



Report of Special Study Mission to Southern Africa

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Report of Special Study Mission to Southern Africa

Alternative title	Report of Special Study Mission to Southern Africa
Author/Creator	Committee on Foreign Affairs; House of Representatives
Publisher	U.S. Government Printing Office
Date	1969-10-10
Resource type	Hearings
Language	English
Subject	
Coverage (spatial)	Southern Africa (region), United States, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia
Source	Congressional Hearings and Mission Reports: U.S. Relations with Southern Africa
Description	This is a report of the visit by Rep. Charles C. Diggs, Jr., of Michigan and Lester L. Wolff, of New York, to Southern Africa from August 10-30, 1969. They visited Angola, Mozambique, Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, Botswana, Zambia, Malawi, and Tanzania, and discussed freedom movements in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Namibia. It also includes policy recommendations and appendices, including the Lusaka Manifesto, the Arusha Declaration, the publication "Southern Africa: A Time for Change," and a list of U.S. companies in Southern Africa.
Format extent (length/size)	181 page(s)

<http://www.aluka.org/action/showMetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.uscg002>

REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY
MISSION TO SOUTHERN AFRICA

AUGUST 10-30, 1969

BY

HON. CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR., Michigan, *Chairman*

HON. LESTER L. WOLFF, New York

PURSUANT TO

H. Res. 143

AUTHORIZING THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TO CONDUCT THOROUGH STUDIES AND INVESTIGA-
TIONS OF ALL MATTERS COMING WITHIN THE JURIS-
DICTION OF THE COMMITTEE



OCTOBER 10, 1969

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

FOREWORD

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C., October 10, 1969.

This report has been submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs by the Special Study Mission to Southern Africa conducted between August 10 and August 30, 1969.

The findings in this report are those of the special study mission and do not necessarily reflect the views of the membership of the full Committee on Foreign Affairs. It is filed in the hope that it will prove useful to the Congress in its consideration of legislation.

THOMAS E. MORGAN, *Chairman.*

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C., October 10, 1969.

HON. THOMAS E. MORGAN,
*Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am submitting for consideration by the Committee on Foreign Affairs the report of the Study Mission to Southern Africa, August 10 to August 30, 1969.

The study mission submits this report with the hope that it will be useful to the committee in its deliberations of legislation and policy considerations as they relate to the southern African countries and the African continent in general.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR.,
Chairman, Study Mission to Southern Africa.

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
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REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY MISSION TO SOUTHERN AFRICA



INTRODUCTION

The study mission, Hon. Charles C. Diggs, Jr., chairman, was accompanied by Hon. Lester L. Wolff, New York, during the first week of a 3-week visit to southern Africa. The study mission visited Angola, Mozambique, Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia, Malawi, and Tanzania. With the exception of Tanzania, this was the first time that an official U.S. congressional delegation had toured any of these countries. South Africa and South-West Africa were not included because the Chairman was denied a regular visa, the subject of his speech on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives on August 7, 1969, which is included in appendix A of this report.

The purpose of this visit was fourfold: (1) To gain firsthand information on the economic development and prospects for sustained economic viability of black-majority-ruled countries; (2) survey the political problems and the prospects for racial peace in white-minority-ruled countries; (3) observe the freedom movements in southern Africa through discussions with many of their leaders; and (4) observe the manifold U.S. operations, specifically U.S. aid programs, U.S. Information Service, and the Peace Corps.

In each country, the study mission met and exchanged views with leading government officials, American representatives, a cross section of private citizens and important leaders of Africa's freedom movements, most of whom are headquartered in Zambia and Tanzania.

Although we found all U.S. personnel technically fit and in many instances outstanding in the performance of their duties, more emphasis should be placed on assuring they are more attuned to the sensitivities characteristic of that area.

A. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

Nowhere in the world is the black-white crisis more starkly un-clothed than on the African Continent. The Republic of South Africa, the illegal regime of so-called Southern Rhodesia, and the Portuguese administrators of Mozambique and Angola have apparently turned their backs on the moral requisites of the 20th-century doctrine of uncompromising equality. In so doing, they have helped to lay the foundation for an eventual black-white collision of explosive proportions. Most of Africa's freedom movements are committed to change through constitutional reorganization based upon majority rule. But South Africa's and Southern Rhodesia's racist reluctance and Portugal's brooding hesitancy, while differing more in degree than in kind in their oppressive policies, are nonetheless equally responsible for the surging proliferation of Africa's freedom movements. As that dedicated and peace-loving freedom fighter, South African Chief A. J. Lutuli, declared in 1964 at the Rivonia trial:

In the face of uncompromising white refusal to abandon a policy which denies the African and other oppressed South Africans their rightful heritage—freedom—no one can blame brave and just men for seeking justice by the use of violent methods; nor could they be blamed if they tried to create an organized force in order to ultimately establish peace and racial harmony.

The members of this study mission wish to make unerringly clear one conclusion as the result of their conversations with various African leaders: should an extremely unfortunate racial bloodbath engulf South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, or the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique, such an eventuality would be the direct consequence of the economic exploitation, political dispossession, and other forms of degradation imposed by the white minority in those countries.

An even more ominous portent is the possibility of heavy Communist involvement in the African freedom struggle as it turns away in frustration from the western nations and seeks, and in turn receives, help from Communist states, anxious for a determinant role in African affairs.

In southern Africa, 4 million whites rule 28 million blacks (about 2½ million are mixed races or Asian). While most of the freedom

movements seem to be multiracial in outlook, there also appears to be a danger of their efforts becoming a rigid black-white confrontation if their progress is frustrated by long, drawnout struggle. Some reports to the study mission indicate that the freedom movements are not all really multiracial in outlook—for example, it was stated that the South-West African Peoples Organization wants “whites” out of South-West Africa, and that the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union includes individuals who would drive out white “settlers,” who outlawed the party in 1962.

It is too soon to predict with any certainty not just when, but even whether, the freedom movements will be successful in their efforts to end white minority rule in southern Africa. Yet, without a change in the present policies of the existing governments and in view of the continuing determination of the movements themselves and the international support which they receive, it appears that time and history are on the side of the revolutionary forces. Details on the major freedom fighters organizations of southern Africa are covered later in this report.

B. U.S. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

American foreign policy toward Africa can be summarized in one word: schizophrenic.

On the one hand, the United States, the most powerful symbol of democracy in the world, is committed to freedom and equality and opposed to tyranny and injustice. And on the other hand, America has made an immoral entangling alliance with one of the most tyrannical governments in the world, the Republic of South Africa. Not only do we maintain intimate economic ties with South Africa, but we have also forged other links such as a NASA tracking station and landing rights for South African Airways that have endowed her with respectability and security. Nor have Africans been impressed with our bumbling policy of confusion toward Southern Rhodesia.

Understandably, a nation's foreign policy is governed primarily by its self-interest or what former State Department policy planner Charles B. Marshall defined as “enabling our constitutional values to survive.”

U.S. self-interest is dramatized by the presence in our midst of over 25 million black citizens who are increasingly identifying with their cultural heritage and who are on the threshold of linking up with the goals of the African liberation movement. Once the struggle becomes internationalized in this fashion they may also expect support from their traditional allies in the labor movement, on the campuses, among the churches, and other liberal elements. This will also give impetus to Africanists, foreign policy organizations, and the thousands of returned Peace Corps volunteers with interest in Africa. The activation of this kind of constituency is much nearer than many of our policymakers realize. Those who think they can buy time with short-range concepts that cater to certain present controlling interests are courting disaster. Africa is “the continent of the future.” The United States should ask itself, “What will be our posture in Africa 5, 10, 25 years from now?” If it is to be on the side of the vast majority of Africans, our present policies and plans should reflect an enlightened projection and drastic revisions are demanded.

The United States is indeed confronted with difficult policy decisions as it attempts to balance the advantages of political stability against the traditional American aim of supporting the development of broadly based and fully representative governments. The foundation of the American attitude toward Africa has been the principle of self-determination and its corollary of government by the consent of the governed. In Rhodesia, the Portuguese territories, and South Africa, nonwhites generally acquiesce in the authority of existing governments, but this is essentially because they have little alternative due to repression and police state methods. Tribal society is still strong in some areas and allowed to exist and even encouraged. At the same time, support for peaceful transition is also a cornerstone of United States-African policy.

The United States has attempted to isolate Africa from the arms race as much as possible and advocates refraining from active military intervention in African affairs. It has been the consensus of American leaders that Africa should be left free to seek African solutions to its problems and be encouraged to act through African institutions. Thus, while American sympathies may lie with the principle of African self-rule which the revolutionary movements represent, the United States has confined its activity in support of the principle only to United Nations action and bilateral discussions with established governments, which has been tragic for our reputation as a democratic leader.

The U.S. Government neither encourages nor discourages new investment in South Africa. However, the agencies of the executive branch insure that potential investors are given full information and briefing on all factors, both negative and positive, which may bear on the investment situation in South Africa. Total U.S. investment in South Africa has been estimated at \$800 million. In comparison the United Kingdom has an estimated investment there of around \$3 billion. See appendix E5 for further discussion of U.S. investment in South Africa.

As a NATO ally of Portugal, the United States has unilaterally attempted to encourage that country to take a more enlightened view of its role on the African continent. Moreover, the United States voted for the U.N. resolution (1742-XVI) which called for self-determination in Angola and for Resolution 1699 (XVI) which censured Portugal for noncompliance with U.N. regulations concerning reporting on non-self-governing overseas territories.

The Portuguese Foreign Minister in discussing his Government's policies in Africa with our study mission admitted that, on the surface, the policies of the U.N. might appear right. However, the Portuguese consider themselves experienced and in the long run they are not impressed by the U.N. resolutions. The Foreign Minister contended that not a single country has implemented any resolution of the U.N. contrary to their vital interest. He also maintained most U.N. resolutions are irresponsible and not realistic.

In spite of its record within the United Nations in support of self-determination for the Portuguese African territories, the United States has been condemned by freedom fighters for its cooperation with Portugal in the form of arms supplies, bases, and trade. The United States has received reassurances from its NATO ally that arms

supplied under NATO agreements are not being diverted for use in Portugal's defense of her African territories, but leaders of the revolutionary movements insist that NATO weapons are being used against them and that provision thereof releases funds which the Portuguese use to finance the war against them. In answer, the United States has stated that the arms embargo is effective and pointed out that any American arms involved in the conflicts are usually of World War II origin, available commercially from markets outside the United States.

The U.S. Ambassador in Lisbon advised the study mission that materiel furnished to Portugal by the United States under the military assistance program is not being utilized by the Portuguese in her African Provinces. Since 1961 no materiel usable in Africa has been furnished the Army. Military aircraft furnished under the military assistance program is limited to that required for NATO training and for NATO committed units. The principal effort of the military assistance program for the Navy in recent years has centered around cost sharing construction of three destroyer escorts, modernizing electronic gear on NATO committed ships, furnishing necessary follow-on spare parts and training ammunition. Such assistance is not directly relevant to African wars of liberation.

U.S. policy toward Rhodesia has also centered around U.N. action by supporting the mandatory sanctions against the Ian Smith government. Neither the United States nor any other nation formally recognizes the illegal government of Prime Minister Ian Smith and the United States continues to recognize British sovereignty over the territory. The United States, under Executive Order 11322 of January 5, 1967, in support of U.N. Security Council sanctions, prohibited Americans from engaging in trade of selected goods with Rhodesia. The United States also joined in unanimous approval of the 1968 Security Council resolution which imposed even more stringent economic sanctions upon Rhodesia.

On November 11, 1965, the United States withdrew all but a token staff from its consulate in Salisbury. The acting U.S. Consul in Salisbury is accredited to the British Government. Since the break between Britain and Rhodesia following the June 20, 1969, constitutional referendum, the United States has not indicated if it would withdraw the remaining members of its mission, although this has been recommended by the State Department and the present Consul. It now awaits decision by the President.

The United States has long been on record in opposition to South Africa's policies of apartheid and rule over South-West Africa. The United States supported the Security Council's 1963 resolutions requesting member states to embargo the sale of arms to South Africa and scrupulously implements such an embargo. The United States also supported the landmark General Assembly resolution (2145 (XXI), Oct. 27, 1966), which declared that South Africa's League of Nations Mandate for South-West Africa was terminated and that the territory came under the direct responsibility of the U.N. During the 1967 trial of South-West African nationalists, the United States joined other U.N. members in calling upon South Africa to cease the illegal application of the Terrorism Act in the territory of South-West Africa and for the release and repatriation of the defendants. To obtain South African compliance with U.N. resolutions, the

FUELING BY OFFICIAL SHIPS

No official U.S. ships should use South Africa ports.

ECONOMIC TIES

The U.S. Government should actively discourage private loans and investment by American businessmen and bankers in South Africa.

The U.S. sugar quota for South Africa should be abolished.

I also urge visible disengagement from Portugal in the Portuguese-ruled African territories of Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea.

As a result of United Nations Security Council action, we have embarked upon a similar policy of disengagement and disassociation with regard to Rhodesia. We should under no circumstances relax our support for this U.N. embargo.

All that I propose with respect to southern Africa is peaceful action. I do not advocate the use of force; on the contrary, I oppose it.

But at the same time that we reject force, we must offer more than words to prove our moral abhorrence of the racist cancer in southern Africa.

We must take all peaceful and practical steps, within the capacity of our Government, to help stop the spread of this cancer, and with all reasonable speed, eradicate it.

(By George M. Houser*)

Not too long ago a group of South African refugees said to me: "Do you realize that Americans are our enemies because they support the apartheid government in South Africa?" What they meant was not so much overt American support of the apartheid policies but a more subtle yet not less substantial backing of the South African regime. The refugees implied that the United States, as a favored trading partner of South Africa, strengthens South Africa's economy and the unjust hold of apartheid on its nonwhite people.

This is not an unusual opinion. In fact, the current debate on the strategy of countries and people who oppose apartheid revolves around the words "engagement" or "disengagement." Proponents of the engagement theory assert that greater economic involvement in South Africa by expanding employment opportunities will eventually integrate the black South African into the economic and political life of the country. Those who urge disengagement state that, even if a disengagement strategy will not bring down the regime by itself, it will at least end our material and psychological commitment to maintain the status quo, so that new options for actions will then become possible.

More than 260 American firms, through affiliates or branch offices, are doing business in South Africa. The total private direct investment is \$601 million, according to a 1968 State Department estimate. With indirect investment added, the total is over \$800 million. This amount accounts for 13 percent of foreign private investment in South Africa, which is second only to Britain's investments. American firms earn more than \$100 million a year from these investments.

As far as trade is concerned, more than 16 percent of South Africa's imports comes from the United States and 8 percent of its exports goes to the United States (not counting gold). The main exports from the United States are chemicals and fertilizers, machinery, petroleum and transport equipment (American companies produce approximately 60 percent of South Africa's cars and trucks). Principal imports from South Africa are fish products, chemical elements and compounds, metals, uranium, chromium, asbestos, and diamonds.

Supporters of the engagement theory argue that, as the economy of South Africa becomes more and more industrial and urbanized, Africans will be encouraged to come to the urban areas at more favorable wages and under better working conditions. The pass system will tend to break down because of the need for black labor in the cities, and from these changes in economic patterns political gains will emerge for black Africans.

Furthermore, it is argued that the regime can be influenced only if there is greater communication from the outside, not less. Supposedly the increase in investment also increases the amount of influential communication.

*George M. Houser is executive director of the American Committee on Africa. He is a member of the Advisory Council of African Affairs of the Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. State Department.

Thus, this theory implies, it is possible to be an opponent of apartheid and yet to carry on business as usual on the ground that the strengthening of the economy is also bringing about the downfall of the architects of this system of racial oppression.

The facts unfortunately indicate a much less optimistic future than the engagement theory provides. As American investment in South Africa has grown, and as the South African economy has expanded, apartheid policies have worsened.

In 1950, just 2 years after the Nationalist Party, with its doctrine of apartheid, came into power, American investment in South Africa amounted to \$140 million. It has grown five times that amount since then. During this same period the Nationalist Party has increased its political hold on the country so that it now has about 75 percent of the seats in Parliament and its legislation cannot be blocked.

The period of Nationalist Party control has resulted in the most oppressive apartheid measures. Numerous restrictive laws have been passed, the major political organizations of nonwhites have been banned and most of the black leadership is either in prison or exile.

The economic situation has become more, not less inequitable during this time. Between 1947 and 1961 white wages increased by 35 percent, while black wages increased by only 11 percent. In 1967 the average black miner received \$21.60 per month; white miners received \$364.10. In construction, black workers were paid \$56.70 and whites \$331.45. The Government spends \$15 a year for the education of every black child in primary grades, but \$182 for each white child.

Apartheid laws make advancement within industry for the African worker almost impossible. Under the Industrial Conciliation Act, for example, African trade unions are not permitted to engage in collective bargaining or to strike. Under the same act the minister of labor has the right to determine which job categories will be reserved for particular racial groups.

The purpose of this legislation is to prevent black competition on the skilled or even the semiskilled level. The minister of labor can make exceptions in job reservation categories, but he always has the power to invoke the law as he sees fit or as he may be pressed to by white workers.

Even in the so-called "Bantu homelands" the African is not free to develop his potential. The 1954 Tomlinson Commission, which brought "separate development" into being, called for the creation of 20,000 new industrial jobs each year in the homelands. In the first 6 years only 1,760 jobs had been created.

Thus, the economic advancement in South Africa seems to have no direct effect on the practices of the apartheid system. One basic reason for this is that apartheid is built on the pass structure by which no African has the legal right to live outside of the 13 percent land surface designated either as a Bantustan or as a reserve. Half a million Africans are arrested every year under the pass laws.

In addition, American economic investment in South Africa aids South Africa in its drive toward self-sufficiency. American oil companies have been particularly active in aiding South Africa in prospecting for oil. An item in the New York Times of October 22, 1966, reported, "Eight American oil organizations, one French, and a South African company have been granted concessions to prospect for oil and gas on the country's continental shelf. The concessions are a part of the Government's intensified search for oil to strengthen its hand in the event that international sanctions are applied because of the Government's apartheid policies." Standard Oil and Mobil Oil, through subsidiaries, handle 48 percent of South Africa's oil refining capacity.

In spite of the ban on sending military equipment to South Africa, some American enterprises nevertheless strengthen the military potential of South Africa. Kaiser Jeep's subsidiary distributes products (Jeep and Gladiator) readily convertible into vehicles for maintenance of internal security. American know-how has perhaps been a vital factor in building South Africa's chemical and nuclear industries.

Thus trade with South Africa has, to a considerable extent, been replaced by production within South Africa. And American major investment has helped to make South Africa so self-sufficient that it cannot be challenged effectively.

American businessmen who are involved in South Africa make no criticism of apartheid's repressive policies. This suggests that American business interests in South Africa are hostages of the system and perhaps not even interested in seeing change. In 1966 Henry Ford II said, "When abroad, we must operate by the standards of the host country or forfeit our welcome."

The South African press is happy to quote statements of visiting American businessmen. In January 1965, for example, Milton P. Higgins, chairman of the Norton Co. in Worcester, Mass., was quoted as saying: "I think South Africa is going to remain a strong country, led by white people. I think foreign countries should leave South Africa alone. If they leave it alone it will get on and do a great job."

In a survey taken among American business representatives operating in South Africa, 39 percent responded that if they were South African citizens they would vote as members of the Nationalist Party. Thirty-five percent said they would vote as members of the United Party. Only 13 percent would vote as Progressive Party members.

Both the Nationalist and United Parties proclaim the necessity of apartheid or of white domination. Thus there is no evidence at all that creative communication between investor and host actually occurs. Indeed, it is more likely that the American investor is often a willing pupil of the "advantages" of apartheid and the cheap labor it provides.

The advocates of economic engagement can factually point out that profits from investments in South Africa have increased in recent years, but they cannot point out that this has lessened the strictures of apartheid on the black people of South Africa. They can rightly declare that the economy of South Africa is booming, but they cannot say that this has increased political or economic freedom for the nonwhites.

If the purpose of engagement with South Africa is to reap greater profits in the short run, then the present policy is a successful one. If, on the other hand, the rationale for engagement is to help end apartheid, to lead to freedom of action for the nonwhite majority of the country, then engagement is a tragic failure. The burden of proof is upon those who advocate and are practicing engagement.

What would a disengagement policy be? Essentially it would reverse the trend toward economic ties with South Africa. The U.S. Government, for example, would discourage increased investments in South Africa. Under the Export Control Act the President could find that it was not to the best interests of the United States to trade with South Africa. The President would urge Congress to end the sugar quota which was set for South Africa when trade was stopped with Cuba. The United States could find alternative locations for the space tracking stations presently located in South Africa. The ban on sending military supplies to South Africa could be expanded to include any heavy equipment such as trucks or truck parts which could conceivably be converted to military use.

Trade and investment in South Africa could be decreased with a minimum of inconvenience to the United States. American investments there are only 1 percent of our total foreign investments. Trade with South Africa amounts to only 1.1 percent of our total foreign trade.

A lessening of American trade and investment in South Africa would have a much more serious effect on South Africa itself. The United States, as has been shown above, provides almost one-fifth of South Africa's import and takes a little less than a tenth of its exports. It is not claimed that unilateral disengagement by the United States would bring down the South African regime. However, it would cause some dislocations within the South African economy and hopefully demonstrate to the South Africans the unreality of the course they have set for themselves.

The effect of a possible disengagement policy by the United States cannot be minimized. Condemnation of South Africa's apartheid policies in the United Nations has been almost unanimous. Only Portugal has openly backed South Africa. If the United States were to adopt an uncompromising policy toward South Africa, it would cause it to find alternative markets. It would be possible to devise a world strategy to aid those countries which are most dependent on trade with or investment in South Africa, such as Great Britain, so that they, too, could adopt a policy of disengagement. The whole world climate might well be reversed if a powerful country such as the United States took the lead in disengagement.

American policy toward South Africa is looked upon by the rest of the world as the measure of the U.S. sincerity in espousing freedom and equality for all men. The policy will be found wanting as long as American capital supports and profits from apartheid. Disengaging from South Africa would aid the United States in helping to mitigate the increasing racial polarization in the world.

The moral imperative for disengagement from South Africa is very compelling. Apartheid is racism. It denies the basic ethic of the Judaeo-Christian religion that

all men are children of God and made in His image. A recent statement of the South Africa Council of Churches has put it this way: "The policy of separate development is based on the domination of one group over all others. It depends on the maintenance of white supremacy; thus it is rooted in and dependent on a policy of sin."

FINAL QUESTIONS

1. Can business be expected to adopt a disengagement policy if the Government has not?

Since business acts primarily to make a profit, it is unlikely that it will voluntarily change its practices. However, business interacts with government. And government, having a wider perspective than any one segment of society (such as business), encourages all institutions to come into line with its policies. Thus pressure for economic disengagement must be brought to bear on both the U.S. Government and business.

2. If a disengagement policy were successful, would it hurt the nonwhites more than the whites? Many African leaders are urging economic disengagement. If the South African economy were hurt by withdrawal of capital, naturally this would affect the South African people. However, it would have less effect on the nonwhites than on the whites because they already occupy the lowest rung on the South African economic ladder. Their per capita income is less than one-tenth that of the whites. A large part of the African population subsists on agriculture.

3. What about other countries whose policies we do not particularly like? Why do we pick on South Africa?

First, as the British Foreign Minister has pointed out, dictatorships based on race are infinitely more dangerous to world peace than any other. In today's world, with its imperative for racial equality, support for the unique brand of legalized racism which apartheid represents only fans the flames of world conflagration.

Furthermore, apartheid is a policy about which it should be possible to take effective international action. South Africa increasingly stands alone. It has, at best, only Portugal and the illegal regime of Rhodesia as its overt allies.

A policy of disengagement toward the Government of South Africa should make it possible to become more actively engaged in aiding those opponents of apartheid who are currently its economic or political victims. More significant support, for example, could be given to the Republic of Zambia as it attempts to break its trade ties with South Africa. A more vigorous American scholarship program, whether in Africa or the United States, should become a reality, particularly for nonwhites who are in exile from South Africa. A positive policy of political asylum for opponents of the regime should go into effect in the United States without delay. More could also be done to aid Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, currently held in economic hostage to South Africa.

With a new policy, the United States would be in a position to give real leadership to those forces which can challenge the repressiveness and the inequalities of apartheid.

2. SOUTH-WEST AFRICA

CAPTIVES IN THEIR OWN LAND

(By Elizabeth S. Landis*)

The documented history of South-West Africa is meager. Bushmen were probably its first inhabitants, but they were gradually driven into the less habitable regions by other Africans whose descendants live in the territory today. In the 19th century white incursions began. The Nama and Herero fought over the south-central grazing lands, while the Ovambo and related peoples controlled the northern area where they live today.

The Germans took advantage of these intertribal enmities to gain protectorate agreements covering much of the territory except for the Walvis Bay area (which is still a part of South Africa) and the northern region, which remained unsubmissive. They exploited the territory cruelly, greedily, and profitably.

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Both the Nama and the Herero finally rebelled against their "protectors" and were brutally suppressed. When the South Africans occupied the territory during World War I in support of the allies, many Africans hailed them as rescuers.

The South African Government expected to claim South-West Africa at the end of the war as its reward from the allies. Instead, all dependencies of the defeated states became wards of the international community, represented by the League of Nations. The league itself could not administer these territories nor were they considered able to govern themselves. So the league assigned them to the victorious allies—in each case to the occupying power—to be administered as a "sacred (international) trust." South-West Africa thus became a South African mandate.

South-West Africa was classified as a mandate which the governing country might administer as an "integral portion" of its own territory. This power was, however, limited by the special mandate agreement for South-West Africa, which provided that the territory must be administered so as to "promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and social progress" of its inhabitants.

South Africa's conduct as a mandatory power made a mockery of the concept of international trust and of the mandate agreement. It was, in fact, hardly distinguishable from the preceding German regime.

South-West Africa was opened to white South African immigrants, and Africans who had reclaimed their tribal lands from the German settlers were again ejected. All Africans not employed by whites were relegated to reserves established for them by the new Government. These reserves were far too small for the number of Africans in the territory. Most of them were within the Kalahari or Namib Deserts, without the bore holes and other improvements which the Government supplied or helped construct on white-owned farms. The land assigned to the Herero lacked not only water but also adequate nutriment in the soil so that animals grazing on it suffered deficiency diseases.

The all-white Government also enacted statutes similar to those in effect in South Africa to control nonwhites. Pass laws prohibited Africans from entering, leaving, or traveling through the "police zone," the southern two-thirds of the territory. For the violation of vagrancy laws, Africans could be sentenced to labor on public works or private property—a fine source of cheap black labor for white farmers. Rigorous master and servant laws emphasize the duties of servants (black) and the rights of masters (white).

Whenever Africans protested, the mandatory reacted with force. It subdued the turbulent Ovambo north of the "Red Line" (the northern boundary of the police zone) in a military action in which their chief and about 100 tribesmen were slain. It quelled a rebellion of the Bondelswarts Nama by bombing them—men, women, and children—into submission. It forced discontented Rehoboth Basters, seeking independence, to back down by suddenly surrounding their area with South African soldiers. And it quieted the again rebellious Bondelswarts by physically removing their chief and imposing other severe administrative sanctions against the community.

South African administration was repeatedly criticized by members of the League of Nations, particularly the bombing of the Bondelswarts, which created a minor international scandal. But since the League required a unanimous vote to take any action, South Africa could veto any effective censure of its own conduct. An international organization unable to cope with nazism and fascism in Europe was unlikely to prevent the maltreatment of blacks in an obscure corner of Africa.

Until the collapse of the League at the beginning of World War II, the South African Government met all the formal requirements of the mandate agreement. After the war the South African delegates to the newly formed United Nations announced that their Government wished to annex South-West Africa and that the inhabitants of the territory desired to be incorporated into the then Union of South Africa. The General Assembly withheld its consent, which was required by the mandate agreement for any change of status. It urged, instead, that South Africa place its mandate under the United Nations similar, but more advanced, trusteeship system. The Union refused.

At the formal dissolution of the League of Nations in 1946, South Africa promised to administer South-West Africa "in accordance with the obligations of the mandate" until a change of status occurred. However, it continued to incorporate the territory into South Africa. It developed the argument that when the League was dissolved, the mandate also came to an end, giving South Africa absolute sovereignty over South-West Africa by right of conquest. South Africa denied the right of the United Nations, as successor to the League, to supervise its administration of South-West Africa.

Differences between the United Nations and South Africa over the administration of South-West Africa increased after the National Party, which advocates rigid apartheid, came to power in 1948. Unable to resolve these differences, in 1950 the General Assembly sought an advisory (nonbinding) opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legal status of South-West Africa. It was the Court's opinion that South-West Africa remained subject to the mandate after dissolution of the League and that the U.N. had supervisory power, even though South Africa was not legally required to transfer the territory to the U.N.'s trusteeship system. During the following decade neither censure, appeasement, nor negotiation moved the South African Government either to recognize the authority of the U.N. or to ameliorate its treatment of the territory's nonwhite population.

When it finally became clear that no agreement could be reached, Ethiopia and Liberia, on the urging of the United Nations General Assembly, proceeded against South Africa before the World Court. Under article 7 of the mandate agreement, former League members could ask the Court to decide a question concerning interpretation or application of the mandate agreement if the question could not be settled by negotiation.

The complainants asked the Court to rule that South-West Africa was still subject to the mandate, that the United Nations was entitled to supervise administration of the mandate, and that South African administration (specifically the introduction of apartheid) was contrary to the "well-being" and "social progress" of its nonwhite inhabitants. This was a novel legal maneuver. If it succeeded, it would result in a decision "binding" on South Africa; that is, the Security Council might order sanctions to compel obedience.

The court struggled with the *South-West Africa* case for more than 5 years. It first ruled it had authority to decide the complaints. But 4 years later, in 1966, the Court, somewhat changed by death, illness, and replacements, held that it should not, after all, rule on the merits of the complaints.

Despite the fact that the Court did not rule on any of the questions raised by Ethiopia and Liberia, the South African Government claimed that the Court had vindicated its administration of the mandate. It immediately began to implement the "Odendaal plan" to extend total apartheid to the territory.

The Odendaal plan follows the general pattern of race relations established earlier in South Africa. Under this plan every South-West African is to be classified ethnically as belonging to one of 12 population groups. Each group is assigned a "homeland" within the territory, where its members are recognized as "citizens" with "full rights." Outside his homeland every person is considered an alien, without rights.

The division of South-West Africa into homelands, which was proposed by an all-white government, naturally assigns the lion's share of the police zone to the territory's 96,000 whites. It includes all the cities, harbors, and coastline, and substantially all presently exploitable mineral deposits—indeed, all territory not specifically assigned to another population group. Most of the coloreds will presumably continue to live around urban areas.

The proposed homelands for the nonwhites correspond generally to present reserves, although the total area is somewhat larger. All the homelands except the Rehoboth Gebiet and Namaland are located in desert or semidesert areas although considerable portions of Ovamboland and Okavangoland may, with Government assistance, eventually be irrigated. The homelands can no more be expected to support their increasing future populations than the existing reserves can support their present populations. Great numbers of Africans will have to continue to work in the white "homeland" as a landless, rightless proletariat. At present there are some 50,000 Africans in the urban areas and about 65,000 on white farms. Most of them exist in desperate poverty, earning less than the minimum standard necessary to sustain healthful living.

The inducement to accept the homelands is the promise that they will eventually receive "self-government." Within each homeland there will be no "job reservation" or other artificially imposed limitation on self-advancement of ethnic "citizens." However, if the South African pattern established in the Transkei is followed, meaningful self-government will not be granted until a homeland becomes economically viable and has a technologically proficient population. And the homelands are too small and too poor ever to be economically viable.

At this point only Ovamboland has been provided with a legislative assembly of tribal chiefs and granted the right to "legislate" on a fairly extensive list of local matters, subject, of course, to South African approval. Ovamboland is a more or less traditional tribal area extending across the border into southern Angola. It has approximately 271,000 "citizens," about 44 percent of the total population of the territory.

In accordance with South African practice it is probable that all Africans will soon have the "opportunity" of progressing towards self-government. This opportunity lies in assuming most of the costs of education and social services in the homelands—to be financed through taxation—thus learning "financial responsibility." Currently the territorial government spends eight times as much for each white child who attends school as it does for each nonwhite child. All white children go to school, whereas only a small, if increasing, percentage of nonwhite children attend any school.

Implementation of the Odendaal plan in the police zone will require the shifting of vast numbers of the nonwhite population. None of the reserves which will be absorbed into the homelands is inhabited exclusively, and many not even predominantly, by the ethnic group to which the homeland is allocated. The South African Institute of Race Relations estimates that approximately 135,000 Africans live outside the homelands proposed for them.

South-West Africa's voteless nonwhites have no peaceful way to protest this implementation of apartheid. Strikes, boycotts and demonstrations are forbidden. Even individual criticism may be punished administratively, as by denying work permits. After the World Court destroyed the long-cherished hope of outside intervention, the largest popular organization, SWAPO (South-West Africa Peoples' Organization), declared it would support guerrilla warfare to end white South African domination of the territory. Freedom fighters, trained in other countries, began to slip back into South-West Africa. Most of them were quickly captured by the South African police. But on the basis of the threat supposedly posed by them, Parliament quickly passed the Terrorism Act.

This statute empowers the police to arrest and hold alleged terrorists and witnesses for indefinite periods. It defines the crime of "terrorism" so broadly that any activity from simple theft to breaking a window in a schoolhouse is technically within the definition and thus punishable as treason. The act was made retroactive to 1962 so that freedom fighters arrested before it was passed were liable to death by hanging. It is believed that some 200 "terrorists" have been arrested under the act although there is no way for anyone outside the Special Branch (secret police) to be sure. Thirty-seven Ovambo were tried under the act in 1967 despite protests by the United Nations, the United States and virtually every civilized country.

As a consequence of the International Court's nondecision and of South African implementation of the Odendaal plan, the United Nations General Assembly declared South Africa's mandate terminated and decided to take over the administration of the territory itself until independence. It created a council of U.N. members to oversee U.N. administration of the territory, which it now designates Namibia. Unfortunately, the great powers effectively sabotaged this action by refusing to become members of the council. The council's small nation members have been unwilling or unable to confront the South Africans, embarrass their regime, assert U.N. authority or even publicize the situation.

By accepting membership on the council, the United States could dramatically reverse South Africa's unimpeded success by default at the United Nations. Some other great powers would then undoubtedly feel compelled to become members also, for reasons of political advantage. Effective action must be taken now to thwart South Africa's attempt to "divide and rule" South-West Africa.

THE PRETORIA TRIAL

In 1966, 37 South-West Africans (Namibians) were arrested in their homeland under South Africa's Antiterrorism Act. They were charged with conspiracy to overthrow their government by force and taken to South Africa for trial.

The Antiterrorism Act is designed to impose the severest sentences on those who oppose the governments of both South and South-West Africa. With its passage, terrorism became a crime punishable by a maximum sentence of death and a minimum prison sentence of 5 years. The act was proclaimed in 1967 and made retroactive to 1962.

Countries around the world expressed outrage at the arrests. The United Nations had repeatedly stated that South Africa's rule in South-West Africa is illegal and hence, its courts have no jurisdiction over Namibians.

The accused were members of the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), a political group formed in the 1950's. At their trial in Pretoria one of them, Toivo Herman ja Toivo, a founder and regional secretary of SWAPO, delivered a statement to the court.

The son of a catechist teacher at a Finnish mission, Toivo was born in 1924. When he was 10, his father died of tuberculosis contracted while laboring in the American-owned Tsumeb lead mines. Toivo studied at a mission school and went to work in Cape Town, South Africa, after World War II. There he and fellow Namibians organized SWAPO.

Toivo first came to public attention in 1957, when his tape-recorded petition to the United Nations, smuggled out of South Africa, created an international sensation. As a result, he was deported back to South-West Africa. There he continued to expose and oppose the policies of apartheid until his arrest in 1966.

Defying world protests, South Africa found the group of Namibians guilty in February, 1968. Toivo was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment, two men were acquitted and the others received sentences of from 5 years to life.

A condensed version of Toivo's courageous statement follows.

"My Lord, we find ourselves here in a foreign country, convicted under laws made by people whom we have always considered as foreigners. We find ourselves tried by a judge who is not our countryman and who has not shared our background.

"When this case started, counsel tried to show that this court had no jurisdiction to try us. What they had to say was of a technical and legal nature. The reasons may mean little to some of us, but it is the deep feeling of all of us that we should not be tried here in Pretoria.

"* * * We are Namibians and not South Africans. We do not now, and will not in the future recognize your right to govern us; to make laws for us in which we had no say; to treat our country as if it were your property and us as if you were our masters. We have always regarded South Africa as an intruder in our country. * * *

"We are far away from our homes; not a single member of our families has come to visit us, never mind be present at our trial. The Pretoria Gaol, the Police Headquarters at Compol, where we were interrogated and where statements were extracted from us, and this court is all we have seen of Pretoria. We have been cut off from our people and the world. We all wondered whether the headmen would have repeated some of their lies if our people had been present in court to hear them.

"The South African Government has again shown its strength by detaining us for as long as it pleased; keeping some of us in solitary confinement for 300 to 400 days and bringing us to its capital to try us. It has shown its strength by passing an act especially for us and having it made retrospective. It has even chosen an ugly name to call us by. One's own are called patriots, or at least rebels; your opponents are called terrorists.

"* * * We will not even try to present the other side of the picture, because we know that a court that has not suffered in the same way as we have, cannot understand us. This is perhaps why it is said that one should be tried by one's equals. We have felt from the very time of our arrest that we were not being tried by our equals but by our masters, and that those who have brought us to trial very often do not even do us the courtesy of calling us by our surnames. Had we been tried by our equals, it would not have been necessary to have any discussion about our grievances. They would have been known to those set to judge us.

"It suits the Government of South Africa to say that it is ruling South-West Africa with the consent of its people. This is not true. Our organization, SWAPO, is the largest political organization in South-West Africa. We considered ourselves a political party. We know that whites do not think of blacks as politicians—only as agitators. Many of our people, through no fault of their own, have had no education at all. This does not mean that they do not know what they want. A man does not have to be formally educated to know that he wants to live with his family, where he wants to live, and not where an official chooses to tell him to live; to move about freely and not require a pass; to earn a decent wage; to be free to work for the person of his choice for as long as he wants; and finally, to be ruled by the people that he wants to be ruled by, and not those who rule him because they have more guns than he has.

"Our grievances are called 'so-called' grievances. We do not believe South Africa is in South-West Africa in order to provide facilities and work for nonwhites. It is there for its own selfish reasons. For the first 40 years it did practically nothing to fulfill its 'sacred trust.' It only concerned itself with the welfare of the whites. * * * Only one who is not white and has suffered the way we have can say whether our grievances are real or 'so-called.'

"Those of us who have some education, together with our uneducated brethren, have always struggled to get freedom. The idea of our freedom is not liked by South Africa. It has tried in this court to prove through the mouths of a couple of its paid chiefs and a paid official that SWAPO does not represent the people of South Africa. If the Government of South Africa were sure that SWAPO did not represent the innermost feelings of the people in South-West Africa, it would not have taken the trouble to make it impossible for SWAPO to advocate its peaceful policy. * * *

"Your Government, my Lord, undertook a very special responsibility when it was awarded the mandate over us after the First World War. It assumed a sacred trust to guide us toward independence and to prepare us to take our place among the nations of the world. South Africa has abused that trust because of its belief in racial supremacy (that white people have been chosen by God to rule the world) and apartheid. We believe that for 50 years South Africa has failed to promote the development of our people. Where are our trained men? The wealth of our country has been used to train your people for leadership and the sacred duty of preparing the indigenous people to take their place among the nations of the world has been ignored. * * *

"I do not claim that it is easy for men of different races to live at peace with one another. I myself had no experience of this in my youth, and at first it surprised me that men of different races could live together in peace. But now I know it to be true and to be something for which we must strive. The South African Government creates hostility by separating people and emphasizing their differences. We believe that by living together, people will learn to lose their fear of each other. We also believe that this fear which some of the whites have of Africans is based on their desire to be superior and privileged and that when whites see themselves as part of South Africa, sharing with us all its hopes and troubles, then that fear will disappear. Separation is said to be a natural process. But why, then, is it imposed by force and why then is it that whites have the superiority?

"I have come to know that our people cannot expect progress as a gift from anyone, be it the United Nations or South Africa. Progress is something we shall have to struggle and work for. And I believe that the only way in which we shall be able and fit to secure that progress is to learn from our own experience and mistakes.

"Your Lordship emphasized in your judgment the fact that our arms came from Communist countries, and also that words commonly used by Communists were to be found in our documents. But, my Lord, in the documents produced by the state there is another type of language. It appears even more often than the former. Many documents finish up with an appeal to the Almighty to guide us in our struggle for freedom. It is the wish of the South African Government that we should be discredited in the Western World. That is why it calls our struggle a Communist plot; but this will not be believed by the world. The world knows that we are not interested in ideologies. We feel that the world as a whole has a special responsibility toward us. This is because the land of our fathers was handed over to South Africa by a world body. It is a divided world, but it is a matter of hope for us that it at least agrees about one thing—that we are entitled to freedom and justice.

"That is why we claim independence for South-West Africa. We do not expect that independence will end our troubles, but we do believe that our people are entitled—as are all peoples—to rule themselves. It is not really a question of whether South Africa treats us well or badly, but that South-West Africa is our country and we wish to be our own masters.

"There are some who will say that they are sympathetic with our aims, but that they condemn violence. I would answer that I am not by nature a man of violence and I believe that violence is a sin against God and my fellow men. SWAPO itself was a nonviolent organization, but the South African Government is not truly interested in whether opposition is violent or nonviolent. It does not wish to hear any opposition to apartheid. Since 1963, SWAPO meetings have been banned. We have found ourselves voteless in our own country and deprived of the right to meet and state our own political opinions.

"Is it surprising that in such times my countrymen have taken up arms? Violence is truly fearsome, but who would not defend his property and himself against a robber? And we believe that South Africa has robbed us of our country.

"I have spent my life working in SWAPO, which is an ordinary political party like any other. Suddenly we in SWAPO found that a war situation had arisen and that our colleagues and South Africa were facing each other on the field of battle.

Although I had not been responsible for organizing my people militarily and although I believed we were unwise to fight the might of South Africa while we were so weak, I could not refuse to help them when the time came. * * *

"In 1964 the ANC and PAC¹ in South Africa were suppressed. This convinced me that we were too weak to face South Africa's force by waging battle. * * * I tried to do what I could to prevent my people from going into the bush. In my attempts I became unpopular with some of my people, but this, too, I was prepared to endure. Decisions of this kind are not easy to make. My loyalty is to my country. My organization could not work properly—it could not even hold meetings. I had no answer to the question 'Where has your nonviolence got us?' Whilst the World Court judgment was pending, I at least had that to fall back on. When we failed, after years of waiting, I had no answer to give to my people.

"Even though I did not agree that people should go into the bush, I could not refuse to help them when I knew that they were hungry. I even passed on the request for dynamite. It was not an easy decision. Another man might have been able to say 'I will have nothing to do with that sort of thing.' I was not, and I could not remain a spectator in the struggle of my people for their freedom.

"I am a loyal Namibian and I could not betray my people to their enemies. I admit that I decided to assist those who had taken up arms. I know that the struggle will be long and bitter. I also know that my people will wage that struggle, whatever the cost.

"Only when we are granted our independence will the struggle stop. Only when our human dignity is restored to us, as equals of the whites, will there be peace between us.

"We believe that South Africa has a choice—either to live at peace with us or to subdue us by force. If you choose to crush us and impose your will on us then you not only betray your trust, but you will live in security for only as long as your power is greater than ours. No South African will live at peace in South-West Africa, for each will know that his security is based on force and that without force he will face rejection by the people of South-West Africa.

"My coaccused and I have suffered. We are not looking forward to our imprisonment. We do not, however, feel that our efforts and sacrifice have been wasted. We believe that human suffering has its effect even on those who impose it. We hope that what has happened will persuade the whites of South Africa that we and the world may be right and they may be wrong. Only when white South Africans realize this and act on it, will it be possible for us to stop our struggle for freedom and justice in the land of our birth."

3. MOZAMBIQUE/ANGOLA

A LONG WAR AHEAD

(By Eduardo Mondlane and William Minter*)

Few Americans have heard of Mozambique, for it has not made the headlines yet. If known at all, it is as a vague name somewhere on the map of Africa, or perhaps a tourist poster with game parks and sidewalk cafes. Certainly very few realize that it is the scene of a violent confrontation between Portuguese troops and African guerrillas, fighting for the independence of their country.

The Portuguese try to portray Mozambique as a tropical paradise of racial harmony. They have integrated different races and cultures, they say, into a blend of peoples all proud to say "Somos portugueses" ("We are Portuguese"). Perhaps economic progress is slow, they may admit, but no other colonial power has so successfully implanted "Christian civilization" in Africa.

To the casual visitor, or to the American full of images of "chaotic" Africa, such a picture may be attractive and convincing. Unfortunately, it bears no relationship to the facts of history or to the realities of today.

Mozambique, which stretches along the southeastern coast of Africa for over 1,000 miles, was first used by the Portuguese as a stopover on their way to India

¹ African Nationalist Congress and Pan African Congress.

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United States pledged its support for such peaceful and practical measures as might be desired. Though the United States has continued to maintain its relations with the Republic of South Africa, it has made clear, as our Ambassador to the United Nations had stated, that:

We will provide full and faithful support to the people of South-West Africa in the peaceful pursuit of their goals, in their efforts to assert and to exercise fully the rights to which all men everywhere aspire and are entitled.

It can be seen that the freedom movements in southern Africa present the United States with delicate policy considerations. In formulating our policy we must take into account the liabilities as well as the benefits from our relations. Perhaps the foremost issue for U.S. policy is what one American Senator has described as “* * * our moral and political credit with all of Africa.” American leaders who share this outlook ask whether the United States can afford not to give substantial encouragement to the freedom movements which represent the aim of self-government for Africans within these territories; to fail to do so, they contend, would be to sacrifice Africa’s faith in the genuineness of America’s dedication to self-determination for all peoples.

In the interest of the free world and Africa itself, the manner in which the United States implements the basic principles of its African policy significantly affects the future political pattern of that continent. Specifically, does the situation in southern Africa demand a more forceful U.S. position against minority rule, or should the United States leave the initiative to the Afro-Asian bloc in the U.N. to formulate international action against the offending governments? Can the present forces supporting political stability be directed toward the development of representative government? Would a unilateral or international attempt to alter the status quo in southern Africa represent, as former Secretary of State Dean Acheson has suggested, “barefaced aggression * * * unjustified by a single legal or moral principle”? Are the freedom movements, in fact, operating in the interest of the native Africans, with the goal of establishing government by consent of the governed? Who determines what native people want, really? To indicate the complexity of this question, for instance, do the chiefs in Rhodesia—who are salaried employees of the government—speak for Africans or do ZANU and ZAPU exile leaders represent African sentiment? Several hundred Africans are imprisoned inside Rhodesia for antigovernment activities; do they speak for Africans?

African representatives in Rhodesia’s Parliament have spoken out against recent political developments and racial policies espoused by the regime and some of these have opposed violence as a solution; do those who advocate peaceful change speak for the Africans? As a protest, followers of the banned ZANU and ZAPU parties have refused to register or otherwise participate in Rhodesian politics for several years; does this action provide us with an answer as to what the Africans really want? It is the answers to these and other complex questions which will determine the nature and future direction of U.S. policy toward freedom movements in southern Africa.

in the fifteenth century. From several small trading posts on the coast they carried on sporadic commerce and occasionally sent expeditions up the Zambezi River in search of the gold and silver of the African kingdoms further inland. Few Portuguese women ventured as far as Mozambique and thus miscegenation was commonly accepted and practiced.

But miscegenation, whether open, as with the Portuguese, or hidden, as with the northern Europeans who went to the United States or South Africa, does not preclude prejudice. Even before the eighteenth century height of the slave trade in Mozambique, the Portuguese firmly held that the black man could legitimately be enslaved and was indisputably inferior to the white man. Any black Mozambican who is free to speak will tell you that the same attitude of racial superiority persists today. Marvin Harris, a specialist in the study of race relations, noted on return from a 1958 trip to Mozambique that "the clear majority of whites in Mozambique regard the Negro as inferior and accept his inferior social position as irrefutable proof of the fact."

In the scramble for Africa in the late nineteenth century, the Portuguese seized effective control of Mozambique and the colonial system that has resulted is unique in the restrictions placed on the people of the country. Mozambicans may even talk enviously of the comparative freedom and prosperity in neighboring South Africa, probably the most consistently racist state in the world.

For most of the twentieth century the Africans have been governed under the legal and administrative system known as the *indigenato* (for the *indigenas*, natives). By this, Africans were treated effectively as children under the full control of the administrator of each district. The administrator exercised practically all police and judicial as well as executive functions. His permission was necessary for any commercial transaction, the allocation of crop land, the choice of an occupation and even entry into or exit from one's home district. The movements of the *indigenas* were controlled by passbooks, which everyone had to carry with him at all times.

The loophole was supposedly that any *indigena* who became "civilized," that is, adopted completely European customs and language and had the economic resources to live like a white man, could become a Portuguese citizen. Up until the change of this system in 1961, only one-tenth of 1 percent of the African population had achieved this status.

Officially the *indigenato* system was abolished after the Angolan revolt began in 1961, and everyone is now a Portuguese citizen. But there have been many laws passed in Lisbon before and ignored in the colonies. The practice continues. The administrator still exercises the same arbitrary authority over his charges; blacks still carry different identification books from whites and are subject to the same restrictions as in the past. This paper citizenship means much less in Mozambique than the rights granted on paper to American Negroes by the various civil rights bills.

