminating the causes of tension in the region and creating an atmosphere of trust, peace, and security as recommended by the special mission in its report, 1. Expresses its appreciation for the work accomplished by the Special Mission of the Security Council; 2. Takes note with satisfaction of the recommendations of the Special Mission of the Security Council established under resolution 294 (1971) contained in paragraph 128 of its report (S/10308); 3. Reaffirms the provisions of its resolution 294 (1971) condemning the acts of violence and destruction perpetrated since 1963 by the Portuguese Armed Forces of Guinea (Bissau) against the population and villages of Senegal; 4. Strongly deplores the lack of cooperation with the Special Mission on the part of the Portuguese Government, which prevented the Special Mission from implementing fully the mandate given to it under paragraph 4 of resolution 294 (1971); 5. Calls upon the Government of Portugal to take immediate effective measures: (a) So that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Senegal shall be fully respected; (b) To prevent acts of violence and destruction against the territory and the people of Senegal in order to contribute to the safeguarding of peace and security in the region; 6. Calls upon the Government of Portugal to respect fully the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of the people of Guinea (Bissau); 7. Calls upon the Government of Portugal to take without further delay the necessary measures, so that this inalienable right of the people of Guinea (Bissau) shall be exercised; 8. Requests the President of the Security Council and the Secretary General to keep this question under review and report on the implementation of the present resolution to the Security Council within an appropriate period and at the latest within 6 months; 9. Declares that in the event of failure by Portugal to comply with the provisions of the present resolution, the Security Council will meet to consider the initiatives and steps that the situation requires; 10. Decides to remain seized of the question.

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN PURSUANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 302 (1971) (S/10662)

1. At its 1586th meeting, held on September 29, 1971, and at its 1599th through 1601st meetings, held on November 23 and 24, 1971, the Security Council considered the item entitled “Complaint by Guinea,” together with the report of the Special Mission of the Security Council established under Security Council Resolution 294 (1971) (S/10308).
2. At its 1601st meeting, on December 24, 1971, the Security Council adopted Resolution 302 (1971), the operative part of which read as follows: 1. Express its appreciation for the work accomplished by the Special Mission of the Security Council.

3. Reaffirms the provisions of its resolution 294 (1971) condemning the acts of violence and destruction perpetrated since 1963 by the Portuguese Armed Forces of Guinea (Bissau) against the population and villages of Senegal.

4. Strongly deplores the lack of cooperation with the Special Mission on the part of the Portuguese Government, which prevented the Special Mission from implementing fully the mandate given to it under paragraph 4 of resolution 294 (1971).

5. Calls upon the Government of Portugal to take immediate effective measures:
   (a) So that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Senegal shall be fully respected;
   (b) To prevent acts of violence and destruction against the territory and the people of Senegal in order to contribute to the safeguarding of peace and security in the region;

6. Calls upon the Government of Portugal to respect fully the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of the people of Guinea (Bissau);

7. Calls upon the Government of Portugal to take without further delay the necessary measures, so that this inalienable right of the people of Guinea (Bissau) shall be exercised;

8. Requests the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General to keep this question under review and report on the implementation of the present resolution to the Security Council within an appropriate period and at the latest within 6 months;

9. Declares that in the event of failure by Portugal to comply with the provisions of the present resolution, the Security Council will meet to consider the initiatives and steps that the situation requires;

10. Decides to remain seized of the question.

3. Immediately upon the adoption of the resolution, the Secretary-General transmitted its text by telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal. The Secretary-General also addressed a telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Senegal with a view to informing him of the resolution adopted.

4. No communication pursuant to this resolution has been received by the President of the Security Council or the Secretary-General since its adoption.

5. Under the terms of paragraph 8 of the resolution, the Secretary-General has reviewed this question with the President of the Security Council. Accordingly, the Secretary-General is submitting the present report.

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

LETTER DATED JUNE 1, 1972, FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SENEGAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS, ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (S/10672)

On instructions from my Government, I have the honor to request you to bring to the attention of the members of the Security Council the serious incidents which have just occurred on the frontier between Senegal and Guinea (Bissau).

On Friday, May 26, 1972, at 5 p.m., the village of Santiaba-Manjak in the Oussouye department was attacked by armed elements from Guinea (Bissau). The incident occurred following a dispute over rice fields whose ownership is the source of frequent disagreements between two villages, one, Santiaba-Manjak in Senegal; and the other, Cassalol in Guinea (Bissau).

Toward midday, armed bands from the village of Cassalol, led by auxiliaries of the Regular Forces of the Portuguese Army, appeared and began to threaten Senegalese villagers engaged in cultivating their fields, by firing shots to intimidate them.

However, these armed bands withdrew without causing damage, following the arrival of elements of the Senegalese Army from the post of Kaneme, who had been alerted.

The same day, at 5:45 p.m., a fresh attack on a larger scale was launched against the same village of Santiaba-Manjak by a force from Guinea (Bissau) estimated at some 200 men, armed with automatic weapons, grenade launchers,
and handgrenades. The defense unit of the National Senegalese Army based at Ziguinchor had nevertheless had time to move reinforcements to the area following the alert given late that same morning.

When the two armed contingents came into contact, a particularly dangerous situation arose. The attackers who, to judge from appearances, were under the influence of drugs, hurled themselves against the Senegalese National Army troops, shouting and opening heavy fire with all the weapons in their possession.

Our troops took immediate counteraction and, although confronted with an armed force superior in numbers and firepower, succeeded in checking the onslaught of the enemy and compelled them to withdraw shortly afterward.

Unfortunately, this clash resulted on the Senegalese side in the loss of six soldiers killed and five others wounded. It was not possible to determine the number of dead and wounded on the Guinea (Bissau) side because they were carried away by their comrades when they withdrew.

It should be noted that the six Senegalese soldiers who were killed were savagely mutilated by the attackers.

The Government of Senegal could not remain passive in the face of this unjustified provocation and therefore ordered a reprisal action, the final phase of which took place during the night of May 30 to 31, 1972.

The report received from the General Staff of the Senegalese Armed Forces gives grounds for hope that the Portuguese authorities responsible for the action against the peaceful village communities of our frontier areas will have learned a thorough lesson.

Obviously, we regard this incident as regrettable, to say the least, particularly as this is the first occasion on which a Senegalese soldier has crossed the frontier separating Senegal from Guinea (Bissau).

It was clear, however, that in view of the emotions aroused by the incidents on May 26, the Senegalese Army could not remain idle and would consider itself dutybound to avenge its comrades who had been savagely murdered.

Furthermore, I would draw attention to the fact that the Portuguese forces from Guinea (Bissau) committed these latest provocative acts at the very time when the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his report of May 24, 1972 (S/10662), informed the Council that no communication from the Lisbon authorities had been received by the President of the Security Council or himself since the adoption of Resolution 302 (1971) of November 24, 1971, which called upon the Government of Portugal to take immediate effective measures:

(a) So that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Senegal shall be fully respected.

(b) To prevent acts of violence and destruction against the territory and the people of Senegal in order to contribute to the safeguarding of peace and security in the region.

It would appear that the purpose of the Portuguese authorities was to reply "in their own way" to the concern expressed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

I should be grateful if you would bring all these facts to the attention of the members of the Security Council and would circulate this communication as a Council document.

It is understood that my Government reserves the right to request you to call an urgent meeting of the Security Council should the development of the situation make it necessary.

(Signed) Médoune Fall,
Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations.
and the Secretary-General to send to the spot a special factfinding mission of Security Council members. The special mission reported to the Council, with recommendations, on September 16, 1971 (S/10308).

S/10388, November 15, 1971. Letter dated November 15, 1971, from the Permanent Representative to Senegal. The letter enumerated incidents occurring on the frontier on the night of November 3–4, 1971, and on October 30, 1971. The Security Council met on November 23–24, 1971, to consider the report of the special mission and adopted a resolution, S/RES/302 (1971) calling on Portugal to take immediate effective measures so that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Senegal should be fully respected and to prevent acts of violence and destruction against the territory and the people of Senegal.

S/10672/Rev. 1, June 2, 1972. Letter dated June 1, 1972, from the Permanent Representative of Senegal. The letter enumerated “serious incidents” occurring on the frontier between Senegal and Guinea (Bissau), on May 26, 1972. The letter pointed out that the incidents took place shortly after the report of the Secretary-General, of May 24, 1972 (S/10662), who indicated that he had received no response from Portugal on its intentions regarding the implementation of S/RES/302 (1971).
APPENDIX 8


INTRODUCTION

1. In May 1971, the special committee dispatched an ad hoc group, composed of six of its members, to countries in Africa for the purpose, inter alia, of consulting with representatives of the national liberation movements of colonial territories in that continent. During the course of these consultations, two of these movements, the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) and the Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique (FRELIMO) extended invitations to the special committee to visit the liberated areas of Angola and Mozambique, respectively.

2. The special committee, by endorsing the observations of the ad hoc group at its 814th meeting on August 11, 1971, decided in principle to accept these invitations. Later, in a resolution which it adopted on September 14, the special committee requested its chairman, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the liberation movements concerned, to work out the necessary modalities for such visits.

3. Subsequently, in a letter addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Amilcar Cabral, the Secretary General of the Partido Africano da Independencia da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), invited a United Nations mission to visit the liberated areas of Guinea (Bissau).

4. Preliminary consultations between the chairman of the special committee and the Assistant Secretary General and the Executive Secretary of OAU concerning all three invitations took place in September 1971. On the basis of these consultations, the special committee, in its report to the General Assembly at its 26th session, indicated its intention to dispatch during 1972 a group of its members to the liberated areas of certain colonial territories in southern Africa. The special committee stated that the purpose of such a visit would be to secure first-hand information on conditions in those areas and to ascertain the views and aspirations of the people regarding their future. It should be noted in this connection that Portugal has consistently disregarded repeated requests by the General Assembly and the special committee to receive United Nations visiting missions to the territories under its administration. It should also be noted, in the same context, that the invitations to visit the liberated areas came from the national liberation movements of the territories concerned, the legitimacy of whose struggle had long been recognized by the General Assembly and the Security Council.

5. At its 26th session, the General Assembly, in its resolution 2795 (XXVI) of December 10, 1971 (105 votes to 8, with five abstentions) concerning the question of territories under Portuguese administration, noted with satisfaction the intention of the special committee to send a special mission to the liberated areas of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). Furthermore, in its resolution 2878 (XXVI) of December 20, 1971 (96 votes to 5, with 18 abstentions), the General Assembly approved the report of the special committee, including the program of work which it envisaged for 1972, which included a visit to liberated areas of the territories under Portuguese administration.

6. On March 14, 1972, on the basis of further consultations with the Administrative Secretary-General of OAU and the liberation movements, the chairman proposed to the special committee at its 840th meeting the creation of a special mission to visit the liberated areas in one of the territories under Portuguese administration. The mission would be composed of not more than three members accompanied by two members of the Secretariat (a secretary and a photographer). Following a statement by the Committee Secretary concerning the administrative
and financial implications (A/AC.109/PV 840), the committee decided without objection to approve the chairman's proposal on the understanding that for security reasons no announcement would be made concerning the mission's destination until after the visit had been completed. At the same meeting, the special committee, by endorsing nominations by the chairman, decided that the special mission would be composed of the representatives of Ecuador, Sweden and Tunisia. Accordingly the Mission was constituted as follows:

Mr. Horacio Sevilla-borja, Deputy Permanent Representative of Ecuador to the United Nations (chairman).
Mr. Folke Löfgren, First Secretary of the Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations.
Mr. Kamel Belkhiria, First Secretary of the Permanent Mission of Tunisia to the United Nations.

7. The special mission was accompanied by the following Secretariat staff: Mr. Cheikh Tidiane Gaye (principal secretary) and Mr. Yutaka Nagata (photographer).

8. Prior to the departure of the special mission, it was agreed that (a) on the basis of the consultations with OAU and the national liberation movements concerned, the mission should, for the time being, visit only the liberated areas of Guinea (Bissau); (b) the visit would commence from a point bordering the Republic of Guinea and would conclude within a maximum period of 10 days thereafter; all necessary arrangements for the visit would be made by PAIGC in close cooperation with the Government of Guinea.

9. Bearing in mind the earlier decision of the special committee to hold a series of meetings away from headquarters in 1972, starting at Conakry, Guinea, in the first week of April, the special mission, after consultations with the parties concerned, departed one week in advance of the committee and visited the liberated area of Guinea (Bissau) from April 2 to 8. An account of the visit, together with the mission's observations, conclusions and recommendations, is set out below. In addition, it may be noted that the voluminous material collected by the mission in the form of taped interviews, photos, films etc., is available at United Nations Headquarters.

10. At the 848th meeting of the special committee held at Conakry on April 10, the members of the special mission, in their statements to the Committee (A/AC.109/SR.848), presented a preliminary oral report of the work of the Special Mission. In the light of the preliminary information furnished by the members of the Special Mission and the testimony given by Mr. Amilcar Cabral, Secretary-General of PAIGC, and other members of PAIGC, the special committee, at its 854th meeting held at Conakry on April 13, adopted a resolution relating to the situation in Guinea (Bissau) (A/AC.109/400). In this resolution, the special committee, inter alia:

2. Affirms its recognition of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, the liberation movement of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, as the only and authentic representative of the people of the territory, and requests all States and specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system to take this into consideration when dealing with matters pertaining to Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde;

4. Expresses its appreciation to the members and the secretariat of the Special Mission which visited the liberated areas of Guinea (Bissau) from April 2 to 8, 1972 and its deep gratitude to the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde for its assistance and cooperation which enabled the special mission to complete its task successfully;

5. Expresses its conviction that the successful accomplishment by the Special Mission of its task—establishing beyond any doubt the fact that de facto control in these areas is exercised by the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, the national liberation movement of the Territory—constitutes a major contribution by the United Nations in the field of decolonization;

"6. Strongly condemns Portugal for resorting to the widespread and brutal use of military force in an attempt to prevent the special mission from completing its task and for the resultant loss of civilian life and the destruction of hospitals, schools and villages in direct contradiction of its obligations as a State member of the United Nations, and expresses its deep sympathy to the people and the national liberation movement of the Territory for the loss and suffering thus incurred."
11. The special mission wishes to place on record its appreciation to the leaders of PAIGC, in particular its Secretary-General, Mr. Amilcar Cabral, for their constant assistance and cooperation and for the facilities which they placed at the mission's disposal during its visit to the liberated areas of Guinea (Bissau). It also wishes to express its gratitude to the Government of the Republic of Guinea whose cooperation was indispensable to the completion of the task, the former Administrative Secretary-General of OAU and other officials of that organization for their generous cooperation and assistance. The mission wishes furthermore to record its thanks to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for making available the necessary supporting staff and facilities and, in that connection, to acknowledge with appreciation the services and dedication of the staff as well as the assistance extended to the mission by United Nations offices.

12. A particularly warm tribute is due to the officials and cadres of PAIGC who accompanied the mission throughout its visit and to the people of Guinea (Bissau) who bore the brunt of Portugal's efforts to prevent the special mission from completing its task (see annex III below). The mission deeply regrets the loss of life, especially among the civilian population, which resulted therefrom.

1. CHRONICLE OF THE SPECIAL MISSION

Mission's activities

13. In view of the delicate nature of its assignment, the special mission endeavoured from the outset to maintain the utmost secrecy with regard to its movements. Neither the date of its departure from headquarters nor its destination was made public. The purpose of such secrecy was to minimize the risks both to the local population and to the members of the mission which might arise from the mission's presence in the liberated areas. As a further precaution, it was decided, prior to departure from New York, that the precise timing and duration of the visit would have to be determined after the mission arrived at the headquarters of PAIGC. Accordingly, when the mission left New York on March 28, 1972, its immediate destination was Conakry, Republic of Guinea where the PAIGC headquarters is located.

14. The mission arrived in Conakry on March 31 and accompanied by Mr. Roger Polgar, the resident Representative of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) at Conakry, paid a courtesy visit on the same day to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Guinea where it was received by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Camara Damantang. The latter assured the mission of his government's readiness to furnish it with every assistance and cooperation for the successful accomplishment of its task. The mission also had a brief meeting with representatives of the local OAU office at Conakry.

15. Immediately thereafter, the mission paid a first official visit to the headquarters of PAIGC where it was received by Mr. Aristides Pereira, Deputy Secretary-General, and a member of the permanent commission of the executive committee. Also present were two other members of the executive committee, Maj. Constantino Teixeira and Mr. Abilio Duarte. The Secretary-General, Amilcar Cabral, was away on an official trip abroad. Arrangements for the visit to Guinea (Bissau) were discussed at the meeting and it was decided that the mission should schedule its departure for the following day.

16. The mission left Conakry on the morning of April 1, attired in military fatigues with United Nations insignia and accompanied by an armed escort under the command of Maj. Constantino Teixeira. The night of April 1 was spent at a PAIGC base, located on the Guinean side of the frontier. Here a meeting was held with Maj. Pedro Pires, the PAIGC commander of the frontier region, in the course of which the members of the mission were briefed on the military situation inside Guinea (Bissau) and plans were made for crossing the frontier.

17. Describing the situation inside the territory, Major Pires informed the mission that during the 5 days preceding its arrival, Portuguese military activity in the frontier region of Guinea (Bissau) had attained a degree of intensity never before experienced. The whole region had been subjected to intensive bombardment both by artillery from adjacent Portuguese forts and from the air. He attributed it to the mission's presence in the area and expressed his firm conviction that the Portuguese authorities had been aware of the mission's movements since its departure from New York. Before the mission's departure, the sector had been comparatively quiet for some time and a number of foreign observers and delegations had visited the liberated area in complete tranquillity.

18. Major Pires said that, generally, the war in Guinea (Bissau) had been increasing in intensity for some time. Portuguese army units were for the most
part entrenched in the few remaining fortified camps in the liberated areas. These were besieged by the forces of PAIGC and were being supplied by air or by rivercraft. A new factor, however, had been the large-scale introduction by the Portuguese of troop-carrying helicopters, which gave the Portuguese troops a vastly greater freedom of movement and were also used as gunships for aerial attacks. Major Pires was convinced, however, that Portugal no longer had any prospect of winning the war and that the Portuguese Government was continuing its resistance only because to do otherwise would weaken its position in Angola and Mozambique.

19. In the morning of the following day, the members of the special mission woke up to the sound of artillery fire from the nearest Portuguese fort of Guilejé. Among other things, they talked with a young soldier of the PAIGC liberation army who had been severely wounded during fighting at Como in 1963. The soldier, Joãozinho da Costa Dozes, said that he had joined the liberation forces when he was 14 years old and had been twice wounded. He showed the mission a part of his hips which were covered with deep scabs and said that, as a consequence of his injuries, he suffered from paralysis of his genital organs. He had not asked the party to allow him to go to Europe for treatment because he wanted to participate in the struggle for the liberation of his people until the final victory.

20. During the night of April 2, the special mission, accompanied by an escort of 60 PAIGC soldiers, was driven to the frontier at a point not far from Kandiafara, on the Gogon River, and entered Guinea (Bissau) in a jeep at 2325 G.m.t. After the crossing, Portuguese artillery in a nearby camp began again an intermittent bombardment of the frontier area.

21. After crossing the frontier, the special mission and its escort left the jeep and the truck. They travelled on foot throughout the remainder of their visit to the liberated areas. During the first night, the mission soon entered forest cover where they were joined by additional PAIGC troops. There followed a long march in a northwesterly direction. The march was made mostly in darkness through forest, swamps, and savannah. During the march, the mission traversed three rivers by means of primitive and dangerous bridges made from tree trunks, waded across brooks and streams and crossed numerous rice paddies.

22. A few hours after sunrise on April 3, the special mission arrived at its first destination deep in the forest of the Balana sector, a heavily guarded PAIGC army base camp composed of several tents, huts, and barracks which is the headquarters of the political commissariat of the southern region. Here the mission met, among others, the following PAIGC leaders and members of the executive committee: Mr. João Bernardo Vieira ("Nino"), the commander-in-chief of the liberation army; Mr. Vasco Cabral, in charge of party ideology; Mr. Carlos Correia, in charge of security and a member of the Permanent Commission of the National Committee of the southern region; Mr. José Araújo, in charge of production and a member of the Permanent Commission of the National Committee of the southern region; Mr. Fidelis Almada, in charge of justice; Mr. Bari Abdulai, political commissioner of the armed forces in the southern region; and Mrs. Teodora Gomes, a member of the political brigade in the southern region.

23. Shortly after the special mission’s arrival at the base camp, Portuguese reconnaissance aircraft, fighter bombers, and helicopters were clearly visible flying over the camp at frequent intervals. On a number of occasions, the members of the mission, on the advice of the leaders of PAIGC, were obliged to take shelter. It was consequently decided, in the interest of security, to move the mission to quarters deeper in the forest.

24. A few hours after nightfall on the same day, the special mission left the base camp and continued its march in the direction of the Cubacará sector. In the course of this march, the mission was escorted by a detachment of more than 400 soldiers, not counting units assigned from local village forces from time to time. During the march, which lasted 13½ hours, the mission passed through many rice paddies and traversed four rivers including the Balana River, and was able to see evidence of the devastation caused by the war. While still in the Balana sector, the mission passed through several villages, among them Setche-Kul, Yem I, Yem II, Flack-N’Gol and Rotche Nbanle, which had been heavily destroyed by aerial bombing. The surrounding fields showed evidence of heavy artillery shelling, crops had been burned by nipa palm and there were many shattered huts and granaries. During its march, the mission visited the village of Xen-Kuntoi, which was totally destroyed on the following day by aerial bombardments, and passed within a distance of 2 kilometers of the Portuguese military encampment of Kadanda.
25. In the morning of April 4, the special mission arrived at the Areolino Lopez Cruz school in the Cubacaré sector (Catio region) where it stayed for two nights. This school, which is named after a former teacher who was killed during a Portuguese attack, provides elementary education for 65 pupils between 10 and 15 years of age, most of whom are either orphans or children of PAIGC soldiers. Because of the danger of aerial bombardment, the school, like others existing in the liberated area, is housed in temporary quarters, hidden deep in the forest and is frequently transferred from one place to another. It is staffed by six teachers, including the director, Mr. Lucas Pereira, who was educated abroad, and is administered with the participation of a committee of students. During its stay, the mission observed an opportunity to inspect the school and other facilities, assist at a working class and discuss with the teachers the problems which they encountered in providing education to the children of the liberated areas. The mission also witnessed an artistic performance of theater, dances, and poetic reading given by the children.

26. While in the Cubacaré sector, the special mission attended a mass public meeting held in the forest at a distance of approximately 11½ hours march from the Areolino Lopez Cruz school. The meeting, which lasted 3 hours, was attended by almost 200 people from 14 villages: Darsalam, Catéssse, Calaque, Carfat, Santa Clara, Cadique, Cabante, Catchamba, Cassinteia, Sogobol, Farim, Carou, Fiqure, N'Bint, and Cavaline.

27. The atmosphere of the meeting was friendly and fraternal and members of the special mission, who mixed with the crowd, had an opportunity to hold numerous individual conversations and thereby gain an insight into the conditions of life of the villagers who live under constant threat of attack from the air. The mission was introduced to the gathering by Mr. José Araujo, a member of the executive committee of PAIGC, who also introduced the other PAIGC leaders present, namely Mr. Abdoulaye Seck, who is in charge of security in the south; Mrs. Satu Djassi, who is responsible for the administration of public health in the Cubacaré sector; Mr. Fidelis Almada, the PAIGC secretary in charge of justice affairs; and Mr. Vasco Cabral, the member of the executive committee in charge of ideology.

28. Introducing the special mission, Mr. Araujo said that more villagers from the Cubacaré sector would have attended the meeting had it not been for the fact that the Portuguese forces had intensified their bombing of the sector during the preceding few days. For the benefit of the assembly, he explained the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security and its action to promote the development of friendly relations among peoples and to bring about the liquidation of colonialism. PAIGC's objectives, he said, were the same as those of the United Nations for its struggle was also aimed at ending colonialism and racialism and the exploitation of one people by another. The leaders of PAIGC had a profound faith in the United Nations and, for that reason, the presence of the special mission in the liberated area of Guinea (Bissau) was a very important event for PAIGC and the Guinean people. At the conclusion of his speech, the crowd gave the mission an ovation.

29. The chairman of the special mission, in his reply, paid tribute to the people of Guinea (Bissau) and the leaders of PAIGC who were building a new future filled with promise for their country. Recalling that the primary purpose of the United Nations was to maintain international peace and security, he pointed out that peace meant not only the absence of war but also the ending of injustice and exploitation. That was why the United Nations was doing its utmost to put an end to colonialism wherever it existed. Much progress had been made since the United Nations had been created in 1945 but a great deal still remained to be done. He explained that the purpose of the special mission was to bring the help of the United Nations to the people of Guinea (Bissau) in its struggle for national liberation. After the chairman's speech, some of the villagers spoke of the atrocities and material damage inflicted upon the people of their village by the Portuguese Army.

30. After the meeting, the special mission discussed, among other things, the administration of justice in the liberated area with the president of the Cubacaré sector court and also had a talk with Mrs. Satu Djassi concerning problems of public health (see sec. 2 below). The mission also talked with the political officer in charge of women's brigades who drew attention to the significant change which the liberation struggle had brought about in the status of women. As the mission was able to observe throughout its visit, women in the liberated areas have been successful in asserting their political, economic, and social rights and are playing an important role within PAIGC as militants and in the fields of security, justice, health, education, and production.
31. In the evening of April 6, the mission set out on its return journey accompanied by a heavily armed escort of 200 PAIGC troops. On route, the mission passed through and inspected three villages, Botche N'Bunhe, Botche Sansa, and Botche Djate, which had been completely destroyed by Portuguese military action only a few days previously and bore evidence of extensive artillery and aerial bombardment, including an unexploded bomb, which was shown to the mission in the village of Botche Djate. The mission found the villagers living in the open among the ruins, from which there arose the smell of freshly burned huts. The mission also saw destroyed granaries with a large quantity of burned rice.

32. Stopping for a few hours at the base camp of the political commissariat of the Southern Region where it arrived in the early hours of April 7, the mission held discussions with PAIGC leaders, including Mr. Vasco Cabral, concerning their plans for the holding of elections both to the regional councils and to a future territorywide parliament (see sec. 2 below) and the measures being taken to reestablish commerce and trade in the liberated areas.

33. The mission spent the night of April 7 at the main headquarters of the Central command of PAIGC, a few hours march from the border of the Republic of Guinea. Here it was again welcomed by Mr. Joao Bernardo Vieira ("Nino"), the commander in chief of the PAIGC armed forces of liberation, and discussed the health problems in the liberated areas with a Cuban doctor who was working in the area as a volunteer. Later on during the night, the mission met a caravan of some 200 civilians returning from the Republic of Guinea to Guinea (Bissau) marching with, among other things, newly purchased cattle to replace those bombed out by the Portuguese.

34. In the early morning (0725 G.m.t.) of April 8, the special mission crossed the frontier into the Republic of Guinea. After a brief rest at the PAIGC military base, and following a ceremony during which the members of the mission received from Major Pires the insignia and flag of PAIGC, it proceeded to the town of Boké in the Republic of Guinea where it encountered other members of the special committee who were visiting the region. Later that day, the mission returned to Conakry where it rejoined the special committee.

35. On April 10, 1972, the members of the mission presented a preliminary report to the special committee.

36. During the 5 days and 6 nights which it spent in Guinea (Bissau), the mission traveled on foot a distance of approximately 200 kilometers and visited nine localities:

- Base du Commissariat politique de la région du sud
- Botche-Kul
- Yem I
- Yem II-Kumba
- Flack-N’Gol
- Internat Areolino Cruz
- Lieu du meeting avec les villages
- Botche Djate
- Base du Commissariat du Front

In the course of its visit in the southwestern part of the country, it had an opportunity to see the devastation wrought by artillery, aerial bombardment, and airborne troops on the villages and cultivated fields of the inhabitants, to visit a school and to meet with a large number of the noncombatant population of the liberated area as well as personnel of the administration, PAIGC authorities, and local political leaders. The mission was able to talk with villagers: students, children, teachers, judges, physicians, and nurses. The mission also had direct contact with the members of the liberation army, was able to visit their camps and installations, and to see for itself the nature and extent of the liberation struggle. The mission’s stay in the liberated area, originally intended to last 4 days, was extended to 1 week.

37. The mission’s observations on the situation prevailing in Guinea (Bissau) are set out in section 2 below.

Portuguese reaction to the mission

38. It will be recalled that, shortly prior to the mission’s departure from New York, the Permanent Representative of Portugal, in a letter dated March 25, 1972 (A/AC.109/398), communicated to the Secretary General the views of the Government of Portugal. The Permanent Representative stated inter alia that

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1 The bomb bore the following markings: MI-7, 61A; TNT; BFE-1-124; 8/69: 50-7KG-0.035-M3.
2 The itinerary of the mission appears in annex I.
entry into the territory of a state member of the United Nations without the consent of the legally constituted government, could not but be construed as an act calculated to violate all rules of international law. The Government of Portugal vehemently protested the proposed violation of its sovereignty and formally declined all responsibility for the consequences. In the same letter, the Permanent Representative said that the ‘decision to visit the ‘liberated areas’ of the Portuguese Overseas Provinces constitutes yet another act of sheer propaganda which can only serve to feed the illusion of certain interested political sectors which refuse to admit that the terrorist organizations do not control any part of Portuguese territory.’

39. Subsequently, in press releases issued on April 11 and 17, by the Foreign Ministry and the permanent mission respectively, an endeavor was made to deny that the special mission had, in fact, visited Guinea (Bissau).

40. Meanwhile, although the Portuguese authorities had no official information as to the precise destination or date of the proposed visit, every effort was made to deter the mission from its task. According to information provided by PAIGC, a state of emergency was declared in Guinea (Bissau) at the time of the mission’s departure from New York and military activity on the part of Portuguese Armed Forces in the territory attained the highest level of intensity since 1964. Between March 28 and April 8, the date of the mission’s return to the Republic of Guinea, intensive aerial and artillery bombardments, accompanied by reconnaissance flights and helicopter-borne commando operations took place, especially in the Balana-Kitañfe region and Cubacaré sector in the south and southwest where the mission was present. In the Cubacaré sector, four villages were destroyed while the mission was in the vicinity and, according to PAIGC, Portuguese forces, during the period, destroyed two hospitals, one health center, and three schools. In all, 25 persons including women and old persons (see annex IV, below) were reported to have been killed by Portuguese military action during the period. The mission wishes to note that according to a press release subsequently issued by the Government of Portugal, the Portuguese “Overseas Minister” was at Bissau during the mission’s visit to the liberated area.

41. Although the mission did not itself come under fire, its members were able to hear the bombardments and to see the reconnaissance planes and helicopters flying overhead; in some cases, members were obliged to hide under shelter and seek protection in the bush. The mission was also able to inspect the destruction caused to villages and crops.

42. The cessation of this activity on April 8, the day following the mission’s exit from the territory, is evidence that Portugal’s purpose was to prevent the mission from accomplishing its task and thereby uphold its contention that there are no liberated areas under the control of PAIGC. The mission notes in this connection that during the last year many foreign observers, including parliamentarians, journalists, and photographers, have visited the liberated areas, both in the northern and southern parts of the country, some of them remaining there for long periods, as the numerous reports, articles, and films on the territory bear witness. In most cases, these visits have met with considerably less difficulty than those inflicted upon the United Nations Special Mission.

2. Observations of the Special Mission

43. This section of the report is based on the information obtained by the special mission during its visit to Guinea (Bissau), both from direct observation of the operation of economic and social conditions inside the liberated area, and from discussions with the inhabitants, local officials and leaders. The mission has also made use of information supplied to it by the leaders of PAIGC both before and after its visit to the liberated area.

Educational conditions

44. According to the leaders of PAIGC, the development of education is one of the highest priorities in the program of reconstruction. Under Portuguese rule, it is said, nearly 99 percent of the population was illiterate and very few Africans had access to education beyond the elementary level. In the whole of Guinea (Bissau) there were, according to PAIGC, only 14 Africans who had graduated from a university.

45. PAIGC’s policy for the liberated area aims at the rapid elimination of illiteracy, the institution of free and compulsory education at the primary level, and a crash program for the training of technicians and professional personnel.
The 1970 sugar crop totaled over 567,000 long tons, owing to cyclone damage, a 13.8-percent drop from 1969. The 1971 crop was about 600,000 tons. Twenty-one public companies cultivate 54 percent of the cropland and control the 23 mills that crush the island’s cane. The balance of the caneland is farmed by about 27,000 small holders. According to law, the growers receive 68 percent of income from sugar and the millers 32 percent. The industry claims that well over 50 percent of the proceeds from sugar are used for worker wages, salaries and other benefits.

The Mauritius sugar syndicate is the sole marketing agency and the supervisor of all export receipts. Various government and sugar industry levies on sugar exports are used to finance a Sugar Industry Labour Welfare Fund (SILWF) for worker health, education, housing, and social development; a rehabilitation fund to assist the industry in modernization costs; and the Sugar Industry Research Institute, one of the world’s four most efficient. In addition to its experiments to increase sugar yields, the Institute has recently also given special attention to crop diversification, experimenting with peanuts and corn.

Mauritians fear that as Britain joins the Common Market, the preferential United Kingdom market will be lost or substantially diminished. Although Mauritius enjoys excellent relations with France, and is receiving associate status with the EEC, the EEC countries are net exporters of sugar and there are a number of other Commonwealth countries heavily dependent on sugar which will have a claim for consideration. Accordingly, Mauritius looks anxiously to the United States for a larger share in the U.S. sugar quota when our Sugar Act is revised later in the year. An increase to an annual level of 100,000 tons has been requested. The Government believes this would be the most effective form of aid the United States could supply. In response, the United States has raised the 1972 quota to 38,000 tons, though the British quota will not be reduced until 1974.

Concisely stated, the central problem of Mauritius is overpopulation in an underdiversified economy. Sugar, as seen above, is the country’s chief source of wealth. With a per capita income of $225, Mauritius is one of the more fortunate among the less developed countries of Africa. However, distribution of wealth is far from perfect and many agricultural workers and others low on the wage scale receive about $225 annually for their entire families—usually numbering five or more. In other aspects, Mauritius also ranks above most less developed countries. Government civil servants and business employees have a high degree of competence. Over 90 percent of the youth and about 60 percent of the total population are literate; most speak two languages; many know three. The road system, public transportation net, community services, the port, radio and TV, health services, the educational system are all well organized and perform with an efficiency rare in less developed countries.

For 90 years prior to World War II, the island’s population remained static at below 400,000. With the eradication of malaria and a generally favorable economic climate, the number of Mauritians has more than doubled in the past 25 years. Family planning programs got under way in the early sixties and, in part, account for the sharp fall in population growth rates in the past decade—from 3.04 percent in 1963 to a claimed 1.16 in 1969. The birth rate per 1,000 has fallen from 39.9 to 25.
From the outset of the liberation struggle, a mass literacy campaign has been in force in which all who are unable to read and write are required to participate. PAIGC also takes credit for having established more than 200 schools, scattered throughout the liberated area, with an enrollment in excess of 20,000 pupils. These schools are organized and centrally administered by PAIGC which, among other things, has laid down regulations relating to their administration, teaching staff, and curriculums. The Areolino Lopez Cruz school in the Cubacaré sector, which the special mission visited, is located for security reasons in the forest, where it is safe from air attack. The school is housed in temporary structures, and contains 65 boys and girls ranging in age from 10 to 15 years, divided into four elementary classes. The children do not begin school until the age of 10 because of the hardship and risks involved. The curriculum includes the following subjects: History, geography, Portuguese, natural sciences, arithmetic, ideological training, PAIGC policy and, for the girls, home economics. There are six teachers; five men and one woman, including the director of the school. The school is administered by the director, Mr. Lucas Pereira, assisted by a pioneer committee of seven pupils elected by their schoolfellows. The school is active in cultural and artistic training which the mission was able to appreciate when the pupils gave a performance in its honor. The mission was impressed both by the artistic talents of the children and by the profound moral and political content of the program, the theme of which was the mobilization of the masses and the guerrilla war in Guinea (Bissau). The mission is of the view that these performances presented to an international audience would greatly enhance the comprehension of the general situation in the liberated areas.

Although the mission did not have an opportunity to visit them it was informed that PAIGC maintains secondary schools, such as the Sara boarding school, in the liberated area. These schools are at present reserved for particularly gifted pupils or for the children of freedom fighters killed in action. A number of students are pursuing university courses in other countries on fellowships offered to PAIGC.

Apart from such fellowships, PAIGC has received substantial assistance from several countries, including Sweden and the German Democratic Republic, which have published readers and arithmetic textbooks prepared by PAIGC for use in its schools. Assistance has also come from the United Nations Educational Scientific and Culture Organization (UNESCO), which has offered to publish 20,000 arithmetic textbooks and, according to PAIGC, has also offered to supply educational materials to a total value of $64,000. As the mission was able to observe, however, such assistance will satisfy only a small part of the need in the liberated areas for educational materials and assistance.

Health conditions

The basic principles governing the organization of health services in the liberated area are set out in PAIGC’s Mots d’ordre general (General instructions). Essentially, the aim is to provide health services first to active freedom fighters and then to the population of the liberated areas in general. The medical services are under the direction of the PAIGC military command.

The facilities so far established consist of a central hospital in each of the three regions, smaller hospitals at the sector level and health centers located in the sectors, each of which consists of three or four villages. In addition, health teams visit the villages frequently to bring medical care to sick persons who cannot be moved, to evacuate others to the health centers or hospitals and to instruct the villagers in child care and hygiene.

The hospitals are directed by medical doctors, who are either Cuban volunteers or nationals of Guinea (Bissau). The health centers are run by medical assistants who are members of PAIGC, and each health team consists of two nurses, one male and one female.

The hospitals located at military base camps give first priority to the treatment of wounded combatants and to the victims of Portuguese bombardments. Subject to this, treatment is given to sick persons generally.

In its discussions with medical personnel, the special mission was told that there was a widespread prevalence of malaria, malnutrition, beri-beri, tuberculosis, and dropsy. The medical personnel were particularly concerned about malnutrition, especially among children, which they attributed largely to lack of protein due to

6 The two regions visited by the mission, the regions of Balana-Katufine and Catlo, reportedly possess a total of 61 schools organized by PAIGC.
7 The two regions visited by the mission, Balana-Katufine and Catlo, reportedly have a total of three hospitals and 20 health centers.
the systematic slaughtering of livestock by the Portuguese military forces. For this reason, one of the many tasks of the medical teams was to encourage the population to raise livestock. 54. From time to time, PAIGC undertakes large-scale vaccination among the local population; in 1971, for example, a vaccination campaign succeeded in protecting the inhabitants of the liberated areas from an epidemic of cholera which was widespread in the neighboring areas of the Republic of Guinea and Senegal. Efforts to vaccinate people, however, are hampered by the lack of cold storage facilities. There is no electricity in the liberated areas but portable refrigerators indispensable to the vaccination campaign are expected shortly. 55. The mission was told, however, that the efforts of the health services were hampered by a serious lack of medical equipment and supplies, especially supplies of antibiotics, antiparasitic drugs and vaccines. There was a similar shortage of vitamins and milk. Another difficulty is the transport situation. It is not easy to carry seriously wounded or sick people to the hospital at Boké or to hospitals in other areas. 56. The training of medical personnel was also a major concern. At present, some doctors are being trained abroad on fellowships made available to PAIGC. Nurses are first given accelerated basic training at one or other of the three main hospitals and are then sent abroad for specialized training or to undergo a 1-year course to complete their general studies. In order to qualify as medical assistants, nurses receive a further 2-month course at centers in the liberated areas, after which they are posted to health centers in the interior of the country. Mrs. Satu Djassi, for example, who was trained as a nurse and is now responsible for public health matters in Cubacaré, explained to the mission that her training had consisted of 1 year at a PAIGC hospital in the Republic of Guinea and a further 1-year course at Kiev, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

**Administration of justice**

57. The judicial system in the liberated area is based on a text adopted in 1966 but only fully applied in 1969. Essentially, there are three tiers of courts. In addition, there is a special temporary court. At the lowest level there are village courts, each consisting of three villagers chosen by their peers. The competence of a village court is restricted to the settlement of minor disputes and petty theft and the judgments are flexibly based on traditional customary law. The role of the village court, according to Mr. Fidelis Almada, PAIGC's Secretary for Justice, who has studied in Portugal and practiced law in São Paulo, Brazil, is primarily to maintain harmony among the villagers. Fines may be imposed, and if the convicted person does not pay the fine he may be required by PAIGC to do some form of compulsory labor. The village courts do not have power to pass sentences of imprisonment. PAIGC leaders explained that the party does not maintain prisons, both for reasons of economy and because it considers rehabilitation preferable. 58. An appeal lies from the village courts to sectoral courts which are composed of five members as follows: the political commissioner of the sector, who is responsible for security; a representative of the Office of the Secretary for Justice; two representatives of the people; and a member of one of the village courts in the sector. Besides hearing appeals from the village courts in the sector, a sectoral court has jurisdiction to try more serious offenses and to hand down sentences of up to 5 years' compulsory labor. Such compulsory labor may consist, for example, of transporting armaments or military equipment to the liberated areas. 59. Above the sectoral courts, there exists the military court, which is the highest permanent judicial body. The court is composed of five members: a representative of the PAIGC Council of War; a representative of the security authorities; a representative of the Office of the Secretary for Justice; and two representatives of the people. The court is competent to review judgments of the lower courts and to try, as a court of first instance, crimes of espionage, homicide, and rape. The sentences handed down by the military court may include the death penalty in case of high treason.

60. Apart from these permanent judicial bodies, there is a special temporary court which is responsible for hearing serious cases of flagrant delito. This special court is comprised of three members: the political commissioner of the region; the official responsible for security; and the commander of the armed forces. 61. Explaining the judicial system to the mission, Mr. Fidelis Almada, in charge of justice, said that the courts were independent of PAIGC and the armed
forces; for example, he cited a case in which a person who had been accused by
the security service of being a spy had nevertheless been acquitted for lack of
sufficient evidence. All court hearings are public and the accused may plead in
his own defense or be represented by a person of his choice or otherwise the
representative of the Secretary for Justice may defend an accused person or may
appoint a competent villager for that purpose. In the event of judicial error, the
Secretary for Justice may take initiative to insure that the judgment is reviewed.
Furthermore, except in cases of espionage, any convicted person may appeal to
the Secretary General of PAIGC.

62. Mr. Almada told the members of the special mission that the problem which
most concerned his department was the preparation of a civil and penal code for
Guinea (Bissau). He said that the code would be popularly inspired and would be
based on African customs and values. It would, however, be an instrument for
combating certain undesirable practices, such as forced marriage.

Reconstruction of the economy

63. PAIGC’s policy in the liberated areas is aimed at eliminating all vestiges
of the economic organization and exploitation imposed by the Portuguese and
replacing it with a new economic system appropriate to the needs of the country.
As the economy of the liberated areas is essentially agriculture, this has involved
the abandonment of the exclusive concentration on the cultivation of groundnuts
as the country’s principal cash crop, and the diversification of agriculture to meet
local requirements. Crop diversification has reportedly progressed despite the
constant aerial bombardments and the destruction of harvests. PAIGC has
established demonstration centers to instruct the villagers in techniques of crop
diversification, collective farming, etc., and an embryonic system of cooperative
farming has already been created. The main products of Guinea (Bissau) today
are groundnuts, rice, palm kernels and palm oil, cola nuts, rubber, and wax.

64. Trade is transacted on a barter basis and Portuguese currency is no longer
used. People’s stores, organized by PAIGC, exist throughout the liberated areas
where the villagers may exchange their produce under the barter system for basic
necessities such as clothing, cooking utensils, and other manufactured goods which
consist largely of gifts received by PAIGC from foreign countries and international
organizations. Local produce accumulated in the people’s stores is used for the
needs of the liberation army for distribution in regions where there is a shortage,
and the surplus is exported to neighboring countries. PAIGC exports quantities
of rice, cola nuts, beeswax, and crocodile skins.

Establishment of a national assembly

65. It will be recalled that in his statement to the Security Council during its
meetings in Addis Ababa, Mr. Amilcar Cabral said that the people of Guinea
(Bissau) had already achieved self-determination through 9 years of armed
struggle and possessed all the component parts of a state in development. He said
that the people would shortly elect regional councils and a People’s National
Assembly.

66. During its visit, the special mission discussed these plans with Mr. Vasco
Cabral, the member of the executive committee who is responsible for ideology.
According to Mr. Cabral, the creation of an elected national assembly would
represent, in the view of PAIGC, a major step forward toward de jure recognition
of the independence of Guinea (Bissau) by foreign countries. It would also involve
significant changes within Guinea (Bissau). PAIGC had been considering such a
step since 1969 but had preferred to wait until all the conditions existed before
entering upon what would be a new phase in the struggle for independence. Now,
however, these conditions had been fulfilled because the people had already
achieved self-determination by liberating more than two-thirds of the territory
and by creating a sovereign political, economic, social, and cultural entity. He
said that Guinea (Bissau) was in fact an independent state, part of whose ter-
ritory was occupied by a foreign army.

67. He explained that the People’s National Assembly would be composed of
120 deputies, of whom 40 would be representatives of PAIGC from the northern,
southern, and eastern regions and the Bijagos Islands, and 80 would be represent-
atives of mass organizations, such as the Union des Travailleurs Guinéens, the
Union de la Jeunesse et des Étudiants and the Union des Femmes Guinéennes.

68. A five-member special commission had been established by PAIGC at the
end of 1971 to supervise preparation for the elections. Of the five members, one
or two were permanent representatives of PAIGC, while the others were representatives of the region where the commission happened to be working.

69. It had already been established by PAIGC that, in order to be eligible for election, a candidate must accept the general PAIGC line, must be committed to the cause of liberation, and must possess moral integrity. Candidates would be proposed by the villagers in collaboration with PAIGC. The election itself would be on two levels: in the first phase, the inhabitants of each region, divided into sectors, would elect the regional councilors by universal suffrage and secret ballot; in the second phase, the councilors of each region would elect one-third of their members to represent the region as deputies in the People's National Assembly. Of the deputies elected from each region, three-fifths would represent mass organizations and two-fifths would be from the ranks of PAIGC.

70. The age qualification for voters would be 15 years. He added that the elections would take place before the commencement of the rainy season in July-August 1972.

3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

71. In its resolution 1542 (XV) of December 15, 1960, the General Assembly determined that the territories under Portuguese administration, including Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde, were non-self-governing territories within the meaning of chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations. Thus, under the terms of article 73 of the charter, Portugal, as the administering power, is under the obligation to promote to the utmost the well-being of the inhabitants of the territories concerned, and, to that end, among other things, to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement.

72. Since the adoption of resolution 1542 (XV), however, the Government of Portugal has continued to maintain the fiction that these territories are overseas provinces of Portugal and has persistently refused to recognize the inalienable right of the people of the territories to self-determination and independence in accordance with the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples and other relevant U.N. resolutions. Moreover, in a futile attempt to suppress the national liberation movements in the African territories and to stifle the legitimate aspirations of their peoples to free themselves from colonial domination, the Government of Portugal has resorted to the extensive use of armed force, involving all the techniques of modern warfare, against the defenseless peoples of the territories.

73. During its recent visit to the liberated areas of Guinea (Bissau), the special mission had ample opportunity to witness the devastation and misery caused by Portugal's actions, particularly the widespread and indiscriminate bombing of villages and the use of napalm to destroy crops. At the same time, the mission was profoundly impressed by the manifest will of the people, despite their innumerable hardships and suffering, to carry on the struggle until freedom and independence were won under the able leadership of the national liberation movement, PAIGC. The mission lauds, on the one hand, the courage and determination of the people of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde and, on the other, the devotion and commitment on the part of PAIGC to guide and assist the people in their attainment of the goals set out in the charter.

74. That the struggle for the liberation of the territory continues to progress and that Portugal no longer exercises any effective administrative control in large areas of Guinea (Bissau) are irrefutable facts. According to PAIGC, the liberated areas now comprise either more than two-thirds or between two-thirds and three-fourths of the territory. This has been verified by many foreign observers and journalists. It is also evident that the population of the liberated areas unreservedly supports the policies and activities of PAIGC, which after 9 years of military struggle exercises de facto administrative control in those areas, and effectively protects the interests of the inhabitants in spite of Portuguese activities.

75. The special mission was impressed by the enthusiastic and wholehearted cooperation which PAIGC receives from the people in the liberated areas and the extent to which the latter are participating in the administrative machinery set up by PAIGC and in the various programs of reconstruction. Accordingly, the mission believes that the special committee's recognition of PAIGC, as being the de facto and the sole and authentic representative for the aspirations of the people of the territory, should be taken fully into account by states and the specialized
agencies and other organizations within the U.N. system in dealing with matters relating to Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde.

76. In an attempt to retain its colonialist domination over those areas of the territory which it still controls and, more recently, in order to prevent the special mission from carrying out its task, the Government of Portugal has increasingly resorted to the indiscriminate use of military force and has continued other acts of harassment and aggression not only against the people of the territory but also against Guinea and Senegal, the independent African states bordering the territory. The mission views with serious concern the resultant critical and explosive situation which seriously disturbs peace and security in that region of Africa.

77. Having observed at first hand the conditions of terror and harassment under which the people of the liberated areas continue to live, the special mission is convinced of the urgent need for concerted action by the international community to exercise pressure on the Government of Portugal to induce it to discontinue forthwith all acts of repression against these people and to withdraw at once all its forces from the territory. Humanitarian considerations alone call for such action. In this connection, the mission wishes to draw attention to the statement made by Mr. Amilcar Cabral before the Security Council meeting held at Addis Ababa on February 1, 1972.9 The mission considers it imperative that the supply of arms to Portugal by some of its allies should cease immediately, for the mission is convinced that without such support Portugal would be unable to pursue its colonial wars against the peoples of Guinea (Bissau), Angola or Mozambique. The mission suggests that the special committee might wish to pay particular attention to that aspect of the situation and consider requesting the Secretary-General to seek information from member states as well as from other sources relating to the arms supplied by them to Portugal.

78. The special mission was able to observe the marked progress achieved by the people of the territory through their national liberation movement, PAIGC, both in their struggle and in their work of reconstruction. In the liberated areas visited by the mission, the colonial administrative machinery has been replaced by new administrative, political and judicial institutions representative of the people and educational and health services have been created, often where none previously existed. As the mission has shown elsewhere in the present report, however, there is an acute and grave need to furnish material assistance to the people in their fight against hunger and sickness. Among their primary requirements are, in the first instance, staple foods, dietary supplements, medical care, particularly maternal and child care, and medicinal supplies as well as educational and training assistance. The mission believes that all states, the specialized agencies and other international organizations should do their utmost to provide, or to increase their supply of such assistance on an emergency basis. In that connection, mission notes with regret that, while some of the specialized agencies of the U.N. system have recently dispatched special representatives to consult with OAU for the purpose of working out programs of assistance to the colonial peoples and to their national liberation movements, very few concrete measures have so far been taken by the agencies to meet these needs. The mission is of the firm view that in order to bring about the desired results, the efforts of these agencies and other organizations within the U.N. system must be effectively coordinated. In that regard, the mission notes the recent decision of the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) to convene, with the participation of OAU, an ad hoc interagency meeting to consider arrangements for closer cooperation, on the basis of concrete proposals for multidisciplinary action. The mission hopes that this interagency meeting will take place as soon as possible so that a steady flow of assistance to the people of the territory can be assured at an early date. The mission also attaches great importance to the need for states members of the governing bodies and deliberative organs of the specialized agencies and organizations of the U.N. system to take effective action along the lines indicated by the General Assembly in paragraph 10 of its resolution 2874 (XXVI) of December 20, 1971. It will be recalled that, in that paragraph, the General Assembly requested all Governments to intensify their efforts in the specialized agencies and organizations of the U.N. system of which they are members in order to insure the full and effective implementation of the Declaration and other relevant U.N. resolutions.

79. The special mission hopes that the information gathered by it during its visit to the liberated areas of Guinea (Bissau) will serve to focus the attention of the whole world on the serious problems which exist in Africa. Its findings reveal the heroic struggle in which the people of the territory under the leadership of

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9 Ibid.
PAIGC are so fiercely engaged in their determination to free their territory from the colonial war which Portugal is waging in its desperate attempt to stave off defeat. Unable to regain control over the liberated areas or to vanquish the national liberation movement, the Portuguese authorities have resorted to widespread and indiscriminate aerial bombardment with the resultant loss of civilian life and in particular the destruction of hospitals, schools and villages. The mission believes that a cooperative effort should be made by all governments and competent national and international organizations to arouse world public opinion with a view to assisting the people of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde to achieve self-determination and independence. The information and evidence which the mission was able to obtain should be brought to the attention of the whole international community as a means of bringing about an intensification of diplomatic and political pressures on the Government of Portugal in order to obtain its compliance with the decisions of the United Nations.

80. Particular efforts should be made, in the view of the mission, to publicize regularly the terrorist activities of the Portuguese military command against the civilian populations. The importance of the role to be played in that connection by the U.N. Office of Public Information has to be underlined. The mission expresses its hope that, in the discharge of the tasks entrusted to him by the General Assembly in its resolution 2879 (XXVI) of December 20, 1971, concerning the dissemination of information on decolonization, the Secretary-General will take into account the views expressed by the mission in this report and will take concrete measures, utilizing all the media at his disposal, including special publications, radio and television, to disseminate the relevant information. The mission also hopes that member states will cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in carrying out the above-mentioned tasks.

81. Throughout its visit to the territory, the special mission was profoundly impressed by the earnestness and dedication of the national liberation movement, PAIGC, and by its realistic and open-minded approach to the problems which it confronts in the ultimate liberation of the whole of the territory. The mission is strongly of the opinion that there is a need for the special committee to maintain direct and continuous contact not only with PAIGC but also with other national liberation movements of the colonial territories in order to enhance the committee’s capacity for assisting the peoples of those territories in their struggle for liberation. The results of the recent meetings of the special committee away from headquarters, which enabled it to contact a number of national liberation movements in Africa, were both fruitful and encouraging. The mission believes that such contacts should be maintained in a more systematic and coordinated manner. Mindful of the decision adopted by the special committee at its 825th meeting on September 9, 1971, in which the committee requested its working group to study the possibility of associating representatives of the national liberation movements of colonial territories more closely with the work of the special committee, the mission expresses the hope that the committee will be able to submit appropriate recommendations to that effect when it reports to the General Assembly at its forthcoming session.

82. Finally, the special mission believes that the experience gained by its visit to Guinea (Bissau) has demonstrated the value of such contacts in terms both of the firsthand information which it was able to obtain and the constructive role which it was able to play as a link between the international community and the peoples of the colonial territories. The mission considers that there is a vital need for the special committee to dispatch similar missions to visit other colonial territories as a means of collecting adequate information on conditions in those territories and on the wishes and aspirations of the people regarding their future status. In the light of the renewed invitations received from other national liberation movements, the mission is of the opinion that the special committee should dispatch as appropriate visiting groups to the liberated areas of other Portuguese colonial territories in southern Africa.

ANNEX I

ITINERARY

March 28, 1972
Left New York for Conakry via Paris and Nouadhibou.

March 31, 1972
0630: Arrived at Conakry.
1030: Courtesy visit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
1200: Meeting with leaders of PAIGC.

April 1, 1972

0900: Left Conakry for Boké.
1800: Left Boké for the frontier.
2115: Left Kandiafara.
2130: Arrived at the base of Major Pires.

April 2, 1972

2245: Left the base for the frontier.
2315: Crossed the frontier.
2330: Left the two vehicles behind.
2335: Explosion heard.

April 3, 1972

0729: Arrived at the base of the political Commissariat of the Southern Region.
2130: Left the base for the Cubacaé sector.

April 4, 1972

1030: Arrived at the Aerolino Lopez Cruz boarding school.
2030: Entertainment by pupils.

April 5, 1972

1400: Left the boarding school for a village meeting.
1530: Arrived at the meeting place.
1800: Left for the boarding school.
1930: Returned to the boarding school.

April 6, 1972

0830: Visited the school's dining room.
0930: Attended history, geography, and mathematics classes.
1030: Interview with Satu Djassi, in charge of health in the Cubacaé sector.
1045: Interview with Mr. Fidelis Alnada, member of the Executive Committee.
1200: Student parade.
1500: Visited a homecraft class.
1730: Left the Aerolino Lopez Cruz boarding school.

April 7, 1972

0030: Passed through the destroyed village of Botche Djate, where there was an unexploded bomb.
0430: Arrived at the base of the Political Commissariat.
1630: Interview with Mr. Vasco Cabral and the person in charge of the Peoples' Stores.
1800: Left the base of the Political Commissariat.
2200: Arrived at the headquarters of the Front Command ("Nino" Base).

April 8, 1972

0005: Left the base for the frontier.
0725: Crossed the frontier.
0945: Arrived at the base of Major Pires.

We left Conakry April 1, 1972, by Land Rover at 0900 G.m.t. for Boké located about 180 kilometers (direct by air) "as the crow flies" northwest of Conakry. We continued our journey to Kandiafara on the Cogon River from Boké in a west-northwesterly direction (approximately 290°-300°) at an average speed of 50-55 kilometers per hour. The direction was confirmed by the fact that the late afternoon sun was almost constantly shining against the windshield of our car at an angle of about 11:30-12:30 o'clock (12 o'clock is dead ahead). We arrived at Kandiafara at 2000 G.m.t. on April 1, 1972, after 2 hours driving from Boké. We had traveled approximately 100-110 kilometers. We crossed the Cogon River by ferry at 2115 G.m.t. on April 1, 1972, reached to opposite bank 5 minutes later, and immediately proceeded to the frontier camp of Commandant Pires in the direction of about

1 See map on page 360 of this annex.
$315^\circ$ or due northwest for 10 minutes at an average speed of 20 kilometers per hour. The direction of travel was established by celestial navigation. In other words, we were then approximately 103–113 kilometers away from Boké in the direction of about $300^\circ$.