The control strikes most directly at the labor of the black man. Like most other colonial powers, the Portuguese followed the abolition of slavery, so long the basis of trade, with attempts to force the Africans to produce cash crops. Labor by conscription was common not only in the Portuguese territories but also in the Congo and many of the French territories. Taxes to be paid in money were also commonly imposed, thus forcing the African to step out of his subsistence economy to work for the white man. In most of the other territories however, the economic development induced and the wages paid soon insured a sufficient supply of black labor without conscription. However, in Mozambique to this day, conscription forms the basis of the economy.

Legally the African is forbidden to be "idle." He must be forced to be useful, the Portuguese say. Unfortunately for the African, growing his own crops on his own farm for his family is not considered work. Only the production of sufficient cash crops, or paid employment for the state or private employers, is considered real work. Any black person not engaged in this can be, and is, rounded up by the administrator, forced to work for the state, or handed over to a private farmer or industrialist with whom he then signs a "voluntary" contract.

To escape being forced to work, he may sign up before being caught and be allowed to stay in his home district with his family. Or he may sign up with the labor recruiters for the mines of South Africa or the estates of Rhodesia. Then he will be somewhat better paid, can send money home to his family, and, on the basis of the number of workers "recruited," the Portuguese Government will itself receive payments and trade concessions from the South African Government. Marvin Harris estimates that approximately two-thirds of the mature, able-bodied men of southern Mozambique are employed in foreign territories. The effect on family life can be imagined.

In northern Mozambique, more distant from the cheap labor-employing enterprises of South Africa and Rhodesia, another system is used to get the maximum out of the Africans. There Africans are assigned to produce certain crops and then sell them to monopolies which buy at a deflated price. Cotton, the chief crop produced under this system, supplies the Portuguese textile industry, which is one of the basic industries of the Portuguese economy.

Officially forced cultivation of cotton was also abolished in 1961, but prices continue to be low because the forced labor system allows the administrator to indict Africans as malingers without having to prove it in a court of law. The very law promulgating the reform says that "the Government recommends the inexorable repression of vagrancy." Thus, in the parts of northern Mozambique still under Portuguese control, the acreage for cash crops cuts into that which needs to be used for food, and famine sometimes occurs.

Until 1964 legally, but still in practice, almost all education for Africans was carried out in a separate system under the control of the Roman Catholic churches. Protestant missions were allowed to operate only a few schools, and Government schools were only for whites and those few assimilated blacks who could afford the high fees.

Education for Africans begins, and often ends, in ensino de adaptação (rudimentary education). It consists of 3 years of mission school, which teaches Portuguese language, catechism, and a little arithmetic as preparation for entry into ordinary primary schools taught in Portuguese. But since heavy agricultural tasks required by the missions often cut into the time needed to learn the language, only one African in five passes the final exam and becomes eligible to enter the ordinary primary school, which goes to the fourth grade.

A somewhat better idea of the ensino de adaptação may be gained from the statistics of the archdiocese of Lourenço Marques, in the southern, more advanced section of the country. In 1961-62, there were 99,200 students enrolled; of these only 75,100 actually attended classes and 10,800 passed the yearly exam. Some 6,100 completed the 3-year course, and were thus eligible to enter third grade in the ordinary primary school. The total population of this section of Mozambique is approximately 1,500,000.

The situation in secondary instruction is similar; it is primarily for the whites and mulattoes. In 1963 there were less than 200 black students of the 3,600 in secondary school. In 1967 there were 6,200 students in secondary school; the percentage of Africans is not known but is unlikely to have jumped substantially. As for the university established in 1963, in its first year it had a total of five black students out of 300.

The curriculum is both backward in educational techniques and oriented completely to Portugal. Portuguese history and geography, Latin, Greek, and French are heavily emphasized. Mozambique is in Africa, but there is hardly a word of history or geography of Africa, no recognition that Africans, too, have a culture. All must be Portuguese: language, culture, concepts, and religion (Roman Catholicism).

Since the revolution began in 1964, the Portuguese have been forced to try to do more for education, to attempt to win over some educated black Africans to their side. But still the education of white settlers comes first; more and more are being encouraged to emigrate from Portugal to Mozambique, and Portugal can't even support its school system at home. It is unlikely to create a fair one for Africans.

In most of the rest of Africa, it has been possible to organize protests, to demand independence or at least reform. And occasionally the colonial governments have given in. But Portugal is different. Under a Fascist dictatorship since 1930, freedom of speech was unknown at home, much less in the colonies. In 1951, the colonies were officially designated "overseas provinces," and it was said that they were integral parts of Portugal itself. Any talk of independence was considered treason.

In 1962, African peasants in Mueda, northern Mozambique, demanded independence. They should have known better. They were invited to a meeting with the administration, then surrounded by the army. Several hundred people were killed. Other attempts at organization were met with similar reprisals and imprisonments.

It was only after the independence of adjacent African states that nationalists had a place to organize openly. Small organizations of exiles, especially in Tanzania and Rhodesia, began to send appeals to the United Nations, already awakened to the situation in the Portuguese colonies by the 1961 Angola revolt. But any effective U.N. action was blocked by Portugal's NATO allies, principally the United States, Great Britain, and France. Nationalists in Portuguese Guinea and

Mozambique soon reached the same conclusion as their brothers in Angola: only by a war of independence would they change the status of their people.

In 1962 several movements came together in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and formed FRELIMO (the Mozambique Liberation Front), a joint movement for the independence of Mozambique. FRELIMO planned further appeals to the United Nations and to Portugal to negotiate, but it also planned for the war it knew to be unavoidable.

Peaceful protest made no more impact than before. U.S. policy was even more supportive of Portugal after the death of President Kennedy than before. On September 25, 1964, 200 FRELIMO guerrillas in four provinces of Mozambique began attacks on Portuguese military installations. The Portuguese tried, and still try, to present it as only a few people crossing over from Tanzania. But it is more than that.

In 1965, Lord Kilbracken, a conservative British journalist, visited the war zone in Niassa Province and testified to FRELIMO activity. Now, in 1968, large areas of two provinces are under FRELIMO control. The number of armed guerrillas has grown to 10,000, most of whom are trained inside Mozambique. Their attacks have escalated from mines and ambushes to attacks on Portuguese military posts and airports.

FRELIMO's policies are those of a long guerrilla war. Attack where the enemy is weak, concentrate on military targets, treat civilians and prisoners well and above all organize among the people. For it is only the support of the people that will enable FRELIMO to win against the vastly better equipped army of Portugal, with its NATO aid and, more recently, reinforcements from South Africa.

In July of 1968 FRELIMO held its second full-scale Congress, for the first time inside Mozambique. Nearly 200 people from all parts of Mozambique, observers from other liberation movements and even an English journalist and writer on African affairs attended. The key leaders were reelected and the organization restructured to deal adequately with the many responsibilities of the movement.

Never has FRELIMO's action been limited to the military alone. In 1963 the Mozambique Institute was founded in Dar es Salaam to give education to refugee Mozambicans. Shortly afterward primary schools were begun in the refugee camps, and, as soon as possible, inside Mozambique. Now over 15,000 students attend FRELIMO bush schools. The teachers are inadequately trained and lucky to have textbooks for themselves, much less for the students. But FRELIMO has now established a teacher-training course in one of the camps, and the teachers at the Mozambique Institute are writing primary school texts, mimeographing some and hoping to get others printed. The demand for new schools is enormous; anyone who has even a little education is pressed into service to teach others.

As FRELIMO occupied more of the interior, other nonmilitary programs also became important. The people abandoned the forced cultivation of cotton and increased their food production. Since the Portuguese had forcibly evacuated all Indian and European traders, FRELIMO had to set up a system of distribution of basic farm tools (hoes and axes) as well as other household items. To supply some of the funds for this, they encouraged the export of easily transportable crops such as cashew nuts, peanuts, and sesame seed. As all transport in the liberated areas is by head portage, export of cotton and sisal has not yet proved profitable.

Health services are also important. As yet there is not one black Mozambican doctor. About 400 workers with various degrees of training carry out a program of first aid, treatment of such basic diseases as malaria and inoculations against smallpox. Patients with more serious cases are evacuated, if possible, to hospitals in Tanzania. Shortage of medicines is always a problem.

The Portuguese withdrew their administration completely from much of northern Mozambique, leaving only the army in its fortified bases. So FRELIMO has set up structures of local and regional administration. Traditional structures have been used whenever possible, but a course has also been established to teach basic administration to a select FRELIMO cadre.

It is a human tendency to hope for easy solutions to difficult problems. Many westerners hope in vain for voluntary changes in Portuguese policy or in the South African racist system. And many Mozambicans thought at first that it would be only a matter of a few months until the Portuguese were driven out. But FRELIMO knows that the struggle may last for years and all programs must be planned on that basis.

If the Portuguese were unaided, they might be forced out quickly. Already they are sending so many troops to Africa that if the United States sent as large a percentage of the American population to Vietnam, there would be two and a half million there. But the diplomatic, military and economic support Portugal

gains from NATO membership is invaluable. In addition there are South African troops in Mozambique guarding the huge Cabora-Bassa damsite in which South African capital is involved. It will be a long struggle.

The demise of Portuguese Premier Salazar is unlikely to make any difference either. On September 27, 1968, Marcelo Caetano, his successor, pledged to continue the same policies and to preserve the "integrity of the Portuguese nation," including the overseas provinces. But it will certainly be used by American apologists for Portugal, saying "give the new man a chance."

And the American people have little to say about it. It is a simple fact that when a foreign policy issue is not in the headlines every day, public opinion is practically nonexistent and its influence nil. The special interests of the American Navy with its base in the Portuguese Azores, and the businessmen with their investments, and the Cold Warriors whose first preoccupation is anticommunism—these interests determine U.S. policy toward Portugal and the independence of its colonies.

The Portuguese present themselves to the world as the defenders of Christian civilization against barbarism and communism. They are certainly not alone in using piety to hide injustice. The church bears a heavy responsibility for such confusion. The Roman Catholic Church in Mozambique has declared the idea of African independence a "philosophical monstrosity," and the Pope himself, on a recent visit to Portugal, awarded a religious medal to the head of the Portuguese secret police. The many Roman Catholics in FRELIMO have indeed a hard time distinguishing genuine Christian faith in Roman Catholicism from such distortions of it.

The Protestant missions have a somewhat better record, being quite active in education. But in Mozambique they have always been inclined to put the security of the institutional church above real identification with the aspirations of the people. The weight of the institutional church in Mozambique is clearly on the side of continued oppression, either by open support or simply by inaction.

The church in Mozambique is still largely a mission church, and Portugal itself is supported by the whole Western World. Inaction on the part of American Christians means tacit support of racism and colonial oppression, the failure to arouse the conscience of Americans means that the weight of American power falls on the wrong side. FRELIMO will fight on regardless, as will the other movements in southern Africa. The question is whether, in their struggle for a just society, they will have to see in the church an enemy or an ally.

THE REVOLUTION ALMOST FORGOTTEN

(By John Marcum*)

The case for Angolan independence first came up at the historic All African People's Conference in Accra, Ghana, in 1958. In 1969, more than a decade later, Angolan nationalists are still trekking to pan-African gatherings to seek support for their cause, often from leaders who had earlier shared status as impecunious nationalist petitioners.

During the intervening decade, Britain, France and Belgium have, however reluctantly, given in to local nationalist pressures. They have transferred political power and sovereignty to African governments. But not Portugal. Under an ultraconservative government that is concerned with prestige, the mystique of a civilizing "mission," and both immediate and long-range economic benefits, Portugal has held firm to the legal fiction that its "overseas provinces" in Africa constitute inalienable parts of the Portuguese Nation. These parts have no right to a separate identity, for they have been officially assimilated. But as of 1960, only 1 percent, or 40,000, of over 4 million Africans in Angola had been recognized as *assimilados*, or persons who have completely assimilated Portuguese ways.

When pent-up, unheeded African grievances against conscript labor, political repression and social discrimination exploded into the Angolan revolt of 1961, soon after Congolese independence, a deluge of violence and counterviolence made Angola headline news around the world. Now entering its ninth year, the

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Angolan conflict—almost forgotten by the world outside—continues its painful course with no resolution in sight.

During its dramatic initial phase, it became a concern of President John F. Kennedy and merited articles by journalists such as Walter Lippman and Arthur Krock. In 1961, Angola occupied six and a half columns in the *New York Times Index*. By 1967, however, it was receiving little government or private attention in the United States, and its space in the *New York Times Index* had declined to one-fourth of one column. Relatively well-informed Americans commonly asked: "What ever became of the Angolan revolution?"

Then, in August 1968, Portugal's seemingly indestructible premier and strongman, Dr. Antonio Salazar, was felled by a cerebral stroke. The press and foreign officers of the world suddenly took a new interest in Portugal and its colonial wars.

Because they had not kept abreast of developments in Angola, Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique, however, some normally perceptive observers wrote rather foolish things. Take for example the case of *The New Republic* (October 5, 1968). "It is principally in Africa," said that serious liberal weekly, "that Salazar's departure is expected to have a marked effect." What one should look for, it went on to say, was a move toward secession by leaders of an estimated 300,000 white Angolan settlers. Shades of another Rhodesia.

Yet readers of Salisbury and Johannesburg papers knew that current white rule in Angola faces a stronger military threat than in Rhodesia. Violent encounters with Angolan guerrillas over wide areas of eastern and northern Angola have been sorely testing the Portuguese Army. Far from being ready to go it alone, Angola, according to Rhodesian and South African correspondents, has need of all the 50,000 metropolitan soldiers stationed within its border—as well as assistance from South Africa to supplement Lisbon's resources.

American opinion about events in Angola is generally formed on the basis of an appalling lack of information and a considerable bit of misinformation. According to *The New Republic*: "A Che-type Marxist guerrilla movement exists in Angola's south, led by Mário de Andrade, a former cat's paw of Nkrumah." The fact is that Andrade has not been the leader of an Angolan nationalist movement since 1963. And Andrade's successor as head of the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA), Dr. Agostinho Neto, has not yet been reported to be leading the revolution from inside the country.

Indeed, a major criticism leveled against Angolan nationalist leaders, including Holden Roberto, head of the rival *Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio* (GRAE), has concerned precisely their tendency to lead from exile and to avoid the risks and hardships of a Che Guevara. In Portuguese Africa, only Amílcar Cabral of diminutive Portuguese Guinea has acquired the popular image of an on-the-spot-with-the-guerrillas revolutionary.

Reports from the Zambian press in late 1968 did suggest that Jonas Savimbi, the leader of a third Angolan movement, the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA), was, in fact, back inside Angola, where he had spent several months in 1966-67 with the *maquis* (underground). Nonetheless, despite the commercial profit with which the American press romanticized the Che Guevara saga, American newspapers and periodicals made no mention whatsoever of this apparent African effort to create a new "Che-type" revolution within a revolution.

Why are Americans so ill-informed? It is preoccupation with Vietnam? Disenchantment with Africa since the Congo entanglement? Belief that the nationalists are so bitterly divided among themselves that they are likely to prove ineffective in the long run? Or is it weariness with a long, nibbling insurgency that produces unconvincing communiqués heralding nationalist victories and Portuguese casualties such as, if real, would have long ago toppled the Lisbon government? Perhaps it is a bit of all of these.

Put summarily, the situation in Angola at the outset of 1969 was one of conflicting trends. On the one hand, coffee production and sales to the United States were excellent. Capital and settlers continued to flow in. An international consortium headed by the West Germans was beginning to tap the rich iron ore of Cassinga in the south. Evacuated by means of an extended rail line and an expanded port at Moçamedes, the ore promised to become a major new source of revenue. From a joint Luso-South African hydroelectric project on the Cunene River in the far south to Gulf Oil's \$150 million investment and breakthrough into a rich new oil field in the Cabinda enclave of the far north, prospects for economic development appeared very good.

All this gave the Portuguese Government some grounds for public expressions of confidence in its capacity to maintain its rule over Angola. Perhaps it is not irrelevant to recall, however, that in 1958-59 oil and iron plus French capital were seen as the bases for developing and keeping Algeria French.

In Angola, as in Algeria, it may not be possible to defeat African nationalism by means of tardy economic and social development. Indeed, the other side of the picture in Angola is one of chronic, small-scale insurgency spread over much of the outlying, lightly populated regions of the north, east, and south. The fighting is under the direction of three rival organizations, each of which denies not only the legitimacy but even the existence of its competitors. In part, they are involved in a race to see who can first establish a firm foothold in the bush and forest and then move into the real population centers along the railroads, on the cultivated plateaus, and in the coastal towns. The decisive test may be their relative and absolute capacities to build an effective political underground in these centers of concentrated population.

Certainly, if the new Marcello Caetano government should ultimately decide to devolve real authority to a local, multiracial government in Angola, such an underground organization could prove a crucial base from which to seek political power. If a war-weary Lisbon turned power over to an essentially white government, however, black Angolans would be faced with a considerably more repressive regime. An insecure white minority government with an uncertain support among a few thousand mulattos and black *assimilados* would almost certainly rely on the vigilante approach to law and order that Angolan whites used during the crisis of 1961.

Lisbon is, of course, counting on a multiracial solution of its own making. In addition to economic development and military supremacy, it is banking upon assimilation through education. Indeed, it may very well be correct in expecting that the Angola of a decade from now will be shaped by young people now enrolled in the territory's much expanded, if still inadequate, school system. This system is designed to produce African graduates who will view themselves as black Portuguese. Everything depends upon not producing graduates who will think, question and act in terms of the rational self-interests of persons who view themselves as Portuguese-speaking Africans.

Because so much depends upon the success of this gamble in education, and because most Portuguese are convinced that Anglo-Saxon Protestants have proven to be inherently incapable of educating Africans to be black Portuguese, Protestant participation in Angola's expanding educational program has been kept to a minimum. American missionary personnel have, in fact, been harassed and squeezed down from over 300 to less than 100 since 1961. As a justification for this the Portuguese can cite the fact that a disproportionate number of African rebel leaders are products of Protestant mission schools.

And is it not a matter of historical record that Protestant missionaries have been engaged in protracted competition with Portuguese Catholics and have long challenged the moral authority of the Portuguese Government to conscript labor or torture prisoners? Inevitably, the freethinking, unorthodox style of the missionaries helped to legitimize the idea of opposition to the colonial system. Protestants were and are a threat to the preservation of an imposed colonial order.

A logical projection from this state of affairs could very well be a further reduction in Protestant activity in Angola during the next few years. The black prospects for Protestantism derive from two factors: (1) The relationship of Protestantism to African protest coupled with Portuguese reprisals against both, and (2) the foreign policies of the United States and Great Britain, which have supported the Portuguese and alienated Africans. Both of these points have been dealt with in detail and with conviction in the growing Protestant literature on contemporary Angola.

In "Cry Angola!" a British Baptist, Len Addicott, described the injustices which led to the uprising of 1961. His moral outrage over the massive slaughter of Africans in retaliatory action by the Portuguese and the graphic picture of Portuguese counterterror drawn by such Baptist observers as the Revs. Clifford Parsons and David Grenfell explains why the Baptist Missionary Society was expelled from the Bakongo area of northern Angola. Similarly outspoken criticism of Portuguese atrocities against Methodist pastors and teachers in the Mbundu region (Luanda-Malange) in articles by Bishop Ralph E. Dodge and the Revs. Malcolm McVeigh and E. Edwin LeMaster reinforced Portuguese assumptions that Methodists, also, are objectively dangerous.

A recent autobiography by a Brethren teacher, "Angola Beloved," ascribes Portuguese beatings and torture of African Protestants in the interior region of Songo to the mere suspicion of "nationalistic leaning." It also points out how Christian communities among the Lwena and Chokwe of the east are now caught between the Portuguese Army and African guerrillas, both of whom demand support or else. And meanwhile, the protective or supportive presence of missionaries dwindles as Lisbon refuses to grant visas for replacements or for those wishing to return from furlough.

The Reverend Dr. Carl R. Dille of the United Church of Christ, principal of the Emanuel Theological Seminary at Dondi, also charged in the Washington Afro-American, October 10, 1967, that Portuguese authorities were torturing and murdering African Protestants because of suspected sympathy or complicity with nationalist guerrilla activity. Perhaps most damning in Portuguese eyes was his assessment that, though legally proscribed, racial discrimination was still widespread and the official goal of a multiracial society increasingly distant. Africans, he said, are being pushed to the point where they have "only one recourse, violence."

Because few missionaries who leave on furlough are allowed back, Dr. Dille may have felt no inhibitions about speaking out critically. But should missionaries have spoken out about injustice even when this would have meant being forced out of the country? Dr. Sid Gilchrist of the United Church of Canada has raised searching questions about this issue in his impressively and disturbingly honest "Angola Awake." Dr. Gilchrist says that it is amazing to him that "an overwhelming majority of missionaries have managed to 'keep their noses clean,' to see naked brutality habitually used against Africans all around them and yet to muzzle themselves and never say 'a mumblin' word' against the oppressor."

In an indictment of Protestant practice that could also be read as a refutation of Portuguese criticisms, the Canadian physician, who served the Ovimbundu community of central Angola for most of his professional life, has concluded that: We have "taught what the Portuguese said to teach." We have produced graduates "far more fluent in the Portuguese language than the products of mission schools in ex-British colonies are in English." We have "tried desperately to convince the youth of Angola that they are 'Portuguese' even when only a very few could ever hope to attain the pseudo-Portuguese citizenship open to a small elite. On matters of politics, human rights, economics, higher education and social justice our silence has been complete, cold and granite!"

Now "retired" and working among Angolan refugees in the Congo, Dr. Gilchrist has also pointed out that at another level the problem is less that of the Protestant teacher or doctor who feels it important to continue his creative work under duress and in silence than that of the governments of Western states that have lined the Western World in support of Portuguese colonial policy.

The symbol of this Western complicity with colonialism is NATO. Writing of Portugal's suppression of the 1961 uprising, Dr. Gilchrist has said: "* * * I doubt that there is one educated African in Angola who is not convinced that the Portuguese fought with NATO arms." There is also a widespread awareness of American financial (coffee sales, bank loans), military (Azores bases) and diplomatic (voting at the United Nations) support for Portugal's overall capacity to maintain its rule over Angola.

In June 1962, Len Addicott predicted that: "Only if the United States, the leading nation of NATO, and England, the traditional defender of Portugal, can force Dr. Salazar to change his policy, will they not be seen by the Africans as the accomplices of Portugal." As "accomplices," Western governments are in truth viewed with a combination of hostility and fear by Angolan liberation movements. Many Africans believe that American support for an arms embargo against Portugal in 1962 would have meant an independent Angola in 1968. Fated, instead, to the prolonged agony of a guerrilla war, they enjoy sympathy and support from both African and Communist powers—a little of the first and none of the second from the West.

Politically conscious Angolans are thus growing increasingly negative about everything—Protestantism included. Some even fear that the United States might someday intervene actively on the side of Portugal to prevent what Washington would perceive as a "Communist take-over" of a key area of industrial and mineral-rich southern Africa. Such an adventure—with incalculable results for a racially divided United States—might be the result of a drifting American policy unless a Vietnam-chastened United States, is prepared to accommodate to the presence of overtly hostile governments in southern Africa. Or unless—and how Washington caresses this unless—Marcello Caetano should prove wise and strong enough to smash the chain of violence and redirect the course of history.

FLIGHT TO FREEDOM
(By Malcolm McVeigh*)

There are well over a million refugees in tropical Africa today. Because of political upheavals, South Africa and its de facto colony South-West Africa, the British Commonwealth renegade Rhodesia, and Portuguese Angola and Mozambique have among them created an estimated 550,000 refugees.

Portugal is by far the worst offender. In the Republic of Congo alone there are 500,000 Angolan refugees listed in the 1968 World Refugee Report of the U.S. Committee for Refugees. There are now twice as many refugees outside Angola as there are European residents inside of it.

African unrest under Portuguese control, not only due to lack of political participation but also because of social and economic abuses, smoldered in the colonies for many years. In 1961 Angola erupted in bitter fighting with an attempt by Angolans to take over the Government. Many Europeans were killed, and the Portuguese responded to these attacks by bombing and destroying African villages throughout the northern part of the country.

In the wake of the devastation and fearful for their lives, Angolans in the border area fled immediately into Congo. Others moved into the forests of northern Angola and built new villages in hiding places wherever they could find them.

Thousands of Angolans still live in these hidden villages. However, it is a precarious existence at the least. Portuguese planes and patrols keep them on the move, and when life becomes too unbearable they set off for Congo.

They travel at dusk and during the night, through the forest, over crocodile-infested rivers and under constant danger from the Portuguese soldiers. Refugees from deep inside Angola have reported marches of up to 45 days on the trip out and almost invariably they tell of death (from illness or encounters with military forces) to members of the group on the way. In the meantime the war goes on.

The causes of refugee movements in eastern Angola and western and northern Mozambique are similar. The attacks of African nationalists on Portuguese outposts and plantations are followed by severe Portuguese reprisals against the local population and these in turn result in the flight of refugees across the border into neighboring countries.

What happens to the refugees after they have crossed the border? Again the Angolans may serve as useful illustration. Of the half million Angolans who came into Congo since 1961, about 400,000 crossed into the relative small area of lower Congo stretching from Kinshasa (formerly Leopoldville) to the Atlantic Ocean. The other 100,000 are spread along the border eastwards, with a rather large number moving into Katanga since December 1966.

Although some relief efforts have been carried on by the Congo Protestant Relief Agency at Dilolo in Katanga and Tshikapa in Kasai Province, the major relief and resettlement programs have been concentrated in lower Congo.

When refugees first began flooding into Congo in 1961, the Red Cross provided emergency aid. However, when it became apparent that the problem was of a long-range nature, relief operations were turned over to the church-related voluntary relief agencies Caritas Congo, Catholic Relief Services, and Congo Protestant Relief Agency. Since 1961 the CPRA has helped to resettle 200,000 Angolans in lower Congo.

When Angolans arrive in Congo, they are registered and given clothing, blankets, cooking utensils, hoes, machetes, seed and weekly food rations for 1 year—that is, until their houses are built, gardens planted and first crops harvested. If there is malnutrition, the sick are hospitalized and fed special diets until health is restored.

New primary schools and dispensaries have been built throughout the refugee area, and a secondary school has been established at Sona Bata, 50 miles south of Kinshasa, to provide refugees with opportunities for academic careers.

The Angolans are not placed in refugee camps but are encouraged to settle among the Congolese of the area. Most are of the same Bakongo tribe, so frictions are not as severe as they might otherwise be. Generally the Angolans become sharecroppers, paying for the use of the land with a percentage of the crops raised. This is not ideal when we consider that the resettled refugees are living at a subsistence level; but on the other hand, we must be grateful that personal relations are as good as they are and that the Congolese have made room for them.

*Malcolm J. McVeigh, a United Methodist missionary, recently served as director of material aid for Protestant relief work among Angolan, Mozambican and Sudanese refugees in Congo. Previously he had served as a United Methodist missionary in Angola and was there during the late 1950, early 1960 hostilities.

The Angolans have more than doubled the population of the area since 1961. If voluntary agencies have been able to help with the resettlement, this does not in any way diminish the credit which must go both to the Congolese people for their part in the process and to the refugees themselves for the enormous effort they have made in their own behalf.

Many international groups have contributed to the resettlement program. Considerable credit also must go to the Congo Government for its cooperation in relief efforts and for taking responsibility in shipping relief goods to the refugee arcas. The Congo Government not only has welcomed the refugees but also has permitted them a degree of freedom allowed by few other countries; and all of this has been done while facing its own enormous problems of adjustment and internal strife since independence in 1960.

In another independent country bordering on southern Africa, Tanzania, relief operations began in 1965 with refugees from Mozambique. Ten thousand of them had crossed the Ruvuma River because of pressure from Portuguese military forces. A fertile site at Rutamba, 80 miles north of the border and 30 miles from the coast, was selected and a 3-year resettlement plan established jointly by the Tanzanian Government, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Lutheran World Federation. As in Angola, clothing, seeds and tools were distributed, with supplementary food rations made available from the World Food Program. The plan has also included the construction of buildings to meet health and educational needs. In 1966, 3,000 more refugees crossed the border in western Tanzania, and these have been resettled in similar fashion at Lundo and Ndecho near Lake Nyassa.

The total refugee population from Mozambique in Tanzania swelled to 19,000 in 1967. An important self-help project of FRELIMO, the Mozambique Liberation Movement, has been the establishment of the Mozambique Institute to prepare students with inadequate educational background for further academic studies in Africa and abroad.

Similar accounts could be made of relief operations and refugee settlement in Zambia and Malawi.

Rhodesia and South Africa present their own special difficulties. To date there have been no mass movements of refugees from either of them. However, unrest runs high in each. If liberation movements should be successful in installing African governments in Angola and Mozambique, the pressure on Rhodesia and South Africa would be much greater.

Refugees from Rhodesia and South Africa are composed principally of students who escape to Francistown, Botswana. It is difficult to know how many refugee students have followed the Botswana route to central and northern Africa. But the U.S. Committee for Refugees, in its 1968 report, estimates about 6,000 are now residing in various African countries.

Those working closely with refugees in Africa are cognizant of the enormous problems which they face today and the lack of coordination and resources placed at their disposal. The new African governments are increasingly aware that they must assume more responsibility for the refugee question.

However, we must recognize that this is not an African problem but a world problem, and consequently we all have a part to play in its solution. A realistic appraisal of the situation should make us aware that assistance, both financial and technical, from government, philanthropic and church-related sources will be required for some time to come.

What does all this mean for us, living in the comforts of the western world? What should our reaction be? How can we become involved? At least three things can be said in reply:

First, we can attempt to deepen our understanding of the refugee situation in Africa. Second, we can be sympathetic with the refugees in their hardships and suffering and contribute to programs aimed at alleviating that suffering.

Finally, we can sympathize with refugees in their desire for a solution to the political problems of their countries which will permit them to return to their homes.

This is not possible, however, so long as the countries of southern Africa are ruled by minority white governments which persecute black populations and deny them participation in the national processes. World opinion has not yet concentrated with any real force on the injustices of southern Africa. When this happens, there is no doubt that international pressure for the recognition of human rights can be a decisive factor in solving this refugee problem.

4. RHODESIA

TO DIVIDE AND RULE

(By Ralph E. Dodge*)

Rhodesia is a land-locked country in southeast Africa, a little smaller than California and with less than a third of that State's population. Its climate and natural resources have over the past 70 years attracted many white settlers, whose children know no other homeland. During the formative period of 1920-30, the largest number of immigrants came from South Africa with the British culture dominating their pattern of life. They are attached, both emotionally and economically, to the rolling hills; fertile valleys; vast expanses of grassland; and mines of iron, chrome, gold, copper, and asbestos.

The more than 4 million Africans also prize their traditional homeland, with its interesting topography and invigorating climate varying from 40° nights in July to 90° days in October. During the past 40 years the Africans have more than quadrupled their numbers, mainly from natural birth. The whites have depended considerably on immigration for their increase.

Presently, the minority white group, under the leadership of Prime Minister Ian Smith, is exercising a reign of repressive domination and rigid control. But the black population is determined that the time has come for majority rule. It seeks to achieve it as soon as possible—at one time through negotiation, but more recently through force, which it now considers the only viable alternative.

Portugal and South Africa have come to the aid of the white minority group in its attempt to maintain the status quo at all costs, whereas the rest of the world at least pays lip service to majority rule. While Great Britain and the United Nations fail to effect drastic changes in Rhodesian policy, the people of Rhodesia continue to prepare for the inevitable showdown between blacks and whites.

Thus, Rhodesia, a land of great expectation and promise, is passing through an intense period of crisis: political, economic, and moral. To understand the issues in the current tense situation, a brief look into Rhodesia's unique history may be helpful.

Unlike most African territories, Rhodesia has never been a colony. Its modern history starts out with a treaty between Lobengula, king of the Matabele, and Cecil John Rhodes, head of the British South Africa Company. The treaty gave the company exclusive mineral rights over the entire territory. In 1889 a charter was granted to the company with rights conferred directly from the British Crown. Not only was Rhodes to promote civilization and establish good government, but he also was given extensive rights to make treaties, promulgate laws, and organize a police force. However, the British Government reserved the right to review the relations between the British South Africa Company and the Africans and to intervene in the interest of the majority population at any time.

Rhodes lost no time in implementing his rights. He set up an administrative post and proceeded to usurp tribal authority. Later an order-in-council from Great Britain provided for an administrator to issue regulations and a judge to preside over a court. The company soon established a land commission and appointed native commissioners. A legislative council was established with a majority of its nine members representatives of the company.

Gradually, however, the white settlers became restive under company administration. In 1923 they went to the polls to decide the future of the country. The two alternatives to company rule were either to join the Union of South Africa or to set up local "responsible government." By a slight majority they decided on local government.

Thus, in 1923, Rhodesia was annexed to the British Crown as a largely self-governing territory. Great Britain, however, continued to reserve the right to intervene in the interests of the Africans and to be responsible for external relationships.

In 1931 the Land Apportionment Act was passed. This act has the same effect as South Africa's Group Areas Act: it severely limits contact between black and white. It reserves 37 percent of the land for 237,000 whites and 46 percent for four

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C. FREEDOM MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA—GENERAL

With worldwide attention currently focused upon guerrilla activity in Asia and Latin America, the increasingly significant freedom movements in southern Africa attract relatively little notice. These movements are divided into two groups: Those operating against colonial rule in the Portuguese territories, Angola and Mozambique, and those opposing white-minority rule in Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia (South-West Africa). A serious revolutionary drive against rule by Europeans in southern Africa was perhaps first sparked by revolt led by the Angolan People's Union in 1961. In general, these movements appear to be nationalist rather than Communist in inspiration, though they all accept material aid and financial assistance from Communist as well as non-Communist sources. However, generalizations about freedom movements perhaps should be avoided. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) has also provided financial assistance to some and has tried to encourage greater unity among the many rival groups. Overall, the freedom groups in the Portuguese territories appear to be making more headway than those which face the strongly entrenched white minority regimes in Rhodesia and South and South-West Africa. However, each group is highly individual in character and each faces differing problems within its organization and in its operations.

In their reaction to the freedom movements, the governments are believed to have a common understanding concerning military assistance and joint action against insurgents. Each has a vested political and economic interest in the maintenance of the other governments. As yet, however, the ruling governments have not been able to extinguish the freedom movements in spite of their splintering into more than one organization in each country. Moreover, the position of the existing governments seems relatively secure because they feel the freedom forces have not been able to attract a mass following. The ruling powers probably will not face an overwhelming threat from any of them unless and until these groups are able to establish a broad national base with a mass following.

The revolutionary groups in southern Africa are perhaps best characterized as African organizations striving to subvert the present minority governments or otherwise gain political power and control of the respective countries. However, when considered within a nationalist-Communist continuum, the movements in the area stand clearly at the nationalist end of the scale, if nationalism is defined in its African context simply as opposition to European authority or its vestiges in the form of white-minority government. The study mission met with several of the representatives of the various freedom movements in their offices in Zambia and Tanzania. Most leaders of freedom movements stress that they accept aid rather than ideology. Many state that they would prefer to accept assistance from the West but because the West refuses to supply them with equipment, finances, and training they have turned to those countries which are asking to assist the liberation movements. It would seem, however, that during the time of struggle for independence, aid influences from China and Russia are only a first step. Communist technique and doctrine do not stop there.

and a half million blacks. Rural Africans are compelled to live in so-called tribal trust lands, under the authority of a government-appointed chief or on small farms patched throughout the country. Although these lands total 40 million acres, only 17 percent of them is suitable for annual crops. Thus the majority of Rhodesia's Africans is forced to live a life of poverty and subsistence.

The whites, on the contrary, are allotted rich farming land by the act: 52 percent of it is suitable for annual crop cultivation. Most of it is situated near the railroads, so that products can easily be marketed. On the whole, 98 percent of the most fertile land is in the white areas, and only two percent in black areas. This act is one of the main bones of contention in the African struggle for justice.

From 1953 to 1963 Rhodesia was included in the Federation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. With the dissolution of the federation, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland became independent, but Southern Rhodesia retained its white minority rule and became more repressive in its policies. The so-called Rhodesian Front came into power, and in 1964 the conservative right-winger, Ian Smith, took the party leadership.

Under Smith the Front began talking about complete independence under "responsible white leadership"—negotiated if possible; declared, if not. A new constitution was drafted. Press censorship was initiated. African nationalists were sent into restriction without trial for an indefinite period or imprisoned.

The University College in Salisbury and the more progressive churches were especially crippled through deportations. Former Premier Garfield Todd was placed under house arrest. Heavy fines were imposed for the mention in print of the names of African nationalist leaders.

Educational advancement was slowed down, separate development programs were initiated, and from the African and the world viewpoint, the wheels of progress halted or turned in reverse. Then came the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on November 11, 1965.

Now, 4 years after the Front's declaration of independence from the tenuous ties which held Rhodesia to the United Kingdom, one can evaluate its effects. Politically the country has survived as a declared free state, but her independence has not been officially recognized by a single country. She has isolated herself from all the world except the few white people in South Africa and Portuguese territories.

Great Britain's lead in requesting sanctions, and the United Nations prompt response, indicated with what concern the nations of the world view the Rhodesian Front's attempt to stop the progress of African people.

Although the black population of Rhodesia is not free to form its own political parties, and although its chosen leaders are still in detention or prison, its opposition to the Rhodesian Front is almost unanimous. Besides, the recent formation of a predominantly white Centre Party advocating African advancement and multiracialism for Rhodesia shows that the Smith regime does not have the support of many liberal and courageous whites. Increasingly, even the whites in Rhodesia are voicing their opposition to the isolation and separate development policies of the Rhodesian Front.

The two main black political parties, the Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), banned in Rhodesia but operating in exile, continue to disrupt the surface harmony of the police state by guerrilla incursions from outside. The seriousness of this threat to the regime is evidenced by the request of Rhodesia for armed police assistance from South Africa. With the increasing opposition of whites from within and the pressure of sanctions and armed incursions from without, Smith now appears to be on the defensive even among his own white electorate.

Nevertheless, one should not assume that the minority white electorate in Rhodesia will move of its own accord toward a truly representative government. The pressures from outside must be stronger than those of self-interest from within; that is, the white people of Rhodesia must be convinced that a democratic, inclusive society is in their own long-range best interest.

In spite of the fact that sanctions have not been enthusiastically followed by all the nations of the world, sufficient economic pressure has been brought to bear upon the Rhodesian economy to hurt it. Recently, respected business and financial leaders in Rhodesia have publicly warned the Prime Minister of the danger of continued or increased sanctions. Carol Heurtley, president of the Rhodesia Tobacco Association, has warned of the near-collapse of the industry. He asserted that there is very low morale among those still trying to earn a livelihood from tobacco farming.

At about the same time as the Heurtley warning, Evan Campbell, chairman of the Rhodesian Board of the Standard Bank, has asserted that there is a marked economic deterioration due to wide-scale unemployment, especially in the black sector of the population.

Both Maurice Smith, a mining engineer, and Robert Meuwson, chairman of the Rhodesian Iron & Steel Co., have publicly declared that Rhodesian mining operations are stagnating under sanctions. Thus, those who are closest to the industrial, economic, and commercial life of the country are deeply concerned with current conditions and future prospects.

The Smith regime has pledged itself to a policy of separate development which is very similar to that of apartheid in South Africa. The vast African community is to remain in an inferior position, subject to the wishes of the minority white group.

Even the Asians and those of mixed blood are feeling the bite of discriminatory legislation such as that contained in the property owners' bill, which removes nonwhites from white residential areas if their presence there is considered undesirable by the white residents. Rather than build up an inclusive national community with common interests and common goals, the Rhodesian Front policy is that of "divide and rule," irrespective of the long-range damage which this may do to the nation. Suspicion, distrust, resentment, and hatred will be the harvest from the seeds of misunderstanding and injustice currently being sown.

In the process of implementing the regime's policy of separate development, the responsibility for education is increasingly being placed on the local communities. This means that, with their limited resources, the African communities are not going to be able to maintain even the present standard or amount of education. The national government is spending about one-tenth as much per pupil on blacks as on whites.

Since UDI, the situation has even further deteriorated because of the great difficulty which both school dropouts and graduates of secondary schools have in finding jobs. Whereas in most independent countries to the north graduates are offered positions in industry or government service, their counterparts in Rhodesia often are excluded. Before UDI it was profitable to sacrifice in order to give one's children an education; this is no longer true, and a retrogression in education is setting in, contrasting greatly with the expanding opportunities in adjacent independent countries.

The greatest tragedy of an authoritarian and exclusive regime is the effect it has on the people it governs. To remain in control, such a regime often disregards the human potential of its subjects. When that regime is also racially biased and repressive in discriminatory legislation and social practices, there is little opportunity for the development of creative personalities. Thus, as national and world figures emerge in independent African countries, those of equal potential in Rhodesia and other dominated areas of southern Africa burn up their energy in frustrations or in open opposition to the repressive regimes.

This leads to a second tragedy of Rhodesia as representative of dominated countries, the danger its political situation poses for world peace. Within and without Rhodesia the Zimbabweans ("Zimbabwe" is the name chosen by Africans for Rhodesia when they can govern it) are not going to sit idly by and wait for the minority white group to offer them the spoils of cooperative subjection. The African no longer accepts an inferior position.

When he is humiliated, as all Africans in Rhodesia presently are, he inwardly rises up in resentment and waits for a time of retaliation. He is like human beings everywhere, abundantly capable of forgiveness and equally capable of vengeance.

The independent nations of Africa have shown ability to forget the hurt of colonial domination as they now burst forth in new cooperative activity. But even as these nations rejoice in their new-found liberty, they do not forget their brothers in southern Africa who are still smarting under repressive laws and psychological intimidation. The stage is set for what might easily become a major world conflict with the initial spark of conflagrations springing from the racial clash in Rhodesia.

The United States is far from Rhodesia geographically. The "A" in America begins the alphabet and the "Z" in Zimbabwe ends it. But they are both part of that alphabet. Realizing this oneness, Americans can help bring about an equitable and peaceful solution to the Rhodesian situation.

They should continue to support the United Nations in its attempts to end the present illegal regime in Rhodesia. There can be no peace in southern Africa until black and white sit down at a conference table and jointly hammer out legislation that will be mutually acceptable. Sanctions, if widely applied and

strictly enforced, may well bring Ian Smith, or his successor, to the conference table with black leaders in Rhodesia.

Americans can let their senators and representatives in Washington know that they support peaceful settlements to world problems. This does not mean a continuation of the status quo. It means a sincere and diligent search for fair solutions to all problems, whether national or world-wide in scope.

If something is not done to change the direction of events in Rhodesia to make possible African advancement and social justice, the world will pay in blood for its indifference. If courageous, long-range planning were undertaken, Rhodesia could once again be a country of promise rather than of tragedy and potential conflagration.

RIGHT OF ADMISSION RESERVED

(By Justin V. Nyoka*)

Discrimination in Rhodesia is intensifying, although the government denies it. While working for *The Rhodesia Herald*, the country's largest white-owned newspaper, I decided to test the color bar in public places. I visited 10 restaurants and five leading hotels. None of the restaurants would allow me to have a meal or even a cup of tea. Of the hotels, only one was truly nonracial.

Recently I tried the same exercise, this time with a British broadcasting company television crew ready to film and record what happened. This action cost me my job on the newspaper, although I had acted purely in my private capacity.

At one hotel where we asked for drinks and lunch, we were told by an African waiter that there was an "objection" from the management; namely, my presence as a black man. My friends from the BBC argued that there was no sign saying only whites were admitted. In an incoherent retort the manager said the sign "right of admission reserved" meant that only whites were admitted.

Indeed, I had expected this type of answer. I knew the double-talk that characterizes white Rhodesian thinking. Rhodesia has never spelled out her racial policy. There is only one place in Salisbury, a public convenience, with the sign "Europeans Only."

In many places a black person, especially if he is in the company of white friends from overseas, is left to guess whether or not he can be served. If members of the Friends of Rhodesia Societies from Britain and the United States happen to visit the country, a hotel proprietor can be persuaded to accommodate blacks so that visitors on guided tours can see the so-called equal social treatment accorded to blacks.

After our incident I told the BBC crew that the increasing bitterness and frustration which the few educated and well-to-do Africans in Rhodesia show toward this kind of treatment is probably the beginning of a more concerted opposition to the white administration. I also said that the majority of whites in the country looked on the African as an animal or as subhuman. This remark especially angered my newspaper employers, the government-owned Broadcasting and Television Corp., and the white public, which associated my personal comments with the paper on which I worked.

At times Rhodesia's national newspapers join in the defensive battle against the probing of outside journalists. After the BBC crew and I had established that Africans were being turned away from the Salisbury swimming pool, the city's only Sunday paper was quick to correct any "wrong impression" created by the BBC.

I had been turned away from the pool one day at 1:50 p.m. while the BBC was taking a film of the incident. I was told that "it was too late to admit any more new customers" but advised to come back at 3 p.m. When a friend of mine tried to be admitted at that time, he was turned back without any reason being given. The Sunday paper, however, persuaded some nonwhite children to pose for a photograph which showed them lying side by side with white children at the pool.

The fact is that the Municipal Amendment Act bars the use of the same facilities by people of different races.

I have discovered that whites in this country do not resent the lowly messenger boy so much as the articulate, well-educated African who confronts them at their own level and in their own language.

*Justin V. J. Nyoka, a Rhodesian journalist who was born in a tribal trust land southwest of Salisbury was fired from the *Rhodesia Herald* on November 29, 1968 because of his controversial writing and political views. He has also been a correspondent for the *Times of Zambia* and *Johannesburg's Rand Daily Mail*.

5. GENERAL

KEEPING THE STUDENT DOWN

(By Mary McAnally*)

Instant communication and international contact have given broader dimensions to the power struggles of the 1960's. Someone in Berkeley yells "flower power," and the next day an echo comes from Tokyo: "flower power." Where formerly there were isolated and regional student organizations, there now appears to be a unified, worldwide student movement.

This worldwide student movement is chameleonlike, manifesting itself in one city as a silent vigil and in another as a violent demonstration. But whatever its expression it is characterized by a militant concern for classic human values, freedom of choice, sharing of wealth, international justice, and social parity.

Why, then, is there so little student activity in southern Africa? Students there have a clear target for defiance in the gross racial injustices that exist. In education itself the disparities between possibilities for whites and nonwhites are glaring:

In all of southern Africa, white schoolchildren have free and compulsory education. Education for African children is neither compulsory nor free.

Government spending in South Africa in 1962 for white and nonwhite education was in a ratio of 8 to 1.

In 1958 only 11 percent of the African school-age population was in school in Rhodesia.

In Angola in 1956 only 1 percent of the African school-age population was in school.

It is no secret that the white minority governments in southern Africa have purposely created educational systems designed to keep the African in his place: Servanthood or slavery. The late South African Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd, when Minister of Bantu Education, said in Parliament in 1953: "There is no place for him (the Bantu) in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour." In Angola, the Portuguese Government says of its policy: "* * * to carry on the work of civilization that is Portugal's special mission it is necessary to guard the Africans against education and advancement * * *"

It is little wonder, then, that a genuine "student movement" has not really developed yet in southern Africa. Not only is contact with the rest of the world severely limited, but contact between universities and among students of different races and political outlooks within a country is highly controlled as well. In South Africa there is strict separation of Africans on a tribal basis and of whites on a language-culture basis, as well as a separation of whites and nonwhites on a racial basis.

Television is illegal; radios are limited; newspapers, journals, books, and speeches are censored and often banned; there are government restrictions on travel, contact, association, speech and printing. Students can do little to protest the many injustices.

This has not always been the case. In the late 1950's and early 1960's countries in tropical and northern Africa were gaining their independence, and repercussions were felt on the southern tip of the continent. The African liberation movements of southern Africa were beginning to stir, and demonstrations took place in South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola, and Mozambique.

In most cases however, any overt action on the part of liberation organizations was promptly and successfully eliminated through intimidation and other strong-arm tactics by the minority governments. And today all the liberation movements of southern Africa have been banned and must operate in exile.

Many young people who were involved in the youth branches of these movements escaped from political persecution and often fled to Europe and America to continue their studies. Westerners, feeling it would be only a matter of time before the Africans in southern Africa gained independence, scrambled to help them. The United States allowed students to enter without passports or on one-way documents issued by Congo, Zambia or Tanzania.

Most of them, however, came on J-1 student exchange visas which required them to leave the United States when they completed their studies. Since independence has not come for southern Africa, these students are now virtually people without a country, living as refugees without official refugee status, unable to return to southern Africa or to stay where they are with any security.

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Any student organization within southern Africa is extremely limited in its activities. Student groups are carefully watched as possible cradles of opposition and political activity is quickly suppressed. Student disturbances at the University College of Rhodesia in the early 1960's were promptly squelched by government interference. Students were expelled or jailed.

The two major African nationalist liberation movements of Rhodesia, the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), have both sought followers among the African students. Each has a youth wing which exists in secret but has no means of expression nor channels for action.

There is a student council-type organization at the university in Salisbury, on which there is nonwhite student representation—albeit with no vote. Recently, the illegal Ian Smith government canceled all Government bursaries for African students at the university because of so-called “political involvement.” The Rhodesia Council of Churches and related ecumenical groups around the world have attempted to raise scholarship funds for them, but permission to continue studying rests with the racist Government.

Thus, for the most part, the only student organizations allowed to exist in Rhodesia—and most of southern Africa—are religious, literary, academic, social, or professional.

The Portuguese have blatantly admitted their program for white supremacy in Angola and Mozambique. Their lack of concern for education of the Africans is evidenced by the fact that all education is left to Christian missions, which depend totally upon resources of their own. The Portuguese Government has also discouraged the creation of a university in Angola or Mozambique, saying only African laborers and artisans are in demand.