We departed by jeep from the camp at 2245 G.m.t. on April 2, 1972, for the liberated areas of Guinea (Bissau) at an average speed of 20 kilometers per hour for the next 45 minutes going due west or approximately $270^\circ$. Again this was established by celestial navigation. The distance covered during this period was about 15 kilometers. In the meantime, we crossed the frontier at 2315 G.m.t., on April 2, 1972.

We began our march at that point at 2330 G.m.t., on April 2, 1972, in the direction of approximately $270^\circ$ or due west (by a compass and by celestial navigation) until 0200 G.m.t. on April 3, 1972, to reach the point where we took our first rest.

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2 Ibid., position “B.”
3 Ibid., position “C.”
Judging that an average distance traveled by foot is about 4 kilometers per hour, we walked approximately 10 kilometers. If we add the distance between Boké and Pires Camp (103–113 kilometers) from Pires Camp to the point where the march began (15 kilometers) and the 10 kilometers covered in the 2½-hour march, we would be 128–138 kilometers away from Boké in the direction of 300°–315°.

Draw a circle with 128–138 kilometers radius from Boké on a map and pay particular attention to the portion of the circumference in the area of 300°–315° from Boké.

It is clearly beyond the frontier, thus proving we were in the territory of Guinea (Bissau).

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*See page 360 of this annex.*
APPENDIX 9

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY-GENERAL AMILCAR CABRAL OF THE PAIGC ON THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION TO THE LIBERATED REGIONS IN THE SOUTH IN GUINEA-BISSAU

COMMUNIQUE

On the invitation of the national leadership of our party and implementing a decision of the General Assembly, a special mission from the United Nations' Organization, made up of the representatives of three member countries (Ecuador, Sweden, Tunisia) and accompanied by two officials of the Secretariat General, who sent a Senegalese secretary and a Japanese photographer, has just spent a week (from the 1st to the 8th of April) in the liberated regions in the south of our country.

During its visit, the special mission, which was received by some of the principal leaders of our party and of the struggle, was able to evaluate the situation in the country on the spot, make contact with the population, participate in public meetings, visit schools and other social undertakings and gather detailed information on the organization and the institutions of the new life that our people are in the process of building all the while they face the terrorist bombs and assaults of Portuguese colonialists.

As they knew of the U.N. decision and the date set for the visit, the Portuguese colonialists, beginning March 28, loosed a vast terrorist action of aggression against the liberated south, especially against the frontier sectors, for which they used the majority of their regular and special troops, all their planes, helicopters, and other technical means, to bar the road to the U.N. mission and cause their planned visit to be aborted.

In response to the criminal acts of barbarism of the Portuguese colonialists who burned many villages with napalm, destroyed two hospitals, a health station and three schools, and killed 25 members of the populace including four children, 13 women and two old people, our soldiers inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and guaranteed the security necessary to carry out the U.N. mission successfully.

This important victory for our people, for the United Nations and for all anticolonialist forces is another irrefutable confirmation of the fact that our people, under the leadership of our party, are sovereign and the only masters of their own destiny in the liberated regions of our country.

Issued, April 10, 1972.

AMILCAR CABRAL,
Secretary General.
Nevertheless, owing to the high percentage of young people in the population, it is estimated that the number of Mauritians will double in the next 30 years. Unemployment, and the resulting social dislocation and crime, are already major problems.

Ideally located at the crossroads of the main Indian Ocean trade routes, and positioned on the reentry path for Soviet polar-orbiting satellites, Mauritius seems destined to remain of strategic interest to a number of powers out of all proportion to its size or limited natural wealth. The continuation of mutually beneficial GOM/USG relationships is of some interest to the United States. Mauritian-American relations have always been harmonious and friendly.

Having existed as a British colony for 150 years, most Mauritians have a typical new nation's love-hate attitude toward their former masters. The British are by far the most significant source of foreign aid. Under the terms of the defense agreement, the British maintain a key communications station on the island and have obligated themselves to consider sending troops when requested by the Government in a serious emergency.

The Soviets maintain a fair-sized embassy on the island and conduct an active information program, but have not been successful in making a significant impact. Last July a Russian delegation signed a fishing agreement, the single new element of which provided for Aeroflot flights to fly in fresh crews for Soviet fishing trawlers. (For some years Soviet vessels have regularly taken on oil and supplies in Mauritius.) Soviet aid to Mauritian fisheries was also mentioned. Another Soviet visit here in late January 1971 and Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Natural Resources Boolell's subsequent visit to the U.S.S.R. led to actual provision of fisheries aid.

The U.S. Embassy conducts a modest range of activities in Mauritius, limiting itself to programs which may be administered by a small staff. Personnel at the Embassy total seven; a Director and Deputy Director are in charge of the Peace Corps.

**Peace Corps**

Since June 1970, 21 volunteers have been engaged in programs directed by the Ministries of Agriculture, Social Security Cooperatives, Education, and at the University of Mauritius. Two PCV's are working in agriculture on the remote island of Rodrigues, a Mauritian dependency. The volunteers are well accepted in Mauritius and make a tangible contribution to the overall U.S. program.

**U.S. Assistance**

No USAID personnel are stationed in the country, but the United States is involved in the following programs:

1. Public Law 480, title II. Since September 1970, a food-for-work program designed to open lands for small tea holdings has provided rice, oil, and milk as part wages for about 3,000 workers at a total cost to the United States of over $900,000 annually. When a pending World Bank loan is approved for the Tea Development Authority, it is hoped that aid remaining in the pipeline may be shifted to other development projects.
APPENDIX 10

STATEMENT BY AMILCAR CABRAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL IN ADDIS ABBABA ON FEBRUARY 1, 1972

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SIXTEEN HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SECOND MEETING

President: Mr. Khalid, (Sudan).

Members: Argentina, Mr. Ortiz de Rozas; Belgium, Mr. Longerstaey; China, Mr. Huang; France, Mr. Kosciusko-Morizet; Guinea, Mr. Toure; India, Mr. Sen; Italy, Mr. Vinci; Japan, Mr. Yoshida; Panama, Mr. Boyd; Somalia, Mr. Farah; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Malik; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Sir Colin Crowe; United States of America, Mr. Bush; Yugoslavia, Mr. Mojsiev.

Ninthly, and finally, the Liberation Committee wishes to pay tribute to those members of the Council who have put forward positive and concrete proposals which are in line with our aforementioned contributions.

The Liberation Committee and the liberation movements recognized by the Organization of African Unity, primarily concerned with the question on which the Security Council is called upon to act, firmly believe that through concrete and resolute decisions on the part of the Council, the present session would be a genuine contribution to the just cause of liberation and dignity of the African man. If the members of the Security Council, and especially its permanent ones, are to assume fully their responsibilities, if effective measures are taken to implement the United Nations resolutions on decolonization, racial discrimination and apartheid, then the Addis Ababa session will go down in history as the true consecration of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter; peace in southern Africa will be maintained and the harmonious coexistence of all races preserved.

It is my sincere hope, not only as the Chairman of the Liberation Committee, but as a son of Africa, that the Security Council will consider thoroughly the problems on its agenda, and with better understanding, so that its action would justify the convening of the present session on African soil.

The President. I thank Mr. El-Bidewy for the kind words he reserved for me. I now invite Mr. Amilcar Cabral to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Cabral (interpretation from French). Mr. President, before I begin my statement, I have the honor to convey brotherly greetings to you, and to wish you the greatest success in your task as President of the Security Council. I offer these greetings on behalf of my organization. I should like to assure you, Sir, that for us in our country it is as if for this month our people themselves were placed at the head of the Security Council in the President's chair, because you are our brothers; we are companions, and we dream of the day when we can express the same feelings whoever may be presiding over the Security Council.

We feel greatly honored and also very encouraged by this opportunity to be heard by the Security Council of the United Nations, but we also realize how much this signifies—how much more responsibility for each as an individual, as a human being and as a fighter for the freedom of our African peoples. But we are also aware that this occasion, this opportunity, this event will represent much more responsibility for the Security Council itself, for after this meeting, as the poet would say, no one can say that the truth did not out.

We shall not repeat here what many other speakers have already said—that this meeting of the Security Council in Africa is an historic event. In fact, we are all disturbed, both our friends and our enemies, at the progress of the African peoples.

We have already had the honor to speak a number of times in this same room, but today we do so under very different circumstances. If I may be allowed a comparison, we feel as we do when in our country we hunt in the sacred forest to contact the great all-powerful Spirit who, according to our moral philosophy,
decrees and decides upon good and ill for both the individual and the community.
We wonder whether the Security Council will be at the level of this humanity—
the great Spirit that synthesizes good and evil; if it is, this meeting is already a
brilliant victory of good over evil.

That is why we should like to congratulate the Organization of African Unity
for its decision to request this meeting in Africa. We also congratulate the Security
Council itself and, most particularly, the permanent members, for having agreed
to this meeting. This event is not only evidence of an acute awareness of the
increasing importance of the problems confronting Africa in respect of the destinies
of mankind; it is also, perhaps, the dawn of a new era in the life of the organiza-
tion in the service of mankind. It is certainly proof that if principles are respected
by, the members of the Security Council, are our companions in our struggle.
We are and until victory is won will remain anonymous soldiers in the cause of
the United Nations despite the fact that we have not been present in the Congo,
nor in Cyprus, nor in the Middle East, and have never worn blue helmets. Those
who have not understood this fact—our being anonymous soldiers of the United
Nations—have understood neither the principles of the United Nations itself
nor the objectives of national liberation.

We are not here before the Council to accuse anyone, not even the particularly
backward Portuguese colonialists. In fact, who is there today who does not know
that the Portuguese colonialists have committed and are committing abominable
crimes against the African peoples in the name of Christian and Western civiliza-
tion? Who does not know that the so-called multiracial society and the so-called
reforms of Portuguese colonialism are nothing more than gross attempts to
perpetuate the colonial exploitation of our peoples while seeking to camouflage
primitive racism, which has always characterized the Portuguese presence in
Africa? Suffice it to know something about the history of Portuguese colonialism
and go back to the sinister days of General Espinola to know that it is charac-
terized by crimes and constant contempt for the African man. Suffice it to recall
that Salazar confirmed quite clearly that Africa does not exist. Suffice it to read
the lessons of colonial law professed by Dr. Marcelo Gaetano at the University of
Lisbon who, on the basis of the arguments of Gobineau and the Nazi Levy-
Bruhl, shows that the black man is inferior to the Portuguese. Suffice it to read
recent lectures of General Kouza d'Arriaga; given at the High Portuguese Com-
mand, concerning Portuguese strategy, in which he affirms that "the African
peoples are the least intelligent of all the peoples in the world." Finally, suffice
it to know the daily crimes perpetrated by the Portuguese colonialist troops who
occupy our country against Africans in the colonial war.

This year we invited the General Assembly of the United Nations to send a
delegation to examine the realities of our country. We have just heard the president
of the liberation committee, and we should like before the Council to give full
support to his proposal concerning a visit of a Security Council delegation to our
country.

For us, for our African people, the time of verbal accusations is long past. The
time of pleading has also gone forever. Precisely because our people have under-
stood how useless it is to make accusations, how vain their pleadings are, they have
taken up weapons to contest the criminal violence of the Portuguese colonialists,
to reap freedom from the colonialist yoke, to regain their independence and to
recover their inalienable right to have their own history. Despite the efforts and
sacrifices that implies, that is what we are doing, and we have met with encourag-
ing success. We shall continue until the final victory is won—in the service of our
people, of course, but also in the service of Africa and mankind as a whole, in the
defense of the principles of the United Nations.

Nor are we here to accuse the allies of the Portuguese Government or to recall
that the United Nations and the Security Council, were it not for limitations
imposed by international contradictions, could have done a great deal more to
liberate our peoples. That would neither be polite on our part nor accord with
African traditions, which would have us embarrass no one. Who does not know
that Portugal—an underdeveloped country and the most backward in Europe—
would not be in a position to devote about 50 percent of its annual budget to the
colonial war and for years to wage three wars against the African peoples were it
not for the aid of those allies? Who does not know that Portugal, which does not even manufacture toy aeroplanes for its children, uses
against us warplanes, helicopters, and the most modern of weapons, furnished by
its allies?

Who does not know who Portugal's allies are, apart from the South African
racists? Who in all honesty can believe that the Portuguese Government, which
respects neither the rules nor the principles of NATO, would have been able to
leave the arms and weapons received from that organization to go rusty when it needs to repress our aspirations to freedom?

Who could believe that the Portuguese Government is not going to make use the millions it receives in financial aid in the continuation of the colonial war against the peoples of Africa, when Dr. Marcelo Caetano himself said in his statement that he needs money to pursue the war?

An elementary rule of public security requires that weapons not be given to criminals and to madmen, and it seems to us that that rule is fully applicable to the criminal madmen of the Portuguese Government, who are international criminals. In view of that attitude it is no longer of interest for us to ask why the Portuguese Government is not making use of the millions the Portuguese Government is not going to make use of the millions it receives in financial aid in the continuation of the colonial war against the peoples of Africa, who needs money to pursue the war? What is of interest now is to ask why the countries which claim that they are champions of freedom, democracy, and the progress of people and boast of it do not help us in our struggle for freedom, democracy, and progress.

If the reply is the same and the reasons are the same, then two aspects become clear to us. First, the so-called adherence to principles is false and is designed only to deceive naive politicians. Among those who proclaim themselves to be the friends of Africa are some who are not our friends, but quite the contrary. We believe that the result of this session will help in a decisive fashion to understand this matter even better, despite our long experience of the question. For as one of the sayings of our people goes: "Whatever be the size of your hand, it will never manage to reach the sky."

Nor are we here—and this is certainly going to surprise some of our African brothers—to ask that Portugal should be expelled from the United Nations. First of all, we do not confuse the Portuguese nation with the Portuguese Government which is now in power, although it has been in power for almost half a century. Second, it appears to us that the interests of some members of the Security Council with respect to Portugal itself and the colonies would not enable them to support such a measure, and we wish very much to be realistic. Third, we believe that such a measure would not be effective. Frankly, our purpose is not to liberate the United Nations from Portugal, but rather to liberate our African country from Portuguese colonial domination and to win our national and international sovereignty.

Moreover—and this is another issue—who does not know that the Portuguese Government is a fascist government, an enemy of democracy and fundamental freedoms? Who does not know that the people of Portugal themselves do not enjoy the most elementary human rights? Who does not know of the fact that the Portuguese Government does not respect the United Nations Charter and the principles of the United Nations and that it does not even respect the principles proclaimed in the NATO charter? To expel Portugal from the United Nations is not the question. It is not Portugal that matters here. As far as we are concerned, it is the attitude of the Security Council, and in particular of the permanent members of the Council, that is important.

Churchill said that each people has the government it deserves. We could paraphrase this to say that every organization has the members it deserves. But for us the problem today is not the question of the expulsion of Portugal, but rather the matter of recognizing that the Portuguese Government no longer has the right, if it ever did have that right, to represent our people within the United Nations. The problem today is not the question of the expulsion of Portugal, but rather the question of recognizing that the Portuguese Government no longer has the right, if it ever did have that right, to represent our people within the United Nations, any more than it has the right to represent our people in the Organization of African Unity. It is a question of recognizing that the only true and legitimate representatives of our African people of Guinea and of the Cape Verde Islands is our party, the PAIGC. Finally, it is the problem of the admission of our African nation to the United Nations as a member. That is the problem which is raised by the specific situation which prevails in our country. It is the problem which the OAU, the African States, and all anticolonialist forces of the world have already solved by recognizing our party as the only true and legitimate representatives of our people. That is the problem which the United Nations and the Security Council, and in particular its permanent members, must come to grips with in order to solve it courageously, if they really wish to do so and if they want to make an effective political contribution to the liberation of our people.

For our part, while intensifying the indispensable armed action that is needed to complete the liberation of our country, we are in the course of taking the necessary political steps for the development of such a situation.

What is the situation as it obtains now? In general, the situation is known because we have always reported on it to the United Nations. In Guinea, our people have already achieved self-determination through 9 years of armed struggle imposed by Portuguese colonialism. Our people, as a result of that self-determination, already have sovereignty over more than two-thirds of its national
territory. Our situation is comparable to that of an independent state which has certain portions of its national territory occupied by foreign armed forces.

We have all the component parts of a state in development in our country. In, the face of the criminal fascist bombs of Portugal, we are building a new life justice, work and democracy in our liberated areas. We are at present in the course of making all the preparations for that and we shall shortly elect the regional councilors and the first popular assembly of our people in Guinea. We shall draw all the necessary consequences from these acts of sovereignty, and shall thus help the United Nations itself and all of our friends to help us even further.

The Portuguese colonialists, of course, are desperate and are day by day increasing their acts of terrorism against our people.

In the Cape Verde Islands, where again a situation of famine is raging, the political situation has developed very favorably and we are determined, if Portugal stubbornly persists in its crimes, to use every possible means to liberate our people on the islands. The Portuguese use all sorts of tricks to try to persuade their allies that we intend to liberate the Cape Verde Islands in order to set up a Communist power base. We declare before this Council that when we liberate ourselves from Portuguese colonialism we shall never subject ourselves to the domination of anyone and that we shall always be ready to defend ourselves against any attempts at the domination of our people.

Our struggle is a very difficult one and it has gone on for many long years, but it has not been useless. On the contrary, we have already made a great deal of progress. It will be of interest to this Council to know that, for example, we have already trained many cadres. More than 400 young men and women at present are following courses in various countries in order to become the cadres of tomorrow. But even now many cadres have already returned to the country and I can tell you that in 1960 I had the privilege of being the only agronomist in our country among the 14 university graduates that Portugal had trained during its 700 years of presence in our country. Today, there are already more than a dozen agronomists and more than 15 that are being trained.

We shall continue to wage our struggle until we have achieved victory. We are determined to do anything that is necessary. We have the necessary means to inflict even heavier blows day by day on the Portuguese colonialists. But we are not warriors. We love peace; we hate war. But we want to be free.

We are not opposed to Portugal. We have already stated that time and time again. We are against Portuguese colonialism. We want to have the best possible relations with Portugal after we have achieved independence. We are convinced that that is in the interest of our people. But we also have the right to have relations with all other countries of the world in order to enhance the progress of our people.

We want to build and construct on the basis of our own efforts and sacrifices, but also with aid from all possible sources, in order to achieve the progress of our people.

We should like to repeat here that we have never confused colonialism in Portugal and the people of Portugal. The people of Portugal are our ally. The people of Portugal are today aware of the fact that the colonial war is a crime not only against our people but also against the Portuguese people itself, and we are doing everything possible in the course of the struggle to strengthen our solidarity with the people of Portugal, which has already decided to use the same violent means against the Portuguese colonial war machine.

We should like to repeat once again that we are for dialog, but heretofore the Portuguese Government wanted to have only the dialog of arms. We repeat that we are ready to negotiate at any time. We should be very grateful to the Security Council if it could help us in that field.

What aid do we need? We need moral aid. We are asking the members of the Security Council and of all the United Nations not to be hostile to us and to allow us to circulate in their countries. We cannot understand that, for example, a country like France—a country of freedom, fraternity and equality, and a country we admire very much—would not allow us to go to France, who in our own country are doing what De Gaulle did for France when that country was occupied by the Nazis.

We need material assistance. We have already begun to receive such assistance through the specialized agencies of the United Nations. UNESCO is helping us; we have the prospect of aid from UNICEF. We should like the Security Council to strengthen all these prospects and make them as realistic as possible because we have a great task of national reconstruction to develop in our country.
Before concluding I should like to thank the Security Council and each one of its members for everything they have done heretofore to help our struggle. We should like to thank, in particular, the members of this Council who are helping in a material fashion to advance our liberation struggle and our people to gain their freedom, and I am referring particularly to the Soviet Union, China, and Yugoslavia, which are present here.

Of course, I must not forget also to thank our African brothers who are helping us.

We hope that, through Argentina and Panama, all of Latin America will continue to develop the spirit of Bolivar and of the other great patriots and national heroes of Latin America and will come to our aid. We hope also that through Japan, which sets an extraordinary example of the possibilities open to the colored peoples to develop themselves and advance, Asia can help us more and more each day.

We should like to support all that has been said here by previous speakers, and in particular by the distinguished speakers such as His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I, and the proposals made by our elder brother, President Ould Daddah and the proposal contained in the message of President Sékou Touré. We support all the statements made by the African representatives present here and the proposals made by the chairman of the Committee for the Liberation of Africa.

We wish to offer the following concrete proposals: the permanent members of the Security Council should take in hand the problem of aid to the liberation movements. They can agree to demand that Portugal should proceed to decolonization. Portugal is a weak country, and as the saying goes in our country: As long as you have a canoe a dirty look from a crocodile is not going to stop you getting through.

We ask that a time limit should be set as the final date for the departure of Portuguese colonialism and we ask that a delegation of the Security Council should visit Mr. Caetano and make a concrete proposal to him to enter into negotiations—at the Headquarters of the United Nations, for example—with the liberation movements of the Portuguese colonies, the authentic movements that are the true representatives of these colonies. If there should be a negative reply, we propose that we should be given all assistance necessary to develop our struggle and liberate our country. For our part, we shall do our best to help you to help us, and we are sure that we shall attain independence.

Addis Ababa, the new flower of this bastion of African independence which is Ethiopia, is once again the site of a historic event—namely, this session. It is up to you, gentlemen, the Security Council, to make of this occasion a historic event or relegate it to the annals of political tourism. We are very confident and encouraged by this session, and we should like to tell you here, like the Roman plebes when they were addressing the great ones of Rome: You who have the capacity and the privilege of being judges in this land, do everything to insure that justice is done. At this very moment when, despite the contradictions which prevail in the world—contradictions of ideology and of social and political systems—there are contacts between the most opposing poles, and these contacts are developing, at this very moment when certain nations are dreaming of conquering the cosmos, in a collective undertaking, to plant there the hopes of man, it is not really much to ask that before you leave for nebulous Andromeda or other far corners of the universe you should help us specifically and realistically to liberate our people from the scourge of Portuguese colonialism, because like you we should like to participate in the great human adventure either on this earth or across the universe.

The President: I thank Mr. Cabral for his good wishes and fraternal salutations.
Thank you very much. May I take advantage of the opportunity first of all to formally introduce the other members of the delegation as I'm very delighted to be joined on this visit by my distinguished colleague from Michigan here, Congressman Guy Vander Jagt, who, as a member of President Nixon's Republican Party, makes this a bipartisan delegation. We are also accompanied by Mrs. Guy Vander Jagt, Attorney Melvin Benson, the staff consultant for the House Foreign Affairs Committee who, by the way, lived in South Africa from 1948 to 1949, by Mrs. Goler T. Butcher, attorney and staff consultant for the House Subcommittee on Africa, and Dr. James McClelland, the staff assistant to Congressman Vander Jagt.

We think our visit reflects a growing interest in the United States on the whole southern African situation. I wish to emphasize that the purpose of our trip, as in others to some 50 African independent countries and territories that I have personally from time to time visited, is in the nature of further familiarization. We wish to learn as much as possible within our limited time frame from all the people of South Africa with respect to their political, economic, social, and legal systems. Consistent with the current hearings of our subcommittee on the subject of U.S. business involvement in southern Africa, most of which is in the Republic of South Africa, we are particularly interested in observing the employment practices and policies of U.S. firms. We are interested in observing the implementation by our own diplomatic mission and related agencies of U.S. pronouncements at the United Nations and in other forums concerning apartheid. We wish to witness for ourselves the South African concept of separate development in operation and to see what have been its results. At the same time, we are aware of the considerations relating to separate development under the U.N. Charter, specifically article I, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the charter and articles 55 and 56 of the charter, copies of which are being made available this morning.

It is a matter of intense regret that facilities and contracts may be available to the black members of our group, including myself, which are denied the majority of the people of South Africa, nevertheless, we believe our visit for on-the-ground observation to be supportive to the majority of the people of South Africa in their legitimate aspirations and therefore of overriding importance.

Congressman Vander Jagt and I came to South Africa in good faith, with the understanding gained from the South African Government that no restrictions would be placed on our travels. We were given to understand that we would be able to travel anywhere and to speak with whomever we chose. It was understood by the South African Government that we planned to visit Namibia.

With great surprise and deep disappointment we learned, upon arrival at Jan Smuts Airport, that the South African Government had interposed an objection to our visit to Namibia, and there was no satisfactory reason for this decision and it's particularly aggravating when you consider that it involves an area in which the International Court of Justice has only recently reaffirmed that the South African Government lacks legal authority in the first place.

But the reasons given concerning the heaviness of their schedule in the area and the lack of accommodations is ludicrous when one considers that less than 2 weeks ago I was part of the U.S. delegation attending the funeral of President Tubman in Liberia, a country of only 1½ million people, who found accommodations without any difficulties and handled without any difficulties 10 chiefs of state and twice that number of delegations from Europe and African nations. So it was certainly unsatisfactory to learn that a country of this size and renowned sophistication could not handle a delegation containing six people. We might add also to that that I believe personally that the countdown on our trip to Namibia began when we insisted that our own mission people were appropriate escorts for a trip in that area and that we did not need anyone from their government accompanying us on that trip. And that was a matter that was discussed some 2 weeks ago and
when we insisted that we did not need such an escort. In my view, that began the countdown. They just didn't have the guts to say it at the time. Under these circumstances we found ourselves unable to accept the restrictions placed upon our travel. And through our Ambassador we conveyed to the Department of Foreign Affairs our displeasure and our intention to cut short our visit to South Africa.

However, we were so deeply moved yesterday by the overwhelming warmth of the reception and the openness of the response by the people of Soweto and Pretoria. This demonstrated the commonality of interest between us and led us to conclude that we should adhere to our travel plan in South Africa, so that we might have more people-to-people contacts. Moreover, the Ambassador and his staff, who strongly urged us to continue with our visit, have worked out an excellent schedule which will permit us to meet and talk with a cross-section of the South African community.

We prefer not to get into the details of the itinerary, except to say that we will be visiting Capetown, Port Elizabeth, Durban, the Transkei, Zululand and Johannesburg, and we in conclusion intend to meet with the communication media before our departure on August 1 and at that time we will take such questions as time will permit.
APPENDIX 12

OPEN LETTER TO HIS HONOR THE PRIME MINISTER OF SOUTH AFRICA

WINDHOEK, June 30, 1971.

His Honor, Mr. B. J. Vorster,
The Prime Minister, Pretoria.

His Honor: After the decision of the World Court at the Hague was made known on June 21, 1971, several leaders and officials of our Lutheran Churches were individually approached by representatives of the authorities with a view to making known their views. This indicates to us that public institutions are interested in hearing the opinions of the churches in this connection. Therefore we would like to make use of the opportunity of informing your Honor of the opinion of the church boards of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in South-West Africa and the Evangelical Lutheran Ovambokavango Church which represents the majority of the indigenous population of South-West Africa.

We believe that South Africa in its attempts to develop South West Africa has failed to take cognizance of human rights as declared by United Nations Organization in the year 1948 with respect to the nonwhite population. Allow us to put forward the following examples in this connection:

(1) The government maintains that by the race policy it implements in our country, it promotes and preserves the life and freedom of the population. But in fact the nonwhite population is continuously being slighted and intimidated in their daily lives. Our people are not free and by the way they are treated they do not feel safe.

In this regard we wish to refer to section 3 of Human Rights.

(2) We cannot do otherwise than regard South-West Africa, with all its racial groups, as a unit. By the group areas legislation the people are denied the right of free movement and accommodation within the borders of the country. This cannot be reconciled with section 13 of the Human Rights.

(3) People are not free to express or publish their thoughts or opinions openly. Many experience humiliating espionage and intimidation which has as its goal that a public and accepted opinion must be expressed, but not one held at heart and of which they are convinced. How can sections 18 and 19 of the Human Rights be realized under such circumstances?

(4) The implementation of the policy of the government makes it impossible for the political parties of the indigenous people to work together in a really responsible and democratic manner to build the future of the whole of South-West Africa. We believe that it is important in this connection that the use of voting rights should also be allowed to the nonwhite population. (Secs. 20 and 21 of the Human Rights.)

(5) Through the application of job reservation the right to a free choice of profession is hindered and this causes low remuneration and unemployment. There can be no doubt that the contract system breaks up a healthy family life because the prohibition of a person from living where he works hinders the cohabitation of families. This conflicts with sections 23 and 25 of the Human Rights.

The church board's urgent wish is that in terms of the declarations of the World Court and in cooperation with United Nations Organization, of which South Africa is a member, your government will seek a peaceful solution to the problems of our land and will see to it that Human Rights be put into operation and that South-West Africa may become a self-sufficient and independent state.

With high esteem,

Bishop Dr. L. Auala,
Chairman of the Church Board of the Evangelical Lutheran Ovambokavango Church.

Moderator Pastor P. Gowaseb,
Chairman of the Church Board of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in South-West Africa (Rhenish Mission Church).

(370)
Evangelical Lutheran Ovambokavango Church
Evangelical Lutheran Church in South-West Africa (Rhenish Mission Church)
The Church Boards

Windhoek, June 30, 1971.

To the Congregations and Members of the Evangelical Lutheran Ovambokavango Church and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in South-West Africa (Rhenish Mission Church):

Dear Brothers and Sisters in Jesus Christ: We greet you with the words of Jesus: “Peace be with you” (John 20: 19). On June 30, 1971, we gathered together as the church boards of our two Lutheran churches because we felt that we must direct words of leadership and guidance to our congregations in this hour of need.

We are concerned about the future of this country and about the future of the various peoples who live here. We not only feel this concern today but, because of the judgment of the World Court given on June 21, 1971, we can no longer remain silent. We feel that if we, as the church remains silent any longer, we will become liable for the life and future of our country and its people.

The judgment of the World Court was the answer to the prayers of many of our people because this judgment involves the hope of freedom and recognition of personal worth. We believe that our people would not have betaken themselves to other bodies and also to the United Nations Organization if the Government of South Africa had not withheld from them the basic rights of man.

The mandate which was given to South Africa included the obligation to create conditions of peace and freedom and to guarantee such conditions for all the inhabitants of South-West Africa.

True peace does not allow people to hate each other. But we observe that our people are caught up with fear and that the hate between people is increasing especially between white and nonwhite. In our opinion this fatal development is caused and upheld by the policy of apartheid. We believe that a false impression arises when it is stated that peace reigns in our country. The peace is maintained by forceful measures.

To the freedom of the people belongs also the freedom of the spread of the gospel. We are concerned that Christians of various population groups are hindered by numerous laws and regulations from freely gathering together for the word of God.

As a result of the application of the group areas laws, the activities of the church are severely restricted and the unity of the various races of the church curtailed. Individual ministers of the gospel and Christians are filled with fear and distrusted. They are also sometimes hindered in their evangelizing by the refusal of permits.

The true development of the inhabitants of South-West Africa on a Christian basis ought to lead to unity and fraternity between the races. We are convinced that this must be the lasting goal for further and future development. The Government, by the application of the homelands policy, constitutes to the creation and continuation forever of the divisions between the races. It is stated that this policy is intended to lead the races to self-government and independence. But our small race groups cannot really be aided by separation. They will be isolated and denied the chance to take a proper part in the development of the country.

We want to also inform the members of our congregations that we are determined to inform the Government of this state of affairs and of our convictions of what changes must occur. We appeal to you to maintain the peace and with a peaceful disposition to continue seeking our brothers in all racial groups. We want to advise you also to build bridges and not to breakdown contact.

Dear congregations, we as your church boards do not intend sowing seeds of animosity, discord, and strife. Our purpose is to stand for the truth and for a better future for our people and races, even when it involves suffering for us.
May the Lord be with you in His Mercy and give you guidance through His Spirit. Let us continue praying for all authorities (I Tim. 2:1-2) so that they may be prepared to alter the grievous circumstances and to take cognizance of the true interests of this country and its people.

On behalf of the two church boards

Dr. Leonard Auala,
Chairman of the Church Board
of the Evangelical Lutheran Ovambokavango Church.

Paulus Gowaseb,
Chairman of the Church Board
of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in South-West Africa.
(Rhenish Mission Church).

Press Release

Windhoek July 23 1971.

The church boards of the two indigenous Lutheran Churches in South-West Africa wrote a letter to His Honor the Prime Minister and also one to their congregations. In this way we gave our opinion to help the people. To do this is also our task which God wants us to do.

We have read the newspapers and have seen that the whites are very unsatisfied with us. They do not agree. But we have experienced that our nonwhite congregations have understood us well because we referred to the true facts. The newspapers and other whites have said the church cannot speak like this. Our own people who daily experience the true state of affairs are thankful that the church boards have intervened for them. So we can then only stand by our statement which has been issued.

Our main point with the Prime Minister is the lack of application of human rights. This is what we nonwhites experience. We know and we can see that the Government is spending money on development. We are all in favor of the development of hospitals and schools and education, et cetera. A beginning has been made and our people are grateful for this. But we are not recognized fully as people and are belittled in daily life. This hurts us. This main point must be corrected.

There are many examples of bad treatment which are against human rights. We can name them. The object of our letter to the Prime Minister was to speak to the Government about these matters.

In our letter, we said that South-West Africa must remain as a unit and become independent. The Government also wants independence. But it wants an independent Ovamboland, an independent Kavango, Hereroland, Damaraland, Namaland, et cetera. The people of South-West Africa are few and because of this are already divided although we wish to stay together. We cannot do anything else but see South-West Africa with all its population groups as a unity.

Because of this, we said that the South African Government in cooperation with the United Nations must make the whole country with all its people independent. We must all be together in one independent country. This is what we are asking of the Government. Our main point is the belittling our people experience through legislation and through the treatment they receive. We are mature people and wish to be recognized as such. It is for this we are asking.

(Get.) Bishop Dr. L. Auala,
Moderator Pastor P. Gowaseb.
(2) Self-Help Fund. In 1971 the Embassy had regularly available $50,000 for small, self-help projects. During the past 2 years this program has provided funds for a wide range of activities, including outfitting an experimental rice farm, sugar technology for the university, building materials for youth clubs, and training for the Young Farmers Organization.

(3) Population programs. Indirectly through the International Planned Parenthood Foundation, USAID provides commodity and financial support for the Mauritius Family Planning Association. This calendar year, when family planning programs are being absorbed by the Ministry of Health with U.N. support, AID funds amount to $30,000. The United States also assists the Pathfinder Fund and the World Assembly of Youth which conduct education programs in Mauritius.

(4) U.N. programs. Through the World Food Program, U.S. commodities are being used in school and child and maternal feeding programs and in a livestock development program.

(5) Currently, additional AID assistance projects for Mauritius will be considered only on a regional or multidonor basis.

USIS

The Embassy, due to its small size, has no USIS personnel but receives a variety of information materials and conducts an active program of book distributions, village film shows, tapes and films for radio and television, and occasional exhibits and other presentations.

Leader and specialist grants

Over 3 years the Embassy has managed to provide either whole or partial grants to most of the key political leaders on the island for visits or study in the United States. A number of specialists, mainly in education, have also visited the United States under leader grants.

Department of Defense

In recent years, U.S. Navy ships have called at Port Louis on an average of one visit every 5 to 6 months. The U.S. Government has been generous in responding to specific Mauritian requests for aid. Last summer, distance measuring equipment was provided for Plaisance Airport and in the fall a patrol craft was made available for the Customs Service. On February 23, 1971, the U.S.S. Stickell arrived with 100 life preservers for Mauritian fishermen, requested by the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Natural Resources. The Stickell also transported the Minister of Works with the Ambassador and Peace Corps Director on a 1-day visit to Rodrigues. On each Navy call, presentations are made of medical supplies and other "hand-clasp" materials. Our ships have never experienced anything but the finest Mauritian hospitality on their visits to the Island.
Luncheon Address to Members of the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce by Hon. The Chief Executive Councilor of KwaZulu Legislative Assembly M. Gatsha Buthelezi, Friday, June 16, 1972, President Hotel, Johannesburg

I would be doing my people a grave injustice if I do not thank you before commencing my short discourse this afternoon. May I add that your public relations officer, Miss Anne Levy, deserves a bouquet for her persistence.

In South Africa, this is one of those rare occasions where people meet across the color line, not as masters and servants but as fellow compatriots to communicate. This is not to deny the fact that I came here as a representative of the underdogs of this land who are the servant class of South Africa, and whether we like this or not you represent the master class of this land on whom my people depend for a living.

It was suggested that I should in my short talk deal with "The Current Economic Situation and How It Affects the Zulu Homeland." I must say that with all due respect for this suggestion, I am no economist. I will, however, do my best to present in as few words as possible the picture as I see it from the point of view of a black man in the street.

As a historian I will be excused for reading a bit of well-known history of our land, because I believe that one can never see things in their proper perspective, save against the wider canvass of the history of the land. This is regardless of whatever one wants to look at, be it political issues, cultural or social problems. This applies equally to our economic ills. As a layman I cannot make pretensions that I can offer a diagnosis or even hazard a guess at any cures for our economic ills in KwaZulu. However, being a representative of the patient, I can at least describe the pains, particularly the very sharp ones around the tummy which are so excruciatingly painful. Even the doctor needs this to arrive at an accurate diagnosis.

As early as 1880 "The Natal Witness" disputed the suggestion that Africans had any right to consider Natal as their country: "They are here as immigrants on sufferance, and not as citizens." This was after the Zulu War, when even Zulu territory north of the Thukela was fragmented deliberately in order "to break the Zulu power once and for all," in the words of Sir Bartle Frere and Zulu territory was opened up by the conquerors for white occupation. This was not peculiar to Natal, but happened throughout this southernmost point of Africa. My people were at first self-sufficient because there was enough to eat and no problems of population explosion. This too was brought to an end by the new conquerors who called upon chiefs to supply young men to work on what was then known as Isibhalo. They were in other words forced to sign contracts to come to places like Johannesburg and Kimberley and other industrial areas to build the white industrial empires that we see in full bloom in all the metropolitan areas of South Africa. Taxation was one of the methods used to force Africans to move into urban areas to work. The tragedy deepened when even in the urban areas my people found themselves regarded as temporary sojourners who were there on sufferance, only to minister to the reasonable wants of whites. According to the 1852-53 commission report it was recommended that "All kaffirs should be ordered to go decently clothed. This measure would at once tend to increase the number of laborers, because, would be obliged to work to procure the means of buying clothing, it would also add to the general revenue of the colony through customs duties."

Coming to the question of the so-called homelands, as early as 1849 Earl Grey agreed that it would be difficult or impossible to assign to Africans reserves of such a size that they could continue to be economically self-sufficient. He added that it was desirable that Africans should "be placed in circumstances in which they should find regular industry necessary for their subsistence." ¹ Not all Africans

could be accommodated on the reserves, and the remainder continued to occupy
Crown lands and colonists owned farms. Africans ultimately spilled over into the
white farms as well as squatters. The reserves were made up of the worst farming
lands in the colony. According to G. R. Peppercorne, most of the land in the
Imphofana reserve as "as worthless as the sands of Arabia". Only 30 percent of
KwaZulu is arable land.

According to Brookes and Hurnitz there was no increase in land provision for
Africans between 1864 and 1913. The promises made by the Hertzog government
under the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936, for an additional quota of land to
make further a reality of the quotas was that whereas other people improve with
times, my people have sunk lower and lower into poverty over the years because they are caught between two devils.

When the Zulu Territorial Authority was inaugurated in 1970, I made it clear
that without consolidation of land, the present government's policy would not
make any sense. There has been very little done or said about this aspect of govern-
ment policy until last year when the Prime Minister promised to consolidate the
Zulu Homeland only to the extent of the 1936 land quota. I pointed out to him
then that consolidating in terms of that quota could hardly be adequate in terms of
setting us up as a separate independent state in terms of his government's
policy. What has happened last week has been merely confirmation of what the
Prime Minister said last year and also a few weeks ago in Parliament. I refer here
to the so-called draft map for the consolidation of KwaZulu. This is a question
which is crucial to this whole exercise of setting up KwaZulu as a country and on
it hangs the issue of whether we can ever be economically viable or not. I wish
also to submit that the whole question of our economic potential depends on it.

Earlier this year I opened a conference at the University of Natal's Institute
for Social Research on "Towards Comprehensive Development in Zululand." This
conference was interesting insofar as we did not try to find cures for Kwa-
Zulu's economic ills, but managed to assess the complexity of KwaZulu's economic
ills. We found that there are two issues closely interlinked, the problems relevant
to the development of the Zulu homeland territories, on the one hand and those
relevant to the development of the Zulu people on the other. Although the two
issues are closely interlinked the problems facing the development of the Zulu
people, the AmaZulu, relate not only to the Zulu Homeland Areas, but more
directly to the entire economic, social, and political structure of South Africa.
The development of the AmaZulu (or that of other blacks for that matter) is
much more closely interlinked with change and progress in the common economy
and common area of South Africa, than is the development of KwaZulu. To me the most important area which concerns all of us is that of the develop-
ment of my people. At present we have hardly any employment opportunities
for the KwaZulu citizens, no wonder we have only about a third of citizens in
KwaZulu at any time. More than 60 percent of our able-bodied males are away
most of the time.

We have at present no industrial growth points except Sithebe which has few
Zulus at present, who are paid very low wages. The specious argument used by
the Bantu Investment Corp. is that although Sithebe has low wage levels and
ample supply of labor on the credit side the relatively low level of training is
ranking high on the debit side and it is, therefore, not strange to find that an
unskilled worker is being paid a weekly wage of R5 to R7. The Bantu Investment
Corp. do further state that they would prefer wage levels comparable with those
in the metropolitan areas but realize that it is far better at this stage of develop-
ment in KwaZulu to have say 100 Zulus employed at R7 a week than to be able
to create say only 10 employment opportunities at R12 per week. It must also
be remembered that the cost of living in metropolitan areas is very much higher
than in the vicinity of Sithebe. The argument of the cost of living being lower
in rural areas is a partial truth, because people can only live in accordance with
their means of livelihood. And in any case this is also on account of poverty and
since we have no cash crops except sugar cane in some parts of KwaZulu, we
have a cash economy and it is a remittance economy, as families depend entirely
on cash from their breadwinners, who must earn wages elsewhere. The measuring
rod as far as wages are concerned is the Poverty Datum line. Food is cheaper

1 David Welsh: The Roots of Segregation, p. 177.
2 Edgar H. Brookes and N. Hurwitz: The Native Reserves of Natal (Natal Regional Survey vol. 7,
Cape Town, p. 57).
3 Statement summarizing major points emerging during the proceedings of the conference: "Towards a
Comprehensive Development in Zululand" prepared by the Organising Secretary L. Schlemmer, Dr.
The greatest shock so far as this whole question of whether KwaZulu can ever be economically viable now or in the dim misty future, has been the decision by the all-powerful South African Government in deciding that Richards Bay be developed as a white port, and in doing so depriving KwaZulu the only opportunity of having an outlet to the sea. No one disputes the fact that Richards Bay is providing jobs for Zulus, and that this will increasingly be the case as the Richards Bay complex develops. Job opportunities are what concern the concern of governments throughout the world. But the question that arises after that, is whether we can really be independent as easily as it is so often glibly said these days, if at most KwaZulu's development means that it is merely going to continue to be a vast labor farm for white South Africa, as all black homelands are at present? What is not so encouraging is that even in the metropolitan areas of South Africa very few of our people are paid above the poverty datum line. Many surveys have been carried out, including one by an employee of the Johannesburg Municipal Non-European Affairs Department. I feel certain you are all familiar with these. On the average it is now well known that the ratio of black and white wages is 1 to 14. Other industries give what are called fringe benefits and many of them boast that they look after their employees and provide them with a balanced diet. What Dr. Francis Wilson had to say last week on this point is quite illuminating concerning the recent rise in the wages in the gold industry. It is also true to say that any wise person who uses any beast of burden, would look after it, feed it well, and shelter it so that it can be in good condition to bear its burdens.

One must also thank and encourage all the other industries that are trying to narrow the wage gap. But we blacks wonder what underlies white thinking in this respect because when one looks around there are no subsidized shops that sell necessaries of life at subeconomic rates. At the same time the majority of white South Africans have for years rejected the idea of accepting black urban workers as anything but temporary sojourners. These people are supposed to send money to their families in the homelands and to help us develop in the homelands. The question is, in view of the above, how does one do it? So far there seems to be no serious consideration of consolidating these homelands. As a result KwaZulu areas cannot at present take even displaced Africans from white farms, as it is congested. We are developing a new class of rural Africans who cannot even have the token arable allotments, and cannot keep any stock, who are settled in what are called closer settlements. Owing to the stringent application of influx control regulations these people cannot freely go to look for jobs in urban areas.

An additional burden is caused by lack of a free and compulsory education for blacks, which is available for the white group. So that some of the meager earnings that are sent for necessaries have also to be used to pay for the children's education, in fees, books, in some cases for the privately paid teachers and also to put up school buildings. At this juncture I wish to congratulate those white people who are assisting in providing funds toward the Rand Bursary Fund, ASSECA, and other similar projects. These are palliatives that are very necessary and which we highly appreciate.

The homelands are all being given "self-government." In other words we are supposed to provide facilities for our people from our taxation and from allocations from the consolidated revenue fund made to us by the republican government. At present it is not yet apparent that these homeland governments can provide separate but equal facilities on the basis of this. In fact the KwaZulu budget of R32 million for the current financial year is, despite inflation, hardly a drop in the ocean, in terms of providing facilities for 4.3 million Zulus. Even for our civil service it is going to be difficult to get the best men in view of these differentiations in salaries on the basis of race.

There is an apparent reluctance on the part of white South Africa to consolidate the homelands realistically, to make them independent countries in a meaningful way. There is also an equal reluctance to accept our people who are in the urban areas as permanent residents in these areas. It might also be pointed out that all of us, including myself, may be indulging in self-hypnosis by even trying to believe we can successfully create several ethnically oriented economies in South Africa instead of one.

Several questions at once arise such as, Does white South Africa hope to eat her cake and have it? At some point we have got to decide one way or the other.

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Or does white South Africa hope we can all live in a make-believe world ad infinitum through sheer force of arms? This seems to be the time for decision whether we are going to be set up as viable homelands or not. This is the dilemma of white South Africa, in which South Africa alone has placed herself. It is black South Africa's dilemma, too, with the difference that since black South Africa does not wield the power of the bullet and the ballot, it is a dilemma in which black South Africa has been placed by white South Africa. So that, in a sense, we are not equally culpable as far as the apportioning of blame as far as this dilemma I am talking about is concerned. But we all have equal reason to "Cry the Beloved Country," since our destinies are so inextricably intertwined.

How long are urban Africans going to remain temporary sojourners in the metropolitan areas of South Africa? If we blacks are as human as whites are, can anyone tell me what are these virile able-bodied men in hostels and compounds supposed to do in order to enjoy feminine company? Of the married temporary sojourners from the homelands who are forbidden to bring their wives with them into metropolitan areas, the question can be asked: Can our male white compatriots countenance the idea of living in separation a mensa et thoro from their wives, and only make love to their wives during the Easter weekend and during a few days at Christmastime?

Many of you will, I am sure, want to ask me: Why, then, be involved in the homelands policy? I believe that it is a moral duty to be involved in alleviating human suffering, even if that is the most one can do. For this reason I believe that despite the many snags I have pointed out that there is still some scope to help my people to develop even within the limitations of the policy. That is why I have great admiration for what American firms like Polaroid, IBM, Pepsi Cola, and banks like Barclays Bank and Standard Bank are doing in paying equal pay for equal work regardless of race. These firms should have by now put our own South African firms to shame, if at all we still have a conscience such as I believe South Africans still have. Do South Africans feel happy that foreign firms should take this lead, and that South African firms should drag their feet instead of following in their footsteps?

I believe that apart from the development of people themselves there is still little scope for developing these homelands whether one believes in separate development or not. The homelands, to me, are a challenge whether one regards the homelands policy as a political fact or a fantasy. I believe that their development even on the basis of establishing microeconomic activities is something in which all of you can assist us. Community development schemes are a necessity in areas such as KwaZulu where people are, as a result of poverty, still victims of diseases of want such as malnutrition, kwashiorkor, and tuberculosis.

I believe that where there is economic infrastructure, industry and commerce in South Africa should not hesitate to help us to establish industries, not necessarily as cures for our economic ills, but even as palliatives. To me, while South Africa battles in trying to make up her mind about the future, we should not forget that human lives are at stake here. What is more, our whole future—yours and ours, and that of our children—depends on this. I believe the manner in which the future will unfold, that is, whether it will be peacefully or violently, depends to a large measure on these factors. We cannot hope that the nerves of our black population will indefinitely stand this insecurity both in the urban and rural areas.

We do not ask to be given doles or what we do not deserve. We would like to be self-reliant and having contributed so much towards the production of South Africa's wealth, we are at least entitled to a little of it, to set up on our own feet, be it in the urban or rural areas.

The Ovambo strike has given us a foretaste of what may one day overtake us, and I do not believe that we need to wait for a trauma.

At this particular time in the history of South Africa, it might be as well to ponder over the words of Mr. H. D. Winter who was Minister for Native Affairs in the Natal Government when the Bambatha Rebellion, which arose as a result of the imposition of the poll tax, took place. After the rebellion, a commission was appointed to hold an inquiry into the causes of the Zulu Rebellion. Mr. H. D. Winter's evidence is interesting to read, the more so, as he was by no means sympathetic to the causes of the black people in Natal and this is what he had to say among other things:

"The heavy burdens which * * * had been pressing on the people for many years past; for he added, the master may continue to hit and strike his dog until the time comes when the dog seizes hold of the hand of the master. This was what had occurred."
APPENDIX 14

ARE THINGS GETTING BETTER IN SOUTH AFRICA?

(By Don Morton*)

There are some people who sincerely believe that apartheid is breaking down under the pressure of economic progress. A leading article in the South Africa Financial Mail of Sept. 11, 1970 said: "The reforms will come from the pressures of economic growth and of burgeoning demand for labor." This naive view reflects an ignorance of the major problems in South Africa. It also fails to recognize that although the lot of the whites has progressed, the lot of the black man has steadily deteriorated.

In this paper I want to argue that things are not getting better in South Africa, by analyzing poverty, health, education and legislation, and in addition point to the role of American corporate investment, indicating that they perpetuate the problem.

I. POVERTY

Poverty can be determined by three basic methods:

(1) The poverty datum line (P.D.L.). The poverty datum line is based on the unavoidable expenses which any household has to face. It includes items like food, clothing, shelter, fuel, and transport. According to the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce and the government supporting non-European Affairs Department, 1970, the poverty datum line for the average family in South Africa is ± $98 per month.

Soweto is a black township near Johannesburg. It is economically the most active black area in South Africa. Even in Soweto 70 percent of all blacks living there live below this poverty datum line, according to the Johannesburg city council. In other words, the percentage of black people in the whole of South Africa who live below the poverty datum line is at least 75 percent, given that other areas are poorer.

The poverty datum line is more remarkable for what it omits rather than for what it includes. The poverty datum line does not include items like cooking utensils, furniture, bedding, linen, cleaning materials, soaps, doctors, and medical expenses. It also makes no provision for any amusements or luxuries like sweets or cigarettes or cold drinks. It doesn't even allow for newspapers, postage, magazines, dentist, holidays, or insurance expenses.

Because the poverty datum line is so unrealistic, another standard gage, including some of the missing items has been devised by sociologists, and this has been called the:

(2) Minimum effective level. On this basis, a level of $170 a month has been established for the average family in South Africa. On that basis at least 85 percent of the blacks in South Africa live in dire poverty.

(3) Professor John Reid, a medical professor, and other sociologists are now saying that the only realistic way to assess poverty is to survey an area and to establish the income of those who show obvious signs of poverty and malnutrition and those who do not. In this way some allowance is made for the unknown element of wastage. On this basis, the basic minimal income required is double the poverty datum line, that is, $196 a month. The mind boggles at the thought that probably 95 percent of all blacks living in South Africa live below this basic minimal line.

For whites in South Africa the position is altogether different. Although the whites constitute only 10 percent of the population, they receive 75 percent of the country's total income. The whites per capita income is $133 per month whereas

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*Don Morton is a South African Methodist pastor. He recently fled that country to avoid arrest by the Security Police. Known as the controversial clergyman, he has long been an outspoken opponent of apartheid has been involved in student and secular politics, and was the former publications director of the University Christian Movement. His wife and two children are still in South Africa.

1 Financial Mail, Johannesburg, April 1971.
for blacks it is only $10 per head per month. Unemployment amongst whites is 0.5 percent whereas amongst blacks it is as high as 25 percent.

Through the department of social welfare and other state aided programs, a white family can draw on a number of financial resources, for example, unemployment, pensions, war veterans, social relief, maintenance grants, family allowances, and disability grants. It is impossible (unless through ignorance of available sources) for a white family in South Africa to have an income of less than $150 a month, a figure below which probably 90 percent of the blacks live.

Comparative figures in various industries show that the position for the blacks has in fact worsened over the years. A look at the mining industry will show this. The ratio of white to black miners wages in the midthirties was 11 to 1. By 1968 the ratio had deteriorated to 18 to 1, and by 1970 the ratio was 20 to 1. So the average wage paid in 1970 to white miners was $540 a month and to black miners only $25 a month.

Added to this tremendous disparity is the fact that the cost of living for blacks has risen faster over the years than for whites. The food price index has risen consistently faster than the general price index. Sales taxes, increased rail fares, etc., inevitably bear hardest on the lower income groups.

II. HEALTH—DISEASE AND MALNUTRITION

There is a close interaction between disease and malnutrition. Disease sometimes leads to malnutrition, but most often malnutrition leads to disease. The most common diseases in South Africa are those associated with malnutrition. Common diseases amongst blacks are TB, kwashiorkor, marasmus, pellagra, vitamin A deficiency, scurvy, and rickets. South Africa is one of the few countries in the world in which the incidence of TB is rising: 2,500 new cases in 1969. The life expectancy for whites in 1967 was 67 years. Dr. Hoffenberg's (of University of Cape Town) calculations for blacks was less than 40 years of age. Infant mortality rates for blacks are not reflected by South Africa government statistics (significantly). For whites the infant mortality rates in 1969 were 21.2 per 1,000 live births. On a national scale it used to be 250 per 1,000 before reports ceased. According to Professor John Reid the death rate for black children in the reserves he surveyed was 25 times higher than for whites, which would make it 530 per 1,000. Even in an urban area like Durban, over half the black children die before they reach the age of 5.

The effects of malnutrition on a population are horrible. Professor J. Smythe and others have shown that besides the high death and disease rates which result from malnourishment, there is also the fact that a child's brain develops completely in the first 2 years of its life. If that child has suffered from certain vitamin deficiencies (and most blacks do), then that child will suffer from permanent brain damage and mental deficiencies (lower IQ's) for the rest of its life.

White South Africans, by contrast, are among the best fed and healthiest people in the world. Their main problem is overnutrition.

According to the Hospital and Nursing Yearbook of Southern Africa, 1970, the number of government-provided hospital beds were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provincial</td>
<td>16,773</td>
<td>28,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government (leper, mental, TB)</td>
<td>9,165</td>
<td>17,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>25,939</strong></td>
<td><strong>46,088</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From this table and the 1970 census figures it may be calculated that whites in South Africa who are extremely healthy by comparison have one bed per 82 persons. Blacks only have one bed for every 615 persons. Furthermore, the ratio of doctors to patients for white South Africans is 1:455 (this is one of the best in the world), whereas for blacks the ratio is 1:100,000 on average; in practice it is about 1:250,000 in rural areas.


\[3\] Race Relations Survey, 1970.

\[4\] Ibid.

\[5\] Report of Medical Officer for Health for Durban, 1970.
There is a chronic lack of health educators to do preventative medicine. The provincial health authorities are not particularly concerned with preventative measures; they cannot even meet the needs at the existing hospitals. The state health department only does education with TB. The few health educators that there are, are mostly doing hospital clerical work and council statistics, but no one is effectively getting into the houses of the people where real, preventative education is really necessary. As the years come and go the gap between the haves and the have nots increases.

III. EDUCATION

Illiteracy is one of the main factors impeding development in South Africa. There are, by various estimates, at least 10 million illiterates in South Africa, over 64 percent of the blacks in South Africa are illiterate. In some areas, like the reserves, the illiteracy rate is as high as 92 percent.1

A lot of statistics vary depending on one's basic definition of literacy. According to Dr. K. Baucamp, there are three stages of literacy:

1) Neoliterate.—One who can only just read very simple words, sign his name, and write short simple sentences. He cannot read any newspaper or book, and, unless he maintains regular practice at reading, he will lose even this minimal capacity. Government statistics use neoliteracy as a gage.

2) Functionally literate.—At this stage a person can read road signs, safety instructions, in a mine or factory, and a few simple books—comics, et cetera. He certainly cannot read a book written for a high school child, nor can he understand, say, the conditions of a hire purchase agreement. Unless practice takes place, here again the functionally literate person will become illiterate again (and many do).

3) A reading person.—One who can read, understand, and interpret an adult book, or who can write fluently. By conservative estimates, over 50 percent of South Africa's blacks fall below this standard of literacy.

A brief look at the contrasting standard in black and white education in South Africa explains why there is such disparity. A black person in South Africa is caught in a vicious circle. Because of his overall basic poverty, he cannot afford education, and because of his lack of education, he cannot lift himself out of his poverty.

For whites in South Africa education is both compulsory and free. For blacks it is not compulsory, and they must pay for their education in fees, uniforms, books, and so forth. The unit cost per annum for educating whites in South Africa in 1968 was $319 per pupil. For blacks the figure was $20. In other words, it was 16 times less than for whites.8 According to Dr. Malherbe, in a paper on Bantu education and manpower, only 0.1 percent of the black population has a matric or senior school leaving certificate.

In a memorandum prepared by the Institute of Race Relations, it was pointed out that the percentage of net national income spent on black education had been declining steadily from 1953 from 0.57 percent (even then one of the lowest in the world) to 0.39 percent in 1964. In addition, $2.8 million was spent in 1968 by black parents toward the salaries of private paid teachers, and a further $749,000 toward the erection, maintenance, and running of schools.9 It has been estimated (Financial Mail, Oct. 9, 1970) that it costs a black parent $24 a year to keep a child in lower primary; $39 a year in higher primary; $67 in secondary school; and $91 in high school.

Furthermore, of the estimated $630 million expenditure on Bantu education for 1970-71 only $20.3 million is to come from the state's consolidated revenue account. The rest comes from African taxation, boarding, and examination fees. In the case of whites, education is financed out of general revenue, which includes sales tax (cigarettes, alcohol, etc.).10 In other words, blacks, out of their poverty, are contributing to the affluent whites' free education.

Ninety-three percent of the whites of high school age attend school, whereas only 8.9 percent of the blacks of that age go to school. In most cases blacks attend abbreviated double sessions at school—20 percent of their teachers are unqualified, many schools have no desks or other facilities. Some have not even got classrooms. Thousands are turned away from school in Soweto every year because there are no teachers and no classrooms.11

The myth that things are getting better fades again as we see in the increasingly deteriorating Bantu education system in South Africa.

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3 House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), June 13, 1969, col. 7954.
5 SPROCAS 1971 "Education beyond Apartheid."
IV. LEGISLATION

Increasingly blacks are being stripped of their meager urban rights and forced to attach themselves to one of eight Bantu homelands, where 80 percent of the population will eventually be forced to live on 13 percent of the land. The cruel influx control and pass laws are being more severely enforced.

The following are some of the harsh laws passed since 1967:

(1) Terrorism Act, 1967. This provides for indefinite detention without trial or charge, of any person suspected of having any information about terrorism. Terrorism is defined as any act which is calculated to embarrass the administration of the affairs of state, or which fosters hard feelings between the various races. No information at all need be given to the public about detainees.

(2) Non-Interference Bill and Separate Representation Act, 1968. This made it illegal for any person of one race to participate in any way (financial included) in the political affairs of another race. It also stripped the 2 million colored people of their representation in Parliament.


(4) Bantu Law Amendment Act, 1970. Gave the Minister powers to prohibit any blacks doing any work, such as he may decide, in white areas.

These are some of the many laws enacted in South Africa over the last 5 years which clearly indicate that things are not getting better.

Can it be said that things are getting better when South Africa officially accounts for over half of the world's total executions (Johannesburg Star, March 31, 1972)—

or when over a million strokes have been inflicted on 200,000 persons in 15 years;

or when people are tortured to death (17 deaths while under detention);

or when a man cannot marry the woman he loves even if she is from the same race, but may be from a different tribe;

or when a woman not working in the same area as her husband can only get a 72-hour permit to visit him on the grounds that they want to have a child, and so on ad infinitum.

Things are getting better for the whites in South Africa, but as conditions for whites have improved over the years, the political, social, economic, and educational conditions for blacks has sunk to an all-time low. Apartheid is not breaking down under the pressures of economic progress; it is thriving.

V. THE ROLE OF U.S. COMPANIES

U.S. corporations play a role that directly supports and strengthens the systems of apartheid rather than alleviating or undermining apartheid. The case for this argument has been argued at length in several different papers. I shall merely summarize the argument in point form. The arguments are as follows:

(1) Different races are paid on entirely different wage scales. "It's the law of supply and demand," to quote the managing director of Cape Town's Chrysler plant, Mr. Bennington. The facts back his statement. The colored workers' starting wage in the Cape Town plant was $75 a month (cf. section on poverty), showing that Chrysler in fact paid starvation wages. Caltex have eight grades for workers. Seven of the eight grades are paid starvation or less than the P.D.L. Union Carbide have various starting wage scales, ranging from $40-$160 per month; not one of the scales meets even the minimal effective level (see Poverty). Newmont Mining, who control Tsumeb mine, earned $15 million profit in 1970 but only pays its black workers an average income of $28 a month. These are a few examples. Other companies reflect very similar patterns.

(2) American corporations reflect the apartheid system in their general practices. All facilities in U.S. corporations' plants in South Africa have: (a) racially segregated (and not equal) facilities; (b) all the best jobs are reserved for whites, and no black man may ever supervise any white, no matter what his skills are; (c) the black trade unions, such as they are, are powerless; and (d) employment of men under the migratory labor system who may not live with their wives and families.

All of this is not surprising when one discovers that in a study conducted by the Charles St. Thomas Group in 1969, only 10 percent of U.S. businessmen interviewed in South Africa felt that apartheid was wrong.

(3) To say that economic progress will dissolve the disparities presupposes a sociology of society that just doesn't fit any historical analysis of how social change...
has taken place in the world previously. It assumes that the economy of the country operates independently of the interests of the groups who control it.

If it were economic needs that were going to change the situation in South Africa, then the process would have become manifest during the boom years of the 1960's. Instead the opposite occurred.

(4) Simple economic betterment of black workers is not the only or in fact the key question as the black uprising in Rhodesia and Namibia has shown. It is the basic and fundamental question of human dignity—justice—political rights and a say in their own destinies in the land of their birth. However, these are precisely the kind of fundamental human rights that the apartheid system is designed to prevent, and U.S. investment in South Africa helps maintain the status quo. It does so in the following ways:

(a) By paying huge taxes to the South Africa Government—which in turn increases their political power, for there can be no political power without economic power.

(b) By supporting the military—whether to build roads, or to provide helicopters, or fuel or extra finances by taxes.

(c) By increased investment, which results in increased prosperity for whites. There is a growing confidence in South Africa, hence the huge inflow of immigrants to take jobs which in turn keeps the black man at the bottom rung of the ladder.

(d) By contributing to the South Africa Foundation (as many U.S. companies do) and by boosting the economy generally South Africa can afford to do public relations work in keeping with her new “outward looking policy.” Thus she can afford to make substantial loans to Malawi, etc.

(e) Finally, U.S. companies have clearly come out in strong support of the white minorities who are inflicting a vicious form of statutory violence on the massive majority of blacks, but have remained significantly silent, or opposed, to the growing swell of black liberation movements in southern Africa.

Is there any doubt whose side they are on? Is there any doubt that as fellow human beings and as Christians our responsibility to identify with the oppressed and downtrodden is clear? The time is now. In the past we have been slow to respond but quick to admit failure. True repentance, however, lies in a firm, brave commitment to the future.
APPENDIX 15

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN CHAIRMAN DIGGS AND SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, HON. GEORGE P. SHULTZ, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, REGARDING SOUTH AFRICAN GOLD SALES TO THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

JULY 20, 1972.

Hon. George P. Shultz,
Secretary of the Treasury,
Washington, D.C.

Re South African gold sales to the IMF.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: It appears that the present arrangement enabling South Africa to sell newly mined gold to the International Monetary Fund, under the agreement of December 1969, appear to be operating in such a way as to undermine the stability of the international monetary system, and in particular the interests of the United States in the strength of the dollar and the stabilization of commodity prices.

The March 1968 agreement to create the two-tiered gold price would operate far better if there were no sales of newly mined gold to official reserves, in unpredictable amounts and at irregular intervals. The 1969 agreement between South Africa and the IMF has had precisely this effect.

I understand that the negotiations for this agreement were originally bilateral, between the United States and South Africa, and were transferred to the IMF only at a comparatively late stage. I note with amazement that the Treasury’s official announcement at the time of the transfer refers to the “Union of South Africa,” a title which has been obsolete since it became a Republic in 1961. This does not add to one’s confidence that the Treasury was fully aware of the issues at stake here.

It may even be necessary to point out the obvious fact as to why South Africa is the major gold producer in the non-Communist world. The gold mines there are economic only because of the abundant supplies of cheap, indentured and forced labor by rightless Africans from the reserves, now euphemistically called “Bantu homelands.” It has been estimated that the real wages of African miners in South Africa are not higher today than they were in 1911, and possibly lower. In fact, a white worker in the mines earns 20 times more than a black worker. The system relies on increasing segregation of the miners from their families, who are confined to the reserves. Given similar labor conditions, there are plenty of uneconomic gold mines in the United States, as well as many other Western countries, which could still be in production profitably.

In an effort to reopen some of the U.S. gold mines, there was an attempt in the Senate recently to allow individuals in this country to own gold, which would have the effect of driving up the free-market price. This was decisively rejected by the Senate as against the national interest. Yet South Africa is following precisely this tactic: by withholding gold from the free market in recent weeks, the price is driven up and speculators are disturbing the international financial equilibrium.

The 1969 agreement effectively provides South Africa with a guaranteed floor price for its gold, while at the same time allowing it to offload gold even when the free price is above the floor, in order to boost the balance of payments. Yet when the balance is in surplus, as it is now, the Republic is taking full advantage by withholding gold. Particularly with the free-market price so high, there can be little justification for providing a floor price operating to our detriment and to South Africa’s benefit, and none at all for allowing purely South African considerations relating to its own balance of payments—which tend to fluctuate wildly—to affect such a delicate international balance.

There is the additional fact that South Africa is reported to have violated the 1969 agreement by selling gold directly to the Swiss central bank, a transaction which is explicitly banned by the deal with the IMF.

To a few manufacturers, primarily in such nonessential fields as jewelry, gold is an essential commodity. The interests of the manufacturers concerned are
NASA programs

During the Gemini and early Apollo flights, NASA regularly based rescue aircraft in Mauritius. An executive agreement was signed at the time providing for construction of a special apron for NASA use at Plaisance Airport. Although Mauritius is no longer regularly used by NASA, Apollo XIV planes would have been routed through if an emergency occurred. Many Mauritians are keenly interested in the achievements of the U.S. space program and turned out in tens of thousands to inspect our moon rock exhibit in 1970.
greatly harmed by the speculative price rises, and many have been forced to cut back their output because of the exorbitant price of the raw material. Since gold is not subject to phase II price controls, there is a strongly inflationary effect. It would clearly be in the interest of both manufacturers and consumers if the price of the metal were stabilized at a lower level, more nearly approximating the official price. This would be helped of course by the discouragement of speculation, and an end to sales of newly mined gold to the official sector. This would return us to the system envisaged in 1968 where gold as a monetary reserve and gold as a commodity are kept separate.

It is the official view of the U.S. Treasury that gold should be demonetized; this is a policy which we wholeheartedly endorse, and I hope that you will follow through the implications of this in your approach to the complete exclusion of newly-mined gold from the official reserves.

The volume of gold production in South Africa is falling, and is likely to decline further in the medium and long-term unless there is a massive devaluation of the dollar in terms of gold. South Africa is not, therefore, a reliable long-term source, and with its accelerating inflation, due largely to its mismanagement of its human resources, the future is unpredictable. Official policy regarding the use of the 1969 agreement, that marked reduction in the proportion of gold held in its own reserves immediately after the devaluation of the Rand, as official reserves were sold on the free market, and now the withholding of newly mined gold from the market, increase this unpredictability.

The 1969 agreement, by effectively subsidizing South Africa’s foreign exchange reserves, helps to undermine the United Nations arms embargo on South Africa, to which we generally adhere, and allows it to disregard world opinion on its domestic race policies and also its illegal occupation of the international territory of Namibia. One of the major beneficiaries is France, which is selling highly sophisticated arms and equipment to South Africa in defiance of U.N. resolutions, including weapons capable of delivering an atomic bomb. South Africa, which has not ratified the Nonproliferation Treaty, has the world’s third largest reserves of uranium, much of which it appears to sell without the “peaceful uses” safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Authority. With the recent discovery of a new enrichment process, South Africa poses a threat to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, as a major source of unrestricted enriched uranium for the use of any country willing to pay for it. In South Africa, uranium is a byproduct of gold mining, and subsidization of the gold mines therefore represents an indirect subsidy for uncontrolled nuclear proliferation.

I should, therefore, like to put to you the following questions:

Is there any reason why we should encourage South African gold production more enthusiastically than domestic production?

Specifically, what representations, oral and written, have been made to the South African Government over its decision to withhold gold from the free market and what response was received?

Is there justification for a floor price for gold if there is no ceiling?

Why should we protect South Africa’s balance of payments when this serves as the excuse to withhold gold?

The 1969 agreement specifies that in the event of a major change of circumstances, the agreement is to be reviewed. Would you agree that the wide gap between the official and the free-market price constitutes such a change?

I would appreciate receiving, at an early date, a response to each of the points raised herein.

Sincerely,

CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR.,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa.

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY,
Washington, August 9, 1972.

Hon. CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR.,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In your letter of July 20 you make a number of comments on the arrangements made with South Africa concerning gold transactions with the International Monetary Fund. The letter concludes with several specific questions you would like answered.

Before turning to those questions, I would like to make some general comments. You are correct in stating that we would like to see the monetary role of gold diminished. We agree that wide price fluctuations, which derive in part from shifts in South African gold sales due to shifts in its balance of payments, are undesirable.
Moreover, we believe that these movements in the gold price due to shifts in supply and the market's sensitivity to rumors simply provide further evidence of the need to build a monetary system not dependent on that commodity.

While agreeing that the shifts in supply increase the volatility of the gold price, I do not agree with any implication that the agreement reached with South Africa creates this problem. The opposite is the case; the agreement provides that South Africa cannot hold back more of its newly mined gold from the market than that equal to its balance-of-payments surplus. In addition, its balance-of-payments position will not be artificially improved by unusual or nontraditional foreign borrowing or other special transactions. Thus, while fluctuations are not eliminated, they are limited and the agreement rules out shifts in supply that might be made for the purpose of influencing the market price, regardless of balance-of-payments conditions.

From this standpoint the present arrangement is clearly preferable to no arrangement at all. I would note that in the absence of the agreement, there would be no means of forcing South Africa to sell gold or any other commodity it produces if it had no need to do so from the standpoint of its current foreign exchange requirements.

With respect to the "floor" price for gold, which appears to be your primary concern, this provision was operative for about 2 months in the first quarter of 1970. No gold sales have been made by South Africa to the IMF under that provision since that time. In fact, no sales to the IMF have been made for over one year under any provision.

It may be assumed that South Africa derives some comfort from the existence of the floor price for its newly mined gold, which becomes available to it in certain situations and with certain limitations.

Turning to your specific questions, the answers are:

1. No, I see no reason why we should encourage South African gold production more enthusiastically than domestic production, nor do I see that in any practical way we do. Our gold producers can, and do, receive such higher market prices as may prevail, as do South African or other producers. In practice, our gold producers have not had to sell their gold below the monetary price even during that short period of time that South Africa did sell newly mined gold to the IMF at 34 percent below market.

2. We have made no representation to South Africa over its decision to withhold gold from the private market because such withholding as has taken place has been well within the limits that might have been withheld due to its present surplus balance of payments position. We have discussed with a representative of the South African Government in general terms the desirability of eliminating the floor price, a proposal they do not favor.

3. Conceptually, I see no justification for a floor price for gold whether or not there is a ceiling. I see no practical way in which a ceiling could be enforced through agreement with South Africa alone. Rather than moving toward adding a ceiling to a floor price the United States itself sees no need for a floor price but a number of countries do grow concerned if they believe the market value of an asset they hold in their reserves might decline below its book value. This in fact was the case as recently as late 1969. The continued concern over a floor price seems applicable only in terms of an expectation that experience could be repeated. The matter is consequently not one for a unilateral determination by the United States.

4. There is no reason why we should protect South Africa's balance of payments and the gold arrangements with South Africa are not directed to South Africa's balance-of-payments problems. In fact, South Africa had a sizable deficit during much of the period of the agreement.

5. As you state, the agreement with South Africa does permit the parties to review the arrangement in the event of a major change in circumstances. I think the developments beginning with last August 15 and the continuing developments with respect to monetary reform could be viewed as a major change in circumstances and the arrangement reviewed, should it be considered desirable to do so. I would emphasize that in important respects, the agreement limits South African freedom of action. The floor price provision, which is of interest to South Africa, is not now operative. The provisions that limit the amount of gold that South Africa can withhold from the market are.

Sincerely yours,

George P. Shultz
Mr. Chairman: I greatly appreciate this opportunity to appear before this subcommittee today, and particularly since it enables me to present some of the hard facts about gold mining—the industry on which this whole question of the monetary role of gold rests.

When experts come together to discuss gold, they tend to theorize to the point where we forget what we are talking about. There are some very urgent human issues involved in gold mining. Specifically, South Africa currently has a virtual monopoly of the gold market. And the methods used to force South African blacks to go down the mines and dig the metal out amount to a mere variation of the age-old evil of slavery. This may seem at first sight an exaggeration, but I hope you will see the point when you have considered the evidence available.

Mr. Chairman, I am in favor of any measures which will have the effect of reducing the price of gold, and in particular in bringing about its long-overdue demonetization, and any other steps which would reduce the speculative demand. This is fully consistent with the official Treasury position. One specific action which I should like to see is the termination of the International Monetary Fund's agreement of December 1969 with South Africa, which provides South Africa with a floor price by allowing it to sell gold directly to the Fund either when the free market price drops below the official price, or to the amount of South Africa's balance-of-payments deficits, as well as on other grounds applicable to all IMF members.

This agreement with South Africa was supposed to insure the orderly marketing of gold, but it has obviously failed in that, for South Africa has recently been withholding large amounts of gold from the free market, formally justified by the favorable balance of payments which results from heavy capital inflows. It is therefore encouraging the speculative price to soar to the present unreasonable levels, almost double the official price. (See for example H. B. Ellis in the Christian Science Monitor, August 10, 1972.) This benefits nobody but South Africa and the Soviet Union. Such tactics are harmful to the international monetary system as I do not need to remind you; it is damaging to confidence in the dollar, and is increasing the difficulties inherent in an adverse balance of payments; it is very damaging to industrial users of gold, notably jewelers, many of whom are having to cut back production as well as raising prices; and I submit that it is very harmful to the people of South Africa.

The U.S. officials you will be hearing have been inclined to blame other countries for the failure to take decisive action to rationalize the role of gold in the international monetary system. They have tried to do so in the case of the 1969 agreement although Mr. George P. Shultz has assured me that in this case they would be inclined to favor a review of it, and do not support the idea of a floor price for gold. I should like to insert my correspondence with him in the record. However, the claim that we cannot control the IMF is an evasion of this particular issue; it was the United States which initiated the negotiations with South Africa and other countries leading up to the agreement, as a bilateral issue. It was not until 2 weeks before the agreement was signed that it was handed over to the IMF to give it international respectability. Incidentally, an indication of the ignorance of the Treasury Department about the political and human issues involved is shown by the reference to "the Union of South Africa"—8 years after it had been forced out of the British Commonwealth because of its apartheid policy and changed its name to "the Republic of South Africa." I should like to insert their press release on this in the record. The IMF, incidentally, still treats South Africa in its grouping system as an "advanced British Commonwealth country."
York Times, July 29, 1972.) Since the United States initiated this commitment to South Africa, it would be asking too much of our credulity to say that we cannot have a decisive voice in its termination. The voting system at the IMF is based on national quotas. The United States, with a $6.7 billion quota as of April 1971 is by far the most important member, its quota being almost 2½ times the next largest, the United Kingdom. This country is also in favor of an increased role for SDRs, and a diminished role for gold. France, the biggest "gold bug" has only a $1.5 billion quota. The U.S. taxpayer is therefore directly involved in the IMF's purchases of gold from South Africa, and our quota was increased by a record $400 million after the 1969 agreement. (IMF Annual Report, 1970 and 1971.)

There are many compelling reasons to terminate this agreement. Firstly, the agreement has not had the intended effect of dampening down speculative fluctuations in the free market gold price. Secondly, the agreement itself provides for review after 5 years or in the event of a major change in the circumstances. The disparity between the official and market prices would justify such a description. Mr. George P. Shultz has admitted in his letter to me referred to above that it could be viewed this way, "should it be considered desirable to do so." Thirdly, the agreement has been very one-sided—to the benefit of the South African Government. South Africa has used IMF facilities as a defense against balance-of-payments problems, and yet now with a favorable balance, South Africa is aggravating international instability. South Africa sold $672 million of gold to the IMF after the announcement of the agreement, up to the time of the agreement, was of vital importance to its balance-of-payments position at that time, and also helped to keep up the price on the free market, which it was using at the same time. Without these sales to the IMF or alternative outlets for the gold, the already serious balance-of-payments deficit would have been almost three times as large. But the South African Government has violated a key stipulation made by the United States in a letter from Mr. Paul Volcker to the Managing Director of the IMF, by selling gold directly to central banks—certainly Switzerland, and possibly some others. (The Times, London, July 1970.) I should like to insert the text of Mr. Volcker's letter into the record, together with the text of the documents relating to the 1969 agreement. The sale of gold to Switzerland is not the only way in which the South African Government's behavior has been unfortunate. We cannot be enthusiastic about South African officials traveling around the world, predicting confidently that the official price of gold is bound to rise, perhaps by double this time. At the end of August the Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, Dr. de Jongh, announced that an increase in the official price of gold would prove to be unavoidable. This is an incitement to speculators who are gambling on a further slashing devaluation of the dollar. Meanwhile, when nobody was watching the South Africans quietly disposed of a large proportion of gold in its own official reserves, immediately after last years devaluation. (Financial Mail, Johannesburg.)

The 1969 agreement with South Africa is not in the least necessary to the two-tier price structure set up in 1968. The system worked perfectly well for over 18 months before the agreement with South Africa. It is very unclear what our interest could have been in agreeing to this arrangement. In fact, by allowing the South African Government to manipulate its gold sales at will into either the free or the official market, the 1969 agreement undermines the principle of separating monetary gold from commodity gold. If the IMF were to sanitize official reserves by buying no more newly mined gold, and if the various central banks were to agree to the same, this would be more consistent with the two-tier principle of separating official reserves from the fluctuations of supply and speculative demand.

Mr. Chairman, the major piece of evidence I wish to put before your subcommittee to support this position relates to the inhuman conditions which prevail in the gold mines of South Africa. In the final analysis, it is here that the gold-based monetary system has been rooted, and I suggest that the highest priority should be given to the human factor which bears the entire weight of the system. Many observers have commented on how ludicrous it is that gold should be laboriously dug out of the bowels of the earth in South Africa, only to be buried again in the bowels of Fort Knox. If we were not so obsessed by the tribal mythology of gold, this ritual would be seen for what it is. But it is very far from a joke. For the people who mine gold, it is one of the cruelest and most unjust systems of exploitation known to man at the present time. And our support for the industry, which is crucial to the economy and therefore lies at the heart of the apartheid system, conflicts with the expressed opposition to that system of the U.S. Government.
So let us look at the nature of this system. It is often argued that without the enormous supplies of cheap labor—labor without any human rights—the South African gold-mining industry would never have developed as it did. There was a great strike of African miners in 1946, which was ruthlessly suppressed by police attacks which killed and injured thousands of miners. At that time, the Chamber of Mines announced that to grant the demand of R1 per day (then worth $2) would put 35 out of the 45 currently producing mines out of operation. Since then no attempt at labor organization has been tolerated. If we compare wages and conditions in South Africa with those in the United States and elsewhere, many of which are now uneconomic to operate, it is obvious that South Africa's monopoly position as a producer of gold is a factor of the cheap labor system. If American mines employed labor under conditions operating in South Africa, many of them would still be working. The Soviet Union may be in a similar position to South Africa and has certainly used convict labor in its gold mines; in this case, Soviet interests are very similar to South African interests, and both are very much in conflict with American and international interests.

The system in South Africa is controlled by the mining industry and the South African Government, working together to effect absolute control over the recruitment of African mine workers, in South Africa itself, the so-called Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique, Malawi, Namibia, where South Africa is in illegal occupation, and the three countries within the South African customs union—Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. The mines recruit through the monopolistic Chamber of Mines, and have agreed among themselves to eliminate competition in wage rates, even at times of great labor shortages. Power is concentrated in a small elite group of companies with interlocking investments and directorates. (Dr. Francis Wilson, Labour in the South African Gold Mines, 1911-1969, Cambridge University Press, U.K., 1972; p. 28.)

The state plays a vital role with bilateral agreements with Mozambique and Malawi for the supply of a given volume of labor units, for which payment is made to the labor-exporting Government in the form of compulsorily "deferred" wages. Even more important is the system of influx control, whereby Africans in the labor reserves are prohibited from leaving without a contract and where a job in the gold mines is often the only alternative to starvation. It was in 1760 that slaves in South Africa were first required to carry passes in moving between rural and urban areas in South Africa, but it was the tightening of influx control after the 1930's that improved the mine labor supply from South Africa itself at a critical time, and still continues to be crucial to recruitment. Africans are dominated by total Government control in all aspects of their lives and work. Government policy restricts educational expenditure on Africans to less than one-tenth of that for whites, so that 65 percent of all African adults have never been to school, and over 70 percent of those who did dropped out before they could become functionally literate (Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, Mar. 14, 1972; Wilson, p. 94; Mr. D. J. Marais, South African House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), Apr. 11, 1972, col. 4576). This gives them a crippling handicap to start with. Then there is no right of residence in any urban area, which is where employment is available. Families and whole communities are arbitrarily broken up. There is no right of political participation, nor of political expression. Africans have no vote. They can be arbitrarily arrested and detained without charge or trial for any length of time if the police dislike their political views, and all their political organizations have been banned, and their leaders dead, in prison, or in exile. Special taxes together with acute poverty force people in the labor reserves onto the job market, where they usually have no choice of employer. Any attempt to go to the towns to find work freely is prevented by the complex network of pass laws, which are fundamental to the whole system of regulating Africans to serve the white economy as "labor units," and have been applied with increasing severity. Between 1936 and 1962, the proportion of convictions under the pass laws relative to the total African population rose from 1.9 percent a year to 3.4 percent. If there were a free labor market in South Africa, the mining industry would have to double its wages to compete with manufacturing industry. This competition is eliminated by the full machinery of a police state, forcing people to take the lowest paid jobs. It is clear, then, that the South African legislation which forces Africans to stay in the reserves until they are needed on the mines is largely responsible for the fact that the international monetary system has the gold supplies that it does.

Equally vital is the supply of non-South African labor, which was the major solution evolved in the 1930's to the problem of attracting more labor without raising wages. The Portuguese colonial government in Mozambique supplies up to 80,000 Africans a year in terms of the 1928 Mozambique Convention. Since 1919,
this territory has supplied over a quarter of the Africans for the mines. Apart from the few employed in the towns, Mozambique Africans are faced with the alternatives of the South African mines, or conscription as forced labor, to work on coffee and other plantations, or into the colonial army. When there is a conscription drive in any area, the South African recruiting offices have ample supplies of labor. The system is obviously capable of great abuse; however, it is said that conditions here are nothing compared to the degrading scenes in Angola, another Portuguese colony (Wilson, pp. 128-9).

Between 1936 and 1969, the total number of Africans employed in the gold mines rose from 318,000 to 371,000 while the number of black South Africans fell from 166,000 to 131,000, less than one-third of the total. Of the nominally independent African nations, it is Lesotho, entirely surrounded by South Africa and with very few natural resources, which is most dependent on the employment of its nationals in the mines. It provided 18 percent of the total labor force in 1961. Other independent countries have been trying desperately to reduce the numbers of their workers going to the mines. Botswana had cut its contribution to 4 percent in 1961, and Swaziland 1 percent. Tanzania, then a United Nations trust territory administered by the United Kingdom, provided 16 percent in 1952; but after the massacre at Sharpeville in 1960, it canceled the agreement providing 10,000 men a year. Tanzania is one of the poorest countries in Africa, but is setting a widely respected example in self-reliance. It should not be assumed, of course, that the recruitment of foreign workers means that they are worse off than Africans in South Africa. In fact, the labor reserves, or “Bantustans” of South Africa and Namibia, are among the poorest areas in Africa in terms of income per capita, and even wages in nonmining sectors in South Africa compare unfavorably with a country like Zambia (see Barbara J. Rogers, “African Incomes in South Africa,” United Nations Unit on Apartheid No. 45/71, November 1971). There is, of course, a very high level of unemployment and underemployment throughout Africa, and throughout the Third World generally, and much larger movements of foreign workers can be observed into the industrial centers of East and West Africa than into South Africa.

The main reason why black South Africans form a declining proportion of the total labor force on the gold mines is because this is deliberate Government policy. In the first place, foreign workers are easier to discipline, and so the possibility of labor organization, such as that which produced a general strike last December through February in Namibia, is reduced; and second, this is essential to the so-called outward policy, which consists of increasing the dependence of southern Africa on metropolitan South Africa, a classic case of neocolonialism. There is very great and rapidly increasing unemployment among black South Africans, for which the Government feels it has to suppress the statistics but which may amount, according to one calculation, to 25 percent of the working population (Trade Union Council of South Africa, quoted in the Rand Daily Mail, Apr. 12, 1972). In the South African Transkei, which is a traditional source of mine labor, many applicants are being refused, while recruitment in Lesotho, Botswana, and elsewhere is still aimed at attracting the maximum possible number. The removal of the cream of the labor force from such countries is very harmful to their rural development.

Any argument of the type which we hear so often from South Africa and its friends, that the South African gold mining industry should be given favorable treatment by the international community in order to provide employment for recruits from South Africa, becomes absurd in the light of the facts. The development plans of the nominally independent African countries stress the goal of economic independence. The United States has acknowledged this priority by giving some aid to Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana, especially the latter for mineral and transportation projects which should reduce its crippling dependence on South Africa, and create employment to reduce the outflow to the South African mines. What we are doing is negligible, compared with the effort we should be making. If we sincerely want to help the people of southern Africa, we should help them create their own employment opportunities, together with rural development programs. This will indirectly help the Africans of South Africa by releasing to them the employment opportunities generated inside their own territory.

Coming back to the gold mines, I should like to indicate briefly the conditions under which the African miners work. By the simple legislative expedient of defining employees so as to exclude Africans, these people are deprived of all their labor rights. Since 1911, it has been a criminal offense to strike or otherwise break the contract, which usually lasts about a year.
There have always been convicts used in the mines, but there is so little difference between the wages of regular laborers and convicts that for all practical purposes they could all be convicts. They have no paid leave at all, and a rigid discipline that means they are allowed to lose far fewer days through illness or family problems than the whites. They also work longer hours, being underground for about 10 hours a day, 6 days a week. One of the white miners' demands which has been consistently refused has been the reduction of the working week to 5 or 5½ days, since the Chamber of Mines fears that giving the blacks spare time would create unrest. Any time that they do have is rigidly organized hence the mine dances on Sundays, for tourists.

The men work 2 miles and more underground at very high rock temperatures, and the rock drilling creates almost intolerable levels of noise and dust. The result is a string of accidents, mostly from falling rocks, and a number of occupational diseases, including heatstroke, deafness (for which the mines do not even bother to keep records), and silicosis of the lungs which makes them more vulnerable to tuberculosis. Some mines contain highly explosive methane gas, and there is constant danger of the stope face bursting under pressure, or of flooding, as in the West Driefontein mine in 1969. The development stage of mining is especially dangerous, as in the Orange Free State mines in 1952-57.

Between 1936 and 1966, 19,000 men, 93 percent of them black, died as a result of accidents in the gold mines, an average of three deaths per shift. This is almost half as many casualties as this country has suffered in the entire Vietnam war (45,855 since January 1961), putting this industry on a par with the world's great war machines. The black death rate is almost double that of whites. There was also an enormous number of disablements from accidents. In 1968, a year when the fatality rate reached an alltime low 491 blacks and 18 whites were killed; and 25,000 blacks and 2,000 whites were disabled for at least 2 weeks by accidents, 98 percent of which were estimated to have been due to the inherent danger of the work. The overall accident rate for 1968 was 64 per 1,000 persons in service. In addition to this are the huge numbers of slow deaths and disablement resulting from lung damage and other occupational hazards, for which there are no records, from direct observation in the Bantustans, appear to be astronomical. In the Transkei, tuberculosis has reached epidemic proportions, affecting almost one-quarter of those surveyed as opposed to almost none 25 years earlier (study by Dr. Guy Danes, St. Lucy's Hospital, Transkei). This is also, of course, a result of chronic and increasing poverty in the reserves, which as early as 1914 were being described as little more than mining villages. If for no other reason than the enormous rate of deaths and disability, then, gold mining is a menace to the people forced to work there.

The color bar dominates every aspect of the industry, and unnecessarily aggravates the dangers in a way unimaginable in any free country, or even perhaps in the Soviet Union. For example, the collection of dust samples is an important safety measure, but although no whites are available to do this job, the powerful Mine Workers' Union successfully opposes the employment of blacks here. The color bar is so rigid that even the enlightened self-interest of white workers in having safety measures taken is ignored.

Apart from the mining companies and the government, it is the white miners who benefit from the color bar in the gold mines. The white unions see the issue not as one between white and black labor, but between free labor and slave labor, as a white strike committee expressed it in 1924. (Transvaal Strike Legal Committee, The Story of Crime (Johannesburg, 1924, p. 39.) They therefore seek to protect their jobs and very high salaries, to the total exclusion of the slave labor which threatens to undercut them. The gap between white and black wages has increased enormously over the last century, from a ratio of 7.5:1 in 1889 to 20.1:1 in 1969—probably the world record for wage differentials. Any situation where one class of people receives 20 times more than another is intolerably unjust. In the United States, where we still have a long way to go, the gap between white and black earnings fell between 1939 and 1953 from 2.4:1 to 1.7:1, and has been almost unchanged since then. In South Africa, real cash earnings for Africans are lower than they were in 1889, probably by over 25 percent, and as a proportion of total costs the wage bill for Africans has fallen dramatically, from 15.7 percent in 1936 to 9.3 percent in 1969.

Between 1936 and 1969, when the productivity of all workers rose by 39 percent, black wages fell. The benefits resulting from the increases in productivity go almost exclusively to the white miners, a minority of between 10 percent and 15 percent. An agreement in 1967 between the mining companies and white trade unions, for example, provided for the elimination of certain restrictive practices, and for the benefits resulting from the extra work of blacks in these areas to go to the whites.
The very low African wages are often justified by employers by the idea that it is not intended to support the worker's family, who are supposed to live off the land in the labor reserves. There is a conspiracy of silence about the actual conditions in these areas; where there have been studies made, the consistent conclusion is that they are totally inadequate to support the very great, and increasing population densities which have been forced into them, probably the highest population densities in Africa. This results in serious soil erosion and total exhaustion of natural resources. A government commission reported in 1954 (Tomlinson Commission; Government Printer, Pretoria, 1955) that the reserves could only support half their current population at minimum subsistence levels, and since then the population has more than doubled. Contracts with the mines are therefore absolutely essential for a family's bare survival. The available evidence indicates that the reserves are becoming steadily more dependent on migrant wages as time goes on. Since they are safely out of sight of the white community, however, the Government and mining industry can operate on the convenient assumption that they have no obligation to provide a wage adequate for the subsistence of a mineworker's family, or for the worker himself in times of illness, unemployment, and old age. In this way the system is even worse than the old slavery, where the victims were visible to those responsible. In South Africa, it is illegal for any non-African to go and see the reserves without special permission.

In line with the assumption that only the worker as a labor unit need be considered, the mines feed their workers as scientifically as modern cattle to make them fit for the grueling labor underground. (Wilson, p. 55.) For the same reason, to make them fit to work, they are given thorough medical attention, although there is no provision for their families—as there is for white families. On the other hand, housing is in bachelor barracks, with between 12 and 90 men to a room. Many of the older compounds have no beds and nowhere to eat except the dormitories. The system had been evolved for the Chinese indentured laborers used in the first decade of this century, and then applied to Africans whose families did not therefore have to be housed. It is sometimes claimed that if fringe benefits are taken into account, the wage differential of 20 to 1 would not be so enormous. However, a comparison between the benefits available to whites, and above all to their families, and those for blacks shows enormous discrepancies, covering such benefits as bonuses and cost of living allowances, paid leave, unemployment, pension and provident funds, active service allowances for World War II veterans, and advanced educational assistance—all for whites only; or medical care, educational assistance for children, subsidized housing (all with servants' quarters) for the families of whites only; or recreation, subsidized canteens, disablement allowances, compensation for lung damage, the rate of overtime pay, and numerous other advantages—all very much more generous for whites than for blacks. These benefits have not been quantified as an overall ration of white to black, but taken all together they add up to a picture analogous to that of the wage structure.

It is quite impossible to convey here the degree of suffering imposed by the system. It is not simply a matter of physical deprivation; it is a question also of the mental suffering which results from the tearing apart of the fabric of African society, just as in the days of the old slave trade. I was able to gain some idea of the human problems inherent in apartheid, as it affects people in the township ghettos. But I was not allowed into the Bantustans which is where increasing numbers of people are being deported, by now over one million of them, mainly what the South African Government calls surplus appendages—the wives, children and other dependents of migrant workers. I should like to quote Dr. Anthony Barker, a doctor in the Zulu reserve for many years, on the effect of the system on African family life.

"Economic or even social analysis of migratory labor will fail to reveal the full picture of its cost in terms of human misery. To learn this you must listen to the lonely wife, the anxious mother, the insecure child . . . It is at family level that the most pain is felt, and we cannot forget that the African culture heritage enshrines a broader, more noble concept of family than that of the West. The extended family has proved a marvelous security for those for whom, otherwise, there was no security at all.

Deprived of their natural guides, children of migrants grow through an insecure, uncertain childhood to an adult life whose sole preoccupation may be to escape the system. There must be a harvest of aggression, with the weeds of violence growing rank within it." (Dr. Anthony Barker, Community of the Careless, South African Outlook, April 1970.)
The details of wages and conditions I have outlined here have been very carefully assembled in a book published last month by a South African economist, Dr. Francis Wilson, entitled Labour in the South African Gold Mines. In order that the facts should be available for anyone wishing to examine the issue further, I should like to insert into the record two chapters of Dr. Wilson's study. And to give an idea of some of the camps inside the Bantustans for the people of no use to the white economy, I should also like to insert the description of conditions in the Transkei and Ciskei, the major sources of mine labor in South Africa, from the researches of a Catholic priest in South Africa, Fr. Cosmas Desmond. As a result of this work, Fr. Desmond has been placed under a banning order by the South African Government—which means, among other things, that his writings cannot now be published, or quoted, inside South Africa.

In the light of these facts, Mr. Chairman, it is clear that South Africa's gold-mining industry operates on a basis of a labor force which is totally without rights, even the right to choose between employers; and that the international monetary authorities, by providing a guaranteed market at a guaranteed minimum price for South African gold, is in a sense subsidizing the industry and its neoslavery system. This has the effect of aid to the South African Government, which has also subsidized marginally economic mines very heavily in times of difficulty because the industry is so crucial to the entire white-owned economy, and therefore to the entire structure of South African society.

The economics of South Africa's gold, where the grade of ore is distributed uniformly over a wide range, operate in such a way that any changes in the cost structure or the price of gold affects the amount of payable ore reserves. Increasing costs mean a reduction in reserves, and an increase in price increases reserves. Although the expected life of the mines is increased, however, current output is reduced, as is happening now with the deliberate reduction in the grade of ore processed, at government instructions. With reduced output, of course, South Africa can reduce the supply to the speculative market without violating the letter of the 1969 Agreement with the IMF.

In the case of the heavily subsidized marginal mines, the high premium on free-market sales has been of enormous benefit recently. In fact, a guaranteed rising price is crucial, since costs are accelerating in South Africa, and once a mine is closed down it is virtually impossible to reopen. From this it is obvious that South Africa's 1969 Agreement with the IMF has been crucial to keeping some of the mines open. The prospect of an increasing gold price has also been essential in order to attract foreign capital for new investment in the industry, and to present a general impression of infinite prosperity for anyone interested in South Africa as an investment.

(See publications of the South Africa Foundation, and publicity materials available from South Africa's diplomatic posts; also the Investor's Chronicle, London, Supplement on South Africa's Go-Go Economy, December 1969; and other newspaper supplements supported by advertising from South African interests.)

International support for the gold mining industry—in the first place with an unlimited demand at the official price from the U.S. Reserve bank, and now with a guarantee against falling prices and balance-of-payments problems for the IMF—has not been beneficial to the workers in the industry. The protection of an unlimited demand at constant prices encouraged the complete abolition of competition between the mining companies, which could therefore concentrate on matters of common interest, notably collusion to keep black wages down. The times of large increases in the gold price have never prompted increases in black wages. In fact, a small increase in the early 1960's was prompted by international pressure against South Africa's apartheid system, resulting in the fear that independent African countries would follow Tanzania's lead in refusing to sell their workers under current conditions. (Wilson, p. 106.) And as Dr. Wilson has pointed out, it is the margin of extra profit provided by international price guarantees that has been decisive in enabling the industry to avoid the pressures to ease the color bar, which is notable even in South Africa for its inflexibility and the inefficiency which results. The color bar reserves certain categories of jobs for whites, and also limits the number of blacks to be employed as a ratio of white employment. It was estimated in 1968 that a 70 percent replacement of white workers by Africans—who are in many cases at least as skilled as the whites—would result in a saving to the gold mining industry of R30 million a year (about $40 to $45 million), approximately 6 percent of working costs. The saving would be greater now since the last series of white wage increases. A further result of encouraging South Africa's gold mining industry has been the development since-
World War II of the uranium industry, uranium being a byproduct of gold in nearly half the mines. South Africa already sells uranium without peaceful uses safeguards, and with its new enrichment process could become a real menace to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. South Africa has not signed the treaty. I need hardly point out the historical importance of the gold mining industry to South Africa, or its crucial role in the system which evolved to supply it, and later other sectors, with labor. The industry has long been the basis for South Africa's prosperity, and for the foreign exchange with which it buys arms and equipment for its massive armed forces and police. In 1970 output accounted for 10.5 percent of GNP, sales of gold in 1971 amounted to $1.5 billion—repeat, one and a half billion dollars—equal to all other exports combined. (Department of Commerce, Overseas Business Reports: Southern Africa; OBR 72-030, July 1972). Our support for these sales is in direct conflict with stated foreign policy, which is to abhor apartheid and support peaceful change in the system. The U.S. Government states that it favors the "constructive interplay of political, economic, and social forces." (Statement by Secretary of State William P. Rogers, of March 26, 1970.)

Since over a century ago, the whole white supremacy system in South Africa has been backed up by gold. The expropriation of the best land and crowding of all the Africans into tiny reserves, under 11 percent of the total area, was to provide cheap labor for the mines. This industry served as a model for all subsequent sectors of the white economy. Above all, gold has attracted foreign capital, and paid for the enormous wastefulness of apartheid, its armed forces, secret police, constant political surveillance, the mass deportation of Africans, the detailed administration of segregation in all its ludicrous aspects, and the propaganda machine that represents South Africa abroad as a bastion of anticommunism and therefore indispensable to the West. In fact, of course, South Africa is creating a mounting regional tension that is ideal for Communist subversion, and very dangerous to our key policy aim of international detente.

U.S. involvement in backing the gold industry in South Africa has been crucial. Private American sources have provided capital investment, but even more important have been unlimited Government purchases of gold over the last decades. It is over the last 2 or 3 years that our support has been of such vital importance, in allowing the IMF to use our huge and increased quota to buy South Africa's gold in enormous quantities, at a critical point in South Africa's economic life, then its balance of payments was moving deeply into the red and overseas confidence seemed to falter after the sudden fall in the Johannesburg stock exchange in April 1969.

For the U.S. Government to support so massively the minority Government of South Africa, to the tune of billions of dollars, and to do so even when this is contrary to our own economic interests and in conflict with our declared foreign policy objectives, simply boggles the mind. The situation amounts to more than complicity with apartheid; it is a massive subsidy for apartheid. It represents total hypocrisy which cries out to be rectified immediately. There is every reason why we should stop supporting the gold industry of these two totalitarian regimes, the Soviet Union and South Africa.

The gold industry is already in a natural decline in South Africa. In 1970, before the recent free market premium, it was estimated that output would be cut by almost half over the next decade. There seems no prospect of new ore discoveries like those which produced the phenomenal growth of the industry in the 1950's and 1960's. Without further substantial rises in the official prices of gold, which would be catastrophic from the point of view of the dollar, output will certainly fall appreciably as mines go out of production. Sooner or later we shall have to find a rational substitute. Let us make it sooner, rather than later, in order to dispel the international currency uncertainty which is doing everybody, except South Africans and the Soviet Union, so much damage. It appears that the overwhelming majority of experts who have commented on this question of monetary reform are in favor of decisive measures to rationalize the role of gold in the international system. (See, for example, Hobart Rowen's review in the Washington Post, Aug. 13, 1972.) At the very least, they say that gold reserves should be sanitized, with no more purchases of gold for official purposes. The IMF has just stressed the need for a new system, in the report by the Executive Directors to the Board of Governors. ("Reform of the International Monetary System," IMF, Washington, D.C., Sept. 6, 1972.) I am sure the witnesses you will be hearing later will be qualified to elaborate on the exact means of achieving this end.
GABON REPUBLIC

Gabon was one of the four territories of French Equatorial Africa, and became independent on August 17, 1960. The other three territories, Central African Republic, Chad, and Congo (Brazzaville), became independent the same year. The country is about the size of Colorado with a population estimated at 500,000.

Gabon, under the leadership of President Albert-Bernard Bongo, generally follows an anti-Communist and pro-West path in foreign policy. Despite occasional difficulties in past years, Gabonese-American relations are good, with Gabon going out of its way to encourage American private investment in Gabon by the active personal encouragement of President Bongo and a liberal investment policy.

Gabon's largely untapped mineral and forestry wealth and its political-economic stability are almost unique in Africa. The lumbering industry remains the foundation of Gabon's economy, but the country boasts glamor items too: oil, manganese, uranium, zinc, and reportedly the richest undeveloped iron ore deposits in the world. Its mammoth plywood factory continues to increase production and is planning major expansion. Allied light industries are meanwhile springing up, including a refinery, a brewery, a textile plant, and a cement crushing factory. Exports continue to rise and doubled imports in 1969.

President Bongo is a young (36) dynamic leader who is impatient to see his nation and people develop, and who works hard to achieve progress. Elected Vice President in 1967 and succeeding to the Presidency after the death of President Leon Mba later the same year, Bongo heads a remarkably politically and economically stable government. He actively pursues modernization, placing economic development ahead of political and diplomatic affairs.

His main effort is devoted to building Gabon by attempting to attract large-scale foreign capital investment through offering exceptionally generous terms to investors, by building up Gabonese capabilities through developing education facilities and through a “Gabonization” program aimed at upgrading the skills of Gabon's labor force, by development of Gabon’s infrastructure—particularly the port of Owendo and the trans-Gabon railway, by expansion of trade horizons, and by devoting 20 percent of the Gabonese budget to development.

Trans-Gabon Railroad

For decades, Gabonese have envisaged a railroad stretching across the heart of Gabon, opening its remote eastern areas to economic exploitation, social development, and commerce, and linking the Gabonese regions and people closer together. The exploration of a proven 1 billion tons of high-grade iron ore near Belinga in the interior stimulated a surge of interest and planning which has now led to a concrete railroad project which the Gabonese believe is the key to the future economic development of their country. Iron ore and timber resources are a sufficient economic justification for the rail-
So, to answer your own question, Mr. Chairman, we should not encourage the gold mining industry of South Africa, any more than that of the Soviet Union; in fact, we should do everything possible to bring the industry to an end as soon as possible. Any argument that it benefits the Africans who work there must be rejected, just as the arguments for continuing the old slave system had to be rejected. The system is rotten through and through, and can only survive on a basis of human suffering; and we want no part in it.

We should, therefore, terminate the IMF agreement with South Africa of December 1969. We should get an international agreement to stop buying the metal for official monetary reserves; sell some of the enormous U.S. gold stocks to bona fide industrial users; and demonetize gold as fast as can be agreed internationally, just as we successfully demonetized silver. In its place, we need further issues of special drawing rights from the IMF, which should be based on rational economic factors and not the ability of one universally despised Government to exploit its people and those of the rest of Africa. We should, incidentally, insist that a special allocation of SDR's be made to the developing countries of the third world, as resolved at the last meeting of UNCTAD, the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, at Santiago, Chile. This is by far the most effective form of development financing, on which the United States has about the most pathetic record in the Western World; it would alleviate the international tensions caused by world poverty, and also benefit us by giving developing countries the means to buy our products, and so boost our balance of payments and increase employment here.

Finally, we should compensate the independent African countries involved, and their people, by channeling additional assistance direct to them, not through the IMF via South Africa but through the international organizations of the United Nations system which were set up for this purpose.
APPENDIX 17


AUGUST 14, 1972.

HON. WILLIAM P. ROGERS,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I wish to express my concern at the persistent violation of the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) by the Republic of South Africa. For a number of years, South Africa has been maintaining import quotas, as well as a range of other nontariff barriers, which contravene the letter and the spirit of GATT. Of particular concern to the auto industry are the "local content" regulations for motor vehicles, which in effect have deprived the industry here of the South African export market, and forced the companies concerned to invest in assembly plants inside South Africa, where they are taking advantage of labor conditions that would be completely intolerable in the U.S. context. This is just one example of an important U.S. export item being excluded from the South African market, with a consequent loss of the balance-of-payments benefits, and of valuable jobs in certain industries.

Although at one time South Africa had exemption under article XII of the General Agreement, which allowed the excuse of balance of payments difficulties to be used to justify import quotas, this defense had to be abandoned at the beginning of 1970. There was strong pressure on South Africa to dismantle its controls, and bilateral negotiations with the major trading partners were undertaken. However, it seems that South Africa was not prepared to offer any quid pro quo for the higher import tariffs that it was seeking, and the negotiations seem to have resulted in deadlock. Far from attempting to come to terms with the requirements of its trading partners under the Agreement, in November 1971, South Africa imposed a very stringent tightening of the existing import quotas. This is a unilateral action which we cannot afford to condone, since it openly defies the understood norms of international trade; strongly inhibits U.S. exports to South Africa, especially of manufactured items; and provides a bad example which, if widely followed, would do great damage to the flow of international trade at a particularly difficult time for the U.S. balance of payments.

Although many members of GATT are from time to time in breach of the General Agreement, South Africa is a particularly persistent offender, and I am anxious that all appropriate pressures should be brought to bear on the country. I understand that the issue of its import restrictions, and application for balance-of-payments justification under article XII, are under active consideration at the moment, and I should like to have an assurance from you that there will be no effort on the part of the U.S. delegation to reduce the already considerable pressure on South Africa, when its import restrictions come before the annual meeting in September.

Since the United States is a member of the balance-of-payments committee of GATT, this issue is clearly one that must be faced without equivocation. It would be illogical and inconsistent to allow South Africa to defy the rules, since the United States has recently benefited from the application of GATT sanctions. When the European Economic Community imposed obstacles on the import of chickens from the United States, in line with its protectionist common agricultural policy, the United States pressed hard within GATT for some redress. It obtained this, through the appropriate GATT processes, in the form of compensatory restrictions on certain items of European origin. In the case of the African states associated with the EEC through the Yaunde Convention, the United States has made loud protests about the "reverse preferences" allo-
cated to European goods by the African states, in return for the concessions which they have for their own products in the European market. This issue has been stressed out of proportion to our concern about South Africa's violation of the principles of international trade.

The immediate issue is, of course, whether or not South Africa qualifies for exemption from the normal regulations because of balance-of-payments difficulties. There has already been strong objection to this claim by a number of countries, and the South Africans appear to be coming under increasing pressure on this. They have even announced their intention of abandoning this line. Looking at the facts of the situation, this is understandable. At the same time as South Africa is contending within GATT that balance-of-payments difficulties justify stringent import restrictions, it is using the healthy balance of payments which it has had since the beginning of this year in order to withhold newly mined gold from the free market, thus driving the price even higher—to the detriment of international monetary arrangements, and particularly to the stability of the dollar. The U.S. Government cannot accept South Africa's use of a balance-of-payments surplus, within the context of the International Monetary Fund two-tier price system and its 1969 agreement with South Africa, while simultaneously allowing South Africa to plead balance-of-payments difficulties in order to extract concessions from GATT at our expense.

South Africa's balance of payments has been in surplus for the first two quarters of 1972, and this surplus is rising. Gold and foreign exchange reserves are rising steadily, and stood at R685.5 million (about $980 million) in mid-June. Dr. Diederichs, the Minister of Finance, told the South African Senate in June that the balance of payments was showing a favorable trend, and that further prospects, particularly on the export side, looked promising. He added that import control and devaluation had begun to show an effect on imports in recent months. If such a promising situation can be used to justify the degree of violation of GATT rules that South Africa is presently displaying, then the floodgates would be opened for a large proportion of other GATT members to take the same line.

When the import quotas were tightened in November 1971, the Minister of Economics, Mr. S. L. Muller, promised a full review in May. In late July, a certain easing of the controls was announced. However, the South African Ambassador in Geneva is reported as saying, "I feel that South Africa has gone as far as it can at present in relaxing its import restrictions." There is even a debate going on in South African business circles about the possibility of increasing the controls on some items.

I should, therefore, like to know the policy of the U.S. Government toward South Africa's position in GATT, with regard to the considerations mentioned above. If it should come to the point of threatening South Africa with suspension from the organization, can I assume that our delegation will support such a step?

There is a further point relating to South Africa's membership of GATT which I wish to raise. South Africa purports to represent Namibia in a number of international organizations. The United States supported U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2145 of 1966, and has accepted the opinion of the International Court of Justice on this issue, affirming that South Africa's occupation of Namibia is illegal. As applied to GATT, therefore, South Africa has no legal right to represent Namibia, as it purports to do at the moment, and no right to obtain most-favored-nation treatment for exports originating in Namibia. I should like to know what action the United States is taking to end South Africa's illegal representation of Namibia in GATT.

I would appreciate receiving, at an early date, a response to the points raised herein.

Sincerely,

CHARLES C. DIORIGS, JR.,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

HON. CHARLES C. DIORIGS, JR.,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of August 14 regarding South African trade policy and South Africa's relations with the GATT.
The U.S. Government objected strongly to the reinvocation by South Africa of GATT Article XII which authorizes GATT contracting parties to place import restrictions temporarily by quantitative restrictions when import demand following an import relaxation in 1970 has threatened the South African balance of payments. The firm position adopted by the United States probably was a significant factor leading to South Africa's disinvocation of Article XII last month and the accompanying extensive relaxation of import controls.

South Africa's balance-of-payments difficulties giving rise to the reinvocation arose from weak world market conditions for South African goods, the inefficacy of South Africa's monetary and fiscal policies in dampening inflation, and import demand following an import relaxation in 1970. South Africa's high-cost import substitution program, inefficient use of labor resources and uncertainties arising from world monetary conditions in the second half of 1971. It was the U.S. position that despite the serious economic problems facing South Africa, recourse to Article XII was not justified. This was particularly apparent as the South African trade and balance-of-payments situation improved significantly in 1972.

During the GATT balance-of-payments consultations with South Africa in January and June 1972, the United States strongly urged South African authorities to rapidly remove the restrictions. South Africa announced its decision to disinvocate Article XII on the eve of the July 26 GATT Council meeting where the possibility of a formal finding of inconsistency of the restrictions with GATT provisions and the withdrawal of concessions to South Africa was to be discussed.

The relaxation of import restrictions almost restores the pre-November 1971 situation. In fact, more items were added to the "no permit required" list than were removed from the list in November. A large increase in South African imports might result from this action. Nevertheless, relaxation is not complete, and the United States will pursue the matter at the September GATT Council meeting.

In the second paragraph of your letter you refer to bilateral negotiations between South Africa and its major trading partners. These negotiations resulted from the South African decision of October 1969 to modify or withdraw GATT concessions pursuant to Article XXVIII. The South African position is that tariff bindings agreed to following World War II have interfered with the country's industrial development and that increases in tariffs on some bound items are necessary if industrialization is to proceed. Under GATT rules a contracting party may, through negotiation and agreement, modify or withdraw previously negotiated concessions if satisfactory compensation is paid to affected countries. These negotiations for compensation have not been completed.

Consultations under Article XII and negotiations under Article XXVIII are distinct issues; however, prior to the import relaxation the United States expressed its concern to South African authorities that Article XII restrictions not be allowed to affect concessions negotiated under Article XXVIII or to afford protection to domestic industry in violation of South Africa's GATT obligations.

It is our view that "local content" regulations to which you refer are a violation of GATT Article III, the purpose of which is to guarantee that imported items are not discriminated against in the application of a country's internal laws or regulations. The system operating in South Africa does not prohibit or curtail the sale of foreign-made automobiles, but it does provide for the partial rebate of excise duties paid on locally manufactured automobiles containing specified percentages of locally produced parts. Thus, the tax rebates effectively discourage the use of imported components.