A decade ago there was considerable political organization among African young people in the Portuguese colonies. In 1960 four political groups combined to form the Frente Revolucionária Africana para a Independência das Colónias Portuguesas (FRAIN). Two other active groups have been the União das Populações de Angola and Frente Libertação de Mozambique (FRELI MO). The major impetus for these movements now comes from the outside, as before, since political activity from within is almost impossible. Too, the Portuguese news censorship keeps young people who identify with the liberation struggle uninformed, isolated, and “contained.”

Like young persons in the Portuguese territories, South-West African students must go elsewhere for their higher education. In 1953 a few South-West African students who were studying in South Africa decided to form a student body in the territory. Leading figures were such men as Jariretundu Kozonguizi, Mburumba Kerina, Toivo ja Toivo, and Zedekia Ngavirue.

Among the bodies they formed was the South-West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO), which has presented many petitions to the United Nations on behalf of South-West Africa's independence. But with South Africa's efficient control of South-West Africa now extending into every area of life, all political activity has been systematically eliminated, and some political leaders have been tried and sentenced for life in South Africa.

South Africa stands out in the southern Africa complex for its advanced technology, and large westernized cities have made possible a student community larger than anywhere else in Africa. Although more than 35,000 South Africans are enrolled in universities, most of them are white. One of every 66 whites is a university student; only one of every 2,334 nonwhites is.

In addition, apartheid is strictly practiced in higher education, and there is a special expurgated curriculum for the Africans throughout their educational careers. There are 11 white universities in South Africa and three “tribal colleges” for Africans. Among a number of student organizations at these universities, four deserve note.

The Students Representative Councils (SRC) of the English-language universities of Cape Town, Natal, Rhodes, and the Witwatersrand, and of the Johannesburg College of Education, are affiliated to the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS). NUSAS also has some individual student members at the Afrikaans-language universities. The SRCs at nonwhite colleges are forbidden to affiliate with NUSAS.

NUSAS stands for multiracial membership and multiracial student functions. It has been publicly critical of much of the apartheid legislation of recent years. Some of its leaders have been served with banning orders or deported from the country. NUSAS and the University Christian Movement of Southern Africa (UCM/SA) are the only two multiracial student bodies in South Africa. NUSAS must be seen as more of a “stand” than as a “movement.”

The University Christian Movement of Southern Africa (UCM/SA) was officially created in July 1967, and arose out of a need by many Christian students for an ecumenical, interracial organization of students nationally and throughout southern Africa. It has recently been involved in experimental worship, demonstrations, and a general student power movement in South Africa which has caused it to be threatened and harassed by the Government.

The Afrikaanse Studentebond (ASB) supports the present Government's policies and is almost entirely representative of the Afrikaans-language universities. Students at the University of Stellenbosch recently decided to bar the ASB in its present form from their campus.

Historically, students in South Africa have placed an important role in the creation and consolidation of any real movement for social justice. This is especially true of the University Christian Movement of Southern Africa. In many ways the UCM is the modern relevant church in a country where the socially concerned church is a rarity.

The church militant, willing to stick its neck out and suffer, has been almost nonexistent in South Africa. However, with the Christian Institute, the UCM and the September 22 statement by the South African Council of Churches, it is evident that a "confessing church" is surfacing that is willing to sacrifice. Many see UCM as a ray of hope on the generally dismal South African scene.

UCM is involving hundreds of black and white university students in multi-racial dialogs and is thereby contributing to a real humanizing process. In addition, it is equipping students, via its "formation schools," to think strategically about controversial social problems.

Possibilities for UCM's continued effectiveness and witness are dim, for it faces a formidable and ruthless enemy which is determined to eliminate it before it becomes a real threat to the racist regime. But while the movement faces fantastic odds in its attempts to remold history, it deserves our strongest support for this task, which is one of suffering and defeat, but also embodies a glimmer of hope.

AMERICAN INVESTMENTS BOLSTER RACISM

(By Colin Legum*)

There are two false notions about American business interests in South Africa: (1) U.S. investments there are free of political implications. (2) Their financial interests are so small that they don't matter. Apart from the immorality of earning huge profits from the exploitation and misery of millions of people, these investments do matter for important political as well as economic reasons.

In recent years, the rate of U.S. investment in South Africa has shown a steady increase. This has happened despite an increase in world awareness about the nature of the racial crisis in the apartheid republic. Investments have increased almost fourfold: \$140 million in 1948, when the apartheid regime was first elected, to \$528 million in 1965. During the last 4 years investments have continued to grow.

Normally sensitive to taking risks, American investors either are willing to accept these risks in South Africa or don't believe that the situation is risky. This can only mean that they believe the white supremacist regime will survive or is capable of achieving peaceful internal changes. These two assumptions need to be challenged.

The expanding investment is mainly in automobile plants, mining, banking, and oil installations and explorations. All the major American automobile companies have greatly expanded their plants in recent years; so have the oil companies. American banking, never strong in the area, has played an increasingly important role only since 1961. In the aftermath of the Sharpeville shootings, world confidence in South Africa's stability evaporated, and with it, foreign investment. As a result, for the first time in its recent history, South Africa was faced with serious foreign exchange problems.

A group of American financiers saved the Republic from these difficulties by getting a \$150 million loan from the International Monetary Fund, the World

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Bank, Chase Manhattan Bank, First National City Bank, and a group of American leaders (not publicly identified). Chase Manhattan is now the single biggest shareholder in the giant Standard Bank, which, although it operates throughout Africa, does most of its business in South Africa.

South African officials speak with appreciation of the organization by Dillon, Read & Co. and Charles Engelhard of the American South African Investment Co., which invests in the Republic's securities. Additionally, there is still in operation a scheme whereby 12 leading American banks provide a revolving pool of \$40 million for South Africa's Central Bank to pay for goods and services imported into the United States from the Republic.

The most important recent type of American investment is in the field of oil exploration. The Gulf Oil Co. is now engaged in exploration in Zululand, while the Essex Corp. of America has invested over \$150 million to finance oil exploration. Its main source of finance is the Liberty National Bank in the United States, Essex had never operated south of the Equator before November 1967; but then, according to its South African manager, Peter Wood, "it was decided that South Africa offered excellent opportunities."

This willingness to participate in a search for oil in the Republic contributes directly to what has become a top priority in the country's security interests. In 1960, the apartheid regime made the decision to embark on a huge program of oil storage and exploration to diminish its vulnerability to international oil sanctions, which were beginning to be talked about at that time. Its ability to resist international pressures will be strengthened to the extent that this policy succeeds in making it less dependent on foreign oil supplies. Here is one clear example of a direct relationship between the role of foreign capital and the political interests of the defenders of apartheid.

American and other foreign investors often find themselves under government pressure to comply with the Republic's national priorities. For example, American oil and automobile companies found they had no alternative but to expand their installations and plants under direct government planning directions or see their rivals given preferential treatment. Pressures of a direct and direct nature are frequently applied to foreign investors. For example, the Ford Motor Co. at one time found itself under pressure because of the policies of the Ford Foundation. On other occasions American automobile companies found themselves in difficulties over the U.S. policy of maintaining an arms embargo in compliance with a Security Council decision.

Although American interests in South Africa are small by U.S. standards they are substantial by South African standards—the yardstick which should be applied in determining their value to the local economics. But it is not only the size of American investments or their role in the strategic sectors of the economy that matters most, what is of crucial importance is the degree to which American participation in the Republic's economy reassures white supporters of apartheid that they can continue to look for support from the West. "So long as U.S. banks and businesses back us, we can go ahead," a South African once remarked.

White South Africans fear nothing as much as possible isolation from the West. Foreign business links can do more to reassure them about these anxieties than diplomatic relations, which, by their very nature, are much more tenuous. Although South Africa's leadership is always upset by Western governmental criticisms of apartheid, those worry them less than the input or output of Western financial and technical resources. Thus the Western businessman, even more than the politician or the diplomat, is a critical factor in the Republic's political thinking. It follows that arguments about whether business and politics should be kept apart ignore a fairly obvious fact: that in the circumstances of South Africa they cannot be kept apart, as indeed every American businessman in the Republic well knows, whatever his disclaimers to the contrary.

Not all American businessmen are content to plead financial self-interest and to leave it at that; many of the larger investors actively promote South Africa's political interests. For example, James Dines, principal of a Wall Street firm of investment consultants, wrote in a series of reports circulated to his clients: "South Africa reminded me of a frontier country with no end of extraordinary growth. It possesses the classic ingredients of a superpower: a reasonable climate, rich mineral resources, and a vigorous and industrious people dedicated to capitalism."

Others make their contribution more obliquely through the South Africa Foundation, an organization devoted to improving the Republic's image abroad. Operating as a lobby, it plays an active part in promoting visits of specially chosen American leaders of opinion, especially in business and political circles. With few

exceptions every prominent American who has taken up the cudgels on behalf of the Republic over the last 5 years has done so after first having visited the country as a guest of the South Africa Foundation.

It is not mere coincidence that Charles Engelhard of New Jersey played a key role in creating the foundation. He is perhaps the largest single American investor in the Republic. Not only does he directly control 23 major enterprises, but, through his chairmanship of the Rand Mines, Ltd., he controls another 11 gold and uranium companies, three coal companies, two chrome companies, four cement companies, one lime company, and one steel and concrete pipe concern.

At this point it is possible to make an interim assessment about the way in which American investments directly help to strengthen South Africa's apartheid regime.

First, their capital and technical resources are of considerable value in a few key sectors of the economy.

Second, they contribute to promoting the regime's political objectives by accepting directives about the strategic industrial requirements of the country.

Third, they help to maintain ties between the Republic and the Western World, thereby encouraging a continued flow of new investments and thus reassuring the defenders of apartheid that however unacceptable their racist policies might be to international opinion, they can rely on the support of influential Western interests.

Fourth, through their financial involvements, prominent American businessmen participate actively in supporting a political lobby on South Africa's behalf.

Fifth, they cause the opponents of apartheid (especially nonwhites) to look upon the United States and other Western countries as supporters of apartheid and therefore as their enemies. They contribute toward strengthening anti-Western attitudes at a crucially formative time in the history of Africa.

If we turn now to the sophisticated defense put forward by American businessmen to justify their involvement in South Africa, we are struck at once by a contradiction. In one breath they assert they are plain ordinary businessmen with no interest in South Africa's political condition, which, they claim, is of purely domestic concern; in the next breath they argue that foreign investment offers the best kind of political leverage to get the Republic's apartheid system changed.

Their argument in support of change through rapid economic development runs along two lines—short term and long term. In the short term, they argue, the application of modern methods of technological development can directly contribute toward improving the wages and training of Africans. This may indeed be their aspiration, but the facts argue otherwise.

Because Africans are not permitted to form free labor unions, enter freely into wage bargaining or even into places of employment, American firms (like all others) can, in fact, have very little say over the basic conditions of work and life of Africans in industry. Wages in American-controlled plants are seldom higher than those paid by locally controlled plants. In the mining industry (especially in South-West Africa) the wage structure of American companies is among the lowest.

Moreover, the place of Africans—within industry—training, apprenticeship, and categories of employment—is the subject of legislation, over which foreign industrialists have little influence. The present policy of converting the whole of the African labor force into a system of migratory labor runs directly against the wishes of all the established industrial organizations in the country. But the Government, motivated by ideology, overrides their representations.

Thus one can see how little reality there is in the short-term benefits advanced in this type of argument. What of the long term? Here the argument is that a fast-expanding economy would, in time, inevitably make apartheid unworkable. This view rests on the prognosis that the Government will be compelled to adapt its policies to the realities of an expanding industrial economy and in submission to the bargaining power of the increasingly large numbers of industrially skilled Africans. This doctrine sounds attractive; how sound is it in fact?

South Africa's past experience shows that it was precisely when Africans began to become an important factor in cities through the rapid industrial expansion achieved in World War II that the ruling political forces first began to evolve their theories of apartheid to stem the advance of black people. Twenty years later, far from showing any willingness to submit to the realities of the country's fast-moving economy and despite crucial shortages of skilled and semiskilled trained labor, which are slowing up even faster growth, their regime has toughened, not weakened, its restrictions.

The aim of this policy is perfectly clear. The white areas will not be deprived altogether of their black labor, but the entire urban black labor force will be turned into a migratory, unskilled working population. All this is done in defiance of the needs of a modern economy but as the price to be paid for maintaining the separation of races.

Meanwhile, the policy of decentralizing industry through the border industries established close to the Bantustans (rural reserves) provides a reservoir of cheap labor. At the same time it destroys the chances of normal industrial opportunities within the Bantustans themselves. South Africa's policy is to attract highly paid white immigrants to do the skilled jobs in preference to letting Africans move up the industrial ladder.

So the facts of the situation run directly counter to the notion that a more flexible system will be the outcome of economic expansion. This is not surprising. Because South Africa has an ideological regime, it ignores sound economic practices as well as humanitarian considerations where these get in the way of its racial doctrines.

To these arguments the believers in the inevitability of political progress through economic growth reply that 20 years is too short a time in which to judge results. They ignore the 50 or so years before the official advent of apartheid. They also ignore the many lessons of other countries.

Americans should be the last to need reminding that huge industrial expansion is insufficient by itself to alter basic political and social conditions. In the United States, with the Constitution on the side of equality, the great economic growth of the last century failed to change the fundamental political condition of the 22 million Negroes, whatever material and social benefits may have accrued to a minority. It has lately come to be recognized that laws and enforcement machinery are necessary to achieve accepted changes in the status of black Americans. What hope, then, is there of getting political change in the vastly more complex race problems of South Africa, where the basic laws, unlike those in the United States seek to entrench racial separation and inequality?

The world is full of examples of economies that have grown rapidly without changing the political relationship between the rulers and the ruled. Even where great improvement was achieved in living conditions, material changes did not produce radical political change. This is especially true of oligarchies. The expanding economy of Nazi Germany, the growth in the industrial development of Salazar's Portugal, the brief economic boom of the ill-fated Central African Federation, the industrial acceleration in Communist countries—in none of these examples has industrial expansion altered in any fundamental way the relations between a privileged elite and the rest of the population. Authoritarian control is capable of producing considerable economic expansion without allowing for any accompanying liberalization.

In a country like South Africa, where the ruling class is united in its determination to defend the principle of white supremacy, economic expansion can be controlled and directed to insure the preservation of the established "national ideal" of those in power. Since the whole purpose of apartheid is to defend the existing power structure, which insures total political, military, and economic control in the hands of a minority, any meaningful changes in apartheid would mean the eventual abandonment of white supremacy.

There is not the slightest evidence to support the view that changes within the present political system would alter the status quo in this respect; all they might do is to soften the impact of a rigidly segregated society. The basic fallacy in the argument of those who hold out any hope of political change through economic expansionism is that they fail to understand a single fact of history: in authoritarian societies economic forces are controlled by political forces, not the other way about.

It is naive to suppose that South Africa's white society would give up its privileges, powers, and its present system of security for the sake of more rapid economic expansion. The change-through-expansion argument should be seen for what it is—a rationalization to justify what is in the best economic interests of those who employ it. Hardheaded political analysis shows that it is almost certain to be a dangerous delusion.

THE CHURCHES ON TRIAL

(By Kenneth Carstens*)

The churches in southern Africa are trapped in their racist societies. Their claim to be Christian is in question, and the possibility of their having a positive influence is very remote. The churches in the United States are not so tightly cornered. Indeed, they are freer than any other institution to begin effecting a change in southern Africa. If they do not use their freedom, if they do not act for the good, there seems to be no other institution free enough to initiate actions which could save southern Africa from a tragedy of frightful proportions.

The basic problem with the churches in southern Africa and the United States is that they are afraid of radical social change and nonconformity. This is true particularly of the traditional, mainline denominations that identify themselves with the ruling establishment. Most churches that are established tend to be captives of the dominant elements in society. They share similar values and see their interests as dependent upon, if not identical with, those of the establishment.

One reason for this is historical: the churches came, grew, suffered and prospered with those who now wield power. Another reason is pragmatic: to get and to stay too close to the poor and the weak could alienate the rich and the strong. This could cut off the churches' income and threaten their privileges, such as tax exemption.

So they may murmur moral misgivings about apartheid in South Africa or shout softly for racial justice after the secular establishment (e.g., the Supreme Court) has led the way in the United States. But it is only when these established churches are in a weak, disestablished position—like the Protestants in Angola or the black churches in the United States—that they seem to be free "to obey God rather than men," regardless of consequences, as the distinctly disestablished church of New Testament times did.

Perhaps more than most institutions, the churches have always had dissident minorities, and therein lies some hope. But the big churches' use of their power to bring humanizing change remains problematical.

The Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) in South Africa provides a classic example of a church conforming to the prejudices of a social group. For two centuries, the DRC maintained an official norm of nonracialism in the church, but in 1857 it succumbed to the mounting pressure to set up separate white and nonwhite congregations. The 1857 synod frankly acknowledged this step to be unscriptural, undesirable and "due to the weakness of some."

This was a fateful decision with the most far-reaching consequences. First, it led to the creation of the "Mother Church" (for whites) and several "daughter" or "mission" churches (for each of the African language-groups and the coloreds). This division furnished a blueprint for the present policy of apartheid. Second, it led the DRC to elaborate a justification for its racial policy, which now provides the ideology upon which apartheid rests.

Until recently, the DRC was without question the most powerful institution in the Afrikaner community. It still has a close grip on its members, who total nearly 50 percent of South Africa's whites. The DRC alone could have stemmed the tide of racism that has now engulfed the country. Instead, during World War II, the Federal Mission Council of the DRC was urging upon the Smuts government its "sacred conviction * * * that the only salvation of the peoples' existence lies in * * * race-separation (*rasse-apartheid*)."

That dissident DRC voices are still heard within that church and in the Christian Institute of Southern Africa is an astonishing tribute to human courage and endurance. But the possibility of their bringing the DRC back to a Christian stance in the foreseeable future is extremely remote. The church is trapped in its own ideology and in the efficient way that ideology has been institutionalized. It has insulated itself from the biblical witness and isolated itself.

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The Communist aid to the freedom forces in southern Africa is significant, and it may well be the element which could tip the balance in favor of the insurgents. Soviet bloc, Chinese and Cuban aid, in the form of weapons and training for freedom forces, is believed to be at least equivalent in magnitude to independent African assistance. The freedom movements are also reported to be receiving assistance from Egypt and Algeria. The United States and other Western States do not permit the sale of military equipment to the liberation movements.

The freedom groups operating in the Portuguese territories are highly organized, have substantial bases of operations inside the respective territories, and within the areas under their occupation, they claim that they have established substitute governments which maintain order and provide public services. Some dispersion of the effort to wrest control from the Portuguese results from the fact that some of the movements have given birth to several sibling rivals. In general, the freedom groups in Portuguese territories are more anti-colonialist than racially oriented, and publicly claim that they seek to replace the colonial administration rather than to "drive the white man out."

The groups working to overthrow the white minority governments in South Africa and southern Rhodesia may be generally characterized as less well organized than the anti-Portuguese forces, and rely more on underground activities than on concentrated guerrilla actions. They operate from exile. These movements are inherently more racially oriented since it is white rule as such that they are attempting to replace.

Presently, activities in the Portuguese territories may prove to be the most meaningful field of action for the freedom movements. Not only would success in the Portuguese territories help psychologically, but it would also provide the necessary geographic bases from which to launch operations against the established regimes of Rhodesia, South Africa, and Namibia (South-West Africa).

1. Angola

a. GRAE (Angola Revolutionary Government in Exile) is based in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo, and receives active support from the Congolese Government. This organization was formed in 1962 by a union of Holden Roberto's UPA (Angolan People's Union) and Emmanuel Kounzika's PDA (Angolan Democratic Party). GRAE is carrying on the rebellion begun by UPA and MPLA elements in 1961. Most of its activities are in the Bakongo area of northwestern Angola, and GRAE claims the people are firmly behind the movement. GRAE is said to have upwards of 2,000 to 3,000 men in the field, but MPLA is regarded as the most serious threat to the Portuguese in Angola. The freedom movement is supported on an apparently firm but limited tribal base.

b. MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) has until recently been based in Brazzaville, Republic of Congo (B), but now operates in eastern and northwestern Angola and sporadically in Cabinda. They are reported to have established their headquarters inside Angola some 30 miles from the Zambian border. Organized by urban Africans and mulattoes in mid-1950's, MPLA has been involved in the rebellion since early 1961 with operations in the area east and

Most of the English-speaking churches came to South Africa after the British took over the colony from the Dutch in 1806. They did not have the 150 years of black/white conflict that the DRC had. They were bound to a different and smaller white constituency and were far more open to the liberal philosophical currents of the time. They were also much freer to get close to, if not to identify themselves with, the nonwhites. A few of their missionaries identified themselves so fully with the nonwhites and championed their cause so vigorously that they are still portrayed as villains in most South African history books.

These churches—especially the Anglican Methodist and Roman Catholic—have a somewhat more Christian stance, officially, on the race question. Their policy tends haltingly toward administrative integration, and the South African Council of Churches, which represents most of them, issued a forthright condemnation of apartheid in 1968 stronger than any previous official church statement. Yet even the best of them are almost completely segregated on the local level and pay lower stipends to nonwhite clergy.

All of them have more nonwhite than white members, but only one of them has ever had a black as its spiritual leader and administrative head: in 1963 the Methodists elected an African president of conference, an office that is held for a year. So there is ample basis for the Dutch Reformed churchmen's charge of hypocrisy on the part of churches that practice the racism they condemn.

The English-speaking churches are, at best, irrelevant to the agony of the "Beloved Country." At worst, they are a part—albeit an unwilling part—of one of the most dehumanizing sociopolitical systems in the world. Where can the church hide its head when 94 percent of the white population professes Christianity and 95 percent of the votes in the last election (only whites, of course, voted) were cast for the two main racist parties—58 percent for the Nationalist (apartheid) Party and 37 percent for the United (white leadership) Party?

Even the black churches in South Africa, although they do not bear the terrible moral responsibility the white churches do, are not theologically free and authentic. Their origin and values have either been foisted upon them by the whites (as in the case of the Dutch Reformed "mission churches") or been fashioned in reaction to the racism in church and society (the African independent churches). Religiously and emotionally they provide their members with a form of temporary escape from the vicious apartheid society. Sociopolitically, they are a passive element of the status quo. Their prophet's role has, as in the white churches, been left to isolated individuals.

If any of these three groups of churches were to gain theological integrity, they could become forces to be reckoned with. Although the prospects are bleak, American churches ought to use every possible opportunity to challenge, confront and debate South African churches on the issues at stake. One of the most basic of these issues is, after all, the South African churches' identity as Christian institutions.

It is possible that the black churches in South Africa, divided though they are, could assume the role that the Dutch Reformed Church played for the Afrikaners. That is, they could nurture a black nationalist ideology and become its political vehicle. This would be a political expedient as disastrous theologically and ethically as that to which the white DRC resorted. But the term "expedient" is questionable since the blacks are continuously pushed in this direction by the ideology, policy and practice of the whites and by the living conditions imposed by apartheid. There would thus be far more pragmatic justification for such a course than the DRC has. Moreover, it is an implicit admission of our moral inferiority to expect the blacks to be more moral and Christian than the whites have been.

Since the churches have become the creatures of society, it is inevitable that they should reflect the polarization of society. As ruthlessly as society has dealt with its political dissidents, so will the churches deal with their own prophets who dare to point to the way of Christ, although this may mean stepping aside and letting the state do the actual crucifixion.

Pursuing this analogy, the American churches stand aghast at the rhetorical question, "Were you there when they crucified * * *?" Traditionally and historically their links with South Africa have been negligible and their racial attitudes as deplorable as any. However, after World War II some changes have set in.

The United States became a dominant power in world affairs. American business began to exploit the high returns of a booming South African economy built on what amounts to virtual slave labor (investments are now approaching \$1 billion), and the evils of racism became more widely recognized and debated. In these circumstances, apartheid could no longer be ignored by the more liberal and prophetic American churches. Nonetheless, they did not recognize the gravity of

the South African tragedy until after the Sharpeville massacre—which, after all, was only a dramatic indiscretion that confirmed what Alan Paton and others had for years been telling Americans about the nature of apartheid.

Finally, when American churches began to address themselves to the South African scene, they did so as unwilling and uninvolved onlookers, even when their missionaries began to be deported. And why shouldn't they? Are they not witnesses to just another ugly crucifixion which has really nothing to do with their own predicament? Most emphatically no.

Scientific and technological advances (e.g., modern drugs, electricity, the printed word) are not only private but also public benefits. Air pollution and the threat of nuclear annihilation are certainly not private problems. Similarly, there is a collective responsibility and guilt borne by every German, every South African, and every American, even though he has never killed a Jew, kicked a black or dropped a bomb. As the benefits of the technological age multiply, so do our responsibilities.

So when Washington gives a preferential sugar quota or refuses to act with her allies against acknowledged South African violations of the rule of law, every American shares this responsibility. When American banks and businesses help and profit from apartheid, even Americans on welfare share in the material benefits and the moral guilt. And where every one of us is either white or nonwhite, the race war that has already started in southern Africa involves all of us.

Perhaps because dollars are more tangible than votes or collective identities, American dollars in South Africa become the clearest and most concrete symbols of U.S. responsibility there. Church statements show a clear recognition of this. In 1963 the United Church of Christ (UCC) warned that "tragic internal conflict" threatened South Africa, that it was "virtually a police state," and that all who trade with and invest in South Africa "contribute indirectly to the continuance of a system that has made a mockery of human rights." The UCC called for action from the U.S. Government (including the imposition of sanctions) and from churches and individuals (including consumer boycotts and withdrawal of investments).

In 1964 the Methodist Church urged "all nations," especially Britain and the United States, "to give serious consideration" to the United Nations call for economic sanctions against South Africa in order to halt the further extension of apartheid.

In 1965 the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. (UPCUSA) stated: "Apartheid is maintained * * * by a totalitarian force reminiscent of Nazi Germany * * *. Apartheid is gravely inimical to the present and the future life, work and witness of the Christian church because its ruthless deeds are blasphemously perpetrated in the name of Christ. The 177th General Assembly * * * therefore strongly deploras any material support * * * of the present Government of South Africa by the U.S. Government * * *. American economic involvement, both governmental and private, has been a significant factor in the stability of the South African economy and therefore of the present apartheid regime."

In 1964 the National Council of Churches issued a similar statement and asked the U.S. Government to consider sanctions. In 1966 the council asked the Government "to explore and exercise such political and economic pressures as may lead to the effective dissociation of the United States and its citizens from implicit support of South Africa's denial of rights to nonwhites."

If all these church bodies had acted on their own words and done what they called on government, business and others to do, things could have been much better than they are. Their own credibility and influence would have been increased and a movement started that could have begun to bring leverage to bear on South Africa. Calling for sanctions against apartheid while indirectly making profits from it can hardly enhance the churches' integrity and authority.

The clearest issue the churches have been challenged to act on are their banking practices. One of the most direct forms of support given to the apartheid government has been a revolving credit arrangement made with a consortium of 10 American banks. Two of the 10, Chase Manhattan and First National City, have made unilateral loans as well. They also have long served some wealthy church boards.

In 1966 several churches asked their banks to discontinue the revolving credit because of the material and symbolic support it gave to apartheid. The banks replied that they could not allow such factors to influence their business, that conditions were improving in South Africa, and that their involvement might help to bring further improvements. The revolving credit was duly renewed for another year in January 1967.

The churches renewed the requests to their banks, and the Methodist Board of Missions told First National City Bank that if it renewed its share of the credit in January 1968, the board would reluctantly have to withdraw a \$10 million investment portfolio to protest "as a first step." The bankers repeated the same arguments, pleaded with the Methodists not to withdraw, and renewed South Africa's credit for another year. The Methodist board did indeed withdraw its portfolio from the bank, but the credit was apparently renewed again in 1969.

The consortium banks are clearly determined not to allow this moral and political issue to influence their business deals. Therefore, the churches are even more clearly under a moral obligation to dissociate themselves from these banks.

The Methodists are likely to follow their first step with a second, and in December 1968 the executive council of the Episcopal Church resolved to take even more drastic action. It decided to terminate the council's involvement with all consortium banks "unless the involvement of the said banks" helps to "promote the welfare or education of all the people in southern Africa." (Hopefully, the Episcopal Church recognizes the fallacy of the theory, favored by the American and South African establishment, that economic involvement will eventually break down apartheid.)

The executive council also established criteria which, if taken seriously, would prevent it from making any further investments in companies operating in white-ruled areas of southern Africa and indeed should lead the council to eventually divest itself of investments in firms that continue to profit from apartheid.

Hopefully the other churches, especially those that first raised the issue, will take similar steps. Some major American universities—not because of the churches' example, but because of the concern of some students and faculty—are moving toward a similar position.

These are modest beginnings after years of unrelenting efforts by a few concerned individuals. But the resistance to them could hardly have been much greater if the churches had been asked to sponsor a military invasion. This suggests that an issue of considerable importance has been raised, not only for South Africa but also for the churches.

For South Africa the importance of American economic involvement is symbolic and potential. The symbolic value of American Government and business dealings with South Africa has far exceeded its actual face value. Its influence ranges from adversely affecting other countries' votes in the United Nations to favorably influencing foreign investors to bolster the morale of the South African establishment. "If America is for us, who can be against us?" the whites justifiably feel, though few of them say it.

The apartheid budget and program unmistakably show that it is vulnerable to two main threats. One is counterviolence, which has already begun and can only end in a frightful conflagration. The other is international sanctions, which is the only way to try to prevent that final conflagration. Effective sanctions are impossible without full American support, if not American initiative.

And how can the United States support sanctions against a nation she is actively trading with and investing in? One cannot go forward in high gear when one is still accelerating in reverse. Getting into neutral is a necessary and desirable first step if one wants to at least stop going backward.

Neither the U.S. Government nor business have shown the will, the desire, or the ability to disengage from apartheid. Among the political factors affecting Washington are the indifference of the American voters to the southern African powder keg and the fact that the racist regimes are white, supposedly anti-Communist, and rich.

Business is inhibited because of the rich returns South Africa offers. When it denies this legitimate profit motive, we must conclude that it is in South Africa only to help the racists. The evidence is so clear as to who benefits from the American dollars that pious prattle about business improving the situation is based on either ignorance or hypocrisy.

The churches are free of these incumbrances to the extent of their integrity as Christian churches. Their actions on the economic issue alone could eventually lead to American economic disengagement from South Africa, which would give Washington the badly needed credibility and freedom it needs in the international arena to act toward South Africa. It would also commit the churches more clearly to the responsible use of economic power.

It is true that the churches' economic involvement in South Africa is indirect. But their continued ties to banks that openly support the apartheid regime have become a clear issue. If they will not dissociate themselves from those banks,

then, rightly or wrongly, whatever other good things they may do for South Africa, as well as their own moral integrity, will be suspect. And with the churches' history of paternalistic race relations at home and abroad, their decision may have the most far-reaching consequences both in the United States and elsewhere.

The churches in southern Africa and in the United States have much to say about love and justice. It is not by their words, however, but by their deeds that they will be judged.

APPENDIX F

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA

1. REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

The following information is given with the understanding that it represents conditions which existed on the date this list was prepared (March 1968).

This list includes only those firms in which American firms have a substantial direct capital investment in the form of stock, as the sole owner, or as a partner in the enterprise. No attempt has been made to include the names of foreign firms operating under a contract, license, or commission basis, where no actual American capital is involved, and in which American firms participate solely on a royalty or profit-sharing basis. Small or anonymous investments are not encompassed and the list cannot be regarded as all inclusive. The noncommercial enterprises and institutions such as churches, missions, schools and hospitals financed or operated by American charitable or religious organizations have also been omitted.

The list has been subdivided into the four consular districts in the Republic, and in each district the companies are listed alphabetically by name of the South African establishment.

The following symbols have been used:

- (S) American parent controls 50 percent or more of capital
- (A) American parent controls less than 50 percent of capital
- (B) Branch (primarily service organization)

Nationality of Chief Executive:

- *American
- **South African
- ***British

At the end of the list there is a separate section for firms owned by local resident Americans. There is no American chamber of commerce in South Africa.

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

JOHANNESBURG CONSULAR DISTRICT

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) ABBOT Laboratories S.A. (Pty) Ltd.	2 Samuel Evans Rd., P.O. Baragwanath, Tvl. (32-2226)	P.J. de Wet van Heerden **	Pharmaceuticals	Abbot Laboratories, North Chicago, Ill.
(S) ADAMS Brands (Pty) Ltd.	17 3rd Ave., Booyens Reserve, Jhb. (838-2903)	J.R. Desilets (Canadian)	Chiclets Chewing Gum	Warner-Lambert International Div. of Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co., 201 Tabor Rd., Morris Plains, N.J.
(B) AETNA Insurance Co.	16 Frederick St., P.O. Box 6166, Jhb. (838-6711)	G.B. Gillham	Insurance	American Foreign Insurance Assoc., P.O. Box 233, Peck Slip Station, New York 38, N.Y.
(S) AFAMAL-Quadrant (Pty) Ltd.	African Life Centre, Eloff St., P.O. Box 7256, Jhb. (23-8361)	H.G. Hyams ***	Advertising Agency including market research and public relations	The Interpublic Group of Companies Inc., 1271 Avenue of the Americas Rockefeller Center, New York, N.Y. 10020.
(B) ALLIS-Chalmers International	P.O. Box 132, Saxonwold, Jhb. (22-1439)	J.A. Johnson * Resident Manager	Crushers, electrical equipment, nuclear reactors, agricultural tractors & earthmoving equipment	Allis-Chalmers International, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
(S) AMERICAN Abrasives Co. S.A. (Pty) Ltd.	P.O. Box 9527, Jhb. (23-3366)	C.G. Frost ***	Corundum	American Abrasives Inc., Westfield, Massachusetts.

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) AMERICAN Ethicals (Pty) Ltd.	4th Fl., Fleetway Hse., Bree St., P.O. Box 8138, Jhb. (836-6271/2)	E.J.M. Odiell **	Pharmaceuticals	Ayerst Laboratories International, 685 3rd Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017.
(S) The AMERICAN Express Co. Inc.	104 Commissioner St., P.O. Box 9995, Jhb. (838-1451)	D.M. Agnew ***	Travel service, travelers checks, & credit cards	American Express Co., 65 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10006.
(B) AMERICAN Foreign Insurance Ass.	16 Frederick St., P.O. Box 6166, Jhb. (838-6711)	G.B. Gillham ***	Insurance	American Foreign Insurance Ass., P.O. Box 233, Peck Slip Station, New York 38, N.Y.
(S) AMERICAN International Insurance Co. Ltd. (an indirect subsidiary thru Bermuda)	Suite 532, 40 Commissioner St., P.O. Box 1694, Jhb. (838-2266)	John M. Lyons *	Short Term Insurance	(various individual United States stockholders)
(S) AMERICAN Motors (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd.	28 President St., P.O. Box 36, Germiston, Tvl. (51-8525/6/7)	Peter J. Ray ***	Rambler Automobiles	American Motors Corp. 14250 Plymouth Rd., Detroit, Michigan.
(B) Arthur ANDERSON & Co.	813 Marlborough Hse., Eloff St. P.O. Box 3652, Jhb. (23-2374)	Walter S. Baker *	Accountants	Arthur Anderson & Co., Chicago, Ill.

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) ARMCO (Pty) Ltd.	21 Wolmarans St. Braamfontein, P.O. Box 2503, Jhb. (22-5176)	James H. Worsley (Australian)	Steel fabricators & merchants	Armco Steel Corp., Middletown, Ohio.
(S) ARTNELL Exploration Co.	324 The Corner House, 63 Fox St., Jhb. (838-5320)	Eugene J. Wilson *	Mineral exploration	Artnell Co., 101 South Wacker Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60606.
(S) ARTNELL International Ltd.	324 The Corner House, 63 Fox St., Jhb. (838-5320)	Horace N. Sharrow *	Holding Company	Artnell Co., 101 South Wacker Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60606.
(s) AUTOMATED Building Components (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd.	P.O. Box 207, Bramley, Tvl. (40-6837)	M.S. Dryden **	Industrial building components	Automated Building Components Inc., Miami, Florida
(S) B.L. Pharmaceuticals (Pty) Ltd.	10th Fl., Newkirk, Cnr. Nugget & Kerk Sts. P.O. Box 2515, Jhb. (22-2735)	H.L. Bernstein **	Pharmaceuticals	Bristol-Laboratories, Div., of Bristol-Myers Co., Syracuse, N.Y.
(S) BECHTEL International Ltd. (an indirect subsidiary thru Panama)	87 De Korte St. Braamfontein, Jhb. (724-5301)	J.W. Mellon *	Engineers & constructors	Bechtel Corp., 220 Bush St., San Francisco, Calif.
(S) BLACK Clawson (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd. (an indirect subsidiary thru Trinidad)	Pharmacy House, 80 Jurissen St. Braamfontein, P.O. Box 4236, Jhb. (724-0234)	J.P. Simpson ***	Paper, pulp, sawmill & plastics machinery	The Black Clawson Co. 203 Park Ave., New York, N.Y.

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) The BORDEN Co. (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd.	325 Innes Chambers, 84 Pritchard St., P.O. Box 10359, Jhb. (23-8021)	P.D. Strong **	Milk products	The Borden Co., 350 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017.
(S) BRISTOL-Myers (Pty) Ltd.	6th Fl., Total Centre, Braamfontein, P.O. Box 9706, Jhb. (724-7312)	B.B. Williamson (New Zealander)	Toiletries & pharmaceuticals	Bristol-Myers International, 630 5th Ave., New York, N.Y. 10020.
(S) BURROUGHS Machines Ltd.	Libertas, Marshall St., P.O. Box 3996, Jhb. (836-3877)	C.C. Cotton ***	Adding & accounting machines & computers	Burroughs Corp., P.O. Box 299, Detroit 32, Michigan.
(S) The BUTTERICK Publishing Co. (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd.	704-706 Cavendish Chambers, Jeppe St., Jhb. (23-3417 and 23-3350)	D.J. Walker **	Dress patterns	The Butterick Co. Inc. 161 6th Ave., New York, N.Y.
(B) The CALABRIAN Co. Inc., of New York	536 Annuity Hse, 18 Rissik St., Jhb. (838-4414)	W.W.A. van de Laar **	Agricultural Commodities, canned goods, & industrial raw materials.	The Calabrian Co., of New York, 26 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10004.
(S) J.I. CASE Company	McLure Rd., Mill Hill, P.O. Bryanston, Tvl. (706-4578)	R.A. Lupton ***	Agricultural tractors & implements & construction equip.	J.I. Case Company, Racine, Wisconsin.

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) CATERPILLAR (Africa) (Pty) Ltd.	Anvil Rd., Isando, Tvl. P.O. Box 11481, Jhb. (39-1811)	A.C.G. Mc-Rae **	Parts for earth-moving equipment	Caterpillar Tractor Co., Peoria, Ill. (Caterpillar Overseas S.A. Geneva, Switzerland)
(S) CHAMPION Spark Plug Co. of S.A. (Pty) Ltd.	82 Electron Ave P.O. Box 88, Isando, Tvl. (39-1738)	C.G. Hall **	Spark plugs	Champion Spark Plug Co. Box 910, Toledo, Ohio.
(S) CHESEBROUGH-Pond's International Ltd.	Cnr. Rossouw & Naggington Rds. P.O. Box 1, Wadeville, Germiston, Tvl. (34-4251)	Charles E. Robert *	Cosmetics & toiletries	Chesebrough-Pond's Inc., 485 Lexington Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017.
(S) CHICAGO Bridge Ltd.	101 Charter Hse., 13 Rissik St., Jhb. (836-8048 & 9)	W. Howard Boessneck *	Field erected steel plate structures	Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. Oakbrook, Ill.
(S) CHROME Corp. (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd.	Hermaine House, 26 Harrison St. P.O. Box 6612, Jhb. (838-3141)	O.T. van der Merwe **	Chrome Ore	Union Carbide Corp., 270 Park Ave., New York, N.Y.
(B) COCA-COLA Export Corp., The.	President Pl., Jan Smuts Ave., Rosebank, P.O. Box 4, Parklands, Tvl. (41-0241) and Mobil Hse., Rissik St., P.O. Box 9999, Jhb. (836-3673)	A.E. Milleen * Area Manager H.W. Roberts ** Regional Manager	Soft drinks	The Coca-Cola Export Corp., 515 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10022.

north of Luanda and, more recently, in eastern Angola. MPLA is considered to be a party of mulatto intellectuals with support in Luanda but no tribal base. MPLA and GRAE are bitter enemies. Their president, Dr. Agostinho Neto, visits Lusaka from time to time. MPLA is a Marxist-oriented group which enjoys extensive support from the U.S.S.R. and some aid from Algeria. The African Liberation Committee of the OAU favors MPLA as the legitimate independence movement in Angola. The study mission met and talked with MPLA representatives in their Lusaka office. The group also maintains an office in Dar es Salaam.

c. UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) was formerly based in Lusaka, Zambia. Key figure is Jonas Savimbi, former Foreign Minister of GRAE, who broke with Roberto in 1964 and formed UNITA in early 1966. Zambia forced Savimbi to leave the country in late 1967. It does not now have an office in Lusaka. The organization has a base inside Angola. UNITA's operations are in eastern Angola and along the Benguela Railroad. UNITA has received minor financial and military aid from Communist China, Tanzania, and to some extent, the UAR.

2. Mozambique

a. FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front) is based in Dar es Salaam. Formed in 1962 by a union of older Mozambiquan political groups, it launched the current rebellion in northern Mozambique in late 1964. Its 4,000 to 5,000 active members make it the largest group in Angola or Mozambique.

After the assassination of FRELIMO's former President Eduardo Mondlane in February 1969, the party established a tripartite leadership, "The Council of the Presidency," made up of Acting President Uria Simango, Defense Secretary Samora Moises Machel, and Political Secretary Marcelino Dos Santos. The leadership is reputed to be divided between those sympathetic to China and those favoring the U.S.S.R. In the past FRELIMO has received aid from the U.S.S.R. and from Algeria. It seems clear that FRELIMO is suffering from the effects of the assassination of Mondlane and of the defection from the party of Lazaro Kavandame. He was FRELIMO's civilian chief of the Cabo Delgado Province. The Portuguese hailed Lazaro's defection as a real breakthrough in their struggle against FRELIMO, but their hope that a large number of his fellow Makonde tribesmen would follow him has not yet materialized.

Last year FRELIMO announced the launching of an offensive in Tete District (the portion of the country nearly entirely surrounded by Rhodesia, Zambia, and Malawi) designed to obstruct the construction of the Cabona Bassa Dam, but no great areas of Tete have as yet been liberated. Insurgency is on the rise in Tete District, however, and this front constitutes the principal Portuguese worry in Mozambique at present.

FRELIMO continues small-scale operations which the Portuguese are unable to completely suppress with their present strength, but the guerrilla activity does not yet approach a scale which would endanger Portuguese control of Mozambique.

The study mission was flown to inspect the abandoned village of Lote in Zambia which they were informed had been bombed. The 150 villagers had fled. It was in July 1969 that Zambia and Portugal traded

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) COLGATE-Palmolive Ltd.	52 nd Commissioner St., Industrial Sites, Boksburg East, P.O. Box 1002, Jhb. (52-5531)	Roy B. Hill *	Toiletries, soaps, detergents	Colgate-Palmolive International, 300 Park Ave., Box 2250, Grand Central Station, New York, N.Y.
(B) P.F. COLLIER Inc.	8th Floor, Merbrook, 123 Commissioner St., Jhb. (22-0096)	M.D. Carstens **	Encyclopaedias	P.F. Collier Inc., 866 Third Ave., New York, N.Y. 10022.
(S) COLLIER-MacMillan (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd.	93 De Korte St. Braamfontein, Jhb. (724-9505)	Adriaan Donker (Dutch)	Books	The MacMillan Co., 866 Third Ave., New York, N.Y. 10022.
(B) COLLINS Radio Co. International Inc.	P.O. Box 6585, Jhb. (22-0157)	W.K. Thompson **	Telecommunications, avionic equip. data processing & satellite tracking business	Collins Radio Co., Cedar Rapids, Iowa.
(S) COMBUSTION Engineering (Africa) (Pty) Ltd.	Gnr. De Korte & Melle Sts., Braamfontein, P.O. Box 6121, Jhb. (724-5371)	P.A. Earle **	Boilers & pulverizers	Combustion Engineering Inc., 277 Park Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017.
(S) CONSOLIDATED Equipment & Manufacturing Co. (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd.	P.O. Box 128, Isando, Tvl. (39-1161)	E.A. Walsh ** Managing Director	Masonry & concrete saws, core drills, concrete road making machinery	Clipper Manufacturing Co., Kansas City, Missouri.

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) CONTINENTAL South Africa	P.O. Box 136, Industria, Tvl. (35-9181)	T. Winton Holt ***	Grain exporters & importers	Continental Grain Co. 2 Broadway, New York, N.Y.
(S) CONTROL Data (Pty) Ltd.	Suite 14, Mayo Centre, Randburg, Tvl. P.O. Box 185, Randburg. (706-1373)	A.G. Lloyd *	Digital computer systems	Control Data Corp., 8100 34th Ave. s., Minneapolis, Minn.
(S) CROWN Carlton Paper Mills (Pty) Ltd.	P.O. Box 6473, Jhb. (34-4211)	W.L. Kalmanson **	Manufacturers of fine tissue papers & converting of same into household paper products	Crown Zellrbach Corp. 1 Bush St., San Francisco, California.
(S) CROWN Cork Co. (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd.	P.O. Box 6473, Jhb. (34-1571)	J.R. Shepard **	Crown cork & bottling machinery	Crown Cork and Seal Co. Inc., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
(A) CUTLER Hammer Igranitic Inc.	Cnr. Esandar & Osborne Rds., Wadeville, Germiston.	Colin Urquhart **	Manufacturers & distributors of motor control equip. control accessories & systems covering integrated process lines, steel mills & crane concrete equip.	Cutler Hammer International, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(B) CYANAMID International Corp.	Avril Malan Building, Commissioner St., P.O. Box 7552, Jhb. (834-4671)	Bruce Crawford *	Administrative office	Cyanamid International Corp., Wayne, N.J.
(S) DEAN International (Pty) Ltd.	214/215 Geldenhuys Building, 33 Jorissen St. P.O. Box 31259, Braamfontein, Jhb. (724-2168 and after hours 706-4622).	John G. Labuschagne **	Importers & exporters of household personal effects and other commodities	Dean Export International Ltd., Long Beach, California.
(S) DENVER Equipment Co. (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd.	Broadway & 9th Sts., Bez Valley, Jhb. (25-7531)	T.S. Bailey, Jr. *	Reduction worksequip.	Denver Equipment Co., 1400 17th St., Denver 17, Colorado.
(S) DERBY & Co. (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd. (an indirect subsidiary thru the U.K.)	Unitas, Marshall St., P.O. Box 4829, Jhb. (838-2471)	Dr.W.H.Grunfeld **	Ores, minerals, metals & chemicals	Engelhard Minerals & Chemicals Corp., 350 Park Ave., New York, N.Y. 10022
(A) DINERS Club (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd.	P.O. Box 10727, Jhb. (23-4718)	Graeme Res-sel **	Businessmans credit card	Diners Club Inc., 10 Columbus Circle, New York, N.Y. 10019
(S) DOBOY (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd. (an indirect subsidiary thru Switzerland)	236 Baker Square, Rosebank, Jhb. (42-1313)	H.J. Butcher **	Packaging machinery	Doughboy Industries Inc., Bridge Ave., Main Street, New Richmond, Wisconsin

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) DODGE & Seymour (Pty) Ltd.	509-511 N.I.C. House, 12 New Street South, P.O. Box 6072, Jhb. (838-5771)	R.L. Plessis ** General Manager	Automotive replacement parts, tools hardware, engineering products	Dodge & Seymour Ltd., 53 Park Place, New York, N.Y. 10007
(S) DONALDSON Air Cleaners (Pty) Ltd.	211 Rutland Place, Odendaal st., P.O. Box 967, Germiston, Tvl. (51-7634 & 51-3140)	F.J. Honness *	Air cleaners	Donaldson Co. Inc., 1400 West 94th St., Minneapolis, Minnesota 55431
(S) DOW Chemical Africa (Pty) Ltd.	Van der Stel Place, Cnr. Melle & De Korte Sts., Braamfontein, P.O. Box 9170, Jhb. (724-3381)	J.H.W. Lapham **	Chemicals	Dow Chemical International, Abbot Rd. Building, Main St., Midland, Michigan.
(S) DUN & Bradstreet (Pty) Ltd.	127 President St., P.O. Box 5166, Jhb. (22-1992)	D.O. Carroll *	Commercial & retail credit information services	Dun & Bradstreet International Ltd., 99 Church St., New York N.Y.
(A) EIMCO (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd.	Barlow St., Industries West, P.O. Box 178, Germiston, Tvl. (51-6211)	D.H. Watson **	Eimco rockershovels, filters & process equipment	The Eimco Corp., 537 W. 6th South St., Box 300, Salt Lake City, Utah.
(S) EMERY Air Freight Corp.	611 Dunwell House, 35 Jorissen St., Braamfontein, Jhb. (724-6113)	Harry Plain ***	Air freight forwarders	Emery Air Freight Corp., Piersall Bldg Wilton, Connecticut.

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) ENCYCLOPAEDIA Britannica (Pty) Ltd.	36 Kerk St., P.O. Box 10064, Jhb. (834-4351)	G.E. Collier ***	Encyclopaedias	Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., 425 North Michigan Ave., Chicago 11, Illinois.
(S) ENDO Drug Corp. (Africa) (Pty) Ltd.	105 Quartz St., Hillbrow, Jhb. (724-1651)	A. Sachs **	Pharmaceuticals	Endo Drug Corp., 1000 Stewart Ave., Garden City, N.Y. 11533
(S) ENGELHARD Hanovia of Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd.	French House, 54 Marshall St., P.O. Box 9123, Jhb. (838-4081)	F. Puerst *	Investment	Engelhard Hanovia Inc. 100 Chestnut St., Newark, N.J.
(S) ESSO Standard South Africa (Pty) Ltd.	30 Simmonds St., P.O. Box 4442, Jhb. (834-3031)	J.F. Campbell *	Petroleum & chemicals	Esso Africa Inc., Case Postale 1211, Geneva, Switzerland (a 100% affiliate of Standard Oil (New Jersey), 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10020)
(/) EWING, McDonald & Co., (Pty) Ltd.	P.O. Box 2579, Jhb., (834-4391)	A.A. MacDuff **	Shippers & exporters	J.A. Ewing & MacDonald Inc., New York, N.Y. (Subsidiary)
(B) FAIRBANKS Morse International	P.O. Box 23374, Joubert Park, Jhb.	David G.K. Eggett ***	Diesel engines, industrial pumps & industrial scales	Fairbanks Morse Int. Inc., Box 606, Glen Rock, N.J. 07452
(B) FARRELL Lines International	Rennie House, Cnr. Jorissen & Melle Sts., Braamfontein, P.O. Box 3841, Jhb. (724-9461)	R.H. Ballard *	Shipping	Farrell Lines Inc., 1 Whitehall St., New York, N.Y. 10004.

(/) Parent Company

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) FERRO Enamels (Pty) Ltd.	P.O. Box 108, Brakpan, Tvl. (55-6628) (Telex 43-7853 Jhb.)	J.K. Hossack (Canadian)	Porcelain enamel, glass colors, enamelling equip colors for plastic & ceramic industry	Ferro Corp., 4150 East 56th St., Cleveland, Ohio.
(A) FIBREGLASS (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd.	Cnr. Janie & Marshall Sts., P.O. Box 9338, Jhb. (24-0311)	H. Cohen **	Fiberglass	Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp., Toledo, Ohio.
(A) FIRST Consolidated Leasing Corp. (Pty) Ltd.	12th Fl., Schlesinger Centre, 222 Smit St., Braamfontein, P.O. Box 4977, Jhb. (838-8151)	D.P. Driver ** General Manager	Leasing	First National City Overseas Investment Corp., 399 Park Ave., New York, N.Y. 10022
(S) FIRST National City Bank of New York (S.A.) Ltd.	71 Fox St., P.O. Box 9773, Jhb. (834-2461)	William E. de St. Aubin *	Banking	First National City Bank, 399 Park Ave., New York, N.Y. 10022.
(S) FOX Theatres South Africa (Pty) Ltd.	Colosseum Bldg. 134 Commissioner St., P.O. Box 1100, Jhb. (23-3520)	R.S. Berry **	Motion Picture distributors & exhibitors	20th Century-Fox Film Corp., Delaware
(S) FRAM Filters (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd.	Nagington Rd., Wadeville, Germiston, Tvl. (34-3520)	Harold Tine *	Automotive & Industrial filters	Fram Corp., Providence Rhode Island.
(S) FRIDEN (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd.	122 Jeppe St., P.O. Box 6337, Jhb. (836-5321)	A.G. Davis (Australian)	Office equip. & data processing	The Singer Sewing Machine Co., 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York

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Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) GALION (Pty) Ltd.	Tedstone Rd., Wadeville, P.O. Box 43, Germiston, Tvl. (34-1521)	T.A. Tribelhorn **	Road making & earth moving equip.	The Jeffrey Galion Manufacturing Co., 100 E. Broad St., Columbus, Ohio 43215.
(S) GARDNER-Denver Co. (Africa) (Pty) Ltd.	18 Barney Rd., P.O. Box 4807, Jhb. (24-7195)	Robert Blane **	Mining, construction & oilfield equipment	Gardner-Denver Co., Quincy, Illinois.
(S) GATES South Africa (Pty) Ltd.	Samkay House, Cnr. Troye & Marshall Sts., P.O. Box 5044, Jhb. (22-5760 & 22-6452)	D. MacD. Keebler (Canadian)	V-belts, hoses & clamps	The Gates Rubber Co., 999 S. Broadway, Denver, Colorado 80217
(A) The GENERAL Tyre & Rubber Co. (S.A.) Ltd.	Zambesi House, Cnr. von Wiedligh & Commissioner Sts., P.O. Box 7516, Jhb. (23-0395)	R.G. Nicholson **	Tires	General Tire & Rubber Co., Akron 9, Ohio.
(S) GILLETTE (S.A.) (PTY) Ltd. (Administrative control thru the U.K.)	Gold St., New Era, P.O. Box 81, Springs, Tvl. (56-9331) (Telex 43-0261 JH)	P.G. Moore **	Razor blades, men's toiletries & cosmetics	The Gillette Co., Prudential Tower Bldg., Boston, Mass. 02199
(S) GRANT Advertising Ltd.	150 Jeppe St., P.O. Box 1529, Jhb. (836-3686)	David Hart **	Advertising Agency	Grant Advertising International Inc., 10 South Riverside Plaza, Chicago, Illinois.
(B) GROLLER International Inc.	Fattis Mans., Loveday St., P.O. Box 25121, Jhb. (838-7801)	C.J. Smith *	Educational books	Grolier Inc., 575 Lexington Ave., New York, N.Y. 10022

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(B) GULF Eastern Company	901 Argon Hse., 87 AJuta St., Braamfontein, Jhb. (724-2271)	O.I. Torkelsen *	Oil Company	Gulf Oil Corp., Gulf Building, 439 7th Ave., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230
(S) HEINEMANN Electric South Africa Limited	P.O. Box 99, Bramley, Tvl. (40-5281)	A.W. Jorgensen (Canadian)	Circuit breakers	Heinemann Electric Co., Trenton, New Jersey.
(S) HELENA Rubinstein S.A. (Pty) Ltd. (an indirect subsidiary thru the U.K.)	34-38 Harry St. Robertsham, P.O. Box 5894, Jhb. (32-6476/7/8)	B.P. Couchman **	Cosmetics	Helena Rubinstein Inc. 655 5th Ave., New York, N.Y.
(S) HEWITT-Robins S.A. (Pty) Ltd.	260 Market St., P.O. Box 4736, Jhb. (24-8526)	J.M. Conroy *	Materials handling systems, engineers & Manufacturers	Hewitt-Robins Inc., a Div. of Littorn Industries, 666 Glenbrook Rd., Stamford, Connecticut
(S) HOCHMETALS (Africa)(Pty) Ltd.	51 Main St., P.O. Box 6458, Jhb. (838-2215)	W.A. Nadermann **	Metals, minerals & ores	South American Minerals & Merchandise Corp., 445 Park Ave., New York, N.Y. 10022
(S) HOOVER S.A. (Pty) Ltd. (an indirect subsidiary thru the U.K.)	P.O. Box 22, Isando, Tvl. (39-1421)	H. Wilcock ***	Washers, cleaners & polishers	The Hoover Company, North Canton, Ohio
(S) HYSTER Africa (Pty) Ltd.	Industrie Rd., P.O. Box 172, Isando, Tvl. (39-1581)	Robert W. Henderson * Managing Director	Assembly of motor vehicles (fork lift trucks & mobile cranes)	Hyster Co., P.O. Box 2902, (2902 N.E. Clackamas St.,) Portland, Oregon 97208

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) INGERSOLL-Rand Co. South Africa (Pty) Ltd.	P.O. Box 720, Alrode, Alberton, Tvl. (869-5361)	Bartus van Til **	Compressed air equip., pneumatic tools, compressors, rock drilling equip., centrifugal pumps electric portable hand tools, plastic pulp & paper machinery.	Ingersoll-Rand Co., 11 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10004.
(B) INSURANCE Co. of North America	Burlington Hse., 22 Rissik St., P.O. Box 6480, Jhb. (838-3481)	A.C. Kilburn **	Insurance	Insurance Company of North America, 1600 Arch St., Philadelphia
(S) INTERNATIONAL Business Machines (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd.	18 Rissik St., P.O. Box 1419, Jhb. (836-1101)	M. Cowley **	Data processing systems electric typewriters, dictating equipment & service bureau	IBM World Trade Corp. 821 United Nations plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017
(S) INTERNATIONAL Flavors and Fragrances I.F.F. (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd.	P.O. Box 231, Roodepoort, Tvl. (763-3821)	D. Crossen ***	Flavors & fragrances	International Flavors & Fragrances Inc., 521 West 57th St., New York, N.Y. 10001
(S) INTERNATIONAL Harvester Co. (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd.	Diesel/Industry Rds., P.O. Box 12, Isando, Tvl. (975-4631)	D. James Hatos *	Motor trucks, farm tractors & implements & light industrial equipment	International Harvester Co., 401 North Michigan Ave., Chicago, Illinois 60611.

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(B) INTERNATIONAL Johns-Manville Corp.	P.O. Box 296, Saxonwold, Tvl. (45-2983)	W.T. Prim * Vice President Area Manager - Africa	Building & industrial materials	Johns-Manville International Corp., 22 E. 40th St., New York, N.Y. 10016.
(S) JEFFREY-Galion (Pty) Ltd.	Albatros House, Marshall St., P.O. Box 4094, Jhb. (836-4029)	A.E. Wilkes** T.A. Tribelhorn ** Joint Managing Directors	Finance holding company	The Jeffrey Company, Columbus, Ohio.
(S) JEFFREY Manufacturing Co.	Albatros House Marshall St., P.O. Box 4094, Jhb.	A.E. Wilkes **	Engineers & contractors handling materials handling plants & equipment, mining equip water, sewage & waste treatments	The Jeffrey Company, Columbus, Ohio.
(S) JOHN Deere (Pty) Ltd.	<u>Mnf. Div:</u> P.O. Box 198, Nigel, Tvl. (799-2331) <u>Marketing Div:</u> P.O. Box 146, Isando, Tvl. (39-1531/5)	H.I. Martin * K.S. Spicer *	Farm & industrial equipment	Deere & Co., John Deere Rd., Moline, Illinois
(S) S.C. JOHNSON & Son of S.A. (Pty) Ltd.	19 Wepener St., Booysens, Jhb. (834-6451)	S.R. Murray **	Auto polish, household polishes & cleaners	S.C. Johnson & Son Inc., Racine, Wisconsin.

charges in the Security Council on the Zambian complaint that Portuguese forces from Mozambique had bombed the village. The Zambian Ambassador to the U.N. implied that Portugal had used weapons furnished by NATO allies.

b. COREMO (Mozambique Revolutionary Committee) is based in Zambia. It was formed in 1965 when its president, Paulo Gumane, broke with FRELIMO. COREMO conducts sporadic forays into western Mozambique, but its operations have so far been very limited in scale.

COREMO is strongly influenced, almost dominated, by the personality of Gumane. He claims broad-based support for the movement within Mozambique. COREMO hopes for some accommodation with the Portuguese and seeks by armed struggle to force Lisbon to negotiations. COREMO has been torn by some factionalism and has lost the support of both China and the U.S.S.R. The movement is now without support from the outside world and is in serious financial difficulty. COREMO maintains an office in Cairo in addition to the headquarters in Lusaka.

3. Rhodesia¹

The study mission did not visit Rhodesia but met and talked with representatives of the freedom movements outside the country. The proposed new constitution is included in this report as appendix C. The new constitution will institutionalize racial separation and ensure the continuing political and economic domination of that country's 4.8 million African inhabitants by its 228,000 whites. The constitution is to be debated in Parliament next month and eventually approved by the 91,000 Rhodesians, mostly white, who are allowed to vote, since it was endorsed by referendum last June. Its implementation proclaims Rhodesia as a Republic which cuts all ties to the British Crown.

In the existing situation in Rhodesia, public claims by both leaders of the freedom movements and the Rhodesian authorities are often exaggerated and should be carefully scrutinized to verify their accuracy.

a. ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union) is based in Lusaka, Zambia. The movement traces its origin to the African National Congress of Rhodesia which was formed September 12, 1957. When this organization was banned it was reorganized under the name National Democratic Party on January 1, 1960. Following the 1961 banning of that organization, the party was reconstituted as ZAPU on December 17, 1961. When ZAPU was banned on September 20, 1962, it reemerged as the People's Caretaker Council, but when that organization, too, was banned, the party determined not to attempt to evade the ban by another change of title but to continue the struggle as ZAPU. The party leadership consists of an 18-member central committee led by President Joshua Nkomo. Most of the leadership, including President Nkomo, are in detention in Rhodesia but five members of the central committee are outside Rhodesia and operate the party's main headquarters in Lusaka.

In addition to the Lusaka office, ZAPU has branch offices in Dar es Salaam, Algiers, Cairo, London, and in Havana.

¹ See app. E4 for further discussion on Rhodesia.

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) JOY Manufacturing Co. (Africa)(Pty) Limited.	1-3 Steel St., Steeldale, P.O. Box 4070, Jhb. (869-5241)	F.J. Walker **	Coal & hard rock mining machinery & equip., core drills, diamond crowns, dust collection equip.	Joy Manufacturing Co., Henry Oliver Building, Pittsburgh Pennsylvania. 15222
(S) KAISER Jeep Africa (Pty) Limited	273 Main Pretoria Rd., Wynberg, Tvl. P.O. Box 180, Bramley Tvl. (40-5268)	J.I. Scialom (Italian)	Jeep cars & trucks	Kaiser Jeep International Corp., Toledo, Ohio.
(A) KEAGRAMS Ltd.	Stephen Rd., Ophirton, P.O.Box 256, Jhb. (838-6681)	A. Tannenbaum ** G.W.H. Perrins **	Intravenous solutions & administration sets, blood collection equip. & administration sets	Baxter Laboratories, Morton Grove, Chicago, Illinois.
(S) KELLOGG Co. of S.A. (Pty) Limited	New Era, P.O. Box 309, Springs, Tvl. (56-6701)	J.F. Malone ***	Ready-to-eat breakfast cereals & soup	Kellogg Company, Battle Creek, Michigan.
(S) KELLY-Springfield Tyre Co. S.A.(Pty) Ltd.	Kelly Hse., 34 Durban St., City & Suburban, P.O. Box 10600, Jhb. (22-0135)	William D.R. Brownie **	Tires & tubes	Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., Cumberland Maryland.
(S) KENDALL Co. of S.A. (Pty) Limited.	31 Voorhout St., Doornfontein, Jhb. (24-2200)	A.G. Burston ***	Surgical dressings, elastic goods & narrow web-bings	The Kendall Co., International Div., 140 Federal St., Boston, Massachusetts.

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) KIMBERLEY-Clark of S.A. (Pty) Ltd.	74-78 Marshall St., P.O. Box 3955, Jhb. (836-6972)	Bernard F. Conroy *	Manufacturers & converters of household paper products	Kimberley-Clark Corp. Neenah, Wisconsin.
(S) L.W. Manufacturing Co., (Pty) Ltd.	4-12 Brunel Rd. Tulisa Park, Jhb. P.O. Box 719 Alrode, Tvl. (869-1811)	C.D. McConnell *	Earth moving & mining equipment	Westinghouse Air Brake, 3 Gateway Center, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15222
(S) LAKESIDE Laboratories (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd.	528 Commissioner St., Industrial Sites, Boksburg East, Tvl. P.O. Box 9724, Jhb. (52-5531)	R. Warrender ***	Pharmaceuticals	Affiliated with Lakeside Laboratories Inc., Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201, USA a subsidiary of Colgate palmolive International.
(S) LAVINO S.A. (Pty) Ltd.	80 Marshall St. Syfret House, P.O. Box 7419, Jhb. (836-2766)	M.G.W. Comyn M.B.E.** Managing Director	Chrome ore	E.J. Lavino & Co., Div. of International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 3 Penn Center Plaza, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
(A) LEASE Plan International Corp of S.A. Ltd.	2nd Fl., City Centre, Pretorius St., Pretoria. (Pta. 34105) Local branches: Johannesburg Cape Town Durban	S.S. Kaplan **	Leasing	Lease Plan International Corp., Great Neck, New York.
LE Carbone (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd. (an indirect subsidiary thru Paris)	P.O. Box 11269, Jhb. (27-4791)	J.P. Aubry (French)	Carbon brushes, AD primary cells & chemical equipment	The Carbone Corp., Boonton, N.J.

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name and Address of American Parent
(A) LEDLAB (Pty) Ltd.	336 Electron Ave., P.O. Box 58, Isando, Tvl. (39-1141)	W.G. Whitaker **	Manufacturer of antibiotic & pharmaceutical products	Cyanamid International, Berden Ave., Wayne, N.J.
(S) LILLY Laboratories (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd.	Short St., P.O. Box 98, Isando, Tvl. (39-1921)	A.D. Fregona **	Pharmaceutical & agricultural products	Eli Lilly & Co., Indianapolis, Indiana
(S) LINK-Belt (Africa) Ltd. Div. of F.M.C.	Industrial Rd., New Era, P.O. Box 287, Springs Tvl. (56-6731)	S.F. Pedwell (Canadian)	Material handling equip. mechanical power transmission products	Link-Belt Co., Div. of F.M.C., Prudential Plaza, Chicago, Ill.
(S) LOVABLE Co. of S.A. (Pty) Ltd.	35 Siefert Rd., Doornfontein, Jhb. (23-1911)	S. Weil ** Chairman	Foundation garments etc	The Lovable Co., 200 Madison Ave., New York 16, N.Y.
(S) MSD (Pty) Ltd	142 Pritchard St., P.O. Box 7748, Jhb. (22-3305)	M.C. McGarity *	Ethical Pharmaceutical & veterinary preparations	Merck Sharp & Dohme International, Div. of Merck & Co., Inc., New York, N.Y.
(S) MASONITE (Africa) Ltd.	1 Sprinz Ave., Village Main, P.O. Box 9680, Jhb. (22-5715)	F.L. Campbell *	Hardboard	Masonite Corp., 29 North Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois.
(B) MAX Factor & Company	Innes Chambers, 88 Pritchard St P.O. Box 8074, Jhb. (22-5334)	F.G. Turner **	Cosmetics & toiletries	Max Factor & Co. Inc. Hollywood, Calif.
(B) McGRAW-Hill Inc.	8 Amalia Crt., 31 1st St. Malvern, Jhb. P.O. Box 82 Cleveland, Tvl. (24-3492)	F.N. Finkle *** & **	Educational books, films magazines & tech. journals	McGraw-Hill Inc., 330 West 42nd St., New York, N.Y.

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) McKINNON Chain (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd.	302 Burlington House, 22 Risik St., P.O. Box 7770, Jhb. (834-2201)	Wm. Grant Mackenzie *	Manufacturers of chain & chain accessories	Columbus McKinnon Corp., Box 72, Tonawanda, New York, N.Y.
(S) METRO-Goldwyn-Mayer Films (S.A.)(Pty) Ltd.	9th Floor, His Majesty's Bldg. Commissioner St., P.O.Box 5493, Jhb. (834-4211)	Robert L. schmitt *	Entertainment motion picture film distribution	Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Int., Inc., 1350 Ave. of the Americas, New York, N.Y. 10019.
(S) Geo. J. Meyer (S.A.)(Pty) Ltd.	402 Hampstead House, Cnr. Bickard & Stiemens Sts., Braamfontein, Jhb. (724-6355)	Wm. N. Cavallie *	Complete range of bottling equipment	Geo. J. Meyer Manf. Co., Box 452, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
(S) MINE Safety Appliances Co. (Africa) (Pty) Ltd.	Stand 16, Aeron, P.O. Baragwanath, Tvl. P.O. Box 1680, Jhb. (32-6841)	A.M.B.Rowan **	Mining & industrial safety equip.	Mine Safety Appliances Co., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
(S) MINNESOTA Mining & Manufacturing Co.(S.A.) (Pty) Ltd.	P.O. Box 10465, Jhb. (25-6361)	E.C. Woods **	Printing products, electrical insulation products, micro-film products & Ferrania photographic products	Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co., St. Paul, Minnesota.
(S) MONTROSE Exploration Co. Ltd.	c/o General Mining & Finance Corp.Ltd., P.O. Box 2283, Jhb. (836-1121)	A.H. Johnstone ** D.S.O., E.D.	Chrome ore	Allied Chemical Corp. Ltd., 40 Rector St., New York 6, N.Y.

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(B) MOORE-McCormack Lines Inc. (S) MOORE-McCormack Lines (S.A.)(Pty) Ltd.	22 Ameshoff St., Braamfontein, P.O.Box 706, Jhb. (724-7201 & 724-4069)	Roland Tiffet *	Shipping	Moore-McCormack Lines, 2 Broadway, New York City, N.Y.
(A) MOTOROLA South Africa (Pty) Ltd.	P.O. Box 118, Bramley, Tvl. (40-5108)	Eric Walter Mole **	Electronics	Motorola Inc., Chicago, Illinois.
(S) MULLER & Phipps Africa (Pty) Ltd.	Innes Chambers, 88 Pritchard St. Jhb. (22-9724)	G. Mayall ***	Grocery, pharmaceuticals, hardware, automotive & industrial products	Muller & Phipps (Asia) Ltd., 1 Park Ave., New York City, N.Y.
(S) NATIONAL Cash Register Co. (S.A.)(Pty) Ltd.	6-8 Bertha St., Braamfontein, P.O. Box 3591, Jhb.(724-1611)	G. Cottrell **	Accounting machines, cash registers, computers & adding machines	The National Cash Register Co., Dayton, Ohio.
(A) NATIONAL Packaging Co. Ltd.	P.O. Box 7698, Jhb.(838-3081)	A. Fruman **	Paper & cardboard packaging	St. Regis Paper Co., 150 E 42nd St., New York, N.Y.
(S) NORDBERG Manufacturing Co., (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd.	6 Hollard St., P.O. Box 4139, Jhb.(834-3081)	J.P. Burls **	Mining machinery	Nordberg Manufacturing Co., Box 383, Milwaukee 1, Wisconsin
(S) NORDBERG-Ramsey Africa (Pty) Ltd.	6 Hollard St., P.O. Box 4139, Jhb.(834-3081)	J.P. Burls **	Instrumentation & automation for the process industries & belt conveyer scales	Nordberg Manf. Co., Box 383, Milwaukee 1, Wisconsin & Ramsey Engineering Co. 185 W. County Rd., St. Paul, Minn.

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) NORTON Abrasives S.A. (Pty) Ltd.	2 Montear Rd., P.O.Box 67, Isando, Tvl. (975-1121)	Sidney B. Wetherhead *	Grinding wheels & coated abrasives	Norton Company, Worcester, Mass.
(S) OTIS Elevator Co. Ltd.	222 Marshall St. P.O.Box 2729, Jhb.(23-0341)	G.A. MacWhirter **	Elevators & escalators	Otis Elevator Co., 260 11th Ave., New York, N.Y.
(A) PALABORA Mining Co. Limited	40 Commissioner St., P.O.Box 2915 Jhb.(838-1641)	E.S.W.Hunt (Canadian)	Copper, magnetite, vermiculite & sulphuric acid	New Mont Mining Corp., 300 Park Ave., New York, N.Y., and American Metal Climax Inc., 61 Broadway, New York, N.Y.
(B) PAN American World Airways Inc.	New Zealand & Australia Hse., 29A Loveday St. P.O. Box 6353, Jhb.(975-2451)	J.R. Woodruff *	Airline	Pan American World Airways Inc., Panam Building, New York, N.Y. 10017
(A) PARACHUTE Industries of Southern Africa (Pty)Ltd.	6 Kruis St. S., P.O. Box 6623, Jhb. (22-0971)	Austin W. Hartley ** Chairman & Managing Director	Parachutes & allied equip for military & civilian purposes	Irving Air Chute Co. Inc., 1315 Versailles Rd., Lexington, Kentucky - thru their shareholding in Irving Air Chute Co. of Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd., & Pioneer Parachute Co. Inc., Manchester, Connecticut.
(S) PARKE, Davis Laboratories (Pty) Ltd.	Electron Ave., P.O. Box 24, Isando, Tvl. (39-1641)	J.P. Jordaan **	Pharmaceuticals	Parke, Davis & Co., Detroit, Michigan.
(S) The PARKER Pen (Pty) Ltd.	P.O. Box 124, Isando, Tvl. (39-1451)	P.A. Lloyd ***	Pens, pencils, ball point pens & ink	The Parker Pen Co., Janesville, Wisconsin.

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) PEPSI-Cola Africa (Pty) Ltd.	Baker Square, P.O.Box 223, Saxonwold, Tvl. (42-7471)	G.P. Privett, Jr. *	Mineral waters	Pepsi-Cola Co., 500 Park Ave., New York, N.Y.
(S) PERMATEX (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd.	10 Jasper Rd., Robertsham, Jhb.(836-6477)	P.R.C. Koll **	Automotive & industrial chemicals	Permatex Co. Inc., Flagerl Court Bldg., West Palm Beach, Fl.
(S) C.J. Petrow & Co. (Pty) Ltd.	Rand Central, 165 Jeppe St., Jhb.(23-5746)	C.J. Petrow *	Raw asbestos	Keystone Asbestos Corp., 1005 Investment Bldg., Washington, D.C.
(S) Pfizer Laboratories (Pty) Ltd.	259 Jeppe St., P.O. Box 7324, Jhb.(23-6741)	T.H. Lloyd *** M.P.S.	Pharmaceutical, veterinary/agricultural & chemical products	Pfizer International, Pfizer Bldg., 235 E. 42nd St., New York N.Y.
(S) PLAYTEX Africa (Pty) Ltd.	732 His Majesty Building, P.O. Box 10740, Jhb. (834-4949)	L.F. Forster ***	Foundation garments	International Playtex Corp., 6424 Empire State Building, 350 5th Ave., New York, N.Y.
(S) PRELOAD Africa (Pty) Ltd.	Speedcraft Hse, Loveday St., P.O. Box 2158, Jhb.(834-2144)	A.L. Pogson ***	Designers & builders of concrete tanks	Preload International Corp., Box 804, Springdale, Connecticut.
(S) PROCTER & Gamble Co. of S.A.(Pty)Ltd. (an indirect subsidiary thru Switzerland)	19 Wepener St., Booysens, P.O. Box 3070, Jhb. (834-6451)	Arthur Murray **	Soaps & shampoos	Procter & Gamble Co. Cincinnati, Ohio.

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) R-M Pharmaceuticals (Pty) Ltd.	25 Newton St., Spartan Township, P.O.Box 456 Kempton Pk. Tvl.(975-5696 & 975-2623)	V. Diamond **	Ethical & proprietary medicines, household commodities	Richardson-Merrill Inc. 122 East 2nd St., New York, N.Y. 10017
(S) REMINGTON Rand S.A. (Pty) Ltd.	Remington Rand House, Jeppe & Nugget Sts., P.O. Box 8243, Jhb. (23-4941)	R.S. Prudence ***	Calculating, accounting & dictating machines, typewriters & supplies	Sperry Rand International Corp., 1290 Ave. of the Americas, New York, N.Y.
(S) REPUBLIC Aluminium Co. (Pty) Ltd.	P.O. Box 25, Olifantsfontein Tvl. (936-1241)	Frederic W. Burns *	Aluminium products	Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., Kaiser Center, 300 Lakeside Dr., Oakland California.
(S) REVLON S.A. (Pty) Ltd. (an indirect subsidiary thru Venezuela)	Derwent House, 30 Rossettenville Rd, Jhb. (23-2995)	E.F.W.Sewell ***	Cosmetics & toiletries	Revlon Inc., 666 5th Ave., New York, N.Y.
(A) RICHELIEU Pearls S.A. (Pty) Ltd.	Voortrekker St. New Redruth, Alberton, P.O. Box 80, Alberton, Tvl. (869-2291/2)	C. Chweidan **	Makers of the world's most famous pearls	Richelieu Corp. Inc., Holbrook, Long Island City, New York.
(S) ROBERTSON Thain (Africa) (Pty) Limited	5th Floor, Qu. Elizabeth Hse. 151 Smit St., P.O. Box 1928, Jhb.(724-9511)	E.S.Howard **	Specialized steel building materials	H.H. Robertson Co., 2 Gateway Center, Pittsburgh, Pa.15222

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Address & Name of American Parent.
(S) A.S. RUFFEL (Pty) Ltd.	26 Julibert Rd., Benrose, Tvl. P.O. Box 7824, Jhb. (24-6712)	A.S. Ruffel **	Veterinary & nutritional products	Smith, Kline & French Laboratories, 1500 Spring Garden St., Philadelphia, Pa.
(S) SKF Laboratories (Pty) Ltd. Smith, Kline & French.	P.O. Box 38, Isando, Tvl. (39-1831)	B. Wright **	Pharmaceuticals	Smith, Kline & French Laboratories, 1500 Spring Garden St., Philadelphia, Pa.
(S) SCHERAG (Pty) Ltd.	54 Electron Ave. Isando, Tvl. P.O. Box 46, Isando, Tvl. (975-3996 & 975-4696)	P. Reist (Swiss)	Pharmaceutical, cosmetic & photographic products	Schering Corporation U.S.A., Bloomfield, New Jersey.
(S) G.D. SEARLE (Africa)(Pty) Ltd.	105 Quartz St., Hillbrow, P.O. Box 256, Jhb. (724-1651)	J. Tannenbaum **	Ethical pharmaceutical preparations	G.D. Searle & Co., Box 5110, Chicago, Illinois.
(S) SIMPLICITY Patterns (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd.	10 Meikle St., City & Suburban P.O. Box 9172, Jhb. (23-0101)	K.R. Christie (Australian)	Dress patterns.	Simplicity Pattern Co. Inc., 200 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10016.
(S) SINGER South Africa (Pty) Ltd.	New Plaza Centre, 150 Jeppe St., P.O.Box 736, Jhb. (838-6241)	K.G. White ***	Sewing machines & domestic electrical appliances	The Singer Co., 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N.Y.
(B) A.O. SMITH Corp. International Div.	P.O. Box 10487 Jhb. (22-4661)	E.E. du Plessis **	Petroleum product meters	A.O. Smith Corp. International Div., Box 331, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) SOUTH African Cyanamid (Pty) Ltd. (an indirect subsidiary thru Canada)	Avril Malan Bldg Commissioner St. P.O. Box 7552, Jhb.(834-4671)	Bruce Crawford *	Mining, agricultural & veterinary chemicals	American Cyanamid Co., Wayne, New Jersey.
(S) SOUTH African General Electric Co. (Pty) Ltd.	Cnr. Richards & Webber Sts., Selby, P.O. Box 1905, Jhb. (836-4121) <u>Local Branches:</u> Bloemfontein Cape Town Durban, Pretoria Port Elizabeth <u>Manf. Div:</u> Benoni	Swan B. Strom *	Heavy electrical equip., household appliances, machine tools X-ray equip.	L.G.E. Export Div. (Div. of General Electric Co) 159 Madison Ave., New York.
(A) SOUTHERN Cross Steel (Pty) Ltd.	6th Floor, The Corner House, P.O. Box 550, Jhb.(838-5231) & Middelburg, Tvl.	Frank Bath**	Stainless steels in the form of ingots, plates, sheets & bars	Eastern Stainless Steel Corp., Baltimore, Maryland.
(S) SQUIBB Laboratories (Pty) Ltd.	Electron Ave., P.O. Box 48, Isando, Tvl. (39-1631)	R. Neesham ***	Pharmaceuticals	Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 460 Park Ave., New York, N.Y.22
(S) STANDARD Telephone & Cables (S.A.)(Pty) Ltd.	Cnr. Van Dyk & Brakpan Rds., Boksburg East, Tvl. (52-5701)	L. Wildman**	Telecommunications & electronic engineers	International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., New York, N.Y.
(S) STEIN, Hall South Africa (Pty) Ltd.	12 Lower Main Reef Rd., Benrose, Jhb. (24-1141)	Haimi Nathan Singer **	Specialized chemicals	Stein, Hall & Co. Inc., 605 3rd Ave., New York N.Y. 10016

ZAPU publishes a weekly newssheet, *Zimbabwe Review*, in Lusaka and a bimonthly magazine called *Zimbabwe Review* in London.

ZAPU claims to have strong and well-trained freedom forces in the neighborhood of 2,000 active guerrillas. They receive arms and training from the U.S.S.R., Algeria, and to some extent Cuba. This association with communist states is the natural product of the needs of the liberation movement and the fact that the communists are ready to extend assistance while western states are not. The ZAPU office in Lusaka displays propaganda from the U.S.S.R., Cuba, and Eastern Europe. The ubiquitous "Little Red Book" of Chairman Mao is much in evidence as well.

While the Rhodesians have intensified their border patrolling and thus have made incursions of freedom fighters more difficult, some small-scale activity continues to be reported. According to an unsubstantiated article appearing in the *Economist* of May 10, 1969, there is activity in northwest Rhodesia around Karoi, Sinoia, and Banket. ZAPU has an alliance with ANC South Africa and a unified army of national liberation has been established. While guerrilla activity is causing the Rhodesians real problems, it is not likely that the regime is in danger of being overthrown yet. ZAPU fighters are attempting to avoid combat and to establish camps and arms caches inside Rhodesia. They have had some success in gaining recruits within the country—a *Zambia Mail* article of May 30, 1969, carried the account of the trial of several Rhodesian Africans who were charged with accepting military training inside Rhodesia.

b. ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) was formed on August 8, 1963, in Salisbury by dissidents from ZAPU who were dissatisfied with the leadership of Nkomo and who demanded a more radical approach to the struggle for the rights of Africans in Rhodesia. The party was convinced that the constitutional methods of ZAPU could not succeed and so, after an unsuccessful attempt to unseat Nkomo as leader, formed ZANU under the slogan, "Chimurenga," that is, "liberation war." The President of ZANU is Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole; his deputy is Leopold Takawira. The party has its headquarters in Lusaka with branches in Dar es Salaam and other locations. Following the arrest of Sithole, in 1964, the party established in Lusaka the "Dar Re Chimurenga," or "supreme council." In early 1969, Sithole, still in prison, was convicted of involvement in a plot to assassinate Ian Smith and was sentenced to 6 years in prison.

ZANU maintains ties with Communist China and this association is reflected in the outspokenly antiwestern attitude of its representatives here. ZANU publishes a weekly newssheet in Lusaka, the *Zimbabwe News*, and in addition to its offices at the Lusaka Liberation Centre, maintains a publicity office in downtown Lusaka.

ZANU has tribal affiliations within Rhodesia and claims to have an extensive network within the country. The actual number of guerrillas ZANU has in action apparently is only a few hundred, but they are more willing than ZAPU to utilize terror as a weapon and so may be effective beyond their numbers in harassing the white Rhodesians. The June 3, 1969, edition of *Zimbabwe News* claims in the 14 days prior to publication ZANU activists had ambushed six Rhodesian white farmers, shot down an army helicopter, and set fire to the Jameson Hotel in Salisbury. The latter claim is known to be in error.

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) TAMPAX S.A. (Pty) Ltd.	P.O. Box 137, Brakpan, Tvl. (55-7671)	A.F. Drysdale **	Internal sanitary protection	Tampax Inc., 161 East 42nd St., New York, N.Y.
(S) TIMKEN South Africa (Pty) Ltd.	Edinburgh & Van Dyk Rds., Industrial Sites, Benoni, Tvl. P.O. Box 5050, Benoni, Tvl. (52-4511)	Victor E. von Lossberg *	Roller bearings	Timken Roller Bearings Co., Canton, Ohio.
(S) TITAN Industrial Corp. (1952)(Pty) Ltd.	46 Marshall St., P.O. Box 9526, Jhb. (834-7661)	G. Meyer **	Steel traders	Pantheon Industries Inc., 30 East 42nd St. New York, N.Y. 10017.
(S) TOKHEIM South Africa (Pty) Ltd.	Cnr. Amsterdam Ave. & Ruargh St. Park Central, Jhb. (834-5721)	F. Holtung (Norwegian)	Petrol dispensers	Tokheim Corp., Fort Wayne, Indiana.
(B) TRANS World Airlines Inc. (service office)	702 Regent House, Cnr. Von Brandis & Market Sts., Jhb. (23-4028)	David Robertson **	Airline	Trans World Airlines Inc., 605 3rd Ave., New York City, N.Y.
(S) TUCO (Pty) Ltd.	255 Jeppe St., P.O. Box 7779, Jhb. (23-9541)	J.O. Korsten **	Pharmaceuticals	The Upjohn Co., Kalamazoo, Michigan.
(S) UNION Carbide South Africa (Pty) Ltd.	Harmain House, 26 Harrison St. P.O. Box 8194, Jhb. (838-2886)	Logan B. Enlet *	Plastic raw materials, industrial & agric. chemicals, silicones, coating & adhesive resins graphite electrodes, special alloys, industrial gases & radio pharmaceuticals	Union Carbide Corp., 270 Park Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017.

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) UNIROYAL (Pty) Limited	P.O. Box 4945, Jhb. (874-4911)	M.J. Hollman *	Tires & industrial rubber products	Uniroyal Inc., 1230 Ave. of the Americas, New York, N.Y. 10020
(S) UNITED Artists Corp. (S.A.) (Pty) Limited	301 Pritchard Hse., Pritchard St., P.O. Box 7582, Jhb. (22-0581)	Robert Hutchinson (Australian)	Motion picture film distribution	United Artists Corp., 729 7th Ave., New York, N.Y. 10019
(S) VALVOLINE Oil Co. S.A. (Pty) Limited	17 Palmer St., Booysens, P.O. Box 2687, Jhb. (874-3831)	Peter Heinz (Swiss)	Lubricants & rust preventives	Ashland Oil & Refining Co., Ashland, Kentucky
(S) VENDO (South Africa) (Pty) Limited	26 Nicholson St. Denver, P.O. Box 25701, Denver, Tvl. (25-8595)	H. Kloss **	Vending machines	The Vendo Co., 7400 East 12th St., Kansas City, Missouri 64126
(S) WARNER Bros. --Seven Arts (Africa) (Pty) Limited	Pritchard Hse., 83 Pritchard St. P.O. Box 6523, Jhb. (23-2378)	J.P. Sutton *	Motion picture film distribution	Warner Bros. --Seven Arts International Corp., 666 5th Ave., New York, N.Y.
(S) The J.R. WATKINS Co. (Africa) (Pty) Limited	Industry Rd., New Era, Springs P.O. Box 489, Springs, Tvl. (56-8771)	K.S. Amols **	Cosmetics	Watkins Products Inc. Liberty St., Winona, Minnesota.
(S) Gordon WEBSTER & Co. (Pty) Limited	210 Fox St., P.O. Box 7202, Jhb. (22-0147)	S.D. Howarth ***	High tensile socket fasteners, engineering & aerospace industries	Standard Pressed Steel Co., Jenkintown, Pennsylvania

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) WESTERN Knapp Engineering Co. (Div. of McKee of Panama, S.A.)	40 Commissioner St., P.O. Box 7651, Jhb. (838-4801)	W.Riethmeier *	Engineering contractors	Arthur G. McKee, Cleveland, Ohio
(S) WESTINGHOUSE Electric International S.A. (an indirect subsidiary thru Geneva, Switzerland)	Mobil House, 90 Loveday St., P.O. Box 6067, Jhb. (834-4891)	H.F.Chagnot *	Heavy & light electrical equip., commercial air conditioning equipment	Westinghouse Electric Int., 200 Park Ave., New York, N.Y.
(A) WHINNEY, Murray, Ernst & Ernst.	7th Fl., Aegis Bldg., Loveday St., P.O. Box 7983, Jhb. (834-7351)	Robert B. Sinclair ***	Accountants	Ernst & Ernst, Cleveland, Ohio.
(S) WHITEHALL Products S.A. (Pty) Limited	37 Julbert Rd., Benrose Township P.O. Box 7181, Jhb. (24-6101)	Stanley F. Janet **	Pharmaceutical, toilet & household products	American Home Products Corp., 685 3rd Ave., New York, N.Y.
(S) WYETH Laboratories (Pty) Limited	Electron Ave., P.O. Box 42, Isando, Tvl. (975-4651)	Nelson R. Tuck **	Pharmaceuticals	Wyeth International Ltd., Box 8299, Philadelphia, Pa.

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

CAPE TOWN CONSULAR DISTRICT

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) ADDRESSOGRAPH-Multigraph (Pty) Ltd.	4 Loop St., P.O. Box 458, Cape Town (2-6581)	N.D. Holland* (resident in Johannesburg) R.C.Osborne**	Office equip.	Addressograph-multi-graph Corp., 1200 Bab-Bit Rd., Cleveland, Ohio.
(S) ARMOUR-Africa (Pty) Ltd.	112 Long Street, P.O. Box 1461, Cape Town. (2-8314)	D.McKechnie**	Foodstuffs	International Packers Ltd., 401 North Michigan Ave., Chicago, Ill. 60611
(S) AULT & Wiborg Co. of S.A. (Pty) Ltd.The	Bridgewater St., Paarden Eiland, Cape Town. (51-2176)	J. Greenway (Canadian)	Printing ink	Interchemical Corp., 67 West 44th St., New York, N.Y. 10036.
(S) BECKMAN Instruments (Pty) Ltd.	Temple House, 59-61 Buitenkant St., Cape Town. (41-0616)	A.S.T.Swartz **	Scientific & process instrumentation	Beckman Instruments Inc 2500 Harbor Boulevard, Fullerton, California.
(S) BLACK & Decker South Africa (Pty) Ltd.	6th Floor, 99 Hertzog Boulevard, Foreshore, Cape Town. (45-1431)	Wm. Hare **	Portable electric & air tools, wood-working & metal cutting; radial saws	The Black & Decker Manufacturing Co., Towson 4, Maryland.
(A) BURLINGTON Hosiery Mills (S.A.)(Ltd.	P.O. Box 18, Plumstead, C.P. (71-5011)	E.C.Sanders *	Women's hose	Burlington Industries Inc., Greensboro, N.C.
(S) CALTEX Oil (S.A.) Ltd.	Sanlam Centre, Foreshore, Cape Town (41-0981)	R.D.Wrigley, Jr. *	Petroleum	California Texas Oil Corp., 380 Madison Ave. New York, N.Y. 10017
(S) CHAMBERLAIN'S (Pty) Ltd.	6-10 Searle St., Cape Town. (41-1725)	Arnold Steele (New Zealander)	Manufacturing chemists	Warner Lambert Pharmaceutical Co., 201 Tabor Rd., Morris Plains, New Jersey.

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) CHRYSLER South Africa (Pty) Ltd.	P.O.Box 64, Elsie River, C.P. (98-8471) <u>Local Branch:</u> Pretoria	John H. O'Brien *	Automobiles	Chrysler Int., S.A., Geneva, Switzerland (Wholly owned by Chrysler Corp. U.S.A.)
(S) CONNELL Bros. Co. Ltd.	1-5 Loop St., Cape Town. (2-2951)	S.J.Hurst **	Importer/ex- porter	Connell Bros. Co., San Francisco, California
(S) FMC South Africa Limited	5 Auckland St., P.O. Box 109, Paarden Eiland, C.P. (51-2331)	F.W.J.Allen **	Engineering food proces- sing equip.	FMC Corp., P.O. Box 760 San Jose, California 95106.
(S) GABRIEL S.A. (Pty) Ltd.	Plessey House, P.O. Box 23, Plumstead, C.P. (77-6171)	J. Senior***	Automotive shock absor- bers	Maremount Corp., 168 North Michigan Ave., Chicago, Illinois 60601
(A) J. GERBER (Factors) (Pty) Ltd.	P.O. B x 200, Cape Town. (45-1311)	M.H. Goldschmidt **	Financer	J Gerber & Co. Inc., 855 Sixth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10001
(S) GILBARCO South Africa (Pty) Ltd.	Assegai Rd., Parow Industria P.O. Box 37, Tiervlei, C.P. (98-1278) <u>Local Branches:</u> Alrode, Tvl. New Germany, Natal.	J.Chesters ***	Pumps, meters & valves for the petro- leum, chemi- cal & water industries	Gilbert & Barker Manfg Co., Greensboro, North Carolina.
(S) W.R.GRACE Africa (Pty) Limited	P.O. Box 274, Bellville, C.P. (97-1771)	P.M.Botha**	Chemical com- pounds flex- ible packa- ging	W.R. Grace & Co., 7 Hanover Square, New York, N.Y. 10005

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) Richard HUD-NUT (Pty) Limited	6-10 Searle St., Cape Town. (41-1725)	Arnold Steele (New Zealander)	Cosmetics	Warner Lambert Pharmaceutical Co., 201 Tabor Rd., Morris Plains, New Jersey.
(S) KODAK (South Africa)(Pty) Limited	Kodak House, 45 Shortmarket St., P.O. Box 735, Cape Town. (45-1101)	D.R. Fisher **	Photographic equipment	Eastman Kodak Co., 343 State St., Rochester, N.Y. 14650
(S) KORET of California S.A. (Pty) Ltd.	Voortrekker Rd., P.O. Box 1100, Parow East, C.P. (98-5241)	S.R. Back **	Women's outerwear	Koret of California Inc., San Francisco, California.
(S) MOBIL Oil Southern Africa (Pty) Limited	Boston House, 44 Strand St., Cape Town. (2-9951)	W.F. de la H. Beck **	Petroleum	Mobil East Inc., 150 East 42nd St., New York, N.Y. 10017
(S) MONO Containers Africa (Pty) Limited	30 Product St., Maitland, Cape Town.	Norman Matthews**	Paper cups & packaging	Artnell Co., 101 South Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois
(S) PEPSI Cola Bottling Co. (Pty) Limited	372 Main Rd., P.O. Box 15, Observatory, C.P. (55-5571)	G.L. Walsh***	Non-alcoholic beverages	Pepsico International, 500 Park Ave., New York 22, N.Y.
(A) PHOENIX Assurance Co. Limited	42 Burg St., Cape Town, (2-8533)	P.W. Holt ***	Insurance	Continental Insurance Co., 80 Maiden Lane, New York, N.Y.
(S) ROYAL Baking Powder (Pty) Limited	Jan van Riebeeck Dr., P.O.Box 11, Huguenot, CP. (Paarl 2191)	J.R. Arnold *	Food & laundry products	International Standard Brands Inc., 625 Madison Ave., New York N.Y. 10022

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) SCHOLL Manufacturing Co. S.A. (Pty) Limited	P.O. Box 2995, Cape Town (2-1961)	E.F.J. Whittall ***	Foot appliances	The Scholl Manufacturing Co. Inc., 813 West Schiller St., Chicago, Illinois.
(S) SOCONY Southern Africa (Pty) Limited	Boston House, Strand St., P.O. Box 35, Cape Town. (2-9951)	E.M. Baker **	Petroleum products	Mobil Petroleum Co. Inc., 150 East 42nd St., New York, N.Y. 10019
(S) SOUTH African Preserving Co. (Pty) Limited	P.O. Box 4423, Cape Town. (51-6333)	W.H. Nichols ***	Canned food	Del Monte International 215 Fremont St., San Francisco, California 94119
(A) TIDAL Diamonds S.W.A. (Pty) Limited	P.O. Box 35, Oranjemund, South West Africa. (2)	D. Borchers **	Diamond mining	Getty Oil Co., 3810 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California 90005
(S) TIDEWATER Minerals S.W.A. (Pty) Limited	P.O. Box 3000, Windhoek, South West Africa. (3759)	H. Laursen *	Mining	Getty Oil Co., Getty-Union Bank Bldg., 3810 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California 90054
(S) TSUMEB Corp., Limited.	Tsumeb, South West Africa. (Tsumeb 7)	J.P. Ratledge (Canadian)	Copper mining	American Metal Climax Inc., 1270 Ave. of the Americas, New York, N.Y. and Newmont Mining Corp., 300 Park Ave., New York, N.Y.
(S) TUPPERWARE Co., The	63-71 Waterkant St., P.O. Box 3097, Cape Town (45-1721)	J.M. Hawkins **	Plastic ware	Tupperware Home Parties Orlando, Florida.

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) VITREOUS Enamelling Corp. (Pty) Limited	P.O. Box 79, Maitland, C.P. (51-2251)	R.P. Schulte *	Plastic signs architectural panels	Symington Wayne Corp., Salisbury, Maryland
(S) WARNER Pharmaceuticals (Pty) Limited	6-10 Searle St., Cape Town. (41-1725)	Arnold Steel (New Zealander)	Manufacturing chemists	Warner Lambert Pharmaceutical Co., 201 Tabor Rd., Morris Plains, New Jersey.
(S) WAYNE Pump Co. (S.A.)(Pty) Limited, The	P.O. Box 3425, Cape Town. (51-2311)	R.P. Schulte *	Metering pumps, air compressors, garage handling equip.	Symington Wayne Corp., Salisbury, Maryland
(S) WILBUR, Ellis Co. (Pty) Ltd.	1-5 Loop St., P.O. Box 4258, Cape Town. (2-2951)	S.J. Hurst **	Suppliers of engineering & marine equip. yacht & boating requisites, importers & exporters	Wilbur-Ellis Co., 320 California St., San Francisco, California.

DURBAN CONSULAR DISTRICT

(S) AMALGAMATED Packaging Industries Ltd.	1290 South Coast Rd., P.O. Box 954, Durban (81-5111)	W.J. Woodage ***	Packaging products	St. Regis Paper Co., 150 East 42nd St., New York, N.Y. 10017
(S) ANDERSON, Clayton & Hunt (Pty) Limited	120 Crompton St. P.O. Box 116, Pinetown, Natal (7-9451)	K.M. MacKenzie **	Agricultural products	Anderson Clayton & Co., Box 2538, Houston, 1, Texas.