We have raised this issue with South African authorities, and, most recently, in July of this year, we instructed our Embassy in Pretoria to protest to the South African Government that the United States considers the rebates to be in violation of the GATT and to request that the South African Government bring its rebate regulations into conformity with GATT provisions. We have not yet received a reply from the South Africans.

South African policies regarding gold sales are one element in a very complex set of largely unpredictable factors determining gold prices. Increasing commercial demand in world foreign exchange markets, declining volume and metal content of production, political events and renewed speculation have been affecting gold prices in recent months. We have consistently pressed the view that newly mined South African gold should be channeled to the free market in the interests of international monetary stability, a position incorporated in the IMF agreement with South Africa on gold sales policy. The recent relaxation of import restraints should be significant in this respect—after a certain time lag—by increasing South African imports and reducing the overall balance-of-
payments surplus, thus reducing South Africa’s justification for withholding from sale newly mined gold to add to its reserves under the terms of its agreement with the IMF.

There is virtually no provision in the GATT for expulsion of a contracting party, although economic sanctions against GATT members are authorized under the provisions of several articles. In any event, the United States has more influence on a country’s trade policies when it is able to act through the GATT mechanism than would be possible if that country were to be excluded from membership. This fact has been amply demonstrated during the GATT consideration of South Africa’s balance-of-payments restrictions.

With respect to your question regarding South Africa’s representation of Namibia in the GATT, we are looking into the implications of the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2145 and the opinion of the International Court of Justice with respect to the GATT. I will write you again as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

DAVID M. ABSHIRE,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.
APPENDIX 18

APARtheid AS A SYSTEM OF FORCED LABOR

(By Sean Gervasi)

The problems of South Africa are often seen as the result of white racism and nothing more. But "racism" is not, in any of its usual senses, the root of the problem. The intolerable conditions in which Africans and other nonwhites must live, and the indignities which they suffer daily, are part of the structure of their society. If we are to understand South Africa, if we are to understand the possibilities for change there, we must understand that the problem is the system, the South African "way of life" itself. South Africa is a society in which whites dominate Africans and other nonwhites. They have exclusive power to control the lives of others. They have used that power in the last century to construct a system of institutions in which Africans are imprisoned, in which they have almost no freedom. Thus South Africa is a racist society. But the source of racism is not merely a set of attitudes. Very little can be done by "educating" whites in order to show them the ways of decency and humanity and brotherhood. The source of racism is the form of economic and social organization which is the matrix of daily life in South Africa.

The basis of the South African system of white supremacy was, and remains, a degree of arbitrary violence which is no longer accepted in most civilized societies. In the beginning, the territory of South Africa was taken by force. The African populations were, over a period of time, subdued by force. Force was turned to economic purposes. Africans were made to do the work required by a simple settler community. Force was explicit and concrete. Its monopoly by whites made it possible for them to establish the tradition of Africans laboring for whites. This tradition has governed the relations between whites and Africans for the whole of South African history. It is the basis upon which white supremacy and white prosperity have been built. This becomes clear when one sees that both depend upon a vast system of forced labor. That is arbitrary violence in its modern form, a system, built by legislation, which leaves Africans almost nothing in life but the necessity of doing the white man's work.

The principal concern of the white population in South Africa has always been to secure an abundant and cheap supply of African and other labor. In the early decades of South African history this did not require any particularly elaborate organization or compulsion. White dominance was undisputed. And the white population, needing labor only for the simplest kind of economy, had only to control conditions in the reserves and the white rural areas. As the mining boom developed, and as laborers were needed in large numbers for the mines, whites developed a more complex system for organizing the flow of cheap labor. Again, this system was created to serve a concrete purpose. Nonetheless, the forced labor system remained a fairly simple one until fairly recently. The great majority of Africans lived in the reserves. And it was possible to entertain the illusion that the races lived separate existences.

The process of industrialization, however, changed all this. It threatened the traditional way of life. Industrialization created enormous demands for African labor. It brought millions of Africans to the cities. The old agricultural and mining economy gave way to a new and more complex one, which seemed to require a much greater "integration" of the races. The races, of course, had always been integrated in the sense that whites had depended upon African labor. They had not lived together. Industrial growth and urbanization created a fear among whites of being forced to live with those whom they had always dominated. The fear of those whom one uses arbitrarily surfaced in white consciousness. Whites spoke of being "overwhelmed". The whites therefore struggled to maintain the traditional "way of life" in the face of these changes. They strove to remain separate in the situation created by the growth of industry.

It is sometimes argued that industrialization necessarily breaks down tradi-
tional and racist societies. Inequalities in income, wealth, and opportunities, it is said, necessarily yield to the imperatives of industrial change. The South African experience demonstrates that this is not so. As industrialization proceeded, the white South Africans simply extended and tightened the former system of labor organization. It was a complex process. But the old system of forced labor was given a modern form. The whites created, by legislation, a smoothly functioning system for extracting labor from Africans even in the new, vastly expanded and differentiated economy. The new and elaborate system made it possible to keep the old master-servant tradition alive. The principle that had governed the relations between races from the beginning remains. Africans were nothing but laborers for the white man. An old tradition was rationalized and refined. It developed along with the economy. And the South African "way of life" remained.

The forced labor system must be seen as a whole. It does not consist merely of labor legislation. It consists of all the legislation governing the way in which Africans must live. That means, therefore, the whole range of law determining the status and rights of Africans in South African society. It is precisely in the legislation defining Africans as citizens of the Bantustans that this system has its foundation. For the effect of this legislation is to deprive Africans of any right to live. This, and the power to enforce that legislation, is the real source of the African's helplessness. And yet it is very rarely seen as such.

In Africa land is the source of life for the vast majority. Only a very privileged few live by any other means. White control of the land is the basis of the system of power by which Africans are controlled in South Africa. Whites have always restricted the land available to Africans. By 1964 what had once been reserves were finally grouped into Bantustans comprising approximately 14 percent of the land. These areas are now, with a few exceptions, the only legal and permanent places of residence for 70 percent of the population. The Bantustans, however, are very poor agricultural areas. And most of the land in them is badly eroded. Its condition has been deteriorating steadily over the last 20 or 30 years. The land could not begin to support the population which, by law, must live upon it. And per capita income, so far as we know, has been steadily declining as population has risen and average yields have fallen. Almost nothing is being done to improve the economies of the Bantustans, in order to support the expanding population. The Government of South Africa, in fact, continues to aggravate the problems of Africans by removing more and more people to the Bantustans.

A considerable proportion of the African population, therefore, has to move, or continue to live, in the cities. "At home" they can find no means of livelihood. The legislation regulating the use of land in South Africa therefore tantamount to a sentence of grinding poverty, and indeed in many cases death, on every African. The sentence can be avoided only by escaping to the "white areas" to offer one's labor on "the market." The government operates a policy of maintaining a delicate balance in the distribution of the African population. Those who are needed as workers stay where they are needed. Those who are not, stay in the reserves or are sent back to them. The principle which determines where an African will live is nothing to do with his desires or his life. Where he will live depends on whether he is "essential" to the white economy. The government has made it clear that it intends to expel all Africans who are not needed, who are not economically active, from the "white areas." Thus, the most basic legislation in South Africa is the embodiment of violence and arbitrariness. It is the basic element of compulsion in the system of forced labor.

The intensified exploitation of African labor which is the hallmark of South African society today is made possible both by this compulsion and by the system of controls to which Africans must submit when they live and work in "white areas." For in those areas they are treated as migrants with no rights, or with very few rights. The modernized system of controls operates in three main spheres. It regulates the movement and residence of Africans. It denies them access to education and training. And it denies them elementary rights of trade union organization. The International Labor Office has described the salient features of South African legislation controlling migrant Africans in the following way:

"The entry of 'natives' into urban areas and 'proclaimed areas' (covering the country's principal urban, mining and industrial areas) and their stay in such areas is subject to strict control designed to maintain in each area the number of 'natives' necessary to meet its labor requirements.

"A national network of native labor bureaus has been established, which discharge three functions: They apply influx control regulations in urban, mining
and industrial areas; they provide a placement service for 'natives'; and they see to the enforcement of vagrancy laws. All unemployed male 'natives' over 15 years must report to a labor bureau. The powers vested in the labor bureaus (which have been developed only since the examination made by the Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labor) provide the authorities with extensive means for the direction of 'native' labor.

“In urban areas and proclaimed areas (covering the main mining and industrial areas in addition to urban areas) under extensively defined vagrancy provisions, natives may be arrested without a warrant, tried by an administrative official, and sent to various penal institutions. Both in these areas and rural areas, the native labor bureaus may cause natives reporting to them to be dealt with under the vagrancy laws.

“All natives over 16 years must have a reference book, which they must produce on demand, and which serves, inter alia, as an employment record. Contracts of employment must be registered with the authorities or particulars thereof notified. A Native Affairs Central Reference Bureau in the Department of Bantu Administration and Development maintains centralized records of the particulars in the reference books.

“Natives employed in mines or works and in the urban, mining and industrial areas which are proclaimed areas are subject to penal sanctions for breaches of contracts. In other areas, provisions for penal sanctions for breaches of contracts of employment, although not limited to native workers, are in practice applied overwhelmingly to such workers. The South African Government has stated that it considers these penal sanctions to be still necessary.

“Natives convicted under vagrancy provisions in urban and proclaimed areas may, as an alternative to being committed to a penal establishment, enter approved employment. Persons sentenced to imprisonment may be hired out to private employers, and arrangements exist whereby associations of farmers may construct prisons with a view to the employment of prisoners who are confined therein. By reason of the manifold special legislative provision which regulate in a complex and detailed manner their everyday existence, persons of African race are particularly liable to conviction for offenses peculiar to them, and frequently they do not enjoy the protection and guarantees provided under the general criminal law.”

The situation with regard to education has already been examined. It is self-evident that Africans are denied any but the slightest chance of achieving any security by educational advancement. The education system barely exists so far as they are concerned. This means that very few have the opportunity to acquire any but unskilled or semiskilled work. Skilled work and the professions are for the most part barred to them, although there have been some improvements in recent years. Africans are now able to learn some skills, because there are not enough white workers to do all the skilled jobs which have to be filled. For the most part Africans are indirectly forced to join a labor force of unskilled and semiskilled workers. They are forced by the pressure of poverty and need in the reserves. And they are forced by the denial of the right to education and the system of controls which allows them to live outside the reserves only when they can be considered essential to the white economy.

In this situation, Africans find themselves almost totally helpless. They constitute, in the South African setting, a vast army of the unskilled, haunted by the spectre of need and unemployment and continually harassed by an oppressive system of labor controls. The fact that in this situation they are further denied any rights to organize in unions, to bargain for their own wages, or to strike sets the seal on their imprisonment. The abundant supply of cheap labor and the near total control exercised over the lives of Africans insures what it is meant to insure: cheap labor. And Africans have no way, beyond challenging the whole system in which they are trapped, to escape from this condition. They may find they are allowed minor improvements from time to time in their material standards. But the system of forced labor remains.

It is important to stress that South Africa has been made into a vast, automated labor camp. For only if one confronts this reality can the obstacles to change in South Africa be seen for what they are. While supremacy rests upon a foundation of forced labor, indeed, the prosperity of South Africa, and much of southern Africa, rests upon forced labor. Since Western countries, through

the large multinational corporations, have important economic interests in this region, they too depend upon the system of forced labor which has been described here. Many of the solutions which are being mooted for the problems of South Africa do not recognize either the existence of a forced labor system or the difficulties which dismantling this system would present to interests outside South Africa itself. That is why these solutions are so unrealistic. The only solution which the nonwhite population of South Africa will ever accept will be one which eliminates the system of forced labor. This would have the most far-reaching consequences for the life of South Africa. It would entail not merely the abandonment of discriminatory legislation, but a revolution on the land, the dismantling of a near-totalitarian state, and the ending of white supremacy and economic privilege.
APPENDIX 19

PREAMBLE TO THE SASO (SOUTH AFRICAN STUDENTS' ORGANIZATION) CONSTITUTION

Whereas we the black students of South Africa, having examined and assessed the role of black students in the struggle for the emancipation of the black people of South Africa and the betterment of their social, political, and economic lot, and having unconditionally declared our lack of faith in the genuineness and capability of multiracial organizations and individual whites in our country to effect rapid social change; and believing that:

(i) Black students in South Africa have unique problems and aspirations pertaining to them;
(ii) It is necessary for blacks to consolidate themselves and close their ranks if their aspirations are to be met;
(iii) There is a crying need in South Africa for blacks to reassert their pride and group identity; and

Recognizing the principles of the Kumasi Declaration of January 1971;
Do commit ourselves to the realization of the worth of the black man, the assertion of his human dignity and to promoting consciousness and self-reliance of the black community.
Hereby resolve:
To adopt this constitution with the determination that unity and positive re-awakening will result in the black world.

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APPENDIX 20

NEW YORK TIMES EDITORIAL ON THE VERY REV. GONVILLE FFRENCH-BEYTAGH, FORMER ANGLICAN DEAN OF JOHANNESBURG, NOVEMBER 2, 1971

"SUBVERSION" IN SOUTH AFRICA

The Very Rev. Gonville Ffrench-Beytagh, Anglican Dean of Johannesburg, is a subversive in the eyes of South Africa’s racist government because he says: “I believe the doctrine of apartheid is abhorrent to Christianity.” He is a revolutionary in the sense that, although he rejects violence, he has come to believe violence is almost inevitable under South Africa’s draconic system of repression for the country’s nonwhite majority.

A court in Pretoria has now convicted Dean Ffrench-Beytagh of subversion and sentenced him to 5 years. He was charged with distributing funds from abroad to black South Africans connected with the outlawed African National Congress. Although the prosecutor claimed the 59-year-old clergyman was “part and parcel” of a plot to overthrow the government, he took care to remind the court that under the Terrorism Act no proof of participation in terrorist activities is required for conviction.

The prosecutor was right about that if about nothing else in this travesty. Anyone arrested under the Terrorism Act is guilty unless he can prove his innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. The range of terrorist activities is so sweeping that a person can be convicted if his alleged offense is adjudged to embarrass the administration of the affairs of state.

What Dean Ffrench-Beytagh really did was to use the funds he received to provide food parcels, medicines and schoolbooks to needy families, including those of men imprisoned for political activities. He was brought to trial for the reason that South Africa’s security police have been hounding other church officials and expelling foreign missionaries: Many churches have become increasingly effective witnesses against the inhumanity of apartheid; and a government based on that hideous doctrine cannot tolerate such opponents.

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APPENDIX 21


Mrs. Luthuli, members of the Luthuli family, sons and daughters of Africa, I feel I have no words adequate enough to describe vividly, what our late brother, Albert John Luthuli meant to his people, and what his memory should mean to his people even after death. But I can at least say without any hesitation and without any apologies to those who may disagree with my assessment of the man, that knowing Chief Luthuli as closely as I knew him, is one of the greatest privileges of my life. I thank the Almighty for his life which enriched not only those who were next of kin, but all of us who had the privilege to know him. Rarely are men born who, by the example they set for their fellowmen, enrich almost an entire nation as he did.

In this very poor attempt at trying to describe his value to us, to South Africa and to the human race, you will all appreciate that because he was silenced and therefore died a banned man, a man the qualities whose character shone most, when he led a banner organization, one is heavily circumscribed in doing this enormous task. In other words one can hardly do him justice without taking a risk each time one utters a sentence, of breaking the law. There are those who considered him a risk to peaceful coexistence in South Africa, and yet all who knew him well agree with me that if he was given a chance, his whole life would have insured not only our peaceful coexistence, but the whole future not only of all black people but of all white people of a country he held so dear. He gave his whole life and paid a price few men can go out of their way to pay, as much as he did.

Here we had a man of God who truly loved all God’s people and who was made to suffer merely because he dared do just that. No one can deny that he was a true Christian, and if there should be doubts about that, did Christ not say in the famous Sermon on the Mount: “How blest you are, when you suffer insults and persecution and every kind of calumny for my sake?” All that happened to him was just that. For he suffered because he kept the greatest of all commandments of loving one’s neighbor as oneself. Albert Luthuli gave up what in those days was a lucrative post, of being a teacher at a training college, and answered the call of serving his people as a chief which meant choosing a life of penury, in order to serve his people here at Groutville Mission Station. Who amongst us can deny that was proof that his whole motivation in life was service to his people at any price? To this man all material considerations were of secondary importance, in fact they were of no importance at all. He was in true Christian mold prepared to slave for the people he loved so dearly.

Those of us who knew him remember with reverence his battles to improve the lot of the simplest of his people not only in Groutville but throughout the province. A battle finally extended to his whole country.

In a country like South Africa where one is almost defied for the mere pigmentation of one’s skin, he strove to prove not only to his people but to those who strove to persecute him, that all men belonged to the one and only fine nobility in this world, and that is to the nobility of all men as God’s children, creatures the Creator has made in His own image. The fact that he comes out triumphant in making this very point, despite all the barriers that are the lot of people of his pigmentation, is proof that this truth will withstand the test of time.

Some people might say, particularly those who attempted to frustrate him, that they failed him, for was he not imprisoned, banned and silenced? I make bold to say that the converse is true. These human actions he faced for the reason that he kindled a spark in men’s hearts that is trampled underfoot in
our land, which is the knowledge that God did not create second- or third-class human beings, and by doing so Chief Luthuli struck fear in the hearts of all those who dehumanize and degrade other human beings for no earthly reason except that they were born with a pigmentation of the skin different from their own. For daring to stand for this he suffered the modern South African version of crucifixion.

Many of his enemies patted themselves on their backs, for they believed that they had defeated him. The proof that there was no time when he was finished or defeated was the very fact that he was kept in invisible chains until the end of his days. The very fact that he was kept in this state of apparent helplessness is proof that he remained much more than a symbol to all who knew him, both within and outside the borders of this country.

When again he was called upon to choose between his chieftainship and being a servant of his people in the wider sense, he found no conflict. We remember that on paper he was deprived of his chieftainship but up to now he remains our chief in the very broadest sense of that term. This won him world recognition as his awards such as the Nobel Prize and others proved.

His country was too small for his stature and she failed to recognize what he was worth to her, in terms of solving her complex problems. By not grabbing the opportunity to solve the problems of South Africa peacefully with himself as a catalyst we may have lost this chance forever, unless there is a deep heart-search and a rethink as far as the whole attitude of white South Africa toward blacks is concerned.

We are living in difficult times and nothing has happened so far to prove that in conducting his life as he did, that he was wrong. When the history of this country is read, particularly about his times and events of those times, coming generations will blame South Africa for having allowed an opportunity to pass to enable so noble a son to rescue his country from her throes.

There is no evidence that there is any willingness on the part of the majority of the powerful in South Africa to heed the screams of the dispossessed and the powerless. As Lord Acton said, “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” As a result the up-and-coming generations will get more and more difficult to convince that a nonviolent change is, as Chief Luthuli believed, possible. On the contrary, when one looks at the South African scene, one is left in no doubt about the fact that violence is on the ascent, and that the chances of nonviolent change are getting scarcer by the day.

Whatever catastrophe overtakes South Africa, whether it is now or in the distant future, South Africa will not escape the harsh judgment that things will have reached a bad pass, because what Chief Luthuli stood for was ignored at the price of political expediency.

He stands as evidence for black patience, black perseverance, and for black love of his fellow human beings transcending all racial barriers. We can still hear his voice now, and South Africa still has a chance to heed the message if she was not so blinded by self-interest and sheer white avarice.

What he stood for were fundamental truths, and focus of our attention today are those fundamental truths he stood for, even more than the tombstone we are gathered here to see unveiled. May this day serve to unveil once again, even if it be for the last time, those fundamental truths for which he stood, for in them only can we seek and find our salvation and freedom for all. For without this kind of freedom there will never be real freedom even for those who wield physical power in our land.

When we look at his whole life, we realize what the late Robert Kennedy meant when he said in 1966:

“Moral courage is a rarer commodity than bravery in battle or great intelligence. Yet it is one essential, vital quality for those who seek to change a world which yields most painfully to change.”

Let us realize that if we find ourselves hemmed in by all sorts of barriers and edicts in South Africa, we can at least follow in Albert John Mvumbi Luthuli by having or cultivating moral courage such as he had in abundance.

Inkosi Sikelel’i Afrika: Freedom in our lifetime.
APPENDIX 22

LETTER BY CHAIRMAN DIGGS TO THE HONORABLE WILLIAM P. ROGERS, SECRETARY OF STATE, REGARDING OFFICIAL U.S. POLICY ON THE ASSIGNMENT OF BLACK PERSONNEL TO U.S. POSTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

AUGUST 2, 1972.

Hon. William P. Rogers, Secretary of State, Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary: In regard to the assignment of Mr. James E. Baker to our Embassy in South Africa, I am writing for clarification on certain points:

1) Is it understood that Mr. Baker will accompany the Embassy to Cape Town during the parliamentary sessions?

2) The Political Counselor of the Embassy was recently reassigned to Washington, thus necessitating a new appointment in this sensitive position. I would like to know whether a black foreign service officer will be assigned in this position to a country where some 82 percent of the people are not white, and if not, why not?

3) Can it be assumed that the policy of racial discrimination has been ended with respect to all appointments to U.S. posts in South Africa? If so, are black foreign service officers and staff being actively considered for appointments to some of the 36 positions in Pretoria as well as the five, three, and nine positions, respectively, at the U.S. Consulates at Cape Town, Durban, and Johannesburg?

4) I would like to have precise information on the composition of the Embassy, and of the other U.S. posts in South Africa, as to officers, staff, and service employees; both Americans and locals:

- The overall numbers of personnel in each category;
- The racial breakdown for each category;
- The job classification for each employee;
- The post of assignment for each employee;
- The wages which are paid to each local white employee;
- The wages which are paid to each local black employee; and
- The wages which U.S. Government personnel pay to their African employees in their individual or personal capacities.

5) Has, or have, there been any African employee, or employees, of the Embassy in the past 24 months who is no longer with the Embassy? If so, I would appreciate receiving a statement on the particulars for each such employee or employees.

6) I am requesting that cause be shown as to why this Government should not indicate in a written communication to the South African Government, at its highest level, its strong preference for the assignment of persons representative of the majority of that country, that is, of Africans to the South African Embassy here in the United States.

7) Finally, when will Mr. Baker be taking up his assignment to South Africa; and, if he must first undergo language studies, what African languages are required for an officer assigned to South Africa?

I would appreciate an early and comprehensive answer to each of the points raised above.

Sincerely,

Charles C. Diggs, Jr., Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa.
In my visits to the General Motors and Ford plants and in other talks with U.S. businessmen on discriminatory labor practices and race problems thus far, I have found them equivocal, apologetic, or overly cautious. There is an obvious communications gap between company headquarters in the United States and their operations in South Africa. I was surprised to learn, for example, that the chairman of the board of directors of General Motors, Mr. James Roche, has not even seen his South African plants since 1964 and that the head of the Ford Motor Co., Mr. Henry Ford II, has not seen his South African plants since 1968. They are therefore obliged to rely on reports that can hardly convey the current racial situation in their own South African facilities. I am particularly disturbed that these two companies, which are located in my own State of Michigan, and many of whose employees are from my own constituency in Detroit, and who operate in accordance with fair employment regulations in the United States, obviously are operating on a double standard. I am convinced that there are many more things that these companies can do which are more consistent with fair employment that would aid the people here and set an example that other businesses might follow. I personally believe that the U.S. companies should lead the way. There are changes which they have under review, but I think the jury has been out too long.
APPENDIX 24

MEMORANDUM ON APPLICATION OF TERRORISM ACT TO ADVOCACY OF BUSINESS WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH AFRICA

The correctness of the statement that advocating a policy of economic withdrawal from South Africa is illegal in South Africa and is punishable by death has been questioned. Examination of certain of the provisions of the Terrorism Act, 1967, show that the statement is accurate.

Section 2(1)(a) of this statute creates the offense of “participation in terrorist activities.” It provides that “any person who with intent to endanger the maintenance of law and order in the Republic commits any act, shall be guilty of the offense of participation in terrorist activities and liable on conviction to the penalties provided for by law for the offense of treason.”

Two requirements are thus set forth: (a) Proof of the commission of “any act”; (b) Proof of intent to endanger the maintenance of law and order.

Advocating economic withdrawal clearly constitutes an “act.” As far as proof of intent is concerned this is established by presumptions under subsection (2) which provides as follows:

“If in any prosecution for an offense contemplated in subsection (1)(a) it is proved that the accused committed the act alleged in the charge, and the act had or was likely to have had any of the following results in the Republic namely:

“(d) prejudice any industry or undertaking;
“(f) further or encourage the achievement of any political aim;
“(h) cause substantial financial loss to any person or the State;”
the accused shall be presumed to have committed such act with intent to endanger the maintenance of law and order in the Republic unless it is proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not intend any of the results aforesaid.

Anyone who advocates a policy of economic withdrawal obviously intends to prejudice South African industry (result (d)); achieve a political aim (result (f)); cause substantial financial loss to persons affected as well as the South African Government (result (h)) and embarrass the administration of the affairs of the South African State (result (l)).

Once the act of advocating withdrawal is proved the presumption of the requisite intent follows, and the offense is established. Since the penalty for treason includes death, the offense under section 2(1)(a) is so punishable.

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APPENDIX 25

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN CHAIRMAN CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR., AND HON. DAVID M. ABSHIRE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS, REGARDING LABOR PRACTICES AND JOB DISCRIMINATION IN SOUTH AFRICA, WITH ACCOMPANYING LIST OF JOB RESERVATIONS UNDER THE INDUSTRIAL CONCILIATION ACT OF SOUTH AFRICA

OCTOBER 1, 1971.

HON. DAVID M. ABSHIRE,
Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. ABSHIRE: I refer to a recent article in the Christian Science Monitor captioned "South African Blacks Gain Jobs." A copy is enclosed.

The article states that the job reservation "war is crumbling." I would appreciate receiving a report listing (1) the jobs which are covered by the Job Reservation Act, and (2) the exceptions thereto.

I would also appreciate a discussion on the rate of the job concept under (1) South African law, (2) South African Government policy, (3) union policy, and (4) the actual practice of industry.

The article further states:

In the wake of Mr. Diggs' visit, nonwhite leaders are calling for better working conditions. On September 23, a delegation had a 90-minute meeting with General Motors executives in Port Elizabeth to demand better working conditions and equal pay, and GM executives are studying proposals.

A similar delegation hopes to soon have talks with Ford's management. The talks are being initiated by the Colored Labor (opposition) Party. Rev. Allan Hendrickse, chairman of the party's national executive, says it is hoped to approach all U.S. firms in South Africa in the near future to adopt Polaroid-type programs.

Ford and GM were sharply criticized by Mr. Diggs, who has demanded a meeting with their boards to discuss nonwhite working conditions at their South African plants.

I would appreciate receiving a detailed report by the Embassy on these movements, as well as any clippings or articles from South African papers relating to these efforts.

Sincerely,

CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR., Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa.


HON. CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR.,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am pleased to reply to your letter of October 1 requesting information regarding labor practices and job discrimination in South Africa. The following comments are arranged in the order you raised the subjects concerned.

Job reservation with the force of law is ordinarily accomplished by determinations of the Minister of Labor under section 77 of the Industrial Conciliation Act. There is no Job Reservation Act as such. A list of the determinations in force as of early 1971 is enclosed. The South African Government has estimated that these determinations affect approximately 3 percent of the total labor force.

In addition, the Mines and Works Act permits certain functions in the mines to be reserved to whites, ostensibly for safety reasons, but at present the limits are set for most mines by a contract between the mine owners and the white labor unions.
Exceptions are not generally published, although it is common knowledge that they are numerous, ordinarily being granted on the grounds that whites are not available. As the Christian Science Monitor article you enclosed relates, exceptions have been granted inter alia to colored bricklayers and plasterers in the Transvaal, to nonwhite forklift operators in the Port of Durban, and for various positions on the railroads. The Minister of Transport publicly stated September 2, 1971, that if it comes to a choice between ideology and the best interests of the country, he will choose the latter.

On the other hand, the South African Government, in the face of opposition from white labor unions, has backed away from its earlier insistence that there would be no job reservation in the homelands.

"Rate for the job," better known in the United States as "equal pay for equal work," is not a subject of South African law. South African Government policy has been to maintain a differential among Government employees on the basis of racial group, but on June 9, Minister of Colored Affairs Loots announced that the SAG has accepted the principle of narrowing the gap between whites and colored until it is ultimately gone. Despite some sympathy expressed by the SAG for increasing black wages, the principle of narrowing the pay gap was not extended to Africans.

The Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA), the largest labor union federation, has traditionally supported the principle of "rate for the job." Many other unions, supporters of the present Government, have opposed it. Industrial practice is similarly diverse. Probably a growing number of firms pay "rate for the job," but many still do not. With regard to recent developments at the GM and Ford subsidiaries in South Africa, I believe you know that Mr. Paul Estes of General Motors has now gone to look over the situation on the spot. When we have further information in this area, we will be glad to provide it to you.

Sincerely yours,

David M. Arshime
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

Enclosure: List of job reservations under the Industrial Conciliation Act.

Annexure C
Currently Valid

(By the Minister of Labor under South Africa's Industrial Conciliation Act)

Reserved for whites the driving of motor transport vehicles in the Durban municipal cleansing department.

Reserved for whites the posts of firemen and traffic policemen above the rank of constable in the Cape Town area and placed restrictions on the employment in Cape Town of colored ambulance drivers and attendants and traffic constables.

Reserved for whites the operation of lifts in certain types of buildings in Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Bloemfontein.

Reserved for whites skilled work in the building industry in urban areas of the Transvaal and Free State other than in Africa townships.

Reserved in the clothing industry a certain percentage of employment for whites and colored people as at a set date.

Reserved for whites the driving of refuse lorries in Springs.

Provides for a percentage of white busdrivers and conductors on City Tramway Co. vehicles in the Western Cape (later relaxed).

Reserved for whites in the Free State goldfields area the driving of vehicles of an unladen weight of 10,000 pounds or more in these industries: Cement products, meat, mineral water manufacturing, quarrying, brickmaking, sale of sand, stonecrushing, and transportation of goods.

Reserved for whites various types of skilled work in the wholesale meat trade on the Witwatersrand and in Pretoria.

Reserved for whites stipulated trades (varying from area to area) in the building industry in the "white" parts of larger towns in the Cape and Natal (later relaxed in many areas).

Reserved for whites the work of barman in white public bars (but not bar lounges) in Durban and Pietermaritzburg.

Reserved in magisterial district of Durban for whites, colored people, and Indians certain forms of motor transport driving (mostly heavy duty vehicles).
Relates to the assembly of motor vehicles from new components and the building of bodies for motor vehicles, but does not affect the manufacture of motor vehicle parts.

With the exception of Blackheath, Cape, car firms throughout the country must allocate supervisory and control work and most welding jobs to whites. At Blackheath, these jobs may be carried on by whites and colored, and all other types of work are reserved for colored.

Compulsory minimum ratios of white to nonwhite labor are fixed, varying in different parts of the country. In Uitenhage, the workers must be at least 65 percent white; in Belville and Port Elizabeth, 45 percent; in East London and on the Witwatersrand, 25 percent; and in Durban, 20 percent.

No employer may replace a white by a nonwhite worker, nor a colored man by an African. If a white employee vacates any post, another white must be appointed in his place. Subject to the other clauses, if a colored man leaves, he must be replaced by a white or another colored man.

Reserved for colored people or Asians in the liquor and catering trade in the Western Cape and certain Natal towns the jobs of waiters, wine stewards, pages, "barboys," bedroom attendants, and handymen.

Applies to the footwear industry throughout the Republic, providing that white workers may not be replaced by "nonwhites," and colored persons may not be replaced by Africans.

No white driver of motor vehicles, road construction machines, and earth-moving machines above a stipulated horsepower or weight may be replaced by a "nonwhite" in the Transvaal, Orange Free State, and Natal.

Applies to the furniture industry throughout South Africa except in the African "homelands": No one except a white may be newly employed as a foreman, supervisor, or machine maintenance mechanic.

Reserved for whites in the major urbanized magisterial districts of the Transvaal and Orange Free State the driving of certain categories of vehicles in certain industries.

Reserved for whites in the employ of the Union Liquid Air Co. (Pty.) Ltd. in the Transvaal and Orange Free State the driving of certain categories of vehicles.

Reserved for whites the posts of barmen in white public bars in the Western Cape and East London.

Reserved for whites the driving of certain categories of vehicles in the Divisional Council of Port Elizabeth.

Applied to the assembly of motor vehicles in the Pretoria magisterial district. It reserved for whites the work of supervision and control and most types of welding. No employer may replace a white by a "nonwhite" or a colored person by an African. In factories outside Rosslyn, a minimum of 50 percent of the workers must be whites and a minimum of 40 percent either white or colored. In factories at Rosslyn, at least 20 percent of the employees must be whites.
APPENDIX 26

"JOB RESERVATION: SAFEGUARD AGAINST INTERRACIAL COMPETITION"


The best-known provision of this act, the Industrial Conciliation Act, is probably the procedure set forth in section 77 which allows the Minister of Labor to regulate the racial composition employment in certain industries and/or occupations. "Whenever it appears to the Minister that it may be desirable," he may instruct an Industrial Tribunal to investigate the situation in a particular industry, occupation, or geographical area. After hearing evidence from interested parties and having consulted any industrial council, trade union, or employer's organization involved—including the Bantu Labor Board if Africans are affected—the tribunal must recommend to the Minister what action should be taken. The recommendations can fall within several categories:

1. To prohibit "the replacement by an employer of employees of a specified race by employees of another race";
2. To establish a minimum proportion of the labor force which must be drawn from members of a designated race;
3. To reserve either entirely or in part certain jobs or types of employment for workers of a designated race;
4. To determine a "minimum, maximum, or average number or percentage of persons of a specified race" eligible to hold particular jobs or perform certain types of work;
5. To restrict certain types of employment exclusively to members of a designated race "on such other basis as the tribunal may deem advisable" (sec. 77(6)(a)).

Although Africans are excluded from consideration as employees for the general purposes of this act, subsection redefines "employee" for section 77 to include Africans, thus making them subject to job reservation determinations.

After receiving the tribunals findings and consulting with the Minister of Economic Affairs, the Minister of Labor can implement the recommendations, making them a determination and publishing them in the Government Gazette.

Of the 27 determinations issued under this section,* 24 are still in force. The first one was overturned on technicalities by the courts, while Nos. 3 and 7—which involved the iron, steel, engineering, and metallurgical industry—were suspended after an agreement was reached between employers and white trade unions to limit African advancement through the requirement of equal pay. Employers are unlikely to hire black employees for positions when whites are available if they have to pay them the same rate.

Industries affected by these determinations include building, clothing, footwear, furniture, mining, and automobile assembly, as well as the liquor and catering trade and the meat trade, elevator attendants, and certain categories of truck and bus drivers. On two occasions, the Minister of Labor has told Parliament that from information available, it is likely that 2.9 percent of South Africa's workers are potentially affected by work reservation determinations (S.R.R. 1970, p. 84; and 1971, p. 189). Since there are many exemptions in effect, the actual number of workers directly affected is lower.

THE PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF JOB RESERVATION

When the industrial conciliation bill was introduced into Parliament in 1956, the Minister of Labor described section 77 as "a precautionary measure to safeguard the standards of living of the white workers of South Africa and to insure that they will not be exploited by the lower standards of any other race" (Han-

*For a complete list and description on the determinations, see appendix.

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road's development and can support it financially. The potential for Gabon in terms of regional, economic, and cultural development are possibly less tangible, but perhaps more important.

The railway project is in two stages. The first stage will extend from the developing port of Owendo on the sea to Booué in the interior, a distance of approximately 200 miles. This section would further open up Gabon's vast timber resources, much of which now remain untapped because of the lack of transport. According to several exhaustive studies, this first stage of the railroad will be financially viable by itself, even before the second stage is completed, because of the increased forestry exploitation. The second stage of the railway will extend from Booué to Belinga, a distance of some 135 miles, and will tap the iron ore reserve; it is estimated that the iron ore traffic will generate more than sufficient net revenue to cover the financial obligations of the railway.

The economic and social benefits of the railway, besides the vast increase projected in forestry production and the extraction of an estimated 10 million tons a year of iron ore, are multiple. The very construction of the railway will spur Gabonese development by bringing in money and new techniques and by training Gabonese. The railroad will provide a boost for agricultural production in the interior and a potential alternative evaluation route for the manganese and uranium industries, and support the modern all-purpose port and industrial complex under construction at Owendo. Gabon is already known to have substantial reserves of oil, manganese, iron, in which U.S. firms have large investments, as well as uranium and other minerals; the part of Gabon to be opened by the railway has been virtually untouched by mineral exploration and its potential is great. Not only will the construction of a railway permit evacuation of a wealth of primary resources currently beyond reach, it will provide important social and political benefits in linking the people and regions of Gabon closer together and in facilitating the Government's bringing jobs, money, training, consumer goods, information, education, health programs, and so forth, to the people of the interior.

Currently Gabon has lined up financing support from France, Germany, the FED and, pending some final studies, the World Bank. Over the past years a series of statements by U.S. leaders, including three U.S. Presidents, have established a virtual U.S. commitment to assist Gabon in its development, and specifically in building the railway. The U.S. Government is currently considering how best to assist Gabon in this enterprise, but no final decision has yet been reached.

In August 1969, President Nixon wrote President Bongo of Gabon: "If the (railroad) project is deemed feasible by both the World Bank and our own experts, the United States will be pleased to participate with others, within the limits of available funds." In a December 1971, meeting of potential aid donors the United States tentatively committed $20 million in Export-Import Bank loans and guarantees, and a $5 million short-term loan through the Agency for International Development. This aid is contingent on a declaration of the project's feasibility by the World Bank, whose decision is expected by the end of 1972. These tentative commitments involve only the first stage of the railway project described above, permitting timber resources exploitation. It will, however, be built to iron ore transport specifications in the expectation of future extension of the railway.
sard, Jan. 23, 1958, col. 276, cited in Doxey, p. 140). H. G. Ringrose, who has studied his country's industrial legislation extensively, gives this explanation:

In a multiracial society, such as that in South Africa, there is always a danger that differences in the traditional standards of living maintained by the different races may prejudice members of these different races when they compete with each other for employment. In section 77 of the Industrial Conciliation Act, the state has aimed to provide a remedy for this situation.

(“Industrial Relations and Law in South Africa,” p. 32.)

The importance of job reservation goes far beyond the small number of workers directly affected by the determinations issued under section 77. Muriel Horrell, research officer for the S. A. Institute of Race Relations, suggests that one of the primary purposes is to protect white workers in a time of depression. To insure that all white workers found employment, the Government could enforce existing determinations and enact new ones immediately. But, she points out, "Any large-scale retrenchment of nonwhites would obviously give rise to much resentment and bitterness and to a threat to the country's security" (“S.A.'s Workers," p. 124).

The practice of reserving skilled jobs for white workers extends much further than the section 77 determinations. A statement by the minister of labor in 1971 emphasized the role which this statute plays in upholding the system of racial job classification:

If section 77 was to be repealed, that would not only undo the 2-percent determinations, but the whole statutory pedestal would be wrenched out from under our whole traditional labor policy. (Hansard 15, May 18, 1971, col. 7001, cited in S.R.R. 1971, p. 190.)

Job reservation, as legislated by the Industrial Conciliation Act, forms the basis for South Africa's "traditional labor policy," by which the Minister means employment practices which allot the most highly skilled and best paying jobs to whites. While the legislation only applies to about 2 percent of the jobs, all workers are affected by labor policies which, though only custom, have as much impact as law. The following excerpt (from "General Electric—Apartheid and Business in South Africa") describes the process by which one large U.S. subsidiary offsets white labor shortages while not upsetting traditional racial patterns. Nearly every manufacturing and mining corporation operating in South Africa practices its own variation of "fragmentation and downgrading."

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**FRAGMENTATION, DOWNGRADING, AND JOB RESERVATION**

One practice which helps GE and other companies preserve the low pay scales for black employees, while placing them in occupations calling for higher skills, is called job fragmentation, a method by which a job previously done by a white worker will be subdivided into two or three component parts. Each of the new sections are then assigned to a black worker. Although the amount of work performed remains the same, the sum of the wage bill for the three new positions is less than the previous single bill.¹

A companion to fragmentation, describes the practice of re-classifying complex jobs into new categories of skill level. Because some higher skilled positions are legally reserved for whites in South Africa, downgrading enables a firm such as GE to fill a previously reserved job with a black employee, and to get the task done at lower cost to the company. Workers performing jobs classified into lower skill categories may be paid lower minimum wages. Essentially, while work remains the same, its name changes.

Fragmentation and downgrading allow white workers to be replaced by blacks, while allaying the fears of white unions that jobs are being taken by black labor. Nevertheless, both white workers and the South African Government are wary of black workers attaining skills which could, in the future, make the white worker dispensable, or erode white bargaining power. Therefore, certain skilled jobs may be filled only by whites. Many firms cite this job reservation policy to explain their inability to promote black workers to higher positions. At SAGE, however, job reservation applies only in apprenticeship training. "For practical purposes," says Mr. Bob Johnson, "job reservation has not been a serious impediment in training and upgrading at SAGE."² The use of frag-

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¹ A brief, issued by the Corporate Information Center of the National Council of Churches, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, N.Y., in cooperation with the Southern Africa Committee, March 1972.

² Mr. R. E. Johnson, managing director of South African General Electric (SAGE), in an interview with Tamd Hultman and Reed Kramer, Benoni, South Africa, Mar. 11, 1971.

mentation, downgrading, and other ways of maintaining the low status and remuneration of black workers, except for job reservation, are not legal requirements of the South African Government's apartheid policies. Yet they do represent additional ways in which companies can dictate low wage levels to Africans in order to gain higher profits.

II. JOB RESERVATION AND THE GROUP AREAS ACT (NO. 36 OF 1956)

Proclamation 329 of November 1, 1957, issued under the Group Areas Act of 1957 but still applicable under the 1966 act (see sec. 49(2) of act No. 36, 1956), has the effect of reserving for whites supervisory and executive positions in certain businesses located in “white areas.” The proclamation applies to trading and business, and excludes factories, mines, farms, hotels and restaurants, banks, the building trade, and others. Persons employed to work in a group area designated for members of another race are exempted from the restrictions on “occupation” which are contained in the Group Areas Act. The exemptions do not apply to whites and are valid only if the person “is not employed as a chargehand, executive, professional, technical, or administrative employee, manager, or supervisor” (sec. (2) (b) and (c)). Thus, the proclamation allows Asian, colored, and African workers to be employed in menial jobs in “white areas” and restricts their employment opportunities therein.
One argument that is commonly put forward for U.S. investment in South Africa is that "if we don't, others will"—the Japanese, for example. This is not based on the factual evidence, which suggests that any reduction in the inflow of foreign investment would be damaging to South Africa, and also that if foreign investors are not competing with U.S. concerns this is certainly not a decision which could be reversed by the United States pulling out. It is the result of governmental restraint on investment in South Africa, or of a general unwillingness to become involved in the South African economy, for economic or political reasons.

Since Japan is so often cited as an alternative source of foreign capital for South Africa, it should be pointed out that there is an official government ban on all permanent Japanese investment in the Republic. Official Japanese sources are very sensitive about allegations that Japanese capital is supporting the regime, and they vehemently deny any suggestion that Japanese industry would move in under any circumstances. The definition of "investment" is, of course, loose enough to allow substantial Japanese interests in South Africa. However, far from there being a prospect of their growing to replace U.S. production capacity, these interests actually depend on United States, or sometimes European plant and facilities. For example, Mitsubishi cars are assembled from Japanese parts, under license, at the Chrysler plant. All the production facilities, including sales and promotion, guarantees, servicing, and related activities are carried out by Chrysler, and might not be available if Chrysler were to withdraw from South Africa.

The major items of Japan's dealings with South Africa are large contracts for iron ore, coal, and other raw materials. With South African mining costs spiraling, and mounting difficulties with bulk transport on the railways and at the ports, the Japanese have terminated negotiations on various deals, including one major, long-term iron ore contract that would have been of great benefit to South Africa's balance of payments. The most recent indication of a Japanese reluctance to become involved in South Africa is their decision to withdraw from a planned participation in the new bulk ore terminal at Saldanha Bay, because of their increasing unwillingness to buy large consignments from South Africa that are available elsewhere (at much less potential political cost), such as Australia, Canada, and Brazil. The Japanese are also investing heavily in Black Africa, and would promptly be unwilling to risk this large and growing stake by a business alignment with the South. Opposition to apartheid within Japan also tends to concentrate on Japan's economic links with South Africa; there has been a great deal of adverse publicity, and resentment over such matters as South Africa's refusal to admit a Japanese jockey to ride in their races.

In Europe, too, antiapartheid groups are tending to move toward a critical interest in business links with South Africa. The Caboia Bassa Dam, in Mozambique, started off the movement, and interests in West Germany, Britain, Italy, Sweden, and elsewhere have withdrawn partially as a result of the pressure; a West German uranium consortium has also withdrawn from participation in a new uranium mine in Namibia. With Britain's entry into the EEC, exchange control exemption for British companies investing in South Africa will be withdrawn, and further incentives are likely to be worked out for European investment in developing countries, particularly those associated with the EEC in Black Africa. A swing away from South Africa is therefore possible, or at the least a reduction in the rate of increase of investment there. West German capital in particular, which was drawn on heavily by South African Government and semi-official borrowers after the U.S. bank consortium was terminated as a result of church pressure, has shown signs of becoming less freely available; by the end of 1971, even with the rate of interest being offered at a relatively attractive level, there was some difficulty in disposing of the issues.
Decisions to commit capital to South Africa, if they are taken on the basis of what other investors are doing, are likely to be encouraged by a demonstration of U.S. confidence in South Africa, and discouraged by withdrawal. The idea that there is some kind of vacuum, and that the withdrawal of one concern will immediately be matched by the entry of another, conflicts with past experience: at the time of Sharpeville, in 1960-61, there was a panic flight of capital from South Africa that threatened to bring its economy to disaster; this was stopped only by the imposition of emergency exchange controls, on June 16, 1961, virtually prohibiting the export of capital. Few investors realize that these emergency controls are still in force. The boom that followed during the decade of the 1960's showed that confidence, and the expectation of very high returns, tended to be boosted by massive investments; one investment therefore stimulated another. We have now come full circle, and the South African economy is no longer looking as healthy as it should. The withdrawal of one investor would draw attention to the problem, and far from stimulating new investment, would probably discourage it further. A British chartered accountant working in Johannesburg, a supporter of the government there, has pointed out: "The business scene is one of the few areas where South Africa is vulnerable, and it is there that the next blow will be struck." This is hardly encouraging for businesses contemplating investment in South Africa, and any withdrawals would increase their doubts.

The South African Reserve Bank has itself pointed out the crucial role of an accelerating inflow of foreign capital to the entire growth rate in South Africa, often pointed out as evidence of the economy's basic attractiveness:

"The relatively high rate of growth experienced by the South African economy during the last 3 years was therefore only achieved with an increase in the relative importance of foreign funds in the financing of gross domestic investment. Although factors of a long-term nature, such as the confidence of foreign investors in the growth potential of the South African economy and the relatively high yields on investments, contributed materially to the substantial increase in foreign liabilities, the large capital inflow during the last 3 years was to a large extent attributable to special circumstances" (namely the international currency uncertainties and high interest rates in South Africa because of the domestic capital shortage there; and the sudden inflow being trapped in South Africa after the crisis by exchange controls. The bank points out that the strengthening of exchange control, especially the measure limiting the local borrowing of foreign investors, had an important influence on investors).

With the decline in the real growth rate, from an average of 6 to 7 percent during the last decade to 4 percent at the end of 1971, combined with the increasing difficulty of repatriating capital. South Africa can no longer be secure about the automatic provision of foreign investment funds to finance growth, and to keep the balance of payments within reason. Already, a faltering in the supply of foreign capital at the end of 1971 has made the government impose very stringent import controls, of unlimited duration and severity. South Africa was forced to devalue, which is allowing some relief to the mining industry but appears unlikely to provide a lasting solution. Long-term direct investment is falling as a percentage of capital inflow, and is being replaced by loans. In 1967-68, service payments, of which interest on the loans is a major item, exceeded the value of gold exports for the first time. The reaction of foreign investors over the coming decade will be of crucial importance to South Africa; hence, it is fairly clear that the withdrawal of U.S. concerns would not be seen as a favourable omen for the stability of the white regime.

APPENDIX 28

CHRONOLOGY OF AFRICAN, COLOURED, AND ASIAN RESISTANCE TO WHITE DOMINATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: MAJOR EVENTS SINCE 1900

(Source: Muriel Horrell, Action, Reaction, and Counter-action, Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race Relations, 1971.) (Compiled by Eric Eckholm)

1900: Several African newspapers exist which speak out against discriminating laws. Mahatma Gandhi's Natal Indian Congress (founded 1894) is working for rights of Indians.

1902: Founding of African People's Organization (APO), a multiracial but mainly colored group which opposes segregation and works for improved education for Africans, Coloreds and Asians.

1910: African and APO leaders petition Britain to extend multiracial franchise to Transvaal and Free State, where it is considering granting representative government.

1908-09: White meet in national convention to set terms of South Africa Act of 1909, giving South Africa Union status in 1910. In response to the draft bill denying Africans a direct franchise, leading Africans call a South African native convention. This convention and the APO send a delegation to London which unsuccessfully tries to have the bill altered.

1910: Mr. John Tengo Jabavu, an African editor and leader, and Dr. Abdul Abdurahman, head of the APO, call unsuccessfully for a political union of black people.

1912: In the face of increasingly repressive legislation, prominent Africans meet in Bloemfontein to found the South African Native National Congress (renamed the African National Congress, or ANC, in 1925). This group works non-violently for African political rights and economic advancement until it is outlawed in 1960.

1913: Gandhi leads nonviolent mass march of Indians in protest of Immigration Act. Many are arrested and imprisoned.

1918: Mr. Clements Kadalie, an African, founds Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ITC) to fight for African industrial rights. By 1926 it has about 60,000 members, but it disintegrates by 1929 due to financial, legal, and organizational problems.

1920: Two previously formed Indian Congresses merge to form the South African Indian Congress.

1924: South Africa Communist Party (founded 1921) opens its membership to Africans, Coloreds and Asians, who eventually become a majority.

1928: A South African Federation of Non-European Trade Unions is organized with the help of the Communist Party, and flourishes for 4 years until ideological differences and organizational problems lead to dissolution of many unions.


1937-44: For 7 straight years the Natives Representatives Council, an advisory body which had been established by the government in 1937 in lieu of a direct franchise in Parliament, passes resolutions demanding the abolition of the pass laws. These and other resolutions are ignored by the authorities.

1938: Two new trade union associations emerge: the Coordinating Committee of African Trade Unions, with entirely African leadership; and the Joint Committee of African Trade Unions, with racially-mixed leadership.

1941: The Coordinating Committee of African Trade Unions is expanded into the Council of Non-European Trade Unions, which claims a membership of 158,000. African trade union movement begins to decline after 1945 due to many factors including its lack of official status and power, fluctuating membership (417)
due to the migratory labor system, inability of many members to pay dues, and inexperienced organizers.

1943: An increasingly frustrated ANC declares the pass laws to be “enemy No. 1” of the African people.

In response to Government establishment of a Coloured Advisory Council, and fears of further segregation of their group, Coloured leaders form the Anti-Coloured Affairs Department movement (Anti-CAD).

The Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM) is established on a federal basis, with Anti-CAD, the African People’s Organization, and parts of the (Coloured) Teachers League of South Africa as constituent members. The organization later becomes known as the Unity Movement of South Africa.

1944: Many younger ANC members form a youth league within the Congress to press for more militant opposition to discriminatory laws. The leaders of this group include Oliver Tambo, Nelson Mandela, Govan Mbeki, and Walter Sisulu. They are supported by the Congress Women’s League. A breakaway group from the ANC forms the African Democratic Party, also urging increased activism.

1946: Natives Representative Council adjourns itself sine die in protest of Government’s lack of response to its objections to many laws.

Indian Congress leaders establish passive resistance councils to fight the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Acts. They refuse to accept the limited indirect representation given them in Parliament.

1948: The Nationalist Party, mainly Afrikaner, is elected to the Government on a platform of apartheid. A variety of laws which systematically institutionalize white supremacy are passed in the following years; this gives rise to new levels of resistance by the African majority.

1949: In November, serious riots by Africans occur, along the reef at Krugersdorp, Randfontein, and Newlands. A Government Commission of Enquiry admits that there was widespread resentment of the police, especially for its indiscriminate raiding for passes and liquor, and that housing and social, recreational, and educational facilities for Africans were inadequate. It still tries to claim, however, that “Communist propaganda” is responsible for the riots.

1950: In January more riots take place at Newclare and Benoni.

The Coloured Advisory Council resigns in protest against apartheid legislation. Leading African, Coloured, and Indian organizations join forces to organize “Freedom Day” on May 1, and urge Africans along the reef to stay home that day. Violence breaks out in which 18 Africans are killed, many from police gunfire, and over 30 are wounded.

On June 14 various groups demonstrate outside the House of Assembly against the suppression of Communism bill.

On June 26 nonwhite organizations call a national day of mourning and protest against recent legislation.

1951: As the lengthy constitutional struggle in which the Government seeks to remove the Cape Coloured direct franchise begins, 33 Coloured organizations with a membership of 30,000 hold a Coloured People’s Convention in Cape Town. The S.A. Coloured People’s Organization (later Congress) is formed to fight for retention of the Coloured vote in the Cape, and for full adult suffrage for all races.

In February a Cape Town meeting of 32 organizations, led by the ANC, the S.A. Indian Congress, and the African People’s Organization elect a Franchise Action Committee. Together with the Coloured People’s National Union a joint manifesto pledging resistance to racially oppressive policies is issued.

In July the national executive committees of the ANC and the S.A. Indian Congress set up a planning committee for a broad-based campaign against oppressive laws.

In December the ANC writes the Prime Minister reiterating its plea for direct representation of Africans in Government, and for the repeal of the pass laws, the Group Areas Act, the Separate Registration of Voters Act, and the cattle-calling policy in the reserves. It threatens mass defiance of the law if the laws are not changed. The Prime Minister replies that the Government has no intention of repealing the long-existing laws differentiating between white and black, but that it encourages Bantu initiative within the Bantu community. The ANC replies it has no alternative but to begin a peaceful campaign of opposition.

1952: April 6—Mass protest meetings held at many urban centers.

June 26—Defiance campaign is launched, in which volunteers are asked to violate mass laws and various segregation regulations, and then go to jail rather than pay fines. By the end of 1952 over 8,000 volunteers have been arrested and prisons are overcrowded.
October to November—Several riots occur. At Port Elizabeth, an arrest incident touches off large crowds of Africans who burn down several buildings in their township, set fire to the railway station, attack white officials, and stone ambulances and fire engines. Nine Africans and four whites die in the riots. In Johannesburg, in reaction to a rent increase, Africans stone a hostel and police. Police open fire killing four. At Kimberley Africans set fire to a beerhall and attack police, who open fire. The crowd sets fire to several official buildings, halls, and schools, and keeps firemen away by stoning them. Thirteen Africans are killed—11 by police bullets—and 78 are injured in East London, when police try to break up a meeting, they are stoned and open fire. The crowd kills two whites and sets fire to official buildings. Eight Africans are killed, one policeman and many Africans are injured. Smaller disturbances occur in Cape Town, Klerksdorp, and Durban.

A white organization, the Congress of Democrats, is formed to support aims of the nonwhite Congresses.

1953: A protest petition signed by over 155,000 Cape coloured people is submitted to Parliament but ignored.

March—Under the chairmanship of ex-Chief A. J. Luthuli, the ANC, Indian Congress, Coloured People's Organization, and the Congress of Democrats (collectively known as the Congress Alliance) meet to plan for future Congress of the People, and to initiate formulation of a freedom charter. In the next 2 years hundreds of meetings are held throughout the country to hear grievances and demands for the future. The Federation of S.A. Women and S.A. Congress of Trade Unions later join in support.

By September 18, 33 trade union officials and 80 other persons, including many black political leaders and many listed Communists of all races, have been banned under the Suppression of Communism Act. Chief Luthuli has his chieftainship removed when he refuses to quit the ANC, and is then elected president-general of the ANC. He and many other ANC, coloured and Indian leaders receive banning orders.

Students from South-West Africa studying in South Africa form a Progressive Organization to encourage nationalism in their own country. They work together with Herero Chiefs Council.

1954: Federation of South African Women, racially mixed but mainly African, is formed to fight injustices including the application of the pass laws to women.

June—the Transvaal or Johannesburg branches of the Congress organizations hold a “resist apartheid” conference to protect recent legislation.

1955: When the Trade Union Council of South Africa confines its membership to registered unions—thus excluding African unions under the new Industrial Conciliation Act—the S.A. Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) is formed with members from all races.

1956: The Federation of S.A. Women holds demonstrations against passes for women in several cities. After its leaders are refused an interview with the Prime Minister, about 10,000 members—nearly all Africans—gather in Pretoria to leave protest forms at the Prime Minister's office.

From 1956 on widespread opposition to the Bantu authorities system develops in the Transkei. Some areas send deputations to Pretoria, and the installments of some government-appointed chiefs are boycotted. Popular resentment of many government-appointed chiefs grows, and some are killed by angry mobs.

In December, police arrest 156 on charges of high treason including many leaders of Congress Alliance organizations. A year later 94 are actually brought to trial, but in 1958 the indictment is dropped. Thirty are then newly indicted for conspiracy to overthrow the state by violence and to substitute for it a Communist state or some other form of state. On March 29, 1961, the 30 are acquitted.