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(A) BARLOW, Weyerhaeuser(Natal) (Pty) Limited	1 Du Toit Viljoen St., Willowtown, P.O. Box 1065, Pietermaritzburg. (2-9793)	D.J.C. O'Reilly **	Packaging products	Weyerhaeuser Co., Tacoma, Washington.
(S) BAYER-Pharma (S.A.)(Pty) Limited	1446 South Coast Road, P.O. Box 74, Moleni, Durban.(81-8221)	H.B. Miller *	Pharmaceuticals	Sterling Drug Inc., 90 Park Ave., New York, N.Y. 10016.
(S) BEECH-Nut Life Savers Limited	Karel Landman St., P.O. Box 127, Dundee, Natal. (394)	Geo. Funston **	Confectionery & chewing gum	Beech-Nut Life Savers Inc., Canajoharie, N.Y.
(S) BUFFALO Paints Limited	437-439 Sydney Rd., P.O. Box 979, Durban. (35-6121)	K. FIRTH **	Paint manufacturers	Celanese Corp., 522 5th Ave., New York, N.Y. 10036, thru Celeuro N.V. Amsterdam, Holland.
(S) CARNATION Co. (Pty) Limited	Eagle Building, Murchie's passage, P.O. Box 1274, Durban. (6-5931)	W.P. Greve**	Milk products	Carnation Co., 5045 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California
(B) COCA-Cola Bottling Co. of Durban	306 Edwin Swales V.C. Drive., P.O. Box 808, Durban.(81-5851)	D.W. Nott ***	Beverages	Coca-Cola Export Corp., 515 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10022.
(S) CORN Products Co. (S.A.) (Pty) Limited	Albany House, Victoria Embankment, P.O. Box 1544, Durban. (6-4767)	W.J.H. Bowden **	Industrial starches, adhesives..	Corn Products Co., 717 5th Ave., New York N.Y. 10022.

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) DIAMOND H. Switches(S.A.) (Pty) Limited	6 Milne St., P.O. Box 2405, Durban.(6-2042)	R.H. Dale **	Switchgear	Oak Electro-netics Corp., Crystal Lake, Illinois
(S) GAMLEN (South Africa)(Pty) Limited	58 South Beach Ave., P.O. Box 660, Durban. (2-5676)	J.A. Vorster **	Marine & Industrial Chemicals	Ritter Pfaudler Corp., 1100 Midtown Tower, Rochester, N.Y.
(S) GENERAL Foods (Pty) Limited	1188 Umbilo Rd., P.O. Box 2823, Durban.(35-6181)	Dr. I.G. Halliday **	Foodstuffs	General Foods Corp., White Plains, N.Y.
(S) LUBRIZOL South Africa (Pty) Limited	901 United Bldg. Smith St., P.O. Box 1582, Durban (2-4762)	R.G. Holliman **	Oil Additives	The Lubrizol Corp., Cleveland, Ohio.
(B) LYKES Lines Agency Inc.	Buckingham Hse., Farewell St., P.O. Box 1337, Durban.(6-7384)	G.B. Smith *	Steamship Agency	Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., New Orleans, La.
(S) MOBIL Refining Co. Southern Africa (Pty) Limited	465 Tara Rd., Wentworth, P.O. Box 956, Durban (87-7711)	F.V. Williams *	Petroleum refiners	Mobil Petroleum Inc., 150 East 42nd St., New York, N.Y. 10017.
(S) MOORE-McCormack Lines (South Africa) (Pty) Limited	46 Point Rd., P.O. Box 1021, Durban.(31-3536)	Capt. C.D. Wells *	Shipping Line	Moore-McCormack Lines Inc., 2 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10004.
(A) PENTA Chemical Industries (Pty) Limited	90 Escrom Rd., P.O. Box 86, New Germany, Natal. (7-5251)	J.E. Schaffer **	Plastic piping & packaging materials	Engelhard Hanovia Inc., Newark, N.J., thru Duroplastic Holdings (Pty) Ltd., Cape Town.

4. *South Africa*²

The study mission was denied unrestricted visa to South Africa, but did visit the three former British Protectorates, Swaziland, Lesotho, and Botswana. Conversations were had with freedom movement representatives in Lusaka and Dar es Salaam.

a. ANC (African National Congress) is based in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, but also has a concentration of leadership in London. The ANC was formed in South Africa in 1912 and is the oldest national liberation movement in Africa. ANC started as an essentially middle-class movement fighting for political rights for nonwhites with the weapons of parliamentary democracy. The party participated in the March 31, 1919, antipass campaign. Its program was to use only nonviolent and legal measures of resistance during this period. During the decade of the 1930's ANC became linked with the South African Communist Party through interlocking memberships since the SACP was almost alone among South African political organizations in encouraging multiracial membership in its ranks. On June 26, 1950, the party joined with South African Communist Party, the South African Indian Congress, and the South African Colored People's Congress in a combined campaign. This joint effort and interracial cooperation became known as the United Front. In 1954 the party, along with the South African Indian Congress, the South African Congress of Democrats, and the South African Colored People's Congress issued the call for a nationwide congress of the people. On June 26, 1955, thousands of delegates representing numerous organizations and movements met at Kliptown, Johannesburg, and adopted the freedom charter. ANC considers the charter to be the basis of its program. ANC was active in the antipass campaign of the late 1950's and during the Sharpeville³ riots of 1960. ANC has been banned in South Africa and many of its leaders, including Nelson Mandela, are in detention on Robben Island.

ANC publishes *Sechaba* in Dar es Salaam and in Lusaka they publish *Spotlight on South Africa* and *Mayibuye*.

ANC has cooperated with ZAPU in operations in Rhodesia and with FRELIMO in Mozambique. It has also been reported that ANC units have operated in South West Africa with SWAPO. ANC claims to have a relatively large force of highly trained fighters and to be well supplied with arms.

The representatives of ANC advised the study mission that the party was following a policy of trying to isolate the South African Government internationally. Internally, the party was trying to organize resistance to the minority regime. The ANC would like to see the United States cut all diplomatic and economic relations with the South African Government.

b. PAC (Pan African Congress) is based in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and was organized in 1959 by dissident members of the ANC who objected to Communist leadership within the ANC and desired a greater focus on black self-reliance.

The PAC broke away from the African National Congress of South Africa in 1958 over the question of tactics. PAC is a basically radical party which espouses unrestricted terror and violence as necessary

² See app. E1 for further discussion on South Africa.

³ See app. E1 for further discussion on Sharpeville massacre.

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) RHEEM South Africa (Pty) Limited	P.O. Box 141, Isipingo, Natal (9-1705/6/7)	R.G. Close (Australian)	Steel containers	Rheem International Inc., 400 Park Ave., New York, N.Y. 10022.
(S) ROBERTSONS (Pty) Limited	1-35 Creek St., P.O. Box 1956, Durban. (6-0361)	W.J.H. Bowden **	Food products etc.	Corn Products Co., 717 5th Ave., New York, N.Y. 10022.
(S) STERLING Drug (S.A.)(Pty) Limited	1446 South Coast Rd., P.O. Box 74 Mobezi, Durban (81-8221)	H.B. Miller *	Pharmaceuticals	Sterling Drug Inc., 90 Park Ave., New York, N.Y. 10016.
(S) TRITON Chemicals (Pty) Limited	125 Shepstone Rd. P.O. Box 78, New Germany, Natal. (7-5165)	W.G. Clark**	Industrial & agricultural chemicals	Rohm Haas Co., Independence Mall West, Philadelphia, Pa.
(S) WINTHROP Laboratories (S.A.) (Pty) Limited	1446 South Coast Rd., P.O. Box 74 Mobezi, Durban (81-8221)	H.B. Miller *	Ethical drugs	Sterling Drug Inc., 90 Park Ave., New York, N.Y. 10016.

PORT ELIZABETH CONSULAR DISTRICT

(S) BERKSHIRE International (S.A.) Ltd.	Woodbrook Industrial Township, Westbank, P.O. Box 788, East London, C.P. (5577)	P.G. Chapman **	Ladies Hose, briefs & knitted outerwear	Berkshire International Corp., Reading, Pa.
(S) BORG-Warner South Africa (Pty) Limited	P.O. Box 388, Uitenhage, C.P.	Col. E.W. Haefner *	Automotive rear axle assemblies	Borg-Warner Corp., 200 South Michigan Ave., Chicago, Illinois, 60604

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) FIRESTONE South Africa (Pty) Limited	Kempston & Harrower Rds., North End, Port Elizabeth. (4-2311)	C.E. Ennett *	Tires, tubes, tire repair materials & hard rubber battery cases	Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., Akron, Ohio
(S) FORD Motor Co. of S.A. (Pty) Limited	Henry Ford Rd., Neave Township, P.O. Box 788, Port Elizabeth (4-8261)	Ronald J. Scott *	Automobiles, trucks, tractors & industrial engines	Ford Motor Co., Dearborn, Michigan
(S) GENERAL Motors Acceptance Corp., Ltd.	Kempston Rd., Port Elizabeth (4-8211)	Joel T. Dobbins *	Credit Corp.	G.M.A.C., 1775 Broadway, New York, N.Y.
(S) GENERAL Motors (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd.	Kempston Rd., P.O. B x 1137, Port Elizabeth (4-8211)	W.G. Slocum, Jr. *	Automobiles	GM Overseas Operations, 1775 Broadway, New York N.Y.
(S) GOODYEAR Tyre & Rubber Co., (S.A.) (Pty) Limited	17 Grahamstown Rd., P.O. Box 3062, Port Elizabeth. (4-4161)	John E. Purcell *	Automobile, truck, tractor tires & tubes, retread & repair materials, conveyor, transmission, Vee belts, hose & misc. industrial rubber products	Goodyear International Corp., 1144 East Market St., Akron, Ohio 44316
(S) JOHNSON & JOHNSON (Pty) Limited	Rattray Rd., Dawn, P.O. Box 727, East London, C.P. (8-7541)	P.J. Quinn *	Surgical gauze & adhesive products, baby products, tooth brushes, pharmaceutical & veterinary products	Johnson & Johnson, 501 George St., New Brunswick, N.J.

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Local Establishment	Address and Telephone No.	Chief Executive	Product Category	Name & Address of American Parent
(S) PHILLIPS Carbon Black Co. (Pty) Limited	P.O. Box 862, Port Elizabeth (4-5465)	T. Van der Zeyde **	Chemicals	Phillips Petroleum Co. Bartlesville, Oklahoma
(S) REXALL Drug Co. S.A. (Pty) Limited	324 Kempston Rd., P.O. Box 4011, Port Elizabeth (4-5991)	J.A. Mellon **	Manufacturers of pharmaceuticals & toiletries	Rexall Drug & Chemical Co., 8480 Beverley Boulevard, Los Angeles California
(S) ROCKWELL (South Africa) (Pty) Limited	59 Kempston Rd., P.O. Box 80, Port Elizabeth (4-5378/9)	Valdor V. Thole **	Portable electric & air power tools & stationary power tools	Rockwell Manufacturing Co., 400 W. Lexington Ave., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
(S) THOMPSON Ramco S.A. (Pty) Limited	P.O. Box 480, Uitenhage, C.P. (2-4219)	William D. Angst *	Automotive components manufacture	TRW Inc., 23555 Euclid Ave., Cleveland, Ohio
(S) VALENITE-Modco (Pty) Limited	P.O. Box 1899, Port Elizabeth (2-2744)	L.E. Shacklady ***	Tungsten Carbide & special purpose engineering tooling	The Valeron Corp., 2800 West Eleven Mile Rd., Berkley, Michigan
(S) WORLDTRONIC	514 Capital Buildings, Main St., Port Elizabeth. (4-4239)	C.W. Forbes **	Electronic control gear	Worldtronic Inc., Clare, Michigan

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

FIRMS OWNED BY AMERICANSJOHANNESBURG CONSULAR DISTRICT

Name of Firm	Address & Phone No.	American Owner or Chief Executive	Product Category
ABELMAN Agencies (Pty) Limited	34 Quebec House, Smal St., Jhb. (22-2772)	N.I. Abelman *	Manufacturers representatives
AMRHO International (service office)	Ferreira House, Cnr. Commissioner & Ferreira Sts., Jhb. (838-7591)	S. Feldman *	Railroad, refrigeration earthmoving & highway construction equipment
BALKIND'S Agencies (Pty) Limited	146 Market St., Jhb. (22-6711)	M. Balkind * G. Balkind * Co-Directors	Exclusive giftware
Charles BEDAUX & Associates	P.O. Box 6478, Jhb. (834-6961)	Charles E. Bedaux *	Management consultants
FORSYTH Udwin (Pty) Limited	42 Stanhope Rd., Malvern East, P.O. Box 165, Cleveland, Tvl. (25-7991)	William A. Miller *	Kirsch drapery, hardware, modernfold & bi-fold doors, Kirsch aluminum louvre windows & Forwin aluminum windows, Forwin cubicle track & general engineering
MONARCH Cinnabar (Pty) Limited	602 Southern Life Building, P.O. Box 8316, Jhb. (834-8645)	J.W. Oltman *	Mining

CAPE TOWN CONSULAR DISTRICT

Tedd McKUNE Investment Co. (Pty) Limited	12 Medburn Rd., Camps Bay, Cape Town. (39-9812)	Robert (Tedd) McKune *	Investment company
MERICAN Enterprises (Pty) Ltd.	135 Voortrekker Rd., Goodwood, C.P. (98-1031)	T. Wykoff *	Putt-putt Golf courses

AMERICAN FIRMS, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES - SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Firm	Address & Phone No.	American Owner or Chief Executive	Product Category
Robert PAGE & Associates	P.O. Box 1215, Cape Town, (201)	R. Page *	Agent
PREMIX Asphalt Co.	P.O. Box 2, Paarden Eiland, Cape Town. (51-4018)	H. Oglesby *	Ready mixed road asphalts
UNIVERSAL Mineral Discoveries (Pty) Limited	12 Medburn Rd., Camps Bay, C.P. (39-9812)	Robert (Tedd) McKune *	Geological surveys

DURBAN CONSULAR DISTRICT

MILLBURG Industrial Painters (Pty) Limited	110 Van Riebeeck House, 456 Smith St., Durban (31-2447)	R.E. Miller *	Painting contractors
PERTH Products (Pty) Limited	110 Van Riebeeck House, 456 Smith St., Durban (31-2337)	R.E. Miller *	Food dealers
P.M. Products (Pty) Limited	110 Van Riebeeck House, 456 Smith St., Durban (31-2337)	R.E. Miller *	Representatives

2. ANGOLA

Cabinda Gulf Oil Co., Caixa Postal 2950, Luanda. Produces and prospects for oil in the Cabinda enclave. Subsidiary of Gulf Oil Corp., Post Office Box 1166, Pittsburgh 30.

Manufatura Angolana de Borracha (MABOR), Luanda. Caixa Postal 3486. Subsidiary of Manufatura Nacional de Borracha, S.A.R.L. (MABOR), Oporto, Portugal in which the General Tire & Rubber Co. of Akron, Ohio, reportedly holds substantial portions of capital stock. The firm has the exclusive right to manufacture tires and inner tubes in Angola.

Mobiloil Portuguesa, Caixa Postal 330, Luanda. Largest distributor of fuels and lubricants in Angola. Head office in Lisbon. Subsidiary of Mobil Overseas Oil Co., Inc., 150 East 42d Street, New York 17, N. Y.

Texaco Africa, Ltd., Caixa Postal 1279, Luanda. Large firm distributing fuels and lubricants. American address of the firm is 135 East 42d Street, New York, N. Y. 10017.

Other. U.S. interests are involved in DIA MANG, the diamond mining company to the extent of several million dollars. Texaco is beginning to invest in oil prospecting off the mouth of the Congo River.

3. MOZAMBIQUE

Caltex Oil (S.A.), Ltd., Post Office Box 712, Lourenco Marques. A subsidiary of the California Texas Oil Co., Ltd., New York, N. Y. It distributes petroleum products in Mozambique and neighboring territories serviced through the ports of Lourenco Marques and Beira.

Laboratórios Pfizer de Mocambique, Lda., Post Office Box 1925, Lourenco Marques. A subsidiary of Pfizer Corp., New York, N. Y. It distributes pharmaceutical products.

Mozambique Gulf Oil Co., Post Office Box 1242, Lourenco Marques. A subsidiary of the Gulf Oil Co., Post Office Box 1166, Pittsburgh, Pa. It is engaged, under a Government concession, in prospecting for oil in Mozambique.

Mozambique Pan American Oil Co., Post Office Box 1242, Lourenco Marques. A subsidiary of Pan American International Oil Corp., New York, N. Y. In equal partnership with Mozambique Gulf Oil Co.

Sunray, Clark, and Skelly Consortium, Lourenco Marques. Prospecting for oil in a concession in southern Mozambique.

Hunt Oil Co., Lourenco Marques. Prospecting for oil in a concession in central Mozambique.

Mobil Oil Southern Africa (Pty), Ltd., Post Office Box 207, Lourenco Marques. A subsidiary of the Socony Mobil Oil Co., Inc., New York, N. Y. It distributes petroleum products in Mozambique and neighboring territories serviced through the Ports of Lourenco Marques and Beira.

Singer Sewing Machine Co., Post Office Box 1629, Lourenco Marques. A subsidiary of the Singer Co., New Jersey. It distributes sewing, household and office machines in Mozambique. Branches in Beira and Nampula.

4. RHODESIA, PRIOR TO 1965

Southern Rhodesian firm	U.S. associate company	Business conducted in southern Rhodesia
African & Overseas Co. (Pvt.) Ltd., Box 2533, Salisbury.	I. R. Lind (resident Salisbury) ¹	Tobacco exporter.
African Consolidated Films (Pvt.) Ltd., Box 855, Salisbury.	Twentieth Century Fox, Inc., New York.	Motion picture showing and distribution.
American Foreign Insurance Association, Box 2592, Salisbury.	American Foreign Insurance Association, New York.	Insurance.
Amrho International, Box 1658, Bulawayo.....	Sidney Feldman (resident Bulawayo). ¹	Manufacturer's representative.
Baker Perkins S.A. (Pty.) Ltd., Box 507, Salisbury...	Baker Perkins, Inc., Saginaw, Mich.	Distribution of industrial machinery.
Bardahl Lubricants CA (Pvt.) Ltd., Box 8299, Causeway, Salisbury.	Bardahl Intl. Oil Corp., Seattle, Wash.	Distributor of petroleum products.
Berzack Bros. Ltd., 16 14th Ave., Bulawayo.....	Union Special Machine Co., Chicago, Ill.	Distribution of industrial sewing machines.
Bikita Minerals (Pvt.) Ltd., P/Bag 9128, Fort Victoria..	American Metal Climax, Inc., New York; American Potash & Chemical Corp., Los Angeles, Calif.	Lithium mining.
Bourne & Co. Ltd., Box 1933, Salisbury.....	Bourne & Co. Ltd., Elizabeth, N.J.	Distribution of Singer sewing machines.
Burroughs Machines Ltd., Box 2316, Salisbury.....	Burroughs Corp., Detroit 32, Mich.	Distributors of accounting machines.
Caltex (Africa) Ltd., Box 372, Salisbury.....	California Texas Oil Co., New York.	Distributor of petroleum products.
Carborundum-Universal SA (Pty) Ltd., Box 3307, Salisbury.	Carborundum Co., Niagara Falls, N.Y.	Manufacturers of coated and bonded abrasives; diamond wheel and refractory.
Central African Pfizer (Pvt.) Ltd., Box 3295, Salisbury.	Pfizer International Ltd., New York.	Chemicals.
China American Tobacco Co. of Rhodesia (Pvt.) Ltd., Box 3417, Salisbury.	China American Tobacco Co., Rocky Mount, N.C.	Tobacco exporter.
Chinchilla Headquarters of Rhodesia (Pvt.) Ltd., Kent House, Queensway, Salisbury.	International Chinchilla Headquarters, Inc., Redwood City, Calif.	Distribution and sales agency for imported chinchillas.
Continental Ore Africa (Pvt.) Ltd., Pearl Assurance House, Salisbury.	Continental Ore Corp., New York 16, N.Y.	Metal and mineral brokers.
Richard Daggitt Agencies, Box 3199, Salisbury.....	Richard Daggitt (resident Salisbury). ¹	Bulk commodity broker.
Dibrell Brothers of Africa (Pvt.) Ltd., Box 960, Salisbury.	Dibrell Brothers, Inc., Danville, Va.	Tobacco exporter.
Eimco (SR) (Pvt.) Ltd., Box 1875, Bulawayo.....	Eimco Corp., Salt Lake City, Utah.	Distribution of mining and industrial machinery.
Elephant Trading Co., Box 283, Bulawayo.....	Affiliated Exporters, Inc., New York.	Clothing manufacturers.
Falls City Tobacco Co. of Africa (Pvt.) Ltd., Box 3221, Salisbury.	Falls City Tobacco Co., Louisville, Ky.	Tobacco exporter.
Gardner-Denver Co. (Africa) (Pty.) Ltd., Box 100, Southerton.	Gardner-Denver Co., Quincy, Ill.	Distributors of mining equipment.
Goodyear Tyre & Rubber Co. (SA) (Pty.) Ltd., Box 1354, Salisbury.	Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., Akron, Ohio.	Manufacturers and distributors of tires, tubes, etc.
Grant Advertising (Pty.) Ltd., Box 1485, Salisbury...	Grant Advertising, Inc., New York.	Advertising consultant.
Ingersoll-Rand Co. SA (Pty.) Ltd., Box 2484, Bulawayo.	Ingersoll-Rand Ltd., New York 6, N.Y.	Distribution of mining machinery.
IBM Central Africa (Pvt.) Ltd., Box 3891, Salisbury..	IBM World Trade Corp., New York.	Distributors of business machines.
Insurance Co. of North America, Box 2693, Salisbury..	Insurance Co. of North America, Philadelphia, Pa.	Insurance.
Jeffrey-Galion (Rhodesia) (Pvt.) Ltd., Box 2342, Salisbury.	The Jeffrey Co., Columbus, Ohio.	Distribution of roadmaking and mining machinery, etc.
Kodak (C.A.) Ltd., Box 2170, Salisbury.....	Eastman Kodak Co. of America, Rochester, N.Y.	Distribution of photographic equipment.
Merchant Bank of Central Africa Ltd., Box 3200, Salisbury.	Dillon Read & Co., New York...	Banking.
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. (S.A.) (Pty.) Ltd., Box 742, Salisbury.	Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co., St. Paul, Minn.	Double-coated tissue tapes, PVC, cellulose and masking tapes.
Mobil Oil S.R. (Pvt.) Ltd., Box 791, Salisbury.....	Socony-Mobile, Inc., New York...	Distributor of petroleum products.
National Cash Register Co. (C.A.) (Pvt.) Ltd., Box 979, Salisbury.	National Cash Register Co., Dayton, Ohio.	Distribution of business machines.
Polythene Piping (Pvt.) Ltd., Box 2235, Salisbury...	L. R. Hautz (resident Salisbury). ¹	Manufactures plastic irrigation equipment.
Rhodesian Cambrai Mines (Pvt.) Ltd., Box 155, Gwelo.	Metallurg Inc., New York, N.Y....	Chrome mining.
Rhodesian Christian Press (Pvt.) Ltd., Box 2146, Bulawayo.	Rev. R. H. Mann, Everete, Pa...	Printing and stationery.
Rhodesian Chrome Mines Ltd., Box 123, Selukwe..	Union Carbide Corp., New York, N.Y.	Chrome mining.
Rhodesian Leaf Tobacco Co. (1953) Ltd., Box 1379, Salisbury.	Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., Inc., Richmond, Va.	Tobacco exporter.
Rhodesian Selection Trust Ltd., Box 1479, Salisbury. ²	American Metal Climax, Inc., New York, N.Y.	Copper mining, smelting, and refining.

Southern Rhodesian firm	U.S. associate company	Business conducted in southern Rhodesia
Rhodesian Vanadium Corp., Eagle Star House, Gordon Ave., Salisbury.	Vanadium Corp. of America, New York, N.Y.	Chrome and manganese mining.
Roan Antelope Copper Mines Ltd., Box 1479, Salisbury.	American Metal Climax, Inc., New York, N.Y.	Copper mining, smelting and refining.
Robins Conveyors (S.A.) (Pty.) Ltd., Box 2412, Bulawayo.	Hewitt-Robins, Inc., Stamford, Conn.	Distribution of material-handling equipment.
Salisbury Motel & Service Station, Box 3500, Salisbury.	L. R. Hautz (resident Salisbury). ¹	Owns motel and service station.
Salisbury Snake Park, Box 3489, Salisbury	L. R. Hautz (resident Salisbury)	Owns snake park.
Socony Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd., Box 357, Salisbury.	Socony-Mobil, Inc., New York	Distribution of bitumens, asphalt, waxes and solvents.
Standard Telephones & Cables Ltd., Box 2120, Salisbury.	International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., New York.	Distribution of telecommunication equipment.
J. Walter Thompson Rhodesia (Pvt.) Ltd., Box 3702, Salisbury.	J. Walter Thompson Co., New York.	Advertising consultants.
Tobacco Export Corp. of Africa (Pvt.) Ltd., Box 3049, Salisbury.	Dibrell Brothers, Inc., Danville, Va.	Tobacco exporter.
Williard Africa (Pty) Ltd., Box ST. 192, Southerton	Electric Storage Battery Co. of America, Philadelphia, Pa.	Manufactures auto batteries.
American products manufactured under license in southern Rhodesia: ²		
Central African Bottling Co. (Pvt.) Ltd, Box 2424, Salisbury.	The Pepsi-Cola Co., Long Island City, N.Y.	Bottling and distribution of soft drinks.
Chesebrough-Ponds International Ltd., Box 2899, Salisbury.	Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc., New York.	Manufacturers and distributors of toiletries.
Salisbury Bottling Co. (Pvt.) Ltd., Hatfield Road, Salisbury.	The Coca-Cola Co., New York	Bottling and distribution of soft drinks.
Scripto of Rhodesia (Pvt.) Ltd., Box 2185, Salisbury.	Scripto, Inc., Atlanta, Ga	Manufacturers and distributors of pens.
Sterling Drug International Ltd., Box 1726, Salisbury.	Sterling Drug, Inc, New York	Manufacturers and distributors of pharmaceutical products.

¹ American citizen with personal investment, no parent company in United States.

² For details of subsidiary companies special inquiries should be made of the Consulate General.

³ An incomplete list from unofficial sources.

Source: Trade List of Business Firms in Southern Rhodesia, prepared by American Consulate General, Salisbury, on Feb. 13, 1964.

APPENDIX G
Regional Summary of Aid Programs for Fiscal Year 1970
ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS

FY 1970 PROGRAM				
(Thousands of Dollars)				
Country	Type of Assistance			
	Total	Alliance for Progress		Supporting Assistance
		Development Loans	Technical Assistance	
LATIN AMERICA				
TOTAL	\$605,465	\$482,665	\$121,000	\$1,800
Contributions to Inter-American Organizations.	15,100	--	15,100	--
Regional Programs	49,606	25,000	24,606	--
Argentina	400	--	400	--
Bolivia	15,300	11,400	3,900	--
Brazil	187,000	174,000	13,000	--
CENTRAL AMERICAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY:				
Regional Office of Central America and Panama (ROCAP)	13,716	10,000	3,716	--
Costa Rica	5,015	3,500	1,515	--
El Salvador	10,474	8,000	2,474	--
Guatemala	18,100	15,000	3,100	--
Honduras	9,450	7,000	2,450	--
Nicaragua	6,693	5,000	1,693	--
Chile	77,633	75,000	2,633	--
Colombia	94,721	91,000	3,721	--
Dominican Republic	21,267	16,000	4,967	300
Ecuador	8,328	5,200	3,128	--
Guyana	7,700	6,400	1,300	--
Haiti	1,500	--	--	1,500
Jamaica	535	--	535	--
Panama	16,625	13,000	3,625	--
Paraguay	6,350	4,000	2,350	--
Peru	3,500	--	3,500	--
Uruguay	9,200	7,000	2,200	--
Venezuela	887	--	887	--
East Caribbean Regional Programs	6,100	6,000	100	--
Program Support, Inter-regional Activities, Research & Sec.211(d)	20,265	165	20,100	--

AFRICA

FY 1970 PROGRAM (Thousands of Dollars)				
Country	Type of Assistance			
	Total	Development Loans	Technical Assistance	Supporting Assistance
AFRICA				
TOTAL	\$186,300	\$92,200	\$73,500	\$20,600
REGIONAL & MULTIDONOR PROG.	(69,563)	(35,700)	(33,263)	(600)
Africa Regional	62,493	33,700	28,193	600
(East Africa Regional)	(7,070)	(2,000)	(5,070)	—
DEVELOP. EMPHASIS COUNTRIES				
East Africa	(14,712)	(3,500)	(11,212)	—
East Africa Regional	7,070	2,000	5,070	—
Kenya	2,405	500	1,905	—
Tanzania	3,072	1,000	2,072	—
Uganda	2,165	—	2,165	—
Ghana	17,535	15,000	2,535	—
Tunisia	11,015	9,000	2,015	—
Ethiopia	10,900	6,000	4,900	—
Liberia	5,254	500	4,754	—
Morocco	14,716	13,000	1,716	—
Nigeria/Economic Development Program	23,750	2,500	11,250	10,000
Nigeria/International Relief Effort	10,000	—	—	10,000
Congo (Kinshasa)	10,975	9,000	1,975	—
OTHER BILATERAL AID COUNTRIES:				
Senegal	225	—	225	—
Somali Republic	2,375	—	2,375	—
SPECIAL DEVELOP. AUTHORITY^{a/}	600	—	600	—
SELF-HELP FUND PROJECTS^{b/}	1,750	—	1,750	—

a/ Special development authority up to \$50,000 for bilateral country programs.

b/ Self-Help funds ranging from \$50,000 to \$100,000 for Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Dahomey, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Malagasy Republic, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Togo, Upper Volta, and Zambia.

to the liberation of South Africa. PAC is considered to be strongly racialist and antiwhite as opposed to ANC which has colored and Indian membership. PAC was banned in 1960 by the South African Government and now operates its main office in Dar es Salaam with a splinter group which claims to be the legitimate PAC operating out of Kinshasa. PAC enjoyed marked original success and during the antipass campaign claimed a membership of 100,000, but it declined after the arrest of the key leaders. While the party president, Robert Sobukwe, has been released from imprisonment, he is restricted to the city of Kimberley in South Africa, and those leaders outside the country seem to be unable to resolve their internal conflicts. The party was expelled from Zambia in the summer of 1968 following the arrest of Tsepo Letlaka and some other leaders by their own soldiers near Livingstone. The present "official" head of the party is a former Johannesburg USIS employee, Potlako Leballo. He was recognized as the legitimate leader of PAC by the African Liberation Committee of the OAU in their conference in Dar es Salaam. Leballo is oriented towards Peking and receives support from that source. The old objection to relations with the Communists seems to have been dropped.

c. UNITY (Unity Movement of South Africa). The Unity movement is a federal body, historically of Trotskyist leanings, made up of numerous small professional, civic, political, and workers' organizations of South Africa. The core of this minor movement is in three organizations, the All African Convention, the Society of Young Africa, and the African Peoples Democratic Union of Southern Africa.

The Unity Movement was founded in South Africa in 1943 for the purpose of bringing peaceful pressure to bear on the Government of South Africa to grant the economic, political, and social demands of its various member organizations. The movement is not militant and does not participate in the armed struggle to free South Africa but its members do not reject violence as a possible tactic. Their analysis is that South African society is extremely complex and diversified, having essential differences among its people in race, tribe, education, culture, and occupation. They argue that an association of various specific organizations is necessary to organize and educate all the disparate people in South Africa to prepare them for the unspecified date when armed struggle can be undertaken. They criticize ANC, PAC and similar movements for attempting the impossible task of crowding all the varied elements in South Africa under a single party and for launching the independence struggle before the masses have been prepared. The Unity Movement claims to be financed by voluntary donations from members in South Africa and welcomes all groups who wish to associate with it. It has no declared ideology but seeks to create a democratic society, preferably by peaceful means. The headquarters of the Unity Movement is in Lusaka.

5. *South-West Africa (Namibia)* ⁴

a. SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organization). The freedom movement for independence in South-West Africa can be traced to the formation of the Ovamboland Peoples Organization in 1959. The organization was formed to win economic equality for South-West African workers and to resist the incorporation of South-West Africa

⁴ See app. E2 for further discussion on Namibia.

EAST ASIA

FY 1970 PROGRAM (Thousands of Dollars)				
COUNTRY	Type of Assistance			
	Total	Develop- ment Loans	Technical Assistance	Supporting Assistance
<u>EAST ASIA</u>				
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>\$233,885</u>	<u>\$90,000</u>	<u>\$54,625</u>	<u>\$89,260</u>
Indonesia	66,500	60,000	6,500	--
Korea	49,800	30,000	4,800	15,000
Loas.	48,160	--	11,900	36,260
Philippines	6,675	--	6,675	--
Thailand.	45,000	--	10,000	35,000
Regional Programs . . .	17,750	--	14,750	3,000

NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

FY 1970 PROGRAM				
(Thousands of Dollars)				
Country	Type of Assistance			
	Total	Develop- ment Loans	Technical Assistance	Supporting Assistance
<u>NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA</u>				
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>\$624,745</u>	<u>\$581,000</u>	<u>\$43,745</u>	<u>--</u>
Afghanistan	7,800	1,000	6,800	--
Ceylon	5,000	5,000	--	--
India	399,500	385,000	14,500	--
Jordan	1,600	--	1,600	--
Nepal	2,565	--	2,565	--
Pakistan	148,700	140,000	8,700	--
Turkey	54,235	50,000	4,235	--
CENTO ^{a/}	350	--	350	--
Regional Programs . . .	4,995	--	4,995	--

^{a/}Central Treaty Organization.

into South Africa. In 1966 after the International Court of Justice declined to give a substantive ruling on the challenge to South Africa's administration of South-West Africa, the liberation movement, which had now adopted the name of SWAPO, declared an armed struggle. The first fighting took place on August 26, 1966, at Bulumbashe near the Kunene River and subsequently SWAPO guerrillas infiltrated into the northern area of South-West Africa through the Caprivi Strip. The Government of South Africa banned SWAPO after the fighting began, and the party now operates out of a headquarters in Dar es Salaam.

SWAPO has a number of significant advantages not enjoyed by other liberation movements. First they have the strongest legal case of any of the nationalist groups in that "Namibia" is held illegally by South Africa in violation of the General Assembly Resolution revoking the South African mandate there. The South African refusal to permit the United Nations Council on Namibia to administer the country fully eliminated whatever legal basis the South African Government had to its continued administration of South-West Africa. The South African determination to set up an Ovamboland Bantustan and to incorporate Namibia gradually as the fifth province of South Africa has galvanized world opinion against the Pretoria regime's policies.

The trials in South Africa of South-West Africans for a variety of political crimes, particularly under the South African Terrorism Act, has outraged public opinion and won international sympathy for the nationalist cause. SWAPO also enjoys a leading position within Namibia. Ovambo people constitute some 46 percent of the population and since SWAPO is essentially an Ovambo movement, this frees them from the competition of other nationalist groups which is such an important obstacle to the independence movements in the rest of southern Africa. SWAPO claims support particularly in the Ovambo north and among the workers but also claim some support from the Hereros and Damaras.

SWAPO has its main office in Dar es Salaam, with branches in Cairo, Algiers, London, New York, Helsinki, Stockholm, and Lusaka.

SWAPO has cooperated with UNITA in joint guerrilla raids into Angola and also has accepted some support from ANC South Africa in operations through the Caprivi Strip but is apparently not linked to any other nationalist groups by strong alliances. They have several hundred fighters who try to infiltrate into Ovamboland and to establish bases there and gain adherents. The actual military strength of SWAPO is not now great but they seem to be politically astute and well organized. If not now able to effectively challenge the South Africans militarily, they claim to have a strong political base within South-West Africa and hope that as increasingly repressive measures by the "foreign" government of South Africa radicalize the people, SWAPO can gain additional adherents.

COUNTRIES VISITED

A. PORTUGUESE SOUTHERN AFRICA TERRITORIES

On the outward bound journey to southern Africa the study mission had a stopover in Lisbon, Portugal, for briefings by the American Ambassador and his country team as well as local officials including the Portuguese Foreign Minister. The explanation and justification of the Portuguese policy as regards their African territories was generally repeated by the people the study mission met and exchanged views with in Angola and Mozambique.

It is quite evident that the Portuguese are convinced that their policies are correct. They point out that their policies in Africa are different and are not determined by other countries. They are followed because they believe they are in their national interest.

The Foreign Minister pointed out that no policies are free of emotions, and that numerous accusations have been leveled against Portugal. They believe the equality of man means equality of races. This notion was brought to Africa by the Portuguese hundreds of years ago. These beliefs are the backbone of their policy. When asked that since they have been in Africa for over 400 years why haven't they done more, they insist they have done a lot. In Angola and Mozambique it is argued that the population of all races are working together. They believe in the intermingling and do not believe in apartheid. The Portuguese say that they are trying to build a multiracial society, different from South Africa, but they do not believe in interfering in that country's internal affairs.

The study mission was advised that 42 percent of Portugal's military budget goes toward maintaining the war against the freedom movements in their African territories. The total budget is 25 million Escudos of which 10 million is allocated for defense and security. Of this 10 million around 4 million is for overseas military forces. It is obviously of great economic importance for Portugal to maintain control over the Overseas Provinces. Angola and Mozambique purchase 23 percent of Portugal's export and supply 13 percent of her imports.

Portuguese policy their officials state is through education and economic development to prepare men to participate fully. Economic development cannot be as fast as one would like because there is the time factor and the human factor. It boils down to two programs—either political like the British or by a sociological program which is more meaningful and on which one cannot set a timetable. Portugal has refused to make a declaration of intentions. To do so they say means abandoning the sociological and reverting to the political. Once such a declaration has been made they feel that they cannot continue as now.

The Foreign Minister pointed out that after the closing of the Suez Canal the sea lanes around the Cape have never been more important, and the security of southern Africa is crucial and must be kept under the control of the Western powers.

The study mission inquired about U.S. private investment in Portugal. It appears that there are no official statistics on the level of U.S. private investment. However, U.S. sources estimate that in Metropolitan Portugal the U.S. investment is in the neighborhood of \$95 million.

In reference to tourism during 1968, out of a total of 2.5 million visitors to Metropolitan Portugal, 236,897 were from the United States. These U.S. visitors to Portugal spent about \$85 million in the country. During the first 6 months of 1969 the number of visitors from the United States was 125,700, an increase of 30 percent over the same period of 1968.

The agreement between the United States and Portugal for our use of the facilities in the Azores dates from September 1951. This agreement expired in 1962 and since then the United States continues to use the facilities on an ad hoc agreement. Our continued need for these facilities, particularly as an airbase, has been seriously questioned in certain thoughtful quarters. *Newsweek* of August 25, 1969, carried an item stating that Portugal in return for renewing the lease of U.S. military installations in the Azores, will be asking for a weapons-modernization program which would cost \$200 million over the next 5 years. The Portuguese Government subsequently denied this. Currently, U.S. military aid to Portugal, a NATO ally, is \$1,030,000 a year.

1. *Angola*¹

Angola is 14 times as large an area as that of Portugal itself and almost twice the size of Texas. The present population is estimated at 4.9 million blacks, 270,000 whites, and 75,000 mulattoes. In 1952 the colony of Angola became an overseas province of Portugal, and as such it is, under the Portuguese Constitution, an integral part of Portugal. Considerable control over Angolan affairs is exercised by the central Government in Lisbon through the Overseas Ministry.

The Portuguese territories in Africa are among the few remaining European-ruled areas on the continent. Revolts in Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea have increased the pressure and Portuguese rule in Africa has been the subject of study and debate by the Security Council, General Assembly, committees, and specialized agencies of the United Nations.

The independent African states, which joined together in 1963 to form the Organization of African Unity (OAU), have charged the OAU's African Liberation Committee with responsibility to assist nationalist movements in European-ruled territories of southern Africa. The three principal freedom movements opposed to minority rule in Angola are discussed earlier in this report.

In the meantime Angola is enjoying a period of economic prosperity. Coffee makes a major contribution to a favorable commercial balance. The country has an abundant mining wealth, primarily iron and diamonds, as well as oil reserves, all of which are being exploited.

¹ See app. E3 for further discussion of Angola and Mozambique.

There have been no U.S. AID loans in Portuguese Africa. Although the Investment Guaranty Agreement between the United States and Portugal covers the overseas territories, it has not been widely used outside of Metropolitan Portugal. Only one investment guarantee for Portuguese Africa has been approved by the Portuguese Government. This was for a \$310,000 investment by General Tire in the Mabor tire factory in Angola.

The study mission was informed that the development plan for Angola started in 1959 and was not a result of the outbreak of insurrection in 1961. Various measures of reform are aimed at alleviating the social and political conditions of the Africans. Most of the African population is engaged in agricultural activities and many remain entirely in a subsistence economy. The modern sector of the economy is almost entirely in the hands of the white Portuguese. There are more blacks in Government positions here than in Mozambique, but none on any high level. The Government's claim of equal opportunity on nonracial basis is not visible as few blacks have gotten very far up the economic ladder.

2. Mozambique ¹

Mozambique, sometimes called Portuguese East Africa, is governed similar to Angola by Portugal as an overseas province. The total area of the province is about twice the size of California. The present population is estimated at 7 million blacks, 125,000 whites and 75,000 mulattoes and East Indians.

Most people in Mozambique are engaged in subsistence agriculture. There are about 6 million Africans who live on the land. Approximately a half million grow cotton. Another 450,000 are employed in the Republic of South Africa and southern Rhodesia. There most of them work in the mines, being recruited in Mozambique by an official South African agency. Still others find work in Tanzania and Zambia. This employment abroad brings in foreign exchange, and these employment opportunities are an attraction to the workers, but the separation of men from their families for a long period of time gives rise to social problems.

During recent years various measures of reform have been undertaken aimed at alleviating the social and political conditions of the Africans. The Government has pursued several settlement and agricultural projects. The study mission visited the best known and largest, the Limpopo River Valley Colony. This project provides irrigation for approximately 80,000 acres; technical guidance; settlement of Portuguese farmers together with a scattering of selected Africans, has been criticized as overly ambitious and costly. Thirteen small villages have been built on this project; there are churches, schools, first aid centers, and social service centers, and approximately 1,200 Portuguese families and about 500 African families have settled there. The project has thus far cost more than \$35 million. The study mission was able to see only a small part of this project and cannot fully appreciate its present or potential importance in comparison to what appears to be excessive costs.

While Mozambique was for many years relatively free from unrest, expatriate black nationalist groups have in recent years organized in neighboring countries. As related earlier in this report the FRELIMO

in 1962 established headquarters in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Since then FRELIMO has been organizing the movement to take direct action inside Mozambique owing to Portugal's unwillingness to negotiate with it for self-determination and independence of the territory. There is no activity by freedom forces in the southern part of the province.

B. FORMER BRITISH PROTECTORATES

The study mission after visiting the former British Protectorates of Swaziland, Lesotho, and Botswana were of the strong opinion that it would be a constructive move for the United States to raise our representation to the ambassadorial level.

This would demonstrate to the majority-ruled countries of southern Africa our interest in their efforts to become economically independent of the Republic of South Africa, and encourage them in their constructive plans to develop moderate, nonracial societies. It would increase their ability to serve as a bridge between the majority-ruled countries and the White Redoubt.

The study mission is convinced that the three countries desire to have American ambassadors assigned to them, and it would improve our working relations with them. It is understood that the replacement of the three chargés by officers of ambassadorial rank would cost less than \$20,000 for all three in increased salaries per annum. There are few ways in which we can manifest better our genuine interest in and support of these countries for such a modest expenditure.

1. Kingdom of Swaziland

The Swaziland constitution, as agreed to with the British in February 1968, established the present King, Sobhuza II, head of state of the independent kingdom. Swaziland is surrounded by the Transvaal and Natal Provinces of the Republic of South Africa except for the common border with Mozambique. The size of Swaziland is less than that of New Jersey. The population is estimated at 400,000, with Africans comprising about 96 percent.

Owing to its geographic position, Swaziland, like Botswana and Lesotho, has close economic links with South Africa. They are joined together in a common customs union, and have common currency.

This customs union has been in existence for 69 years. There are four essential features to the agreement: (1) The maintenance of a common external tariff, (2) free interchange for manufactured products of South Africa and the three countries of Swaziland, Lesotho, and Botswana, (3) payment by South Africa to the other countries of a share of the total pool of customs revenue, and (4) conformity by the three small countries to the relevant tariff laws of South Africa. The agreement is very much to the benefit of South Africa for it allows South African manufactured goods free entry in the three other countries which have no industry to speak of. A report was called to the attention of the study mission which indicated that in 1967 South Africa's share of the customs and duties was 98.6 percent of the total. Since South Africa imposes tariffs on foreign goods to protect its own developing industry, it works to the disadvantage of the other countries which have to pay more for the product from South Africa than if it were imported from some other country.

Although Swaziland annually sent as many as 30,000 of her labor force to South African mines, industry, and farms, the number has recently been reduced to about 10,000. American investment would be welcome, and it is pointed out that because of the customs union the potential market is not confined to the 400,000 population of Swaziland but includes all of South Africa. Among the difficulties this small country faces is that South Africa has a number of industries on its border that have large incentives which Swaziland cannot match.

On September 22, 1969, Swaziland became a member of the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the International Development Association (IDA).

Swaziland's quota in the Fund is \$6 million; its subscription to the capital stock of the International Bank is 64 shares with a total par value of \$6,400,000; its subscription to the capital stock of IFC is \$35,000; and its subscription to IDA is \$320,000.

Aside from some food for peace for the country the United States assistance consists of Peace Corps volunteers which number 44 at present and who arrived in early 1969. The annual total cost of the Peace Corps in Swaziland is approximately \$334,000.

The sugar industry, based solely on irrigated cane, provides one of Swaziland's major exports. The study mission visited the plantations which cover an area of about 40,000 acres. It is evident that the practical and easy way for the United States to cement its present friendly relations with Swaziland is by increasing the sugar quota that can be exported to the United States. Sugar has been produced in Swaziland since 1958. The total annual production is 170,000 short tons. Until 1964, by intergovernmental agreement, all exports were made through the Sugar Association of the Republic of South Africa, these arrangements were terminated at the end of 1964, and thereafter Swaziland marketed its own sugar.

In 1965 Swaziland was given a quota of 9,300 tons through the administrative action of the U.S. Department of Agriculture but the quota subsequently established by the Sugar Act of 1965 resulted in Swaziland, along with other Eastern Hemisphere nations, having its quota reduced. Its quota is now about 6,600 short tons including the quantity redistributed from the Cuban quota. This reduction adversely affected the foreign exchange generated by the sale of sugar and created a shipping problem due to the difficulty of obtaining a ship small enough to handle a cargo of this size, as the average vessel is designed to carry cargoes of 11,000 tons.

The importance of the export of sugar to the economy of Swaziland cannot be overstated. The sugar industry is the largest single exchange earner and the largest single employer in the country.

Swaziland is a member of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement and sells 55 percent of its production to the United Kingdom at a specific negotiated price. Without this basic foundation the industry cannot exist because the local consumption is small. However, the value of this foundation was very seriously undermined by the devaluation of sterling in 1967, which had the effect of reducing the revenue from sugar sold to the United Kingdom by approximately R1,200,000 per annum. This loss of revenue which arose since the South African rand,

the currency used by Swaziland, was not devalued in line with the devaluation of sterling, was a severe blow to the economy of the sugar industry. Apart from the United States quota referred to above, the remainder of production must be exported to world markets under Swaziland's international sugar quota of about 57,000 short tons. While world sugar prices have increased since the coming into force of the economic provisions of the international sugar agreement, these prices are still not sufficient to provide an economic return for sugar to either growers or millers.

Efforts made since the devaluation of sterling to obtain special assistance from the British Government have not been successful and one of the few ways in which the Swaziland sugar industry can be assisted is by obtaining an increased quota in the United States at prices which are generally substantially above those ruling in the world free market and do provide an economic return to sugar producers.

Regarding employment in the sugar industry, the study mission was informed the total number of persons employed in 1968 was 11,510 or 22.1 percent of the total of 52,130 employees recorded in the whole country. The total employment figure covers 808 firms and Government departments. Assuming that each person employed, has, on average, three dependents, the total number of persons for whom the sugar industry provides a livelihood may be about 46,000 of whom 44,500 are Africans.

2. Kingdom of Lesotho (formerly Basutoland)

Lesotho became independent on October 4, 1966. The country is an enclave slightly larger than the State of Maryland located entirely within the east central part of the Republic of South Africa. The present population is estimated at 1 million of which over 99 percent are Africans, about 1,600 whites and 800 Asians. Over 87 percent of the resident population is engaged in subsistence agriculture. Agricultural production is increasing but so is population which will double by 1988.

Owing to Lesotho's geographic location and heavy economic dependence on South Africa, it is naturally extremely sensitive to political and economic developments in the Republic. While shunning South Africa's racial policy the Government of Lesotho cannot avoid vital ties. The job shortage in Lesotho is so acute that nearly half of the male working population is living in South Africa at any given time. Less than 10 percent of the labor force is able to find employment in Lesotho, and the largest percentage of these are employed by the Government.

The exportation of labor to South Africa represents one of the most important sources for the flow of cash and consumer goods into Lesotho. It would be reasonable to say that nearly 10 percent of the national income is earned by remittances of wages from South Africa.

Since the country has not been adequately surveyed for possible natural resources, such a survey might be undertaken with multilateral assistance and U.S. initiative. It is difficult to believe that, surrounded by the rich resources of South Africa, Lesotho does not have more resources of her own. Great Britain finances more than 50 percent of all annual expenditures of Lesotho. Independence is practically meaningless to a state that is, in fact, almost totally dependent upon other nations for the livelihood of its citizens. This country is faced

with the question of economic survival. Trained manpower is lacking to achieve greater self-sufficiency and economic growth. South Africans occupy technical positions, control all wholesale businesses and most major retail enterprises, as well as a large number being civil servants.

Most of the primary and secondary schools and teacher training colleges in Lesotho are operated by missions of the Evangelical Church and the Roman Catholic Church. Many hospitals and village clinics are also financed by the churches. The Roman Catholic Church operates well over half of the schools while the Government operates less than 1 percent.