1957: Large numbers of demonstrations against passes for women, some resulting in violence, occur throughout the country in 1957 and 1958.
The Congress Alliance calls 1-day work boycott on June 26, the fifth anniversary of the launching of the defiance campaign. It is between 40 and 50 percent effective in Johannesburg, and somewhat less so in other cities.

Congress Alliance calls for boycott of certain nationalist controlled firms. Potato boycott, protesting farm labor conditions, makes considerable impact.

Ovamboland People's Organization (OPO) founded to work for rights of Ovambos in South-West Africa.

1958: In Snelshuwuland Reserve of Central Transvaal, the introduction of Bantu authorities and cattle-culling schemes provokes serious opposition to the Government. Some supporters of the Bantu authorities system are killed, and large scale riots result in the arrest of more than 330.

March 19—The ANC convenes a national workers' conference which is attended by more than 1,700 delegates and 2,000 observers. It decides to campaign for a minimum daily wage of R2, and for abolition of pass laws and the Group Areas Act. A stay-at-home demonstration is planned for April 14. The demonstration is not large as the Government temporarily prohibits all meetings of more than 10 Africans in urban areas, and imprisons many for the crime of inciting others to stay away from work to protest the laws of the land.

After a group known as the Africanists fails to gain control of the ANC, they break away under the leadership of Robert Sobukwe and form the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). With an emphasis on African nationalism rather than multiracial cooperation, the PAC plans for a program of "positive non-violence" to bring down the Government and result in majority rule.

December—ANC begins preparations for long struggle against the pass laws; it is hampered by renewed banings of its leaders.

1959: Large-scale riots break out in Natal. Many buildings are burned, several Africans are killed and injured, and thousands are arrested.

In objection to the banishment of Mrs. Elizabeth Mafekeng, a trade union and ANC leader, Coloured and African women or Paarl hold large demonstration which results in violence.

At December conference, ANC finalizes plans for major antipass campaign. They plan for deputation to authorities on the following March 31, and "African Freedom Day" demonstrations on April 15.

South-West African National Union (SWANU) established; it is initially linked closely with the OPO and Herero Chiefs Council.

1960: PAC anticipates ANC campaign by calling for nonviolent mass turn-in of passes, inviting arrest, on March 21. Large crowds gather in many cities and widespread clashes with police occur. In the most violent single event, at Sharpeville police open fire on an unarmed crowd killing 69 and wounding 178 Africans. In various riots and demonstrations between March 21 and April 19 a total of 83 civilians and three policemen lose their lives.

In response to March 21 massacres, ANC and PAC call for a day of mourning on March 28. Urging Africans to stay home from work with great success in Cape Town, Johannesburg, and Port Elizabeth. Africans in Cape Town boycott work for over a week.

March 30—Government declares state of emergency. The same day in Cape Town 30,000 Africans march to center of city in protest. During the emergency period, which lasts officially until August 31, 11,279 Africans, 36 coloureds, 90 Asians, and 98 whites are detained under emergency regulations. At last 6,800 Africans are jailed for pass or other offenses. Under new legislation the ANC and PAC are banned on April 8.

1961: January—African employees of bus company serving townships of Port Elizabeth go on strike. They are supported by the African community, which walks or uses other means of transportation for nearly 5 weeks. A settlement is ultimately reached.

February—Coloured leaders meet to plan means of opposition to apartheid. They call a convention in Cape Town for the following June. When the government bans all meetings at this time, the date is changed to July 7-10. However, as delegates are arriving on July 6 the government bans the convention from meeting in nine districts in and around Cape Town. The convention secretly moves to a farm outside the prohibited areas. It pledges to work for a nonracialist South Africa, not to collaborate with the nationalist government, denounces the apartheid laws, and calls for a multiracial national convention to plan the nation's future.

March—An "all-in" conference, organized mainly by former members of the banned ANC, is held despite the arrest of 13 planners 5 days before the meeting.
The 13 are charged with furthering the aims of an illegal organization, but are later acquitted. The conference calls for a national convention of all races by May 31, 1961, and pledges to organize nationwide demonstrations and positive actions if the convention is not held. A National Action Council, led by Nelson Mandela but with other members remaining secret, is named.

May 29-31—National Action Council distributes thousands of leaflets calling on Africans, Coloureds, and Asians to stay home as South Africa becomes a republic, Government emergency regulations, widespread raiding of meetings, and the refusal of ex-PAC members to support the demonstration make it a comparative failure. A warrant is issued for the arrest of Nelson Mandela, who evades arrest for 16 months.

June—After liberal white groups join in call for national convention representing all sectors of the population, Prime Minister Verwoerd totally rejects the idea, saying “It would be nothing but a breeding ground for Communist conditioning with the object of introducing black domination in South Africa, so that communism can then take over and make that vote worthless.”

The Yu Chi Chan Club, a small group of Peking-oriented coloured people, is planning means of revolution.

Former ANC members meet secretly in Bechuanaland to plan new tactics of resistance. Later publications indicate their goal has advanced from the repeal of oppressive laws to a total undermining of the status quo. Though the major emphasis is still to be on mass political action a military wing, Umkonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) is formed to undertake sabotage and eventually guerrilla warfare.

Many ex-PAC members form a military wing, Pogo (“pure”) to work toward revolution leading toward an African Socialist democratic state. It has greatest support in Western Cape.

African People’s Democratic Union of Southern Africa (APDUSA) is formed as political vanguard of the Unity Movement of South Africa. Many leaders go into exile. The organization works mainly among African peasants.

OPO is expanded into South-West African People’s Organization (SWAPO).

Former Chief A. J. Luthuli is awarded Nobel Peace Prize.


1961–64: Frequent acts of sabotage occur, directed at diverse targets including government buildings, powerlines, railroads, and homes of pro-government chiefs. Most are attributed to Pogo, Spear of the Nation, the National Committee for Liberation, and the African Resistance Movement. On March 10, 1964, the Minister of Justice says there have been 203 serious cases of sabotage up to that time. Pogo carries out sporadic killing of whites and chiefs during the period.

Large numbers of black political leaders go into exile. Exiled members of the ANC and PAC set up offices in various African and European cities. These two organizations work together briefly in a South Africa united front, but this splits in 1962. The ANC begins training freedom fighters to fight in southern Africa, while the PAC concentrates mainly on organizing within South Africa for revolution.

1962: Leaders of SWAPO and SWANU begin training guerrilla forces for the liberation of South-West Africa (later known as Namibia).

National Committee for Liberation, a multiracial body including many white intellectuals, is formed and is believed to be allied with the Spear of the Nation. An African resistance movement, comprised mainly of whites, plans sabotage.

September—The Congress of Democrats is banned.

November—Major rioting by Africans erupts in Paarl, and at least five are killed by police bullets.

1963: July—17 wanted antigovernment leaders, including many top ANC officers, are arrested in a police raid at Rivonia. Many ANC and Spear of the Nation leaders, including Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, are sentenced to life imprisonment for planning violence.

Ex-chief Luthuli’s banning order is tightened and he is confined to a rural area of Zululand, where he remains until his death in a plane crash in 1967. Robert Sobukwe’s detention is continued by parliamentary action and he is moved to Robben Island.
1963-64: Hundreds of Africans throughout the country are given sentences averaging 3 years for being members of the banned ANC or PAC.

1964: May 10—The Minister of Justice says that 562 people charged with sabotage have fled the country up to this point. Thousands are suspected to have left the country for military training; 150 of those who have returned have been captured.

Thirty-three members of Spear of the Nation are sentenced to long prison terms, while three others are executed.

According to the Minister of Justice, as of June 10, 1964, 202 Poqo members have been found guilty of murder, 12 of attempted murder or conspiracy to murder; 385 of sabotage, 126 of leaving the country illegally, and 820 of lesser crimes.

Eleven members of the Yu Chi Chan Club, including its leaders, are imprisoned for belonging to the banned organization.

1964-71: More than 1,648 persons, mostly Africans, are convicted under the principle security laws during this period, according to the government. Trials of ANC, PAC, Spear of the Nation, and Poqo members are frequent.

1966: Mr. Toivo Ja Toiva, leader of SWAPO, is arrested by South African police. Sabotage and guerrilla attacks continue in Namibia to the present. Trials in South Africa of captured SWAPO members stir worldwide outcry.

By the end of 1966, in the Eastern Cape region alone 1,328 people have been arrested under laws related to security of the state, according to the Minister of Justice. Most had been charged with participation in the illegal ANC.

1966-67: 15 men are sentenced to death for committing sabotage and/or murder while members of Poqo.

1967: September—The OAU decides to concentrate its aid to liberation movements in South Africa-controlled areas to the ANC and SWAPO.

1967 to present: South Africans, particularly ANC members, participate in guerrilla activities against the illegal government of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). In September 1967 South African security forces are sent to Southern Rhodesia to help fight guerrillas.

1968: May—12 PAC members, trying to infiltrate into South Africa through Mozambique, are attacked by Portuguese forces.

August—Zambian Government bans the PAC, claiming it engages in futile activities which dissipate the efforts to combat white supremacy.

1968-71: ANC leaflets are from time to time distributed anonymously in South Africa.

1969: Robert Sobukwe of the PAC is moved from Robben Island to Kimberly and ordered to remain there.

The increasing trend toward black self-reliance rather than participation in liberal white organizations on the part of politically active Africans within South Africa is demonstrated by the formation of the black South Africa Students' Organization (SASO).

October—22 Africans, including Winnie Mandela (wife of Nelson Mandela) are charged under the Suppression of Communism Act with furthering the aims of the ANC. They are acquitted in February 1970, but are immediately rearrested and detained under the Terrorism Act. Nineteen are subsequently charged with conspiring to overthrow the government by violence. They are acquitted, but are all served with banning orders anyway. One is tried separately and convicted under the Terrorism Act.

1970: Executive Committee of the World Council of Churches announces monetary grants to liberation movements, to be used for nonmilitary purposes.

1971: May—SASO organizes "Black Consciousness Revival" at the university of the north.

In mid-1971, ANC is reported to have 2,000 guerrillas, several hundred of whom are fighting with ZAPU forces in Zimbabwe.

1971-72: Thousands of African workers go on strike in Namibia. Despite government intimidation and the arrest of leaders, many strikers continue to hold out and much international attention is focussed on the plight of Namibians.

1972: 13 members of the Unity Movement of South Africa are convicted, as the long trial at Pietermaritzburg comes to an end.
The Governments of Gabon and the United States share a wide range of common objectives and policies. And there has been extensive American investment ($60 million) in the development of the country's mineral and petroleum resources, with additional major investments likely. Gabonese frustration with the American Government's failure to respond positively to its many requests for bilateral assistance have strained relations periodically, but the underlying base of common political and economic interests has prevented any serious deterioration. The two countries have been in agreement on many United Nations issues.

**Gabon's relations with its neighbors**

Gabon is one of the moderate states of Africa, and has actively promoted regional political stability.

Gabon's relations with the Cameroon are good, with no problems outstanding between them. Gabon participates with the Cameroon in several regional economic and financial activities, most notably in the common financial structure of the Communauté Francophone Africaine: the two countries also carry on a substantial trade within the framework of the Central African Economic and Customs Union (UDEAC). Although Gabon has a different political orientation than its other two neighbors, Congo-Brazzaville and Equatorial Guinea, this difference has not interfered with the maintenance of correct relations with them. Brazzaville President Marien Ngouabi visited Libreville in March and was warmly received; Gabon took the occasion to name a new resident Ambassador to Brazzaville. Gabon's manganese production, extremely important for Gabon's economy, continues to exit without difficulty through the Congo-Brazzaville port of Pointe Noire, symbolizing the economic ties between the two countries. Gabon and Equatorial Guinea remain in close consultation over some nagging border problems, but these have not seriously troubled relations. President Bongo stresses regional stability, not only for political and diplomatic reasons but because he sees it as a necessary factor in encouraging economic development. His interest has not only found expression in maintaining good relations with his neighbors, but also in his efforts to help resolve other regional problems, such as recent quarrels between Congo-Kinshasa and Congo-Brazzaville, where Bongo played a key role in effecting a reconciliation.

**Peace Corps**

The Peace Corps served in Gabon from 1962 to the end of 1967, when President Bongo asked it to leave. The official reason given was that Gabon could no longer afford to pay its share of Peace Corps expenses. During the 6 years in Gabon the Peace Corps representatives, who numbered over 50 at times, helped build schools and health dispensaries, taught English and math, and provided assistance in nutrition, public health, fishing, agriculture, and technical training. The total cost to the United States was about $3.3 million.
APPENDIX 29

TEXT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S REPLY TO CHAIRMAN DIGGS' ACTION MANIFESTO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

HON. CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR.
Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In our letter of January 5, 1972, we indicated our intention to study closely the points you brought out in your Action Manifesto of December 14, 1971. We have found this a comprehensive document which provides thought-provoking ideas regarding virtually all aspects of U.S. relations with southern Africa. I am pleased to offer the following comments.

In the complex area of southern Africa conflicting interests often make it particularly difficult to define policies that will best meet the total requirements of the United States. Your manifesto brings this out most forcefully.

In responding to your many points, we believe it pertinent first to mention several actions of the U.S. Government responsive to African concerns not mentioned in the manifesto.

The U.S. Government, for example:

- Has led the field in actively discouraging investment in Namibia (South West Africa);
- Supported the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on Namibia (the United Kingdom and France abstained);
- Continues to maintain the embargo on the sale of arms and military equipment to southern Africa, despite the actions of certain other governments and heavy domestic pressure for the resumption of such sales;
- Continues to maintain, despite concern over the Indian Ocean, the ban on U.S. naval visits to South Africa because of the problem of exposure of U.S. personnel to discriminatory treatment there;
- Gives total support for U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia, except where this has been limited by act of Congress;
- Has encouraged and facilitated a greater degree of black American contact with South Africans of all racial groupings;
- Has upgraded the level of U.S. diplomatic representation to Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland with the assignment of an Ambassador;
- Has developed a sound AID program designed to help the three black majority ruled states advance their economic and political independence; and
- Is not involved in the Cabora Bassa project.

In commenting on the manifesto itself, I will group our remarks by subject and attempt to present the basic rationale for our position and strategy.

GENERAL

Policy on southern Africa clearly affects our entire stance in Africa. A major policy review was conducted 2 years ago, and its basic elements are under constant reexamination. In this reexamination, we welcome inputs such as yours. Recommendations from private organizations are also appreciated. The African Advisory Council, established to advise the Department of matters pertaining to U.S. policy in Africa, has been most helpful (manifesto: point 52).

SOUTH AFRICA

Discrimination on the basis of race is the central element in the policies and programs of the white minority South African Government, and it permeates all aspects of life. That this is anathema to the United States we have made amply clear, both in our public utterances and in our bilateral discussions with the
South African Government. President Nixon has specifically stated that we cannot condone the violence to human dignity implicit in apartheid (points 1 and 3).

In this situation, the crucial question is how the United States can effectively support its political position on behalf of the African majority and its rights.

Our basic approach to this is through communication—communication not only with the South African Government but with all elements of the South African population. Our Embassy and U.S. information officers are in active contact with leaders in the African, colored, and Indian communities. They are constantly working to expand these contacts, and the extension of USIS facilities to serve SOWETO is currently under consideration (points 20 and 22).

In our discussions with the South African Government, we seek to bring home the points that they are dangerously and unacceptable out of step with the rest of the continent; that change is essential to their own future in Africa; and that it is best to adjust before internal and external pressures become unmanageable.

The Embassy and consulates general in South Africa play a central role in all of this activity, and we believe our ability to make contact with all elements of the South African population is substantially enhanced by the extent and level of our diplomatic and consular representation. Any downgrading of representation would lessen our impact, our insight into the problems of the area, and our awareness of opportunities to make a constructive contribution toward their solution (point 2).

Our Embassy and consulates general themselves provide examples of racial integration. They follow fair employment practices, are seeking to recruit additional nonwhite staff, and provide informational and cultural programs that cut across racial lines. There has been no change from the policy on integrated entertainment laid down under the administration of President Kennedy and enunciated in a statement made by Ambassador Satterthwaite in South Africa on July 4, 1963. Although we have at present no black American personnel in South Africa, we intend to make future personnel assignments solely on the basis of ability and without regard to race (points 23 and 38).

In all of their activities in South Africa, our Embassy and consulate general personnel conduct themselves in keeping with our opposition to apartheid and are particularly careful to avoid actions which would be seen as condoning that discriminatory system. It is not desirable at this time to set more specific guidelines governing their activities, as contact and communication with as broad a spectrum of South African life as possible is an essential part of their function (point 24).

As you have pointed out in your manifesto, many questions have been raised with regard to the business and other material interests which the United States has in South Africa. In weighing possible courses of action with regard to these interests, the fundamental considerations must of necessity be the practicality and the consequences of the actions concerned.

We believe the current efforts of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to improve the situation of its nonwhite workers in South Africa will have a constructive impact on attitudes and practices in that country and specifically in the South African scientific community. Your visit was very helpful in this connection. On the other hand, removal of the NASA tracking station would harm the U.S. space program without leading to any constructive consequences in South Africa and with respect to the South African racial situation (point 25).

Similarly, termination of all nuclear cooperation with South Africa might create problems in the area of international inspection and control without leading to any constructive consequence in South African racial or other relations (point 40).

Visa retaliation on a quid pro quo basis would be incompatible not only with our general policy of encouraging travel to the United States but with our policy of communication and with the open nature of our society (point 42).

The general area of trade raises a number of interesting questions. The export of American products to South Africa stimulates production and provides jobs in this country. Eximbank guarantees and insurance constitute assistance to American exporters. The withholding of American exports from South Africa would merely result in the diversion of South African purchases to other suppliers. Eximbank does not extend loans to South African borrowers (points 27 and 33).

We do, of course, maintain and faithfully observe the embargo on sale of arms and military equipment to South Africa. Extension of that embargo to
cover all sales to the South African defense forces or to prohibit the sale of light aircraft to civilian purchasers in South Africa would not, in our estimation, serve the basic purpose of the embargo, which was related to the conduct of military operations and maintenance of internal security (point 36).

In an effort to clarify a gray area in the arms embargo, the decision was made that no major transport aircraft will be sold to the South African defense force and that sales will be limited to small, executive aircraft for military VIP transport—aircraft which would be difficult to adapt for any other use. The South Africans have apparently found this ruling too restrictive and have purchased their executive aircraft from other sources (point 36).

We have suggested to the Department of Defense that it might usefully review other parts of points 36 and 37 and provide you with their comments.

In the area of imports, we ban the importation of goods produced with convict or forced labor. I understand that the Treasury Department is examining the question of whether nonwhite labor can be categorized as forced labor. With regard to the sugar quota, the Congress did not increase the South African share last year, and all quota allocations are to come up for review in 1975. I might add that while the South African sugar quota was maintained essentially unchanged in the congressional action last year, the quotas for certain developing black African countries were substantially increased (Swaziland, Mauritius, and Madagascar), and quotas were established for others which had not had them before (Uganda and Malawi) (points 34, 35, and 48).

U.S. private investment in South Africa has come under extensive criticism as representing support for the white South African Government and its system of apartheid. Arguments can be made on both sides of this matter. While it can be said that U.S. plants do make a contribution to the South African economy, it is clear that the investment possibilities in South Africa are so attractive that in most cases withdrawal of American investment would have no effect other than to shift the activity concerned to South African or other foreign hands. I question the benefit in withdrawing U.S. business, which is increasingly conscious of its responsibilities toward nonwhite workers in South Africa, simply to leave room for businesses of other countries less concerned (point 27).

As you know, we do not encourage private U.S. investment in South Africa, as we do in the cases of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. OPIC does not operate in South Africa at all (points 45 and 50).

As you have suggested, American firms can make a constructive contribution to improvement of the conditions and prospects of nonwhites. Following the catalytic action of Polaroid a year ago and the efforts of your subcommittee during the past year, attention of American industry has been focused on the question of business practices in South Africa. Concrete improvements have been made along the lines you have suggested, and further constructive progress is expected. We believe improvement in nonwhite wages, training opportunities, worker-management relations, etc., can provide an important impetus to South African and other firms to take similar measures, thus accelerating improvement in the status of nonwhite on a broader scale. We urge U.S. firms to move ahead in this area. At the same time, however, U.S. legislation on fair employment practices applies in South Africa only to American employees and others hired in the United States, and cannot be applied to South African employees of American firms without amendment (points 29, 30, and 53).

The role and functions of the mission's economic/commercial officers are viewed in light of the above considerations, and a serious and continuing attempt is made to limit their activities to those which are clearly in the U.S. interest and to avoid the appearance of giving support to the South African Government or to the system of apartheid. (Point 26.)

The question of the Bantustans is a complex one. On one hand, their establishment represents a flagrantly unequal and unjust allocation of territory, resources, and wealth among the African majority receiving a disproportionately small share. On the other hand, in the absence of alternatives, many black South Africans believe the arrangement offers the only real possibility, at this time, for political as well as economic advancement. Thus, while the Bantustan system is clearly undesirable as a final solution to the South African problem, many responsible Africans are seeking to make use of it for the advancement of their peoples while still not abandoning the hope ultimately for equal political participation in a unified South Africa. (Point 21.)
The problem of Namibia is highlighted by recent events. The international status of the territory is established; the interest of the world community is direct and insistent; and yet the South African Government remains in complete and defiant control. In keeping with the conclusions of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2145, the United States considers South Africa’s presence in and administration of Namibia illegal, and we are careful to refrain from any acts or dealings with the South African Government which would imply recognition of the legality of, or lend support to, its presence and administration there. (Point 43.)

Under this rubric, we do not plan to apply to Namibia any bilateral treaty we have with South Africa, and we would oppose any South African attempt to represent Namibia in international meetings or conferences. Refugees from Namibia are entitled to seek political asylum in the United States on the same basis as those from other parts of southern Africa. (Point 43, pars. 4 and 5.)

As the International Court of Justice opinion itself recognized, fundamental considerations in any action taken with regard to Namibia concern the interest and welfare of the people of the area. It is important, for example, to have access to the territory so we can know conditions and developments there and base our actions on the realities of the situation. Similarly, calls for military action and economic sanctions against Namibia must be examined in light of the effect they would have on the people of the territory. (Point 43, pars. 3 and 5.)

Other practical considerations relate to the rights and interests of the Tsumeb Corp. and any other U.S. business interests which were established in Namibia legally and properly prior to termination of the League of Nations mandate in 1966. We would not consider it legal or equitable to regard Tsumeb’s concessions in Namibia as invalid or to prohibit the importation into the United States of products from this or other American enterprises in the same situation in Namibia. The question of whether U.S. firms doing business in Namibia should be allowed tax deductions or credits for moneys paid to the South African administering authority is currently under examination by the Treasury Department, and a decision is expected shortly. (Point 43, pars. 1, 2, and 3.)

These measures do not resolve the problem, however, and it is a difficult task to devise a course of action which will in fact lead to a solution on the basis of self-determination for the people of Namibia. What is needed first is a framework within which the problem itself can be discussed between South Africa and the United Nations. Some channel or mechanism is necessary, possibly through the office of the United Nations Secretary General. Such a possibility is suggested by a recent Security Council resolution. (Point 43, par. (c).)

The Rhodesian problem is a matter of serious concern to the entire international community. The community recognizes that responsibility for the situation and its resolution rests with the United Kingdom, which is the acknowledged sovereign in Rhodesia. Despite the political arrests and violent disturbances that have occurred since its presence in the territory, the British commission appointed to determine the acceptability of the Home/Smith settlement proposals to the people of Rhodesia is continuing its efforts. Accordingly, we believe it would be neither appropriate nor helpful for us to comment at this time either on the proposals themselves or on the reactions of the Rhodesians toward them. We will continue to follow developments in Rhodesia most closely and will adopt such course as appears most constructive as the situation evolves. (Point 54.)

Portugal and its African territories represent a classic case of conflicting U.S. interests and the problems and limitations imposed on the U.S. Government by the policies of another state. Our military assistance to Portugal, running currently about $1 million a year, is designed to enable that state to carry out its responsibilities under NATO. (Point 6.) The use of the Azores base is important to U.S. security interests, not only for antisubmarine warfare in the North Atlantic but also to enhance this Nation’s ability to deal with crises in the Mediterranean and Near Eastern areas. Extension of the Azores base agreement was therefore of considerable importance to the United States. As this continued arrangements which had existed since World War II, and as it contained no new
U.S. defense commitments to Portugal, the matter was handled by executive agreement. (Point 55, paras. (b) 8, (c), and (e).) The economic assistance that we will provide to Portugal does not, in our view, contribute to Portugal's ability to continue its wars in Africa. None of the assistance is military in nature, and all of the development projects for which assistance was discussed are in Metropolitan Portugal.

Very little of the assistance that we have offered is in grant aid. The $400 million figure for Ex-Im Bank credits, for example, represents the global value of a number of development projects the Portuguese Government has under consideration for construction of bridges, railroad facilities, roads, schools, etc., in Metropolitan Portugal. The figure is only illustrative and does not represent a specific aid package. (Point 55, par. (d).) Ex-Im financing is intended to help U.S. firms and contractors compete for contracts and as such is designed to improve the U.S. balance-of-payments situation by fostering U.S. exports. A key criterion in the extension of such export loans is the ability of the foreign state to repay. Portugal's credit rating is good.

While the availability of Ex-Im Bank financing enhances the competitiveness of U.S. exporters, there is no assurance that Ex-Im support will actually increase the U.S. share of the Portuguese market. Ex-Im facilities were available for Portugal before the Azores agreement was extended, yet the U.S. share of the Portuguese market has not been impressive. Meaningful comparison of the global Ex-Im Bank figure for Portugal with financing extended to Africa and other areas is therefore difficult. (Points 55(b), 11.1.b, 11.1.c, 2, 4, and 6.)

As for the rest of the agreement, we have offered Portugal a 2-year Public Law 480 program in the amount of $15 million per year. The program provides credits for the importation of U.S. goods (in this case agricultural commodities) by Portugal. The only items of direct grant aid for Portugal are the following:

A. The use of an oceanographic ship which is being loaned on a no-cost basis;
B. $1 million for educational development projects in Metropolitan Portugal;
C. $5 million worth of nonmilitary excess equipment, also for use in Metropolitan Portugal. The excess equipment will be calculated at acquisition cost—what it cost the U.S. Government when new—not the current value. If comparisons are to be made, this limited amount of grant aid could be compared with the $61.6 million in grant assistance for Africa in 1971.

With regard to U.S. policy on Portugal's African territories, we have made clear our view that the time for colonialism is past and that self-determination holds the only hope for a viable long-range Portuguese relationship with these territories. We have repeatedly urged the need for peaceful negotiations to explore ways in which progress can be made toward this goal and toward the economic, social, and political advancement of the peoples of the African territories. We maintain normal relations with Portugal, a NATO Ally, and our conduct of these relations is enhanced by maintenance of full diplomatic representation in Lisbon. (Points 2, 11, and 14.)

In order to avoid any contribution to military activity in the Portuguese territories, we have since 1961 maintained an embargo on the sale of arms and military equipment to Portugal for use in Africa. We believe this has been an effective policy, and despite allegations to the contrary, we have no evidence that U.S. arms supplied since 1961 under Portugal's assurances against African use have in fact been used in Africa. Suspension of military sales to Portugal would degrade Portuguese ability to carry its NATO responsibilities but would have little effect on Portuguese policies and activities in Africa. (Points 7, 8, 9, and 12.)

The U.S. Government has not supplied any herbicides or herbicide equipment to Portugal, nor has it provided Portugal with training, advice, or other assistance on the use of herbicides. Antiplant chemicals (herbicides) with primarily a military use are subject to munitions control licensing. No such license has been issued to Portugal in recent years. Herbicides for primarily agricultural use may be purchased in normal commercial transactions and are not the subject of special licensing arrangements. It should be noted that Portugal, itself, manufactures herbicides. (Point 13.)

On the economic side, we have no interests in Portuguese Guinea, and U.S. investment in Angola and Mozambique is modest. We neither encourage nor discourage investment in the Portuguese territories, but we point out to potential investors the political and security problems of the area. OPIC has been involved on a limited scale in Angola and Mozambique, but on the specific basis that any investment must serve to benefit the economic and social advancement...
of the indigenous population. Ex-Im operates on the same basis. We believe that as they become increasingly aware of political considerations, American business could exert a constructive influence in these territories (points 27, 29, and 45).

Our economic officers play an important role in identifying such possibilities, and they are active in encouraging U.S. business to improve wages, training facilities, and other arrangements affecting African workers. Actual investigation of the practices of U.S. companies abroad lies outside our competence, but encouragement of such firms to adopt enlightened policies can be and is being pursued (points 26 and 31).

LIBERATION GROUPS

We recognize what is at stake in the question of U.S. relations with liberation groups. The problems are similar to those faced two decades ago in dealing with liberation groups in various African colonial territories. While we wish to encourage peaceful resolution of independence struggles, failure to give support to liberation groups leaves the field to other world powers, thereby increasing their influence.

These issues have been carefully weighed in determining our policy. We have concluded that as a government, we cannot endorse or be a party to the use of force of the liberation movements, although we are not unmindful of the problems of individuals affected by the conflicts in southern Africa (points 4, 15, 16, 18, and 19).

We extend assistance to southern African refugees, both directly and through international organizations, although, as you know, budgetary restrictions limit these activities. The administration has not been able for the past 2 years to get congressional approval for a contribution to the U.N. Trust Fund (points 19 and 53).

I appreciate the opportunity to make this general survey of problems of concern to both of us. The observations and suggestions in your manifesto are welcome, and you can be sure we will have them in mind as we move forward in southern African matters.

Sincerely,

DAVID M. ABSHIRE,
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations.
APPENDIX 30

REPORT ON THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION TO GUINEA-BISSAU,
APRIL 2-8, 1972

"The United Nations has been present in an area which has been lib-
erated from colonial domination by the military and political efforts of
the indigenous forces led by PAIGC. The United Nations, represented
by the committee's special mission, spent approximately 130 hours in
the liberated areas of Guinea (Bissau), which was an unprecedented
event in the annals of United Nations efforts to eliminate colonialism,
and it is now for the General Assembly and the committee to assess the
legal, political, constitutional and administrative consequences of the
fact that the United Nations flag, the symbol of peace, has flown in the
villages, schools and fields of Guinea (Bissau). For our part, the mem-
ers of the mission wish to stress that, as a result of our presence in
Guinea (Bissau), the situation can never be the same again."

The words are those of Horatio Sevilla-Borja of Ecuador reporting on the
experiences of a three-man special United Nations mission he led to the liberated
areas of Guinea (Bissau), a west African territory administered by Portugal.
The mission [whose presence in the territory was denied by the Portuguese
mission to the United Nations] visited liberated areas of the territory from
April 2-8 at the invitation of the national liberation movement, the Partido
Africom da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC).

Mr. Sevilla-Borja said that the group had traveled mostly on foot, day and
night, during the 7-day journey and had been able to establish direct contacts
with the people of the territory and had observed various reconstruction pro-
grams being undertaken by the liberation movements, as well as witnessing
firsthand the social, economic, educational, and other conditions in the liberated
areas visited.

The other members of the mission, all represented on the United Nations
special committee of 24 on decolonization, were Folke Löfgren of Sweden and
Kamel Bellharia of Tunisia.

The special committee itself visited Africa for 3 weeks in April and opened
its meetings in Conakry, Guinea, on April 10 by hearing an interim oral report
from members of the three-man mission.

PAIGC IN CONTROL

Mr. Sevilla-Borja related how the mission had accomplished "its serious and
highly unorthodox assignment" in spite of the backwardness of the area, the
existing state of war, and the fact that the members of the mission were not
physically conditioned "to making treks of up to 15 hours at a time".

"The mission" said Mr. Sevilla-Borja, "gathered a great deal of information
in the form of photographs, films, documents and sound recording and will, in
due course, submit a detailed report with specific recommendations. For the
present, it will confine itself to recounting its first impressions, the most important
of which is perhaps the actual existence of the liberated areas despite the denials
of the Portuguese authorities. The military and administrative forces of PAIGC
are in control of the situation and are the real masters of the areas which the
mission visited. Continually on the move for 7 days, the mission witnessed
everywhere the presence of the national guerrillas fighting to free the people and
establish an administrative organization for the community. It is remarkable
that, after only a few years of fighting and in spite of inferior strength, PAIGC
has been able to take over vast areas of the territory from the illegal occupants.

"Even more remarkable are PAIGC's efforts to organize community life and
to create a new and forward-looking society. The schools operated by PAIGC
provide a complete education for the children of Guinea (Bissau), many of
whom were born in liberated areas and have never seen a Portuguese. They,
too, are called upon to take part in the defense and reconstruction of the territory and live under the constant threat of air raids, since the schools appear to be the favorite targets of the Portuguese. Bilateral cooperation in education is most important; the children use textbooks in Portuguese, printed and provided by the Government of Sweden. PAIGC has established various hospitals which not only attend to war injuries, including those inflicted on the civilian population, but also carry out preventive campaigns against diseases endemic to the region and train middle-level medical personnel to form a new kind of army working for the people. It has organized popular stores where the people trade by barter, thereby helping them to discourage overproduction of traditional crops such as rice, and to acquire the formerly unobtainable products they require. It has established a system of justice based on people's courts. Their needs are, however, still great and it is to be hoped that the United Nations, and particularly the specialized agencies, will find their way to meeting them.

"Mention should be made of the attitude of the Government of Portugal toward the visit. Not only has it made every effort at the diplomatic level to prevent the mission's entry into the territory, ironically alleging that the visit constituted a violation of international law, but it has also mobilized all its military resources in order to thwart the mission. The committee should give due consideration to such facts. Portuguese military activities have been greatly intensified since the membership of the mission had been announced in New York. The Portuguese authorities have had no concern for the lives of the representatives of the committee, and the highest Portuguese authorities have gone to Guinea (Bissau) to direct operations. Fortunately, because of the capacity of the national guerrillas and the fact that the Portuguese can operate only in the air, the mission was able to accomplish its task and return safely. The song sung by the children in school, "Guerrilla on the ground. Portuguese in the sky" describes the situation perfectly. The mission has also seen the atrocities committed by the Portuguese forces. Villages have been burned and crops and cattle destroyed by costly air raids; there are constant reconnaissance flights; powerful unexploded bombs lay in the fields, dropped by modern aircraft. In this connection, it should be recalled that Portugal is a backward and poor country which does not even produce toy planes. If the international community is incapable of preventing certain powers from continuing to provide aid and modern military equipment to Portugal, it can do little to achieve its aims. The fact that the visit was successful despite Portugal is yet another proof of Portugal's weakness.

"From my experiences in Guinea (Bissau) I know that the territory will one day become independent. The committee should find ways and means to assist the people of Guinea (Bissau) in their struggle."

TOWARD A NEW AND JUST SOCIETY

Mr. Löfgren, the Swedish member of the mission, said it was too early to judge the political and juridical consequences of the experience. The most important aspect of the mission, as he saw it, had been the direct contact with the work done by PAIGC in the liberated areas.

Mr. Löfgren added: "It is very moving to see for oneself what a strong will and noble ambition can do in extremely difficult conditions and with very limited means. I feel that that combination of boundless energy and humanism is sufficiently exceptional in the contemporary world to deserve general recognition and support. Heroic though the military struggle is, however, the Swedish Government perhaps feels even more admiration for the determination to build a new and just society in dignity. For that reason I am in a position to formulate the following quite preliminary recommendation: the mission visited a school where the children had given a musical performance so remarkable that it deserved the widest possible audience. Could not the United Nations invite that troupe of children to New York? Such a project could have a great impact and make everyone understand what admirable work is being done in the liberated territories.

"Second. it was my unfortunate duty to mention the mission's shocking contacts with Portuguese repression. What is called at the United Nations the 'administering Power' does nothing but spread terror in the liberated areas, especially through aerial bombings, parachute drops of armed detachments ordered to burn and destroy everything in their path, isolated fortresses in the middle of the liberated areas and minefields. It is too early to draw specific conclusions on the subject, but it might be considered that it is the duty of the United Nations
to be more active or to obtain the necessary means to observe and verify these ignoble acts and denounce them regularly.

"Mr. Sevilla-Borja has already described the Portuguese activities directed against the mission, but it should be added that before the mission's departure none of its members, naive as they were, dreamed that it was possible to flout the will of a large majority of the members of the United Nations in such a flagrant, aggressive, and shocking manner, especially since the members of the mission came not as soldiers, but as peaceful representatives of the United Nations.

"Third, I wish to mention the possibility of helping PAIGC in its admirable work. It is well known that for 3 years the Swedish Government has been providing PAIGC with humanitarian assistance, which in 1972 will amount to the equivalent of almost a million dollars. I have certainly not gone on the mission to see how that money has been used, but what I have seen has convinced me that PAIGC deserves to receive much more assistance from abroad, that it is quite capable of administering and using such assistance to the best advantage, despite very difficult conditions, and that these facts should be recognized and taken into consideration by the United Nations, by its specialized agencies and by governments. This is a duty of international solidarity.

"In conclusion, I may say that the Swedish Government is proud to have participated in such a mission, which has strengthened the bonds of friendship that linked it to PAIGC; it also regards that participation as a contribution to the urgent work of the United Nations in the sphere of decolonization, which was designed to restore respect for the highest human values."

PORTUGUESE AIRCRAFT ATTACK

The third member of the mission, Mr. Belkhiria of Tunisia, reported that for a whole week, the group lived with the freedom fighters and the hard-working Guinean people.

"We shared their daily life, their food and their water; we shared their difficulties, their labor, their cares and their problems. But we also shared their enthusiasm, their hopes and their exaltation. In short, we are united with them for better and for worse.

"During the whole of the mission's stay in the liberated territory," Mr. Belkhiria said, "jet aircraft, which were Portuguese in name only, did not cease their harassment, their reconnaissance flights and their bombings throughout those parts of the territory where the mission was supposed to be. These aircraft disappeared only to be replaced by giant helicopters recently delivered to the Portuguese troops to destroy whole villages of peaceful peasants. On April 3, 2 kilometers from the camp where the mission was staying, two Portuguese helicopters destroyed a village in order to intimidate the mission. The attack was fruitless, for despite such activities the mission completed the task entrusted to it. Its faith fused with that of the combatants and we supported a common cause. It was that implacable determination that enabled the members of the mission to march for four whole nights, defying hostile nature and the danger of an enemy surprise attack. It enabled us to get to the most distant villages to establish contact with the inhabitants, listen to them and learn about their living conditions. We were impressed by the villagers' maturity, their civic sense and their devotion to their country. We were also agreeably surprised by the large-scale action undertaken by PAIGC with a view to improving the living conditions of the Guinean citizens in the economic, social, cultural and educational spheres. Squads of nurses are teaching the people the rules of hygiene and child care. There is a school in which 70 pupils are receiving intensive instruction before going to complete their studies in Conakry. PAIGC thus provides the people with health and educational facilities and a civic sense. The military organization is admirable.

"Political, administrative, judicial, social, health and educational institutions are thus established. What more is needed to constitute a free and sovereign country that controls its own fate? In my view, Guinea (Bissau) is a model pilot country for all peoples fighting for their freedom. For that reason it deserves all the moral and material assistance the international community can provide.

"What impressed me most during the mission were the demented and hysterical policies and the blind obstinacy of the Portuguese fascists, who are desperately trying to cling to a territory which has long since ceased to belong to them."
UNITED NATIONS MISSION REPRESENTS "OUTSTANDING GESTURE"

The Secretary-General of PAIGC, Amílcar Cabral, also appeared before the Special Committee of 24 at its meeting in Conakry. In his statement, he paid tribute to the members of the mission and Secretariat staff, and briefly reviewed the struggle of the liberation movement in Guinea (Bissau) and the progress made in mobilizing the population.

Excerpts from Mr. Cabral's statement follow:

"I wish to thank those countries which sent distinguished members to take part in the special mission. Ecuador, with its popular heroes, particularly Bolivar, is a source of inspiration in the struggle for independence. Sweden has no traces of colonialism: on the contrary, at the current decisive juncture it is offering significant aid to all the liberation movements. Tunisia, a sister African country, has combated colonialism and the liberation movements are inspired by its struggle and that of Algeria. Throughout all their trials, the Tunisian people have set an example for all oppressed nations.

"The special mission has completed its assignment despite the efforts of the Portuguese, thus proving the truth of the African proverb: 'The baleful glare of the crocodile does not stop the canoe from passing'. The liberation movements live in the mud, in jungles full of dangers, but they are defending their own cause. The members of the United Nations mission have made an outstanding gesture by risking their lives to assist the liberation movement. Selfishness is more common than acts of generosity and good intentions. The chairman of the committee is to be commended for having chosen men of such great merit to carry out the mission. A tribute should also be paid to the members of the secretariat who accompanied them ***.

"There is hardly any need to add to the reports made by the members of the special mission. Great progress has been made during the 9 years of armed struggle in Guinea (Bissau). More than two-thirds of the territory has now been liberated and great progress is being made in mobilizing the population. Portugal has reacted by offering concessions designed to divide and demobilize the freedom fighters. These maneuvers have not produced the desired results, and Portugal has intensified its repression, stepping up its intensive bombing, its terrorist attacks, its use of napalm, its massacres and its destruction of crops and livestock. It has even launched attacks against neighboring countries, in particular the Republic of Guinea.

"PAIGC has struck back by attacking the Portuguese fortified camps and launching commando and sabotage attacks. At the same time it is creating a new political, cultural, administrative and legal life in the country. Political activity is very intense, an administrative plan has been implemented, schools and courts have been set up, a barter trade system is in operation and the people will soon elect the first People's Assembly.

"In the nonliberated areas, PAIGC has begun to attack the enemy even in urban centers. It has inflicted enormous losses on the enemy and the military government now admits that it will be a long time before it can crush the resistance. Twenty percent of the Portuguese gross national product is spent in Guinea (Bissau), to no avail. The reason for this obvious waste is that Portugal wishes to defend at any cost the myth that its colonies are in fact overseas provinces. The liberation of Guinea (Bissau) will sound the knell of the Portuguese occupation of Angola and Mozambique. Furthermore, Portugal is convinced that time is on its side and that its allies will defend its interests in the territory. Lastly it hopes that PAIGC will be handicapped by the losses suffered. Portugal is mistaken. Nothing will stop the struggle.

"The visit of the special mission has constituted a victory for the United Nations. This visit has been the first occasion on which the liberated areas of a country still struggling for its freedom have been visited by an official mission appointed by the General Assembly. This in itself is already an historic achievement. As the representative of Ecuador pointed out, this victory will have juridical and political consequences as well as other, incalculable consequences. Portugal and its allies have suffered a severe defeat.

"The mission's task has not been easy, however, for the enemy of the people of Guinea (Bissau) has done everything it can to assure the mission's failure. At the diplomatic level, it has exerted pressure on the special committee; what is more serious, a plot had been hatched to prevent the mission from succeeding, even if that involved endangering the lives of its members. Portugal was informed of every detail of the mission's program; at the moment when the mission entered the territory it stepped up the action begun several days before. Between
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

The Central African Republic became an independent nation on August 13, 1960. It is a landlocked, sparsely populated, and largely open savannah country with no proven mineral resources except for uranium deposits in the early stages of exploitation. The Central African Republic is heavily dependent on support from France. The former metropole provides a large number of advisers to the CAR Government as well as operational personnel in vital sectors, including education and health. Historical trade and investment patterns, reinforced by a tariff structure advantageous to EEC member states, tend to favor a continuation of the preponderant commercial role of EEC member states in general and of France in particular.

Diamonds, cotton, and coffee are the CAR's three leading exports, with lumber a poor fourth. Diamonds account for 40 to 50 percent of the country's export earnings. More than half of the diamond earnings result from the operations of the American-owned Diamond Distributors, Inc. (DDI). DDI has engaged in both mining and buying of diamonds in the CAR (Central African Republic). In November 1969, however, the CAR Government ordered the DDI mines closed after a lengthy dispute over royalty payments had not been resolved. Negotiations went slowly but by the end of 1971 DDI and the CAR Government had agreed on new terms of operation in a jointly owned venture. Preparations for a resumption of DDI mining activities were underway in early 1972. Reportedly, the counseling of Subcommittee Chairman Diggs during the visit to the CAR helped set the stage for the amicable settlement.

There are no employees or contract technicians of the U.S. Agency for International Development in the CAR. The regional area development officer travels from Yaounde periodically to help the Embassy on AID matters. The last AID bilateral project in the CAR was phased out in February 1971.

According to policies now in force, future AID assistance to the CAR must be of a regional nature, be under the sponsorship of a regional organization, or be supported by several donors. U.S. assistance on projects of interest to the CAR has been provided on several occasions through UDEAC, the Bangui-based Customs and Economic Union or Central Africa. The AID-financed regional measles and smallpox program is being carried on in the CAR under the auspices of OCEAC, a Yaounde-based organization against communicable diseases in Central Africa. An AID regional public health project to be executed in the framework of OCEAC will include a pilot center in the CAR. Approximately 30 Central Africans have been trained at the AID-supported heavy equipment training center in Lome, Togo; five are currently in training.

Food assistance to the CAR is provided under the authority of U.S. Public Law 480 through the World Food Program for the establishment of cooperative villages, for the operation of rural development...
10,000 and 15,000 men were sent to the south of the country and the bombing was intensified. Foreign journalists had previously traveled freely throughout the territory without being victims of Portuguese attacks. The attack had therefore been deliberate. The freedom-fighters fought back valiantly, but the Portuguese aircraft had destroyed hospitals, schools and villages, and had killed at least 20 people.

"The people of Guinea (Bissau) have not made that sacrifice in vain. The whole world has now been informed, through the legitimate representatives of the international organization, of the true situation in the territory."

PAIGC RECOGNIZED AS ONLY AUTHENTIC REPRESENTATIVE OF TERRITORY

On the basis of the experience of the mission to Guinea (Bissau), and in the light of statements made by its members and the representatives of the national liberation movement, the PAIGC, the Special Committee on April 13, unanimously adopted a resolution affirming that PAIGC is "the only and authentic representative of the people of the territory." The resolution requests all states, specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system to take this into consideration when dealing with matters pertaining to Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde.

The text of the resolution follows:

The Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Having considered the situation regarding Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde,

Having considered the preliminary report presented at its 847th meeting, on April 10, 1972, by the representative of Ecuador, chairman, and the representatives of Sweden and Tunisia, members of its Special Mission to the Liberated Areas of Guinea (Bissau),

Having heard the statements of the Secretary-General of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, the national liberation movement of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and other representatives of the movement concerning the territory,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of all people under colonial and alien domination to self-determination, freedom and independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960.

Expressing its profound indignation at the intensified armed aggression by Portugal against the people of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and in particular at the ruthless mass destruction of villages and property, as confirmed in the preliminary report of the special mission,


Deploring the policies of those states, particularly some of the military allies of Portugal within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, in disregard of the repeated appeals addressed to them by the United Nations, continue to provide Portugal with military and other assistance, without which Portugal could not pursue its policies of colonial domination and oppression of the people of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde.

Taking note of the fact that there are states which are ready to accord recognition to the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde as the sole effective power in Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde.

Noting with satisfaction the progress in the struggle for realization of national independence and freedom being made by the national liberation movement of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, both through its struggle and through reconstruction programs in the liberated areas, and expressing its deep gratitude to the Government of the Republic of Guinea for its continued moral and material support to the national liberation movement, including, in particular, its inception of a concrete assistance project in close collaboration with the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization and within the framework of the United Nations development program,
1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde to self-determination, freedom and independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960, and the legitimacy of the struggle by the people through their national liberation movement to achieve that right by all available means;

2. Affirms its recognition of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, the liberation movement of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, as the only and authentic representative of the people of the territory, and requests all states and specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system to take this into consideration when dealing with matters pertaining to Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde;

3. Strongly condemns the persistent refusal of the Government of Portugal to implement resolution 1514 (XV) and all other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council and calls upon Portugal to desist forthwith from all acts of repression against the people of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde and to withdraw immediately all its forces from the territory;

4. Expresses its appreciation to the members and the secretariat of the special mission which visited the liberated areas of Guinea (Bissau) from April 2-8, 1972, and its deep gratitude to the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde for its assistance and co-operation which enabled the special mission to complete its task successfully;

5. Expresses its conviction that the successful accomplishment by the special mission of its task—establishing beyond any doubt the fact that de facto control in these areas is exercised by the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, the national liberation movement of the territory—constitutes a major contribution by the United Nations in the field of decolonization;

6. Strongly condemns Portugal for resorting to the widespread and brutal use of military force in an attempt to prevent the special mission from completing its task and for the resultant loss of civilian life and the destruction of hospitals, schools and villages in direct contradiction of its obligations as a state member of the United Nations, and expresses its deep sympathy to the people and the national liberation movement of the territory for the loss and suffering thus incurred;

7. Calls upon all states and the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system, directly or in consultation with the Organization of African Unity, to render to the people of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, through their national liberation movement, the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, all the moral and material assistance necessary to continue their struggle for the restoration of their inalienable right to self-determination and independence, and to keep the Secretary-General informed of the concrete action taken or envisaged by them in the implementation of the present resolution;

8. Decides to transmit to the President of the Security Council, as a matter of urgency, the preliminary report of the special mission and the statements of the Secretary-General and other members of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, and to draw the Council's attention, for appropriate action, to the serious situation obtaining in the territory, bearing in mind in particular the indiscriminate use of armed force by Portugal in its attempt to prevent the special mission from completing its task, as disclosed in the above-mentioned report and statements;

9. Decides to keep the situation in Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde under continuous review.
APPENDIX 31

EXCERPTS FROM THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON RHODESIAN OPINION UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE THE LORD PEARCE

CHAPTER 1

FOREWORD

1. The proposals for a settlement agreed on November 21, 1971* between the British and Rhodesian Governments started with the following statement:

"The proposals set out below are conditional upon the British Government being satisfied that they are acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. The British Government will therefore appoint a commission to ascertain directly from all sections of the population of Rhodesia whether or not these proposals are acceptable and to report accordingly to the British Government. It will consist of a chairman, deputy chairmen, and a number of commissioners. The report will be signed by the chairman and the deputy chairmen. The members of the commission will travel extensively throughout the country visiting in particular all centers of population, local councils, and traditional meeting places in the tribal trust lands.

In the period before and during the test of acceptability normal political activities will be permitted to the satisfaction of the commission, provided they are conducted in a peaceful and democratic manner. Radio and television time will be made available to political parties represented in the House of Assembly. The commission will carry out its inquiries in public or in private as it deems appropriate. There will be immunity for witnesses heard by the commission in respect of their evidence and freedom for persons resident in Rhodesia, whatever their political views or affiliations, to enable them to appear before the commission. All Rhodesian Government employees will be permitted to express their views to the commission. Persons in detention or under restriction will be similarly permitted. Arrangements will be made in London and elsewhere as necessary for Rhodesians resident abroad to submit their views to the commission. The Rhodesian Government will provide the commission with such assistance as may reasonably be required to enable them to carry out their functions."

2. On November 25 the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary announced the appointment of Lord Pearce as chairman of this commission; and Lord Harlech and Sir Maurice Dorman were named as deputy chairmen. On December 16, 1971, the further appointments as deputy chairmen of Sir Glyn Jones and Sir Frederick Pedler were announced, but the latter withdrew on personal grounds on January 7, 1972.

3. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary gave us the following terms of reference:

"To satisfy themselves that the proposals for a settlement as set out in annex B to Command Paper 4835 have been fully and properly explained to the population of Rhodesia; to ascertain by direct contact with all sections of the population whether the people of Rhodesia as a whole regard these proposals as acceptable as a basis for independence; and to report to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary accordingly."

4. In answer to the first part of our terms of reference we are satisfied that the proposals have been "fully and properly explained to the population of Rhodesia." We believe that the great majority of those from whom we heard had a sufficient understanding of the content and implications of the proposals to enable them to pass judgment on them. The grounds for this view are set out in our report.

5. So far as the second part of our terms of reference is concerned we have no doubt that apart from a small minority the European population was in favor.

*Comnd. 4835. Annex B. Sec. 1.
Opinion in the small colored community (15,000) was broadly in favor. So too, we think, was that of the Asians (9,000). Our task in assessing African opinion was very much more difficult. We have set out these difficulties and our attempts to surmount them in our report. But the majority of those Africans whom we consulted privately or publicly was against the proposals. We believe, for reasons which we shall set out in detail, that this represents the opinion of the African population. We have reached the conclusion that the people of Rhodesia as a whole do not regard the proposals as acceptable as a basis for independence.

6. In order that the value of our conclusions may be assessed we think that we should give a fairly detailed account of our activities, our difficulties, and our decisions from the beginning. But first we would like to say that in the complex exercise which we have done our best to carry out we needed help from many sources. We wish to give our thanks to many people both in Britain and in Rhodesia, and particularly to "the people of Rhodesia as a whole" who received us at a difficult time with great courtesy and friendship. We pay tribute to the patience and understanding of the officials of the Rhodesian Ministry of Internal Affairs and to the provincial and district commissioners; to the members of the police of all ranks; to our locally engaged staff who worked for long hours under pressure; to our interpreters; to our drivers; and to all the members of our Secretariat including the secretaries who worked with fidelity and dedication. Finally we express our admiration of the commissioners—our eyes and ears—who completed what many have said was an impossible task with courage, patience, and competence.

CHAPTER 13

CONCLUSIONS

419. We believe that taking into account the explanation given by the Rhodesian authorities, the activities of those opposing or promoting the proposals, the distribution of our simplified version of the proposals and the explanations given by the commission at meetings and over the radio, the great majority of those who gave us their opinions had a sufficient understanding of the content and implications of the proposals to enable them to pass judgment on them. We are satisfied that the proposals have been fully and properly explained to the population of Rhodesia.

420. We are satisfied on our evidence that the proposals are acceptable to the great majority of Europeans. We are equally satisfied, after considering all our evidence including that on intimidation, that the majority of Africans rejected the proposals. In our opinion the people of Rhodesia as a whole do not regard the proposals as acceptable as a basis for independence.

PEARCE  (Chairman).
HARLECH  (Deputy Chairman).
MAURICE H. DORMAN,  (Deputy Chairman).
GLYN JONES  (Deputy Chairman).
H. SMEDLEY  (Secretary-General).
APPENDIX 32

REMARKS ON THE OCCASION OF THE AWARDING POSTHUMOUSLY TO CHIEF ALBERT LUTHI motive OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS PRIZE

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

TWENTY-THIRD SESSION, GENERAL ASSEMBLY PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SEVENTEEN HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SIXTH MEETING

(Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, December 9, 1968, at 3 p.m.)

President: Mr. Arenales (Guatemala).

Special meeting in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The President (interpretation from Spanish). We come now to the awarding of the United Nations Human Rights Prizes.

In accordance with General Assembly resolution 2217 (XXI) of December 19, 1966, and by decision of the Assembly at its 1731st plenary meeting, six prizes are to be awarded this year to persons who have made outstanding contributions to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in other United Nations instruments relating to human rights since the proclamation of the declaration on December 10, 1948.

The six persons whom the Special Committee has selected as winners of the United Nations Human Rights Prizes are: Mr. Manuel Bianchi, Mr. René Cassin, Mr. Albert Luthuli, Mrs. Mehranguiz Manoutchehrian, Mr. Petr Emelyanovich Nedibailo, and Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt.

Albert Luthuli, of South Africa, was born in 1899 and died in 1967. He was elected Chief of his tribe when he was 30. In 1935 he was appointed Chief at Groutville by the South African Government, but was deprived of this position in 1952. In the same year he was elected president of the African National Congress, which he had joined in 1946. He was a teacher and leader of the African people for more than 40 years, and a disciple of nonviolent action to achieve the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms in his country. In 1956 Chief Luthuli was arrested on a charge of treason and detained until 1958. Upon his release he was confined to a small area in rural Natal. In 1961 he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, and was allowed to receive it in Sweden. In 1967 he was killed in a train accident. His autobiography "Let My People Go" was published in 1962.

The President (interpretation from Spanish). A message has been received from Mrs. Luthuli, widow of the late Albert Luthuli which I shall now read to the Assembly (spoken in English).

"My family and I are proud that the United Nations has decided to award a plaque in honor of my late husband and their father, Albert John Luthuli, to mark the 20th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

"My late husband was a great defender of human freedom, and did not believe in the almighty state. This freedom he would have accorded to every man, woman, and child in South Africa, no matter what their color, race, or creed. This belief in freedom was deep and sincere, as deep and sincere as he was.

"This is his third international honor from abroad. My family and I sincerely hope that one day the country of his own birth, South Africa, will accept and honor his service to it."

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PRESS STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR., ON THE REFUSAL OF THE ILLEGAL SMITH REGIME TO ADMIT HIM ENTRY INTO ZIMBABWE

We have a new world's light heavyweight champion of racism. Obviously, South Africa is still the world's heavyweight champion of racism, but Southern Rhodesia is the new champion in the light heavyweight division.

I have just been informed by a representative of the Smith regime that my entry into Zimbabwe for a 2 to 3 day visit, from approximately the 13th of January to the 16th, will not be permitted.

I charge that this is racism, because there have been several white Members of Congress who have been admitted to Zimbabwe this year. Moreover, the Smith regime was admitting two Congressmen to be present at the same time as I was. Some of these Congressmen have been on the record in opposition to minority rule in Rhodesia and also in favor of the continuance of sanctions against the importation of chrome from Rhodesia to the United States. So, it's not a question of a person's ideology or evaluation of Rhodesian policy that is involved here.