The study mission visited the University of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (UBLS) which is located at Roma. Here the chairman gave a short talk and then fielded numerous questions put by the enthusiastic students. These students wanted to know why the United States continues to invest in the Republic of South Africa. They do not draw a line between U.S. Government and American private business. Another frequently asked question was about greater involvement of Afro-Americans in assisting Africans. Here also, the study mission met with a group of Peace Corps volunteers connected with the university. Altogether there are 55 PCV's in the country. The cost of the Peace Corps program in Lesotho amounts to approximately \$404,000 a year.

U.S. assistance to Lesotho during the fiscal year 1968-69 in direct aid, Public Law 480, title II (Catholic Relief Services) amounted to \$771,000, and AID self-help fund was \$75,000. In addition, Lesotho participated as a beneficiary in fiscal year 1969, with Botswana and Swaziland in AID regional aid of \$65,000 for scholarships to the University of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (UBLS). Also, under the regional heading, there were signed in fiscal year 1969: (a) An agreement with UBLS obligating \$368,000 for expenditure over an 18-month period to pay for six professors (two in each of the three countries) for the university; and (b) an agreement obligating \$350,000 for regional educational testing and training center to be located in Botswana and to benefit Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Malawi. The United States at present has no bilateral assistance program. However, an investment guarantee agreement has been negotiated between the two countries.

Lesotho is also receiving a large amount of food aid under the world food program (WFP), a high percentage of which comes from the U.S. contribution to WFP (about 65 percent of the total on a world basis). WFP assistance this year will amount to about \$3.5 million.

What the future will bring is impossible to predict. But a strong and economically independent Lesotho could encourage greater unity and pride among black people in southern Africa.

3. Republic of Botswana (formerly Bechuanaland)

Botswana became an independent sovereign republic within the British Commonwealth on September 30, 1966. The country has never been surveyed completely but has an estimated area about the size of Texas. The estimated total population is 600,000. Aside from approximately 29,000 Bushmen, 5,000 whites, 500 Hottentots, 526 Asians, and some 4,700 mixed, the people are Bantu and are divided into eight main tribal groupings.

Owing to its geographic location Botswana, like Lesotho and Swaziland, has close economic links with South Africa. About 30,000 of the population are employed in the mines in South Africa. Forty-five percent of Botswana's exports are sold to South Africa, to which it is joined together with Lesotho and Swaziland in a customs union; it uses South African currency; and there is close cooperation on various practical matters including transport, agriculture, and health.

Botswana holds a bottom rung on the development ladder. The problems are manifold, colossal, and daunting. Money poor, Botswana balances 55 percent of the fiscal year 1968-69 budget with United Kingdom grants-in-aid.

The lack of colonial investment may give considerable freedom to the present government to deal imaginatively with problems unforeseen 10 years ago.

The lack of government investment in roads, water, and power discourages private investment. On an industrial scale, all three resources are prerequisites to the exploitation of truly significant mineral deposits. There are only 11 miles of paved road; only three towns where electricity is available to new enterprises; and only two towns with an adequate supply of water for present levels of consumption.

An extremely low population density of 2.6 per square mile requires an administrative superstructure costing vastly more, in per capita terms, than that of most countries. The cost of roads, water, supplies, power, security, and administration are unusually high.

The basic economic problem is the shortage of recurrent and development capital. Domestic revenues are able to meet only 45 percent of the recurrent budget and none of the development budget of the country.

The shortage of capital has four important implications. It impedes the exploitation of raw materials. Recent announcements confirm the presence of 30 million tons of high grade copper and nickel in Botswana, and unofficial estimates confirm at least 100 million tons. While these minerals will not likely bring significant revenues to Botswana before 1975, they will precipitate a revolutionary change in the credit position. Each month required to raise infrastructure costs for the mining requirements will delay the return of extraction revenues.

Without large or small industries, there are insufficient jobs for school graduates. Fifty percent of her total male wage earners are employed in the South African mines making labor Botswana's second largest export. The capacity of the country to absorb the restive unemployed is minimal, yet school enrollment, and school graduates, are growing at an explosive rate.

Botswana remains a largely subsistence economy, the average per capita income being an estimated \$70 per year. Over 90 percent of the population are engaged in agriculture. Savings are accumulated in cattle herds, and cattle are traditionally sold only when cash is needed. Such attitudes reduce the savings capacity of the cattle owner, for the meat is not marketed in its prime. However, cattle and cattle products account for 80 percent of total exports. Cash accumulated

in the market economy by traders and European farmers is frequently invested in South Africa where a dynamic economy brings higher returns. The lack of domestic cash savings has an unhappy effect upon agricultural and livestock improvements, upon the ability of farmers to finance new boreholes, upon the ability of individuals to borrow for small business.

Finally, the most obvious implication of Botswana's shortage of capital is the restriction placed upon her ability to address the other major sectors of development: agriculture, education, social services, tourism, and so forth.

The Shashi complex is the one major development scheme at present envisaged capable of making a dramatic impact on the economy. The study mission visited the diamond mine at Letlhakane and the copper/nickel mining at Sedibe/Pikwe. The development of these mines will be accompanied by industrial development at Francistown and Shashi Siding. This is some indication of Botswana's existing potential. Since it does have a common border with Zambia of about 300 yards, the existence of a corridor to the north adds to its value. President Seretse Khama, an impressive and dedicated leader, told the study mission that he hopes to get the funds for the infrastructure from sources other than South Africa. He is hopeful of a 25-year loan from the World Bank.

The AID regional program in southern Africa is not too good for Botswana because of geographic location. They would like to see reconsideration of bilateral aid. However, the Botswana/Zambia transportation survey agreement was signed in June. The survey will determine the economic and technical feasibility of developing an all-weather road link between Botswana and Zambia. There have been Peace Corps volunteers in Botswana since 1967 and at present there are 70 there. The United States has also assisted with 40 self-help projects. The approximate total cost of the Peace Corps program in Botswana amounts to \$490,000 a year.

C. REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA

The Republic of Zambia, formerly Northern Rhodesia, achieved its independence on October 24, 1964. It remains a member of the British Commonwealth. Zambia is about twice the size of Colorado and is a landlocked country completely surrounded by seven bordering countries. The estimated population of the country is about 4 million with the ratio of Africans to whites about 50 to 1. The whites, largely of British or South African origin, are concentrated on the Copper Belt where they are employed in the copper mines.

Zambia is one of the most richly endowed countries of Africa, possessing in its Copper Belt a quarter of the world's exploitable copper reserves. As the world's third largest producer of copper its exports of the metal continues to be favorable in the present strong world copper market. U.S. private investment in Zambia, principally in the copper mines, amounts to over \$350 million.

Zambia supports sincerely the aim of majority rule in southern Africa and has made considerable national sacrifices to sustain this position. Zambia is one of only four states in the Organization of African Unity which has paid its full subscription to the African

Liberation Committee. Zambia has provided office space and telephones at the Liberation Centre and permits liberation organizations to rent Government-owned homes at low rates. In addition to overt material and moral support the Government permits the liberation groups to travel across Zambian territory and to establish staging camps on Zambian soil. Zambia's efforts and expense to host the eastern and central African heads of state conference in April 1969 which brought out the manifesto that is included as appendix B. The leaders of 14 independent African states issued this remarkable manifesto on southern Africa. It rejects black as well as white racism. It calls on the white minority regimes to recognize that all men have equal rights to human dignity and respect and to move toward the gradual emancipation of their black majorities before racial strife becomes inevitable. More recently, the Lusaka session of the U.N. Committee of 24 and Zambian actions in the Security Council are further proof of her commitment to the cause of independence on the continent.

The Zambian Government is headed by a strong President, who is the military Commander in Chief and shares legislative responsibility with the Parliament. In August 1969 the President announced plans which will effectively nationalize Zambia's \$1.2 billion copper mining industry. The mines will be invited to offer the Government 51 percent of their shares. In addition the copper companies will have to pay a new mineral tax of 51 percent on profits while all present royalty and export tax arrangements will cease. He also announced that all mineral rights, many of them held in perpetuity, will revert to the state. Copper mines will be given 25-year leases instead. Two months previously the Government won a referendum giving it power to alter entrenched constitutional clauses by two-thirds majority of Parliament and without recourse to future referendums. The objective is to reorganize the Zambian economy so as to increase the capacity of Zambians to control their own economic destiny.

At this time the Zambian Government and the copper companies are still negotiating the terms of settlement of the nationalization. There is indicated that the Government will reimburse the companies out of a percentage of its share of the profits. The terms that are finally arrived at will obviously have great bearing on future private investment in the country, as well as, the possible nationalization of additional industries.

President Kenneth Kaunda has ambitious economic development plans for his country. These include large-scale improvements to the primitive transportation system away from the line of rail and the upgrading of agriculture to bring Zambian farmers into the cash economy, thus diminishing the present excessive dependence on copper. The President says that foreign capital is welcome. All he asks is that the investors understand they are welcome as participants, and not as controllers, of the economic development process.

In reference to expatriate workers, the President says they are welcome to work in Zambia whatever their industry may be. Zambia is building a nonracial nation under the philosophy of humanism. This philosophy means developing a cooperative spirit, a spirit of respect for one another, a spirit of community-mindedness and an appreciation of the inestimable value of man. Zambians are working for a classless society, and it is their President's hope that expatriate

workers of any color will not hinder these efforts or destroy this hope by trying to isolate themselves or indeed trying to treat themselves as a separate class of human beings committed, as it were, to a different approach to life.

The major foreign aid project is the Zambia-Tanzania Railway. The "Tripartite Agreement" with the Red Chinese was signed on April 28, 1968. The agreement provides for the survey and design stage on a route of 1,042 miles between existing railheads at Kidatu in Tanzania and Katanino in Zambia.

Under the present AID policy for Africa, the shift is to regional and multidonor assistance in AID's nonconcentration countries. The AID plans call for about 10 of the 40 less developed African countries to receive bilateral U.S. aid. Zambia is not one of these because it had large foreign exchange resources derived from copper exports (the Zambian Government receives in the neighborhood of \$200 million per year from copper royalties, export tax on copper and income tax on copper companies), and is not in pressing need of foreign exchange financing for development projects. Because of its favorable financial situation, Zambia has been able to attract considerable loan assistance from other countries and institutions at concessional rates; for example, some \$56 million since independence from the United Kingdom and \$55 million from the International Bank.

1. U.S. AID regional program for southern Africa

The regional AID Office for southern Africa located in Lusaka has been operational for about a year. The principal emphasis of the Office is to develop regional and multidonor programs which would help foster the economic independence and political stability of the southern African region. The Office has also responsibility for insuring the orderly termination of residual bilateral technical assistance projects in Zambia.

The southern Africa region includes Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, and Zambia. This is not nearly the cohesive economic and political grouping that one finds in east Africa. But all five countries in varying degrees have economic ties with the Republic of South Africa and are concerned also in varying degrees that this economic dependence does not contribute to erosion of their political independence. There is, therefore, increasing interest in closing ranks by way of developing regional contacts and associations which would help strengthen the political and economic posture of each.

Some recent initiatives have moved the concept of southern African regional cooperation a step or two forward. They have involved trade missions, exchanges of presidential and ministerial visits, and a possible rapprochement between Malawi and Zambia. There is evidence also that Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland are coordinating their bargaining efforts to obtain a more equitable distribution of income derived from the customs union with the Republic of South Africa.

These signs of greater regional cooperation, although encouraging, are fairly recent events. As far as AID is concerned, they are faced with the formidable task of selling the regional approach and of convincing them the new AID policy had relevance and that it is not a covert way of abandoning southern Africa.

By the end of 1969 fiscal year, funds had been obligated for four new regional projects, which amounted to nearly a million dollars. They began by assisting in the construction of additional facilities for the Francistown Teacher Training College in Botswana. This was a joint effort with Sweden and UNDP with the latter having managerial responsibility. Later in the fiscal year they obtained project approval and funds to provide staff for the regional University of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. They expect the U.S.-supplied staff, due to arrive at their posts in September, to have an important influence on strengthening the regional character of this institution. Funds for the Regional Testing Resources and Training Center were obligated in June. This is a four-country project which is to establish a center in Malawi and a branch in Botswana to develop secondary entrance and aptitude tests more closely aligned with cultural considerations and educational requirements of Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. Staff for the project is expected in September. The Botswana/Zambia transportation survey agreement was also signed in June. The survey will determine the economic and technical feasibility of developing an all-weather road link between Botswana and Zambia. Survey field parties are due the first week of September.

The identifying, planning, and activating economically viable regional and/or multidonor projects is considerably more difficult than mounting bilateral programs. However, regional programs in the planning stage include an agriculture research project to produce drought resistant, high yield varieties of wheat and sorghum as well as grain legumes. A regional technician training project is now a well-advanced proposal. This project will provide a number of specialized short-term agriculture training courses at various centers for in-service personnel from all four of the southern African governments. A multidonor agricultural project centering in Lesotho is also being considered.

In the field of education, study is being given to a proposal to provide a project in programmed learning which will involve all five countries of the region. AID hopes to obtain approval of a project to provide teacher training for southern African institutions to expand the output of qualified local educators. A request for a Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland statistical training project is being reviewed. The project would create country statistical departments able to provide data processing capabilities essential for prudent decisions involving the allocation of scarce human and financial resources. AID has requested approval of a multipurpose feasibility study project with the objective of identifying and developing income producing projects in the public and private sectors. AID-U.S. assistance to the region should contain a careful mix of both income producing and human resource developing projects in order that the former could provide the means of supporting the latter.

Four countries of the region have also indicated interest in a proposed regional road maintenance training project. The field work of a multicountry regional transport survey, middle Africa transport study (MATS), has been completed and the final report expected shortly. MATS is expected to identify priority transport projects which could be assisted through AID and other donors. In addition

to possible loan assistance to Botswana for the NATA-Kazungula Road and a project to upgrade the Gaborone-Lobatsi Road link to South Africa, there is a possibility for a multidonor loan project for Swaziland. Loan proceeds would help equip the GOS Highway Department.

A major obstacle to fuller economic and political independence for countries of the region is the lack of skilled manpower at intermediate professional or technical levels. Thousands of expatriate personnel continue to staff essential operational positions in all five countries. It is ironic that Africans with qualifications for the same positions as expatriates are paid considerably less. Expatriates receive as an incentive for recruitment housing and other emoluments to which indigenous personnel are not entitled. This differential, which in many instances amounts to 50 percent, has created some morale problems. Experience has shown that one way to tackle the problem of additional skilled manpower has been to provide highly specialized training courses in the United States lasting from 9 months to a year. With the termination of bilateral assistance for nonemphasis countries this approach is no longer possible. AID is hopeful that legislation this year will permit a limited amount of this type of training to be resumed.

2. Southern African refugee education project

The African-American Institute is a private, nonprofit organization engaged in the sponsorship and management of a wide variety of educational programs in the States of independent Africa. AID assistance in a 1970 contract amounts to \$1,001,219. More should be encouraged. One of these programs is the southern African refugee education project. To meet the broadest human and education needs of southern African students currently residing in these countries, the institute has established education centers in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and in northern Zambia. The programs offered at these centers represent a major American effort to assist in the long-range educational and human resource development of southern Africa. The study mission met with the regional representative in Lusaka.

The southern African refugee education project had its origins in 1962-63 through the institutes ad hoc response to the acute and immediate needs of southern Africans then living in Dar es Salaam, the capital of Tanzania. Developing from a small, preparatory, education effort conducted in a private residence with young volunteer teachers, the program rapidly expanded, necessitating the construction of the Kurasini International Education Center, which was completed in 1964. Today Kurasini is a modern, well-equipped school meeting the needs of about 200 students through a group of educational programs under the guidance of a highly qualified professional and volunteer staff.

The period 1962-64 witnessed a movement of southern African refugees into the independent African State of Zambia. The African-American Institute's response to this situation was to construct the Nkumbi International College, which received its first students in mid-1966 and is now offering an educational program to 180 African students, with an expected enrollment in October of 255.

Over 75 percent of the students at the centers are southern African refugees. They have come to Tanzania and Zambia from Mozambique,

Angola, Rhodesia, South Africa, and South-West Africa, many traveling distances of over 1,000 miles. There are also students from the host countries studying at the centers. AID is financing the Nkumbi International College at an annual cost of some \$500,000.

Due to the heterogenous educational histories and achievement levels of many of their students, both centers conduct significant secondary preparatory efforts. The unique feature and demand of both Kurasini and Nkumbi, whose continuation will present a major methodological and curricular challenge to all teaching staff, is the desire to shape the nature and length of each academic course to meet the particular needs of each student.

To be understood in the broadest perspectives and developed to the maximum effectiveness, both centers may be viewed as American-managed educational institutions existing within evolving African systems whose origins are clearly British. The African-American Institute believes that both centers can be a window for educators in the host African countries to view different teaching methods and technological developments. Thus, while the primary effort of the institute's work is directed toward the academic education of Southern Africans, the influence and ideas of the schools may add new ingredients to the changing nature of African educational systems.

The teaching staff at both Kurasini and Nkumbi is composed of U.S. hired professional educators, American and Canadian volunteer junior educators, and appropriately hired local staff. To fill the roles of educators at these centers, the institute is seeking individuals with a high sense of human teaching commitment, versatile program development skills, a flair for methodological/technological improvisation, and a strongly developed academic training.

3. Refugee situation in Zambia

The presence of large numbers of refugees represents a continuing serious problem for Zambia. If intensified military activity in southern Africa or political or economic problems in Malawi and the Congo were to set large numbers of people moving for shelter into Zambia, the problem could become critical. Problems of refugees are not uniquely Zambian, of course. The UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees) has estimated that as of October 1968, there were some 850,000 persons on the African Continent who could be classified as refugees. The UNHCR has its office in Geneva. The U.S. contribution to its activities in 1968 was \$600,000 and in 1968 amounted to \$800,000, or about 23 percent of total government contributions. Additional funds come from private individuals and organizations. Zambia is in a particularly exposed position, however, in that with the exception of the former high commission territories, Zambia is the southernmost independent African state and the first place of refuge should fighting intensify to the south.

The program of the High Commissioner for Refugees for 1969, as approved by the Executive Committee, contains the following allocations in respect of the African continent.

The Central African Republic: \$300,000 for the settlement of Sudanese refugees in M'Boki.

Democratic Republic of the Congo: \$876,000, of which \$350,000 is for the settlement of Sudanese refugees, \$270,000 for settling Angolan refugees, and \$225,000 for Zambian refugees.

Morocco: \$35,000 for the local settlement of a group of European refugees.

Senegal: \$100,000 to strengthen health and education services and for individual assistance.

Sudan: \$820,000, of which \$650,000 is for the settlement of refugees from Ethiopia and \$170,000 for Congolese refugees.

Tanzania: \$235,000, of which \$175,000 is for the settlement of refugees from Mozambique, \$32,000 for Rwandese refugees, and \$16,000 for an all-purpose fund for permanent solutions.

United Arab Republic: \$57,000 for assistance and counseling in the UAR for various groups of refugees including Armenians.

Uganda: \$523,000, of which \$94,000 is for the settlement of Rwandese refugees, \$194,000 for Sudanese and Congolese refugees, and \$235,000 for assistance toward education.

Zambia: \$260,000 for the settlement of Angolan refugees and \$6,000 for an open fund for permanent solutions for various groups of refugees.

Refugees in Africa are therefore allocated \$3.2 million out of an overall allocation of \$5.6 million.

Apart from specific allocations, the overall figure includes, a central fund from which to finance solutions through local settlement, promotion of resettlement, voluntary repatriation and legal assistance. Included in this amount are also a reserve of \$370,000 and \$410,000 for the grant-in-aid which UNHCR remits to the U.N. to help meet UNHCR administrative expenses.

The Government of Zambia recently estimated the total number of refugees in Zambia at some 16,500. The figure is almost impossible to prove or refute since it is extremely difficult to agree on the definition of "refugee." The UNHCR estimate is in the range of 12,500 (8,000 Angola, 2,800 Mozambique, 1,300 Namibia, 400 South Africa). This figure includes refugees in the permanent refugee settlement camps administered by the Zambian Christian Refugee Service in conjunction with the Government of Zambia and the UNHCR. The largest of these camps is Mayukwayukwa, which has some 3,000 refugees, predominantly Angolans and South-West Africans. It is located on the Luena River in a remote area of northwestern Barotse Province in the general area of Mankoya. A second camp is located at Lwatembo, some 12 miles south and east of Balovale in northwestern province. The camp now contains some 2,000 refugees, primarily from Angola. The oldest of the refugee camps is Nyimba, which is located some 20 miles from the Mozambique border in the southwestern section of the eastern province. The camp houses some 1,800 refugees, most of whom are from Mozambique.

To meet the needs of the refugees in the camps, the Zambian Christian Refugee Service receives food through the world food program and food and clothing from voluntary welfare agencies through the Lutheran World Federation and other similar bodies. ZCRS estimates that they expend some \$160,000 in direct assistance, exclusive of some \$40,000 spent for ocean freight on the surplus foodstuffs distributed.

Zambia's policy is to encourage refugee settlements to become self-sufficient as soon as possible. Nyimba settlement in the Eastern Province is scheduled to achieve self-sufficiency in June. It has about 1,500 refugees. About 650 acres are under cultivation and the service

Director described this year's crops as "good." Money earned from crops will enable refugees to buy their own seed, clothing, tractors, and equipment, which is currently provided by the Government in conjunction with the refugee service and the UNHCR. Some refugees are attending the Mukushi Agriculture Training Institute together with local farmers.

The 1969 program of the UNHCR contained the following items for relief work in Zambia: \$260,000 for the settlement of Angolan refugees and \$6,000 for an open fund for permanent relocations of refugees. In addition, an allocation of \$14,000 from the emergency fund, supplementing \$15,000 appropriated at the beginning of 1968, was made available in November 1968 in response to a Zambian Government request for settling some 3,700 Angolan and 1,300 Namibian refugees. The U.S. Government supplies 75 percent of the funding of the world food program and 40 percent of the UNHCR budget. According to the UNHCR Bulletin for the fourth quarter of 1968, the United States has contributed \$600,000 to the 1969 total program budget of \$2.9 million.

D. REPUBLIC OF MALAWI

Malawi was known as Nyasaland before gaining independence on July 6, 1964. The country has a land area of about 45,000 square miles and a population estimated at 4 million (about 7,000 whites and 12,000 Asians and mixed). About 90 percent of the population is engaged in subsistence agriculture. The national curse is poverty without easily exploitable natural resources. No get-rich-quick possibilities exist. Some 15-percent working-age Malawian men work outside the country. Malawi has one of Africa's lowest yearly per capita incomes—about \$40.00. It thus has a high potential for economic and hence political discontent.

Although Malawi is making progress in the light industrial sector of the economy, Malawi's development is and will be dependent upon agriculture. The country has virtually no mineral resources, and must live with very high transportation costs to export markets. Agricultural growth will have to be optimum if it is to keep ahead of the population increase.

Malawi has traditionally relied heavily on outside economic aid. Until recently, the United Kingdom supplied by far the major share of external assistance to Malawi. Now, however, British (as well as American) aid is phasing out, leaving a vacuum into which South Africa is rapidly moving. Pretoria has funded the initial cost (\$11 million) of the move of Malawi's capital from Zomba to Lilongwe, in the center of the country, to avoid a north-south aggravation, and an extension of Malawi's railway line (another \$11 million). Also, South African experts are moving into policy level positions in economic planning, information, radio, and tourism.

Dr. Banda does not accept aid from Communist sources, and has refused to establish diplomatic relations with any Communist country. There is little U.S. trade and no U.S. investment in Malawi. There are few Americans resident in Malawi except for U.S. Government personnel and missionaries.

The U.S. assistance to Malawi was established in 1960. Since then through 1968 AID had spent a total of \$23 million on this cooperative

program which has emphasized assistance in the fields of education and rural development.

In Malawi, the Peace Corps began in January 1963 with 42 teachers. During the 5 years 1963-68 a total of 490 volunteers have contributed to Malawi's development, particularly in the fields of education and public health. At the present time there are 164 volunteers in Malawi. The Government of Malawi will not be asking for more volunteers, which means that the Peace Corps will be phased out in 2 years.

Currently the 61 Peace Corps volunteers as secondary school teachers represent over 20 percent of all graduate secondary school teachers. Peace Corps contributes to Malawi's education program in three ways—by providing critically needed trained manpower, by initiating significant agricultural involvement on behalf of secondary school students and primary teachers—by inculcating into teacher training a more positive attitude toward education while introducing new teaching problem-solving methods, countering prevailing rote-learning methods.

Malawi is one of the developing countries that is making a serious effort to find solutions to the problem of youth. The Malawi Young Pioneers is a training program based on land husbandry and its members are taught how to till the soil, to work hard with their hands, and they are also taught discipline and citizenship. The expert advisers are provided by the Israeli Government, which, incidentally has aid programs with 31 African governments. The number of bases has risen from two in 1964 to 21 in 1969, which means that at present there is a base in almost every district. The number of trainees handled has also risen from 367 in 1964 to more than 2,000 in the 1968-69 training year. The study mission visited the base near Blantyre and was impressed with the effort in training the enthusiastic youth in modern farming methods.

Malawi's present foreign policy is largely dictated by its geographic location and the philosophy of President Banda, which, despite multiple critics, he insists is the most practical for his situation. It is a black African salient jutting over 300 miles into the so-called White Redoubt, comprised of South Africa, Mozambique, Angola, and Southern Rhodesia. Malawi extends deep into Mozambique, close to the strategically important Cabora Bassa power scheme in Mozambique near Tete. Malawi's political orientation is of interest therefore to South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Portugal and also to FRELIMO, ZANU, ZAPU, and other liberation movements which see Malawi as a convenient gateway (on the Laotian pattern) into the White Redoubt from bases in Tanzania and Zambia.

Since President Banda has few resources at his disposal, his foreign policy style has been characterized by what one might call balance, accompanied by what he calls "bridge building." For example, he depends on ports in Mozambique for his landlocked country, so he cannot throw in with FRELIMO and African Liberation Committee of the OAU. On the other hand, FRELIMO's military capability is such that Dr. Banda cannot afford to become marked as FRELIMO's enemy.

Over the past year, Dr. Banda has moved closer to the regimes of the White Redoubt by accepting increasing South African assistance and presence in Malawi. The Portuguese recently upgraded their representation in Malawi by sending an ambassador and, like the South

Africans, are building up a large staff. And, Dr. Banda was perhaps alone among Africa's leaders in not deploring the results of southern Rhodesia's proposed constitution referendum last June.

The study mission met with President Hastings Kamuzu Banda and found him very frank in explaining his foreign policy with the white-minority governments. Apartheid, according to Banda, will not crumble by talks in the OAU conferences or Commonwealth meetings. Likewise, it cannot be stopped by boycotts or sanctions. In any confrontation between blacks and whites, the whites would win according to President Banda's view. The solution he maintains is to give aid, both public and private, to the majority ruled countries and thereby lessen their dependence on the Republic of South Africa. Efforts should be made to bring the races together. There are whites in South Africa and Rhodesia who are interested in justice. President Banda is in favor of influence through contact. He would like to see South Africans visit all African countries. The Calvinists have to be won over, and changes are taking place. Isolation is the worst answer to the problem in his opinion.

E. UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

The United Republic of Tanzania, formed on April 26, 1964, is comprised of Tanganyika (including the island of Mafia) and Zanzibar (including Pemba and the uninhabited island of Latham). It is about the size of Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas combined. Tanzania's population is estimated at 12.2 million, of whom about 350,000 reside on Zanzibar and Pemba. Mainland Tanzania's population includes approximately 90,000 of Indo-Pakistani origin, 26,000 Arabs and 20,000 whites; the remainder are Africans, consisting of about 122 tribes.

Tanzania serves as an important supply route for Burundi, Ruanda, the eastern Congo and most important of all, Zambia. Many African freedom movements are headquartered in Tanzania and many South African exiles have found refuge there. China has made Tanzania a target of its activities in Africa. Tanzania is committed to the introduction of majority rule and the independence of southern Africa countries. She has inevitably been drawn into the military struggle between Portugal and the Mozambique freedom movement, FRELIMO.

Tanzania is one of the constituent members of the East African Community, the most promising institution working toward economic and political unity in the continent. Simultaneously, she is developing strong links with Zambia to the south. Tanzania enjoys considerable good will in both the east and west and is looked to as a leader by a number of other new states.

Tanzania ranks high among the new nations of the world as one which has planned her development to meet priority needs. The current 5-year plan got underway in 1964; its long-term goals are to achieve the following by 1980: (1) to raise the per capita income from \$54 per annum to \$126 per annum; (2) to become self-sufficient in trained manpower; (3) to raise the expectation of life from 35 to 40 years to 50 years. At the present time infant mortality is approximately 50 percent before the age of 5. The Tanzania Government expects to invest

a total of \$688.8 million over the 5-year period to accomplish these goals.

More than 90 percent of the population is engaged in farming, much of it at the subsistence level. She plans to develop on an agricultural base in order to grow sufficient crops to feed her own people and to yield a significant surplus for export. To the extent that Tanzania aims at developing an industrial sector, those industries will be agricultural processing firms, producers of agricultural implements or fertilizers, and manufacturers of consumer goods that can serve as import substitutes in Tanzania and exports to the other members of the East African Community and Zambia.

Because Tanzania was a trust territory rather than a colony, her manpower resources at the time of independence were considerably thinner than those of her neighbors. Today, Tanzania still relies very heavily on expatriates to staff her civil service and to fill middle-level and senior positions in public enterprises. The education system is not yet producing the kind of manpower needed.

Unlike her neighbor, Zambia, Tanzania has virtually no natural resource which can serve as a producer of development capital. She, therefore, must rely on internally generated savings, foreign aid, and foreign private investment. Foreign aid is a source of useful amount of capital; but Tanzania has made it quite clear that she will take aid from all sources and will accept no political conditions on the aid. U.S. investment is between \$10 to \$12 million. Of 40,000 tourists in 1968, about one-third were Americans, many of whom were black.

Tanzania's announced policy of socialism, her actions in nationalizing banks and major industries in 1967, and her leaders' attitudes toward foreign investors have acted to dry up all but a few sources of private capital from overseas.

Since 1961 through fiscal year 1969, the U.S. Agency for International Development has provided approximately \$84.5 million in assistance to Tanzania in loans, grants, and food for peace programs. The figure includes those portions of multicountry or regional projects which are of direct and primary benefit to Tanzania. The largest regional loan for the Zamtan Highway is \$20.5 million. U.S. bilateral aid is around \$6 million this year.

During fiscal years 1962-67, AID assistance per annum, including financing from regional programs, averaged around \$9 million in grants, loans, and food for peace. Much of the program has been concentrated in four areas: education and manpower development, rural development, transportation, and water supply. Increased attention is now being given to projects which will contribute toward an early expansion of agricultural production. As of December 30, 1968, there had been 525 Tanzanians sent for training to the United States, or third countries, by AID.

The Peace Corps has been almost phased out from a high level of about 400 volunteers because the Tanzanians have not requested any additional programs. The heavy emphasis on education by the Peace Corps was contrary to the Tanzanian declaration of self-reliance. The Arusha declaration published in February 1967, which explains President Nyerere's policy of socialism and self-reliance, is such a fundamental document for Tanzania that it is included as appendix D of this report.

WANTED: A NEW FOREIGN POLICY FOR AFRICA

No longer can the United States enjoy the luxury of having its democratic cake and selfishly eating it, too, in a world that is three-fourths colored. Increasingly, the Africans are going to judge America not by what it says, but by what it does. The admonishing of Ralph Waldo Emerson is particularly applicable here: "Do not say things. What you are stands over you the while and thunders so loud that I cannot hear what you say to the contrary." The rhetoric of American democracy must be substantiated by the reality of American action.

In 1947, one word summed up our foreign policy in the world, especially Europe, to immobilize the challenge of expanding international communism: containment. Two of the pillars of the fortress of containment were the Marshall plan and NATO, both successful in their initial aims.

If a concept were to be evolved that should guide and control American foreign policy in Africa to equal that policy's success in Europe, it would be reflected in two words: moral consistency.

Since they are comparatively new in their independence and achievement of self-government, African countries place a great emphasis on the application of democracy and the grandeur of its tenets. America, the land of the free and the home of the brave, as they have been taught in their history books, still remains for them the most exciting example and for all of its shortcomings the most successful practitioner of the democratic ethic.

Because the United States commands a position as the enduring leader in the free world, African nations logically expect us to begin to exert the moral power of our leadership toward the universal fulfillment of full equality. To do this, the United States has no alternative but to pursue a foreign policy rooted in moral consistency. To do otherwise is to ultimately alienate three-fourths of a world which rejects the basis of whiteness as a superordinate value of their lives.

A foreign policy of moral consistency in Africa can be established. It can and must consist of the following measures in the following countries:

SOUTH AFRICA

1. Revocation of the South Africa sugar quota and the annual subsidy shifted to the independent-majority-ruled southern African countries. This can be accomplished immediately through discretionary authority of the President or through congressional action when all sugar quotas come up for review at the end of 1970.

2. Relocation by the end of 1970 of the American tracking station in South Africa.

3. U.S. initiative for the imposition of total economic sanctions against South Africa by the U.N. if South Africa does not surrender the mandated territory of South-West Africa by the end of 1970.

4. The United States should reevaluate its policy of granting visas to certain South Africa Government officials and athletes with a view toward excluding them when black Americans of similar status are excluded from South Africa.

SOUTH AFRICA AND SOUTHERN RHODESIA

1. A public statement by the Department of State and the Department of Commerce that "it is not in the best interests of the United States for American businessmen and corporations to continue to trade with or maintain any business relationships with the Governments of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia as long as those governments practice their indigenous forms of apartheid, and that continued maintenance of businesses, offices, or factories by American businessmen and corporations in those two countries is totally antithetical to the American Government." If the executive branch fails to act to reduce U.S. economic involvement in these two countries, the legislative branch should provide disincentives to American investors so they will not continue to profit from racial exploitation.

2. The initiation of a step-by-step plan to isolate South Africa and Southern Rhodesia economically and politically within the next 3 years unless their tyrannical restraints are removed and will have been adjudged as being removed by a United Nations Commission. Our diplomatic mission in Southern Rhodesia should be immediately withdrawn.

3. American tourists should be discouraged from traveling to South Africa or Southern Rhodesia as it is not in the best interests of U.S. foreign policy.

ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE

The discontinuation of military aid to Portugal to prevent the use of American weapons against the liberation forces in Angola and Mozambique until she issues a "declaration of intent" to decolonize those territories.

GENERAL

1. A plan for Africa should be evolved that would be a comprehensive economic development program, comparable in scope to the Marshall plan for Europe and the Alliance for Progress in Latin America, with particular attention to the needs of majority-ruled nations in southern Africa. Its irreducible minimum would be quadrupling foreign assistance to the Continent of Africa and would be a 5-year program planned by a consortium of African nations to strengthen their economic interdependence and coordinated by American expertise.


2. All political refugees from South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, and South-West Africa should be accepted in the United States and assisted just as refugees from Communist nations are permitted to stay here until they are able to return as free men to their countries.

STATEMENT OF HON. LESTER L. WOLFF

Representative Diggs has a remarkable understanding of the situation in southern Africa and has distinguished himself as chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Unfortunately, I was unable to accompany the chairman to all the countries visited by the study mission; and although all the opinions voiced by the chairman do not concur with my own estimates, he is totally conversant with the political and economic problems of the area and is to be congratulated for the depth and breadth of the report.

SOUTHERN AFRICA



APPENDIX B

FIFTH SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES HELD IN LUSAKA, ZAMBIA—APRIL 14–16, 1969

MANIFESTO ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

1. When the purpose and the basis of States' international policies are misunderstood, there is introduced into the world a new and unnecessary disharmony, disagreements, conflicts of interest, or different assessments of human priorities, which provoke an excess of tension in the world, and disastrously divide mankind at a time when united action is necessary to control modern technology and put it to the service of man. It is for this reason that, discovering widespread misapprehension of our attitudes and purposes in relation to Southern Africa, we the leaders of East and Central African States meeting in Lusaka, 16th April, 1969, have agreed to issue this Manifesto.

2. By this Manifesto we wish to make clear, beyond all shadow of doubt, our acceptance of the belief that all men are equal, and have equal rights to human dignity and respect, regardless of colour, race, religion, or sex. We believe that all men have the right and the duty to participate, as equal members of the society, in their own government. We do not accept that any individual or group has any right to govern any group of sane adults, without their consent, and we affirm that only the people of a society, acting together as equals, can determine what is, for them, a good society and a good social, economic, or political organisation.

3. On the basis of these beliefs we do not accept that any one group within a society has the right to rule any society without the continuing consent of all the citizens. We recognise that at any one time there will be, within every society, failures in the implementation of these ideals. We recognise that for the sake of order in human affairs, there may be transitional arrangements while a transformation from group inequalities to individual equality is being effected. But we affirm that without an acceptance of these ideals—without a commitment to these principles of human equality and self-determination—there can be no basis for peace and justice in the world.

4. None of us would claim that within our own States we have achieved that perfect social, economic and political organisation which would ensure a reasonable standard of living for all our people and establish individual security against avoidable hardship or miscarriage of justice. On the contrary, we acknowledge that within our own States the struggle towards human brotherhood and unchallenged human dignity is only beginning. It is on the basis of our commitment to human equality and human dignity, not on the basis of achieved perfection, that we take our stand of hostility towards the colonialism and racial discrimination which is being practised in Southern Africa. It is on the basis of their commitment to these universal principles that we appeal to other members of the human race for support.

5. If the commitment to these principles existed among the States holding power in Southern Africa, any disagreements we might have about the rate of implementation, or about isolated acts of policy, would be matters affecting only our individual relationships with the States concerned. If these commitments existed, our States would not be justified in the expressed and active hostility towards the regimes of Southern Africa such as we have proclaimed and continue to propagate.

6. The truth is, however, that in Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia, South-West Africa, and the Union of South Africa, there is an open and continued denial of the principles of human equality and national self-determination. This is not a matter of failure in the implementation of accepted human principles. The effective Administration in all these territories are not struggling towards these difficult goals. They are fighting the principles; they are deliberately organising their societies so as to try to destroy the hold of these principles in the minds of men.

It is for this reason that we believe the rest of the world must be interested. For the principle of human equality, and all that flows from it, is either universal or it does not exist. The dignity of all men is destroyed when the manhood of any human being is denied.

7. Our objectives in Southern Africa stem from our commitment to this principle of human equality. We are not hostile to the Administrations in these States because they are manned and controlled by white people. We are hostile to them because they are systems of minority control which exist as a result of, and in the pursuance of, doctrines of human inequality. What we are working for is the right of self-determination for the people of those territories. We are working for a rule in those countries which is based on the will of all the people, and an acceptance of the equality of every citizen.

8. Our stand towards Southern Africa thus involves a rejection of racialism, not a reversal of the existing racial domination. We believe that all the peoples who have made their homes in the countries of Southern Africa are Africans, regardless of colour of their skins; and we would oppose a racist majority government which adopted a philosophy of deliberate and permanent discrimination between its citizens on grounds of racial origin. We are not talking racialism when we reject the colonialism and apartheid policies now operating in those areas; we are demanding an opportunity for all the people of these States, working together as equal individual citizens, to work out for themselves the institutions and the system of government under which they will, by general consent, live together and work together to build a harmonious society.

9. As an aftermath of the present policies it is likely that different groups within these societies will be self-conscious and fearful. The initial political and economic organisations may well take account of these fears, and this group self-consciousness. But how this is to be done must be a matter exclusively for the peoples of the country concerned, working together. No other nation will have a right to interfere in such affairs. All that the rest of the world has a right to demand is just what we are now asserting—that the arrangements within any State which wishes to be accepted into the community of nations must be based on an acceptance of the principles of human dignity and equality.

10. To talk of the liberation of Africa is thus to say two things. First, that the peoples in the territories still under colonial rule shall be free to determine for themselves their own institutions of self-government. Secondly, that the individuals in Southern Africa shall be freed from an environment poisoned by the propaganda of racialism, and given an opportunity to be men—not white men, brown men, yellow men, or black men.

11. Thus the liberation of Africa for which we are struggling does not mean a reverse racialism. Nor is it an aspect of African Imperialism. As far as we are concerned the present boundaries of the States of Southern Africa are the boundaries of what will be free and independent African States. There is no question of our seeking or accepting any alterations to our own boundaries at the expense of these future free African nations.

12. On the objective of liberation as thus defined, we can neither surrender nor compromise. We have always preferred, and we still prefer, to achieve it without physical violence. We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill. We do not advocate violence; we advocate an end to the violence against human dignity which is now being perpetrated by the oppressors of Africa. If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible, or if changed circumstances were to make it possible in the future, we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change. But while peaceful progress is blocked by actions of those at present in power in the States of Southern Africa, we have no choice but to give to the peoples of those territories all the support of which we are capable in their struggle against their oppressors. This is why the signatory states participate in the movement for the liberation of Africa under the aegis of the Organisation of African Unity. However, the obstacle to change is not the same in all the countries of Southern Africa, and it follows therefore, that the possibility of continuing the struggle through peaceful means varies from one country to another.

13. In *Mozambique* and *Angola*, and in the so-called *Portuguese Guinea*, the basic problem is not racialism but a pretence that Portugal exist in Africa. Portugal is situated in Europe, the fact that it is a dictatorship is a matter for the Portuguese to settle. But no decree of the Portuguese dictator, nor legislation passed by any Parliament in Portugal, can make Africa part of Europe. The only thing which could convert a part of Africa into a constituent unit in a union which

also includes a European State would be the freely expressed will of the people of that part of Africa. There is no such popular will in the Portuguese colonies. On the contrary, in the absence of any opportunity to negotiate a road to freedom, the peoples of all three territories have taken up arms against the colonial power. They have done this despite the heavy odds against them, and despite the great suffering they know to be involved.

14. Portugal, as a European State, has naturally its own allies in the context of the ideological conflict between West and East. However, in our context, the effect of this is that Portugal is enabled to use her resources to pursue the most heinous war and degradation of man in Africa. The present Manifesto must, therefore, lay bare the fact that the inhuman commitment of Portugal in Africa and her ruthless subjugation of the people of Mozambique, Angola and the so-called Portuguese Guinea, is not only irrelevant to the ideological conflict of power-politics, but it is also diametrically opposed to the policies, the philosophies and the doctrines practised by her Allies in the conduct of their own affairs at home. The peoples of Mozambique, Angola and Portuguese Guinea are not interested in Communism or Capitalism; they are interested in their freedom. They are demanding an acceptance of the principles of independence on the basis of majority rule, and for many years they called for discussions on this issue. Only when their demand for talks was continually ignored did they begin to fight. Even now, if Portugal should change her policy and accept the principle of self-determination, we would urge the Liberation Movements to desist from their armed struggle and to co-operate in the mechanics of a peaceful transfer of power from Portugal to the peoples of the African territories.

15. The fact that many Portuguese citizens have immigrated to these African countries does not affect this issue. Future immigration policy will be a matter for the independent Governments when these are established. In the meantime, we would urge the Liberation Movements to reiterate their statements that all those Portuguese people who have made their homes in Mozambique, Angola or Portuguese Guinea, and who are willing to give their future loyalty to those states, will be accepted as citizens. And an independent Mozambique, Angola or Portuguese Guinea may choose to be as friendly with Portugal as Brazil is. That would be the free choice of a free people.

16. *In Rhodesia* the situation is different insofar as the metropolitan power has acknowledged the colonial status of the territory. Unfortunately, however, it has failed to take adequate measures to re-assert its authority against the minority which has seized power with the declared intention of maintaining white domination. The matter cannot rest there. Rhodesia, like the rest of Africa, must be free, and its independence must be on the basis of majority rule. If the colonial power is unwilling or unable to effect such a transfer of power to the people, then the people themselves will have no alternative but to capture it as and when they can. And Africa has no alternative but to support them. The question which remains in Rhodesia is therefore whether Britain will re-assert her authority in Rhodesia and then negotiate the peaceful progress to majority rule before independence. Insofar as Britain is willing to make this second commitment, Africa will co-operate in her attempts to re-assert her authority. This is the method of progress which we would prefer; it could involve less suffering for all the peoples of Rhodesia; both black and white. But until there is some firm evidence that Britain accepts the principles of independence on the basis of majority rule, and is prepared to take whatever steps are necessary to make it a reality, then Africa has no choice but to support the struggle for the people's freedom by whatever means are open to her.

17. Just as a settlement of the Rhodesian problem with a minimum of violence is a British responsibility, so a settlement in *South West Africa* with a minimum of violence is a United Nations responsibility. By every canon of international law, and by every precedent, South West Africa should by now have been a sovereign, independent State with a Government based on majority rule. South West Africa was a German colony until 1919, just as Tanganyika, Rwanda and Burundi, Togoland and Cameroon were German colonies. It was a matter of European politics that when the Mandatory System was established after Germany had been defeated, the administration of South West Africa was given to the white minority government of South Africa, while the other ex-German colonies in Africa were put into the hands of the British, Belgian, or French Governments. After the Second World War every mandated territory except South West Africa was converted into a Trusteeship Territory and has subsequently gained independence. South Africa, on the other hand has persistently refused to honour even

the international obligation it accepted in 1919, and has increasingly applied to South West Africa the inhuman doctrines and organisation of apartheid.

18. The United Nations General Assembly has ruled against this action and in 1966 terminated the Mandate under which South Africa had a legal basis for its occupation and domination of South West Africa. The General Assembly declared that the territory is now the direct responsibility of the United Nations and set up an ad hoc Committee to recommend practical means by which South West Africa would be administered, and the people enabled to exercise self-determination and to achieve independence.

19. Nothing could be clearer than this decision—which no permanent member of the Security Council voted against. Yet, since that time no effective measures have been taken to enforce it. South West Africa remains in the clutches of the most ruthless minority Government in Africa. Its people continue to be oppressed and those who advocate even peaceful progress to independence continue to be persecuted. The world has an obligation to use its strength to enforce the decision which all the countries co-operated in making. If they do this there is hope that the change can be effected without great violence. If they fail, then sooner or later the people of South West Africa will take the law into their own hands. The people have been patient beyond belief, but one day their patience will be exhausted. Africa, at least, will then be unable to deny their call for help.

20. *The Union of South Africa* is itself an independent sovereign State and a Member of the United Nations. It is more highly developed and richer than any other nation in Africa. On every legal basis its internal affairs are a matter exclusively for the people of South Africa. Yet the purpose of law is people and we assert that the actions of the South African Government are such that the rest of the world has a responsibility to take some action in defence of humanity.

21. There is one thing about South African oppression which distinguishes it from other oppressive regimes. The apartheid policy adopted by its Government, and supported to a greater or lesser extent by almost all its white citizens, is based on a rejection of man's humanity. A position of privilege or the experience of oppression in South African society depends on the one thing which it is beyond the power of man to change. It depends upon a man's colour, his parentage, and his ancestors. If you are black you cannot escape this categorisation; nor can you escape it if you are white. If you are a black millionaire and a brilliant political scientist, you are still subject to the pass laws and still excluded from political activity. If you are white, even protests against the system and an attempt to reject segregation will lead you only to the segregated and the comparative comfort of a white jail. Beliefs, abilities and behaviour are all irrelevant to a man's status; everything depends upon race. Manhood is irrelevant. The whole system of government and society in South Africa is based on the denial of human equality. And the system is maintained by a ruthless denial of the human rights of the majority of the population—and thus, inevitably of all.

22. These things are known and are regularly condemned in the Councils of the United Nations and elsewhere. But it appears that to many countries international law takes precedence over humanity; therefore no action follows the words. Yet even if international law is held to exclude active assistance to the South African opponents of apartheid, it does not demand that the comfort and support of human and commercial intercourse should be given to a government which rejects the manhood of most of humanity. South Africa should be excluded from the United Nations Agencies, and even from the United Nations itself. It should be ostracised by the world community until it accepts the implications of man's common humanity. It should be isolated from world trade patterns and left to be self-sufficient if it can. The South African Government cannot be allowed both to reject the very concept of mankind's unity, and to benefit by the strength given through friendly international relations. And certainly Africa cannot acquiesce in the maintenance of the present policies against people of African descent.

23. The signatories of this Manifesto assert that the validity of the principles of human equality and dignity extend to the Union of South Africa just as they extend to the colonial territories of Southern Africa. Before a basis for peaceful development can be established in this continent, these principles must be acknowledged by every nation, and in every State there must be a deliberate attempt to implement them.

24. We re-affirm our commitment to these principles of human equality and human dignity, and to the doctrines of self-determination and non-racialism. We shall work for their extension within our own nations and throughout the continent of Africa.

APPENDIX C

PROPOSALS
FOR
A NEW CONSTITUTION
FOR
RHODESIA

(43)

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- Chapter II.* European and African Areas
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- Chapter IV.* Entrenchment of Certain Provisions Relating to Land Tenure

INTRODUCTION

The Government of Rhodesia believe that the present Constitution is no longer acceptable to the people of Rhodesia because it contains a number of objectionable features, the principal ones being that it provides for eventual African rule and, inevitably, the domination of one race by another and that it does not guarantee that government will be retained in responsible hands.

Therefore it is proposed that there should be a new Constitution which, while reproducing some of the provisions of the existing Constitution, will make certain major changes in order to remove these objectionable features.

The proposed new Constitution will ensure that government will be retained in responsible hands and will provide Africans with the right to play an increasing part in the government of Rhodesia as they earn it by increased contributions to the national exchequer. Moreover, the new Constitution will recognize the right of the African chiefs, as the leaders of their people, to take part in the counsels of the nation.

The existing inequality in the treatment of the land rights of the races will be remedied. Provision will be made for the same protection to be given to the European Area as that given to the African Area. New Bills governing land tenure, which will replace the Land Apportionment Act [*Chapter 257*] and the provisions relating to Tribal Trust Land in the present Constitution, will be introduced into Parliament at the same time as the new Constitution. The provisions of the new Bills which are designed to protect land rights of Europeans and Africans will be entrenched in the Constitution.

Power will be vested in the Legislature to delegate to provincial or regional councils or other bodies certain functions of government as and when such delegation is considered to be appropriate.

The new Declaration of Rights will not be enforceable by the courts. The rights enshrined in the Declaration will be entrenched and will be safeguarded by the creation of a Senate and the vesting in it of power to delay legislation. In this important function the Senate will be advised by a special committee. As the Senate will be entrusted with the duty of upholding the Declaration of Rights no provision will be made for a Constitutional Council. In addition, the proposed procedure for constitutional amendments will ensure that the Senate will play a significant part in protecting the Constitution and the rights conferred by it.

This paper sets out the constitutional proposals. Part I deals with the matters which will be contained in the Constitution, Part II with the matters which will be contained in an Electoral Act and Part III with the matters which will be contained in new legislation relating to land tenure.

Any reference in this paper to a European means a person who is not an African.

PART I—PROVISIONS OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION

CHAPTER I. HEAD OF STATE

Appointment and term of office

1. If a republican form of government is adopted the Head of State will be chosen by the Executive Council. Whatever form of government is adopted the Head of State will hold office for a period of five years and, at the termination of his period of office, he will be eligible for re-election for one further period of five years.

Removal of Head of State

2. If a republican form of government is adopted the Head of State will be removable from office only on a resolution passed by two-thirds of the total membership of the House of Assembly after a committee of that House has recommended his removal on the grounds of misconduct or inability to perform efficiently the duties of his office.

Powers and functions

3. The Head of State will have such powers and duties as are conferred or imposed upon him by the Constitution or any other law. Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, he will have the same powers by way of prerogative as are now possessed by the Officer Administering the Government. These powers will include the prerogative of mercy.

Remuneration of Head of State

4. The salary of the Head of State will be fixed by a law of the Legislature and may not be reduced during his continuance in office.

Acting and Deputy Head of State

5. The Constitution will provide for an Acting Head of State or Deputy Head of State whenever the office of the Head of State is vacant or the Head of State is absent or is unable to perform the functions of his office.

CHAPTER II. THE LEGISLATURE

Legislature

6. The Legislature will consist of the Head of State and a Parliament comprising a Senate and a House of Assembly.

Senate

7. The Senate will consist of twenty-three senators of whom—

- (a) ten will be European members elected for the whole of Rhodesia by an electoral college consisting of the European members of the House of Assembly from candidates nominated by voters on the European voters roll;
- (b) ten will be African chiefs elected by the Council of Chiefs, five of whom will be from Matabeleland and five from Mashonaland;

- (c) three will be persons of any race appointed by the Head of State who, in making these appointments, will take into account the requirements of the Senate Legal Committee.

Senate Legal Committee

8. The Senate will elect a committee to be known as the Senate Legal Committee consisting of not less than three members. A majority of members of this committee will be senators with legal qualifications. It will be the function of the committee to examine all Bills, except Money Bills and constitutional Bills, and all statutory instruments published in the *Gazette* and to report to the Senate whether in its opinion any provisions are inconsistent with the Declaration of Rights.

House of Assembly

9. Initially there will be sixty-six members of the House of Assembly of whom—

- (a) fifty will be European members elected by the Europeans registered on the rolls of voters for fifty constituencies; and
- (b) sixteen will be African members—
 - (i) eight being elected by the Africans registered on the rolls of voters for four constituencies in Matabeleland and four constituencies in Mashonaland; and
 - (ii) eight being elected by four tribal electoral colleges in Matabeleland and four tribal electoral colleges in Mashonaland comprising chiefs, headmen and elected councillors of African councils in the Tribal Trust Lands.

Increase in number of African members

10. In principle the number of African members in the House of Assembly will be in the same proportion to the total number of members as the contribution by way of assessed income tax on income of Africans is to the total contribution by way of assessed income tax on income of Europeans and Africans until the contribution by Africans amounts to one-half of the total contribution.

Until the contribution of Africans amounts to sixteen sixty-sixths of the total contribution of Europeans and Africans the principle will not be applied and the number of African members will remain at sixteen. When the contribution of Africans exceeds sixteen sixty-sixths of the total contribution of Europeans and Africans the following procedure for increasing the number of African members will come into effect.

The number of African members will be increased two at a time being one additional member for Matabeleland and one additional member for Mashonaland, until the number of African members is equal to the number of European members.

The first increase of two African members will be allocated to the African members elected by tribal electoral colleges and the number of colleges will be increased accordingly. The second increase of two African members will be allocated to the members elected by the voters on the African rolls and the number of

African constituencies will be increased accordingly. Subsequent increases will be made in a similar manner.

Every increase of two African members will be made in direct proportion to the increase in the contribution of Africans compared with the total contribution of Europeans and Africans in such a manner that when the contribution of Africans amounts to half of the total contributions of Europeans and Africans at that time the number of African members will be equal to the number of European members.

The Delimitation Commission will be charged with the duty of calculating, from evidence supplied by the Commissioner of Taxes, whether there has been an increase in the contribution of Africans as compared with the total contribution of Europeans and Africans sufficient to warrant an increase in the number of African members.

In calculating the contribution of Europeans and of Africans, income tax will be deemed to include supertax. Taxation on companies will not be taken into account.

Electoral provisions

11. The following will be prescribed in the Electoral Act and are dealt with in Part II of this paper—

- (a) the composition and functions of the Delimitation Commission;
- (b) qualifications and disqualifications for enrolment on the voters rolls;
- (c) qualifications and disqualifications of candidates for election or appointment as members of the Senate or for election as members of the House of Assembly;
- (d) the composition and procedure of the tribal electoral colleges and the Council of Chiefs when sitting as an electoral college.

Election of presiding officers

12. At the beginning of each new Parliament after a general election, a President of the Senate and a Speaker of the House of Assembly will be elected from members of the Senate or the House of Assembly who are neither Ministers nor Deputy Ministers or from persons who are not members of either House. A person who is not a member of the House concerned will not be eligible for election unless he possesses the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for election as a member of the Senate or the House of Assembly, as the case may be. A member of the Senate or the House of Assembly who is elected as President of the Senate or Speaker will vacate his seat as a member of the House concerned.

Removal of presiding officers

13. The President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Assembly may be removed from office only by resolution of the House concerned passed by a two-thirds majority of its total membership.

Remuneration of presiding officers

14. The salaries of the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Assembly will be fixed by a law of the Legislature and may not be reduced during their continuance in office.

Ministerial right to sit in both Houses

15. A Minister or Deputy Minister who is a member of the Senate or the House of Assembly will have the right to sit and speak in both the Senate and the House of Assembly, but may vote only in the House of which he is a member.

Voting in Parliament

16. Except where otherwise provided in the Constitution all questions before the Senate or the House of Assembly will be determined by a majority of the votes of the members present and voting.

Language in Parliament

17. Proceedings in the House of Assembly will be conducted in the English language. Proceedings in the Senate will be conducted in English but, for the convenience of the Chiefs for an interim period, debates may be in Chishona and Sindebele as well as in English and provision will be made for the translation of any language used into the other two languages.

Power to make laws

18. The Legislature will be the sovereign legislative power in and over Rhodesia. It will have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Rhodesia and this power will include—

- (a) the making of laws having extra-territorial operation; and
- (b) the making of laws to create provinces and other regional divisions, to establish provincial councils and other regional bodies and to allocate functions and powers to such councils and bodies for the purpose of the administration of such provinces or regional divisions.

Initiation of legislation.

19. Any Bill may originate in either the Senate or the House of Assembly except a Money Bill or a private Bill, which may originate only in the House of Assembly.

Procedure in regard to Bills

20. After a Bill originating in one of the Houses of Parliament has been passed by that House, it will be sent to the other House for consideration. That other House may pass the Bill with or without amendment or may reject it, provided that the Senate will not be able to amend or reject a Money Bill. If the Bill is passed without amendment, it will be presented to the Head of State for assent. If the Bill is amended, it will be returned to the House in which it originated, which House may accept or amend or reject any amendment made by the other House. After the Bill has been returned to the House in which it originated either House may by message to the other House, pursuant to a resolution, agree to any amendment or withdraw any amendment which has been made to the Bill.

Delaying powers of Senate

21. The Senate will have the power to delay for a period of one hundred and eighty days the enactment of a Bill which has

originated in the House of Assembly. After that period has expired the House of Assembly may resolve that the Bill be presented to the Head of State for assent.

Where a Bill originating in the Senate has been rejected by the Senate or has lapsed and an identical Bill is introduced into and passed by the House of Assembly, if the Senate has not passed that latter Bill within a period expiring one hundred and eighty days after the original Bill was introduced into the Senate or, if this period has expired, within eight sitting days, the House of Assembly may resolve that the Bill be presented to the Head of State for assent.

Functions of Senate Legal Committee in regard to Bills

22. Every Bill introduced into the Senate, other than a Money Bill or a constitutional Bill, will be referred immediately to the Senate Legal Committee for examination and report as to whether any of the provisions of the Bill are inconsistent with the Declaration of Rights. The Senate Legal Committee will have a prescribed period in which to make its report during which period no further proceedings on the Bill will be taken by the Senate. When the report is tabled the Senate may accept or reject the findings of the Senate Legal Committee. If the Senate resolves that any provision of the Bill is inconsistent with the Declaration of Rights it may—

- (a) amend the provision to remove the inconsistency; or
- (b) reject the Bill; or
- (c) pass the Bill notwithstanding the inconsistency if it is satisfied that the provision is necessary in the national interest.

If the Senate resolves that a provision of a Bill is inconsistent with the Declaration of Rights and that such provision is not necessary in the national interest, the Bill will be returned to the House of Assembly which may remove the inconsistency or, after a period of one hundred and eighty days has elapsed from the date on which the Bill was introduced into the Senate, resolve that the Bill be sent to the Head of State for assent notwithstanding such inconsistency.

Functions of Senate Legal Committee in regard to subsidiary legislation

23. Every statutory instrument published in the *Gazette* will be referred to the Senate Legal Committee for consideration and report as to whether any of the provisions of the statutory instrument are inconsistent with the Declaration of Rights. The report will be tabled in the Senate which may accept or reject the findings of the Senate Legal Committee. If the Senate resolves that the provision reported upon is inconsistent with the Declaration of Rights and is not necessary in the national interest, that provision will be annulled unless—

- (a) it is revoked or amended by the issuing authority; or
- (b) the House of Assembly passes a resolution confirming the provision, in which case it will remain in force.

Where a provision has been annulled the House of Assembly may, after the expiry of one hundred and eighty days, resolve that the provision shall be reintroduced, in which case the provision after publication in the *Gazette* will be of full force and effect and will not be referred to the Senate Legal Committee.

Certificate of urgency

24. A Bill, other than a constitutional Bill, which has originated in and been passed by the House of Assembly may be given a certificate of urgency by the Prime Minister on the ground that it is so urgent that it is not in the public interest to delay its enactment. Where the Senate has not passed an urgent Bill within eight sitting days after its introduction into the Senate, the House of Assembly may at any time thereafter resolve that the Bill be sent to the Head of State for assent. If the Senate thereafter resolves that any provision of that Bill is inconsistent with the Declaration of Rights and is not necessary in the national interest, that provision will be annulled after the expiry of eight sitting days unless the House of Assembly within that period resolves that the provision should remain in force. If the resolution of the House of Assembly is passed—

- (a) by a two-thirds majority of the total membership of the House, the provision will continue in force until repealed;
- (b) by more than one-half but less than two-thirds of the total membership of the House, the provision will continue in force for a period of two hundred and seventy days from the date on which that provision became law.

Money Bills

25. If a Money Bill which has been passed by the House of Assembly has not been dealt with by the Senate within a period of eight sitting days, the House of Assembly may at any time thereafter resolve that such Bill be sent to the Head of State for assent. The Senate will have no power to amend or reject a Money Bill but may recommend amendments.

Summoning, prorogation and dissolution of Parliament

26. The Head of State may at any time summon or prorogue Parliament save that a session of Parliament will begin in every calendar year and not more than twelve months will intervene between the last sitting of Parliament in one session and the first sitting of Parliament in the next.

The Head of State will be required at the expiry of five years to issue a proclamation dissolving Parliament and he may at any time by proclamation dissolve Parliament on the advice of the Prime Minister or, in certain special circumstances governed by convention, in his discretion, in which case he will act in accordance with convention. The proclamation dissolving Parliament will fix a date for a general election within a period of four months of the date of the issue of the proclamation. Parliament will be dissolved on the day preceding the date fixed in that proclamation for the holding of a general election.

CHAPTER III. THE EXECUTIVE

Executive powers

27. The executive government of Rhodesia will be vested in the Head of State. He will act on the advice of the Executive Council or the Prime Minister or a Minister, as the case may require, except where the Constitution or any other law otherwise requires.

Appointment of Prime Minister

28. The Head of State will appoint the Prime Minister and in doing so will appoint the person whom, in his discretion, he considers to be best able to command the support of the majority of the members of the House of Assembly.

Appointment and tenure of office of Ministers

29. The Head of State, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, will appoint Ministers and Deputy Ministers who will hold office during the pleasure of the Head of State and may be removed from office by the Head of State acting on the advice of the Prime Minister. A Minister or Deputy Minister who is not a member of the Senate or of the House of Assembly may hold office for not longer than four months unless he becomes a member of either House.

Executive Council

30. There will be an Executive Council to advise the Head of State. It will consist of the Prime Minister and such other Ministers as the Head of State, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, may appoint.

State of emergency

31. The Head of State may at any time declare that a state of public emergency exists. Unless such a declaration is approved by a resolution passed by the House of Assembly it will cease to have effect--

- (a) if Parliament is sitting, at the expiry of seven days after the declaration;
- (b) if Parliament is not sitting, at the expiry thirty days after the declaration.

A declaration if so approved will continue in force for not longer than twelve months and may be renewed from time to time by resolution of the House of Assembly. The House of Assembly may authorize a declaration for a shorter period and may at any time resolve that a declaration should be revoked.

CHAPTER IV. THE JUDICATURE

High Court of Rhodesia

32. The judicial authority of Rhodesia will be vested in a High Court consisting of such divisions and having such jurisdiction as will be prescribed by law.

Appointment of Chief Justice and other judges

33. The Chief Justice and other judges of the High Court will be appointed by the Head of State on the advice of the Prime Minister who will be required to consult with the Chief Justice in the case of any appointment other than to the office of Chief Justice.

Qualification of judges

34. A person will not be qualified for appointment as a judge unless he is or has been a judge in a country in which the common law is Roman-Dutch and English is an official language or he has been qualified to practise as an advocate for not less than ten years in Rhodesia or in a country in which the common law is Roman-Dutch and English is an official language.

Removal of judges

35. A judge may be removed from office by the Head of State only for inability to discharge the functions of his office or for misbehaviour and may not be so removed unless an independent tribunal has recommended that the judge be removed on one of these grounds. In considering whether a tribunal should be appointed to inquire into such inability or misbehaviour of a judge, the Head of State will, in the case of the Chief Justice, act in his discretion and will, in the case of any other judge, act on the advice of the Chief Justice.

The tribunal will consist of not less than three members selected by the Head of State from the following—

- (a) the Speaker of the House of Assembly;
- (b) retired judges of the High Court;
- (c) judges or retired judges of a country, other than Rhodesia, in which the common law is Roman-Dutch and English is an official language;
- (d) an advocate of not less than ten years' standing from a panel nominated by the association representing advocates;
- (e) an attorney of not less than ten years' standing from a panel nominated by the association representing attorneys.

Remuneration of judges

36. The salary of a judge of the High Court will be fixed by a law of the Legislature and may not be reduced during his continuance in office.

Law to be administered

37. The law to be administered by the courts in Rhodesia will be the law in force in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope on the 10th June, 1891, as modified by subsequent legislation having in Rhodesia the force of law.

CHAPTER V. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

Declaration of Rights to be non-justiciable

38. No court will have the right to inquire into or pronounce upon the validity of any law on the ground that it is inconsistent with the Declaration of Rights.

Content of Declaration of Rights

39. The new Declaration of Rights will follow the general pattern of the existing Declaration. It will be in a form which is more appropriate to a non-justiciable Declaration. The more important changes which are proposed are as follows:—

Preamble

(1) The preamble will state that it is desirable to ensure that every person in Rhodesia enjoys fundamental rights and freedoms but will point out that there are responsibilities and duties expected of an individual who receives the protection of the State. The duty to respect the rights and freedoms of others and the public interest and to abide by the Constitution and the law and, in the case of citizens, to be loyal to Rhodesia will be included.

Right to life

(2) The existing exceptions to this right will be extended to permit the use of force where it is reasonably justifiable in the circumstances for the purpose of suppressing terrorism.

Right to personal liberty

(3) In order to cure an omission in the existing Declaration the exceptions to this right will be extended to cover arrests ordered by statutory tribunals, quasi-judicial authorities and commissions of inquiry in appropriate circumstances.

Preventive detention and restriction will be authorized in the interests of national defence, public safety or public order. An impartial tribunal will be established with at least one member who holds or has held judicial office or who has been entitled to practise as an advocate for at least ten years. This tribunal will review the case of a detainee within a period of three months of his detention, if he so requests, and in any case at intervals of not less than twelve months. The responsible Minister will be obliged to act in accordance with a recommendation by the tribunal that the detainee should be released unless the Head of State directs otherwise.

An accused person will not be entitled as of right to be released on bail before and during his trial.

Protection from slavery and forced labour

(4) This right will be retained.

Protection from inhuman treatment

(5) The existing provision will be retained.

Protection from deprivation of property

(6) The existing provisions will be redrafted to provide that no person shall be deprived of his property unless such deprivation is authorized by law. As at present compulsory acquisition of property by the Government in circumstances where no compensation is payable will be restricted, but provision will be made for the compulsory acquisition of property by the Government in any circumstances so long as adequate compensation is paid.

Protection from search and entry

(7) The existing provisions will be retained save that it will be specifically provided that a law may authorize the search of a person or the entry into or search of a dwelling-house in circumstances where there are reasonable grounds for believing that the entry or search is necessary for the prevention or detection of a criminal offence or for the lawful arrest of a person.

Protection of law

(8) The existing provision will be retained except that the requirement that a person shall not be compelled to give evidence at his trial will be omitted. This requirement is, in any case, contained in the criminal law and should be subject to regulation by ordinary legislation to reflect current trends in criminal procedure.

Freedom of conscience

(9) This freedom will be retained.

Freedom of expression and of assembly and association

(10) For convenience these two freedoms which are set out separately in the existing Declaration will be combined. The existing provision permitting laws made for the purpose of regulating telephony, telegraphy, posts, wireless broadcasting and other matters will be extended to permit laws for the regulation of newspapers and other publications.

Freedom from discrimination

(11) The existing provisions relating to freedom from discrimination will be revised. Every person will be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms in the new Declaration of Rights without unjust discrimination on the grounds of race, tribe, political opinion, colour or creed. Specific provision will be made permitting laws relating to African customary law, jurisdiction of tribal courts and restrictions on the ownership, occupation or use of land.

The existing provision relating to freedom from discriminatory executive or administrative acts will be omitted from the new Declaration. The Senate and its legal committee will be concerned only with laws.

Savings for periods of public emergencies and disciplinary laws

(12) As in the existing Declaration provision will be made that laws authorizing the taking of justifiable measures during a period of public emergency and disciplinary laws may contain provisions which are inconsistent with certain rights in the Declaration.

CHAPTER VI. MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS

Official language

40. The English language will be the only official language of Rhodesia.

Oath of loyalty

41. If a republican form of government is adopted persons required under the Constitution to take an oath of loyalty will take an oath to be faithful and bear true allegiance to Rhodesia.

CHAPTER VII. AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION
AND ENTRENCHMENT OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF
ELECTORAL AND LAND TENURE LAWS*Amendment of ordinary provisions of the Constitution*

42. A Bill to amend the Constitution will require to be passed by the affirmative votes of two-thirds of the total membership of the House of Assembly and two-thirds of the total membership of the Senate:

Provided that, if such a Bill does not receive the required majority in the Senate, it may be reintroduced into the Senate after a period of one hundred and eighty days, whereupon it may be sent to the Head of State for assent if it has received the affirmative votes of more than one-half of the total membership of the Senate.

Amendment of specially entrenched provisions of the Constitution

43. The procedure to amend the ordinary provisions of the Constitution will be followed in the case of specially entrenched provisions, save that, if the Bill does not receive the affirmative votes of two-thirds of the total membership of the Senate, the Bill will lapse.

Provisions of the Constitution to be specially entrenched

44. The following will be specially entrenched under the Constitution—

- (a) the composition of the Senate and the House of Assembly;
- (b) the judicature;
- (c) the official language;
- (d) the Declaration of Rights;
- (e) the procedure for amending the Constitution and the provisions of the laws referred to in section 45 of this paper.

However, in the case of a Bill to amend the Constitution so as to increase the number of members of the Senate or the House of Assembly, the procedure to amend the ordinary provisions of the Constitution may be followed if the proportion of African members to European members in the Senate or the House of Assembly, as the case may be, immediately before the increase is maintained.

Certain provisions of electoral and land tenure laws to be entrenched

45. Provision will be made that those parts of the Electoral Act referred to in section 74 of Part II of this paper can only be amended by following the procedure for amending the ordinary provisions of the Constitution. Provision will also be made that those parts of the law relating to land tenure referred to in section 87 of Part III of this paper can only be amended by following the procedure for amending the specially entrenched provisions of the Constitution.

PART II—ELECTORAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER I. DELIMITATION COMMISSION

Appointment of Delimitation Commission

46. Provisions relating to the appointment and composition of the Delimitation Commission similar to those contained in the present Constitution will be reproduced.

Functions of Delimitation Commission

47. The functions of the Delimitation Commission will be—
- (a) to divide Rhodesia into fifty European roll constituencies;
 - (b) to divide each of Matabeleland and Mashonaland into four African roll constituencies or, if the number of African roll members has been increased in accordance with section 10 of Part I of this paper, into the appropriate number of African roll constituencies;
 - (c) to calculate in accordance with section 10 of Part I of this paper whether any increase in the number of African roll members is justified;
 - (d) to determine the adjustments to the boundaries of areas of the tribal electoral colleges when the number of such colleges is increased in accordance with section 10 of Part I of this paper.

In dividing Rhodesia into European roll constituencies and Matabeleland and Mashonaland into African roll constituencies the Delimitation Commission will observe the same directions and give due consideration to the same factors as are specified in the present Constitution save that, in the case of the African roll constituencies, a minimum number of rural constituencies will not be required.

CHAPTER II. VOTERS ROLLS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF VOTERS FOR HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY

Voters rolls

48. The Registrar-General of Voters will maintain a European roll of all European voters in each European constituency and an African roll of all African voters in each African constituency. Suitably qualified persons will be entitled to enrolment on their respective rolls.

General qualifications of voters

49. The qualifications as to citizenship, residence, knowledge of English and ability to complete the prescribed application form for enrolment as a voter on any roll will remain as at present. An applicant must be twenty-one years of age or over.

Disqualification of voters

50. The existing grounds for disqualification as a voter will remain. In addition, a person who is restricted or detained for more than six months will be disqualified for the period of his restriction or detention and for five years after his release.

Means and educational qualifications for European voters

51. A European who possesses the general qualifications and is not disqualified will be entitled to enrolment as a voter if he—

- (a) has an income of not less than £900 during each of the two years preceding the claim for enrolment or owns immovable property in Rhodesia valued at not less than £1,800; or
- (b) has an income of not less than £600 during each of the two years preceding the claim for enrolment or owns immovable property in Rhodesia valued at not less than £1,200 and, in addition to the income or property qualifications, has completed four years' secondary education of a prescribed standard.

Means and educational qualifications for African voters

52. An African who possesses the general qualifications and is not disqualified will be entitled to enrolment as a voter if he—

- (a) has an income of not less than £300 during each of the two years preceding the claim for enrolment or owns immovable property in Rhodesia valued at not less than £600; or
- (b) has an income of not less than £200 during each of the two years preceding the claim for enrolment or owns immovable property in Rhodesia valued at not less than £400 and, in addition to the income or property qualifications, has completed two years' secondary education of a prescribed standard.

Value of immovable property

53. For the purpose of calculating the value of immovable property to qualify for enrolment the value will be the market value of the property less any capital charges in respect of, and amounts secured by mortgage on, that property.

Means qualifications of married women

54. The existing provisions relating to the means qualifications of married women will remain.

Means qualifications of ministers and members of religious orders

55. A minister of a prescribed religious order or a member of a prescribed religious order under vows of poverty will be deemed to possess the necessary means qualifications for enrolment on the European roll or the African roll.

Variation of means and educational qualifications for African voters

56. The Head of State, acting on the recommendation of a commission appointed for the purpose, will be empowered to vary by proclamation from time to time the means and educational qualifications for the African roll in order that the differences between the qualifications for the European roll and the qualifications for the African roll are progressively reduced and eventually eliminated when the number of African seats equals the number of European seats in the House of Assembly.

Transfer of voters to the European roll or the African roll

57. Voters on the existing "A" or "B" rolls will be automatically transferred, in the case of Europeans, to the European roll and, in the case of Africans, to the African roll.

CHAPTER III. ELECTIONS FOR EUROPEAN ROLL AND AFRICAN ROLL SEATS IN THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY

Nomination of candidates

58. The existing procedure will be retained save that a European will not be eligible for nomination for an African roll seat and an African will not be eligible for nomination for a European roll seat.

Qualifications of candidates

59. A candidate will be qualified for nomination if he—
- (a) is enrolled as a voter; and
 - (b) has resided in Rhodesia for five years during the seven years immediately preceding his nomination; and
 - (c) is not disqualified.

Disqualification of candidates

60. The existing grounds for disqualification from nomination will be retained. In addition, a candidate will be disqualified if he has been restricted or detained for a period of more than six months, for the period of his restriction or detention and for a further period of five years after his release.

CHAPTER IV. TRIBAL ELECTORAL COLLEGES

Establishment of tribal electoral colleges

61. Initially four tribal electoral colleges will be established for Matabeleland and four will be established for Mashonaland. Each college will be required to elect one African member to the House of Assembly.

The areas of tribal electoral colleges will be fixed in such a manner that the boundaries coincide with the boundaries of administrative districts and so far as is possible—

- (a) representation is based on tribal interests; and
- (b) a reasonably even distribution of tribal population between the tribal electoral college areas in Matabeleland and between those areas in Mashonaland, respectively, is achieved.

Composition of tribal electoral colleges.

62. A tribal electoral college will consist of chiefs and headmen residing in the area of the tribal electoral college and elected councillors of African councils situated in that area.

Procedure of tribal electoral colleges

63. Candidates may address the college and members of the college may put questions to candidates. Each member of the college will have one vote and the voting will be by secret ballot. If at the first count the candidate with the most votes does not obtain more than half of the votes cast, the candidate who has the fewest votes will be eliminated and a fresh vote taken. If necessary this procedure will be repeated until one candidate has an over-all majority of votes.

Nomination of candidates

64. The nomination paper of a candidate for election must be signed by at least one chief, two kraal heads and seven tribesmen resident in the area of the college.

Qualifications of candidates

65. A person will be qualified for nomination as a candidate if he—

- (a) is a citizen of Rhodesia; and
- (b) is a tribesman of twenty-one years of age or over; and
- (c) has resided continuously in the area of the college for a period of five years during the seven years immediately preceding his nomination; and
- (d) possesses a prescribed qualification sufficient to enable him, if elected, to contribute to and understand proceedings in the House of Assembly.

Disqualifications of candidates

66. A person will be disqualified from nomination as a candidate on any of the grounds of disqualification relating to candidates for the European or African roll seats in the House of Assembly.

CHAPTER V. ELECTION AND APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE SENATE

Nomination of European senators

67. The procedure for the nomination of European senators will be similar to that for the nomination of candidates for election to the European seats in the House of Assembly save that a candidate will have to be nominated by not more than fifty or less than thirty persons enrolled on the European voters roll.

Qualifications of Europeans for election to Senate

68. A candidate for election as a European senator must possess the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for nomination as a candidate for a European roll seat in the House of Assembly save that he shall—

- (a) be not less than forty years of age; and
- (b) have resided in Rhodesia for ten years during the fifteen years immediately preceding his nomination.

Procedure for election of European senators

69. The electoral college will be composed of the European members of the House of Assembly. Each member of the electoral college will be entitled to one vote for every vacant seat of a European senator and may not cast more than one vote for any one candidate. The ballot will be secret.

Nomination of chiefs for election to Senate

70. The Council of Chiefs will sit as an electoral college for the purpose of nominating and electing chiefs to the Senate. Candidates for election to the five seats reserved for Matabeleland chiefs will be nominated by members of the Council from Matabeleland and candidates for election to the five seats reserved for Mashonaland chiefs will be nominated by members of the Council from Mashonaland.

Qualifications of chiefs for election to Senate

71. A candidate for election must—
- (a) be a duly appointed chief; and
 - (b) reside in Matabeleland, in the case of a seat reserved for chiefs from Matabeleland, or in Mashonaland, in the case of a seat reserved for chiefs from Mashonaland; and
 - (c) not possess any of the disqualifications applicable to candidates for European or African roll seats in the House of Assembly.

Procedure for election of chiefs

72. The electoral college will be composed of the members of the Council of Chiefs. Each member of the electoral college will be entitled to one vote for every vacant seat of a chief for Matabeleland or Mashonaland, as the case may be, and may not cast more than one vote for any one candidate. The ballot will be secret.

Appointment of senators

73. The three senators appointed by the Head of State shall—

- (a) be not less than forty years of age; and
- (b) have resided in Rhodesia for ten years during the fifteen years immediately preceding their appointment; and
- (c) be enrolled as voters on the European roll or African roll; and
- (d) possess none of the disqualifications applicable to candidates for European or African roll seats in the House of Assembly.

CHAPTER VI. ENTRENCHMENT OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE ELECTORAL ACT

Procedure for amendment

74. The procedure for amending the ordinary provisions of the Constitution will be followed for any amendment of the Electoral Act which would vary—

- (a) the qualifications and disqualifications for the franchise;
- (b) the procedure for varying the means and educational qualifications for the African roll described in section 56 of this paper;
- (c) the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates for the Senate or House of Assembly.

PART III—LAND TENURE PROVISIONS
CHAPTER I. CLASSIFICATION OF LAND

Categories of land

75. All land in Rhodesia will be classified as—

- (a) the European Area; or
- (b) the African Area; or
- (c) National Land.

The total area of all the land in the European Area and the total area of all the land in the African Area will at all times be equal, save that in each Area a variation of two *per centum* from half of the acreage of these two combined Areas will be permissible to facilitate the initial classification of, and future exchanges and transfers between, the three categories. The area of National Land will be fixed subject to a two *per centum* variation from its initial acreage to enable these exchanges to be made.

In order to achieve this equality the existing European and African Areas will be adjusted by the addition of all the existing Unreserved Land, which will cease to be a separate category, and some areas of National Land. In addition, various small "islands" of land owned by persons of one race within the Area of the other race will be eliminated but the rights of present owners will be safeguarded. It has been calculated that this adjustment will result in the following acreages being allocated to the three categories of land—

- (a) 44.9 million acres in the European Area;
- (b) 45.2 million acres in the African Area;
- (c) 6.4 million acres of National Land.

As some areas of Rhodesia have not been accurately surveyed, slight adjustment of the acreages of these areas may become necessary when such surveys are carried out.

Exchanges of land

76. A board of trustees for each of the European Area and the African Area will be established and entrusted with the functions of determining such transfers and exchanges of land between the land categories as may be desirable to meet changing circumstances and of ensuring that the permitted variations in the area of the respective categories are not exceeded.

CHAPTER II. EUROPEAN AND AFRICAN AREAS

Fundamental principles

77. The European Area shall be deemed to be an area in which European interests are paramount and the African Area shall be deemed to be an area in which African interests are paramount. The rights of Europeans and the restrictions on Africans in the European Area will be on a reciprocal basis to the rights of Africans and the restrictions on Europeans in the African Area.

Composition of European and African Areas

78. The European Area and the African Area will consist of the following land—

- (a) privately owned land;

- (b) State land which may include--
- (i) forest areas;
 - (ii) national parks;
 - (iii) wild life areas;
- and will include, in the case of the African Area, Tribal Trust Land.

Ownership of land

79. (1) Land in the European Area may not be privately owned by an African and land in the African Area may not be privately owned by a European, save for the exceptions referred to in this Part and for the case of property which has been acquired in terms of a mortgage bond thereon and which will be subject to the restriction that it may not be so owned for more than five years.

(2) State land will vest in the Head of State.

(3) Since Tribal Trust Land will vest in the Head of State the present Board of Trustees will be abolished. The principal responsibilities at present cast on that Board will be transferred to the Head of State.

Non-racial residential areas

80. The responsible Minister will have the power to declare any area of land zoned for residential purposes to be a non-racial residential area where persons of either race may own and occupy land for residential purposes. If the proposed non-racial residential area is within a local authority area the Minister can act only after an application by or consultation with the local authority.

European and African townships

81. The responsible Minister will have the power to declare any portion of land in the European Area to be an African township and any portion of land in the African Area to be a European township. If the proposed township is within a local authority area the Minister can act only after an application by or consultation with the local authority. Persons of the race for which a township is provided may own, lease or occupy land within that township. If a township ceases to be a declared township the rights of ownership by Africans in African townships and Europeans in European townships will cease, subject to the payment of such compensation as may be agreed or fixed by arbitration.

Mining rights

82. Any person may occupy land in the Area of the other race if he is granted a right under the mining laws and such occupation is for the purpose of exercising that right.

Special provisions relating to occupation by Africans of certain mission lands

83. Certain rights acquired by Africans in respect of the occupation of mission land in the European Area which have been in existence for many years will be subject to registration and review and will lapse on the death of the holders.

Participation in local government

84. Ownership or occupation of land by persons of one race in the Area of the other race will confer no voting rights on such owners or occupiers for the purposes of participation in local authority elections in that Area, but residents of townships set aside for a particular race and of non-racial residential areas may take part in elections in respect of local bodies established to administer local services for such townships or residential areas.

CHAPTER III. NATIONAL LAND

Ownership

85. National Land will vest in the Head of State and will be inalienable but leasehold rights for periods not exceeding ninety-nine years may be granted to persons of either race.

Occupation

86. National Land may be occupied by persons of all races but the use of such facilities as may be provided may be regulated according to the race of the user.

CHAPTER IV. ENTRENCHMENT OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS RELATING TO LAND TENURE

Entrenched provisions relating to land tenure

87. - A Bill to amend any of the following will be subject to the same procedure as that for amending a specially entrenched provision of the Constitution—

- (a) the classification of land into European Area, African Area and National Land and the acreages thereof, subject to the permitted variation of two *per centum*;
- (b) the procedure for exchanging land and the establishment and functions of the boards of trustees;
- (c) the basic rights of, and restrictions on, persons of either race in relation to the three categories of land;
- (d) the principle that rights of ownership or occupation by a person of one race in the Area of the other race will not confer voting rights in local authority elections;
- (e) the area of Tribal Trust Land and the rights of tribesmen.

APPENDIX D

THE ARUSHA DECLARATION

and

***TANZANIA AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION'S
(TANU'S) POLICY ON SOCIALISM
AND SELF-RELIANCE***

(65)

PART ONE

The TANU "Creed"

THE POLICY OF TANU IS TO BUILD A SOCIALIST STATE. THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIALISM ARE LAID DOWN IN THE TANU CONSTITUTION, AND THEY ARE AS FOLLOWS:—

WHEREAS TANU believes:—

- (a) That all human beings are equal;
- (b) That every individual has a right to dignity and respect;
- (c) That every citizen is an integral part of the Nation and has the right to take an equal part in Government at local, regional and national level;
- (d) That every citizen has the right to freedom of expression, of movement, of religious belief and of association within the context of the law;
- (e) That every individual has the right to receive from society protection of his life and of property held according to law;
- (f) That every individual has the right to receive a just return for his labour;
- (g) That all citizens together possess all the natural resources of the country in trust for their descendants;
- (h) That in order to ensure economic justice the State must have effective control over the principal means of production; and
- (i) That it is the responsibility of the State to intervene actively in the economic life of the Nation so as to ensure the well-being of all citizens and so as to prevent the exploitation of one person by another or one group by another, and so as to prevent the accumulation of wealth to an extent which is inconsistent with the existence of a classless society.

Now, THEREFORE, the principal aims and objects of TANU shall be as follows:—

- (a) To consolidate and maintain the independence of this country and the freedom of its people;
- (b) To safeguard the inherent dignity of the individual in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- (c) To ensure that this country shall be governed by a democratic socialist government of the people;
- (d) To co-operate with all political parties in Africa engaged in the liberation of all Africa;
- (e) To see that the Government mobilizes all the resources of this country towards the elimination of poverty, ignorance and disease;
- (f) To see that the Government actively assists in the formation and maintenance of co-operative organizations;
- (g) To see that wherever possible the Government itself directly participates in the economic development of this country;
- (h) To see that the Government gives equal opportunity to all men and women irrespective of race, religion or status;
- (i) To see that the Government eradicates all types of exploitation, intimidation, discrimination, bribery and corruption;
- (j) To see that the Government exercises effective control over the principal means of production and pursues policies which facilitate the way to collective ownership of the resources of this country;
- (k) To see that the Government co-operates with other States in Africa in bringing about African Unity;
- (l) To see that the Government works tirelessly towards world peace and security through the United Nations Organization.

PART TWO

THE POLICY OF SOCIALISM

(a) Absence of Exploitation:

A true Socialist State is one in which all people are workers and in which neither Capitalism nor Feudalism exist. It does not have two classes of people: a lower class consisting of people who work for their living, and an upper class consisting of those who live on other people's labour. In a true Socialist State no person exploits another, but everybody who is able to work does so and gets a fair income for his labour, and incomes do not differ substantially.

In a true Socialist State it is only the following categories of people who can live on other people's labour: children, the aged, cripples and those for whom the State at any one time cannot provide with employment.

Tanzania is a state of Peasants and Workers, but it is not yet a Socialist State. It still has elements of Capitalism and Feudalism and their temptations. These elements could expand and entrench themselves.

(b) Major Means of Production to be under the Control of Peasants and Workers:

The way to build and maintain socialism is to ensure that the major means of production are under the control and ownership of the Peasants and the Workers themselves through their Government and their Co-operatives. It is also necessary to ensure that the ruling party is a Party of Peasants and Workers.

These major means of production are: the land; forests; mineral resources; water; oil and electricity, communications; transport; banks; insurance; import and export trade; wholesale business; the steel, machine-tool, arms, motor-car cement, and fertilizer factories; the textile industry; and any other big industry upon which a large section of the population depend for their living, or which provides essential components for other industries; large plantations, especially those which produce essential raw materials.

Some of these instruments of production are already under the control and ownership of the people's Government.

(c) *Democracy:*

A state is not socialist simply because all, or all the major, means of production are controlled and owned by the Government. It is necessary for the Government to be elected and led by Peasants and Workers. If the racist Governments of Rhodesia and South Africa were to bring the major means of production in these countries under their control and direction, this would entrench Exploitation. It would not bring about Socialism. There cannot be true Socialism without Democracy.

(d) *Socialism is an Ideology:*

Socialism is an Ideology. It can only be implemented by people who firmly believe in its principles and are prepared to put them into practice. A true member of TANU is a socialist, and his compatriots, that is his fellow believers in this political and economic faith, are all those in Africa or elsewhere in the world who fight for the rights of the peasants and workers. The first duty of a TANU member, and especially of a TANU leader, is to live by these principles in his day-to-day life. In particular a TANU Leader should never live on another's labour, neither should he have capitalist or feudal tendencies.

The realization of these socialist objectives depends a great deal on the leadership, for as stated above, Socialism is an ideology, and it is difficult for leaders to implement it if they do not believe in it.

PART THREE

THE POLICY OF SELF-RELIANCE

We are at War:

TANU is involved in a war against poverty and oppression in our country; this struggle is aimed at moving the people of Tanzania (and the people of Africa as a whole) from a state of poverty to a state of prosperity.

We have been oppressed a great deal, we have been exploited a great deal and we have been disregarded a great deal. It is our weakness that has led to our being oppressed, exploited and disregarded. We now intend to bring about a revolution which will ensure that we are never again victims of these things.

A poor Man does not use Money as a Weapon:

But it is obvious that in the past we have chosen the wrong weapon for our struggle, because we chose money as our weapon. We are trying to overcome our economic weakness by using the weapons of the economically strong—weapons which in fact we do not possess. By our thoughts, words and actions it appears as if we have come to the conclusion that without money we cannot bring about the revolution we are aiming at. It is as if we have said, "Money is the basis of development. Without money there can be no development".

This is what we believe at present. TANU leaders, and Government leaders and officials, all put great emphasis and dependence on money. The people's leaders, and the people themselves, in TANU, NUTA, Parliament, UWT, the Co-operatives, TAPA and in other national institutions think, hope and pray for MONEY. It is as if we had all agreed to speak with one voice, saying: "If we get money we shall develop, without money we cannot develop".

In brief, our Five-Year Development Plan aims at more food, more education and better health; but the weapon we have put emphasis upon is money. It is as if we said: "In the next five years we want to have more food, more education and better health and in order to achieve these things we shall spend £250,000,000". We think and speak as if the most important thing to depend upon is MONEY and anything else we intend to use in our struggle is of minor importance.

When a Member of Parliament says that there is a shortage of water in his constituency and he asks the Government how it intends to deal with the problem, he expects the Government to reply that it is planning to remove the shortage of water in his constituency—WITH MONEY.

When another Member of Parliament asks what the Government is doing about the shortage of roads, schools or hospitals in his constituency, he also expects the Government to tell him that it has specific plans to build roads, schools and hospitals in his constituency—with MONEY.

When a NUTA official asks the Government about its plans to deal with the low wages and poor housing of the workers, he expects the Government to inform him that the minimum wage will be increased and that better houses will be provided for the workers—with MONEY.

When a TAPA official asks the Government what plans it has to give assistance to the many TAPA schools which do not get Government aid, he expects the Government to state that it is ready the following morning to give the required assistance—of MONEY.

When an official of the Co-operative Movement mentions any problem facing the farmer, he expects to hear that the Government will solve the farmer's problems—with MONEY. In short, for every problem facing our Nation, the solution that is in everybody's mind is MONEY.

Each year, each Ministry of Government makes its estimates of expenditure, i.e., the amount of money it will require in the coming year to meet recurrent and development expenses. Only one Minister and his Ministry make estimates of revenue. This is the Minister for Finance. Every Ministry puts forward very good development plans. When the Ministry presents its estimates, it believes that the money is there for the asking but that the Minister for Finance and his Ministry are being obstructive. And regularly each year the Minister for Finance has to tell his fellow Ministers that there is no money. And each year the Ministries complain about the Ministry of Finance when it trims down their estimates.

Similarly, when Members of Parliament and other leaders demand that the Government should carry out a certain development, they believe that there is a lot of money to spend on such projects, but that the Government is the stumbling block. Yet such belief on the part of Ministries, Members of Parliament and other leaders does not alter the stark truth, which is that Government has not money.

When it is said that Government has no money, what does this mean? It means that people of Tanzania have insufficient money. The people pay taxes out of the very little wealth they have; it is from these taxes that the Government meets its recurrent and development

expenditure. When we call on the Government to spend more money on development projects, we are asking the Government to use more money. And if the Government does not have any more, the only way it can do this is to increase its revenue through extra taxation.

If one calls on the Government to spend more, one is in effect calling on the Government to increase taxes. Calling on the Government to spend more without raising taxes is like demanding that the Government should perform miracles; it is equivalent to asking for more milk from a cow while insisting that the cow should not be milked again. But our refusal to admit that calling on the Government to spend more is the same as calling on the Government to raise taxes shows that we fully realize the difficulties of increasing taxes. We realize that the cow has no more milk—that is, that the people find it difficult to pay more taxes. We know that the cow would like to have more milk herself, so that her calves could drink it, or that it would like more milk which could be sold to provide more comfort for itself or its calves. But knowing all the things which could be done with more milk does not alter the fact that the cow has no more milk!

What of External Aid?

One way we employ to try to escape the need for increased taxation for development purposes is to put emphasis on money coming from outside Tanzania. This money from outside falls into three categories:—

(a) *Grants*: This means that another Government gives our Government a sum of money as a free gift for a given development scheme. Sometimes it may be that an Institution in another country gives our Government or an Institution in our country financial help for development programmes.

(b) *Loans*: The greater portion of financial help we expect to get from outside is not in the form of gifts or charity, but in the form of loans. A foreign Government or a foreign institution, such as a Bank, lends our Government money for the purposes of development. Such a loan has repayment conditions attached to it, covering such factors as the time period for which it is available and the rate of interest.

(c) *Private Investment*: The third category of financial help is also greater than the first. This takes the form of investment in our country by individuals or companies from outside. The important condition which such private investors have in mind is that the enterprise into which they put their money should bring them profit and that our Government should permit them to repatriate these profits. They also prefer to invest in a country whose policies they agree with and which will safeguard their economic interests.

These three are the main categories of external finance. There is a great deal of talk on this question of getting money from external sources. Our Government and our leaders and other people keep on thinking about ways of getting money from outside. And when we get the money, or even the promise of it, our newspapers, our radio, and our leaders announce the news so that everybody may know that salvation has been obtained or is on the way. When we get a gift we make an announcement; when we get a loan or a new industry we make an announcement. In the same way, when we are given the promise of a gift, a loan or a new industry, we make an announcement of this promise. Even when we have merely started discussions with a foreign Government or institution for a gift, a loan, or a new industry, we make an announcement—even though we do not know the outcome of the discussions. Why do we do all this? Because we want people to know that we have started discussions which will bring prosperity.

DO NOT LET US DEPEND UPON MONEY FOR DEVELOPMENT

It is stupid to rely on money as the major instrument of development when we know only too well that our country is poor. It is equally stupid, indeed it is even more stupid, for us to imagine that we shall rid ourselves of our poverty through foreign financial assistance rather than our own financial resources. It is stupid for two reasons.

Firstly, we shall not get the money. It is true that there are countries which can, and which would like to help us. But there is no country in the world which is prepared to give us gifts or loans, or establish industries, to the extent that we would be able to achieve all our development targets. There are many needy countries in the world,

And even if all the prosperous nations were willing to help the needy countries, the assistance would still not suffice. But prosperous nations are not willing to give all they could. Even in these prosperous nations, the rich do not willingly give money to the Government to relieve want.

Money can only be extracted from the rich through taxation. Even then tax revenue is not enough. However heavily we taxed the citizens of Tanzania and aliens living here, the resulting revenue would not be enough to meet the costs of our development programme. Neither is there any Government in the world which can tax the prosperous or rich nations in order to help the poor nations. Even if there was such a government, the revenue would not be enough to do all that is needed. But in fact there is no world Government. Such money as the rich nations offer to poor nations is given voluntarily, either through their goodness or for their own benefit. For all these reasons it is impossible for us to get enough money for development from overseas.

GIFTS AND LOANS WILL ENDANGER OUR INDEPENDENCE

Secondly, even if it were possible for us to get enough money for our needs from external sources, is this what we really want? Independence means self-reliance. Independence cannot be real if a Nation depends upon gifts and loans from another for its development. Even if there was a Nation, or Nations, prepared to give us all the money we need for our development, it would be improper for us to accept such assistance without asking ourselves how this would affect our independence and our very survival as a nation. Gifts which start off or stimulate our own efforts are useful gifts. But gifts which weaken our own efforts should not be accepted without asking ourselves a number of questions.

The same applies to loans. It is true that loans are better than "free" gifts. A loan is intended to increase our efforts or make those efforts more fruitful. One condition of a loan is that you show how you are going to repay it. This means you have to show that you intend to use the loan profitably and will therefore be able to repay it.

But even loans have their limitations. You have to give consideration to the ability to repay. When we borrow money from other countries it is the Tanzanian who pays it back. And as we have already stated, Tanzanians are poor people. To burden the people with big loans, the repayment of which will be beyond their means, is not to help them but to make them suffer. It is even worse when the loans they are asked to repay have not benefited the majority of the people but have only benefited a small minority.

How about the enterprises of foreign investors? It is true we need these enterprises. We have even passed an Act of Parliament protecting foreign investments in this country. Our aim is to make foreign investors feel that Tanzania is a good place in which to invest because investments would be safe and profitable, and the profits can be taken out of the country without difficulty. We expect to get money through this method. But we cannot get enough. And even if we were able to convince foreign investors and foreign firms to undertake all the projects and programmes of economic development that we need, is that what we actually want to happen?

Had we been able to attract investors from America and Europe to come and start all the industries and all the projects of economic development that we need in this country, could we have done so without questioning ourselves? Would we have agreed to leave the economy of our country in the hands of foreigners who would take the profits back to their countries? Supposing they did not insist on taking their profits away, but decided to reinvest them in Tanzania. Would we accept this situation without asking ourselves what disadvantages it would have for our Nation? How can we build the Socialism we are talking about under such circumstances?

How can we depend upon gifts, loans and investments from foreign countries and foreign companies without endangering our independence? The English people have a proverb which says: "He who pays the piper calls the tune". How can we depend upon foreign Governments and Companies for the major part of our development

without giving to those Government and countries a great part of our freedom to act as we please? The truth is that we cannot.

Let us therefore always remember the following. We have made a mistake to choose money, something which we do not have, to be our major instrument of development. We are mistaken when we imagine that we shall get money from foreign countries, firstly, because to say the truth we cannot get enough money for our development and, secondly, because even if we could get it such complete dependence on outside help would have endangered our independence and the other policies of our country.