I think it is significant that I was admitted to the Republic of South Africa despite my well-established opposition to apartheid and other racist policies of that government. It is, therefore, difficult to put any favorable interpretation on this latest action by the Smith regime. In fact, I have difficulty in rejecting an inference, as indicated by the establishment of the coalition in Zimbabwe against the settlement proposals, that there is acceptability of these proposals by the black people of Zimbabwe who comprise 95 out of every 100 persons in Zimbabwe. The ratio of Africans to whites is 19 to 1.

The Smith regime is alleging that my presence will have some influence on public opinion during a period when the commission will be present conducting the test of acceptability of the settlement proposals to the people of Zimbabwe.

I have visited all of the areas of Africa except the Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Namibia, and frankly, my main purpose in seeking entry there was first that I have never been in Zimbabwe. My present itinerary had included these three places, as I believe the value of the study missions to each area in Africa speaks for itself.

Also, of course, since the Lusaka Conference which is the raison d'être of this trip coincides with this period involving the testing of the settlement proposals, I would witness for myself the acceptability of these proposals to the black majority. I believe that, in view of their significance, this would be important to the international community as well as for U.S. policy. Definitely, I had not contemplated any action that might reasonably be construed as "foreign interference" as a representative of the Smith regime has termed my presence there.

Of course, it should not be particularly surprising that that regime is exhibiting racism and refusing me entry. Racism has been the fast-spreading disease in that country ever since UDI and the Smith regime has moved with obvious racial motivation to restrict the land use of blacks, to restrict the employment and educational opportunities of blacks, and to prevent the blacks, who constitute some 96 percent of the population of Zimbabwe from real political participation.

I think this action underscores one of the main points we emphasized during the debates on the Byrd amendment and in connection with several issues at the U.N., namely, that the Smith regime is racist. Regrettably, it confirms a continuing intolerance by Mr. Smith of any forces that might be supportive of a majority rule in that country from wherever they might come.

Further, it ought to dramatize to our Government that we ought to be very cautious in evaluating any kind of rationale that leads toward supporting that government.

In the action manifesto which I issued December 14, I have already called upon our Government, to recognize that the Heath/Smith proposals for a settlement do not secure to the people of Zimbabwe majority rule, self-determination,
human rights, or the enjoyment of the totality of their rights as set forth in article 73 of the United Nations Charter.

I think also, that we ought to examine the reciprocation of admissions of Rhodesians to the United States, because obviously they are able to get in.

I think that this action is particularly untimely, because we are on the threshold of an important conference in Lusaka to bring together American parliamentarians and African parliamentarians and other leaders for the purpose of evaluating U.S. and Western policy vis-a-vis Africa. The racial implications are quite significant in this whole dialog. The site of this meeting, which is right across the river from Rhodesia, makes this whole thing particularly undesirable.
a. The Achievements of Sanctions

(1) If it is assumed that the only purpose of sanctions was (in lieu of force) to bring down the illegal regime, then clearly they have failed.

(2) However, short of that total objective, sanctions have achieved a number of vital—if more limited aims as follows:
   a. They have denied outright victory to the Smith regime.
   b. They have kept Rhodesia in a state of complete diplomatic isolation.
   c. They have forced the regime to go on struggling for economic survival at ever rising costs to itself.
   d. They have encouraged and strengthened internal opposition to the regime by demonstrating continuing world interest in their cause.
   e. They have maintained international concern over the Rhodesian issue.
   f. They have sustained the world view of the unacceptability of the Smith regime.

(3) Consequently, arguments about sanctions should pose the question: How can the continuation of sanctions and their strengthening in the future assist to achieve yet other objectives which in combination could bring about the collapse of the illegal Smith regime.

(4) It would be a major political mistake to argue that because sanctions have not achieved the end that the world community would like to see in Rhodesia—majority rule—they should therefore be abandoned.

The future of sanctions depends upon a number of factors:
   a. The role of Britain after the publication of the Pearce Report.
   b. A recognition of the failure of sanctions.
   c. A recognition of the positive effects of sanctions, leading to—
   d. Measures required for the strengthening of sanctions.

b. Britain and Rhodesia

(5) Ever since UDI, Britain has acknowledged that she is the power responsible for Rhodesia.

(6) On three occasions since UDI—in 1966, 1968, and 1971—successive British Governments have attempted to come to an agreement with the illegal regime in Rhodesia.

(7) The outcome of the latest (1971) attempt now awaits the result of the Pearce Commission which will be made public during May 1972. Should the answer of the Pearce Commission be a "Yes" the present British Government will recognize the Smith government and this would undoubtedly—and rapidly—lead to a general erosion of international sanctions. Should the answer of the Pearce Commission be "No" the British Government is pledged to maintain the status quo ante.

(8) However, there are powerful political and business lobbies in Britain which want to recognize the Smith regime and resume normal business with Rhodesia while there are others who would wish simply to wash their hands of the whole affair.

(9) In consequence, a Pearce Commission "No" answer could produce an adverse British reaction and in the ensuing climate of political opinion it is at least likely that one of the following arguments would be advanced:
   a. That Britain should recognize the Smith regime anyway and have done with the whole business.

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b. That no positive action should be taken but sanctions should simply be allowed gradually to lapse so that at a later date the regime could be recognized as a fait accompli.

c. That some form of act should be passed through the British Parliament "terminating British sovereignty"—in other words washing Britain's hands of any further responsibility.

(10) Any British recognition of the Rhodesia regime would fundamentally undermine the whole program of U.N. sanctions.

(11) If, therefore, a meaningful program of sanctions is to be continued in the future, the realities of the present British political situation must be taken into account.

(12) These realities would appear to be as follows:

(a) That Britain has applied sanctions more thoroughly than any other nation; is least guilty of breaking them; and has taken the most decisive action (legal) against sanctions breakers.

(b) That while Britain is maintaining sanctions she sees her chief trading rivals breaking them, often with impunity, and as a result her businessmen ask forcibly why Britain alone should apply sanctions properly and allow others to obtain trade she denies herself.

(c) That as long as it is argued that sanctions can achieve something and should be continued, then other major trading countries should apply sanctions with the same degree of thoroughness as Britain.

(d) That the United Nations should persuade the other major trading countries: To apply sanctions as rigidly as Britain, in the spirit as well as the letter of the U.N. resolution.

(e) That the United States should be persuaded to reimpose its embargo on chrome and other minerals.

(f) That only if Britain sees the rest of the world community applying sanctions with an equal thoroughness to her own is she likely to be persuaded to continue to apply them properly herself.

(13) None of this is ideal: It does represent political reality.

(14) Britain's critics may well argue that, on the one hand, she claims to be responsible for Rhodesia but that, on the other hand, she refuses to exercise her power to discharge that responsibility. This may well be true. The fact is that in terms of international politics and the United Nations sanctions must either be treated as the joint concern of all the members of the world community to be applied equally, or they will not work.

c. The failings of sanctions

(15) Critics of sanctions would argue that after 6½ years of voluntary and certain mandatory sanctions, and 4 years of mandatory sanctions Rhodesia not only survives but in many respects appears to flourish.

(16) Not only have sanctions failed to bring about the collapse of the illegal regime, but they have also stimulated the development of local manufactures. The United Nations third supplement to the Sanctions Committee's Report for June 1970 demonstrates, in the contradictory figures it presents, the failure of sanctions to achieve even part of their objective. One set of figures shows how the trade of Rhodesia's former major trading partners—Britain, the United States, France, et cetera—has apparently fallen to 2, 1, or one-half percent of presanctions figures. Another set of figures shows that Rhodesia's exports for 1969 are, apparently, up by $62 million over 1968 and about $180 million in Rhodesian exports are unreflected in world trade figures. In consequence, the drafters of the report are obliged to conclude that Rhodesian exports have "reached world markets via Rhodesia's neighboring countries."

(17) Rhodesia appears able to sell, without great difficulty, almost her entire mineral production.

(18) France, Germany, and Japan are probably Rhodesia's biggest non-African trading partners, but most Western European countries outside Britain and Scandinavia carry out some trade (and so, no doubt, do some British and Scandinavian companies). It seems possible that other countries like the U.S.S.R. and Greece have also traded with Rhodesia. Within Africa the bulk of the trade has been carried out with South Africa and, to a lesser extent, Portugal. There is also a small trade with independent African countries such as Zambia, Malawi, and Gabon.

(19) Short of blockading the entire coastline of Africa south of Zaire in the west and Tanzania in the east, it seems inconceivable that all trade between
Rhodesia and countries outside Africa could be effectively stopped. It is important here to distinguish between exports from and imports into Rhodesia. Particular difficulty would be experienced in tightening up sanctions against imports since these tend to be indistinguishable from the imports of South Africa and Portugal. However, most of Rhodesia's exports—asbestos, chrome, other minerals and tobacco—can be identified as being of Rhodesian origin. Moreover, buyers of their imports know their source. The emphasis must therefore be placed not so much on the port of departure in southern Africa but on the place of entry into the importing country. It is at this point that the U.N. machinery should be set to work, to insure that the government of the country concerned takes action to seize the Rhodesian goods.

(21) At a superficial level the Rhodesian economy appears to have survived fairly well. Secondary industry has developed quickly, partly because sanctions have eliminated most of the competition from other countries while profits from other sectors of the economy, for example, mining, have not been allowed out of the country and have therefore been reinvested; but other sectors of the economy—agriculture, retailing, wholesaling, and transport—have suffered and this has severely affected the balance of the economy.

d. The positive effects of sanctions

(22) Though sanctions have not had the fullest possible effect that might have been achieved, they are directly responsible for most of the pressures on the Smith regime. Rhodesian leaders are well aware of their effects. Smith said, guardedly, in October 1971: "I wouldn't like to put my shirt on it that we will be stronger, say, 2 years hence." John Graylin, head of the Association of Rhodesian Industry, said in April 1972: "The tremendous growth of secondary industry in the last few years is slowing down because insufficient foreign exchange is available for manufacturers to expand as quickly as they would like. We in ARl believe we can get more foreign exchange only if we export more and we have got to get down and see where we can export more."

(23) The most important effect of sanctions in economic terms (referred to a number of times in this report) has been to deny Rhodesia access to world money markets. As long as this denial of access is maintained the Rhodesian economy will face mounting difficulties.

(24) Shortage of foreign exchange and consequent inability to purchase crucial machinery and spare parts has led to a deterioration in the infrastructure of Rhodesia—especially the state of the railways—and this in turn exacerbates other economic problems.

(25) A direct result of the shortage of foreign exchange is the mounting public indebtedness as a result of the raising of internal loans.

(26) Tobacco is the Rhodesian commodity that has been hardest hit by sanctions: the annual crop has had to be drastically reduced; and although a substantial part of the crop is sold each year the Rhodesian Government pays a high price in support costs to the farmers (50 percent or more of whom are now bankrupt) in order to make this possible.

(27) Soil erosion and a deterioration in land conditions in the tribal trust lands combined with the exploding African population between them insure mounting pressures upon the regime which it is unable to alleviate without new capital to inject into African agriculture—and this will not be available as long as sanctions continue.

(28) Key commodities such as oil reach Rhodesia but at a price. Thus, although petrol is not now rationed it sells at an inflated price whose long-term effects will be to induce inflation and further foreign exchange shortages.

(29) Sanctions have limited white immigration into Rhodesia. Figures are difficult since some emigrants from Rhodesia are classified as Rhodesians on holiday while some visitors to Rhodesia are classified as immigrants. Under sanctions the Rhodesian Treasury and the Rhodesian Department of Immigration are at loggerheads as to the desirability of immigrants. Politically they are wanted. Economically, however, they are, at least in the short run, a burden on the country, creating demand before supply and often not bringing enough foreign capital to pay for the import component of their house, consumer durables and day-to-day needs. They are, therefore, both inflationary and a drain on foreign currency, though probably not an especially important one as long as their numbers are small. White immigrants also compound the chronic black unemployment problem—according to Ian Wilson the President of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia speaking in 1970, African work seekers then numbered 400,000.
(a conservative estimate) and increase at the rate of 45,000 a year—although ultimately they represent the regime's only check against black advancement.

(30) It is often claimed that sanctions hurt the blacks in Rhodesia most although this statement is incompatible with two other statements, usually made by the same people in Rhodesia: (a) that sanctions have little or no effect at all and (b) that sanctions have provided Rhodesian industry with the greatest shot in the arm that it has ever had—and hence, presumably, must have provided additional job opportunities for Africans. Possibly as a result of sanctions some Africans who otherwise might have expected to obtain jobs as waiters in new hotels or as messengers for new companies have not done so. However, since 85 percent of the African population is outside regular employment and only 9 percent is in nonagricultural employment, the scale of the problem can be seen to be small. There is no evidence that Africans feel they have suffered intolerably from the effects of sanctions.

(31) Another general effect of sanctions has been to change the character of Rhodesia's economy from that of a powerful British colony to that of being another province of South Africa. Economic links with Britain have been replaced by economic links with South Africa and the economy as a whole has become integrated with the South African economy. This is now unlikely to change.

(32) The principle behind a policy of economic sanctions is that economic pressures should be transferred into political pressures for change; in the case of Rhodesia, therefore, the key to change will depend upon the political sensitivity of the white electorate. In this connection the atmosphere of beleaguered uncertainty that sanctions engender does not enhance business confidence. There is little doubt that either the lifting of sanctions or a proper settlement would greatly enhance the morale of businessmen and would release the more aggressive Rhodesian businessmen onto the markets of the world to compete on an equal footing with others and allow the less aggressive Rhodesian businessmen to operate with increased confidence at home.

(33) The most important effect of sanctions has been the continuing isolation of the regime (see above under "The Achievements of Sanctions," par. 2) and the denial of outright victory to it.

(34) Now, therefore, the political problem that clearly emerges from an examination of U.N. sanctions to date is the need to persuade all members of the U.N. and nonmembers to apply sanctions according to the spirit as well as the letter of the resolution. This is only likely to happen if two other attitudes prevail:

(a) The will to make sanctions work. Here it is worth repeating the quote given in part II, paragraph 13, from an anonymous British M.P.: "If we were at war, we'd starve Rhodesia out in no time because everyone would have a stomach for what we are doing. As it is, no one has." This remark is not just true of the British.

(b) The belief that sanctions, given the attitudes of South Africa and Portugal, and other unavoidable loopholes, will still achieve something that is desirable from the point of view of the world community. At present many members of the international community clearly do not believe anything of the sort.

(c) The next 2-year period could prove of crucial importance in making sanctions against Rhodesia effective and thus demonstrating that this peaceful means of international pressure can be used to good effect.

C. The Strengthening of Sanctions

(35) A British note published by the United Nations in 1969 made the following point: "The crucial question for the success of comprehensive mandatory sanctions in 1969 is the willingness of U.N. member states who are cooperating over sanctions to close the existing sanctions gaps." The problem remains.

(36) The progressive success of sanctions in the future must also depend upon the clear isolation and publicity of South African and Portuguese sanctions-breaking operations and the production of evidence of third countries trading through them to Rhodesia. Despite their attitudes toward U.N. sanctions neither South Africa nor Portugal welcome world publicity and it is, therefore, of considerable political importance to focus constant world attention upon their sanctions-breaking activities.

(37) The bulk of the information supplied to the U.N. so far to assist in forestalling the breaking of sanctions has been provided by Britain. Other member nations should be encouraged equally to provide such information and subsequently to follow it up and prosecute sanctions breakers.
(38) Although the United Nations has introduced mandatory sanctions it does not have the power or the machinery adequate to enforce the policy fully. In the event of a “No” from the Pearce Commission the United Nations will certainly maintain sanctions and there will be pressures to extend them. The strategy then to be followed will be of crucial importance. In the light of the experience of 6 years—since the first U.N. sanctions were applied in December 1966—the U.N. must take a stronger line if its sanctions policy is to be more effective. It should—

(a) Mount a major and sustained diplomatic offensive to persuade its members to maintain sanctions;

(b) Follow up all information supplied to member nations persistently and focus public attention upon any breaches or suspected breaches of sanctions;

(c) Most importantly, make public in clear and realistic political terms, what it expects sanctions to achieve and, in consequence, why it insists they be maintained.

(39) The United Nations also needs much more effective machinery than at present if it wants sanctions to work. It needs:

(a) A larger permanent staff to run the operation with a strong committee headed by a permanent (rather than rotating) chairman;

(b) The sessions of the Sanctions Committee to be held in public and maximum publicity to be given to all its findings and work;

(c) To mount pressures upon all its members to legislate in their respective countries to make sanctions breaking a criminal offense so that all agents for or carriers of Rhodesian cargoes will automatically be prosecuted.

The object of a tightened sanctions policy should be to inspect and seize cargo at the point of entry into the importing country; goods should be confiscated and not merely returned; then Rhodesia would lose both the foreign earnings and the goods. Such a policy would require the availability of U.N. experts able to ascertain the origin of the goods and it would also require the willingness of member nations to call upon these experts whenever a cargo came under suspicion of being of Rhodesian origin.

(40) Ultimately, however, the real key to the effectiveness or otherwise of sanctions must remain the political willingness of the member nations of the U.N. to apply them and this in turn will depend upon the extent to which they believe sanctions can and will achieve some form of worthwhile objective.
It is indeed a pleasure to greet you at this, my first press conference in London, although the subject matter and reason for calling this conference is very serious.

I was informed by my Government, an hour or two before departing Washington for London, that the South African Government would not permit me entry into the international territory of Namibia, nor, indeed, into South Africa, notwithstanding the fact that that government issued me a visa on August 3, 1971 “valid for multiple entries within 1 year” from that date. In reneging on its own visa issuance, the South African Government is dishonoring its international agreement with the United States.

I am en route to the forthcoming conference in Lusaka of African officials and some 15 American parliamentarians. Having made study missions to all the areas of Africa except the Sudan, Zimbabwe and Namibia, it was my plan to include these three areas in my present itinerary. And I am leaving this afternoon for the Sudan.

However, as I stated in the press conference I held Friday, the morning of my departure from Washington, I have been informed that the Smith regime will not permit my entry into Zimbabwe.

Present events in both Zimbabwe and Namibia are history making. Thus, I regard the coincidence of my trip to attend the Lusaka Conference and make visits to these two areas of signal importance.

In Zimbabwe, the Pearson Commission, which I understand will be departing here today, will be conducting the test of acceptability of the settlement proposals. The Smith regime’s expressed attitude that my very presence there might serve to influence the majority against the proposals can but confirm the mounting evidence that these proposals do not have the acceptability of the majority. This evidence is reinforced by the establishment of the African National Council dedicated to the rejection of the settlement proposals, which it terms an effort “to legalize the treason of UDI with African support.”

The denial of entry to me raises questions as to the Smith regime’s implementation of the freedom of speech envisioned by the settlement proposals during the period of the test of acceptability.

In Namibia, the amazingly courageous action of the strike by more than 10,000 African workers in six different towns in protest against the infamous contract labor system is continuing to spread to other towns and mines, notwithstanding police and army mobilization and strenuous government efforts to halt the strike. This unprecedented action by the Ovambos, who comprise about half of the population of Namibia and whom the South Africans had considered loyal, underscores and supports the action of last summer by an Ovambo group calling for an end of South Africa’s illegal occupation of Namibia and for freedom.

Of course, in each area my study mission was conceived as one of observation and I do not believe could reasonably be construed as “foreign interference”, as Mr. Smith’s representative termed it. I do believe that such factfinding would have been of inestimable value to the international community with respect to these two areas where over one, as confirmed by the International Court of Justice last summer, the General Assembly has direct responsibility, and over the other, the Security Council has exercised its authority under chapter VII and found that situation a “threat to the peace.”

I find particularly disturbing these actions of the South African Government and of the Smith regime, neither of which possesses any legal authority with respect to the territory from which it is excluding me.

I can only characterize Mr. Smith’s action as racist in refusing me entry into Zimbabwe at a period when two other of my fellow congressmen, both white,
had been planning to visit Zimbabwe and had been told they would be welcome. Have there been any blacks of any nationality admitted to Zimbabwe in the past year? Thus far, silence has greeted this question.

The Smith regime points to certain statements I have made in a joint press statement of December 18 and also in my December 14 Action Manifesto, which included among the 55 recommendations to my Government on African policy, a call upon it to recognize that the Heath/Smith "Proposals for a Settlement" do not secure to the people of Zimbabwe majority rule, self-determination or their rights as set forth in article 73 of the U.N. Charter. My response to the denial of racism by Mr. Smith's representative in Washington is to reiterate that there are three other black Congressmen who will be attending the Lusaka Conference and who could, I am sure, include Zimbabwe in their itinerary.

In further regard to the action manifesto, which was endorsed by the Congressional Black Caucus, the South African Government has taken the position that it considers certain points of that document as improper interference in their domestic affairs. I would remind them of the provisions of the U.N. Charter which impose legal obligations on the United Nations and all members to take joint and separate action toward the promotion of equal rights and self-determination of all peoples.

Apartheid is an unconscionable system of discrimination and denial of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms on the basis of race and color; and the United States, and each other state, has international legal obligations under the Charter, as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to work toward its eradication and the achievement of self-determination by the people of South Africa, as well as of Namibia, Zimbabwe and the so-called Portuguese Territories.

On the latter point, I wish to note here that I considered the recently concluded Azores agreement between my Government and Portugal a "watershed" in the regression of U.S. policy toward Africa. In exchange for the continuing use of base rights in the Azores, my Government has made a wholly anomalous commitment of almost half a billion dollars to Portugal, which is engaged in colonial wars against the people of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.

As a member of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. General Assembly, I had been greatly concerned by the position on African issues and also on the Byrd amendment which would permit the importation of chrome in violation of sanctions. But it was the announcement of the Azores agreement which constrained me to submit my resignation from the delegation to the President.

It is well-known that here in Britain there are many groups who actively support self-determination for the people of the presently minority-ruled areas of Africa and especially of Namibia and Zimbabwe. Therefore, I consider this site especially fitting for the press conference on the refusal to permit me to visit Zimbabwe and Namibia by the two authorities controlling these areas in derogation of law and in defiance of the United Nations and of the international community.

In conclusion, I wish to note that, with respect to Zimbabwe, I am calling on my Government:

(1) To refuse entry into the United States of Rhodesians who support or represent the Smith regime, and this would particularly include the Rhodesian Information Service;

(2) To be mindful of the clear inferences of this action by the Smith regime on the acceptability to the people of Zimbabwe of the settlement proposals; and

(3) To continue to recognize the Security Council’s authority in this matter; and thus to refrain from any economic or political relations with that regime.

With respect to the action of the South African Government, I believe my Government should make unmistakable its protest and concern at this doubly illegal action of that government—in violation of its international agreement with the United States on visas and in continuing to exercise its authority over the international territory.

Our Ambassador to South Africa is in the United States now for routine purposes. I believe that this necessitates that my Government find that continuous consultations in Washington with Ambassador Hurd are in order until the South African Government indicates that it is in all cases prepared to honor its visa agreement with the United States.
APPENDIX 36

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA CONCERNING PASSPORT VISAS

TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS SERIES 3544

PASSPORT VISAS

Agreement Between the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
and the UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

Effected by Exchange of Notes
Signed at Capetown March 28 and
April 3, 1956
The South African Minister of External Affairs to the American Ambassador

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA
DEPARTEMENT VAN BUITELANDSE SAKE.

M. R. AMBASSADOR,

I have the honour to refer to recent negotiations between our respective countries to provide for the simplification of existing visa formalities and to inform you that the Government of the Union of South Africa have considered and approved the following arrangement:

1. The Government of the Union of South Africa will order all visas to be issued gratis to citizens of the United States of America intending to visit the Union of South Africa or South West Africa for purely temporary purposes. Such visas shall be valid for one year from the date of issue and for multiple entries into the Union or South West Africa, with the following exceptions:

   (i) A visa issued to an exchange visitor shall be limited to a single entry;

   (ii) a visa issued to a representative of a non-member government to an international organisation, and members of his immediate family, shall be limited to a single entry;

   (iii) a visa issued to a temporary worker shall be valid for multiple entries for a period not to exceed one year and
shall expire upon the anticipated date of termination of the authorized employment.

2. The Government of the United States of America will likewise order all visas to be issued gratis to South African citizens intending to visit the United States of America for purely temporary purposes.

Such visas shall be valid for one year from the date of issue and for multiple entries into the United States of America, with the following exceptions:

(i) A visa issued to an exchange visitor (i.e. the EX type) shall be limited to a single entry;

(ii) a visa issued to a representative of a non-member government to an international organisation, and members of his immediate family (i.e. the G3 type) shall be limited to a single entry;

(iii) a visa issued to a temporary worker (i.e. the H type) shall be valid for multiple entries for a period not to exceed one year and shall expire upon the anticipated date of termination of the authorised employment.

3. This agreement shall not exempt South African citizens or citizens of the United States of America from the obligation of complying with the requirements applicable in respect of admission, residence and employment on entering the United States of America and South Africa respectively. Persons who are not able to satisfy immigration or police authorities of their compliance with the above-mentioned requirements are liable to be refused admission on arrival.

This letter, together with your confirmation thereof, will be regarded as an agreement between our two Governments which shall be binding until further notice by either party, and the arrangement shall come into operation on the first day of May, 1956.

Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

ERIC H. LOUW.
Minister of External Affairs.

His Excellency Mr. E. T. Wailes,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America,
Cape Town.
My dear Mr. Minister:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Note of March 28, concerning visa arrangements between our two countries, which reads as follows:

"Mr. Ambassador:

I have the honour to refer to recent negotiations between our respective countries to provide for the simplification of existing visa formalities and to inform you that the Government of the Union of South Africa have considered and approved the following arrangement:

1. The Government of the Union of South Africa will order all visas to be issued gratis to citizens of the United States of America intending to visit the Union of South Africa or South West Africa for purely temporary purposes. Such visas shall be valid for one year from the date of issue and for multiple entries into the Union or South West Africa, with the following exceptions:

(i) A visa issued to an exchange visitor shall be limited to a single entry;

(ii) a visa issued to a representative of a non-member government to an international organisation, and members of his immediate family, shall be limited to a single entry;

(iii) a visa issued to a temporary worker shall be valid for multiple entries for a period not to exceed one year and shall expire upon the anticipated date of termination of the authorized employment.

2. The Government of the United States of America will likewise order all visas to be issued gratis to South African citizens intending to visit the United States of America for purely temporary purposes. Such visas shall be valid for one year from the date of issue."
issue and for multiple entries into the United States of America, with the following exceptions:

(i) A visa issued to an exchange visitor (i.e. the EX type) shall be limited to a single entry;

(ii) a visa issued to a representative of a non-member government to an international organisation, and members of his immediate family (i.e. the G3 type) shall be limited to a single entry;

(iii) a visa issued to a temporary worker (i.e. the H type) shall be valid for multiple entries for a period not to exceed one year and shall expire upon the anticipated date of termination of the authorised employment.

3. This agreement shall not exempt South African citizens or citizens of the United States of America from the obligation of complying with the requirements applicable in respect of admission, residence and employment on entering the United States of America and South Africa respectively. Persons who are not able to satisfy immigration or police authorities of their compliance with the above-mentioned requirements are liable to be refused admission on arrival.

This letter, together with your confirmation thereof, will be regarded as an agreement between our two Governments which shall be binding until further notice by either party, and the arrangement shall come into operation on the first day of May, 1956.

Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

/s/ ERIC H. LOUW.
Minister of External Affairs.”

I am pleased to inform you that the Government of the United States of America agrees with the arrangements outlined above, and concurs that your Note of March 28, 1956, together with this reply, shall constitute an agreement between our two governments which will enter into force on May 1, 1956.

Please accept, Mr. Minister, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

EDWARD T. WAILES
American Ambassador.

The Honorable
ERIC H. LOUW,
Minister of External Affairs.

TIAS 3544
PASSPORT VISAS

Agreement Between the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
and the UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

Amending Agreement of March 28
and April 3, 1956

Effect ed by Exchange of Notes
Signed at Pretoria March 31, 1958
projects, for preschool feeding programs, and for feeding southern
Sudanese refugees settled in the southeastern corner of the CAR under
the auspices of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

The Ambassador’s Special Self-Help Fund is utilized for material
assistance to small-scale projects. Besides accomplishing worthwhile
economic and social objectives, expenditures from the Self-Help Fund
have reaped political benefits for the U.S. Government far out of pro-
portion to the sums involved. The size of the Ambassador’s Fund has
ranged from $143,000 in fiscal year 1968 down to $75,000 available as
of mid-February for fiscal year 1971. The impact of this program, in
a country where a foreign government’s influence and friendship are
measured by its willingness and ability to provide tangible assistance,
indicates the usefulness of the Self-Help Fund as a tool for the Am-
bassador in the absence of a bilateral aid program.

Aside from the 10 Americans on the Embassy staff and members of
their families, the resident American community in the CAR is limited
to one businessman and about 150 missionaries and dependents. The
missionaries, who have been active in the CAR as far back as 1922,
are engaged in a variety of medical and social activities throughout
the country.

President Jean-Bedel Bokassa, who assumed power in a bloodless
coup d’état in January 1966, has maintained a position of undisputed
leadership. Assisted by a 27-man cabinet, he rules by decree. The sole
political party, MESAN, plays an insignificant role in the formulation
of government policy.

After more than a year of leftward-looking foreign policy, Presi-
dent Bokassa in November 1970, reaffirmed his attachment to the
West. The arrival of the new American Ambassador, who presented his
credentials in February 1971, ushered in a period of close Central
African Republic-United States relations. A significant manifestation
of the new spirit was the decision, announced by President Bokassa
during the visit of our study mission, to relieve American citizens of
the requirement for CAR entry visas and residence permits.

This change in the CAR Government’s stance toward the West in
general, and toward the United States in particular, coincided with a
50-percent reduction in the budget for USIS activities in the CAR.
One American officer and three local employees are working closely
with CAR information, education, and youth officials to provide news
items, English classes, books, and films to promote a deeper apprecia-
tion of American culture and a better understanding of United States
foreign policy. Two CAR students have completed their undergraduate
studies in American colleges at U.S. Government expense and have
returned home. Three others will graduate in the next 2 years.

SELF-HELP ACTIVITIES IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

The study mission found the Self-Help program extremely worth-
while in every country visited which is not an AID concentration
country. Details of the program activities in the Central African Re-
public are outlined here to show how it operates in general.

The Self-Help program of the American Embassy in Bangui has
been cited by the U.S. Agency for International Development for its
effectiveness. The number of projects and the total amounts available
for expenditure by the American Ambassador in recent years are as
follows:
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

Passport Visas

Agreement amending the agreement of March 28 and April 3, 1956. Effectuated by exchange of notes
Signed at Pretoria March 31, 1958;
Entered into force April 1, 1958.

The South African Secretary for External Affairs to the American Ambassador

Pretoria.

Mr. Ambassador,

I have the honour to refer to the visa agreement between the Government of the Union of South Africa and the Government of the United States of America, which was effectuated by means of an Exchange of Notes dated the 28th March, and 3rd April, 1956, respectively, and to inform you that the Government of the Union of South Africa approve of the suggestion that, in order further to simplify the visa formalities, the agreement be amended by the deletion of sub-section (i) of paragraphs 1 and 2 thereof.

I, therefore, have the honour to propose that this Note and your confirmatory reply shall be regarded as constituting a supplementary agreement between our two Governments which shall come into force on the 1st April, 1958.

Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

G. P. Jooste,
Secretary for External Affairs.

His Excellency Mr. H. Byroade,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of the United States of America,
Pretoria.
Mr. Secretary,

I have the honor to refer to your Note of this date in which you inform me that the Government of the Union of South Africa approves the suggestion that, in order to further simplify the visa formalities between our two countries, the visa agreement be amended by the deletion of sub-section (i) of paragraphs 1 and 2 thereof.

I agree that your Note and this confirmatory reply shall be regarded as constituting a supplementary agreement between our two Governments which shall come into force on April 1, 1958.

Accept, Mr. Secretary, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

HENRY A. BYROADE

The Honorable,

G. P. Jooste,

Secretary for External Affairs,
Department of External Affairs,
Pretoria.
APPENDIX 37


It is a pleasure for me to be able to open this Conference of African and American representatives. I extend to you all, on behalf of the Party, Government and the people of Zambia, cordial greetings. It is our hope that your stay in Zambia will be both enjoyable and fruitful.

We in Zambia welcome meetings like this one which afford us the opportunity to exchange information and views on matters which are of vital interest to us. The endeavors which are being made through frank discussions give expression to the new and growing interest among the American people in matters relating to Africa and her problems; in the welfare of the people of this continent.

I, therefore, wish to pay tribute to the organizers of the Conference. We cannot expect dramatic achievements in these efforts; these are often intangible. The amount of effort being made to create a better understanding between Africans and Americans underlines the major hurdle in the improvement of human relations, as they affect the people of America and the people of Africa, as well as the entire world community.

Relations between the people of America and Africa are in many ways natural. They are a natural consequence of human development. America is largely a nation of people descended from many continents. The majority of them are descendants of the people of Europe and Africa. America's relationship with Europe cannot escape the influence of history. America is Europe oriented. The interests of the people of America in Europe's future were forged by history even though time may be driving the two continents apart. There are good reasons why America should have been Africa oriented. Africa's relationship with America could have been stronger than it is today except for the factor of race. The ties that bind America and Africa are deeply rooted in the history of the African-American community in the continent. These ties had been buried under the debris of the much decimated African image by colonialism; but now they have been brought back to life. Africans in Africa feel a sense of growing affinity with Africans in America. The first decade of African independence has given more than a hope in the continent's future. Despite immense problems, our initial achievements have given a new realization of the growing potential of the African people to contribute to peace and the well-being of mankind as a whole.

We in Africa, therefore, deserve to be understood. We deserve the assistance of other continents in order to be able to join them effectively in the defense of peace and in building progress and security for all.

The value of this Conference must, therefore, lie in the greater understanding it must help create among the people of America and the world about the problems of Africa, the desires and aspirations of the African people and their determination to work out a future which will guarantee a decent life and a life full of promise. The task of all of us is more fundamental than that. It involves improving the understanding of Africans by the Americans and of the Americans by the Africans. In this way increased cooperation will be possible. In this way we will be able to achieve the goals of peace and development.

It is the paradox of our era that having achieved so much in the field of science and technology to improve the human condition, we have done so little to improve man's understanding of himself; to improve the relations amongst the people of the world. This is the greatest weakness in man's material success. However, man's success in science and technology must slowly drive us toward greater interdependence and one world community. Therefore, we can no longer merely be concerned with achievements in material progress. We must succeed in building better human relations.
It is in this realization, that we in Zambia, a nonracial state, are always ready to play host to visitors from many parts of the world.

In our conduct we are guided by the knowledge that Africa stands midway between the continents of the East and the continents of the West. We share the problems of the Pacific Ocean which on the other side of the globe divides the Americas from the continent of Asia.

The Pacific Ocean is an international waterway for competing ideologies; but the continent of Africa consists of independent states. We, on this continent, cannot allow our countries to be the battleground for competing ideologies. We have only one ideology—the ideology of peace and development.

We know our primary responsibilities. We know the responsibilities which are beyond our competence to discharge alone and which must be shared with other members of the international community. We know that today’s activities create our tomorrow, and our present lives determine the bridge on which we must enter the next life. In today’s activities, it is our primary task to provide the basic needs of the people. They need among others water, food and shelter. These must be improved both in quality and quantity. We have already declared an all-out war on poverty, ignorance and disease, a war we must win. We must improve the image of Africa by the decency of the people, the stability and prosperity of independent African States. To achieve these goals, we need the means: namely, professional and technical skills and equipment with which to exploit the resources to solve the immediate, short- and long-term economic and social problems. We know that peace and stability are vital prerequisites to our success. We will continue to strengthen them.

We know our needs to be pressing and our resources to be limited. We know peace and development to he expensive while the world conditions are generally cruel.

Our policies are formulated in the context of our understanding of these problems. Some of our economic policies must certainly be baffling to Americans, just as we are equally baffled by the poverty which manifests itself in many ways in an affluent America able to support expensive space programs. We never call these prestige projects. Americans say that we Africans have our priorities wrong; we in turn point to ghettos in America’s flourishing cities vis-a-vis space research programs and say Americans have their priorities upside down.

In the circumstances, we in Africa can only ask you people in America to understand that our continent is a late comer in a race for prosperity. We are in a hurry to get to a higher level of advancement. All our resources that supported the European industry during the colonial period must be devoted to our development efforts to give substance to national hopes; to the task of matching the aspirations of the people of this continent.

We do welcome foreign investment. We want it. We need it. We would like to expand trade with all nations of the world that offer us fair terms. If we should succeed in expanding trade, this will greatly add to the number of ties that now bind our various nations in an interdependent world community. We are necessarily sensitive, but not hypersensitive, about exploitation of our resources at our expense. We have been dominated in the past; we have been exploited. The history of Europe and African contact did not favor the interests of the majority of the people. We, therefore, are striving to insure that the benefits of industrial and technological revolution in Africa accrue to the people of Africa. This is why we would like greater participation of the African people in building their economies while leaving vast room for foreign investors. We ask for no more than fair play in the relations between men and nations, particularly in the exploitation of the resources of our countries.

We cannot genuinely say that private investment alone will achieve for us social justice and yet in order to strengthen democracy, every investment must, in the final analysis, add to the contentment of the people. It must help us solve economic and social problems directly or indirectly.

While we in independent Africa are working out our own future participation in shaping our destiny, there are millions in southern Africa who are still denied this God-given right. You will be discussing this problem. It is an important factor in African-American relations.

There are many reasons why southern African crisis deserves the attention of the United States. First, it is a moral issue which continues to prick the moral conscience of the world.

Secondly, America is a superpower with great responsibilities. When an area is a threat to international peace and security, members of the United Nations
and major powers in particular, cannot continue to turn a blind eye to dangerous developments. Thirdly, America has large investments in southern Africa and has a treaty with Portugal which is one of the major factors responsible for the crisis in this area. It is a matter of decision whether or not the interests of the United States in Portugal weigh more heavily than the interest of building peace on a more stable basis in southern Africa. Treaty obligations with Portugal, to which Congressman Charles Whalen Jr. referred in his opening remarks, stand in the way of the U.S. active participation in the removal of colonialism on the African continent. Indeed the future of the African-American relations will be greatly determined by the U.S. policy in matters relating to self-determination in southern Africa. No major power genuinely committed to peace and the welfare of mankind can ignore the unfolding crisis in this part of the world.

Africa need not repeat the assurance given to the white community in southern Africa about their future. For nowhere on this continent has an independent African country chosen deliberately to practice reverse racialism after independence. The manifesto on southern Africa is still on the table. It is not a document of confrontation. It is a challenge to minority regimes and their supporters to work out a just and lasting solution on the basis of equality. We in Zambian hope that the same realization, courage and conviction which have led President Nixon to take concrete steps toward normalization of relations with China will inspire America to adopt a more realistic and positive policy toward Africa in general and southern Africa in particular.

Our task is to build democracy. Our systems of government may differ because we are all looking for the best solution to problems. Look at the instability which plague Governments which operate under multiparty political systems. A multiparty system is not necessarily the best form of Democratic Government. Let us, therefore, give due weight to the enjoyment of full rights for all law-abiding citizens, but let us not be misled into thinking that this is possible only under one form of democracy. Democracy takes many forms. We therefore need the sympathy and understanding of the American people and the people of the world in our search for the best road to economic and social advancement.

We are partners in building peace and security in the world. The partnership involving a 200-year-old America, rich and full of experience, with a 10-year old continent of Africa, no doubt demands a lot from the older. But this is natural in many African customs. For in many of our villages, the strong must always help defend the weak. Similarly in our world community, the strong, the well endowed, must be ready to assist the weak in order that the entire community can move forward, matching its aspirations on every turning in peace and freedom.

I am glad that the agenda of this conference will cover these issues. We in Zambia are prepared to cooperate with every nation in the world that is ready to treat us on the basis of equality and respect. There is every reason why we should increase our cooperation with the United States. Our ties are deeply rooted in history, through the presence in that continent of millions of the descendants of Africans with whom we have unbreakable bonds of affinity.

It is my sincere hope that this conference will make a historic contribution to the American understanding of African problems. We welcome declarations of good will and good intentions, of commitment to principles and antiracialism and to self-determination for the oppressed peoples. Now we need to give concrete expression to our intentions, to our commitments by positive policies.

Let us give substance to the hopes of millions desiring to join the great march to prosperity in freedom. This is the challenge of the United States, Africa and the world. I, therefore, wish the conference every success in its deliberations.
APPENDIX 38

STATEMENT BY HON. CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR., AT THE CONFERENCE OF AFRICAN AND AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES, LUSAKA, ZAMBIA, JANUARY 20, 1972

I appreciate the opportunity to address this the final session of the Conference of African and American Representatives in Lusaka—a conference which has been particularly meaningful, and has provided a forum for discussion and for the exchange of viewpoints. It has furnished an opportunity for clarification of perceptions with respect to policy on African issues through open and forthright dialog.

As I read the papers this morning and saw the myopic perspective of a well-meaning friend, the New York Times, in decrying the holding of the Security Council meeting in Addis, the need for such interchange was reaffirmed in my mind. The New York Times mentions the expenditure of $150,000 and asks what is going to be the dividend. It then equates this to what the Times considers to be the impotence of the United Nations and rhetoric. The editorial concludes by asking how is the problem of minority rule in southern Africa to be solved by rhetoric in Africa when it has not been solved by rhetoric there in New York.

Of course, rhetoric at the United Nations is only impotence to those who are not perceptive. It still stands as the only instrument through which African members can express themselves and have confrontations with the superpowers and, in that sense, it is not rhetoric. To move the site of the deliberations on African issues is to bring African issues attention they have not been getting. One of the main deficiencies in the whole African liberation movement is the failure to seize the attention of the superpowers. It is a matter of priorities. A meeting in Africa will get priority, focus, drama and perhaps will make the dinosaur at least open one eye.

Another concept which I wish to address is that of violence versus nonviolence. He who disassociates himself from the use of any violent means for winning the war of liberation lacks a historical perspective. One of the remarkable characteristics of the whole African liberation movement has been the reasonableness with which Africans have pursued their course so that, out of all the 41 African nations, only two have been forced to obtain liberation by violence, Kenya and Algeria. But the kind of resistance that is being experienced in pursuit of independence in the remaining areas to be liberated invites violence, invites the use of all means available and all means that are necessary. The only question is, do the majority of blacks in these areas have the will to make the supreme sacrifice; and it is clear, just from what has been happening in Zimbabwe, in the past few days, that they do. That is another myth that has been exploded in the past few days—the myth that the Africans lack spirit—as evidenced in Zimbabwe and in Namibia, and as evidenced by the desperate attempts by the colonialists to offset the onrushing drive for freedom in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau—and as evidenced to us during our trip to South Africa last August in the growing determination and resistance in South Africa.

I am sure that the experience of my colleagues here at this conference explodes any notion that our African brethren do not realize the implications of certain aspects of American foreign policy that affect their interests. They are not fooled by the substitution of "foreign travel for foreign policy" as John Conyers so aptly phrased it. It is clear that our African brethren realize the meaning of recent U.S. actions:

The renewal of the sugar quota for South Africa.

The new statutory enactment authorizing the importation of chrome into the United States, notwithstanding U.S. international legal obligations under the Security Council resolutions.

The complicity of the U.S. Government in failing to discourage investment or to encourage equality in South Africa.

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U.S. abstention and negative votes on matters crucial to Africa at the United Nations.
The enormous, unprecedented and anomalous commitment of the United States to Portugal in the Azores Agreement.
I am sure it has been informative to our African friends to learn firsthand of the complexities of our government as it relates to foreign policy in Africa or elsewhere.
The fact that the Executive makes the decisions.
The frequent conflict between the White House and foreign policy advisers and professionals in the State Department.
The conflicting interests in the State Department itself between the African bureau and the European bureau which is following a pro-Portugal line, and with the Economic Bureau which is protecting business interests, and with the military who insist on the retention of the Azores and who evidently promote a military interest in southern Africa.
It has been informative, I am sure, to learn of our complicated legislative machinery. I am sure that it has been informative to learn about the importance of American public opinion as it relates to the political implications of American foreign policy, and how our aid to Africa has been affected by adverse American reactions to our experiences in other areas.
I am sure it has been informative to learn more about the emerging Congressional Black Caucus and its interests, to be informed about the other encouraging signs which point to a growing constituency for Africa in the United States.
Over 100 college campuses.
Other organizations whose concern with foreign policy in the past has not been noticeable, particularly with respect to Africa, such as the United Nations Association.
And other organizations which have been provincial in their outlook on civil rights are now beginning to see the implications of U.S. African policy for civil rights at home.
As testified to at the Congressional Black Caucus press conference, the presence here of four black Congressmen in Africa for the first time has been a renewal of our commitment. The Congressional Black Caucus has scheduled a National Conference on Africa in May.
A primary concern is the failure of the U.S. Government to have an AID concentration country in southern Africa.
Any position that it is only Africans seeking aid and that the United States has no interests in Africa is one sided. African nations look to America for assistance in the development of their countries. What does America look to African countries for? What is the quid pro quo for the United States? I do not think the average American or even the average delegate has a real clear picture of this. What are our interests?
Africa is the landmass between Europe and Asia. Therefore, U.S. interest lies in the geopolitics of the situation of Africa and in the 300 million people of Africa, and in the fact that any serious instability in an area of this size, and involving this number of people, is a threat to the peace of the world. Africa's strategic location in terms of worldwide communication links and natural resources, means that it is important to the United States. Moreover, any failure to recognize that the struggle in Africa will continue until liberation is won is myopic and inconsistent with U.S. interests.
And beyond independence, the United States needs the friendship and the good will of Africa for these same geopolitical reasons. Further, who knows what potentials there are in the skills and brainpower of Africans which are being lost to the world because of prejudice and neglect and divergence of interests.
Finally, Africans can learn much from their African-American brethren regarding the techniques of revolution, and they ought to examine and draw the lessons that we have gone through in order to move forward.
Out of the marches, out of the civil disobedience, out of the demonstrations, and out of the smoldering ruins of the ghettos of Detroit, Newark, Washington, and Watts—out of all of these there came a new recognition of the dignity of the black man. There came a realization on the part of the power structure that it is much simpler to share the benefits of our society equitably than it is to pay the price of repression.
APPENDIX 39

TEXT OF THE FIRST CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS PRESS CONFERENCE IN AFRICA, JANUARY 18, 1972

This is the first time that four black Members of the U.S. Congress have been on African soil at the same time. This press conference is being called because of the historical significance of this, our being together in Africa and in Zambia, which under the courageous and wise leadership of President Kenneth Kaunda has been a moving force in the political and economic liberation of Africa.

First, let me introduce the other Members, all of whom are lawyers: Congressman John Conyers, serving his third term from the State of Michigan. He is a member of the House Committees on Judiciary and Government Operations. Congressman Louis Stokes, serving his second term from the State of Ohio, is a member of the House Appropriations Committee. Congressman Charles Rangel, secretary of the Congressional Black Caucus, serving his first term from New York where he was previously elected to the State assembly. He is assigned to the Committee on Space and Aeronautics and the Committee on Public Works.

Our presence here in Africa, among other things, symbolizes the growing strength of black political power in the United States. There are 13 black Members of the House and one Senator, and we expected to add at least three more Congressmen of color as a result of the 1972 elections. This group stands at the top of approximately 2,000 black elected officials throughout the country serving at the local and State levels as members of school boards, city councils, law enforcement officers, judges, mayors, State legislators, commissioners, State elected officials, and so on. The Congressional Black Caucus provides a thrust for a new kind of leadership in America which focuses attention on black concerns both in the United States and abroad.

Our presence also symbolizes the ever-deepening affinity between Afro-Americans and our brethren here on this continent. We are particularly well aware of the imperfections regarding American foreign policy in Africa. We have stood out among its most severe critics. We have offered constructive alternatives. We have counseled our Government and the American people about the significance of Africa to America's economic and security interests. Finally, we have reminded all concerned about America's moral and legal responsibility for sharing the benefits of our society with the developing areas of the world, especially Africa.

Our Government's reply lacks the kind of motivation and commitment which characterized our assistance to Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. We are aghast at developments which have taken place with respect to U.S. policy in Africa during the past few months, highlighted by:

- The renewal of a sugar quota for South Africa,
- By a new statutory enactment authorizing the resumption of the importation of chrome from Rhodesia, notwithstanding our UN Charter obligations,
- By the restoration of the Azores Base Rights Agreement with Portugal, accompanied by an unprecedented financial quid pro quo amounting to approximately $436 million,
- By abstinence and negativism in U.S. votes on African issues at the General Assembly of the United Nations which just concluded.

It is deplorable that the black members of the American delegation cannot cross the borders of Zambia into Zimbabwe or Namibia. We charge that this refusal to permit our entry is blatant racism.

We are delighted to be joined by five of our white colleagues from the House and the Senate, all of whom have been involved in similar conferences before and who represent a growing base of interest regarding Africa in the U.S. Congress. We welcome their participation, for we realize that changes in American foreign policy in Africa are dependent upon factors which they can influence and are also dependent upon effective interracial coalitions.

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We believe that 1972 will be a crucial year in the emergence of a new American awareness about Africa. We hope to contribute significantly to this awareness by calling a national conference in May on U.S. policy in Africa to which will be drawn together for the first time a coalition of forces that cannot be ignored by the decisionmakers in our Government.

We have repeatedly recommended that bilateral aid be provided to majority-rulled countries in southern Africa in order to assist their efforts to decrease their economic reliance on their minority-rulled neighbors. We renew this commitment to encourage favorable consideration under the U.S. foreign assistance program. We are convinced that at least the Republic of Zambia should be accorded that status and that it should be one of the AID-concentration countries. We call upon our Government to make this concrete expression of our oral support for majority rule in southern Africa.

Finally, we pledge ourselves to seek Government and private contributions to the liberation movements in all of these territories, Azania, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Cape Verde.

At the conclusion of this, our first Black Caucus press conference in Africa, let the word go forth that we will not rest until the fight for the freedom of Africa is won.
Address by Sir Seretse Khama, President, on the Occasion of the Opening of the Chancery of the High Commission of the Republic of Zambia, Gaborone, October 25, 1971

This is an important occasion, not only for Botswana and Zambia, but also for Africa. Botswana is greatly honored and encouraged that the first chancery that Zambia has actually built in another country has been built in Botswana. I am greatly honored that my friend and colleague Dr. Kaunda has asked me to open it. And it is a real pleasure once again to welcome Minister Mudenda to Gaborone. We ask him to take back to Lusaka fraternal greetings from the Government and people of Botswana, and to convey our best wishes on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of Zambia's independence.

Zambia's decision to erect this building was first of all a contribution to the development of our capital. It was also a demonstration to the world that Zambia, like Botswana, regards the relationship between our two countries as a stable and enduring one.

This newly built Zambian High Commission here in Gaborone demonstrates that when the physical barriers which separate our two neighboring countries have been overcome the relationship will develop rapidly in our mutual interest. We are already progressing. Zambian Airways will shortly be flying between Lusaka and Gaborone. Zambia is also replacing the obsolete ferry at Kazungula with a modern one which can carry more traffic. This will not only help to bring our two countries closer together but will assist Botswana in our efforts to develop the Chobe district. Thanks to U.S. assistance, the route which the Botswana-Zambia highway will take is being traced across the bush of northern Botswana and the design of the road is in hand. We hope that if all goes well the road will be completed by 1975.

Then Botswana-Zambia relations, which at present are based mainly on common aspirations, will take on economic muscle. Our efforts to expand trade will be greatly stimulated. We shall be able to consult together and plan for further regional development.

But that is not to underestimate the significance of our existing relationship. This relationship is important to both our countries and it is a victory for African unity in the face of the forces which would seek to divide us. When Botswana achieved independence many in the outside world regarded this independence as merely nominal. Botswana's ability to make its own contribution to the total emancipation of Africa was doubted and our determination to work for African progress in southern Africa was contemptuously disregarded. We were described as a "hostage", a "satellite", a "client state." We were even accused by some of condoning the evils of racial discrimination and apartheid.

From the outset Zambia did not share this view. Zambia took our aspirations seriously, and despite her own difficulties extended moral support and practical assistance. This expression of confidence has been greatly appreciated, and our sense of unity with the Government and people of Zambia is very real.

Both countries understand the foundations of this unity. In many ways our situations are similar. Zambia is nearly surrounded by minority-ruled territories. Botswana, save for its boundary with Zambia, is entirely surrounded by the forces of minority rule. Zambia, despite the many problems involved, has not sacrificed its principles on the altar of geographical expediency. It has refused, at great cost to itself, to give comfort to the opponents of majority rule. Botswana too, though its options are more limited than are those of our sister republic, has always sought to be true to similar guiding principles.

We in Botswana have always made it clear that our geographical position places certain serious limitations on the contribution we can make to common African causes, but we have never sought to conceal that our national objectives are those of Africa. We have always stated our confidence in the eventual triumph of human dignity and self-determination in southern African. We have always refused to give comfort to those who seek to deny these fundamental rights to the oppressed people of our region.

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As a result of an effort to give broad geographic distribution to self-help funds, the funds for the fiscal years 1968–71 have been directed to projects in 12 of the CAR's 14 prefectures.

A determination to apply the limited funds available to high impact sectors has resulted in the following distribution of projects and amounts for the fiscal years 1968–71:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Percentage of projects</th>
<th>Percentage of amounts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and rural development</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and social affairs</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth and education</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Typical of the kinds of activities falling into these sectoral categories are the following:

**Agriculture and Rural Development**
- Material for the construction of control centers for the prevention of cattle disease.
- Machines for the CAR's pilot dairy farm.
- Peanut-shelling machines.
- Manioc-crushing machines.

**Health and Social Affairs**
- Material for the construction of a nurses-training center.
- Material for the extension of dispensary facilities.
- Material for the reconstruction of a child day-care center.
- Purchase of potable-water distribution apparatus.

**Youth and Education**
- Material for the construction of youth centers.
- Furniture for youth centers.
- Material for the construction or reconstruction of schools.

American participation in Self-Help activities has won praise from all levels of the CAR population. Each proposed expenditure is based on a request signed by a CAR official of the locality concerned. That official thereby becomes responsible for the proper execution of the project. The CAR Government is thus assured that it is aware of the Embassy's activities; the Embassy receives assurance by the same procedure that each proposed expenditure warrants the attention of the CAR authorities.

At the time of the study mission, the Embassy had requested that a total of $175,000 be made available for the Ambassador's Self-Help Fund for fiscal year 1971.
9. It was in accordance with these principles that we declared our support for the Lusaka Manifesto. Our endorsement of this fundamental and constructive document is a matter of public record. This is why Botswana refuses to endorse any proposal for unconditional dialog with the minority regimes. But, despite our clear assertion that the only dialog we favor is a dialog based on the commitment to the principles of human dignity and equality set out in the manifesto, there are those who continue to group Botswana with certain elements who seem prepared to advocate dialog on any terms.

10. Let me take this opportunity to reiterate the true position. Botswana will talk to any African country about steps that can usefully be taken to advance the objectives of the Organization of African Unity. We will support any practical measures proposed to promote African cooperation and unity. But we are not interested in new groupings which would have the effect of undermining the unity which has been so painfully achieved. We will not assist anyone who hopes to bring about a return to an Africa divided between those labeled "moderate" and those labeled "radical."

11. There should be ample opportunity within the institutions of the OAU to exchange views on how best to achieve common objectives. It is within the OAU that strategies and tactics should be reviewed and any differences resolved. And the OAU must organize its affairs so that realistic and serious analysis and objective discussion of our common problems is possible.

12. So far as dialog is concerned, I want to repeat that our position remains unchanged and that our support for the Lusaka Manifesto has in no way diminished. We continue to believe that the offer it contains should remain open. And we could not endorse an interpretation of the manifesto which would shut the door on meaningful dialog which had as its mutually agreed objective the ending of minority rule. But until there is a positive response to the manifesto, no comfort should be given to the minority regimes which have rejected its peaceful and constructive message.

13. Until the manifesto's challenge is taken up, dialog will be without significant content and will serve no useful purpose. Nor would it be helpful if external powers were to encourage meaningless dialog in the mistaken belief that it is the genuine article. We respect and share the desire that change should come peacefully. Since it is Africa that would suffer most from an extension of violence, it is Africa that has most to gain by working for peaceful change. But change there must be. And dialog which simply serves to shore up an oppressive status quo will not contribute to stability or a lasting peace. Stability which is not firmly based on solutions which meet the aspirations of the oppressed will inevitably be temporary and illusory.

14. Thus a settlement in Rhodesia which does not meet the just demands of 5 million Africans will not be a contribution to peace and stability. Contacts between independent Africa and the minority regimes will not achieve peace and stability while there remains no genuine contact on a basis of complete equality and mutual respect between black and white within these countries.

15. Therefore, rather than promoting deceptive stability, those external powers who are concerned to exert a beneficial influence on the affairs of this region should continue to press for reform on the part of the minority regimes and at the same time urge restraint upon them. It should be pointed out to the ruling minorities that the only rational and responsible answer to the internal violence provoked by their policies is peaceful change—certainly not ambiguous threats to extend the violence they themselves have brought about.

16. Meanwhile independent Africa must strengthen itself. In present circumstances this will best be achieved by cooperating with each other in the interests of development and self-reliance. Africa's strongest defense is unity—and not only unity between countries but unity within them. Indeed, the greatest threat to African progress comes not from the military might of the minority regimes but from weaknesses within our own societies which our enemies seek to exploit. Different countries will employ different means to achieve the same objective. But the objective must be achieved. We must feed the hungry, find jobs for the unemployed, struggle to insure that independence has real meaning for all. Only thus can we continue to offer hope to our brothers and sisters who have still to achieve their freedom.