WE HAVE PUT TOO MUCH EMPHASIS ON INDUSTRIES

Because of our emphasis on money, we have made another big mistake. We have put too much emphasis in industries. Just as we have said "Without Money there can be no development", we also seem to say "Industries are the basis of development, without industries there is no development". This is true. The day when we have lots of money we shall be able to say we are a developed country. We shall be able to say: "When we began our development plans we did not have enough money and this situation made it difficult for us to develop as fast as we wanted. Today we are developed and we have enough money". That is to say, our money has been brought by development. Similarly, the day we become industrialized, we shall be able to say we are developed. Development would have enabled us to have industries. The mistake we are making is to think that development begins with industries. It is a mistake because we do not have the means to establish many modern industries in our country. We do not have either the necessary finances or the technical know-how. It is not enough to say that we shall borrow the finances and the technicians from other countries to come and start the industries. The answer to this is the same one we gave earlier, that we cannot get enough money and borrow enough technicians to start all the industries we need. And even if we could get the necessary assistance, dependence on it could interfere with our policy on Socialism. The policy of inviting a chain of capitalists to come and establish industries in our country might succeed

in giving us all the industries we need, but it would also succeed in preventing the establishment of socialism unless we believe that without first building capitalism, we cannot build Socialism.

LET US BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE PEASANT FARMER

Our emphasis on money and industries has made us concentrate on urban development. We recognize that we do not have enough money to bring the kind of development to each village which would benefit everybody. We also know that we cannot establish an industry in each village and through this means effect a rise in the real incomes of the people. For these reasons we spend most of our money in the urban areas and our industries are established in the towns.

Yet the greater part of this money that we spend in the towns comes from loans. Whether it is used to build schools, hospitals, houses or factories, etc., it still has to be repaid. But it is obvious that it cannot be repaid just out of money obtained from urban and industrial development. To repay the loans we have to use foreign currency which is obtained from the sale of our exports. But we do not now sell our industrial products in foreign markets, and indeed it is likely to be a long time before our industries produce for export. The main aim of our new industries is "import substitution"—that is, to produce things which up to now we have had to import from foreign countries.

It is therefore obvious that the foreign currency we shall use to pay back the loans used in the development of the urban areas will not come from the towns or the industries. Where then shall we get it from? We shall get it from the villages and from agriculture. What does this mean? It means that the people who benefit directly from development which is brought about by borrowed money are not the ones who will repay the loans. The largest proportion of the loans will be spent in, or for, the urban areas, but the largest proportion of the repayment will be made through the efforts of the farmers.

This fact should always be borne in mind, for there are various forms of exploitation. We must not forget that people who live in towns can possibly become the exploiters

of those who live in the rural areas. All our big hospitals are in towns and they benefit only a small section of the people of Tanzania. Yet if we have built them with loans from outside Tanzania, it is the overseas sale of the peasants' produce which provides the foreign exchange for repayment. Those who do not get the benefit of the hospitals, thus carry the major responsibility for paying for them. Tarmac roads, too, are mostly found in towns and are of especial value to the motor-car owners. Yet if we have built those roads with loans, it is again the farmer who produces the goods which will pay for them. What is more, the foreign exchange with which the car was bought also came from the sale of the farmer's produce. Again, electric lights, water pipes, hotels and other aspects of modern development are mostly found in towns. Most of them have been built with loans, and most of them do not benefit the farmer directly, although they will be paid for by the foreign exchange earned by the sale of his produce. We should always bear this in mind.

Although when we talk of exploitation we usually think of capitalists, we should not forget that there are many fish in the sea. They eat each other. The large ones eat the small ones, and the small ones eat those who are even smaller. There are two possible ways of dividing the people in our country. We can put the capitalists and feudalists on one side, and the peasants and workers on the other. But we can also divide the people into urban dwellers on one side, and those who live in the rural areas on the other. If we are not careful we might get to the position where the real exploitation in Tanzania is that of the town dwellers exploiting the peasants.

THE PEOPLE AND AGRICULTURE

The development of a country is brought about by people, not by money. Money, and the wealth it represents, is the result and not the basis of development. The four prerequisites of development are different; they are (i) People; (ii) Land; (iii) Good Policies; (iv) Good Leadership. Our country has more than ten million people and its area is more than 362,000 square miles.

AGRICULTURE IS THE BASIS OF DEVELOPMENT

A great part of Tanzania's land is fertile and gets sufficient rains. Our country can produce various crops for home consumption and for export.

We can produce food crops (which can be exported if we produce in large quantities) such as maize, rice, wheat, beans, groundnuts, etc. And we can produce such cash crops as sisal, cotton, coffee, tobacco, pyrethrum, tea, etc. Our land is also good for grazing cattle, goats, sheep, and for raising chickens, etc.; we can get plenty of fish from our rivers, lakes, and from the sea. All of our farmers are in areas which can produce two or three or even more of the food and cash crops enumerated above and each farmer could increase his production so as to get more food or more money. And because the main aim of development is to get more food, and more money for our other needs, our purpose must be to increase production of these agricultural crops. This is in fact the only road through which we can develop our country—in other words, only by increasing our production of these things can we get more food and more money for every Tanzanian.

THE CONDITIONS OF DEVELOPMENT

(a) *Hard Work:*

Everybody wants development; but not everybody understands and accepts the basic requirements for development. The biggest requirement is hard work. Let us go to the villages and talk to our people and see whether or not it is possible for them to work harder.

In towns, for example, the average paid worker works seven-and-a-half or eight hours a day for six or six-and-a-half days a week. This is about 45 hours a week, excluding two or three weeks' leave every year. This means that an urban worker works for 45 hours a week in 48 to 50 weeks a year.

For a country like ours these are really quite short working hours. In other countries, even those which are more developed than we are, people work for more than 45 hours a week. It is not normal for a young country to

start with such a short working week. The normal thing is to begin with long working hours and decrease them as the country becomes more and more prosperous. By starting with such short working hours and asking for even shorter hours, we are in fact imitating the more developed countries. And we shall regret this imitation. Nevertheless, wage-earners do work for 45 hours per week and their annual vacation does not exceed four weeks.

It would be appropriate to ask our farmers, especially the men, how many hours a week and how many weeks a year they work. Many do not even work for half as many hours as the wage-earner does. The truth is that in the villages the women work very hard. At times they work for 12 or 14 hours a day. They even work on Sundays and public holidays. Women who live in the villages work harder than anybody else in Tanzania. But the men who live in villages (and some of the women in towns) are on leave for half of their life. The energies of the millions of men in the villages and thousands of women in the towns which are at present wasted in gossip, dancing and drinking, are a great treasure which could contribute more towards the development of our country than anything we could get from rich nations.

We would be doing something very beneficial to our country if we went to the villages and told our people that they hold this treasure and that it is up to them to use it for their own benefit and the benefit of our whole Nation.

(b) Intelligence:

The second condition of development is the use of INTELLIGENCE. Unintelligent hard work would not bring the same good results as the two combined. Using a big hoe instead of a small one; using a plough pulled by oxen instead of an ordinary hoe; the use of fertilizers; the use of insecticides; knowing the right crop for a particular season or soil; choosing good seeds for planting; knowing the right time for planting, weeding, etc.; all these things show the use of knowledge and intelligence. And all of them combined with hard work to produce more and better results.

The money and time we spend on passing on this knowledge to the peasants are better spent and bring more benefits to our country than the money and the great amount of time we spend on other things which we call development.

These facts are well-known to all of us. The parts of our Five-Year Development Plan which are on target, or where the target has been exceeded, are those parts which depend solely upon the people's own hard work. The production of cotton, coffee, cashewnuts, tobacco, and pyrethrum has increased tremendously for the past three years. But these are things which are produced by hard work and the good leadership of the people, not by the use of great amounts of money.

Furthermore the people, through their own hard work and with a little help and leadership, have finished many development projects in the villages. They have built schools, dispensaries, community centres, and roads; they have dug wells, water-channels, animal dips, small dams, and completed various other development projects. Had they waited for money, they would not now have the use of these things.

HARD WORK IS THE ROOT OF DEVELOPMENT

Some Plan projects which depend on money are going on well, but there are many which have stopped and others which might never be fulfilled because of lack of money. Yet still we talk about money and our search for money increases and takes nearly all our energies. We should not lessen our efforts to get the money we really need, but it would be more appropriate for us to spend time in the villages showing the people how to bring about development through their own efforts, rather than going on so many long and expensive journeys abroad in search of development money. This is the real way to bring development to everybody in the country.

None of this means that from now on we will not need money or that we will not start industries or embark upon development projects which require money. Furthermore, we are not saying that we will not accept, or even that we shall not look for, money from other countries for our development. This is NOT what we are saying. We

will continue to use money; and each year we will use more money for the various development projects than we used the previous year because this will be one of the signs of our development.

What we are saying, however, is that from now on we shall know what is the foundation and what is the fruit of development. Between MONEY and PEOPLE it is obvious that the people and their HARD WORK are the foundation of development, and money is one of the fruits of that hard work.

From now on we shall stand upright and walk forward on our feet rather than look at this problem upside down. Industries will come and money will come but their foundation is THE PEOPLE and their HARD WORK, especially in AGRICULTURE. This is the meaning of self-reliance. Our emphasis should therefore be on:—

- (a) The Land and Agriculture,
- (b) The People,
- (c) The Policy of Socialism and Self-Reliance, and
- (d) Good Leadership.

(a) The Land:

Because of the economy of Tanzania depends and will continue to depend on agriculture and animal husbandry, Tanzanians can live well without depending on help from outside if they use their land properly. Land is the basis of human life and all Tanzanians should use it as a valuable investment for future development. Because the land belongs to the Nation, the Government has to see to it that it is used for the benefit of the whole nation and not for the benefit of one individual or just a few people.

It is the responsibility of TANU to see that the country produces enough food, enough cash crops for export. It is the responsibility of the Government and the Co-operative Societies to see to it that our people get the necessary tools, training and leadership in modern methods of agriculture.

(b) The People:

In order properly to implement the policy of self-reliance, the people have to be taught the meaning of self-reliance and its practice. They must become self-sufficient in food, serviceable clothes and good housing.

In our country work should be something to be proud of, and laziness, drunkenness and idleness should be things to be ashamed of. And for the defence of our Nation, it is necessary for us to be on guard against internal stooges who could be used by external enemies who aim to destroy us. The people should always be ready to defend their Nation when they are called upon to do so.

(c) Good Policies:

The principles of our policy of self-reliance go hand in hand with our policy on Socialism. In order to prevent exploitation it is necessary for everybody to work and to live on his own labour. And in order to distribute the national wealth fairly, it is necessary for everybody to work to the maximum of his ability. Nobody should go and stay for a long time with his relative, doing no work, because in doing so he will be exploiting his relative. Likewise, nobody should be allowed to loiter in towns or villages without doing work which would enable him to be self-reliant without exploiting his relatives.

TANU believes that everybody who loves his Nation has a duty to serve it by co-operating with his fellows in building the country for the benefit of all the people of Tanzania. In order to maintain our independence and our people's freedom we ought to be self-reliant in every possible way and avoid depending upon other countries for assistance. If every individual is self-reliant the ten-house cell will be self-reliant; if all the cells are self-reliant the whole ward will be self-reliant; and if the wards are self-reliant the District will be self-reliant. If the Districts are self-reliant, then the Region is self-reliant, and if the Regions are self-reliant, then the whole Nation is self-reliant and this is our aim.

(d) Good Leadership:

TANU realizes the importance of good leadership. The problem is that we have not prepared proper plans for the training of leaders. The Party Headquarters is now called upon to prepare specific plans for the training of leaders from the national level down to the leaders of the ten-house cells, so that all may understand our political and economic policies. Leaders must be a good example to the rest of the people through their actions and in their own lives.

PART FOUR

TANU MEMBERSHIP

Since the founding of the Party greater emphasis has been put on having as large a membership as possible. This was justified during the struggle for independence. Now, however, the National Executive Committee feels that the time has come for emphasis to shift away from more size of membership on to the quality of the membership. Greater consideration must be given to a member's commitment to the beliefs and objectives of the Party, and its policy of Socialism.

The Membership Clause in the TANU Constitution must be closely observed. Where it is thought unlikely that an applicant really accepts the beliefs, aims and objects of the Party, he should be denied membership. Above all it should always be remembered that TANU is a Party of Peasants and Workers.

PART FIVE

THE ARUSHA RESOLUTION

Therefore, the National Executive Committee, meeting in the Community Centre at Arusha from 26.1.67 to 29.1.67, resolves:—

A. THE LEADERSHIP

1. Every TANU and Government leader must be either a Peasant or a Worker, and should in no way be associated with the practices of Capitalism or Feudalism.
2. No TANU or Government leader should hold shares in any Company.
3. No TANU or Government leader should hold Directorships in any privately-owned enterprises.
4. No TANU or Government leader should receive two or more salaries.
5. No TANU or Government leader should own houses which he rents to others.

6. For the purposes of this Resolution the term "leader" should comprise the following: Members of the TANU National Executive Committee; Ministers, Members of Parliament, Senior Officials of Organizations affiliated to TANU, Senior Officials of Para-Statal Organizations, all those appointed or elected under any clause of the TANU Constitution, Councillors, and Civil Servants in high and middle cadres. (In this context "leader" means a man, or a man and his wife; a woman, or a woman and her husband).

B. THE GOVERNMENT AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS

1. Congratulates the Government for the steps it has taken, so far in the implementation of the policy of Socialism.
2. Calls upon the Government to take further steps in the implementation of our policy of Socialism as described in Part Two of this document without waiting for a Presidential Commission on Socialism.
3. Calls upon the Government to put emphasis, when preparing its development plans, on the ability of this country to implement the plans, rather than depending on foreign loans and grants as has been done in the current Five-Year Development Plan. The National Executive Committee also resolves that the Plan should be amended so as to make it fit in with the policy of self-reliance.
4. Calls upon the Government to take action designed to ensure that the incomes of workers in the private sector are not very different from the incomes of workers in the public sector.
5. Calls upon the Government to put great emphasis on actions which will raise the standard of living of the peasants, and the rural community.
6. Calls upon NUTA, the Co-operatives, TAPA, UWT, FYL, and other Government institutions to take steps to implement the policy of Socialism and Self-reliance.

C. MEMBERSHIP

Members should get thorough teaching on Party ideology so that they may understand it, and they should always be reminded of the importance of living up to its principles.

APPENDIX E

SOUTHERN AFRICA—A TIME FOR CHANGE

The articles reprinted in this appendix are from the above-entitled publication by the Friendship Press and the United Methodist Church, room 753, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, N. Y. Their purpose is to call attention to the growing crisis in southern Africa.

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FOREWORD

Aside from several organizations specializing in African affairs, a few groups of university students, and schools of African studies at about 50 universities and colleges, few people have demonstrated any concern for the black masses of southern Africa who are still brutally dominated by a stubborn white minority.

This public unawareness of conditions there may well be a major reason why the United States has been able to avoid establishing a practical southern Africa policy, let alone a reasonable policy for Africa as a whole. It may also be a reason why public indignation over southern Africa has not yet arisen here.

That public response is needed is unquestionable. But response in behalf of black Africa will not come about until the news media regard Africa as a major source on a par with Europe, Asia, and Latin America, and people acquaint themselves with the issues.

Southern Africa: "A Time for Change" is an effort on the part of the church to emphasize the deepening plight of southern Africa, the background of the current crises, and its future. It attempts to help bridge the communications gap between two vital areas of the world.

Africa was once almost totally owned by others. As late as 1953 only five countries (Liberia, Libya, Egypt, Ethiopia, and South Africa) were considered free. Britain had 14 colonies and protectorates, and French Africa covered almost a third of the continent. Portugal, Belgium, and Italy had the rest.

Now, with most of Africa free, it is the southern tip where white rule has proved reluctant to change, to read the signs of the time. It is there that a cataclysmic clash between whites and blacks, the haves and have-nots, is menacingly near. It is there that a great mass of people live an existence of misery and degradation.

The church is deeply concerned about the problems of Africa. Historically, its involvement came from a preoccupation with preaching the Gospel; its primary goal was to convert and to civilize. However, its teachings often fell upon deaf ears because for Africans, it was the flesh that suffered from inhuman treatment, the stomach that ached from hunger and the mind that thirsted for knowledge.

Gradually the church realized that it could not minister to the soul of the African without consideration for his health, education, and social welfare. So it built and staffed hospitals, schools, social centers and hostels, often before it was able to build its own houses of worship.

During these early years of the church in Africa it also served as the voice of the African, who, ruled by outsiders, had little or no voice of his own. But as the years wore on, the church grew strangely silent as pressures from the ruling white governments threatened to close the institutions it had worked so hard to establish and that had cost it so much to build. As Kenneth Kaunda, president of Zambia, once pointed out, the church lost its voice out of fear of losing its institutions.

Today, the church reacknowledges its responsibility to speak in behalf of the oppressed. Most denominations have forthrightly condemned apartheid in the Republic of South Africa and her illegal takeover of South-West Africa. In Rhodesia the church has championed social, political, and economic reforms that would allow the African a significant voice in his own affairs. A similar stance was taken in regard to Portugal's subjugation of Angola and Mozambique.

Southern Africa has reached a stage in history where change is imperative. It is to this end that Southern Africa: A Time for Change examines a blatant racism perhaps unparalleled anywhere else in the world.

Critics will charge that this is an unbalanced, exceedingly biased approach to the question of racism in southern Africa. We cannot agree more. South Africa has its own lobbyists. So do white Rhodesians and the Portuguese. Their positions have always been championed and they need no help from us. What we present here is an urgent message to people who have a compassionate, humanitarian concern for those who are forced to live under conditions most of us would not tolerate for long.

This publication attempts to arouse a response which will help to cause a change in southern Africa. It outlines actions all of us can take if we are really sensitive to the plight of our fellow human beings, regardless of their color or where they may happen to live.

In southern Africa there is time for change while the prospects for peace and co-existence between blacks and whites are still a possibility and before the issues have assumed more disastrous proportions.

That time is now.

GEORGE M. DANIELS.

ROOTS OF REVOLT

(By Edward W. Brooke*)

A grave crisis faces the world in the five states of southern Africa, where some 36 million people are denied the right to participate in making the laws by which they are governed and are segregated and classified on a purely racial basis. Trouble is brewing in this area, for, as the white minority governments have become more repressive, numerous well-organized liberation groups have turned to violence to secure the rights of the majority.

It behooves every American to acquaint himself with the trends and conditions in this vital region. All five of the political divisions in the area are ruled in one form or another by white minority governments. The history of each is a story in itself.

South Africa has followed a policy of segregation for generations, with the restrictions on the black majority becoming more severe in direct proportion to the achievement of independence in other parts of the continent and to the anticipated possibility of political and economic demands from within.

South-West Africa became a trusteeship territory of South Africa under a League of Nations mandate. It is now, for all practical purposes, a colony of South Africa, despite a series of United Nations resolutions terminating the areas mandate status and contemplating establishment of an independent government.

South Africa's contempt for democratic principles is matched by the harsh practices of the breakaway regime in Rhodesia, where British and United Nations sanctions have proven too mild and too easily circumvented to be effective.

*Edward W. Brooke, Republican, Massachusetts, is the first Negro Senator elected by popular vote since Reconstruction. This article is condensed from the speech he delivered on the floor of the Senate after his factfinding trip to Africa in 1968.

In Angola and Mozambique, where half a million whites dominate a black population of more than 12 million, African liberation groups and some 100,000 Portuguese troops have been engaged in armed conflict for several years.

Taken as a whole, there are 36 million nonwhites in these five areas who are ruled by a white minority of four and a half million. They have been suppressed for generations. They have been denied political and economic rights. They have been exploited, segregated, terrorized and killed. Their best leaders, who dared to speak out against the governments, have paid for their ideals with their lives.

There are significant white populations in these five territories, to be sure. For many of these white people, Africa is the only home they have ever known. They do not want to leave, yet they are afraid to stay if majority rule ever becomes a reality. In their fear they ignore the commendable experiences of Zambia and Kenya, and are instead seeking strength in military suppression. It will not work.

The leaders of the African liberation movements increasingly have come to believe that they will achieve their objectives only by violence. When one considers that they are denied the opportunity for peaceful demonstrations, rallies and petitions, that political organization is forbidden, that 99 percent of the population is not even allowed to vote in most of these areas, their desperation is understandable.

With positions hardening on both sides, the conflict seems destined to grow and to involve not only the peoples of southern Africa but also neighboring African states and an increasing number of nations throughout the world.

The other independent nations of Africa have cast their lot with the freedom fighters. At the September (1967) meeting of the Organization for African Unity in Kinshasa, the 38 members of the Organization of African Unity voted to give \$2 million of their \$3.1 million budget to the various liberation groups.

In these circumstances, with a long and bitter struggle looming ahead, the choices for U.S. policy are as difficult as they are urgent. To be sure, we have often expressed our ideological position and our hostility to both colonialism and the antidemocratic systems in southern Africa.

The United States has long made clear its opposition to the apartheid policies of South Africa. Our Government has joined in economic sanctions against Rhodesia. It supported the creation of an ad hoc United Nations committee to study the problem of South-West Africa. It deplored the trial in Pretoria of the South-West African freedom fighters. And the United States has tried to exact guarantees from its NATO ally, Portugal, that military equipment provided by the United States will not be used outside the NATO area.

But, in African eyes, the record of what we have not done speaks much more clearly. We have taken no purposeful action to discourage American private investment in South Africa, which is now in excess of \$600 million and serves as a vital pillar of support for that unpopular regime. In addition, we have placed no restrictions on U.S. trade with South Africa other than a prohibition against the sale of military equipment.

The United States regards Rhodesia as a British colony in rebellion, yet because of the limited nature of our investments and trade, our economic sanctions have had no impact at all; and we have done too little to persuade the British to increase pressure on the rebel governments.

America's allies sell arms and sophisticated military equipment outright to the South African Government, and the U.S. Government has made little effort to persuade them to do otherwise. Portugal receives considerable military assistance from the United States, and the African freedom fighters insist that American weapons are killing their people in Angola and Mozambique.

I believe that the time has come to wrench ourselves from this pattern of implied complicity with the southern African regimes. I do not fancy that maximum American pressure will bring early and easy political change to the area. I realize that firmer action on our part may increase tensions with our European allies. But I believe we must remove from the United States any hint of sympathy for the minority governments of southern Africa.

Conditions in southern Africa confront the United States and other members of the international community with the most difficult issues of international law and morality. No one who respects as I do the rule of law among men and among nations, will lightly transcend the principle that the domestic affairs of sovereign states are not an appropriate subject for international consideration. The United

States and other Western nations have been understandably reluctant to take stringent action against southern Africa precisely because of their respect for this standard.

But the facts are that the abridgment of human liberty in this area is so overwhelming that it is necessarily the concern of all nations. The danger to international peace is so great that it must be dealt with by the larger community of nations. With the exception of South Africa itself, none of the territories involved is itself a sovereign state which can properly invoke the privileged claim that its domestic affairs are immune from international review. What we face in southern Africa is a last, terrible harvest of practices which have won the general condemnation of mankind.

I believe we must make clear to South Africa that, lacking evidence of that Government's willingness to move toward social justice and equality for the African population it controls, the United States will begin to disengage from its burgeoning economic ties to that country.

I believe we must make clear to Portugal that, lacking a credible commitment to self-determination in Angola and Mozambique, the United States must and will begin to reduce its military relations with the Lisbon Government, even at the sacrifice of the military facilities which we have permitted to develop on Portuguese territory.

I believe we must do all in our power to end the intolerable situation in Rhodesia, and that includes an absolute ban on U.S. trade with the territory.

These steps will not suffice for the purposes we seek, but they will represent a beginning. At stake is our moral and political credit with all of Africa. I believe that credit is more precious than any short-term advantages we might protect by maintaining cordial relations with the minority regimes in southern Africa.

If we are to enjoy beneficial relations with Africa as a whole, it is imperative that we be willing to sacrifice the ephemeral advantages of good relations with South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal so long as they persist in oppressing millions of Africans. Only by standing with the just demands of the African majority, only by fidelity to our own principles, will we be able to lay a sturdy foundation for our future relations with the continent at large.

1. SOUTH AFRICA

A NATION TORN ASUNDEB

(By William R. Frye*)

South Africa is a land of bewildering contradiction. Its whites, both Afrikaans- and English-speaking, are among the most enterprising and talented people in the world. They have a frontier spirit, a zeal for economic conquest and a sense of boundless opportunity for the imaginative and talented (provided they are white). There is a kind of early-American flavor to the zest and sweep of South Africa. Rags-to-riches stories among the whites are not uncommon. One of the world's great tragedies is that such admirable qualities should be overhung by a cloud of fear, prejudice and extremism.

Few of these people are intentionally cruel; most are devout, hospitable and even tenderhearted. Yet they do cruel things, and a majority of them vote for a government that enshrines their prejudices and practices into law. (If an Afrikaner wants to break a chap's heart, he makes a law.) Then they turn around and deplore what has happened, finding a rationalization for it: "We must maintain civilized standards," or: "We would be overwhelmed," And they desperately want the world to understand why they have acted as they have.

All the pressures that have produced a worldwide movement from farm to city are present in South Africa: population pressure, poverty on the farms, opportunity at the centers of industrial growth. Such farm to city migration became significant in South Africa in the 1920's and reached extremes during World War II, accompanied by a rash of ugly slums, crime, misery, hazards to health and other familiar blights of slum life. When mass migration continued after the war, the Smuts government sought to regulate the flow of migrants with a system which barred people who would be a burden on the white economy but permitted a convenient influx of cheap labor to industrial areas.

*William R. Frye, award-winning United Nations diplomatic correspondent, provides coverage of the world organization for nearly 100 newspapers in the United States and overseas. "A Nation Torn Asunder" is condensed from his recent book "In Whitest Africa," copyright, 1958, by William R. Frye, published by Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Despite this control, between 33 and 40 percent of the nonwhite population lived in cities in 1967, and best estimates are that it will be 70 percent by 1990. Thus influx control has not stopped African migration from country to city, and the government holds out little hope of its doing so before 1978, if then. Moreover, there is no prospect of relaxation in the incredibly complex and virtually unmanageable system of regulation which influx control has required.

For nonwhites, the heart of the control system was and is what they call the *dom pas* (stupid passbook), now officially known as a "reference book." (All South Africans over 16 years of age are required to carry at least an identification card, but only nonwhites must have the elaborate reference book.) A document of 90-odd pages, resembling in some respects a passport, it contains a miniature life history of the owner. He must have it on his person at all times. Without it, he or she cannot travel, take up residence, obtain employment, or even legally exist.

No fewer than 1,313 persons a day, on the average, were prosecuted for pass-book irregularities and related offenses in the year ending June 30, 1966. The bloody demonstrations at Sharpeville and elsewhere in 1960 arose out of protests against the pass laws.

These laws produce all kinds of hardships. Even getting caught momentarily without the book can bring punishment. "I was arrested near my house while on my way to buy a paper," Cameron B., of Johannesburg related. "My family brought my pass to the police station, and it was in order; but I was not released, and the next day I was fined 8 rand (\$11.20)." This is 6 days' pay for the average urban black person.

Other pass violation cases are handled more quickly—much more quickly. New York Times correspondent Joseph Lelyveld, whom the government later expelled, tells of visiting the Bantu court in September 1965. He saw 71 cases handled before lunch, 57 of them in 80 minutes.

"Why were you in Johannesburg?" the magistrate asks an accused.

"I was looking for my child."

"Where is your child?"

"Lost."

"Ten days," says the magistrate, and bangs his gavel.

Many South Africans would agree that a revolutionary could be born in a cowed. Mrs. Helen Suzman, for example, has repeatedly warned the government that influx control pass laws and other inequities are making revolutionaries out of Africans. Mrs. Suzman is the only Member of Parliament elected from the Progressive Party, which favors voting rights for all men and women who meet certain qualifications, regardless of race. Leaders of the much larger United Party have said somewhat the same thing, though they would ease, not repeal, pass laws. The government dismisses such warnings of possible revolution as lying propaganda and many South Africans consider them politics.

Virtually every aspect of influx control produces its own special inequities and cruelties. Without government permission, children may not live with their parents after they reach the age of 18. They are thus forced into the labor market to become useful. The Johannesburg authorities in 1966 ruled that an African mother residing on her white employer's property may not keep an infant child with her even until she has finished nursing it. Presumably it would reduce her usefulness to the employer.

And the regulations are steadily getting tougher. On January 1, 1965, it became impossible for Africans to win unchallengeable residence rights anywhere in white South Africa. Even though a man had lived and worked in an area for 15 years, or worked for the same employer for 10, or had been born there, he was no longer entitled to remain as a matter of right if the authorities wished to evict him.

This law, embodied in the so-called Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1964, has been widely denounced, both in and out of South Africa. It made every urban African a migrant laborer, a disembodied pair of hands, completely at the mercy of the authorities. Temporary sojourner in a white area, the Government called him.

The Bantu Laws Amendment Act made influx control, in legal theory, absolute. It enabled the Government to isolate potential revolutionaries, idlers, delinquents and criminals. But it also served to create furious grievances. For every revolutionary the government might segregate under this law, four, or perhaps 40, would be created in his place.

The Group Areas Act of 1950 (called by its critics the "Ghetto Act") is a massive zoning ordinance which seeks to rearrange South African society into a pre-determined pattern with all the whites housed in certain areas, all the coloreds in others, all the Asians in still others, and finally all the blacks in what is left.

Gathering all members of a group into its designated area has meant uprooting and resettling hundreds of thousands of people in what surely must have been, and still is, one of the largest involuntary movements of peoples in modern times. For many blacks, the change from slums to Government townships or locations, even with their concentration-camp appearance, has been a dramatic physical improvement. The Government dwellings are simple, but they have small yards, and are equipped well enough that Africans consider it a tragedy when they are endorsed out.

On the other hand, the change from slum to township or location involves certain hardships: loss of familiar surroundings; and increase in rent, which is sometimes severe; the inconvenience and expense of living in an isolated district, many locations being some miles out of town; severe restraints on one's movements (Africans may not be outside the fence after 11 p.m.); and perhaps most galling of all, acquiescence to apartheid.

From the moment an African settles in a government township or location, the ceiling on his advancement becomes clear and visible. Even if he is moderately successful—some are, despite the enormous obstacles—he cannot move up to better housing unless it is available inside the fence. He is kept at the level the Government considers appropriate for people of his color.

Moreover, he is dependent on the sometimes capricious government, not just for his residence, but for everything else of importance he possesses. He may not even marry freely under all circumstances and expect to live a normal life. If a black African is married to a mulatto or an Asian, he and his wife may never be able to make a home together. One or both may be restricted to a location or township for people of that racial group. Nonwhites lack the essential ingredient, freedom, without which life is an empty routine.

A group of some 1,000 African squatters in a shantytown called Holpan, 40 miles north of Kimberley, the diamond center, was ordered to transfer to a nearby location in late 1965. Many had lived in Holpan all their lives and did not want to shift. The rent to be charged for the Government houses (\$5.60 a month) was, for them, very high; it would be one-third of all they could earn at nearby farms and diamond diggings, even in the best months. They refused to go.

One day, about a week before Christmas, Government trucks pulled up abruptly. The Africans were taken, with their possessions, not to the designated location but to the Mamuthla Reserve, 25 miles away. There was nothing there but barren veld—no shelter, no food, no opportunities to earn a living, no schools for the children, nothing. The trucks dumped them and left them to fend for themselves.

For Asians, the move often represents a physical downgrading. It can also be accompanied by severe financial injury, despite Government effort to mitigate it. Property often cannot be disposed of advantageously when its occupants have been ordered to vacate and when the neighborhood has been closed. Some Asians are small entrepreneurs, and for them, enforcement of the Group Areas Act may mean damage to their livelihood as well, since their place of business may also be uprooted. One elderly Indian in Pretoria, a disciple of Mahatma Gandhi, has served three prison terms rather than move from a home he has occupied for 37 years.

The rationale for this policy is that different races, or "nations," as they are now being called, must be compartmentalized "for their own good." While much of the world is striving to become colorblind, South Africa persists in seeing men not only in terms of their color, but of their shades of colors.

No contact which remotely implies equality between races is permitted. They travel, with rare exceptions, in separate trains and buses, eat in separate restaurants, sit on separate park benches, walk through separate doorways and are buried in separate graveyards. There are separate hospitals, separate ambulances, separate telephone booths and separate taxi stands. The main Afrikaner churches are strictly segregated. (Some smaller denominations are integrated, but the authorities can forbid it.)

There are separate clubs, schools and movies. Factories even make workers punch separate time clocks, and comic books deal almost exclusively with characters of a single color. There are separate hours for nonwhites at zoos, art galleries, museums and public gardens. Stiff penalties are meted out for sexual intercourse between white and nonwhite.

"Petty apartheid," as segregation practices of a minor character are called, sometimes gives rise to curiously strained logic. The 150 or so Japanese businessmen in Johannesburg are treated as "honorary whites," a concept that would certainly have startled the authors of the "yellow peril" legend in the 1920's. This special concession can perhaps be explained by the fact that so few people

are involved. A more likely explanation, however, is that Japan now is one of South Africa's most important trading partners, along with Britain, the United States, and West Germany.

Some 6,500 Chinese, on the other hand, are not considered white, though they are accorded special treatment. They could perhaps be described as "white by government permit." Chinese born in South Africa are usually issued permits to live and work in white areas; foreign-born Chinese, still whiter, have additional privileges.

Even among white South Africans, classification is not always an easy task. A white man may have a dark complexion, and a mulatto a light one. According to the Institute of Race Relations, there has been at least one case where a white man was classified nonwhite because he had worked in the sun for a long time and gotten a deep tan. On appeal, he was restored to white status.

One aspect of apartheid unquestionably intensifies hostility between races. It is "job reservation," the law or custom that certain types of jobs must be filled only by members of the race considered "suited" for it. Regardless of a man's qualifications, he may not legally cross the barrier which artificially defines his occupation. A nonwhite may sacrifice and struggle to gain expertise badly needed by the economy (it is formidably difficult for him to get education and training beyond the elementary level, but a few manage it). Then, after getting his degree, he is expressly forbidden by law to seek a job on the open market commensurate with his skill. Except in his own milieu such jobs are, with rare exceptions, for whites only. There are ways to get around some of the requirements and others are not strictly enforced. But for many nonwhites, and especially for the unemployed, the impact of the law is heavy.

Job stratification is intended primarily for the benefit of whites, but it also applies among blacks, coloreds, and Indians. Black Africans resent the fact that Indians and coloreds take from them some of the few opportunities they might otherwise have. In turn, Indians and coloreds look down on black Africans and discriminate against them socially, fearing their potential competition and hence sharing with whites an economic motive for repressing them.

Psychologically too, prejudice is a contagious disease. Feeling repressed by the whites, the Asians and the coloreds seek, perhaps unconsciously, to enhance their own status by shoving the blacks further down the scale.

Fear of job competition from nonwhites ("cheap black labor") is strongest among ill-educated, unskilled, or semiskilled whites—"poor whites" some of them would be called in the American South, although the parallel is not precise—their position on the American socioeconomic ladder being a rung or two higher. Unable or unwilling to compete with nonwhites on even terms, they are given specially protected status. For them, job reservation is a kind of social subsidy—a convenient cushion, but one removes what could otherwise be a useful stimulus to self-improvement.

Job reservation produces some of the most extraordinary irregularities of all. South Africa's boom has brought a major shortage of housing-construction workers.

Yet in many places black plasterers may not legally be hired, no matter how desperate a contractor may be for labor. So unemployment and a labor shortage exist side by side in the same field.

Underlying all this inhumanity to man is baasskap (boss-ship). Baasskap is the doctrine—the utter conviction—of white superiority, with a determination to keep things that way. "We want to make South Africa white," Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd told Parliament in 1963, when euphemisms and circumlocutions were less in style than they are today. "Keeping it white can only mean one thing—namely, white domination—not leadership, not guidance, but control, supremacy."

Apartheid, however, cannot safely be presented to the world in the form of bald white supremacy. The outside world's hostility is an economic disadvantage to South Africa as well as an inconvenience and an embarrassment, and the Government wishes to minimize it. To do so, and to help silence domestic opposition as well, the Government has devised an elaborate structure of theory and logic with which to rationalize its policy. It has even ceased to use the word "apartheid," preferring to call the policy "separate development" of whites and nonwhites in their "respective areas."

The centerpiece of this structure of rationalization is the plan to establish the eight Bantustans, or black-ruled states, three of which have already been set up as of 1968. Here black Africans will theoretically possess the rights of which they have been deprived in white areas: the right to elect their own rulers, to run their own economy, to own property, to choose where they will live and work.

The Bantustans are to comprise roughly the 264 present tribal areas or reserves, plus a little additional land, a total of about 13 percent of the country. Each Bantustan will embrace the "homeland" of a tribe or group of tribes (a "nation"). Africans of that tribal origin who are not presently living in the Bantustan but instead are "temporarily sojourning" in white areas will be allowed to exercise civil and political rights in absentia. Government literature promises that ultimately the Bantustans will take their place within a "Commonwealth of South Africa" in which "the white state and the black states can cooperate together, without being joined in a federation, and therefore without being under a central government, but cooperating as separate and independent states."

On paper this ingenious plan accounts for much. Black Africans living in white areas can be said to be away from their home state. Like aliens in a strange country, they cannot expect to take part in the government of the state of residence. They can reasonably be required to carry passports; they can be deported at will by the local authorities; the terms of their employment can be arbitrarily determined. They can even be forbidden to own land, though few countries treat aliens this severely. Being legally migrant, they are not to be regarded as a regular and permanent part of the community, even if they and their forebears have in fact lived there for generations. Having thus conjured away the majority of the population, the minority becomes a majority, the area becomes white and white men can exercise control, supremacy.

The South African Government has invested a great deal of time and money, domestically and abroad, in promoting understanding of the Bantustan scheme. It is clearly intended to be the capstone of the apartheid edifice, the ultimate realization of "separate development." Known as grand apartheid, by contrast with the "petty apartheid" of separate taxi stands or job reservation, it clothes Government policy in wise and beneficent garb, giving the Government a useful vehicle for both domestic politics and foreign propaganda.

In fact, the Bantustan scheme as outlined on paper and as tested in the Transkei, a coastal area below Durban, falls so far short of the theoretical optimum as to raise serious doubts about the Government's real motives. There are gaping holes both in the theory and in the practice.

Rural Africans in the reserves, numbering perhaps 4 million, will be separate, but they will certainly not be equal. They will face these handicaps:

1. The allocation of land between black and white areas is not equitable. Africans constitute 68 percent of the population of the country; those now in the reserves, roughly 27 percent of it. This many people clearly cannot be accommodated properly on 13 percent of the land (even if that area represents a greater percentage of South Africa's arable land). The black area includes none of the country's rich gold or diamond mines, none of its principal ports, none of the manufacturing centers—in short, little except underdeveloped agriculture and forestry on which to build an economy. And much of the agricultural area is suited primarily for grazing.

2. No adequate effort is being made or proposed to render the African areas viable. Africans, most of whom are at or below subsistence level, have virtually no savings to invest in development projects. White capital, without which there can be no real development on a significant scale, has been authorized only under strictly controlled conditions (on the curious theory that otherwise it would preempt black opportunities).

White men are being permitted and, indeed, encouraged and assisted to build industries outside the borders of the reserves, the workers commuting across the frontier to their jobs. However, fewer than 250 factories, employing only 44,000 black men in all, were built or expanded between 1960, when the program began, and mid-1966. Moreover, these totals are arrived at, in Government reports, by an extraordinarily broad definition of the word "border".

Some factories are included which are located scores of miles from the African reserve which they presumably adjoin. And the program is running out of steam. Except where the Government has made special concessions such as tax rebates and authorization to pay unusually low wages, these industries rarely have been striking financial successes, and the Government is having a hard time persuading investors to establish more of them.

There is serious doubt that the Government will ever genuinely want the Bantu homelands self-supporting. It is convenient to have to export labor—that is, send out workers on limited-term contracts—to white mines and farms, as they have done for decades. Thousands of youths sign up each year for stints ranging from 3 to 10 months, the white recruiters portraying the tour as a "badge of manhood." While away, part of their pay is withheld and sent home to their relatives in the form of "remittances."

Some \$1.4 to \$2.8 million is believed to be transmitted in this manner each year to the Transkei alone, providing a sizable share of the net income of the territory, one without which it could not survive. The young men then return home bringing a few lengths of cloth, some jewelry, a Coleman lamp or stove, and/or some cash.

3. The prospect of self-government for the reserves is largely on paper and may well be a fraud. At best the process of "emancipation" is likely to move at a very slow pace indeed. In the Transkei, the first Bantustan established, African self-rule is largely illusory.

When I was in Transkei's capital, Umtata, in 1964, the hotels were strictly segregated, admitting whites only. The white authorities had just turned down a proposal to build a hotel for blacks. This made Umtata just about the only "national" capital in the world where the prime minister could not hire a hotel room. Since then, about one-third of Umtata has been designated a black area and a small motel connected with a filling station has been purchased for African use.

The Transkei has a unicameral legislature in which the 45 elected representatives are outnumbered by 64 traditional chiefs, whose position is hereditary but who can be dethroned by the South African Government. The election of November 1963 was the first and as of this writing the only territorywide election to be held. The party of the paramount chief of western Pondoland, Victor Poto, a soft-spoken, barrel-shaped man who opposes apartheid, won 33 of the 45 elected seats, but Poto failed to become prime minister. Instead, his rival, Chief Kaiser D. Matanzima, a man more responsive to Pretoria, put together a parliamentary majority, obviously composed primarily of hereditary chiefs. It was taken for granted that Pretoria had twisted arms and greased palms among the chiefs to make sure the right man was elevated.

The policy of Chief Kaiser D. Matanzima is to apply apartheid, or separate development, to the Transkei in reverse; that is, to make the Transkei all black except for Umtata and Port St. Johns, the only harbor. Whites have been, or are being, barred from owning property, voting, taking jobs reserved for blacks, and so on. The principal practical effect of this policy is to number the days of the "white traders," once numbering 600 to 800, who run "trading stations" (general stores) in the countryside. Each of these traders acts as a combination doctor, lawyer, adviser, and great white father for his captive clientele of several thousand blacks. Many of the traders are an important stabilizing influence, but they are being sacrificed to the doctrine of race separation. As of August 1966, 246 stations had been offered for sale.

Chief Victor Poto, one of Matanzima's political rivals, would prefer a multi-racial society. He told me Chief Matanzima keeps his parliamentary majority in line by threatening chiefs with withdrawal of their benefits. Poto said he favors establishment of more Bantustans, but only if they are made multiracial, that is opened to whites. In such multiracial societies he would not want unqualified majority rule, one man, one vote. He would set up qualifications for the franchise, including especially literacy. But African voters would inevitably be in the majority.

I also talked with some of the white "advisers" designated by Pretoria to sit at the right hands of the cabinet ministers. Matanzima's alter ego was J. T. II. Mills, a tough and supremely self-confident man with an extensive, detailed knowledge of the Transkei.

He seemed very much in charge. He controlled the prime minister's appointments, apparently without the balderdash of consulting the prime minister. He said with a straight face that there was no way to judge Chief Matanzima's independence: Since the chief has not clashed with Pretoria, there had never been a difference of policy. (When Verwoerd was assassinated, Matanzima called him South Africa's "greatest statesman of all time.")

Pretoria offers a variety of rejoinders. It claims that outsiders do not understand the unique character of South Africa's problems. It says the Government knows what is good for the primitive "natives" better than they do. It claims that white men pioneered the country, as Americans conquered and displaced the Indians, if anything, less inhumanely; that they developed the land by their own sweat and ingenuity, as did Americans, and are, therefore, entitled to regard it as their country.

South Africans maintain that outside interference is illegal, immoral, and counterproductive. Finally, they say the outside world will one day awaken to the fact that racial integration leads to conflict, not harmony, as shown in Watts, Detroit and Chicago. A variant of this argument, not used so frequently of late, is that South Africa is really not so very different from the American South.

There is some truth to the contention that outsiders do not fully understand South Africa's problems, but not much substance to the rest of this case. The paternalism of the argument that "Papa knows best" what is good for the "natives" is often a cloak for the determination to remain "Papa."

White South Africans did indeed contribute ingenuity, hard work and enterprise to the development of their splendid country. Nonwhites contributed much of the physical labor. There is no apparent reason why both should not reap the harvest, sharing its benefits in proportion to ability and contribution, as in any freely competitive, shared society. It is the determination of the white man to retain a disproportionate share of benefits by the exercise of naked power that offends the outside world. It is the belief of the whites that they must have all or will be left with nothing that is at the root of the trouble.

Outside "interference" to help awaken the whites in South Africa to this mistake is certainly neither illegal nor immoral, and if carefully honed, need not be counterproductive. Nor is it true that too much integration has produced racial discord in the United States. During the Newark riots in July 1967, *Die Vaderland*, a pro-government newspaper, recommended that the United States try apartheid as a remedy for its social ills. "America's obsession with integration only causes chaos, strife, and destruction," it commented. The truth, as most thoughtful Americans know, is that chaos, strife, and destruction have sprung from too little, not too much integration. Despite progress in recent years, Negro ghettos still afford too little opportunity for adequate education, too few job openings, too much slum misery. It would scarcely be a satisfactory answer to round up troublemakers, unemployed and drifters and ship them to a partially Negro governed state in, say, West Virginia.

Nor is South Africa the American South with an Afrikaans accent. There are important differences of kind, as well as degree, between discrimination in the two areas. Even before Congress passed the civil rights bill of 1964 and the voting rights bill of 1965, the comparison was invalid. It is not just that the Government of the United States is fighting against, not for, white supremacy; even the policies of the most conservative Southern States are not comparable to apartheid.

George Wallace could never forcibly separate a Negro from his wife and children by Government decree, deport him from the city to the countryside, or pass a law requiring his employer to fire him and hire a white replacement. Hard as it is for Negroes to get good jobs in the South—and the North—they are not forbidden by law to take them, if employer (and union) are prepared to give them an opportunity. Negroes have had trouble getting registered to vote in the deep South; people have been murdered for attempting it. But they are legally entitled to the franchise, and more are getting on the rolls each year.

It is because white South Africa has embodied racial discrimination in law and enshrined it as eternal verity, even claiming scriptural authority for it, that it has set itself apart, not merely from the American South, but from the overwhelming majority of mankind.

SHARPEVILLE MASSACRE

March 21, 1960, was the day set aside by the African people to protest the pass laws that stringently control the movement of black people within South Africa. The pass is a document of 96 pages containing personal statistics and history which must be carried at all times by each "native male or female above the age of 16." It must be produced on demand for inspection by the police at any hour and in any place.

The pass laws have been used as a means of harassment by South African authorities. Incessant pass raids have become a permanent feature of the state. Brutality is a normal occurrence in raids in which police invade homes, separate families and terrorize whole communities.

The increase of pass raids and other indignities brought on the call, initiated by African political leaders, for a mass peaceful protest on March 21. Over 20,000 protesters gathered at Sharpeville and Langa, Capetown. Despite strong feelings of indignation, they were assembled in a spirit of complete nonviolence. Mangaliso Robert Sobukwe, one of the protest leaders, said, "We are willing to die for our freedom; we are not yet ready to kill for it."

The demonstrators at Sharpeville told police they had left their passes at home and that they would no longer carry them. The plan was to overflow all the jails and engulf the whole country. The police, however, reacted to such numbers with panic. Without warning, squads appeared from inside the police station, armed with rifles and automatic weapons, and opened fire on the crowd.

The front ranks of demonstrators were cut down in a slaughter that killed 69 people immediately and injured 257, most of them seriously. The Rand Daily Mail, South Africa's leading English-language newspaper, reported: ". . . volley after volley of 303 bullets and sten-gun bursts tore into the crowd . . . as scores of people fell before the hail of bullets. Bodies lay in grotesque positions on the pavement. Then came ambulances, 11 of them. Two truckloads of bodies were taken to the mortuary."

The South African Government unleashed a wave of terror following the massacre. In a single sweep, 21,000 activists and opponents of apartheid were arrested on contrived charges and detained without trial. Hundreds fled ahead of the net across every border northward. A generation of exiles came into being which now numbers well over a thousand and grows daily.

The people of South Africa and South-West Africa wait silently for a deliverance that an indifferent world does not bring. Every day of silence brings violence closer.

A CASE FOR DISENGAGEMENT

(By Arthur J. Goldberg*)

In light of South Africa's unyielding and intensified policy of apartheid, the U.S. Government immediately should disentangle itself from remaining economic, military, and scientific ties with that country.

We have long recognized that South African race policies offend human dignity today and might threaten peace tomorrow. We have long sought through diplomatic channels to induce changes in South African racial policies. Unfortunately our efforts have had little impact of consequence.

The South African Government has ignored U.S. representations while continuing to build its repugnant system of total racial segregation—apartheid. It has increased its suppression of democratic liberties for its people, blacks and whites alike.

Now, even at some cost to ourselves, our Government should take steps which would visibly disengage us from South Africa.

By so doing we will protect our moral and political position in the world. We will also lend practical support to those who are working toward the reconciliation and equality of the races in South Africa. And we will strengthen the defense of American interests in the rest of Africa and the nonwhite world, including the high level there of U.S. investments and trade.

Among these fast-growing large-magnitude economic American interests are oil in Libya and Nigeria, copper in Zambia, rubber and iron ore in Liberia and bauxite in Ghana. We often overlook the fact that the value of these interests in Africa north of Rhodesia now substantially exceeds our economic interests in southern Africa. And we tend also to overlook the political value of fostering the good will of more than 30 black African governments representing 150 million people. This should not be.

I propose the following governmental steps:

ARMS EMBARGO

Stricter enforcement of the South Africa arms embargo, including a ban on sales of American "dual-purpose" items such as trucks and executive type planes that can be used by their military. We should also use our influence to halt such sales by Japan, France, and other countries.

MISSILE AND SPACE PROGRAM

We should close our missile and space tracking stations and shift to facilities elsewhere as soon as possible.

NUCLEAR AGREEMENT

We should carefully examine whether continuance of the United States-South Africa nuclear cooperation agreement is in our overall interest.

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