18. May I now declare open this chancery which is a tangible symbol of the unity which our two countries have achieved.
APPENDIX 41

SOUTHERN AFRICA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY

(By Gilad Loewenstein and Sean Gervasi, Oxford University, January 1972)

RESEARCH NOTES*

The purpose of this investigation is to ascertain the facts about the role of southern Africa in the world economy. The region is generally thought to be one of the more remote corners of the third world. It is certainly isolated. And it is, in terms of per capita income, one of the poorest parts of the world. But it is far from unimportant. Trade and capital flows between southern Africa and the rest of the world are relatively small. They do not compare, for instance, with the flows between the United States and Latin America. But these flows are important to a few Western nations. In some ways they are critical. What is more, they are likely to become much more important in the future. The economy of southern Africa is closely linked to the Western economic system. Four countries in particular are very closely linked to southern Africa. And, in the view of their governments, these countries have crucial strategic interests in the area.

It is generally taken for granted that regions like southern Africa could not "do without the assistance they receive from the rich countries." The poor countries are often spoken of as if they were the helpless and dependent children of the rich. This, of course, a false and misleading view. There is a very little bit of truth in it. On the whole, however, it hides a refusal to face the realities of domination and dependence in the world economy. We are concerned in this investigation with a different kind of dependence which has received far less attention. We are concerned with the dependence of the wealthy countries upon the poor, and in particular with the dependence of the Western industrial nations upon southern Africa. The question which needs to be raised is whether Western industry really could function without the markets and the raw materials to be found in the third world. So far as southern Africa is concerned, we do not have enough information to answer this question fully. Our purpose, again, is to get at the facts.

The authors have not yet been able to complete a full investigation of the economic links between southern Africa and the Western nations. That would require a comprehensive analysis of the following questions:

1. What is the value of total investment in southern Africa for Western nations? Is this value growing relative to the total of overseas investment?
2. What is the relative importance of direct and indirect investments? What is the sectoral distribution of investments?
3. What are the returns to investments in the area? Are profits relatively high? What is the volume of repatriated earnings, interest and management fees? What is the value of retained earnings?
4. What proportion of corporate profits is generated in the area? Is that proportion growing?
5. What is the annual flow of investments to the area? Is it growing in relation to flows going to other areas? Could the capital be invested profitably in the domestic economy?
6. What is the value of imports to the region? What is the value of sales of overseas subsidiary companies in the region? Is the total of the two rising as a percentage of domestically generated output?
7. What is the value of imports from the region? Are the commodities imported of importance? Can they be replaced elsewhere?
8. Is there a growing net dependence on imported raw materials and minerals? Is the proportion of imports from the region high in relation to domestic consumption of imported commodities? Is it rising rapidly in relation to domestic consumption?

A number of other questions would have to be asked as well. But these are the principal ones which require investigation. Certain answers to these questions would mean that the Western economy could not function without the

*Note.—These are notes from work in progress. All figures are provisional.
maintenance of "normal economic relations" with southern Africa. They could establish a high degree of dependence by the rich upon the poor.

We do not know what the final answers will be yet. Our investigation has so far been concerned only with the question of southern Africa's exports to the industrial nations. Nevertheless, even at this early point, it has become clear that southern Africa is beginning to play an important role in the Western economic system. More particularly, it is clear that the Western industrial countries are jointly dependent upon southern Africa for essential raw material supplies. The region is currently producing and exporting a large percentage of the world supply of many important minerals. These exports are essential to the functioning of modern industry. The bulk of southern Africa's production is shipped to the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. These countries could not find alternative sources of supply for many of the minerals exported from the region. Such facts underline the meaning of "dependence" in the context of the present investigation.

The dependence of Western economies on foreign sources of raw materials is not generally recognized. One reason, of course, is that this dependence has become significant only in the last few decades. It is important to understand the forces which have created this new dependence in order to deal rationally with the problems which it creates. Dependence arises essentially as a result of the expansion of industrial production. It is in a sense one of the cumulative effects of economic growth. Industrial production requires large inputs of minerals and energy. As it expands over time, these requirements expand as well. They may even increase more rapidly than the volume of output. When levels of production are very high, the demand for mineral inputs can become enormous.

Let us take an example. The United States was relatively rich in minerals at the turn of the century. It has supplies enough at home for current levels of production. The enormous and unprecedented growth of the last 70 years, however, has changed that situation. The demand for imported raw materials clearly depends upon other factors besides the volume of production, notably the kind of technology which a country uses and the pattern of its production. But at very high levels of production the volume of output has so far proved the crucial determinant. In the case of the United States, the achievement of high levels of production has led to demands for minerals and raw materials which simply cannot be met by the domestic economy. The United States is now a significant net importer of minerals. It is, in other words, dependent, perhaps even critically so, upon foreign supplies of minerals.

One need only consider briefly the figures for net imports of minerals in order to find confirmation of this conclusion. The following figures give the ratio of net imports to consumption for all minerals except gold (annual averages in 1954 dollars):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900-1909</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-1919</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-1939</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-1949</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1959</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is possible to cite much more evidence, especially as regards key minerals like bauxite (for which net imports in 1966 were 638 percent of domestic mine production). The point may be taken as established. A rich industrial economy cannot any longer function without large imports of industrial raw materials, especially minerals.

Policymakers in the United States have been acutely aware for some time that the country is becoming more and more dependent upon the rest of the world for supplies of raw materials. The point was made in almost alarmed tones by the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy in 1954:

This transition of the United States from a position of relative self-sufficiency to one of increasing dependence upon foreign sources of supply constitutes one of the most striking economic changes of our time. The outbreak of World War II marked the major turning point of this change. Both from the viewpoint of our long-term economic growth and the viewpoint of our defense, the shift of the United States from the position of a net exporter of minerals to that of a net importer is of overshadowing significance in shaping our foreign economic policies.
We have always been almost entirely dependent on imports for tin, nickel and the platinum group of metals. In addition, our requirements for asbestos, chromite, graphite, manganese, mercury, mica, and tungsten have been generally covered by imports. Prior to World War II, this was about the extent of our list of strategic materials; that is, mineral substances of which our requirements are wholly or substantially supplied by foreign sources. At present, by contrast, the United States is fully self-sufficient only in coal, sulfur, potash, molybdenum, and magnesium. What is true for the United States is even more true of countries like the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Japan. These countries have seen total output rise rapidly to very high levels in the space of 2 or 3 decades. None of them is well endowed with natural resources.

They are, consequently, even more dependent upon foreign supplies of essential materials for industry than is the United States. Their dependence, in other words, is greater than that of the United States. In particular, these countries are highly dependent upon exports of minerals from southern Africa. That dependence, furthermore, is likely to increase. The joint dependence of the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Japan is enormous.

The tables which are attached to these notes provide some useful figures for defining more precisely the nature, areas and degree of that dependence. A number of conclusions emerge from these figures. We note only some of the more obvious.

1. Southern Africa produces very high proportions of the world supply of more than 10 important minerals. Many of these, such as cobalt, vanadium, chromite, and copper, are of critical importance to metallurgical, machinery, and electrical industries. Others are important to other industries.

2. The Republic of South Africa produces an important part of the region’s exports of minerals. Zambia and the Congo produce significant quantities of certain minerals.

3. The reserves of minerals already in production and of other minerals, including petroleum, are very high and constitute an important proportion of world reserves in many cases. The potential for expansion of production and for exploitation of new minerals is great.

4. The importance of southern African mineral supplies in the world is rising and will probably continue to rise.

5. The United States uses a substantial proportion of South African uranium, antimony, chromite, diamonds and asbestos in its total domestic consumption of those minerals. The quantities imported are large and could not easily be replaced. U.S. dependence on South African supplies appears to be growing.

6. United Kingdom dependence on South African supplies is enormous. The proportion of total consumption of antimony, platinum, asbestos, clay, chromium and mica which is imported from South Africa is very large. Dependence on southern Africa is obviously much greater still. Dependence on South Africa appears to be growing rapidly for a number of minerals.

7. West German dependence on South African minerals supplies is very great. Imports of manganese, chromium, asbestos, copper, diamonds, mica and nickel are high and growing very rapidly.

8. Japan does not appear to be as dependent upon South African supplies as West Germany. It imports a very high proportion of its consumption of manganese, asbestos and chromium from South Africa. But the most notable feature of Japan’s relations with South Africa is that the degree of its dependence is growing very rapidly.

9. The joint dependence of all these countries on southern African minerals is of a very high degree. Supplies from the region are critical to their economies.

It is important to note that the dependence spoken of here is a Joint dependence by the Western countries on southern Africa. If one considers only the link between a particular country and southern Africa, “dependence” may seem a strong term. But the region must be seen as a whole. For it is the political fate of the whole region which is at issue in the next 15 years. There is little doubt that the future of the region will be profoundly affected by its experience under the white regimes which now hold sway there. The countries of the subcontinent are likely to be of a single mind, and they may well react against those powers.
which have implicitly supported the white regimes against the liberation movements. More particularly, they will wish, after liberation, to pursue policies for economic development which will involve profound changes in the structure of the southern African economy. Such change will inevitably mean a move away from the present massive dependence upon the export of minerals to Western countries.

There is, therefore, a grave conflict of interest between the poor countries and the rich. In the case of southern Africa and the West, this conflict is not yet very sharply felt. The people of the region have no voice in government, at least in many parts of the area, and they are unable to do anything about the fact that their economic system is essentially an appendage of the free world economy. But the Western nations must clearly begin to think about the problem.

There are two alternatives for them in the future. The Western nations can create a new technology which substantially reduces the need for mineral inputs. This would release resources in the poor countries for domestic development. On the other hand, the rich must try to stabilize the status quo in the area in order to permit the continued exploitation of mineral resources. It would be easy to opt for the second choice. But the question must remain whether such a choice would ultimately be any more feasible than the attempt to maintain Western hegemony in Southeast Asia.

The final results of this investigation may be seen in two ways. Some may come to the conclusion that the Western countries cannot possibly afford any political uncertainty in southern Africa. They may go beyond that—and there are signs that this may be happening—to the formulation and execution of plans for keeping Africa in our camp. This seems to be the drift of thinking among certain strategic planners. The authors prefer to think that their conclusions will point to the necessity of renegotiating the terms on which the peoples of southern Africa coexist in the world economy. The present terms are highly advantageous to the rich. And they block the possibility of progress in most poor countries. This is certainly the case in southern Africa. These terms simply cannot endure. So it is best to begin to do something about them while there is time.

### Table 1: Production of Minerals in Southern Africa As a Percentage of World Production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mineral Type</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1969</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>68.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gem diamonds</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>63.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial diamonds</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cobalt (contained)</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>56.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chrome</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanadium 1 (ore and concentrate)</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platinum group metals</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermiculite</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimony</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper (ore and concentrate)</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uranium 4 (contained)</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manganese 3 (ore)</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beryllium 5 (beryl)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zinc (ore)</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mica 7 (mica)</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin (ore and concentrate)</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fluorspar</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nickel (ore)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead 4 (lead and concentrate)</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver (ore and concentrate)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron ore</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal 6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbium and Tantalum</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asbestos</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graphite (natural)</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Includes South Africa, Namibia, Rhodesia, Zambia, Zaire, Angola, Mozambique, Swaziland, Botswana, Malagasy Republic.
1 All percentages less than 0.1 percent not considered.
2 Namibia production is of lead vanadate concentrate. South Africa production is of vanadium pentoxide.
3 Free world production only.
4 South Africa and Botswana = 30+ Mn concentrate. Angola and Zambia = 35+ Mn concentrate. Zaire = 42+ Mn concentrate.
5 1967 figure for Rhodesia is taken from U.S. imports.
6 Malagasy Republic figures include block splittings and scrap.
7 Zambia figures are for smelter production. Namibia figures are of recoverable ore.
8 All coal is bituminous. Rhodesian figures are of sales.
9 Not available.

TABLE 2.—PRODUCTION OF MINERALS IN SOUTH AFRICA AS A PERCENTAGE OF WORLD PRODUCTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>67.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermiculite</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>29.79</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platinum + GP metals</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimony ore</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanadium</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chromite</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamonds</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uranium (UO₂)</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manganese (30+5% Mn)</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asbestos</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flourspar</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mica</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 World production derived from listed figures only.
2 Preliminary figures.
3 Production figures for South Africa are only estimates and represent the quantity produced from platinum ores and osmiridium from gold ores.
4 Vanadium is vanadium pentoxide. South Africa includes vanadium in ammonium metavanadate, but not in slag production of which began in 1968.
5 Production is of natural industrial and gem diamonds.
6 Free World production only. No data available for Hungary, U.S.S.R., East Germany, West Germany, Czechoslovakia, India, Italy, and Japan.
7 Includes sheet and scrap mica.
8 NB Production figures for South Africa exclude Namibia, Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland.


TABLE 3.—UNITED STATES: IMPORTS FROM SOUTH AFRICA AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL U.S. IMPORTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uranium (UO₂)</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>39.15</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>75.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimony + (ore and concentrate)</td>
<td>19.95</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermiculite</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chromite</td>
<td>10.25</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamonds (industrial and gem)</td>
<td>8.79</td>
<td>7.70</td>
<td>6.23</td>
<td>5.47</td>
<td>9.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asbestos</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper +</td>
<td>5.71</td>
<td>6.82</td>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>2.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nickel (ore and concentrate)</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>8.12</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>6.02</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 All percentages are derived from proportions in monetary values except for those of nickel, lead, and manganese in table 4.
2 All import figures include ores and concentrates of mercury, cobalt, plutonium, magnesium, beryllium, and columbium.
3 Consumption figures are of antimony ore and concentrate only.
4 Figures include all minerals in S.I.T.C. category 27.99.
6 Includes ore, unwrought, and alloys and scrap.
7 Unwrought, alloys and scrap are included in table 4.
8 U.S. consumption and imports are of 35+5% Mn.

TABLE 4.—UNITED STATES: IMPORTS FROM S.A. AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL U.S. CONSUMPTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chromite</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimony + (ore and concentrate)</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamonds (industrial and gem)</td>
<td>9.15</td>
<td>7.30</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>11.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermiculite</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>8.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uranium (UO₂)</td>
<td>9.25</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>8.32</td>
<td>6.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asbestos</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>1.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manganese + (ore and concentrate)</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>1.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver</td>
<td>Less than 0.5% in each year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 All percentages are derived from proportions in monetary values except for those of nickel, lead, and manganese in table 4.
2 All import figures include ores and concentrates of mercury, cobalt, plutonium, magnesium, beryllium and columbium.
3 Consumption figures are of antimony ore and concentrate only.
4 Figures include all minerals in S.I.T.C. category 27.99.
6 Includes ore, unwrought, and alloys and scrap.
7 Unwrought, alloys and scrap are included in table 4.
8 U.S. consumption and imports are of 35+5% Mn.
9 NA Not available.

TABLE 5.—WEST GERMANY: IMPORTS FROM SOUTH AFRICA AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL IMPORTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manganese (ore and concentrate)</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chromium (chromite)</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asbestos (crude)</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermiculite (4)</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clay (crude)</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>8.68</td>
<td>8.48</td>
<td>9.29</td>
<td>9.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper (unwrought, alloys and scrap)</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>7.72</td>
<td>8.10</td>
<td>7.78</td>
<td>8.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mica (crude)</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>8.08</td>
<td>7.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feldspar and fluorspar (crude)</td>
<td>6.82</td>
<td>5.98</td>
<td>7.42</td>
<td>5.91</td>
<td>5.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamonds (industrial and gem)</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>5.24</td>
<td>7.45</td>
<td>4.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nickel (unwrought, alloys)</td>
<td>5.16</td>
<td>3.98</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 South African figures include Namibia, Botswana, Swaziland.
2 Percent is derived from a monetary value relationship.
3 Asbestos includes crude and partly worked.
4 Vermiculite is part of the SITC category 276.99 from which figures have been taken for table 7. Very little vermiculite seems to have been imported and/or consumed.


TABLE 6.—WEST GERMANY: IMPORTS FROM SOUTH AFRICA AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CONSUMPTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manganese (ore and concentrate)</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>65.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chromium (chromite)</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mica (crude)</td>
<td>8.56</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.29</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nickel (unwrought, alloys)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>6.43</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asbestos (crude)</td>
<td>7.58</td>
<td>7.11</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clay (crude)</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>7.95</td>
<td>7.32</td>
<td>5.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feldspar and fluorspar (crude)</td>
<td>6.53</td>
<td>7.40</td>
<td>12.35</td>
<td>11.75</td>
<td>6.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamonds (industrial and gem)</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermiculite (4)</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 South African figures include Namibia, Botswana, Swaziland.
2 Percent is derived from a weight relationship except for diamonds. Consumption is derived from a combination of production plus imports minus exports.
3 In table 9 asbestos includes crude and partly worked.
4 Not available.
5 Vermiculite is part of the SITC category 276.99 from which figures have been taken for table 7. Very little vermiculite seems to have been imported and/or consumed.


TABLE 7.—JAPAN: IMPORTS FROM SOUTH AFRICA AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL IMPORTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asbestos (crude)</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chromium (chromite)</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manganese (ore and concentrate)</td>
<td>6.08</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clay</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pig iron</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermiculite (4)</td>
<td>5.19</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feldspar and fluorspar (crude)</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nickel (ore, concentrate and matte)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.22</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron ore</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>6.94</td>
<td>8.61</td>
<td>8.25</td>
<td>6.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimony (ore and concentrate)</td>
<td>6.05</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>9.36</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>5.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamonds (gem, industrial and gem dust)</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>9.37</td>
<td>7.16</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Percent is derived from a monetary relationship in table 7 and a weight relationship in all of table 8 except diamonds.
2 South African figures include Namibia, Botswana, and Swaziland.
3 Figures are for all minerals in the relevant SITC category. This makes correlation with consumption rather difficult.
4 Mainly fluorspar imported from South Africa. Consumption of fluorspar in 1965 and 1966 was much less than that of feldspar. Home production accounts for over 90 percent of feldspar consumption and accounts for less than 10 percent of fluorspar consumption. These points would suggest a greater independence on South Africa for fluorspar than indicated.

TABLE 8.—JAPAN: IMPORTS FROM SOUTH AFRICA AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CONSUMPTION

[In percent]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chromium (chromite)</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asbestos (crude)</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manganese (ore and concentrate)</td>
<td>4.53</td>
<td>8.25</td>
<td>9.91</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feldspar and fluorspar (crude) 4</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>6.33</td>
<td>8.12</td>
<td>6.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron ore</td>
<td>3.98</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>7.36</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>5.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clay</td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>2.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamonds (gem, industrial and gem dust)</td>
<td>10.05</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>9.95</td>
<td>7.33</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pig iron</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimony (ore and concentrate) 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nickel (ore, concentrate and matte)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermiculite</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 South African figures include Namibia, Botswana, and Swaziland.
2 Consumption figures are derived from a combination of production plus imports minus exports.
3 Mainly fluor spar imported from South Africa. Consumption of fluor spar in 1965 and 1966 was much less than that of feldspar. Home production accounts for over 90 percent of feldspar consumption and accounts for less than 10 percent of fluor spar consumption. These points would suggest a greater independence in South Africa for fluor spar than indicated.
4 Figures are for all minerals in the relevant SITC category. This makes correlation with consumption rather difficult.
5 In the case of vermiculite, probably none was imported and/or consumed.
6 Not available.


TABLE 9.—ABSOLUTE CONSUMPTION OF VARIOUS MINERALS BY COUNTRY, 1969

[In thousands of metric tons]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mineral</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>West Germany</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antimony (ore and concentrate)</td>
<td>16,2</td>
<td>18,9</td>
<td>5, 8</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asbestos</td>
<td>1,711</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clay (crude)</td>
<td></td>
<td>420</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper (ore, concentrate and matte)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>205</td>
<td>1,271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamonds (gem and industrial)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>885</td>
<td>5,236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feldspar (crude)</td>
<td>1,496</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron ore</td>
<td>142,000</td>
<td>30,568</td>
<td>51,109</td>
<td>85,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead (ore and concentrate)</td>
<td>1,567</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manganese (ore and concentrate)</td>
<td>1,960</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>2,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mica (crude)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>707</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platinum group metals (troy ounces)</td>
<td>1,957</td>
<td>863</td>
<td>3,874</td>
<td>718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver (troy ounces)</td>
<td>142,000</td>
<td>79,000</td>
<td>32,904</td>
<td>36,864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uranium (U3O8)</td>
<td>11,250</td>
<td></td>
<td>32,904</td>
<td>36,864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanadium</td>
<td>5,6</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>615.7</td>
<td>380.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermiculite</td>
<td>272.5</td>
<td>212.7</td>
<td>( )</td>
<td>( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zinc (ore)</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>1,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper (scrap, unwrought, etc.)</td>
<td>2,045</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>1,028</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Apparent consumption figures generally derived from production plus imports minus exports.
2 Included in category containing magnesium ore and concentrate, mercury, bismuth, beryllium, cobalt, plutonium, radium, and columbium ores and concentrate.
3 1966 figures—1965 figures not available.
4 Not available.
5 Production is of low-grade ore.
6 Includes all gem dust.
7 Imports are general. Production is of 35-plus percent Mn.
8 Excludes coinage.
9 Includes thorium ore.
10 Includes molybdenum, tantalum, and zirconium. U.S. figures include only vanadium.
11 This figure is not strictly comparable to others.
12 U.S. figures include slab zinc.
13 U.S. figures include primary and old scrap. West Germany and Japan figures include alloys, unwrought and scrap.
14 Source is Annual Abstract of Statistics of the Department of Trade and Industry.

Antimony is used in combination with other substances as a hardener and to inhibit chemical decay. It is used in antifriction bearings and with lead to produce cast printing type. It is used, as a compound, for fireproofing and in the production of paints and ammunition.

Asbestos is used as a fireproofing material in cloth. It can be spun or woven. It is used in the manufacture of cement, board, tiles and paint.

Chromite is used in the manufacture of special steels and alloys. It is added to iron, nickel, and other metals to increase their strength and their resistance to corrosion and oxidation. It is used in the manufacture of chemicals and pigments and in dyeing and tanning.

Cobalt is used in the manufacture of tool steels, magnets, and jet engines. Cobalt steel alloys resist corrosion and high temperatures. Cobalt 60 is a radioisotope.

Columbium is important in the manufacture of stainless steel alloys which resist high temperatures. These alloys are used in nuclear power reactors. Columbium is also used in the manufacture of electron tubes.

Copper is valuable for its properties as a conductor and is essential in the manufacture of electrical equipment. It is used, as a compound, for fireproofing and in the production of paints and ammunition.

Fluorspar is used as a flux in the manufacture of open hearth steel. It is also used for refining lead and antimony and for the manufacture of aluminum fluoride and artificial cryolite. It is used as a catalyst in the manufacture of high-octane fuels.

Lead has a variety of industrial uses. Its most important single use is in the manufacture of storage batteries. Other metals, including silver, copper, zinc, cadmium, and tin, can be recovered in lead smelting and refining operations.

Manganese has no substitute as a purifying agent in the manufacture of steel. It is used to deoxidize and desulfurize steel.

Nickel is used as a hardening agent in the manufacture of tool steels. High nickel alloys resist heat and corrosion and are essential to the manufacture of steels for machinery. They are used in combination with chromium in the production of jet engines.

Platinum metals resist corrosion and have a high melting point. They are used in the manufacture of crucibles, electrical contacts, and sparking parts. They are also used as catalysts in metallurgical industries.

Vanadium in the form of ferrovanadium is used in the manufacture of high-strength tool and engineering steels. Vanadium pentoxide and ammonium metavanadate are also useful catalysts.

Vermiculite is an important constituent in materials designed to give thermal and acoustic insulation. It is widely used in the building and packaging industries.
PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE)

While in Bangui, Central African Republic, the study mission received the invitation to visit Congo (Brazzaville) via Ambassador Yost at the United Nations. Our reception in Brazzaville was exceptionally friendly and we met and exchanged views with several Government officials as well as the representatives of the West German Embassy.

Relations between the United States and Congo (Brazzaville), which had been maintained on a friendly basis since the Congo achieved independence in 1960, were severely strained during 1965 by instances of arrest, detention incommunicado and, in two cases, expulsion of U.S. diplomats and officials by Congolese authorities. In August 1965, Secretary of State Rusk informed the Ambassador of the Congo that all official U.S. personnel were being withdrawn because disregard of diplomatic privileges, harassment, and improper treatment by the Congolese authorities made it impossible to maintain representation.

At the time of the suspension of relations, the Congolese Government was informed that the United States would be prepared to consider reopening its Embassy upon receiving meaningful assurances of respect for the full range of diplomatic rights, privileges, and immunities for official personnel. The Embassy of the Federal German Republic was asked to represent U.S. interests after the withdrawal.

Congolese reaction to the suspension of relations was reflected in President Massamba-Debat's declaration at the time that his country had never been hostile to the United States and that the incidents which led to the withdrawal of U.S. representatives resulted from the use of American military aid against his country's interests by the government of Moise Tshombe in Zaire. "In other countries," he was quoted as saying, "the American Embassy would have been burned to the ground." Congolese representatives were withdrawn from Washington and assigned to the Congo U.N. Mission in New York.

Our study mission was the first Americans to be received by Government officials in Brazzaville since the suspension of diplomatic relations 6 years earlier. During the 8 hours there, we had talks with Boniface Matino, Finance Minister and Acting Foreign Minister. We also met with Paul Kimbouala-Kaya, Commissioner for External Affairs of the Congolese Workers' Party which we understand makes all important decisions. An additional half dozen officials had a lengthy luncheon with the study mission.

Although these talks indicated an exceptionally friendly atmosphere the Congo (B) is not prepared at this time to restore diplomatic relations with the United States. They are, however, concerned that the correct interpretation of their position is understood in the United States, and they show interest in economic relations. Kimbouala-Kaya stated that the people of the Peoples Republic of the Congo held no
animosity toward the American people, but given existing U.S. Government policies vis-a-vis Vietnam, South Africa, and Portugal, diplomatic relations were not at present feasible.

The People's Republic of the Congo maintains close relations with the Socialist states (U.S.S.R., Communist China, North Vietnam). In April 1970, the People's Republic of the Congo took up diplomatic relations with the German Democratic Republic (GDR). In return the GDR promised $6 million for development aid. France, the former colonial power, still exerts a large influence in the field of economy and culture. Yet, the Congolese have been making attempts to diminish the influence of France (nationalization of one of the largest enterprises in the country—the sugar refinery in Jacob—and designs to abandon the French educational system in favor of a socialized system.)

As a socialist state in the heart of Africa, the Republic of Congo is suspiciously watched by her neighboring countries which, politically, are differently oriented. Regardless of the July 1970 reconciliation, the foregoing is especially true concerning her relations with Zaire. Among the African and international organizations, the Republic of Congo has made herself a name as a progressivist pioneer of socialism in black Africa. In her contacts with international bodies, the Republic of Congo has consistently championed the admission of the GDR.

In the field of development aid, the countries of the Eastern Bloc had so far committed themselves in the Congo as follows:

**U.S.S.R.**
- Building of a 120-room hotel in Brazzaville (credit of approximately 36 million DM).
- Building of a hospital for women in Brazzaville.
- Arrival of 70 Soviet teachers.
- A total of 400 Congolese students have so far studied in the Soviet Union.

**China**
- Construction of a textile mill in Brazzaville (credit of approximately 80 million DM).
- Budget and goods credit of 20 million DM.
- State farm in Kumbe.
- Shipyard in Brazzaville (cornerstone ceremony on July 23, 1970).
- Plan for the building of a hospital in Fort Rouset and construction of a railway line between Brazzaville and Dolisie.
- The negotiations concerning the building of a hydroelectric power station in Bouenza have not yet been concluded. (Credit aid of $50 million.)

**North Korea**
- (Mid-1970.) Inauguration of a match factory in Bétou.

**German Democratic Republic**
- In connection with the $6 million promised by the GDR to the Congo at the time when the diplomatic relations between the two
countries were initiated, the following three projects were earmarked for realization:

Building of a cooking oil factory in Jacob;
Directive transmitter stations between Brazzaville and Ouesso; and
Shipment of diesel units for providing electric power.

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES

The Peoples Republic of the Congo, more frequently referred to as Congo (Brazzaville), is relatively poor in natural resources. The range of its agricultural products is the same as that found elsewhere in central Africa and, except for lumber and sugar, exportable agricultural production is insignificant. Mineral resources are virtually nonexistent although there is a good possibility that the oil deposits off the coast of neighboring Cabinda may extend into Congo (B) waters.

The country does, however, have some economic assets which lend themselves to further modest exploitation. Most importantly it enjoys a favorable situation with respect to transportation of finished goods and raw materials into and out of the central African region. Gabon, Chad, and the Central African Republic all rely heavily on the port facilities at Pointe Noire and the connecting rail and water transportation network. With the saturation of the port of Matadi, Zaire has also begun to show signs of interest in Congo (B)'s transportation facilities to help relieve some of the pressure on the clogged arteries between Kinshasa and the sea. However, the condition of the Pointe Noire-Brazzaville rail system is a limiting factor. Studies have been made which envisage reconstruction of major sections of this line but work could not begin for several years.

Closer economic cooperation between Congo (B) and Zaire would be beneficial for both in the opinion of many experts. In addition to making available its transportation facilities, Congo (B) could provide Zaire with cement which is now in short supply there. The German-built and supervised cement plant at Loutete in Congo (B) is currently producing 50,000 tons per year. Its capacity is 80,000 tons/year and this could be raised to 150,000 tons with a relatively small investment for expansion of the present plant. Such an expansion would probably require an input of outside capital. For the foreseeable future there will probably be a sufficient demand in Zaire to absorb the entire output of the Loutete plant operating at maximum capacity.

Another product of Congo (B) which could find a natural market across the river is sugar. Zaire's import requirements are estimated at over 10,000 tons annually. Before nationalization in September 1970 the large French owned and operated SIAN complex at Jacob together with the Niari Sugar Company (SOSUNIARI) were producing 60,000 tons of refined sugar annually but were having difficulty marketing it.

Other agricultural projects which have been contemplated for Congo (B) include the establishment of a pineapple plantation with an associated canning factory by a subsidiary of the Libby, McNeil and Libby Corp., which was attracted by the fact that conditions are favorable for growing pineapples of good quality in the Niari Valley area. However, experimental work was stopped in 1965 and the cur-
rent status of Libby's interest in this area is unknown. Also the East Germans have offered to finance the construction of a peanut oil factory in the same area but the future of this project is uncertain.

The prospects for tourism in Congo (B) are limited. There are no really outstanding natural attractions, although the beaches are pleasant and might be further developed. Brazzaville itself offers a modest potential for drawing tourists from Kinshasa as that city's large and relatively affluent expatriate population finds itself short of places which can be visited with a minimum expenditure of time and money. Brazzaville's reputation for good restaurants and quiet charm used to draw many visitors from across the river in days when travel was unrestricted.

Such economic opportunities as exist in Congo (Brazzaville) are clouded by the political situation. The French, who are by far the heaviest investors, are simply hanging on to what they have and hoping that nationalization will not spread too fast and too far. A promising development in recent times has been the cautious but steady improvement of relations between the Congo (B) and Zaire since mid-1970. If nothing occurs to upset this rapprochement, more normal trade patterns should develop which would give the Congo (B) economy a modest shot in the arm.
Republic of Equatorial Guinea

Equatorial Guinea obtained its independence from Spain in October 1968, and its Government has been preoccupied with political problems virtually ever since. Under U.N. pressure, Spain advanced the timetable for independence at the last minute without adequate transition arrangements and President Macias was elected after a campaign opposing many of the Spanish plans for the new country. Shortly after independence, the resident Spanish troops were expelled and most of the 7,000 Spanish civilians went with them. With the assistance of U.N. intermediaries, a break was avoided. Although the President continued to blame Spain publicly for the country's political and economic troubles, he negotiated commercial and aid agreements with the Government of Spain in May 1969. Relations are far from smooth, however, in view of frequent Presidential accusations of Spanish plotting against him. Attitudes toward Portuguese and Spanish residents after the invasion of Guinea in November 1970, has again accelerated Spanish departures.

The internal political scene has been tense since the Spanish exodus as well. The President's chief opponent in the presidential campaign died after an abortive coup attempt in March 1969 and many of his supporters were imprisoned or exiled. Fear of other such attempts has led to the imposition of strict security measures and limitation of the right of association and of contacts with foreigners.

Relatively inactive on the international scene since independence, Equatorial Guinea recently established diplomatic relations with North Korea and Communist China.

President Macias is concerned with a number of problems, including internal and external plotting against the regime. He believes the Spanish would like to see him out and therefore finds it very galling to be obliged to depend on them. He fears that his neighbors covet his territory and is reluctant to benefit by their experience in dealing with the developed world. Because of latent claims by these neighbors and tribal interrelationships, trouble in Equatorial Guinea could affect the whole region.

At independence, virtually all of the country's cocoa plantations were Spanish owned, as were most of the commercial establishments. 30,000 Nigerians constitute most of the work force. Ownership or management of the plantations is now largely in Equatorial Guinea hands, but Spain continues to buy all the agricultural products at preferential prices. It also provided $14 million in aid in 1969, including a budgetary subsidy. Many, but not all, Spanish technical assistants left at the time of the exodus and the U.S. Development Program provided advisers to help survey the country's many needs and to keep vital services operating. The Organization of African Unity has also provided considerable technical assistance. The International Monetary Fund is supervising the establishment and operation of the central banking system and the country's financial posi-
tion is sound. The economy was having serious problems, however, de-
spite good cocoa crops, because of disorganization, wearing down of
the infrastructure, and difficulties with the Nigerian laborers.

The United States has no bilateral aid program for Equatorial
Guinea. We funded a survey of the country's telecommunications needs
for links with its neighbors in 1969, and Equatorial Guinea partici-
pated in the regional measles-smallpox inoculations program financed
by AID. The study mission was advised that the Embassy hopes to
have a modest Self-Help program and to fund some Equatorial Guinean
students' study in African universities.

Foreign investment is mostly Spanish and is centered in cocoa and
coffee growing and lumber. There is also some Spanish investment in
modest hotels and small industries.

The day following the study mission's visit, the Minister of Health
requested the U.S. Embassy to inoculate the whole population of the
Republic (around 320,000 souls) against cholera. We understand the
United States is attempting to be helpful in this big effort.

The Equatorial Guinea smallpox eradication/measles control pro-
gram is one of 20 West and Central African country programs co-
operating in a regional communicable disease eradication and control
effort. The program is a cooperative effort of the Government of
the United States of America and the Government of the Republic
of Equatorial Guinea.

The objectives of the program are:

1. The complete and continued implementation of a
smallpox/measles program to eliminate the possibility of
endemic smallpox in Equatorial Guinea through attack
phase and maintenance phase activities.

2. The full establishment of a surveillance system
sensitive enough to detect any outbreaks of smallpox and
to assure regular reporting of measles morbidity and mort-
ality.

3. A complete investigation and control system in
Equatorial Guinea that will allow for management of measles
outbreaks.

4. A continued concurrent assessment program to
measure the effectiveness of vaccination program activities.

5. The improvement of preventive health services
available to the people through an expansion of activities of
the communicable disease program.

Attack phase operations were carried out on Fernando Po in No-
vember and December of 1969. At that time 82,155 people were vac-
cinated against smallpox and all children between 6 months and 6
years of age were vaccinated against measles. In Rio Muni, by the
close of last year, 222,496 had been vaccinated; again with all children
6 months to 6 years of age receiving measles vaccine.

Formerly the U.S. Mission to Equatorial Guinea was composed of
two personnel. In August 1971, one of these died and the other was
subsequently charged with his murder. Presently, no permanent repre-
sentatives have been assigned to the country, and U.S. interests are
handled by temporary representatives operating from other countries.
Ghana became an independent nation on March 6, 1957, with Kwame Nkrumah as Prime Minister. He became President in 1960. Subsequently on February 24, 1966, while President Nkrumah was en route to Communist China, the Ghanaian Army and police overthrew his regime. Nkrumah and all his ministers were dismissed, the Convention People’s Party and National Assembly dissolved, and the constitution suspended. The new regime cited as the principal reasons for their action; abuse of individual rights and liberties, oppression and corruption, and the deteriorating economic situation. The coup received widespread support from the Ghanaian people, and the new government released hundreds of prisoners who had been detained by Nkrumah for political reasons under the Preventive Detention Act.

National parliamentary elections were held in August 1969, and Dr. Kofi A. Busia became Prime Minister, and the country returned to civilian rule.

Some 10 months following our visit a coup led by Lt. Col. I. K. Acheampong toppled the Busia government on January 13, 1972. Ghana’s economic problems, particularly with respect to the rescheduling of its enormous debts was thought to be one of the causative factors for the coup. Lt. Col. Acheampong charged Busia with economic mismanagement. The coup followed drastic emergency measures, including a 44% devaluation of Ghana’s currency, imposed by the Busia government 2 weeks earlier. A National Redemption Council of nine military and one police officer currently run Ghana.

Of several meetings the study mission had with Ghanaian officials, the one with the then Prime Minister Busia was exceptionally interesting. He discussed at some length the minority African position of advocating dialog with South Africa.

The proposed dialog with South Africa was advanced by Houphouet-Boigny in November 1970. Madagascar, Gabon, and Malawi who already had closer relationship with South Africa, also supported the Ivory Coast initiative. Ghana’s Prime Minister Busia committed his Government to the principle in December 1971. Ghana was joined by Dahomey and Central African Republic. At its summit meeting of 1971, in Addis Ababa, the OAU in a vote of 28 to 6 rejected dialog.

The mission found American relations with Ghana to be excellent. There were no outstanding bilateral problems. In December 1970 a $15 million AID program loan was signed between Ghana and the United States. At the December 1970 meeting of aid donors and the Ghana Government in Paris under World Bank sponsorship, the Ghanaians believe the United States played a very constructive role.

In recent years the United States, along with other donor countries and organizations, has expressed concern to the Ghanaian Government that its fiscal policies have not placed enough emphasis on the reduction of its trade deficit. The country has experienced serious defi-
cits over the last 6 years. The Ghanaians have naturally been sensitive about any infringements on their sovereignty implied by these suggestions. The new military regime has announced new import controls and balancing measures, and says it will develop a new unified development plan, but it is unknown how successful its efforts will be.

Ghana's economy is still stagnant in terms of real per capita growth, but is widely believed to have the capacity to achieve a satisfactory growth rate. Its present per capita income of about $245 is relatively high for West Africa, and its infrastructure and material and human resources are among the most adequate of any country in the area.

Ghana's major economic burden since 1966 has been repayment of foreign debts of over $800 million largely accumulated in the Nkrumah years. The Busia government refused to repudiate the debts out of fear that it would lose future aid and credit, but repeatedly requested a major rescheduling of the debt repayment schedule. The extreme hardship presented by the debt is illustrated by the fact that 11% of the country's budget, about $45 million, was scheduled for payment in 1972. New repayment agreements were negotiated in 1966, 1968, and 1970, but were not of the long-term nature desired by the Ghanaian Government.

The amount of the debt owed to private U.S. firms is not known, but does not comprise a substantial proportion of the total. However, the State Department says it has carried on continuing discussions with Britain (the major creditor country) and other creditor countries in an effort to encourage flexibility and, in the words of one official, "ensure that both Ghanaian and Western interests would be protected."

The situation has changed somewhat since the January 1972 coup. In February the military rulers announced that they did not consider themselves bound by the former repayment agreements. They unilaterally announced new repayment terms for most of their medium-term debts, and repudiated some British-held debts altogether. A U.S. State Department official has said that the coup demonstrated the urgency of Ghana's external debt problem.

The Ghanaians have argued for greatly increased U.S. aid, notwithstanding the fact that about one-sixth of our economic assistance to Africa goes to Ghana. It is one of the 10 African Development Emphasis countries.

U.S. aid to Ghana after the 1966 coup has been primarily in the form of balance-of-payments assistance. Commodity loans, valued at $50 million, and Public Law 480 title I sales, valued at $68 million, have financed industrial and agricultural raw materials, equipment, and machinery in order to assist Ghana in maintaining a minimum level of imports. U.S. assistance is provided in the context of an effort to promote economic policy reforms which will alleviate structural impediments to sustained growth, particularly in regard to import practices, taxation, credit, and export diversification. Within the context of the IBRD Consultative Group, the GOG is being encouraged by the United States and other donors to undertake these Self-Help measures.

The United States is providing technical assistance, approximately $2 million annually, concentrating on agriculture, human resources development, and family planning/population. Ghana receives sizable technical assistance from the United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, and Canada.
Ghana is the world’s most important producer of cocoa, earning about $200 million a year from cocoa exports. The United States is by far Ghana’s most important single customer for cocoa, taking about one-quarter of Ghana’s crop (39 percent of U.S. cocoa imports).

Ghana has also become an important producer of aluminum over the last few years through the wholly U.S.-owned (Kaiser and Reynolds) VALCO aluminum smelter, which is now expanding its capacity. Wood, gold, diamonds, and manganese are other important Ghanaian export products.

If economic conditions improve, Ghana might be able to attract considerable new private U.S. investment, which already amounts to nearly $100 million. Major possible new fields include bauxite and alumina, ship and oil rig repair operations, and previously neglected commercial export crops such as palm oil. Geological indications for petroleum are favorable.

The United States is Ghana’s second largest supplier. About one-half of Ghana’s imports from the United States have been on concessional terms, under AID and Public Law 480 programs which are strengthening Ghanaian acceptance and preference for U.S. products.

With external assistance, Ghana has undertaken impressive measures to bring order and stability to a severely disrupted economy. It has done this in full cooperation with Western donors and the IMF—IBRD. A major part of the stabilization program was the rescheduling of some $246 million of medium-term credit repayments falling due between 1966 and 1972. Serious economic problems still remain. Unemployment is estimated as high as 20 percent of the potential work force; reserves (net of IMF drawings) are still negative; and expansion of the GNP has barely kept pace with population growth. As Ghana initiates economic programs and policy reforms in order to alleviate some of these problems, external assistance will continue to be required. The United States, as the major donor, is working with the IBRD and other donors in order to encourage an increased flow of resources and the optimal utilization of those resources. U.S. assistance will probably continue to be in the range of $20 to $30 million annually in balance-of-payments assistance and $2 to $3 million in technical assistance.

U.S. military assistance to Ghana during fiscal year 1971, about $50,000, was solely for training Ghanaian military personnel in the United States. Total assistance since independence is $100,000 for communications equipment—all since Nkrumah’s fall in 1966.

The USIS program in Ghana had six Americans and 18 local positions with a budget of $183,413 for fiscal year 1971. They conduct an active and varied information and cultural program.

During 1954–69, 1,105 Ghanaians studied in U.S. universities at U.S. expense. In 1970, there were 2,500 Ghanaians who pursued studies in the United Kingdom, while about 1,500 came to the United States.

The study mission was advised that there were 320 Peace Corps volunteers and their dependents serving a dozen agencies in almost 90 Ghanaian communities. This contingent includes 13 families with a total of 35 children. The staff consists of eight professionals and 12 local hires including part-time employees. There were 12 black volunteers in the Peace Corps in Ghana at that time.
The lack of black personnel in the Embassy was a matter of great concern. There were no black personnel high enough to participate in the briefing provided the study mission by the Embassy.

The Study Mission attended a 12 hour "Soul to Soul" concert, part of an independence celebration, which featured American performers Les McCann and Roberta Flack as well as African entertainers. During our visit, Jesse Jackson's attendance at the Afro-American Dialogues in Lagos, Nigeria, was arranged. The delegation also travelled to Kumasi, in mid-Ghana, to meet the Asantehene or Paramount Chief of the large Ashanti tribal group.
REPUBLIC OF TOGO

Togo emerged fully independent on April 27, 1960. Since January 13, 1967, the country has been ruled by a civilian government headed by an army officer, Gen. Etienne Eyadema. It is one of the smaller African countries with a total area of 22,000 square miles, about the size of West Virginia.

Togo's foreign relations are primarily concerned with its neighbors, Ghana and Dahomey, and with its primary aid donor, France. As a former German colony, Togo still maintains links with and receives aid from West Germany. Smuggling from Togo into Ghana where there is a free port, is a problem.

The country's economy is almost entirely based on agriculture, most at the subsistence level. Principal agricultural exports are cocoa and coffee. In recent years, important quantities of high-grade phosphate have been exported. Although Togo suffers from many of the problems associated with developing countries, it nevertheless maintains a balanced government budget and has been able to devote all foreign assistance to development purposes.

The United States has no outstanding bilateral problems of major significance with Togo. The country is interested in obtaining increased U.S. investment and assistance. Between 1961 and 1970 the United States gave a total of $6.1 million in bilateral aid to Togo. Currently, however, Togo is eligible for U.S. aid only under regional programs. The USAID-supported regional heavy equipment training center is located in Lomé, as is the regional Afro-American Labor Center. The study mission visited the heavy equipment training center where 106 Africans from the public works ministries of 13 countries at the present time are trained in the various echelons of road maintenance and the operation and repair of heavy equipment. In addition to the Center a number of mobile units are being set up in various countries of the Entente for on-the-job training in operating and maintaining heavy equipment.

Togo is one of the five member states of the Entente Fund, including Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta, and Togo, and participates in AID regional programs with the fund. In addition to those already described, there are programs covering meat and livestock, grain production and marketing, rice development, and telecommunications. AID is also considering a loan to an Entente Fund Development Bank. Togo is also one of the 21 countries in Central/West Africa which has benefited from the AID-financed measles/smallpox vaccination program. This program is now in its fifth year. By June 30, 1971, AID will have contributed more than $30 million to this program. The U.S. Embassy in Lomé has $80,000 for allocation to Self-Help projects.

(51)
U.S. financial interests in Togo include W. R. Grace's 35-percent interest in a company which mines high-grade phosphates, Union Carbide Petroleum Co.'s offshore oil concession, where a drilling rig is currently working a second bore, and the Banque Internationale pour l'Afrique Occidentale (BIAO), in which the First National City Bank of New York has a 49-percent interest and which maintains a large office in Lome and a branch in Atakpame. Mobile and Texaco distribute their products through chains of service stations in Togo.

Among the officials the study mission met with was Mme. Marie Sivomey, mayor of Lome. She expressed particular satisfaction with the work being done by the Peace Corps volunteers. There are a total of 98 volunteers in four fields of endeavor—31 in health, 30 in education, 34 in rural community development, and three in small business. She was disappointed, however, that an earlier publicized "Twin City" arrangement between Lomé and Bay City, Michigan, had failed to materialize after its initial founding. Many Togolese have received training or education in the United States, as indicated by the fact that the American Ambassador has held functions for U.S.-educated Togolese.
STUDY MISSION TO AFRICA, AUGUST 5–SEPTEMBER 8, 1971

INTRODUCTION

As a sequel to the earlier trip, and again in his capacity as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa, Congressman Diggs conducted a Study Mission during the period of August 5–September 8, 1971 to South Africa, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Mauritania, The Gambia, Algeria and to several European countries (Lisbon, Paris, The Hague, and Stockholm) to discuss their African policy, with particular emphasis on policy towards South Africa.

The Hon. Guy Vander Jagt of Michigan was a member of the Congressional Delegation to Lisbon, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, South Africa and Mauritania, thus making a bipartisan and bi-racial delegation to these countries. The Honorable J. Herbert Burke of Florida and the Honorable Seymour Halpern of New York were part of the fact-finding mission to Algeria. Melvin O. Benson, Staff Consultant to the Foreign Affairs Committee, Goler T. Butcher, Staff Consultant and Attorney for the Subcommittee and James F. McClelland, an aide to Congressman Vander Jagt, accompanied the study mission.

The purpose of the study mission was to complete the Chairman’s fact-finding visits to African countries. The original itinerary for this mission included the Sudan. But the political difficulties there during July caused the revision of those plans.

ABORTIVE PLANS TO VISIT NAMIBIA

The original itinerary also included Namibia, the international territory formerly administered by South Africa under the League of Nations mandate and pursuant to the League Covenant, Article 22, of the Treaty of Versailles. Under this Mandate, the territory became a “sacred trust of civilization.” The recent Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of June 21, 1971, on the “Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence in Namibia of South Africa, Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276,” affirmed the 1966 U.N. General Assembly Resolution No. 2145, terminating South Africa’s mandate and holding that South Africa has no legal authority in the international territory.

It was proposed to visit Namibia in full recognition of the Opinion of the Court and of the implications thereof for visits by parliamentarians of a member state. One, the contemplated visit was not conceived of as a diplomatic, consular, or special mission to the territory. Two, the visit was not to imply any recognition of South Africa’s presence in Namibia as legal. Three, the visit would not come within the precepts given by the Court against dealings with Namibia which might entrench South Africa’s authority over the territory.
The proposal was for a fact-finding mission to assist the international community in a program towards the goals for which the sacred trust was instituted. Four, and finally, the fact-finding trip was proposed in full awareness of the responsibility of the United States Government under the charter, especially Articles 55 and 56, in which all members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the U.N. to achieve "universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, language, sex, or religion." It was in this light, as well as in regard to the specific undertakings of the United States in Article I of the charter, that it was proposed that the Embassy should assist the study mission in the proposed visit to Namibia.

The United States Government through its Embassy in Pretoria and the State Department had made known to the South African Government the intention of the study mission to visit Namibia. The South African Government had indicated its understanding of these plans. However, upon arrival at Jan Smuts Airport in Johannesburg, South Africa, the Chairman was informed that the South African Government had reneged on this understanding and was interposing an objection to the visit to Namibia. This was in clear violation of its undertaking that no limitations or conditions would be placed upon the study mission. (Inasmuch as no special visa is required to travel to Windhoek, this was a special condition). South Africa is in illegal occupation of Namibia, in derogation of the rights of the people of that international territory, in desecration of the "sacred trust" which it undertook in the Mandate agreement and the Covenant, in violation of its obligations under the United Nations Charter and in defiance of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the International Court of Justice. The action by the South African Government of denying the right of entry into the international territory over which it lacks any legal authority moved the Chairman to consider aborting the trip to South Africa. (This will be more fully discussed in the section of the Report on the Visit to South Africa.) It is a matter of regret that the South African Government did not issue accurate statements to the press on the subject of the proposed visit to Namibia.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

The visit to Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Mauritania and The Gambia marked the first time that a congressional delegation had visited these areas or countries. The visit to South Africa was conducted as a people-to-people mission. Inasmuch as diplomatic relations between Algeria and the United States have been interrupted since the Six-Day-War of June, 1967, the visit to Algeria was a people-to-people mission. In each area visited, with the exception of South Africa, the study mission met and conferred with high officials of that country including, in many cases, the Presidents, Cabinet Officers, Parliamentarians, as well as the United States Country Team and, where present, Peace Corps volunteers.

1 The August 4 statement issued by the South African Minister of Interior Gerdener read: "The issuance of visas to Charles Diggs and a few other members of the American Congress to shortly visit South Africa and South West Africa must not be seen as a departure from the South African policy as it was applied in the past. The visit, which was arranged by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs in the American State Department is part of a fact-finding tour through altogether seven African States. The objects and reasons for the visit as expressed to the Government were not the same as those supplied when the application of Mr. Diggs for a visa was refused by the South African Government in the past."
With the exception of Namibia and Zimbabwe, the Chairman has now visited all the African countries and territories. His general findings are first, that the most striking phenomenon of that great continent is its diversity and secondly, that there is not a single African country that has not made greater progress socially, educationally, and economically as an independent country governed by the majority of its people.

The basic fact found by this study mission—especially arising out of its visit to Lisbon, to Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, South Africa, the conversations with the President of the Organization of African Unity and the visit to Algeria—is that the territories in Africa which still remain under colonial and minority control are not isolated from the forces of self-determination and majority rule which have revolutionized the world in the middle half of this century, and which have made self-determination and human rights the legal obligations of all members of the United Nations. Thus, not only do South Africa and Portugal have obligations with respect to the peoples of the minority ruled countries and colonial areas under their respective control, but the United States, by virtue of the obligations assumed under the United Nations Charter, has obligations with respect to the people of these territories, as well as to the people of the international territory of Namibia.*

This visit demonstrated that there is no substitute for on-the-ground observation, and that the overriding need for United States policy is to establish communication with the people of these areas. A tide of freedom is surging in the colonial and minority-ruled areas of Africa and the United States has no choice but to get on the side of freedom.**

* See p. 309 of the appendix for report on the Cunene Dam Scheme and its relation to obligations of states with respect to Namibia.

GUINEA-BISSAU

The Congressional delegation visited Guinea-Bissau from August 8 to August 10, 1971. Located on the coast of West Africa, Guinea-Bissau is bounded by independent Senegal to the north and independent Guinea to the east and south. No officials of the U.S. Government are stationed in Guinea-Bissau, which Portugal considers an overseas province.

The total area of the territory, which includes several islands and the Bijagos Archipelago as well as the mainland, is 36,125 square kilometers or about 14,000 square miles. It is thus about half the size of Portugal, or one-third larger than the state of Maryland. Guinea-Bissau is low-lying—no part of it is more than 950 feet above sea level—and it has a tropical climate. There are two seasons annually, one wet and one dry. July and August are normally the rainiest months, while December and January are generally drier and more comfortable. Annual rainfall ranges from 70–120 inches in the coastal areas, to about 60 inches in the far interior. The coastal areas are swampy and generally covered with mangroves. Much of the terrain in the region is periodically covered with tidal waters. The central regions are mainly heavy rain forest, while the far interior includes some scrub savanna.

The United Nations estimated the total population of Guinea-Bissau in 1969 to be 530,000. Since the Portuguese Government, pursuant to its stated policy of “multi-racialism,” has not collected data by race since 1950, it is impossible to obtain an exact breakdown of the current population by race. However, the 1950 census gave the following figures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>2,263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mestizos</td>
<td>4,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assimilated Africans</td>
<td>1,478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Africans</td>
<td>502,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total population</strong></td>
<td>510,777</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While today there are probably only about three thousand Europeans actually residing in Guinea-Bissau, close to 30 thousand Portuguese soldiers are there.

The African population is mainly rural. The population of Bissau, the capital city, is 25,000; but no other town has more than a few thousand residents.

The African population is also characterized by considerable tribal diversity. At least 17 tribes, with as many languages, reside in the area. Some groups are split by the international boundaries, and movements back and forth across the borders with Senegal and United Nations. "Report of the Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to the Colonial Countries and Peoples." Chapter VII: "Territories Under Portuguese Administration." October 5, 1970. (A/8023/Add. 3)
Guinea have always been frequent. According to the 1950 census, the main ethnic groups were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balanta</td>
<td>160,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulani</td>
<td>108,402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manjako</td>
<td>71,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malinke</td>
<td>63,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papel</td>
<td>36,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brame or Mancanha</td>
<td>16,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biafada</td>
<td>11,581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayote</td>
<td>10,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>22,743</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The history of the area now called Guinea-Bissau extends back long before the first Portuguese penetrations in the mid-15th century, and historical changes among the African populations not related to the Portuguese presence continued into the 20th century. Unfortunately a great deal of research into the history of the peoples of Guinea-Bissau has not been carried out. However, the broad outlines of change in the territory can be sketched. It is important to remember that the history of Guinea-Bissau, like that of the rest of Africa, is one of dynamic movement and adaptation rather than of static societies as sometimes assumed by westerners.

By the end of the first millennium A.D. much of Guinea-Bissau was inhabited by tribes often grouped together as Senegambians, including the Balanta, Manjaco, Papel, and Brame peoples. The Sudanic empire of Ghana existed to the east but did not extend its reach to Guinea-Bissau. The disintegration of Ghana and the rise of the larger Mali Empire in the 13th, 14th, and 15th centuries, however, had important consequences for Guinea-Bissau. As Mali expanded, Mandingo (Mandinka) peoples pushed out into the territory. The Senegambians in Guinea-Bissau were forced into the coastal areas which they mainly inhabit today. At Mali's height a loose hegemony over other peoples was established all the way to the sea in this part of West Africa.

The expansion of Mandingo tribes into the territory had particular cultural significance; this marked the first introduction of Islam into Guinea-Bissau. Spreading from various sources, Islamic influence was to grow gradually right up to the present day, when slightly less than 40% of the population is estimated to be Muslim. Since the time of Mali, roving Mandingo traders have played a major role in the peaceful diffusion of Islam in Guinea-Bissau.

West Africa experienced major convulsions known as the Islamic Revolutions in the late 18th and 19th centuries. Holy wars or jihads, mainly carried out by the widely dispersed Fula peoples, forcibly spread Islam through much of the interior of West Africa. Fulas from nearby Futa Jalon invaded the inland regions of Guinea-Bissau, further aiding the spread of Islam in the area. Some of the invaders joined Fulas already residing in Guinea-Bissau and stayed permanently. However, the arbitrary borders staked out by Europeans had little significance. Then, as today, many Fulas and other peoples travelled freely back and forth across the borders of Guinea-Bissau.

Portuguese explorers were the first Europeans to make contact with the inhabitants of West Africa. The initial Portuguese contact with Guinea-Bissau came in 1446, but traders did not actually settle in the area until 1470. They moved there from the nearby Cape Verde.

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1 Ibid.
Islands, which were to become an important trade and slaving center for the Portuguese. Historical evidence indicates that when the Portuguese first arrived in Guinea-Bissau, all the present major ethnic groups already resided in the territory. (Information on the African history of Guinea-Bissau is based largely on abstracts of Portuguese scholarship in the journal “African Abstracts”.)

Guinea-Bissau was only one of several trading areas established by the Portuguese in West Africa. In the following four centuries Portugal gradually lost most of its holdings in West Africa, losing all but Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe (islands in the Gulf of Guinea) to other European powers. In the southern part of the continent its very large dominions were reduced to the areas presently called Angola and Mozambique. Even its title to Guinea-Bissau was disputed by the British through most of the 19th century. Portugal was finally “granted” the area in 1870 by the American President Ulysses S. Grant, who served as an arbitrator. Until the late 19th century Guinea-Bissau was officially administered together with Cape Verde; since then the two have been separated administratively.

Despite European and American sanction to Portugal's claims in Guinea-Bissau, the territory’s residents were not acquiescent. Until the early 20th century the Portuguese made little headway in their attempt to establish control over the territory. Throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries violent rebellions by various African tribes were frequent, and the Portuguese had little control outside the towns they had established. Finally in 1912, after a 3-year campaign led by Captain Teixeira Pinto, Portugal was able to cement its rule. Small-scale tribal uprisings continued into the 1930's, but substantial violent African opposition to Portuguese rule was not to erupt again until 1962.

Portugal's official colonial philosophy and goals have been apparently different from those of most other imperial powers in Africa. The Portuguese have claimed to view people in terms of cultural rather than racial criteria, and racial segregation has not been legal. The idea of assimilating Africans into the Portuguese culture, including the language and Catholic religion, has always received major emphasis in official circles. However, the failure of this approach in Guinea-Bissau is demonstrated by the estimation that in 1960 only 4% of the African population could be considered Christian in religion, whereas 38% were Muslim and 58% animist. In the past few years a new trend toward tolerance of traditional cultures and religion has been emerging in Guinea-Bissau, as the Government has competed with the revolutionary nationalist movement for the support of the population. Guinea-Bissau and the other African territories are still considered by Portugal as elements in one multi-racial Portuguese state.

The African nationalist revolution in Guinea-Bissau is being carried on by the PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde). This party, which hopes to lead Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde together to independence from foreign rule, is led by Amilcar Cabral, a Cape Verdian agronomist who was educated by the Portuguese. The PAIGC has received world-wide publicity for its emphasis on combining military struggle with political organization and social benefits in the countryside of Guinea-Bissau.

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4 Ibid.
The PAIGC was formed secretly in Bissau in the mid-1950’s, with the intention of promoting African political power. After seeing the government respond to African strikes with considerable violence, it switched to a rural base in the early 60’s. A program of sabotage and later guerrilla warfare was initiated.

Under the leadership of Cabral a flexible Marxist ideology based on local conditions has been developed. The party has established schools, medical facilities, and economic structures in the areas of Guinea-Bissau it holds militarily. (The extent of these holdings is under dispute and is discussed below.) The PAIGC receives aid from the Organization of African Unity, individual African countries, several Communist nations and some private western organizations. The greatest share of aid comes from the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies.

A rival movement exists called FLING (Frente para a Libertação e Independência da Guiné Portuguesa) which is a blend of several smaller groups. It opposes the inclusion of Cape Verde in its goals for liberation, and is less radical politically than the PAIGC. It has shown very little effectiveness in carrying on a military struggle with the Portuguese.

Many Africans have left Guinea-Bissau for neighboring countries in order to avoid the ongoing fighting. Some estimates place the number of refugees at over 50,000.

Portugal’s African territories were officially called colonies prior to 1951. In the face of anti-colonial pressures in the United Nations, Portugal began referring to them as Overseas Provinces in that year, and has since referred to them as Overseas Territories or Provinces.

The congressional fact-finding mission visited the capital town of Bissau, some of its environs, and Mansoa. In addition to escorting us on the tour, the Portuguese gave an exhaustive briefing on their policies and on conditions in Guinea-Bissau. The Governor, General Antonio Spinola, who exercises both civil and military authority in the territory, provided two lengthy briefing sessions for the mission. During the briefings it became clear to us that, despite talk of “autonomy” and “African participation,” Portugal hopes to keep firm control over Guinea-Bissau and its other African colonies.

Portugal’s African Territories and the United Nations

Portugal did not become a member of the United Nations until November 13, 1955, along with 15 other nations. It first took its seat in the General Assembly (XI) in 1956. On February 24, 1956, the Secretary General addressed a letter to each of the new members asking “Whether there are any territories referred to in Article 73 of the Charter for the Administration of which it has responsibility.” Article 73, of Chapter XI “Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories,” relates to the obligations of states administering those “territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government.” Such states have the following obligations among others: to recognize that the interests of the people of these territories are paramount; to accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost their well-being; to that end, to develop self-government, to assist in the development of free political institutions, and to ensure
their political, economic, social and educational advancement; and, under section (e) of Article 73, regularly to provide the Secretary General with information relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the non-self-governing territories.

On November 8, 1956, Portugal replied to the Secretary General that Portugal did not administer any territories falling under the scope of Article 73 of the Charter. In response to challenges to Portugal’s position, Portugal’s U.N. representative stated that “the constitutional status of the overseas provinces is absolutely equal to the status of the European provinces: any overseas territory has no more and no less in its status than any other territory.” “In accordance with its centuries-old constitutional laws, the Portuguese nation is, and always has been, a unitary state, regardless of the relative geographic situation of its various provinces.” Portugal charged the United Nations with applying discriminatory standards in its case, and stated that it “is exclusively up to the States (themselves) to indicate the territories which may be affected by Article 73.” The United Nations’ response was to set up a Committee of Six, consisting of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Mexico, India and Morocco, to determine guiding principles on the application of Article 73 obligations to member states.

In 1960, after the entry into the United Nations of many former colonies, Portugal’s position on its African territories was totally repudiated and denounced by the fifteenth General Assembly. On December 14, 1960, the “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,” General Assembly Res. 1514, was adopted by a vote of 89 to 0, with 9 members, including the United States, abstaining. The “Colonial Resolution,” as this is known, declared that:

1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.

2. All peoples have the right of self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.

4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected.

5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in trust and non-self-governing territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire; without any distinction as to race, creed or
color, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.

6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

7. All states shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and this Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all states, and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity.

The following day the General Assembly passed two resolutions which made it clear that the Declaration on Colonialism applied to Portugal’s African territories. Resolution 1541, which passed by a vote of 69 to 2, with 21—including the United States—abstaining, re-affirmed the obligation of member states to transmit information to the United Nations under Article 73 (e), and accepted the principles laid down by the Committee of Six for determining the applicability of 73 (e). These established that, prima facie an obligation to transmit information exists when a territory is “geographically separate and is distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it.” If administrative, political, juridical, economic or historical factors indicate that the governed territory is in a subordinate position to the metropolitan state, the assumption of an obligation to transmit information is strengthened. The principles included a statement that political integration of diverse areas was acceptable only if it was the result of the freely expressed wishes of the territory’s peoples acting with full knowledge of the change in their status, their wishes having been expressed through informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted and based on universal adult suffrage.

The same day Resolution 1542 passed by a vote of 68–6, with 17 abstentions, including the United States. It specifically named each of Portugal’s so-called Overseas Provinces to be non-self-governing territories, falling within the scope of Article 73.

The Portuguese continued to claim that any application of Article 73 to its territories was illegal under the Charter, and have to date refused to supply any information to the Secretary General under section (e). Since 1961 a special U.N. committee has collected information on Portuguese Africa.

A large number of resolutions directed against Portugal’s stand in Africa have passed the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council throughout the 1960’s and up to the present. Since the middle 1960’s, the General Assembly has called upon all member states to end military assistance of any kind to Portugal. It has also called on U.N. agencies, international institutions, and member states to assist the African nationalist liberation movements fighting in the Portuguese territories, as well as in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. The United States, while always reaffirming its support for the principle of self-determination in Portuguese Africa (for which it voted in the Security Council in 1963), has either abstained on or opposed most U.N. resolutions on Portugal’s African territories over the last decade.
The United States claims that its military aid to Portugal does not assist Portugal's military efforts in Africa, and has always adhered to the goal of "peaceful change" in Portuguese Africa.

The most recent General Assembly Resolution specifically concerning Portugal's territories was Resolution 2795, which passed on December 10, 1971. The resolution demanded immediate independence for the Portuguese territories, and included among its many provisions appeals to:

... all States, particularly to those members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which continue to render assistance to Portugal, to withdraw any assistance that enables Portugal to prosecute the colonial war in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) and to prevent the sale or supply of weapons, military equipment and material to the Government of Portugal, as well as all supplies, equipment and material for the manufacture or maintenance of weapons and ammunition that it uses to perpetuate its colonial domination in Africa;

... those Governments that have failed to prevent their nationals and companies under their jurisdiction from participating in the Cabora Bassa project in Mozambique and the Cunene River Basin project in Angola to take all necessary measures to terminate their participation and to withdraw immediately from all activities related to these projects;

... all States and the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity, to render to the peoples of the Territories under Portuguese domination, in particular the population in the liberated areas of those Territories, all moral and material assistance necessary to continue their struggle for the restoration of their inalienable right to self-determination and independence; and

Draws the attention of the Security Council, in view of the further deterioration of the situation in the Territories of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea (Bissau) which seriously disturbs international peace and security, to the urgent necessity to consider taking all effective steps, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to secure the full and speedy implementation by Portugal of resolution 1514 (XV) (the Colonial Resolution) and of the decisions of the Security Council concerning the territories under Portuguese domination. . . .

This resolution passed by a vote of 105—8—5. The United States voted no. Although there was no statement of the U.S. position, in the past the United States has specifically objected to elements in each of the quoted action provisions.

Government and Administration

Effective political power in Guinea-Bissau, as in all of Portugal's Overseas Territories, resides in the Portuguese Government in Europe. Those decisions not made completely in Portugal are still subject to

Political sovereignty in Portugal and all its territories is vested in "the Head of State, the National Assembly, the Government and the Courts of Justice." The Government consists of a Prime Minister and a Council of Ministers, and is formally responsible to the President of the Republic rather than to the National Assembly. In practice it has been the Prime Minister who has wielded most power since the "New State" was established in 1926.

From the 1926 military coup which established the "New State," with its emphasis on stability and a corporate state, to 1968, Portugal was ruled by Prime Minister Antonio de Oliveira Salazar. Since his illness and subsequent death, his successor has been Marcello Caetano, who had earlier helped write the Portuguese Constitution.

The Government supervises the administration of the non-European areas through the Minister for Overseas Portugal. This Minister appoints the Governors and Governor-Generals and all other overseas officials. In some matters he has direct legislative authority, and legislation of the territorial Legislative Councils must be approved by him.

On important matters of policy and administration the Overseas Minister must consult the Overseas Council. This high-level advisory body was first established in 1964, but the Overseas Territories were not given representation on it until 1963. In 1970 the Council included a President and 39 members, including 19 who were elected from all the overseas Legislative Councils. This included two representatives from Guinea-Bissau.

Another consultative body affecting the African provinces is the Corporative Chamber, which includes over 200 representatives of various interest groups. Since 1964 Guinea-Bissau has had one member in this body.

The Portuguese head of state, or President, has always been a high-ranking military officer. He is elected indirectly by an electoral college which includes representatives of the National Assembly, Corporative Chamber, Municipal Councils, and the overseas Legislative Councils. In the 1965 elections for head of state, Guinea-Bissau had five representatives in the Electoral College of 616 members. Until the 1971 Constitutional Amendment the National Assembly included 130 deputies elected to 4-year terms. Guinea-Bissau had one representative, selected by the local Legislative Council. The size of the National Assembly has recently been increased from 130 to 150, and the total number of overseas deputies was increased from 23 to 43. Although no breakdown of this latter figure was available, presumably Guinea-Bissau received at least one additional member.

In July, 1970, Guinea-Bissau's deputy to the National Assembly, who was of mixed racial background, died in a helicopter accident along with three other deputies. They were part of a group of eight deputies visiting Guinea-Bissau. They were caught in a storm and Portuguese investigators reported no evidence of an explosion. The PAIGC later claimed to have shot down the helicopter. A new

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representative for Guinea-Bissau, a non-African, has since been chosen.

Guinea-Bissau's chief local executive is the Governor, who is appointed by the metropolitan government. Since 1968 this post, along with that of military commander, has been held by General Spinola. He has direct authority over all civil and military personnel in the province.

The Governor is responsible for the enforcement of all laws and directives from the Overseas Minister in Lisbon. He has certain powers of legislation himself and may veto any decisions of the local Legislative Council. When he vetoes legislation that was initiated within the Council rather than by himself, he may either send it back for reconsideration, then requiring a two-thirds majority, or he may defer to the Overseas Minister for a final binding decision. The Governor and his assistants are advised by a Government Council, the membership of which is partly elected and partly selected by various interest groups in the territory.

The Legislative Council has limited legislative authority over affairs of the territory, and the power to appoint representatives to national political and advisory bodies. Guinea-Bissau and the other smaller Overseas Territories were first given the privilege of Legislative Councils in 1963, whereas Angola and Mozambique had them a decade earlier. The jurisdiction of the Councils has recently been redefined and is discussed in more detail below. All Council legislation must ultimately be approved by the Overseas Minister.

The membership of the Council is selected by an amalgam of direct election, local authorities, and “social interests” in keeping with the Portuguese notion of an organic, corporate state. Guinea-Bissau's Legislative Council is composed of 14 members. Three are *ex officio*—the Governor and two other administrators. Three are elected by direct vote of all qualifying for suffrage. Eight are selected by “organic vote,” including two representatives of those paying a tax of 1000 escudos (100 escudos equals US $3.50); one of cultural and religious groups; three of African traditional authorities (government-appointed); and two of municipal and district authorities.

Candidates for the Legislative Council must be Portuguese citizens by birth, literate and over 21 years of age, a resident of the province for at least three years, and not a civil servant except for the prescribed African authorities and Portuguese administrators.

It is impossible to pinpoint the extent of African participation in the selection of Council members, since the Portuguese refuse to reveal the racial breakdown of voting rolls and interest groups. However, it does not appear to be substantial by any standards. Only those over 21 years of age who can read and write Portuguese, or non-literates who are heads of families under Portuguese civil law, have the right to vote. The vast majority of African adults are illiterate, and a large portion of them live under customary rather than Portuguese civil law, so it appears that most Africans do not even participate in the election of the three Legislative Council members who are chosen by direct election. Since Africans hold few administrative posts, and few are wealthy, they do not participate substantially in

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54 In Angola and Mozambique the chief executive is called the Governor-General.
the "organic vote" either. The only explicit representation for most Africans is that of the three government-appointed tribal leaders who are selected by their peers for seats on the Council. Though the Portuguese provide no racial figures, it has been reported that few other Africans have obtained seats on the Council.

Guinea-Bissau is divided into 10 local administrative units called *concelhos* and two called *circunscrições*. The *circunscrições* are areas least developed by Portuguese standards. The *concelhos* are Bafatá, Bissau, Bissora, Bolama, Bula, Cacheu, Catió, Farim, Gabu, and Mansoa. The *circunscrições* are Fulacunda and São Domingos.

Administration in these local units and smaller parishes is carried out by a combination of locally-selected and government-appointed officials. Where most residents are living under traditional African civil law, government-appointed chiefs preside known as *regedores*.

In some areas, special local councils known as *cadmils* have been given local powers since 1967. These are composed of the local military commander, the local administrative authority, and an African chief.

The Portuguese military has been given a greatly expanded role in the administration of Guinea-Bissau at all levels. Members of the military are omnipresent in the area. With one exception—a female teacher—all the Portuguese the Congressional delegation met in Guinea-Bissau were members of the Portuguese armed forces whether they were performing military or civilian functions. Soldiers in regular uniform and in camouflage dress were in frequent evidence on the streets of Bissau. During our tour of Bissau and a few neighboring districts we had to go through several military checkposts.

Prior to our visit to Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde we stopped in Lisbon, where the Portuguese Overseas Minister discussed the policies of his government toward the territories. He emphasized that the last 50 years have seen an evolution toward increased local autonomy in the Overseas Territories. He referred in particular to the recent amendments to the Portuguese Constitution which redefined the relative powers of the central and territorial governments.

In 1969 Prime Minister Caetano spoke in favor of increasing the administrative autonomy of the territories after receiving many requests to that end from the territorial officials. The constitutional amendments he proposed were passed in the summer of 1971. In addition to the enlargement of the National Assembly mentioned previously, the powers of the overseas governments were described as follows:

> The territories of the Portuguese nation outside Europe constitute Overseas Provinces, which will have their own statutes as autonomous regions; they may be designated as States, in accordance with the national tradition, when the progress of their social system and the complexity of their administration justify this honorable title.

Autonomous powers of the overseas regions are to include:

1. the right to have elective organs of self-government;

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*Keesing's Contemporary Archives. October 2-9, 1971.*
2. the right, subject to various restrictions, to legislate through these organs on all matters of exclusive interest to themselves, and to ensure the carrying out of laws and internal administration;

3. the right to levy taxation and use it for public expenditure;

4. the right to possess economic systems appropriate to the needs of their development and the well-being of their people;

5. the right to deny entry into their territory to both foreigners and Portuguese nationals in the public interest, and, subject to an appeal to the central government, to order their expulsion should their presence cause serious inconvenience to internal or international order.

It was stressed that "the autonomy of the Overseas Provinces will not affect the unity of the nation, the solidarity between all parts of the nation or the integrity and sovereignty of the State."

The central Government is to retain responsibility for:

1. representation of the entire nation at home and abroad;

2. establishing the statutes of the Overseas Provinces and legislating on matters of collective interest, as well as the annulment of local charters contrary to this interest or which offend against constitutional principles and the edicts of the sovereign organs;

3. designation of the governor of each province as the representative of the Government and as head of the local executive organs;

4. ensuring national defense;

5. supervision of the administration of the provinces, in accordance with the higher interests of the State;

6. supervision of the provinces' financial management and provision of financial assistance, as required;

7. integration of the economy of each province into the general economy of the nation;

8. protection of the provinces against threats to their security and well-being which could not be countered by local means; and

9. ensuring individual rights under the terms of the Constitution, and the maintenance of the cultural values, customs and practices of the populations of the Overseas Provinces, in so far as these are compatible with Portuguese law and morality.

Examination of these provisions makes it clear that few powers and no real sovereignty are being devolved to the territorial governments. The Lisbon Government will retain final authority over all areas of decision-making in the African provinces. It is also apparent that the use of the word autonomy does not imply any progress toward independence or self-determination for the territories.
After Prime Minister Caetano proposed the new amendments in Lisbon, there were charges in the National Assembly that he was leading the territories on the path to independence. Dr. Caetano responded by reaffirming Portugal's commitment to "international unity." He has said, "The Constitution adds that the autonomy of the provinces will be compatible with 'their state of development and resources' which implies its expansion according to the economic and social growth of the territories concerned. . . . Yet we should not suppose that this participation can lead to an autonomy of secession. In the present-day world even more than before, only unity can bring strength."7

During the four-hour official briefing given the study mission, a 1971 Congress of the people of Guinea to discuss the territory's problems was described. It was claimed that 500 people representing various interests and tribes attended.

At the briefing there were several Africans present. All of these were introduced as members of the ANP, a government-sponsored popular movement of Guinea. This organization was described as a grass-roots movement of the people, "a natural reaction to the terrorism and campaigns of the PAIGC." One of the Africans who spoke was said to be a former member of the PAIGC. (At a later meeting in Algiers with PAIGC representatives, he was identified as a former low-level functionary.) He claimed to be the grandson of the first governor of the territory, an African who served two terms, one in the 1840's and the second in the 1850's. Of the other three Africans present at our briefing two were said to be members of the local municipal council, and the third a traditional chief.

In the briefing, the Portuguese stressed five principles as the basis of their current policies in Guinea-Bissau: (a) social justice and equality before the law, (b) respect for traditional institutions of different ethnic groups, (c) economic and social development, (d) increasing African participation in the administration of the territory, and (e) internal and national security.

Governor Spinola has recently stated that with social progress "African Portuguese" are becoming increasingly involved in the territory's administration, and that this would eventually lead to "a Guinea basically and naturally governed by Guineans." He has also emphasized that by this he did not mean independence from the Portuguese nation. In practice, increased African administrative involvement has usually meant the increased use of tribal leaders in local administration.

A United Nations committee has noted that the substance of the new provisions actually already existed under previous laws for the most part. The committee did see potential significance in the apparent intention to allow greater budgetary and financial freedom to the territories. The extent to which increased autonomy in any areas will actually be granted is impossible to assess since the new provisions are just in the process of implementation. However, it is clear that the Lisbon Government will retain firm control over the main directions of territorial policies.

The Military Situation

Portugal’s close control of the media both in Guinea-Bissau and in Portugal itself means that extensive information on the military situation is not available. Portuguese and PAIGC sources present a highly disparate picture of the state of the military struggle in Guinea-Bissau.

The PAIGC claims to control over two-thirds of the territory and a substantial part of the population. Portugal claims that over 85% of the population is under government control. In 1970, according to the Portuguese, only 100 European soldiers were killed as opposed to 900 guerrillas. The PAIGC claims it killed about a thousand soldiers during that year. By a recent estimate, 30,000 Portuguese soldiers are facing about 7,000 guerrillas in Guinea-Bissau.

According to a United Nations report, the most certain fact is that the war is very extensive. By the end of 1970 the Portuguese had been successful in creating only two “great zones of peace,” one was around Bissau, and the other in the Manjaro area, where especially concentrated military, economic, and social efforts have been underway. Even Bissau has been shelled by the guerrillas within the last year. Various outsiders who have travelled in the province report a general picture of Portuguese control of towns, while the guerrillas operate freely through much of the countryside.

The Portuguese claim to be gradually defeating the PAIGC forces. By contrast PAIGC leader Cabral says his party has “reversed the old situation... now it is we who are surrounding the Portuguese.” The nationalists claim that the Portuguese seldom leave their fortified urban areas, and charge that the Portuguese bomb and napalm indiscriminately in the liberated areas. The PAIGC has declared its willingness to open negotiations for the complete independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.

When the Congressional delegation met with high Portuguese officers, the officers emphasized at great length several factors which they feel contribute to their difficulty in defending Guinea-Bissau:

1. The size of the province, which is 250 kilometers in length and 150 kilometers in breadth, so that it is possible to walk across the area in 2 days.
2. The resulting closeness of all points in the province to sanctuaries in Senegal and Guinea.
3. The open nature of the borders with Senegal and Guinea.
4. The difficulties in transportation and communications presented by the terrain, and the consequent advantages for guerrilla forces.
5. The many ethnic groups living in the territory.

PAIGC forces operate from both Senegal and Guinea as well as from bases within the territory. Guinea has been especially hospitable to the guerrillas, and the PAIGC has its head offices, a school, and a prisoner-of-war camp in Guinea’s capital city of Conakry. Several

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3 Ibid.
border incidents have led to Security Council complaints by the two bordering nations.

The major such incident was the series of armed invasions by sea of Guinea of November 22 and 23, 1970, during which offices of the Guinean Government and the PAIGC were attacked. In a resolution of December 8, 1970, the United Nations Security Council affirmed the findings of its special mission to the Republic of Guinea by declaring that the invasions were carried out from Guinea-Bissau by naval and military units of the Portuguese armed forces. The resolution urged all states to end military aid to Portugal, and declared the presence of Portuguese colonialism on the African continent to be “a serious threat to the peace and security of independent African states.” It warned the Government of Portugal that “in the event of any repetition of armed attacks against independent African States, the Security Council shall immediately consider appropriate effective steps or measures in accordance with the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter.” The resolution was adopted by a vote of 11-0 with four abstentions—France, Spain, United Kingdom, and the United States.

The United States explained its abstention on the grounds that the resolution went too far in the direction of committing the Council to action under Chapter VII of the Charter in any future situation. Chapter VII provides for a U.N. response to any “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” The United States felt that the armed invasion of independent Guinea should not be construed as meeting this stipulation.

With their own version of “strategic hamlets,” the Portuguese are using a carrot/stick approach to try and gain control of the African population. The government is attempting in some areas to resettle Africans in fortified villages where they receive previously unknown benefits in housing, education and health. Those remaining outside find themselves in “intervention zones” which means they and their villages may be the target of Portuguese bombs and artillery. Under Governor Spinola, emphasis has also been placed on the arming of Africans in these government-controlled villages for their own defense from the PAIGC forces. He claims that about 15,000 Africans have been armed in all, and has declared the intention of turning a greater fighting burden over to “loyalist” African troops.

Tribal and religious considerations have had some military significance. The Fulas, the second biggest tribal group, are Muslim with a tightly-knit social structure. Along with other Muslim tribes (totaling nearly 40% of the population), the Fulas are said to have been quite supportive of the Portuguese presence. Perhaps this is part of the explanation for the Government’s official de-emphasis in the last few years on the need to catholicize Africans.

The largest single tribal group, the Balantans, have on the other hand been a major source of support for the PAIGC. Cabral and several other PAIGC leaders are Cape Verdian mestizos (mixed African and European). The Portuguese have tried to exploit this fact in propaganda portraying the PAIGC as disruptive outsiders.

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12 Hoagland, note 8 supra.
Since Governor Spinola's appointment in 1968, emphasis has been placed on a bold new "battle on two fronts," combining a stepped-up military effort with a "better Guinea" development effort. The nationalist liberation movement of the PAIGC must be given credit for provoking a broad new program for improvements in African living conditions from the Portuguese, after five centuries of Portuguese laxity in that area.

EDUCATION, PUBLIC WELFARE, AND THE ECONOMY

The Portuguese told us they were making considerable progress in providing education for the people of Guinea-Bissau. They emphasized particularly that enrollment in primary schools has increased greatly in recent years. Guinea-Bissau has one secondary school and a technical school, but no university.

While no accurate literacy figures are available for the territory, it was clear to us that the Portuguese have a very long way to go in improving education for Africans, and that a substantial effort in this field could not have begun before the last few years, after the PAIGC presented a major threat to Government control of the province. Some observers estimate that 80-90% of the Africans in Portuguese Africa are functionally illiterate. (The fact that as much as 40% of the population in Portugal itself may be illiterate should be taken into account when considering educational figures in Portuguese territories.)

Schools in the territory are not legally segregated. However, while the first years of primary school include a preponderance of Africans, the last few years of secondary school include a large majority of Europeans and mestizos. In keeping with its new policy of "respecting" traditional cultures, the Government is not trying to establish Catholic schools in Muslim areas.

The army is heavily involved in building new schools and in teaching. Many of the new schools are of the type called military school posts, which are run by the military in areas where the resources and teachers are not available to establish a normal school. According to the Government's development plan, 31 school posts and 14 regular primary schools were to be built during 1971.

The delegation visited a special training school for school post and primary teachers, called monitors. We visited three classes. The first was for students of both sexes ranging from 18-40 years of age. Many were married, but less than half had children. The second class was all military men. The third was all women, ranging in age from 16-42.

The prerequisite for attending this school is completion of the first four years of primary education. The course is given in the holiday period and lasts about six weeks, after which students teach in school posts or primary schools, and then return the next year's holiday for further training. This contrasts with the requirements for full teachers, who must complete 11 years of schooling before attending a training school in Lisbon or Cape Verde. We were told that 260 students were attending the school, but that only about 20 new monitors graduate each year.

Guinea-Bissau has a particularly difficult public health situation due to its climate and terrain. Many tropical diseases including malaria, tuberculosis, intestinal parasitosis, leprosy, and trypanosomiasis cause serious problems there. The Portuguese told us that Guinea-Bissau has one central hospital, three regional hospitals, six sub-regional hospitals, and 171 mobile medical groups which operate from 60 points. Both military and civilian personnel are involved in the effort. They stated that there are 63 doctors (one for every 8,000 people) and 400 nurses (one for every 1,400 people), ratios which they felt were very good. In comparison with the recent past, by another source in 1963 there were only 34 doctors in the province, or one to every 15,400 people. Our group’s official tour included a stop at a small medical station. The United Nations estimates life expectancy from birth to be 33.5 years—one of the lowest figures on the continent of Africa.

The Portuguese commented that their policy of moving the people and concentrating them in newer settlements served health, education, and sanitation purposes as well as military purposes. They said the first settlement was built in 1904, and now there are a total of 64 settlements including 50,000 people.

After spending two months with the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau, a French observer wrote in "Le Monde" (September 1970) that the PAIGC had more than 15,000 children in its schools within the territory, and that another 300 were getting higher training outside the province. He also said that the PAIGC maintained three hospitals inside Guinea-Bissau.

In the effort to improve social and economic conditions in Guinea-Bissau, the Portuguese are operating under the "Third National Development Plan, 1968-1973." In 1968 and 1969 it projected annual investments of slightly over 200 million escudos in agriculture, fisheries, industry, rural improvement, electric power, marketing, transport, communications, tourism, education, research, housing, and health. However, actual authorizations each year have been somewhat smaller than the projected figures. Most of the development funds are in the form of loans from the central Portuguese government.

Guinea Bissau has an abundance of cows, with about two cows for every person. There are also many pigs and sheep. During our tour many animals were visible in the countryside and in the towns.

The territory's major exports in 1968 were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Escudos</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground-nuts</td>
<td>51.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coconuts</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground-nut bagasse</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hides and skins</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground-nut oil</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beeswax</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15 Abshire and Samuels, note 3 supra.
Guinea-Bissau has a chronic deficit in its balance of payments. The figures for 1965-1968 are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>417.2</td>
<td>507.3</td>
<td>471.1</td>
<td>580.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>105.8</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>85.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>-311.4</td>
<td>-422.2</td>
<td>-380.0</td>
<td>-494.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While no American businesses have holdings in Guinea-Bissau, Esso Exploration, Inc., of Standard Oil of New Jersey pays the Portuguese for petroleum concession rights in the territory. According to the American Committee on Africa over $8 million had been invested in exploration there up to 1968.

FINDINGS OF THE STUDY MISSION TO GUINEA-BISSAU

1. The visit confirmed that there is no substitute for direct observation; a whole new understanding both of the rudimentary development of Guinea-Bissau under the Portuguese and of the extent to which the Portuguese are embattled was gained from the mission.
2. As emphasized by the Portuguese Government, the geographical and physical facts of the territory make the task of defending it most difficult.
3. The Portuguese are hard-pressed to keep control of Guinea-Bissau.
4. Guinea-Bissau is an armed camp with the military everywhere.
5. The Portuguese efforts toward economic, social, and educational development accelerated greatly only after 1962, when the nationalist insurgency began in earnest.
6. As stressed to the Governor at our briefing, it is clear that the political, social, and economic welfare of the people of Guinea-Bissau would, as in other African countries, improve greatly with the attainment of self-determination.

The report of the three-member mission of the Special Committee of 24 on Decolonization which visited the liberated areas of Guinea-Bissau at the invitation of the PAIGC from April 2 to April 8, 1971 is set forth in the appendix, p. 346, and the text of the Communique issued by Amilcar Cabral, the Secretary General of the PAIGC is set forth on p. 362 of the appendix.

(The text of the statement of Amilcar Cabral before the Security Council at Addis Ababa, Feb. 1, 1972 is inserted on p. 363 of the appendix.)

20 Ibid.
21 For a vigorous rationale of the Portuguese effort to hold on, see the statement by the Prime Minister Caetano in Bissau on 14 April 1969. The text is contained in "Portugal's Reasons for Remaining in the Overseas Provinces" pp. 13-18, Lisbon (1970).
CAPE VERDE

On August 10, 1971, the congressional delegation visited the Portuguese-administered islands of Cape Verde. About 300 miles west of Dakar, Senegal, the islands are about an hour from the African mainland.

The 10 islands and some tiny islets form an archipelago and have a total area of 1,552 square miles, which makes the province one-fourth larger than Rhode Island. These volcanic islands are divided into two subgroups: the Barlavento (Windward) Islands include Santo Antão, São Vicente, São Nicolau, Sal, and Boa Vista. The Sotavento (Leeward) Islands include Maio, Santiago, Fogo, and Brava. The island of Santiago is the most populous and is the seat of the territory's capital city of Praia.

These are islands of unique and scenic beauty. Their volcanic, rugged and utterly arid terrain bore a striking resemblance to the landscape of the moon. The land and climate do not serve well the needs of the local residents, however. At the time of our visit Cape Verde had just experienced a 3-year drought, the worst in half a century though droughts occur periodically. It had devastated the already poor economy of the islands. A few days before our visit there had been a brief rain, and people were hailing this as a sign that the drought was ending. In normal years the climate is monotonously warm with slight rainfall.

The total population of the territory of Cape Verde is currently estimated at slightly over 250,000. The islands have been overpopulated for many years, and are undergoing a serious population explosion. The Portuguese are encouraging emigration to other African territories, and in the mid-60's about 4,000 people were leaving each year.22

The islands' unique history has produced a very high proportion of mestizos (mixed European and African) in the population. The Portuguese Government's refusal to collect racial data in the last two decades makes an accurate racial breakdown impossible, but in 1950 69% were mestizo, 29% were African, and 2% were European. Some recent writers have put the number of mestizos at 200,000, or about % of the population.23

The Cape Verde Islands were uninhabited when first discovered by Portuguese explorers in the mid-1400's. They were populated by European immigrants and soldiers, and Africans brought as slaves from the area of Portuguese Guinea to work on plantations. Mixing among these immigrants produced the predominantly mestizo population of the present day. The Cape Verde Islands were a major trading center in the 16th century, but faded in importance with the general Portuguese loss of power in West Africa in the following centuries.

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The Portuguese officials we talked with showed a markedly different attitude toward the people of Cape Verde than that which we had observed in Guinea-Bissau. They emphasized at great length that Cape Verdians were not African or European, but people with "special personalities," and the Portuguese seemed to hold a special preference for the racially mixed population of Cape Verde to the African people of Bissau. This different attitude has been manifested materially—in terms of its population size, Cape Verde has received the greatest amount of development aid from Portugal of any of the African territories. The Portuguese consider the islands a showcase for their official policy of multi-racialism.

The Portuguese Government likes to stress the strategic importance of the islands as a transportation and communications center. An air base at Sal provides landing and re-fueling facilities for European planes going to and from South Africa, Angola, and Mozambique. The islands also have harbor facilities which, we were told, serve about 110 ships a month.

During the last few years there have been several arrests of people accused of having connections with the revolutionary PAIGC. This party is led by Amilcar Cabral, a Cape Verdian, and includes many Cape Verdians in its leadership. It includes the liberation of Cape Verde in its goals, though so far its military activities have only been in Guinea-Bissau.

Cape Verde's political and administrative structure is similar to that of Guinea-Bissau; so an extensive explanation will not be repeated. The province's governor since March 1970, has been Brigadier Lopes Santos. As in the case of the other territories, he is appointed by and responsible to Lisbon, and has virtually unrestricted power in the province. Administratively, Cape Verde is divided into 12 concelhos.

Cape Verde had five members in the 1965 Head of State Electoral College, and has one member in the Corporative Chamber, and two in the Overseas Council. Before the 1971 enlargement of the Portuguese National Assembly it had two representatives in that body, and presumably it has received additional representation. In terms of its population size, Cape Verde has received considerably greater representation on these national advisory and legislative bodies than has Guinea-Bissau.

The province has a Legislative Council with 21 members. Three are ex officio, six are elected by the direct vote of those qualifying for suffrage, and 12 are elected by "organic" or interest-group vote.

Most of the population is engaged in subsistence agriculture, and the climate combines with over-population to make life a constant struggle for many. The most recent drought, which began in 1968, ravaged agricultural production and caused serious food shortages. The government emphasized that it had taken special relief measures to avoid widespread famine. No actual figures on starvation have been released. The Portuguese are exploring the possible uses of underground and desalinated water to mitigate the effects of future shortages.

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24 Abshire and Samuels, note 1 supra.
In September of 1971 a United Nations committee described the economic situation in Cape Verde as follows: 26

The 3-year drought has brought to the forefront all the territory's long-standing economic problems and highlighted its chronic poverty. Despite the investments made under successive national development plans, no real solution has been found to stimulate economic growth. According to official data, the annual per capita income in the territory rose by only 430 escudos between 1960 and 1968, from 1,751 escudos at 1963 prices to 2,181 escudos. As described by one of the deputies who visited the territory, agricultural methods are still archaic, there are no significant industries, inter-island communications need to be improved, and a policy must be found to meet the problems of over-population.

Cape Verde's major exports are bananas, tuna fish preserves, and fish and fish products. Following are import and export figures for 1969: 27

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Products</th>
<th>Main imports</th>
<th>Value (million escudos)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td></td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton textiles</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat flour</td>
<td></td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td></td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wines</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td></td>
<td>72.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobiles</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total imports</td>
<td></td>
<td>418.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Products</th>
<th>Main exports</th>
<th>Value (million escudos)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bananas</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuna fish preserve</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish and fish products</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pozzolanas</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peanuts</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total exports</td>
<td></td>
<td>44.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Negligible.

Due to Cape Verde's large need for imports, which come mainly from Portugal, it has a chronic trade deficit with Portugal. This rose from 3.6 million escudos to 85.1 million escudos in 1969, after the drought began. Ordinarily Cape Verde maintains a balance of payments surplus with the rest of the world excluding Portugal, but in 1969 this dropped to 52.9 million escudos from the 1968 total of 59.6 million. In 1969, there was a net global balance of payments deficit of 32.2 million escudos, contrasting with a net global surplus of

27 Ibid.
32.0 million in 1968. There is an unexplained discrepancy between the import-export figures and the balance of payments statistics, since the former show a considerably higher trade deficit than that included in the balance of payments calculation.

In 1969 3.8% of Cape Verde's imports originated in the United States, and 12.0% of its exports went to the United States.

The major diseases in Cape Verde are influenza and malaria. In 1964 there were 25 doctors in the territory, or one to every 4,500 people. In 1968, the United Nations calculated the infant mortality rate (death in first year) at 91.7 per 1000 live births, a very high figure. No data on life expectancy are available.

The Portuguese have made considerable efforts to upgrade education in Cape Verde, especially in the last three years. During our visit officials claimed that 95% of the children in the islands were in school. The main expansion has been in primary education, and has included the establishment of school-posts like those described for Guinea-Bissau. According to figures supplied by the Portuguese, the total number of primary schools and school posts has tripled since the PAIGC revolt began in the early 1960's, as illustrated in the following graphs. It is notable that the greatest increases have been in the lower-quality school posts.

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**SCHOOLS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Primary Schools</th>
<th>School Posts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Source: "Problemas de Cabo Verde" by Brigadeiro Antonio Lopes Dos Santos, Agencia Geral Do Ultramar, Lisboa (1971).

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28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Abshire and Samuels, note 1 supra.
SCHOOL ATTENDANCE

Source: "Problemas de Cabo Verde" by Brigadeiro Antonio Lopes Dos Santos, Agencia Geral Do Ultramar, Lisboa (1971).
SOUTH AFRICA AND SOUTH-WEST AFRICA
RESERVES AND BORDER AREAS

Transkei Legislative Authority
Ovamboland Territorial Authority
Ciskei Territorial Authority
Tswana Territorial Authority
Lebowa Territorial Authority
Venda Territorial Authority
Zulu Territorial Authority
Matshangana Territorial Authority
Southern Sotho Territorial Authority
Other native reserve
Border areas for industrial development
Area subject to physical planning
Chairman Diggs had been refused a regular visa by the Government of South Africa on two previous occasions. On the earlier occasion, August 1969, the Department of State had issued a strong statement regretting the refusal of that Government to issue visas to the chairman, or to Ogden Reid.2 Congressmen Whalley, Derwinski and Burke had traveled to South Africa as part of the Special Study Mission to West, South and North Africa of February 7-March 7, 1971.

In the summer of 1971, the chairman's application for a visa was granted with a concomitant understanding that the study mission would visit Namibia immediately following the visit to South Africa.

Purpose of visit to South Africa

The usual goals for a factfinding mission—namely, to become informed on a particular country, to increase understanding of the country and its people, as well as the ability to offer constructive evaluation of and recommendations for U.S. policy—were underscored in the case of South Africa. South Africa is unique in that it is the only country in the world whose laws, society, economy are based on a governmentally-imposed system of discrimination on the basis of race and color. Although Africa has changed from a number of dependent areas under colonial rule to independent States with majority rule, South Africa has remained a bastion of minority rule.

The basic purposes of the factfinding mission to South Africa were:

To witness separate development on the ground, to see apartheid in practice, and to observe firsthand its meaning to all of the people of South Africa;

To witness the practices of our own Government and in particular the implementation of the stated U.S. policy of abhorrence of apartheid;

To find the facts about the majority of the people of South Africa; and

In connection with the present hearings of the subcommittee on "U.S. Business Involvement in Southern Africa" to visit some U.S. plants in South Africa and to have some discussions with United States and South African businessmen managing U.S. businesses in South Africa.

The belated arrival statement 3 of the study mission, while noting awareness of the legal considerations applicable to apartheid under the

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1 These findings are those of the chairman of the subcommittee, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the members of the subcommittee or of the other members of this special study mission or of the special study mission of Feb. 7-Mar. 7, 1971.
2 Congressman Reid had been invited to South Africa to make the Day of Reaffirmation Address for the National Union of South African Students as had Robert Kennedy in 1964, or of the special study mission of Feb. 7-Mar. 7, 1971.
3 For text, see app., p. 368.
United Nations Charter, said that a basic purpose of the factfinding mission was to observe separate development on the ground.

Inasmuch as apartheid, or separate development, is a policy of the South African Government and relates to its internal policies toward the people of South Africa, the question is valid as to the legal basis of the study mission’s concern.

The applicable principles of international law relating to apartheid are found, in the first instance, in the United Nations Charter and are reaffirmed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The United Nations Charter addresses this subject uncompromisingly with the stated conviction that international peace and cooperation and international achievement cannot be attained until countries dedicate themselves to eradicate racism. Article I of the Charter refers, inter alia, to two of the purposes, inter alia, of the United Nations as one, to develop friendly relations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and as two, to achieve international cooperation in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. In articles 55 and 56 of the Charter, all members of the United Nations pledge themselves, inter alia, to take joint and separate action, in cooperation with the United Nations, to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, with a view toward the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.

Each member of the United Nations—the United States and each other member—has, therefore, undertaken solemn treaty obligations toward its own people and toward all peoples to work for their human rights and fundamental freedoms without distinction as to race and color. Thus, the United States has specific duties to take action in cooperation with the United Nations toward the realization of these objectives of the Charter.

The “domestic jurisdiction” argument is not available to South Africa with respect to apartheid, because the Charter applies to each member state, imposes on each state an obligation to observe and promote equal rights and self-determination for all, and imposes on each other state an interest in such observations by all states.

The principles of the Charter with respect to racial discrimination are reaffirmed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides in articles I, II, and VII:

**Article I.** All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act toward one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

**Article II.** Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

**Article VII.** All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.
The 25th Anniversary Resolution of the General Assembly, G.A. Res. 2627 (XXV), recognized the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as representing humanitarian standards for all members of the international community.

ARRIVAL OF THE STUDY MISSION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Upon arrival at Jan Smuts Airport, Johannesburg, the chairman was informed that the South African Government had reneged on its unconditional granting of the visa and was interposing an objection to the visit to Namibia. The first decision of the chairman and Congressman Vander Jagt was to abort the trip. Accordingly, the Ambassador notified the South African Government immediately of this decision and of the consequent canceling of any appointments with members of the Government. A decision was made, however, to fulfill some part of the purpose of the mission to see and visit the majority of the people of South Africa by a visit the following morning to Soweto, which is the black township near Johannesburg, and in which probably a million Africans live. The official population is about three-fourths of a million.

But the greeting by the children of Soweto was deeply moving. They sang a hymn to the chairman:

"Here's a black man, who is lion-hearted."
"And he is here with us today.
"Perhaps he will help us, the difficulties we have. Amen."

When the children of Soweto, with their uplifted faces, called insistently upon the chairman for a response, the remarks which the chairman then made with a wave of greeting to the assembled children are worthy of note:

"You are the future of Africa; and with the resources that this country has—natural, industrial, and human—I can only say one day you will be free and all the world will be proud of you."

Following this tumultuous welcome by the throngs of children in Soweto and later by the crowds of black workers in Pretoria, masses of people from the black townships around Pretoria who gathered to welcome the chairman, it was decided to continue the visit to South Africa as a people-to-people mission. There were no meetings with the officials of the South African Government; nor is it felt that the mission suffered because of the decision not to see the Government officials. Their views are well known, whereas the views and feelings of the vast majority of the people of South Africa are generally completely overlooked. We met with the people of South Africa—the black people, the white people, the colored people, the Indians. We met with urban and rural blacks, with the educated and uneducated.

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4 See page 370 of the appendix for the text of the letter by Bishop Dr. Leonard Auala of the Lutheran Church of South West Africa to the South African Government on the unsettled situation in Namibia arising out of the protest of the Ovambo and the Ovambo-Kavango Lutherans over the continued holding of Namibia by the South African Government in defiance of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice.

5 There are three-fourths of a million blacks living in the townships of Mamelodi, Atteridgeville, Garankuwa, and Hammanskraal.
blacks, with those caught up in grim self-effacing poverty and with the well-to-do. We met with English-speaking whites and with Afrikaners of various gradations in their attitudes toward “the problem” of South Africa, as they termed the problem of minority control by the whites. We met with nonracial groups, church groups, and the South African counterpart of civil rights organizations.

The stark isolation of the whites from the majority of the people permits almost no social intermingling and effectively inhibits meaningful communication between the races. Mutual antipathy is implicit in the situation where whites do not meet blacks and where blacks are building up an increasing awareness of black identity. Thus, observations of this situation during the study mission confirmed the rightness of the decision to concentrate those 9 days in South Africa on the people, rather than on the Government of South Africa.

**Geography and Demography**

South Africa is located in the southernmost portion of the Continent of Africa. Its total area comprises some 472,494 square miles. (Although South Africa is frequently compared in size to the State of Texas, it is in fact considerably larger.)

The factfinding mission visited each of the four largest cities of South Africa: Johannesburg (1,305,000 population), Cape Town (807,000 population) on the western coast, Durban (690,000 people) on the Indian Ocean coast, and Pretoria (448,000 people) which is close to Johannesburg. Pretoria is the administrative capital of South Africa. Cape Town is the legislative capital and Bloemfontein in the Orange Free State is the judicial capital. The study mission also visited Port Elizabeth, as well as East London and Alice, where the College of Fort Hare and the Black Theological Seminary are located.

South Africa is composed of four provinces, Cape Province and Natal, which were the former British colonies, and the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, which were the former Boer Republics.

South Africa is a white-minority ruled country of approximately 21 million people of whom more than 17 million are not white. The 1970 census figures show a total of 21.5 million people in South Africa, of these 15.1 million or 70.1 percent are African, 3.8 million or 17.7 percent are white, 2 million or 9.4 percent are Coloured, and 0.6 million or 2.8 percent are Asians. Of the whites, approximately 60 percent are Afrikaner and 40 percent are of English descent.

The trends in the population composition of South Africa may be seen from a comparison of the 1960 census which listed: 16 million people, of whom 10.9 million were Africans, 3 million white, 1.5 million Coloured, and 0.5 million Asians.

The whites of South Africa as indicated above are composed of two groups, the English, who won the Boer War at the turn of the century, and the Afrikaners, who tenaciously held on and in 1948 won the elections, thus ousting the United Party from power, putting into

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6 See the SPRO-CAS publication “South Africa’s Minorities” (Johannesburg 1971) on The Indian People, the Afrikaner, the English-Speaking Whites, and the Colored People of South Africa.
power the Nationalist Government and instituting the policy of apartheid. The Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, has expressed fears that whites will be outnumbered 14 to 1 in 150 years' time (Daily News, November 20, 1969). Indians, as well as the Cape Malays, comprise the Asiatic population. The Coloureds are of mixed ethnic origin.

The population of South Africa is required by the law, the Population Registration Act No. 30 of 1950, as amended, to be classified into rigid race classification, either as “a white person, a Coloured person, or a Bantu.” The racial classification of a person determines every aspect of his life. Someone stated to the study mission “This is God’s own country, but unfortunately it has become predicated on black and white.” Another eloquently put it: “They have designated us as seven different groups with differing facilities. Our system is based on color and nothing else.” A person’s racial classification is the utmost importance to him, for it decides, inter alia, where he may live, how he may live, what work he may do, what sort of education he will receive, what political rights he will have, if any, whom he may marry, the extent of the social, cultural, and recreational facilities open to him, and generally the extent of his freedom of action and movement. (Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Manouchehr Ganji, Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/949, November 22, 1967, para. 24). Racial classification also determines if and when a person must pay tax. Africans must pay taxes from the ages of 18 through 65, regardless of income. An African is liable for tax if he earns no income at all. A white person pays income tax from age 21 through 60 and then only if his income exceeds $840.

The act cited makes detailed provisions for determining a person’s race. The broad definition given is: “‘Bantu’ means a person who in fact is or is generally accepted as a member of any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa; ‘Coloured person’ means a person who is not a white person or a Bantu; ‘white person’ means a person who (a) in appearance obviously is a white person and who is not generally accepted as a Coloured person; or (b) is generally accepted as a white person and is not in appearance obviously not a white person.”

The law then provides for subcategories: that “every colored person and every Bantu shall be further classified into ethnic or other groups.” “Further the Government has power to proclaim subcategories within the Bantu and Coloured categories, which are then treated as separate categories for certain purposes. The following subcategories have been proclaimed for Coloured persons: Cape Coloured, Malay, Griqua, Chinese, Indian, other Asian and other Coloured. (Proclamation No. 46 of 1959.) Japanese are classified as white.” The classification of Japanese as white is provided for in an agreement between South Africa and Japan.

The Population Registration Act requires that every person in South Africa be classified, that a population register be established and every person be entered according to his classification, and that every person be issued an identity card to be produced upon demand by any authorized person. In South Africa, race is all-pervasive.
Archaeology has proved conclusively that the Bantu-speaking Africans settled some two-thirds of South Africa before the first black-white contact was made. Africans were also mining the area around modern Johannesburg at least 600 years before the first whites settled at the Cape. (Brian Fagan, "Southern Africa," Thames and Hudson, London, 1965; "The Oxford History of South Africa," vol. I, Oxford University Press, 1969; Dr. R. Mason, "The Prehistory of the Transvaal," Johannesburg, 1965, and so forth.) The stone ruins of their kraals still stretch across most of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, in areas which whites now claim as their exclusive preserve. The Archaeological Research Unit at Witwatersrand University has shown that an African smelting furnace, unearthed in a "whites only" suburb of Johannesburg, was in use in 1060 A.D. Many African kraals are of a similar age. (See John Lawrence, "South African Propaganda," United Nations Unit on Apartheid, document No. 26/71, June 1971.)

In fact, according to a very recent discovery in the Lebombo Mountains between Swaziland and South Africa, the presence of human populations in southern Africa predates that of Europe. Traces of human occupation have been found there dating back at least to 46000 B.C., or 10,000 years before human traces in Europe or the Middle East. Even lower strata, undatable by present methods, give evidence of human occupation of Southern Africa going back perhaps 100,000 years, which immediately suggests this part of Africa was the cradle of modern human civilization. The discovery of stone tools there suggests that the bow and arrow was invented there far earlier than previously thought. ("To the Point," Johannesburg, Jan. 15, 1972, p. 58.)

When the Dutch colonizers arrived at the Cape of Good Hope, two-thirds of South Africa was inhabited by Africans of the Bantu language group, who had been settled in the heart of the country for several centuries. The southern part of the country, the Cape area, was populated by Africans speaking the "Hottentot" languages. The Dutch settlers mixed freely with these people, and produced the "Coloured" people of the Cape. The original inhabitants were incorporated into the Coloured community.

With respect to the Afrikaners, a mixed group of white settlers from Europe, a demographic study concluded that: (1) Of South Africa's 2 million "white" population in 1935, at least 750,000, or 37½ percent, were Coloured; (2) in any "white" marriage, there is a 3 in 5 chance of one of the partners being Coloured; (3) there are almost no pure "whites" in any family which has lived in South Africa for more than two generations. Thus, the older-established a family, the more likely it is to be racially mixed. (George Findlay, "Miscegenation," Pretoria News & Printing Works, 1936, a study which was seen as so dangerous by the Government, even then, that every available copy is alleged to have been tracked down and destroyed.)

The white population of South Africa arrived gradually from the 17th century onward, and migration continues steadily today. The Afrikaans-speakers came from Holland, France, Germany, and other
European countries, many of them refugees from religious persecution. There was almost constant conflict and war between the white settlers and the Africans, from the beginning. This was largely due to the Dutch settlers' pastoralism and assumption that the land belonged to them and their cattle. The Africans who had no tradition of individual ownership, and needed the land for their own cattle, resisted the European incursions.

The later settlers from Britain followed in the wake of the British Government's takeover of the Cape Colony. They brought with them relatively modern views against slavery, although they still treated the Africans as inferior. Many of the earlier settlers trekked away from the Cape Colony, and its antislavery legislation, to preserve their traditional way of life. Fierce battles with the Africans resulted, in the areas which the Europeans were trying to take over. Superior firepower and specifically the Gatling gun (the predecessor of the machinegun) gave the whites general military superiority. By the end of the 19th century the whole area had come under white domination, often as a result of brutal massacres of the original inhabitants.

The discovery of gold and diamonds brought about the beginning of the African migratory labor system, and the rapid urbanization of African workers. At the turn of the century, tribal warfare sparked off by a dispute over the gold mines, erupted between the English and Afrikaners. This was the Boer war, in which the Afrikaners showed a remarkable talent for guerrilla warfare and the British devised the concentration camp in which to intern Afrikaner wives and families. The hatred aroused at that time has remained very strong among the Afrikaners, and there is a constant groundswell of tribal rivalry between them and the English-speakers.

The Boer war ended with the union of the colonies of the Cape of Good Hope, the Transvaal, and the Orange River Colony in the South Africa Act of 1909, wherein South Africa was given independence within the British Commonwealth. The act contained two entrenched provisions (that is, clauses requiring special procedures for amendment and thus conferring special guarantees): the first, continuing the existing limited suffrage of the Coloureds in the Cape and the second, conferring equal and official status on the English and Dutch languages. Power was handed over to the white minority, with some limited representation for Coloureds and Africans in the Cape. Notwithstanding the constitutional sanctity of the Coloured franchise, the nationalists pursued in the early 1950's a "prolonged constitutional struggle" to nullify this provision, legally or not; and in the Separate Representation of Coloured Voters Act (No. 30 of 1956) the Coloured people were removed from the common roll. (Horrell, Legislation and Race Relations, Institute of Race Relations, p. 16 (1971)).

The indirect representation in the Senate by four whites of Africans, under the South Africa Act of 1909 and the Representation of Natives Act of 1936, was abolished in the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959. There is now no representation, direct or indirect, of Africans, Asians, or Coloureds in the South African Parliament. Indignation within the Commonwealth at this and other forms of repression forced South Africa to leave the Commonwealth in 1961 and declare a republic. The Republic of South Africa Constitution Act of 1961
provides that "Parliament should be the sovereign legislative authority" and "no court of law should be compelled to enquire into or to pronounce upon the validity of any act passed by Parliament." other than an act purporting to repeal the sections entrenching the equality of English and Afrikaans as the official languages. The act further vests control and administration of Bantu affairs and "of matters specially or differentially affecting Asians . . . in the State President."

World opinion has continued to condemn South Africa's racial policies, however. The United Nations has condemned apartheid as a "crime against humanity," G.A. Res. 2202 (XXI) of December 16, 1966, and continues its efforts to seek out, and make public, the facts on apartheid and the abnegation of human rights which it involves. These are documented in publications of the Unit on Apartheid, the Special Committee on Apartheid (established by G.A. Res. 1761), the Commission on Human Rights, the Economic and Social Council, and the International Labor Organization. Because of difficulties in regard to its policies—difficulties which South Africa interpreted as "interference in South African racial problems"—South Africa withdrew from UNESCO in 1955. (Notice of withdrawal cited, Unit on Apartheid document "UNESCO on Apartheid," March 1971, p. 1.) The remarks with which UNESCO concluded its comment on "UNESCO and Apartheid" are noteworthy: Above all, UNESCO's mission, as laid down in its Constitution, is to "contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science, and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law, and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world without distinction of race, sex, language, or religion by the Charter of the United Nations. Between this aim and the aims of apartheid, there can be no compromise." (Ibid., p. 5.)

In the ILO "Declaration Concerning the 'Policy of Apartheid' of the Republic of South Africa," the ILO emphatically reaffirmed "its condemnation of the degrading criminal and inhuman racial policies of the Government of South Africa" and "called upon the governments, employers, and workers of member states to combine their efforts and put into application all appropriate means to lead the Republic of South Africa to heed the call of humanity and renounce its shameful policy of apartheid." The International Labor Conference of 1961 called upon South Africa to withdraw from the ILO "until such time as the Government of the said Republic abandons apartheid." In 1964 South Africa advised of its decision to withdraw. (This became effective in 1966, pursuant to the relevant provision of the ILO Constitution.) On August 7, 1963, the Security Council "being convinced that the situation in South Africa is seriously disturbing international peace and security," inter alia, called upon all states to "cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types, and military vehicles to South Africa; * * *" (S/5386). The arms embargo against South Africa has been reaffirmed on several occasions. It is nonmandatory in that the action was not taken pursuant to chapter VII.